SSS Law

1. SSC v Azcote

2. SSS v Favilla

3. Mendoza v People
FACTS:
Romarico Mendoza (petitioner) was the company president of Summa Alta Tierra
Industries, Inc. (SATII). During the month of August 1998 to July 1999, the
employees contend that Mendoza failed and/or refuse to remit the SSS Premium
contributions in favor of the employees amounting to P421, 151.09. Such amount
was also the monthly premium contributions of SATII employees to SSS. After
SSS advising Mendoza to pay the amount, Mendoza proposed to settle it over a
period of 18 months, which the SSS approved. Despite the extensions granted
by SSS to Mendoza, Mendoza still failed to settle the amount. Thus, the
employees filed an information against Mendoza. Mendoza contends that during
the period of August 1998 to July 1999, SATII shut down due to the general
decline in the economy. Thus, the non-remittance was done in good faith.
Issue:
Whether or not good faith can be a defense for failure to remit the SSS Premium
Ruling:
Remittance of contribution to the SSS under Sec. 22 of the Social Security Act is
mandatory. No discretion or alternative is granted to the SSS Commission in the
enforcement of the laws mandate that the employer who fails to comply with his
legal obligation to remit the premiums to the SSS shall pay a penalty of 3% per
month. Good faith or bad faith is irrelevant since the law makes no distinction
between an employer who professes good reasons for delaying remittance of
premiums and another who deliberately disregards the legal duty imposed upon
him to make such remittance. From the moment the remittance of premiums due
is delay, the penalty immediately attaches to the delayed premium payments by
force of law. Failure to comply with the law being malum prohibitum, intent to
commit it or good faith is immaterial.

4. SSS v Signey
FACTS:
Rodolfo Signey, a SSS member, died on May 21, 2001. In his records, he
declared Yolanda as primary beneficiary and his 4 children with her as secondary
beneficiaries. Yolanda then claimed for the benefits in SSS and she revealed that
the deceased had a common-law wife named Gina Servano, with whom the
deceased had 2 minor children (Ginalyn and Rodelyn). This was indeed
confirmed because Gina likewise, claimed for benefits. She declared that,
Yolanda and she were just the common-law wives, and Editha Espinosa was the
legal wife. Editha then also claimed for the benefits stating that she indeed was
the legal wife.
SSS denied the death benefits claim by Yolanda, but recognized the two minor
children of Gina as the primary beneficiaries of the deceased under the SSS
Law. SSS was also able to discover that the marriage between Yolanda and
Rodolfo were null and void for having been contracted while Rodolfos marriage
with Editha still subsisted as confirmed by the Civil Registry.
Issue:
Who is entitled to the SSS benefits of a member who was survived not only by
his legal wife, but also by two common-law wives with whom he had six children?
Held:
The Court agreed with SSS, stating that the two minor children of the deceased
with Gina was entitled 100% of the benefits as provided by the SSS Law. The
SSS Law was clear in stating that for a minor child to qualify as a dependent
entitled the benefit, the only requirement was that the child must be below 21
years of age, not married nor gainfully employed.
Though Editha waived her claim for the rights to the claim of benefits, it was not a
strong ground for Yolandas claim because she did not even try to allege and
prove any infirmity in the marriage between the deceased and Editha, after
having been proven that her marriage with Rodolfo was null and void. She was
disqualified because thet did not have a legitimate child or children. Under the
SSS Law, it follows that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the
deceased shall be entitled the death benefits as the primary beneficiaries.

5. SSS v Jarque
FACTS:
In 1955 Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz married in Barcelona, Sorsogon. Fifteen
plus years later, Clemente filed an action to declare the presumptive death of
Alice, she being an absentee. The petition was granted in 1970.
In 1983, Clemente married Jarque. The two live together until Clementes death
in 1998. Jarque then sought to claim her husbands SSS benefits and the same
were granted her. On the other hand, a certain Cecilia Bailon-Yap who claimed
that she is the daughter of Bailon to a certain Elisa Jayona petitioned before the
SSS that they be given the reimbursement for the funeral spending for it was
actually them who shouldered the burial expenses of Clemente.
They further claim that Clemente contracted three marriages; one with Alice,
another with Elisa and the other with Jarque. Cecilia also averred that Alice is
alive and kicking and Alice subsequently emerged; Cecilia claimed that Clemente
obtained the declaration of Alices presumptive death in bad faith for he was
aware of the whereabouts of Alice or if not he could have easily located her in her
parents place. She was in Sorsogon all along in her parents place. She went
there upon learning that Clemente had been having extra-marital affairs.
SSS then ruled that Jarque should reimburse what had been granted her and to
return the same to Cecilia since she shouldered the burial expenses and that the
benefits should go to Alice because her reappearance had terminated
Clementes marriage with Jarque. Further, SSS ruled that the RTCs decision in
declaring Alice to be presumptively death is erroneous. Teresita appealed the
decision of the SSS before the Social Security Comission and the SSC affirmed
SSS. The CA however ruled the contrary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared
presumptively dead automatically terminates the subsequent marriage.
HELD:
There is no previous marriage to restore for it is terminated upon Clementes
death. Likewise there is no subsequent marriage to terminate for the same is
terminated upon Clementes death. SSS is correct in ruling that it is inutile for
Alice to pursue the recording of her reappearance before the local civil registrar
through an affidavit or a court action. But it is not correct for the SSS to rule upon
the declaration made by the RTC.
The SSC or the SSS has no judicial power to review the decision of the RTC.
SSS is indeed empowered to determine as to who should be the rightful
beneficiary of the benefits obtained by a deceased member in case of disputes
but such power does not include the appellate power to review a court decision

or declaration. In the case at bar, the RTC ruling is binding and Jarques marriage
to Clemente is still valid because no affidavit was filed by Alice to make known
her reappearance legally. Alice reappeared only after Clementes death and in
this case she can no longer file such an affidavit; in this case the bad faith [or
good faith] of Clemente can no longer be raised the marriage herein is
considered voidable and must be attacked directly not collaterally it is however
impossible for a direct attack since there is no longer a marriage to be attacked
for the same has been terminated upon Clementes death.

GSIS Law
1. GERSIP ASSOCIATION petitioner vs GSIS 2013
FACTS: On March 19, 1981, GSIS Board approved the proposed GSIS
Provident Fund Plan (Plan) to provide supplementary benefits to GSIS
employees upon their retirement, disability or separation from the service, and
payment of definite amounts to their beneficiaries in the event of death. It
likewise adopted the "Provident Fund Rules and Regulations" (PFRR) which
became effective on April 1, 1981. Under the Plan, employees who are members
of the Provident Fund (Fund) contribute through salary deduction a sum
equivalent to five percent (5%) of their monthly salary while respondents monthly
contribution is fixed at 45% of each members monthly salary. A Committee of
Trustees (Committee) appointed by respondent administers the Fund by
investing it "in a prudent manner to ensure the preservation of the Fund capital
and the adequacy of its earnings." Out of the earnings realized by the Fund,
twenty percent (20%) of the proportionate earnings of respondents contributions
is deducted and credited to a General Reserve Fund (GRF) and the remainder is
credited to the accounts of the members in proportion to the amounts standing to
their credit at the beginning of each quarter. Upon retirement, members are
entitled to withdraw the entire amount of their contributions and proportionate
share of the accumulated earnings thereon, and 100% of respondents
contributions with its proportionate earnings
On March 30, 200 (GERSIP) composed of retired GSIS employees and officers,
wrote the President and General Manager of respondent requesting the
liquidation and partition of the GRF. In his letter-reply then President and General
Manager Garcia explained that there exists a trust relation rather than coownership with respect to the Fund. He stressed that the PFRR authorizes a
reduction of 20% earnings for the GRF, not a total liquidation of the fund itself.
Moreover, the GRF, being an integral part of the Fund, must be maintained as a
general policy to serve its purpose of providing supplementary benefits to retired,
separated and disabled GSIS employees and, in the event of death, payment of
definite amounts to their beneficiaries. Petitioners initially filed a civil suit before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-01-45533) but
on motion of respondent said case was dismissed on the ground that it is the
GSIS Board which has jurisdiction over the controversy
ISSUE: W/N GSIS Provident fund is not a "trust" but a co-ownership, giving
them legal right accounting and audit of the Fund.
HELD: Yes. There is no doubt that respondent intended to establish a trust fund
from the employees contributions (5% of monthly salary) and its own
contributions (45% of each members monthly salary and all unremitted
Employees Welfare contributions). We cannot accept petitioners submission that
respondent could not impose terms and conditions on the availment of benefits
from the Fund on the ground that members already own respondents

contributions from the moment such was remitted to their account. Petitioners
assertion that the Plan was a purely contractual obligation on the part of
respondent is likewise mistaken.
Republic Act No. 8291, otherwise known as "The Government Service Insurance
System Act of 1997," mandated respondent to maintain a provident fund subject
to rules and regulations it may adopt. Thus:
SECTION 41. Powers and Functions of the GSIS. The GSIS shall exercise the
following powers and functions: (s) to maintain a provident fund , which consists
of contributions made by both the GSIS and its officials and employees and their
earnings, for the payment of benefits to such officials and employees or their
heirs under such terms and conditions as it may prescribe
The General Reserve Fund shall be used for the following purposes:
(c) To pay the benefits of separated employees in accordance with Article IV,
Section 326; and
(d) For other purposes as may be approved by the Board, provided that such
purposes is consistent with Article IV, Section 427.
It is clear that while respondents monthly contributions are credited to the
account of each member, and the same were received by petitioners upon their
retirement, they were entitled to only a proportionate share of the earnings
thereon. The benefits of retiring members of the Fund are covered by Section
1(b), Article V which states:
(b) Retirement. In the event the separation from the System is due to retirement
under existing laws, such as P.D. 1146, R.A. 660 or R.A. 1616, irrespective of the
length of membership to the Fund, the retiree shall be entitled to withdraw the
entire amount of his contributions to the Fund, as well as the corresponding
proportionate share of the accumulated earnings thereon, and in addition, 100%
of the Systems contributions, plus the proportionate earnings thereon.
We find nothing illegal or anomalous in the creation of the GRF to address
certain contingencies and ensure the Funds continuing viability. Petitioners right
to receive retirement benefits under the Plan was subject to well-defined rules
and regulations that were made known to and accepted by them when they
applied for membership in the Fund. Petitioners have the right to demand for an
accounting of the Fund including the GRF. Under Section 5,28 Article VIII of the
PFRR, the Committee is required to prepare an annual report showing the
income and expenses and the financial condition of the Fund as of the end of
each calendar year which they failed to provide

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, v. FERNANDO P.

DE LEON, Respondent. 2010
FACTS: Respondent Fernando P. de Leon retired as Chief State Prosecutor of
the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 1992, after 44 years of service to the
government. He applied for retirement under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 910,
invoking R.A. No. 3783, as amended by R.A. No. 4140, which provides that chief
state prosecutors hold the same rank as judges. Thereafter, and for more than
nine years, respondent continuously received his retirement benefits, until 2001,
when he failed to receive his monthly pension.
Respondent learned that GSIS cancelled the payment of his pension because
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) informed GSIS that
respondent was not qualified to retire under R.A. No. 910; that the law was
meant to apply only to justices and judges; and that having the same rank and
qualification as a judge did not entitle respondent to the retirement benefits
provided thereunder.
Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus before the CA, praying that
petitioner be compelled to continue paying his monthly pension and to pay his
unpaid monthly benefits from 2001. The CA granted the petition. Petitioner GSIS
is now before this Court, assailing the Decision of the CA and the Resolution
denying its motion for reconsideration. GSIS argues that the writ of mandamus
issued by the CA is not proper because it compels petitioner to perform an act
that is contrary to law.
ISSUE: W/Nthe CA erred in granting the petition for mandamus
HELD: This case involves a former government official who, after honorably
serving office for 44 years, was comfortably enjoying his retirement in the relative
security of a regular monthly pension, but found himself abruptly denied the
benefit and left without means of sustenance. This is a situation that obviously
cries out for the proper application of retirement laws, which are in the class of
social legislation. Indeed, retirement laws are liberally construed and
administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited, and all doubts are
resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose.
In this case, respondent was able to establish that he has a clear legal right to
the reinstatement of his retirement benefits. In stopping the payment of
respondents monthly pension, GSIS relied on the memorandum of the DBM,
which, in turn, was based on the Chief Presidential Legal Counsels opinion that
respondent, not being a judge, was not entitled to retire under R.A. No. 910. And
because respondent had been mistakenly allowed to receive retirement benefits
under R.A. No. 910, GSIS erroneously concluded that respondent was not
entitled to any retirement benefits at all, not even under any other extant
retirement law. This is flawed logic.
Respondents disqualification from receiving retirement benefits under R.A. No.
910 does not mean that he is disqualified from receiving any retirement benefit
under any other existing retirement law.

Prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8291, retiring government employees who were
not entitled to the benefits under R.A. No. 910 had the option to retire under
either of two laws: Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 660, or
P.D. No. 1146. In his Comment, respondent implicitly indicated his preference to
retire under P.D. No. 1146, since this law provides for higher benefits, and
because the same was the latest law at the time of his retirement in 1992.
Under P.D. No. 1146, to be eligible for retirement benefits, one must satisfy the
following requisites:
Section 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension.
(a) Old-age pension shall be paid to a member who:
(1) has at least fifteen years of service;
(2) is at least sixty years of age; and
(3) is separated from the service.
Respondent had complied with these requirements at the time of his retirement.
GSIS does not dispute this. Accordingly, respondent is entitled to receive the
benefits provided under Section 12 of the same law. To grant respondent these
benefits does not equate to double retirement, as GSIS mistakenly claims. Since
respondent has been declared ineligible to retire under R.A. No. 910, GSIS
should simply apply the proper retirement law to respondents claim, in
substitution of R.A. No. 910.
It must also be underscored that GSIS itself allowed respondent to retire under
R.A. No. 910, following jurisprudence laid down by this Court.
One could hardly fault respondent, though a seasoned lawyer, for relying on
petitioners interpretation of the pertinent retirement laws, considering that the
latter is tasked to administer the governments retirement system. He had the
right to assume that GSIS personnel knew what they were doing. Since the
change in circumstances was through no fault of respondent, he cannot be
prejudiced by the same.
DENIED.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, v. MARILOU

ALCARAZ, Respondent.
FACTS: Bernardo was employed by the Metro Manila Development Authority in
Makati City as laborer, Metro Aide and Metro Aide I for almost twenty-nine years.
Sometime in February 2004, Bernardo was diagnosed with Pulmonary
Tuberculosis (PTB) and Community Acquired Pneumonia (CAP). On May 13,
2004, he was confined at the Ospital ng Makati. He was discharged on May 19,
2004 with the following diagnosis: Acute Diffuse Anterolateral Wall Myocardial
Infarction, Killips IV-1, CAP High Risk, PTB III and Diabetes Mellitus Type 2. On
January 15, 2005, Bernardo was found dead at the basement of the MMDA
building. It was found in the autopsy that Bernardo died of Myocardial Infarction,
old and recent. Bernardos widow, Marilou, subsequently filed a claim for death
benefits with the Govenment Service Insurance System (GSIS).
The GSIS denied the claim for death benefits on the ground that myocardial
infarction, the cause of Bernardos death, was directly related to diabetes which is
not considered a work-connected illness; hence, its complications, such as
myocardial infarction, are not work-related. Marilou appealed to the ECC which
affirmed the GSIS ruling. Aggrieved, she sought relief from the CA through a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, contending that (1) the
ECC misappreciated the facts. She argued that even if the underlying cause of
Bernardos death was diabetes, the illness was acquired in the course of his
employment and was further aggravated by the nature of his work; and (2) the
ECC gravely abused its discretion for giving scant consideration to the medical
findings on Bernardos true condition prior to his death. The GSIS, on the other
hand, prayed that the petition be denied, contending that in the absence of
satisfactory evidence that Bernardos nature of employment predisposed him to
contract the ailment, the widows claim must fail. The CA granted the petition and
set aside the ECC ruling. It opined that while myocardial infarction is not among
the occupational diseases listed under Annex A of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation, the ECC, pursuant to Resolution No. 432, laid down
conditions under which cardio-vascular diseases can be considered as workrelated and therefore compensable. The CA found sufficient proof of workconnection between Bernardos ailment and his working conditions. It believed
that his work as laborer and metro aide must have substantially contributed to his
illness. GSIS moved for reconsideration but was denied by the CA. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: W/N Bernardos illness was work-related and/or the risk of contracting the
illness was increased by the nature of his work?
HELD: The GSIS and the ECC denied the claim of his widow for death benefits
on the ground that his death was due to myocardial infarction which they
declared to be non-compensable; that it is not work-related as it is simply a
complication of diabetes mellitus; and that diabetes mellitus is not in the list of
occupational diseases and, for this reason, its complications such as myocardial

infarction, are not work-related. The conclusions of the two agencies totally
disregarded the stressful and strenuous conditions under which Bernardo toiled
for almost 29 long years as a laborer and as a metro aide. By so doing, they
closed the door to other influences that caused or contributed to Bernardos fatal
heart problem an ailment aggravated with the passage of time by the risks
present in the difficult working conditions that Bernardo had to bear from day to
day in his employment. While diabetes mellitus was indeed a complicating factor
in Bernardos health condition and indisputably aggravated his heart problem, we
cannot discount other employment factors, mental and physical, that had been
indisputably present; they contributed, if not as a direct cause of the heart
condition itself, as aggravation that worsened and hastened his fatal myocardial
infarction. For instance, it is undisputed that Bernardo was earlier diagnosed with
CAP which could also be a predisposing factor to myocardial infarction. There is
also stress due to the nature of Bernardos work.
Myocardial infarction, also known as coronary occlusion or just a coronary, is a
life threatening condition. Predisposing factors for myocardial infarction are the
same for all forms of Coronary Artery Disease, and these factors include stress.
Stress appears to be associated with elevated blood pressure. (Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) v. Cuanang, G.R. No. 158846)
The CA, therefore, is correct in holding that there is substantial evidence
supporting the conclusion that myocardial infarction in Bernardos case is work
related.
The CAs conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the ECC itself, the government
agency tasked by law to implement the employees compensation program.
Included cardio-vascular diseases in the list of occupational diseases, making
them compensable, subject to any of the conditions stated in its enabling
Resolution No. 432.With the resolution, it should be obvious that by itself, a heart
disease, such as myocardial infarction, can be considered work-related, with or
without the complicating factors of other non-occupational illnesses. Thus, the
Court so ruled in Rases v. ECC (504 Phil. 340, 345 (2005)) where it emphasized
that the incidence of acute myocardial infarction, whether or not associated with
a non-listed ailment, is enough basis for compensation.
Resolution No. 432 provides (as one of the conditions) that a heart disease is
compensable if it was known to have been present during employment, there
must be proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual
strain by reason of the nature of his work. Based on the evidence on record, we
find as the CA did, that the nature of Bernardos duties and the conditions under
which he worked were such as to eventually cause the onset of his myocardial
infarction. The stresses, the strain, and the exposure to street pollution and to the
elements that Bernardo had to bear for almost 29 years all to real too be ignored.
They cannot but lead to a deterioration of health particularly with the contributing
factors of diabetes and pulmonary disease.
CA AFFIRMED.