An Overlooked Argument for Epistemic Conservatism

Author(s): Jonathan E. Adler

Source: Analysis, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Apr., 1996), pp. 80-84
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Committee
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An overlookedargumentfor epistemic conservatism

E. ADLER
JONATHAN
The weak form of epistemic (or methodological) conservatismthat I
defendis that believingthat p is a reasonfor beliefor continuedbeliefthat
p. The principlewill not seem weak, if we read 'reason' as 'ground'or
'evidence'.(Indeed,such a principleis dismissedout of hand in the best
known, if circumspect,defenceof conservatism- Sklar 1975: 377). But I
will argueagainstthat interpretation.
The defenceinvolves a comparisonwith practicalreasoning,and it has
two parts.First,the defencesimplybringstogethera dominantview of the
epistemicsof belief, as a decision to accept, with a particularanalysisof
decision.Second,I try to diagnosisand underminethe intuitiveforce of a
main anti-conservatismargument,drawing on the levels of justification
distinctioncentralto rule-utilitarianism.
The following is a widely accepted position in epistemology and the
philosophyof science:The justificationfor movingfrompartial(or degrees
of) beliefto full beliefor acceptanceinvolvesa decisionand an action. It is
the decisionto cease inquiryinto a hypothesis,and the act of acceptingit
as true. (See,for a recentexample,Harman1986: Chapters3 and 5).
Butwhat forcedoes the decisionto, and act of, acceptance,have distinct
from the assignment of probability or support (each on the same
evidence)?If we understanddecisionaccordingto analysesin the study of
practicalreasoning,then thereis force just in conceivingof acceptanceas
a decision.On theseanalysesa decision,like an intention,suppliesan additional (second-order) reason to act (Raz 1990). Joining these two
assumptions- unarguedfor here, but defendedelsewhereon independent
grounds- together,we derive the form of epistemicconservatismstated
above. The decisionto acceptp as true, which representsone's coming to
fully believeit, providesa reasonin itselfto believe(or continueto believe)
that p, and so, to extend the point, an epistemicadvantageover an otherwise equally warranted hypothesis q. (Comparisonof theoretical and
practicalreasoningis limited.The relationof reasonsto beliefis more intimate than reasons to actions. Arguably, to recognize reasons as
establishinga statementas true is to believeit; while, if weaknessof will is
possible, recognizing a reason to act does not entail the intention to
performan act, let alone being identicalto it.)
The analysisof decision and its relevanceto the problemof conservatism is illustratedby the followingexample.Janeshops intenselyfor a car,
and after a carefulinvestigationopts for the Dodge Intrepid.She decides
ANALYSIS
56.2, April 1996, pp. 80-84. ? Jonathan E. Adler

AN OVERLOOKEDARGUMENTFOR EPISTEMICCONSERVATISM 81

to buyit, formsthe intentionto buyit, andso ceasesinvestigating

it.
Afterherdecision,butpriorto thepurchase,
Jane'sfriendshowsherthat
theToyotaCamryseemsto meetherrequirements
aboutas well as, if not
the
If
better
the
was
than, Intrepid.
slightly
Camry muchsuperior,Jane
rethink
her
it
decision.
But
as
is,giventhatshehasdecided,shethereby
might
hasa (non-overridden)
reasonto favourtheIntrepid
overtheCamry.More
she
has
a
reasonto excludeacting(e.g.reconsider(second-order)
precisely,
ing her decision)upon the reasonthat the Camryappearsan equalor
betterdeal(Raz1990:S1.2 andPostscript).
Shehasthisreasonby virtue
of herhavingdecided,despitethefactthatabsentthatdecision,herjudgementwouldnot clearlyfavourtheIntrepidoverthe Camry.
Wearenow poisedto understand
why defencesof epistemicconservatismalwaysappearat an intuitivedisadvantage.
Considerhow difficultit
is forJaneto invokein herdefencethereasonshedoeshave,evenwhereit
is appropriate.
Sheis challengedto showthattheIntrepidis preferable
to
the Toyota,whichheravowed(first-order)
reasonsdon'tclearlyshow,if
theyshowit at all. It wouldbe untoward- strangeto Janeandherfriend
- if sheaddedto herreasons'andtheIntrepidis, in fact,thecarI decided
on'.HowdoesthatreasonbringJanenearerto hergoalof gettingthebestbuy(truth)?
as follows:the confrontation
of her selection
Jane'sbindI understand
withthe newchoiceimposesthe contextof the normalweighingof costs
andbenefits.So the reasonaffordedby herdecisionis madeto appearas
anotherfirst-orderreasonto enterinto that weighing,and, as such, it
seemsveryweak,if not irrelevant
or bizarre.
Turnnow to one standardway the epistemicconservatismissue is
joined.We are askedto imaginethat T is a hypothesisthat we accept
(believe),and then we discoverthat T' is equalin all (other)epistemic
recent
respects.Shouldwe continueto believethat T? In Christensen's
of
we
are
offered
a
version
of
the
anticritique conservatism,
prototypical
conservatism
appeal:
an
to theconservative
... agentmay,according
principle,correctlysay,
'I happento believeit - andthatis partof myjustification
forcontin1994:69)
uingto believeit' (Christensen
Andlateron, referring
to thekindof examplementionedabove,he writes
similarly,
A scientistwho madeexplicitto hercolleaguesthefactthatshegave
T morecredencethanT' on thebasisof herownbeliefinT wouldnot,
I think,be takenseriously.(Christensen
1994:83)
But the conservatismdefenderonly claims that there is a reason to maintain T not availablefor T', not that it is properas a reason to offer. The

82

JONATHAN E. ADLER

point, however,is not merelyconversational.It applies primarilyto the

nature of argumentor reasoning,even when there is no corresponding
assertion.(As in, for example,Vogel 1992).
The line of criticismChristensenemploys construesconservatismas a
reason within a (first-order)justificationfor T rather than T'. We are
placed in the context of whetherwe shouldacceptT. So the fact of acceptancepaleswhen set on the samescalesas normalevidence,as Jane'sdecision
is unusableas a first-orderreasonin favourof the Intrepidoverthe Camry.
(Hereis a point at which we are temptedto readthe 'reason'of the above
conservatismthesisas 'ground'or 'evidence'.)Any argumentfor the acceptance of T must claim a selectiveadvantageof T to any other competitor,
so that gettingT' on those scales(of a first-orderargumentfor acceptance),
immediatelycomes down againstthe beliefor acceptanceof T.
Yet this is, in effect, to deny the force of acceptancein inquiry,and to
misconstrueits role in argument.What Christensen'sscientist has is a
reasonto set aside T' as a reasonto reconsiderher position or to reopen
inquiry.(Thestrengthof the second-orderreason- how resistantit should
- can,of course,vary).Itdoes not belong
be to exceptionsor reconsideration
on the scalesby whichwe determinethe acceptabilityof T. Byso doing,there
is an implieddenialof the legitimacyof acceptanceas contrastedmerelyto
the assignmentof partialdegreesof belief (with action then guided by the
principleto maximize expected utility). It may be that those who reject
conservatismwill now come to rejectthe notion of acceptance(or that, like
decision, it generatesan additionalreason to act). But if so, it requires
much further,substantiveargument(as in, for example,Jeffrey1970) and,
in any case, theircriticismswere not intendedto have this implication.
I want to raisean objectionto my defenceso far,whose answerleadsme
to be explicit about the broaderperspectiveunderlyingmy argumentand
diagnosis.Jane may not be quite as tongue tied as I imaginedher above.
Shemay find a way to articulatea place for her decisionas a reason:
Well, I've alreadythought hard enough about it. The choice of the
Intrepiddoes fulfilmy requirements,even if the Camrymightdo so a
bit better.ButI don'twant to expendanymoreenergy.So I'll staywith
the Intrepid.
The objectionthen is this: We can just cut away from the decision as a
reason,and look directlyat the advantagessoughtfrom deciding,as themselves (first-order)reasons.The appealto economizingon her effortscan
be offereddirectlybyJanein favourof stayingwith herchoice.In thatcase,
we do have a straightforwardadvantageof the Intrepidover the Toyota.
If the objection works, the distinctness of decision as a reason vanishes.
It is replaced by the purposes or advantages of decision itself in practical

AN OVERLOOKED ARGUMENT FOR EPISTEMIC CONSERVATISM

83

reasoning.The same strategyappliesagainstmy defenceof conservatism.

We can cut throughthe fact of acceptance,and applyits allegedadvantages
directlyto favouringT (preservingbelief)over the effortsor losses incumbent upon suspending judgement. Presuming such a reason (e.g.
economizing) is a legitimate one, we now have an epistemic reason in
favour of T rather than T', without the need to invoke any thesis of
conservatism.We simply by-passan intermediary--decision
in Jane'scase
and acceptancein the case of conservatism.
But the objection, once again, misconstruesthe place of decision and
acceptance,and, in particular,the reasons for introducingdistinct stages
(or levels)of practicalreasoningor inquiry.It deniesthat reasonsare structured in simply and tacitly assumingthat the reason-relationis transitive.
The assumptionarisesin reasoningthat if economizing,say, is a reasonto
distinguishdecision and acceptancein practical reasoning and inquiry,
respectively,and decisionor acceptanceis to be a reasonin favourof an act
or hypothesis,thenwe can simplyby-passtheseintermediaries,
andconsider,
on its own, economizingas a reasonto favourthe act or hypothesis.
The broaderperspectivein which I view my argumentand diagnosisis
that of Rawls's'Twoconceptsof rules'(1968). In that paper,Rawls limited
defenceof rule-utilitarianism
consistedof a clarificationof distinctjustificatorylevelsor questions(justifyingan act within a practiceand justifying
a rule governing that practice) and a diagnosis of errors in arguments
againstutilitarianismthat conflatedthese distinctlevels or questions.
An implicationof Rawls'sanalysisis a denial of the transitivityof the
reason-relation.We may adopt the rulethat a basketballdefencemust be
1-on-1 in orderto please audiences.And, given that rule, we may penalize
a team for playing a zone defence.But it doesn't follow that when we do
penalize a team, the reason that justifies(or explains) our doing so is to
please the audience.
So too a main reasonto incorporatea notion of acceptance(decision)is
to economize. (Additionaladvantagesthat have been mentioned include
systematization,stability and to advanceto new inquiries.But the same
basicpoint will applyto these advantages.)But for acceptanceor decision
to succeedit must take on a status akin to a norm or rule, representinga
distinctlevel of reason, and not just anotherreason.But if this is granted,
it is fallaciousto infer from the refusalto suspendjudgementor reopen
inquiry,faced with T', as a way to economize,that our reason (justification) is to economize.
Consequently,we are not subjectto criticismin virtueof the possibility
that by economizinga little less, we might bettersecureother gains.Jane
might make a better decision or we might accept a better hypothesis.
(Compare: it cannot be rightly objected that since the basketball team

84

JONATHAN E. ADLER

penalizedfor playinga zone defenceis the hometeam,whose fans aremost

distressedby the decision,we shouldrescindthe penalty,as not servingthe
purposeof pleasingthe fans.) Rules to functionas rules (and so too, I am
holding,decisionsor acceptanceto servetheirfunction)must acquiresome
autonomous force in argument from the reasons that justify their
introduction.
The epistemicvalue of conservatism(or acceptance)is not necessarily
realizedin each particularcase, as a good rule may fail to serve its basic
rationalein a case. So it is no surprise,but also no longer a threat, that
when the questionof how followingconservatismin a particularcase will
leadus nearerto the truth,we cannotgive a satisfactoryanswer.If we think
of 'nearerto the truth'as akin to maximizingutility,then the parallelwith
the rule-utilitarianstrategyconcludes that the question is illegitimateif
addressedto a judgementwithin a methodology (accordingto a rule),
ratherthan as one about why we should adopt that methodology (rule).
(Compareto Sklar1975: 390, 395.)
The strategyfor defendingand debatingconservatismofferedheregoes
some way toward fulfilling Sklar'ssuggestion that taking conservatism
seriously involves rethinking epistemology; justification, in particular.
WhereI differfrom Sklaris in the less radicalsourceI findfor the revision.
The differentform of justificationthat a properconsiderationof conservatismdemandsfollows fromthe structuringof reasons,not (yet)requiring,
as he speculated,commitmentto any substantivetheoryof knowledge.1
BrooklynCollegeand the GraduateCenter,CUNY
Brooklyn,NY 11210, USA
jeabc@cunyvm.cuny.edu
References
Christensen,D. 1994. Conservatismin epistemology.Noa^s28: 69-89.
Harman, G. 1986. Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. Cambridge:The MIT
Press.
Jeffrey, R. 1970. Dracula meets Wolfman: acceptance vs. partial belief. In Induction,
Acceptance,and Rational Belief, ed. M. Swain. Dordrecht:D. Reidel.
Rawls, J. 1968. Two concepts of rules. Reprintedin Readings in the Theory of Action,
ed. N. Care and C. Landesman,306-40. Bloomington:Indiana UniversityPress.
Raz, J. 1990. PracticalReason and Norms. 2nd edition. Princeton:PrincetonUniversity
Press.
Sklar,L. 1975. Methodological conservatism.PhilosophicalReview 84: 374-400.
Vogel, J. 1992. Sklar on methodologicalconservatism.Philosophy and Phenomenological Research52: 125-31.

1 Thanksto JonathanVogelfor extremelyhelpfulcomments.