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Since 9/11, a great deal of data has been accumulated on the terrorists
linked to al Qaeda.1 The picture that emerges shows the growing role
played by Western Muslims. They constitute the bulk of the terrorists
involved in actions perpetrated here in Europe. But they are also involved
in terrorist actions abroad and participate in the different international
military jihad (from Faluja to Kashmir). These Western Muslims have
varied personal histories and include different categories: the majority are
second-generation Muslims who were either born in Europe or came as
children; we also find people who came as students or as political refugees;
thirdly, there has been a significant number of converts.
They all share common patterns. They speak European languages,
are Western educated, and many have citizenship of a European country.
They have had a normal Western teenagers upbringing, with no
conspicuous religious practices, often going to night clubs, womanising
and drinking alcohol. None have previous religious training. Most of them
are born-again (or converts): they became religious-minded Muslims in
Europe, even if a few of them, in the aftermath of (re)discovering Islam,
went to Middle Eastern madrasa (school or college) to improve their
Marc Sageman (2004), Understanding Terrorist Networks, Pennsylvania
University Press; Robert Leiken (2006), The Quantitative Analysis of Terrorism
and Immigration: An Initial Exploration, Terrorism and Political Violence,
December, Nixon Institute.
1
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Leiken, ibid.
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them what they are. Al Qaeda and consorts offer a narrative of revolt and
violence that appeals to an unmoored youth and gives a religious and
political dimension to youth revolt that could have been expressed in other
forms of violence (gangs, Columbine-style school-shootings, drugs,
delinquency). It is not by chance that jails in the West seem to be as much
recruiting grounds as mosques.
4.2
The picture is quite variable in Europe. There are countries where Muslims
are mainly first-generation immigrants (Spain, Italy), while in France,
Germany, the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands, they are mainly made up
of second and even third generations. Polls also show that there is an
impact of the host countrys political culture on the Muslims: the bulk of
the French Muslims claim individual integration as full citizens and
complain about discrimination on the job-market, while a majority of the
British Muslims seem to be more in favour of living as a community with
its own rules (see the polls carried out the Pew Institute).3 But nowhere is
there a real Muslim community with legitimate leaders and institutions.
In Europe it is common to oppose two approaches: the British multiculturalism (where Muslims are defined by a distinct ethno-cultural
identity) and the French assimilationnisme (where Muslims may become
full citizens only by shedding their pristine identity). But paradoxically
both approaches share the same premises: religion is embedded in a
culture, so if one is a Muslim one belongs to a different culture.
Interestingly enough, the level of radicalism has nothing to do with state
policy: there have been as many terrorist threats in the UK, France, Spain,
Belgium and Holland, although the policy toward Islam is very different in
each country. Radicals do not answer to a specific national policy, but to a
global perception of the state of the umma. In any event, both policies
multiculturalism and assimilation have failed for the same reason:
Muslims in the West, with the exception of many British Muslims, do not
push for an ethno-cultural identity, but want to be recognised as a mere
faith community. Religion is dissociated from culture: as we have seen
Pew Institute (2006), The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View
Each Other (report available at
http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=253).
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4.3
The key issue is thus the attitude of the Muslim population in Europe. It
has a far greater political stake and plays a far greater role than its
counterpart in the US for three reasons: it is the main source of
immigration, and has thus a demographic weight that bears no relation to
the percentage of Muslims in the US. It originates from the closely
neighbouring southern countries, bringing a risk of connection between
radicalisation in the countries of origin and Europe. It is made up largely of
the under-class and jobless youth; hence the social tensions tend to
aggravate the feeling of discrimination and alienation. Social, geographic,
political and strategic implications are thus intertwined.
We have seen that both the multi-culturalist and the integrationist
approaches have failed. A more sound approach would be to acknowledge
and encourage the disconnection between religion and culture. The second
and third generations are no more the bearers of a traditional culture, even
if they may reconstruct a tradition (by wearing the veil for instance). Such a
disconnection is clearly demonstrated by the fact that a significant
percentage (between 10- 20%) of al Qaeda recruits in Europe are converts.
But it should be clear that building a Western Islam does not mean
interfering in theology. It will not work and will brand any reformer as a
tool for manipulation. It will also unduly interfere in a debate that is taking
place among Muslims. Another problem is that many Muslims advocating
reform in Islam are in fact avowed non-believers (Ayan Hirsi Ali for
instance), which could accredit the idea that for the West a good Muslim is
a non-Muslim. In fact the issue is to promote Western Muslims not
Western Islam.
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teaching