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Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
INSTITUTIONS DIVISION
BREWER v. QUARTERMAN
Syllabus
Syllabus
sufficient effect standard has no foundation in this Courts deci
sions. 542 U. S., at 284. For the reasons explained in this case and
in Abdul-Kabir, ante, p. ___, the Circuits conclusions that Brewers
mental-illness and substance-abuse evidence could not constitute a
Penry violation, and that troubled-childhood evidence may, because of
its temporary character, fall sufficiently within the special issues
ambit, fail to heed this Courts repeated warnings about the extent to
which the jury must be allowed not only to consider mitigating evi
dence, or to have such evidence before it, but to respond to it in a rea
soned, moral manner and assign it weight in deciding whether a de
fendant truly deserves death. Pp. 79.
442 F. 3d 273, reversed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY,
SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dis
senting opinion, in which SCALIA, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined.
SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined, and
in which ALITO, J., joined as to Part I.
No. 0511287
_________________
INSTITUTIONS DIVISION
BREWER v. QUARTERMAN
Opinion of the Court
(footnotes omitted).1
As a result of a strategic decision on his counsels part,
Brewer neither secured nor presented any expert psycho
logical or psychiatric testimony.
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, Brewer
submitted several additional instructions designed to give
effect to the mitigating evidence he did present. App. 81
87. The trial judge rejected all of his proposed instructions
and instead instructed the jury to answer only two special
issues:
Do you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt that the conduct of the defendant, BRENT RAY
BREWER, that caused the death of the deceased,
Robert Doyle Laminack, was committed deliberately
and with the reasonable expectation that the death of
the deceased would result?
.
.
.
.
.
Do you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt that there is a probability that the defendant,
BRENT RAY BREWER, would commit criminal acts
BREWER v. QUARTERMAN
Opinion of the Court
2 The
BREWER v. QUARTERMAN
Opinion of the Court
BREWER v. QUARTERMAN
Opinion of the Court
ABDUL-KABIR v. QUARTERMAN
ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting
ABDUL-KABIR v. QUARTERMAN
ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting
ABDUL-KABIR v. QUARTERMAN
ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting
ABDUL-KABIR v. QUARTERMAN
ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting
1 In evaluating the state courts analysis, the Court criticizes its reli
ance on Graham because Graham primarily addressed retroactivity
under Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989). Ante, at 23. But in consid
ering whether the rule requested was dictated by precedent, Graham of
course had to evaluate the scope of that precedentincluding Penry I
and did so extensively. See 506 U. S., at 467477. Moreover, as ex
plained below, the Court in Johnson v. Texas, 509 U. S. 350, 370372
(1993), adopted the same reading of Penry I adopted in Graham,
without considering the issue under Teague.
10
ABDUL-KABIR v. QUARTERMAN
ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting
2 The
11
12
ABDUL-KABIR v. QUARTERMAN
ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting
13
14
ABDUL-KABIR v. QUARTERMAN
ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting
3 The
Court criticizes this dissent for failing to define the rule that
our post-Penry I cases either did or should have applied. Ante, at 25, n.
22. But the whole point is that the rule, far from being clearly
established by our decisions, wasat the very leastunsettled and
confused. Under AEDPA, those defending the finality of a state-court
judgment challenged on federal habeas review do not have to show that
the state-court judgment was consistent with some version of clearly
established Federal law other than that offered by the challenger;
AEDPA obviously contemplates that there may not be clearly estab
lished Federal law. The Courts criticism only underscores how far the
reasoning employed today strays from AEDPAs mandate.
15
16
ABDUL-KABIR v. QUARTERMAN
ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting
ABDUL-KABIR v. QUARTERMAN
SCALIA, J., dissenting
ABDUL-KABIR v. QUARTERMAN
SCALIA, J., dissenting
ABDUL-KABIR v. QUARTERMAN
SCALIA, J., dissenting