Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
E.
In [the] said judgment, the Family Home of the plaintiffs comprised as
Lot 21 and the plaintiffs residence thereat be declared free from any
encumbrances, foreclosure sale, Certificate of Sale, Definite Deed of Sale,
attachment and the null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. 224439
aforementioned and any other document that may later on be shown as
affecting the same Family Home.[3]
mortgage.
For its part, the CA noted that:
After expiration of the redemption period without redemption being made,
the writ must issue in order to place the buyer in possession of the
foreclosed property (Veloso, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra).
The right to such possession is absolute; it may be obtained thru a writ which
may be applied for ex-parte pursuant to Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended
(Navarra vs. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 850).
The subject property was not redeemed within the one-year period. Being
the successful bidder in the foreclosure sale, appellee had consolidated
ownership over the property, for which TCT No. 224439 was issued to him. In
IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance Corp. vs. Nera (19 SCRA 181), the
Supreme Court stated that if under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, the court has
the power, on the ex-parte application of the purchaser, to issue a writ of
possession during the period of redemption, there is no reason why it should
not also have the same power after the expiration of that period, especially
where, as in this case, a new title has already been issued in the name of the
purchaser.[5]
(2001).
[7] Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 752 (2001); Banco Filipino
FELICIANO, J.:
The subject of the present Petition for Review is the Decision
dated 3 April 1986 of the then intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. CV 05774 (entitled
"Rosita Zafra Bantillo, for herself and in representation of the Heirs of Spouses Candida
Zafra. and Maria Pimentel Zafra, plaintiff-appellants, versus Elsa Maniquis-Sumcad,
defendant-appellee'). The appellate court affirmed a 2 August 1983 Order of Branch 2 of the
then Court of First Instance of North Cotabato, ordering (a) the dismissal of the Complaint in
Civil Case No. 161; and (b) the striking out of the Amended Complaint filed in the same case.
(docketed as Civil Case No. 161), dated 19 April 1982, filed by petitioner Rosita Zafra Bantillo
against respondent Elsa Maniquis-Sumcad with the Court of First Instance of North Cotabato.
The action involved a 240 square meter parcel of land (Lot No. 63, BSD-11551) situated in
the poblacion of Midsayap, North Cotabato. In the Complaint, it was alleged that petitioner
Bantillo (plaintiff below) "is the surviving heir" of the deceased spouses, Candido Zafra and
Maria Pimental Zafra; that the Zafra spouses had occupied and possessed Lot No. 63 "under
claim of ownership since 1950;" that petitioner, as surviving heir and in representation of the
heirs of [the Zafra] spouses," had been in open and continuous possession and occupation of
Lot No. 63 ever since the death of the spouses; that by virtue of Original Certificate of Title
No. P35267 issued in the name of respondent Sumcad, respondent had claimed ownership of
the disputed land and had sought petitioner's removal therefrom; and that respondent had
rejected demands to reconvey the land to petitioner.
the
Amended Complaint should not have been dismissed and ordered stricken from the record.
In the first place, the amendment of the original complaint consisted simply of deletion of
any reference to "other heirs" of the Zafra spouses as co-plaintiffs in the action for
reconveyance; petitioner, in other words, clarified that she alone was plaintiff and heir and
therefore was no longer suing also in a representative capacity. This amendment, in the
second place, imposed no substantial prejudice upon respondent Sumcad and was thus
formal in character. 10 As a matter of fact, Sumcad had not yet filed any responsive pleading
at all and had not disclosed the nature and basis of her own claim of ownership of Lot No.
63. The issues had not yet been joined. Thirdly, the Amended Complaint was already before
the trial court and it could have and should have proceeded with the case.
SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE
G.R.
No.
PHILIPPINES,
148154
represented
by
the
Presidential
Commission
on Present:
Good Government
(PCGG),
QUISUMBING,
J.,
Petitioner,
Chairperson,
CARPIO
MORALES,
- versus TINGA,
VELASCO, JR.,
SANDIGANBAYAN
and
(Second Division)
REYES,* JJ.
and FERDINAND R.
MARCOS, JR. (as
executor of the
Promulgated:
estate
of
FERDINAND
E.
December 17,
MARCOS),
2007
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --------------------x
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
The propriety of filing and granting of a
motion for a bill of particulars filed for the estate
of a defaulting and deceased defendant is the
main issue in this saga of the protracted legal
battle between the Philippine government and
the Marcoses on alleged ill-gotten wealth.
This special civil action for certiorari[1]
assails two resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
(anti-graft court or court) issued during the
preliminary legal skirmishes in this 20-year case:
[2] (1) the January 31, 2000 Resolution[3] which
granted the motion for a bill of particulars filed by
executor Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. (respondent) on
behalf of his fathers estate and (2) the March 27,
2001
Resolution[4]
which
denied
the
governments motion for reconsideration.
From the records, the antecedent and
pertinent facts in this case are as follows:
The administration of then President
and abroad.
Specifically, Cruz allegedly
purchased, in connivance with the Marcoses,
assets whose values are disproportionate to
their legal income, to wit: two residential lots
and two condominiums in Baguio City; a
residential building in Makati; a parcel of land
and six condominium units in California, USA;
and a residential land in Metro Manila. The
PCGG also prayed for the payment of moral
damages of P50 billion and exemplary damages
of P1 billion.
On September 18, 1987, Cruz filed an
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, strike out
averments in the complaint, and for a bill of
particulars.[6]
On April 18, 1988, the court ordered that
alias summonses be served on the Marcoses
who were then in exile in Hawaii.[7] The court
likewise admitted the PCGGs Expanded
Complaint[8] dated April 25, 1988, then denied
Cruzs omnibus motion on July 28, 1988 after
finding that the expanded complaint sufficiently
states causes of action and that the matters
circumstances.[34]
In this case, former President Marcos was
declared in default for failure to file an answer.
He died in Hawaii as an exile while this case was
pending, since he and his family fled to Hawaii
in February 1986 during a people-power revolt in
Metro Manila. His representatives failed to file a
motion to lift the order of default. Nevertheless,
respondent, as executor of his fathers estate,
filed a motion for leave to file a responsive
pleading, three motions for extensions to file an
answer, and a motion for bill of particulars all of
which were granted by the anti-graft court.
Given the existence of the default order
then, what is the legal effect of the granting of
the motions to file a responsive pleading and bill
of particulars? In our view, the effect is that the
default order against the former president is
deemed lifted.
Considering that a motion for extension of
time to plead is not a litigated motion but an ex
parte one, the granting of which is a matter
addressed to the sound discretion of the court;
Manager
of
the
Government
Service
Insurance System (GSIS), as President and
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Philippine Airlines (PAL), and as Executive
Officer of the Commercial Bank of Manila, by
himself and/or in unlawful concert with
defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda
R. Marcos, among others:
(a)
purchased through Arconal N.V., a
Netherland-Antilles Corporation, a lot and
building located at 212 Stockton St., San
Francisco, California, for an amount much
more than the value of the property at the
time of the sale to the gross and manifest
disadvantageous (sic) to plaintiff.
GSIS
funds
in
the
amount
of
$10,653,350.00 were used for the purchase
when under the right of first refusal by PAL
contained in the lease agreement with Kevin
Hsu and his wife, the owners of the building,
a much lower amount should have been paid.
For the purchase of the building,
defendant Cruz allowed the intervention of
Sylvia Lichauco as broker despite the fact that
the services of such broker were not
necessary and even contrary to existing
policies of PAL to deal directly with the seller.
The broker was paid the amount of
$300,000.00 resulting to the prejudice of GSIS
and PAL.
(b) Converted and appropriated to . . .
own use and benefit funds of the Commercial
Bank of Manila, of which he was Executive
Officer at the time.
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[40]
[41]
[42]
Rollo, p. 89.
Id. at 65-69.
Virata v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 86926 & 86949, October
15, 1991, 202 SCRA 680; Justice Hugo Gutierrez, Jr. dissented,
saying the motion to dismiss should have been granted because
the complaint consisted of mere inferences and general
conclusions, with no statement of ultimate facts to support the
sweeping and polemical charges, which cannot substitute for a
cause of action.
[43]
Id. at 694-695.
[44]
G.R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 428.
[45]
G.R. No. 106527, April 6, 1993, 221 SCRA 52.
[46]
Id. at 62.
[47]
G.R. No. 115748, August 7, 1996, 260 SCRA 411.
[48]
Id. at 419.
[49]
Go Occo & Co. v. De la Costa and Reyes, 63 Phil. 445, 449
(1936).
[50]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 17, at 538.
[51]
Santos v. Liwag, No. L-24238, November 28, 1980, 101 SCRA
327, 329.
[52]
Virata v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 114331, May 27, 1997, 272
SCRA 661, 688.
THIRD DIVISION
SONIA
MACEDA
ALIAS
SONIALITA
MACEDA
AND
GEMMA MACEDAMACATANGAY,
Petitioners,
- versus ENCARNACION DE
GUZMAN VDA. DE
MACATANGAY,
Present:
QUISUMBING
J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
and
TINGA, JJ.
Promulgated:
January 31, 2006
Respondent.
x ----------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner Sonia Maceda (Sonia) and
Bonifacio Macatangay (Macatangay) contracted
marriage on July 26, 1964.[1] The union bore
one
child,
petitionerGemma
(Gemma), on March 27, 1965.[2]
Macatangay
her
position
paper,
respondent
contended as follows:
[I]n the present case, the agreement of
the spouses to live separately four (4) months
after their marriage and which agreement
was
finally
made
in
writing
before
theBarangay will unquestionably show that
Sonia or Sonialita Maceda was not
dependent upon the late member for
support and therefore cannot be considered
as his primary beneficiary under the aforesaid
law. Said agreement, though proscribed by
law by reasons of public policy, was a mutual
agreement short of a court decree for legal
separation and will not in any way change the
fact that the two lived separately. This under
any
circumstances
will
dispute
the
presumption of the dependency for support
arising from the legitimacy of the marital
union as reasoned out by the SSS in their
Petition for Intervention.[13] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
beneficiary, thus:
(e) Dependents The
dependents shall be the following:
(1)
The
legal
spouse
entitled by law to receive support
from the member;
(2)
The
legitimate,
legitimated or legally adopted,
and illegitimate child who is
unmarried,
not
gainfully
employed and has not reached
twenty-one years (21) of age, or if
over twenty-one (21) years of
age, he is congenitally or while
still
a
minor
has
been
permanently incapacitated and
incapable
of
self-support,
physically or mentally, and
(3) The parent who is
receiving regular support from the
member.
(k) Beneficiaries The
dependent spouse until he or she
remarries,
the
dependent
legitimate, legitimated or legally
adopted, and illegitimate children,
who
shall
be
the
primary
beneficiaries of the member;
Provided, That the dependent
ORDERED.[19]
(Underscoring
Court
of
Appeals,
finding
no
CONCHITA
CARPIO
MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chaiperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
ARTEMIO
V.
PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
Rollo, p. 4.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 55.
Supra note 2. The records of the case do not contain a copy of
the advice of denial.
[5]
SSC records, pp. 18-20.
[6]
Id. at 21-23.
[7]
Id. at 30, 129, 147. Vide note 2.
[8]
Id. at 1-31.
[9]
Id. at 2. See also pp. 13 and 14 (copies of SSS Forms E-4 and
E-1 containing the designation of beneficiaries).
[10]
Id. at 4.
[11]
Ibid.
[12]
Id. at 37-40.
[13]
Id. at 97 (citations omitted).
[14]
Id. at 135-136.
[15]
Id. at 39 (citation omitted).
[16]
Id. at 145. See also supra note 3.
[17]
Id. at 145-146.
[18]
Id. at 143-148.
[19]
Id. at 147.
[20]
Id. at 151-155.
[21]
Id. at 169-172.
[22]
CA rollo, pp. 2-16.
[23]
Penned by Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, with the concurrence
of Justices Portia Alio-Hormachuelos and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.; id.
at 75-76.
[24]
Ibid.
[25]
CA rollo at 79-84 [sic].
[26]
Id. at 85-119 [sic].
[27]
Id. at 110 [sic].
[28]
Id. at 111 [sic].
[29]
Id. at 115-117 [sic].
[30]
Rollo, pp. 3-16.
[31]
Id. at 8 and 10.
[32]
Id. at 8.
[33]
Id. at 10-12, citing Fulgencio, et. al. v. NLRC, et. al., G.R. No.
141600, September 12, 2003, 411 SCRA 69 and Tan v. Court of
Appeals, et. al., 356 Phil. 1058 (1998).
[34]
G.R. No. 144533, September 23, 2003, 411 SCRA 538.
[35]
355 Phil. 404 (1998).
[36]
Id. at 413-414.
[37]
430 Phil. 128 (2002).
[38]
Id. at 138.
[39]
Supra note 32.
[40]
The Municipality of Lopez, Quezon: In a Nutshell (from The
Official Website of MUNICIPALITY OF LOPEZ), 13 October 2005,
<http://www.lopezquezon.gov.ph/index.php?id1=11> (visited 20
January 2006).
[41]
Supra note 37 and note 38.
[42]
Supra note 33.
[43]
Vide Albano v. Gapusan (162 Phil. 884 [1976]). In this case,
Judge Patrocinio Gapusan was censured for notarizing a document
for personal separation of the spouses Valentina Andrews and
Guillermo Maligta and for extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal
partnership. We held:
There is no question that the covenants
contained in the said separation agreement
are contrary to law, morals, and good
customs. Those stipulations undermine the
institutions of marriage and the family.
Marriage is not a mere contract but an
inviolable social institution. The family is a
basic social institution which public policy
cherishes and protects. Marriage and the
THIRD DIVISION
ANDY
QUELNAN,
G.R.
No.
138500
P
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
e
r
,
versu
s-
Present:
PANGANIBAN
, J., Chairman
SANDOVALGUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO
MORALES,
and
GARCIA,
JJ.
Promulgated:
September
16, 2005
VHF
PHILIPPINE
S,
R
e
s
p
o
n
d
e
n
t
.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Under consideration is this petition for
review on certiorari to nullify and set aside the
decision[1] dated September 17, 1997 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. SP-41942,
and its resolution[2] dated April 27, 1999,
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The factual backdrop:
In an ejectment suit (Civil Case No. 139649-
In
time,
petitioner
moved for a
reconsideration but his motion was denied by
the appellate court in its resolution of April 27,
1999.[8]
With this turn of events, petitioner is now
the one with us via the present recourse urging
us to nullify and set aside the assailed decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals on the
following grounds:
A.
xxx
xxx
Nonetheless,
the
RTC
granted
Quelnans relief from judgment without
sufficient basis. What it considered as
perhaps excusable negligence is the act of
Quelnans
wife
in
tearing
the
summons/complaint because of marital
disharmony. This is extending a plethora of
leniency of the rules to the point of defeating
justice to the other party. xxx.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Associate Justice
Chairman
ANGELINA
SANDOVALGUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
RENATO C.
CORONA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairman's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
pp.
pp.
pp.
pp.
132-133.
65-76.
124-129.
97-98.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 32-41.
[8]
Rollo, p. 211.
[9]
Rollo, p. 21.
[10]
Formerly Section 8, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court.
[11]
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
[12]
First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Co., Inc. vs.
Hernando, 199 SCRA 796 [1991].
[13]
Turqueza vs. Hernando, 97 SCRA 488 [1980].
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[1987].
[22]
[1987].
SECOND DIVISION
MARCELINO DOMINGO,
G.R. No. 169122
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus CORONA,*
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS,
AGAPITA DOMINGO,
ANA DOMINGO, HEIRS OF
GAUDENCIO DOMINGO, namely:
DOROTEO DOMINGO,
JULITA DOMINGO,
AMANDO DOMINGO, and
ARCEL DOMINGO; HEIRS OF
JULIAN DOMINGO, namely:
JULIAN DOMINGO, JR. and
PONCIANO DOMINGO; HEIRS
OF EDILBERTA DOMINGO, namely:
ANITA DOMINGO and
ROSIE DOMINGO; HEIR OF
FELIPE DOMINGO, namely:
LORNA DOMINGO; and HEIRS OF
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
This is a petition[1] for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petition
challenges the 5 April[2] and 10 June[3] 2005
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 89023. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition[4] for certiorari, with prayer for issuance
of a temporary restraining order, filed by
Marcelino Domingo (Marcelino) for failure to
land.
The evidence of the plaintiffs also
showed that defendant Marcelino Domingo
had actually fenced the subject property.
This Court, notwithstanding its already
final order of May 26, 2004, finding and
declaring defendant Marcelino Domingo in
contempt of court as well as the order of June
23, 2004 wherein it warned of the automatic
re-issuance of a warrant of arrest against him
and any other acting in his behalf in the event
of reentry and retaking possession of the
subject property, set the present motion for
hearing on December 15, 2004 to afford
defendant Marcelino Domingo the opportunity
to explain his side even only for the purpose
of mitigating the legal consequences of his
very stubborn arrogance that amounted to
open defiance of the power of contempt of
this Court.
Unfortunately, not only did defendant
Marcelino Domingo refuse to receive the
notice of the hearing set on December 15,
2004, but he actually disregarded it by failing
to appear on said date.
Again, to give the defendant another
chance, the hearing set on December 15,
2004 was reset to December 20, 2004, as
requested by defendants counsel Atty.
Restituto M. David x x x but again, none of
2.
Marcelino
reconsideration of
Order.
filed
a
motion
for
the 23 December 2004
Marcelino
being
beneficiaries.
only
one
of
such
What
accentuates
defendant
Marcelino contemnary [sic] act of reentering
and retaking possession of the subject land
was the fact that he did so without even
waiting for the finality of the order relied upon
by him. As it has turned out the DAR Region
III had reversed its order of October 4, 2004
in another order, dated February 17, 2005,
copy of which was presented by the plaintiff
to this Court by way of manifestation filed on
February 23, 2005, SETTING ASIDE the
Order, dated October 4, 2004, and a new one
is hereby issued DENYING the petition for
coverage filed by Marcelino Domingo for utter
lack of merit.
It is now very clear to this Court that
defendant Marcelinos re-entry and retaking
possession and cultivation of the subject land
was sheer display of stubborn arrogance and
an open, deliberate and contemptuous
defiance of its order and processes.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the Motion for Reconsideration of defendant
Marcelino Domingo is hereby denied and
further ordering that:
1.
hereby maintained;
2.
Defendant Marcelino Domingo is
again found and declared in
contempt of Court and penalized
with imprisonment of Twenty (20)
days;
3.
Defendant Marcelino Domingos
further detention at the Nueva Ecija
Provincial Jail until he shall have
effectively
surrendered
and
redelivered
possession
of
the
subject land to plaintiffs;
4.
Ordering the forfeiture in favor of
the plaintiffs of all the movable
improvements put or introduced on
the subject property by defendant
Marcelino Domingo[;]
5.
6.
Marcelino
filed
a
motion[18]
for
reconsideration of the 5 April 2005 Resolution.
In its 10 June 2005 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion. The Court of
Appeals held that Marcelinos failure to file a
written explanation to justify service by mail in
lieu of the preferred mode of personal service is
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
MARIANO C.
DEL CASTILLO
Associate
Justice
Associate Justice
JOSE
P.
PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons
Resolution
had
been
reached
in
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Designated additional member per Special Order No. 812.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 3-30.
[2]
Id. at 57-59. Penned by Associate Justice Renato C.
Dacudao, with Associate Justices Edgardo F.
Sundiam and Japar
B. Dimaampao concurring.
[3]
Id. at 64-65.
[4]
Id. at 44-55.
[5]
Id. at 72-76. Penned by Judge Senen R. Saguyod.
[6]
Id. at 77-82.
[7]
Id. at 140-147.
[8]
Id. at 144-145.
[9]
Id. at 149-150. Penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral
Mendoza, with Associate Justices Eugenio
S. Labitoria and Jose
L. Sabio, Jr. concurring.
[10]
Id. at 83-85.
[11]
Id. at 36-38. Penned by Judge Santiago M. Arenas.
[12]
Id. at 37-38.
[13]
Id. at 86-88.
[14]
Id. at 87.
[15]
Id. at 39-43.
[16]
Id. at 41-43.
[17]
Id. at 57-59.
[18]
Id. at 60-63.
[19]
Id. at 64.
[20]
Id. at 66-69.
[21]
Id. at 70.
[22]
Id. at 18.
*
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
SECOND DIVISION
SPS. DOMINGO M. BELEN and
175334
DOMINGA P. BELEN, herein
represented by their attorney-
G.R. No.
Present:
in-fact NERY B. AVECILLA,
Petitioners,
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO-MORALES,
TINGA,
- versus NAZARIO, and
VELASCO,
JR., JJ.
HON. PABLO R. CHAVEZ, Presiding
Promulgated:
Judge, RTC-Branch 87, Rosario,
Batangas and all other persons acting
March 26, 2008
under his orders and SPS. SILVESTRE
N. PACLEB and PATRICIA A. PACLEB,
represented herein by their attorney-infact JOSELITO RIOVEROS,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure
assailing
the
Decision[1]
and
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 88731. The appellate courts decision
dismissed the petition for certiorari which
sought to nullify the orders of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Rosario, Batangas, Branch 87,
denying herein petitioners motion to quash writ
of
execution
and
their
motion
for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals resolution
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of
the decision.
The instant petition originated from the
action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment
against herein petitioners, spouses Domingo and
Dominga Belen, filed by private respondent
spouses
Silvestre
and
Patricia
Pacleb,
pleadings,
motions,
notices,
orders,
judgments and other papers shall be made
either personally or by mail.
SEC. 9. Service of judgments, final
orders or resolutions. Judgments, final
orders or resolutions shall be served either
personally or by registered mail. When a
party summoned by publication has failed to
appear in the action, judgments, final orders
or resolutions against him shall be served
upon him also by publication at the expense
of the prevailing party.
SEC. 6. Personal service. Service of
the papers may be made by delivering
personally a copy to the party or his counsel,
or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or
with a person having charge thereof. If no
person is found in his office, or his office is
not known, or he has no office, then by
leaving the copy, between the hours of eight
in the morning and six in the evening, at the
partys or counsels residence, if known, with
a person of sufficient age and discretion then
residing therein.
SEC. 7. Service by mail. Service by
registered mail shall be made by depositing
the copy in the post office, in a sealed
envelope, plainly addressed to the party or
his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise
at his residence, if known, with postage fully
pre-paid, and with instructions to the
DANTE
TINGA
O.
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V.
A.
QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief
Justice
SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No.
175891
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
PERALTA,
- versus -
ABAD,
PEREZ,* and
MENDOZA, JJ.
RESINS,
INCORPORAT
ED,
Promulgated:
January 12,
2010
Respondent.
x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
G.R. No. 175891 is a petition for review1 assailing
the Decision2 promulgated on 25 May 2006 by the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78516. The
appellate court denied the petition filed by the
Republic of the Philippines (Republic) through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). The appellate
court found no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental,
SO ORDERED.8
SO ORDERED.10
ORIGINAL WORDINGS:
SO ORDERED.
The Issues
Cagayan de Oro.
TAUMATURGO U. MACABINLAR
Clerk of Court V32
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
14 Id. at 144-149.
15 Id. at 137-138.
16 Id. at 150.
17 Id. at 151.
18 Id. at 152.
19 Id. at 157-158.
20 Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
21 Rollo, pp. 82-99.
22 Id. at 36-37.
23 Now Section 7, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
24 Now Section 9, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
25 Now Section 10, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
26 Now Section 13, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
27 Government of the Philippines v. Aballe, G.R. No. 147212, 24 March
2006, 485 SCRA 308, 317.
28 Petition for Habeas Corpus of Benjamin Vergara v. Judge Gedorio,
Jr., 450 Phil. 623, 634 (2003). See also note 26.
29 Ting v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 481, 493 (2000) citing Central
Trust Co. v. City of Des Moines, 218 NW 580 (1928).
30 Supra note 27, at 318. Emphasis in the original.
31 Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 436 Phil. 641, 652 (2002).
32 Rollo, p. 151.
G.R. NO.
PUNO, Chairman,*
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
- versus TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* * JJ.
HON. ABRAHAM Y. PRINCIPE,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan,
CAGAYAN PROVINCIAL SHERIFF
or his deputies, and NELSON
Promulgated:
RECOLIZADO,
Respondents.
November 11,
2005
x----------------------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
claiming
respondent
Judge
that
the
of
denial
its
of
motion
the
for
abuse
of
It
likewise
court
denied
found
no
such
petitioners
motion
for
reconsideration.[7]
Hence, the present petition for review on
no
longer
its
lawyer;
petitioner
was
especially
since
it
was
only
on
execution
issued
is
valid
and
proper
It should be
is
replete
with
the
client,
nullification
of
the
decision
was
far
from
protecting
the
interest
being
of
his
vigilant
client,
in
his
exercised
only
in
the
manner
and
in
of
the
case.[23]
It
is
also
its
was
promulgated.[26]
Insofar
as
copy
of
the
decision
and
no
The
rule
is
that
when
party
is
The differences in
said
petitioners
that
he
because
did
the
not
case
inform
the
escaped
his
have
prevented
commit
any
error
or
grave
abuse
of
the
petition
is
hereby
(On Leave)
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Acting Chief Justice
*
**
[1]
\
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
Marriage before the RTC, Branch 70, Pasig City, entitled "Delia
Soledad Domingo, etc. v. Roberto Domingo" and docketed as JDRC
Case No. 1989-J (JDRC case). 7In this case, Avera asserted
exclusive ownership over the property in dispute. 8 On January 23,
1992, a notice of lis pendens was inscribed on TCT No. 34351,
pertaining to the JDRC case pending at the time. 9
Since 1997, petitioners possessed the property in dispute. 10 On
July 22, 1998, TCT No. 34351 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof,
the Registry of Deeds issued petitioners TCT No. 14216 for the
property in dispute, on the basis of the deed of sale executed on
October 1, 1987.11 The notice of lis pendens was carried over to
TCT No. 14216.12
On November 28, 1994, the RTC, Branch 70, Pasig City, rendered
a Decision in the JDRC case, declaring the marriage of Avera and
Domingo void and ordering the property acquired during their
cohabitation to be put in the custody of Avera, including the
property in dispute.13 After the decision in the JDRC case became
final and executory, the RTC, Branch 70, Pasig City, issued a Writ
of Execution.14 On June 13, 2001, the same trial court issued an
Alias Writ of Execution, which reads:
Movant declared in her motion that the said property is now
registered in the name of another person, namely, Protacio
Vicente, under TCT No. 14216 of the Register of Deeds of
Mandaluyong City. It appearing, however, that the transfer was
made notwithstanding the annotation thereon of the notice of lis
pendens that the same property is the subject of the instant case,
it can still be the subject of a writ of execution to satisfy the
judgment in favor of herein petitioner.
WHEREFORE, let an alias writ of execution be issued over Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 34351, now covered by TCT No. 14216 of
the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City.
1avvphil.zw+
SO ORDERED.15
Pursuant to the Alias Writ of Execution, respondent Ronberto
Valino, in his capacity as Sheriff IV of the RTC, Branch 70, Pasig
injunction despite the fact that the Petitioners are the registered
owners of the property and as such cannot be evicted out
therefrom unless:
A. the sale from which they based their acquisition is declared
void.
B. the title issued in their names based on the Deed of Sale is
likewise declared void.
II
The CA erred in dismissing the complaint because in so doing, it
made an implied recognition that a real property titled under the
torrens system may be attacked collaterally in contravention of
law and established jurisprudence[.]
III
The CA erred in concluding that the Petitioners are bound by the
lis pendens it being clear that the property was acquired long
before the lis pendens was annotated. Petitioners (sic) became
owners of the property on October 1, 1987 and not on July 20,
1998 when their ownership was merely confirmed by the title
issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds.
Petitioners maintain that as the registered owners and actual
possessors of the property in dispute, they are entitled to a writ of
injunction that will prevent the implementation of the writ of
execution corresponding to the JDRC case.
Respondents assert that petitioners are not entitled to the writ of
injunction, because the petitioners are subject to the outcome of
the JDRC case and thus the implementation of the writ of
execution due to the notice of lis pendensannotated on their TCT.
They further allege: (1) that there was no sale by Rebuquiao in
favor of petitioners on October 1, 1987; and (2) if there was a
sale, the same happened in 1997, the year petitioners registered
the deed of sale executed in their favor. 26
The core issue in the case at bar is whether injunction lies in favor