Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
575
66 S.Ct. 1176
90 L.Ed. 1447
attorneys for the 'patent club.' Universal contended that these circumstances
made the other oil companies substantial parties to the Root litigation and as
such bound by its outcome.
2
On June 2, 1941, during the pendency of these latter cases, attorneys who had
represented Root and were representing the other oil companies advised the
attorneys of the petitioner that on June 5, 1941, they would bring to the
attention of the judges of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals the circumstances
surrounding the appeal in the Root case, and, more particularly, the relations of
one Morgan S. Kaufman to the outcome of that appeal, and invited petitioner's
attorneys to attend. At the hearing on June 5, the moving attorneys suggested,
in substance, that testimony taken at the trial of Judge Davis pointed to bribery
of Judge Davis by Kaufman to secure a decision favorable to Universal in the
Root appeal. They urged an investigation of the questionable features
surrounding affirmance of the Root decree, but expressed doubt as to the
capacity in which they could formally make such a request of the Court. Their
difficulty was due to the fact that after this Court had denied certiorari in the
Root case, Root had settled its controversy with Universal and was unwilling to
disturb the agreement by an attempt to reopen the law suit. The other oil
companies who were in litigation with Root insisted that they were neither
formal nor substantial parties to the Root case. And so their attorneys, who
were the attorneys in the Root litigation and the moving attorneys in the present
proceedings, could not move on their behalf to have the Root decree vacated.
But these other oil companies had an interest in the Root decree since it might
be used in pending cases to their disadvantage. Universal offered to consent to a
reargument of the Root case and to preserve to the Root Company the benefits
of the existing agreement, even if Universal should prevail upon reargument.
Throughout these proceedings Universal stood ready to carry out this offer, but
nothing ever came of it, presumably because Root was not represented at these
hearings and the other oil companies were not parties of record in the original
litigation.
The dilemma of the attorneys who initiated these proceedings to set aside a
fraudulent judgment but could not speak for any client prepared to come before
the court as a party in interest, was resolved by a suggestion from the presiding
judge of the Circuit Court of Appeals. The suggestion was that the court would
accept the services of these attorneys as amici curiae. Accordingly, they offered
themselves in that role. Upon their acceptance as such by the court they asked
for the appointment of a master to investigate the Root appeal. while they thus
proceeded as amici they stated quite candidly that they were also concerned
with the interests of their clients, the oil companies in pending litigation. As a
matter of law, however, their status was only that of amici, for their clients did
not subject themselves to the court's jurisdiction. The relation of these lawyers
to the court, after it recognized them as amici, remained throughout only that of
amici.
4
On the basis of this conclusion, the Court of Appeals on June 15, 1944, entered
an order directing that the judgments be vacated and the cause be reargued. The
relief thus granted was that to which petitioner had consented before the
investigation got under way. On July 24, 1944, the amici applied to the court
below for an order directing that the expenses and compensation of the master
be taxed against Universal. In view of the fact that Universal appeared and
participated in the investigation before the master, with acquiescing knowledge
that the master's fees and expenses would be assessed by the court, we do not
disturb the taxation of the master's fees and expenses. The amici also asked the
Court to assess against Universal their expenses and reasonable attorneys' fees.
The court awarded $54,606.57 in expenses, part of which was for the amount
they had advanced in payment to the master, and $100,000 as compensation for
their services. These amounts had in fact already been paid to the attorneys by
their oil company clients. The awards thus constituted an order for
reimbursement of the clients by Universal. The case was heard by the court en
banc, and two of the judges thought that the amici were only entitled to a
compensation of $25,000. 3 Cir., 147 F.2d 259. Questions of importance in
judicial administration were obviously involved by the disposition below, and
so we brought the case here. 324 U.S. 839, 65 S.Ct. 1029, 89 L.Ed. 1402.
In No. 48, the judgment is reversed and remanded to the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the entry of a judgment in conformity with this opinion.
In No. 64, the writ of certiorari invoked under 262 of the Judicial Code, 28
11
Mr. Justice MURPHY and Mr. Justice JACKSON took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.