424 U.S.

800
96 S.Ct. 1236
47 L.Ed.2d 483

COLORADO RIVER WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT

et al., Petitioners,
v.
UNITED STATES. Mary AKIN et al., Petitioners, v. UNITED
STATES.
Nos. 74-940, 74-949.
Argued Jan. 14, 1976.
Decided March 24, 1976.

Leave to File Petition for Rehearings Denied June 1, 1976.

See 426 U.S. 912, 96 S.Ct. 2239.
Syllabus
In order to manage the allocation of water and to resolve conflicting
claims thereto, Colorado enacted legislation under which the State is
divided into seven Water Divisions, in each of which a procedure is
established for the settlement of water claims on a continuous basis. A
State Engineer is charged with responsibility for administering the
distribution of state waters. Seeking adjudication of reserved rights
claimed on behalf of itself and certain Indian tribes, as well as rights based
on state law, in waters in certain rivers in Division 7, the United States,
which had previously asserted non-Indian reserved water rights in three
other State Water Divisions, brought this suit against some 1,000 water
users in the District Court. The Government invoked District Court
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1345. Shortly thereafter, one of the federalsuit defendants sought in the state court for Division 7 to make the
Government a party to proceedings in that Division for the purpose of
there adjudicating all the Government's claims, both state and federal,
pursuant to the McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. 666. That law
provides for consent to join the United States in any suit (1) for the
adjudication of water rights, or (2) the administration of such rights, where
it appears that the United States owns or is acquiring such rights by

appropriation under state law or otherwise. The District Court, on

abstention grounds, granted a motion to dismiss the Government's suit.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that jurisdiction for that suit
existed under 28 U.S.C. 1345, and that abstention was inappropriate.
Held:
1. The McCarran Amendment, as is clear from its language and legislative
history, did not divest the District Court of jurisdiction over this litigation
under 1345. The effect of the Amendment is to give consent to state
jurisdiction concurrent with federal jurisdiction over controversies
involving federal water rights. Pp. 806-809.
2. That Amendment includes consent to determine in state court reserved
water rights held on behalf of Indians, see United States v. District Court
for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 91 S.Ct. 998, 28 L.Ed.2d 278, and United
States v. District Court for Water Div. 5, 401 U.S. 527, 91 S.Ct. 1003, 28
L.Ed.2d 284, and the exercise of state jurisdiction does not imperil those
rights or breach the Government's special obligation to protect the Indians.
Pp. 809-813.
3. The abstention doctrine is confined to three categories of cases, none of
which applies to the litigation at bar; hence the District Court's dismissal
on the basis of abstention was inappropriate. Pp. 813-817.
4. Several factors, however, are present in this litigation that counsel
against exercise of concurrent federal jurisdiction, clearly supporting
dismissal of the Government's action and resolution of its water-right
claims in the state-court proceedings. Pp. 817-820.
(a) Most significantly, such dismissal furthers the policy of the McCarran
Amendment recognizing the desirability of unified adjudication of water
rights and the availability of state systems like the one in Colorado for
such adjudication and management of rights to use the State's waters. The
Colorado legislation established a continuous proceeding for adjudicating
water rights that antedated the Government's suit and reached "all claims,
perhaps month by month but inclusively in the totality," United States v.
District Court for Water Div., supra, at 529, 91 S.Ct. at 1004, 28 L.Ed.2d
at 285. Pp. 819-820.
(b) Other significant factors include (1) the apparent absence before
dismissal of any District Court proceedings other than the filing of the
complaint; (2) the extensive involvement of state water rights occasioned
by this suit against 1,000 defendants; (3) the distance between the federal
court and Division 7; and (4) the Government's existing participation in

proceedings in three other Divisions. P. 820.

504 F.2d 115, reversed.
Kenneth Balcomb, Glenwood Springs, Colo., for the petitioners in both
cases and Howard E. Shapiro, Washington, D.C., for the respondent in
each case.
Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The McCarran Amendment, 66 Stat. 560, 43 U.S.C. 666, provides that

"consent is hereby given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1)
for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other
source, or (2) for the administration of such

[Amicus Curiae Information from page 802 intentionally omitted] rights, where
it appears that the United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring
water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or
otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such suit." The
questions presented by this case concern the effect of the McCarran
Amendment upon the jurisdiction of the federal district courts under 28 U.S.C.
1345 over suits for determination of water rights brought by the United States
as trustee for certain Indian tribes and as owner of various non-Indian
Government claims.1

* It is probable that no problem of the Southwest section of the Nation is more

critical than that of scarcity of water. As southwestern populations have grown,
conflicting claims to this scarce resource have increased. To meet these claims,
several Southwestern States have established elaborate procedures for
allocation of water and adjudication of conflicting claims to that resource.2 In
1969, Colorado enacted its Water Rights Determination and Administration
Act3 in an effort to revamp its legal procedures for determining claims to water
within the State.

Under the Colorado Act, the State is divided into seven Water Divisions, each
Division encompassing one or more entire drainage basins for the larger rivers
in Colorado.4 Adjudication of water claims within each Division occurs on a
continuous basis.5 Each month, Water Referees in each Division rule on
applications for water rights filed within the preceding five months or refer
those applications to the Water Judge of their Division.6 Every six months, the
Water Judge passes on referred applications and contested decisions by

Referees.7 A State Engineer and engineers for each Division are responsible for
the administration and distribution of the waters of the State according to the
determinations in each Division.8
5

Colorado applies the doctrine of prior appropriation in establishing rights to the

use of water.9 Under that doctrine, one acquires a right to water by diverting it
from its natural source and applying it to some beneficial use. Continued
beneficial use of the water is required in order to maintain the right. In periods
of shortage, priority among confirmed rights is determined according to the
date of initial diversion.10

The reserved rights of the United States extend to Indian reservations, Winters
v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 28 S.Ct. 207, 52 L.Ed. 340 (1908), and other
federal lands, such as national parks and forests, Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546, 83 S.Ct. 1468, 10 L.Ed.2d 542 (1963). The reserved rights claimed
by the United States in this case affect waters within Colorado Water Division
No. 7. On November 14, 1972, the Government instituted this suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado, invoking the court's
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1345. The District Court is located in Denver,
some 300 miles from Division 7. The suit, against some 1,000 water users,
sought declaration of the Government's rights to waters in certain rivers and
their tributaries located in Division 7. In the suit, the Government asserted
reserved rights on its own behalf and on behalf of certain Indian tribes, as well
as rights based on state law. It sought appointment of a water master to
administer any waters decreed to the United States. Prior to institution of this
suit, the Government had pursued adjudication of non-Indian reserved rights
and other water claims based on state law in Water Divisions 4, 5, and 6, and
the Government continues to participate fully in those Divisions.

Shortly after the federal suit was commenced, one of the defendants in that suit
filed an application in the state court for Division 7, seeking an order directing
service of process on the United States in order to make it a party to
proceedings in Division 7 for the purpose of adjudicating all of the
Government's claims, both state and federal. On January 3, 1973, the United
States was served pursuant to authority of the McCarran Amendment. Several
defendants and intervenors in the federal proceeding then filed a motion in the
District Court to dismiss on the ground that under the Amendment, the court
was without jurisdiction to determine federal water rights. Without deciding the
jurisdictional question, the District Court, on June 21, 1973, granted the motion
in an unreported oral opinion stating that the doctrine of abstention required
deference to the proceedings in Division 7. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit reversed, United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115 (1974), holding

that the suit of the United States was within district-court jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. 1345, and that abstention was inappropriate. We granted certiorari to
consider the important questions of whether the McCarran Amendment
terminated jurisdiction of federal courts to adjudicate federal water rights and
whether, if that jurisdiction was not terminated, the District Court's dismissal in
this case was nevertheless appropriate. 421 U.S. 946, 95 S.Ct. 1674, 44 L.Ed.2d
99 (1975). We reverse.
II
8

We first consider the question of district-court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

1345. That section provides that the district courts shall have original
jurisdiction over all civil actions brought by the Federal Government"(e)xcept
as otherwise provided by Act of Congress." It is thus necessary to examine
whether the McCarran Amendment is such an Act of Congress excepting
jurisdiction under 1345.

The McCarran Amendment does not by its terms, at least, indicate any repeal of
jurisdiction under 1345. Indeed, subsection (d) of the Amendment, which is
uncodified, provides:

10

"(d) None of the funds appropriated by this title may be used in the preparation
or prosecution of the suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of California, Southern Division, by the United States of America
against Fallbrook Public Utility District, a public service corporation of the
State of California, and others." Act of July 10, 1952, Pub.L. 495, 208(d), 66
Stat. 560.

11

In prohibiting the use of funds for the maintenance by the United States of a
specific suit then pending in a District Court, subsection (d) plainly implies that
the Amendment did not repeal the jurisdiction of district courts under 1345 to
adjudicate suits brought by the United States for adjudication of claimed
federal water rights.11

12

Beyond its terms, the legislative history of the Amendment evidences no clear
purpose to terminate any portion of 1345 jurisdiction. Indeed, three bills,
proposed at approximately the same time as the Amendment, which expressly
would have had the effect of precluding suits by the United States in district
court for the determination of water rights, failed of passage. 12 Further, the
Senate report on the Amendment states: "The purpose of the proposed
legislation, as amended, is to permit the joinder of the United States as a party

defendant in any suit for the adjudication of rights to the use of water . . . ."13
Nothing in this statement of purpose indicates an intent correlatively to
diminish federal-district-court jurisdiction. Similarly, Senator McCarran, who
introduced the legislation in the Senate, stated in a letter made a part of the
Senate report that the legislation was "not intended to be used for any other
purpose than to allow the United States to be joined in a suit wherein it is
necessary to adjudicate all of the rights of various owners on a given stream."14
13

In view of the McCarran Amendment's language and legislative history,

controlling principles of statutory construction require the conclusion that the
Amendment did not constitute an exception "provided by Act of Congress" that
repealed the jurisdiction of district courts under 1345 to entertain federal
water suits. "When there are statutes clearly defining the jurisdiction of the
courts the force and effect of such provisions should not be disturbed by a mere
implication flowing from subsequent legislation." Rosecrans v. United States,
165 U.S. 257, 262, 17 S.Ct. 302, 304, 41 L.Ed. 708, 710 (1897). See Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549-551, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 2482-2483, 41 L.Ed.2d 290,
300-301 (1974); United States v. Jackson, 302 U.S. 628, 632, 58 S.Ct. 390,
392, 82 L.Ed. 488, 491 (1938). "In the absence of some affirmative showing of
an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by
implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable." Morton v.
Mancari, supra, 417 U.S. at 550, 94 S.Ct. at 2482, 41 L.Ed.2d at 300. Not only
do the terms and legislative history of the McCarran Amendment not indicate
an intent to repeal 1345, but also there is no irreconcilability in the operation
of both statutes. The immediate effect of the Amendment is to give consent to
jurisdiction in the state courts concurrent with jurisdiction in the federal courts
over controversies involving federal rights to the use of water. There is no
irreconcilability in the existence of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction.
Such concurrency has, for example, long existed under federal diversity
jurisdiction. Accordingly, we hold that the McCarran Amendment in no way
diminished federal-district-court jurisdiction under 1345 and that the District
Court had jurisdiction to hear this case.15

III
14

We turn next to the question whether this suit nevertheless was properly
dismissed in view of the concurrent state proceedings in Division 7.

A.
15

First, we consider whether the McCarran Amendment provided consent to

determine federal reserved rights held on behalf of Indians in state court. This is

a question not previously squarely addressed by this Court, and given the
claims for Indian water rights in this case, dismissal clearly would have been
inappropriate if the state court had no jurisdiction to decide those claims. We
conclude that the state court had jurisdiction over Indian water rights under the
Amendment.
16

United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 91 S.Ct. 998, 28
L.Ed.2d 278 (1971), and United States v. District Court for Water Div. 5, 401
U.S. 527, 91 S.Ct. 1003, 28 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971), held that the provisions of the
McCarran Amendment, whereby "consent is . . . given to join the United States
as a defendant in any suit (1) for the adjudication . . . or (2) for the
administration of (water) rights, where it appears that the United States is the
owner . . . by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or
otherwise. . . . ," subject federal reserved rights to general adjudication in state
proceedings for the determination of water rights. More specifically, the Court
held that reserved rights were included in those rights where the United States
was "otherwise" the owner. United States v. District Court for Eagle County,
supra, 401 U.S. at 524, 91 S.Ct. at 1002, 28 L.Ed.2d at 281. Though Eagle
County and Water Div. 5 did not involve reserved rights on Indian reservations,
viewing the Government's trusteeship of Indian rights as ownership, the logic
of those cases clearly extends to such rights. Indeed, Eagle County spoke of
non-Indian rights and Indian rights without any suggestion that there was a
distinction between them for purposes of the Amendment. 401 U.S., at 523, 91
S.Ct., at 1001, 28 L.Ed.2d, at 281.

17

Not only the Amendment's language, but also its underlying policy, dictates a
construction including Indian rights in its provisions. Eagle County rejected the
conclusion that federal reserved rights in general were not reached by the
Amendment for the reason that the Amendment "(deals) with an all-inclusive
statute concerning 'the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river
system.' " Id., at 524, 91 S.Ct., at 1002, 28 L.Ed.2d, at 282. This consideration
applies as well to federal water rights reserved for Indian reservations. And
cogently, the Senate report on the Amendment observed:

18

"In the administration of and the adjudication of water rights under State laws
the State courts are vested with the jurisdiction necessary for the proper and
efficient disposition thereof, and by reason of the interlocking of adjudicated
rights on any stream system, any order or action affecting one right affects all
such rights. Accordingly all water users on a stream, in practically every case,
are interested and necessary parties to any court proceedings. It is apparent that
if any water user claiming to hold such right by reason of the ownership thereof
by the United States or any of its departments is permitted to claim immunity

from suit in, or orders of, a State court, such claims could materially interfere
with the lawful and equitable use of water for beneficial use by the other water
users who are amenable to and bound by the decrees and orders of the State
courts."16
19

Thus, bearing in mind the ubiquitous nature of Indian water rights in the
Southwest, it is clear that a construction of the Amendment excluding those
rights from its coverage would enervate the Amendment's objective.17

20

Finally, legislative history demonstrates that the McCarran Amendment is to be

construed as reaching federal water rights reserved on behalf of Indians. It was
unmistakably the understanding of proponents and opponents of the legislation
that it comprehended water rights reserved for Indians. In the Senate hearings
on the Amendment, participants for the Department of Justice and the
Department of the Interior made clear that the proposal would include water
rights reserved on behalf of Indians.18 In addition, the Senate report on the
amendment took note of a recommendation in a Department of the Interior
report that no consent to suit be given as to Indian rights and rejected the
recommendation.19

21

The Government argues that because of its fiduciary responsibility to protect

Indian rights, any state-court jurisdiction over Indian property should not be
recognized unless expressly conferred by Congress. It has been recognized,
however, that an action for the destruction of personal property may be brought
against an Indian tribe where "(a)uthority to sue . . . is implied." Turner v.
United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358, 39 S.Ct. 109, 110, 63 L.Ed. 291, 294 (1919).
Moreover, the Government's argument rests on the incorrect assumption that
consent to state jurisdiction for the purpose of determining water rights imperils
those rights or in some way breaches the special obligation of the Federal
Government to protect Indians. Mere subjection of Indian rights to legal
challenge in state court, however, would no more imperil those rights than
would a suit brought by the Government in district court for their declaration, a
suit which, absent the consent of the Amendment, would eventually be
necessitated to resolve conflicting claims to a scarce resource. The Government
has not abdicated any responsibility fully to defend Indian rights in state court,
and Indian interests may be satisfactorily protected under regimes of state law.
See 25 U.S.C. 1321, 1322; 28 U.S.C. 1360.20 Cf. California-Oregon
Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 164 n. 2, 55 S.Ct.
725, 731, 79 L.Ed. 1356, 1364 (1935). The Amendment in no way abridges any
substantive claim on behalf of Indians under the doctrine of reserved rights.
Moreover, as Eagle County said, "questions (arising from the collision of
private rights and reserved rights of the United States), including the volume

and scope of particular reserved rights, are federal questions which, if

preserved, can be reviewed (by the Supreme Court) after final judgment by the
Colorado court." 401 U.S., at 526, 91 S.Ct., at 1003, 28 L.Ed.2d, at 283.
B
22

Next, we consider whether the District Court's dismissal was appropriate under
the doctrine of abstention. We hold that the dismissal cannot be supported
under that doctrine in any of its forms.

23

Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the
rule. "The doctrine of abstention, under which a District Court may decline to
exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and
narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy
properly before it. Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified
under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the
parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve an important
countervailing interest." County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S.
185, 188-189, 79 S.Ct. 1060, 1063, 3 L.Ed.2d 1163, 1166 (1959). "(I)t was
never a doctrine of equity that a federal court should exercise its judicial
discretion to dismiss a suit merely because a State court could entertain it."
Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n. v. Southern R. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 361, 71 S.Ct.
762, 774, 95 L.Ed. 1002, 1015 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result).
Our decisions have confined the circumstances appropriate for abstention to
three general categories.

24

(a) Abstention is appropriate "in cases presenting a federal constitutional issue

which might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court
determination of pertinent state law." County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda
Co. supra, 360 U.S. at 189, 79 S.Ct., at 1063, 3 L.Ed.2d, at 1166. See, E. g.,
Lake Carriers Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 92 S.Ct. 1749, 32 L.Ed.2d
257 (1972); United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134, 82
S.Ct. 676, 7 L.Ed.2d 623 (1962); Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). This case, however, presents
no federal constitutional issue for decision.

25

(b) Abstention is also appropriate where there have been presented difficult
questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import
whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar. Louisiana Power
& Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 79 S.Ct. 1070, 3 L.Ed.2d 1058
(1959), for example, involved such a question. In particular, the concern there
was with the scope of the eminent domain power of municipalities under state

law. See also Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W. S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593, 88 S.Ct.
1753, 20 L.Ed.2d 835 (1968); Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52, 53 S.Ct. 240, 77
L.Ed. 610 (1933). In some cases, however, the state question itself need not be
determinative of state policy. It is enough that exercise of federal review of the
question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to
establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public
concern. In Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424
(1943), for example, the Court held that a suit seeking review of the
reasonableness under Texas state law of a state commission's permit to drill oil
wells should have been dismissed by the District Court. The reasonableness of
the permit in that case was not of transcendent importance, but review of
reasonableness by the federal courts in that and future cases, where the State
had established its own elaborate review system for dealing with the geological
complexities of oil and gas fields, would have had an impermissibly disruptive
effect on state policy for the management of those fields. See also Alabama
Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern R. Co. supra.21
26

The present case clearly does not fall within this second category of abstention.
While state claims are involved in the case, the state law to be applied appears
to be settled. No questions bearing on state policy are presented for decision.
Nor will decision of the state claims impair efforts to implement state policy as
in Burford. To be sure, the federal claims that are involved in the case go to the
establishment of water rights which may conflict with similar rights based on
state law. But the mere potential for conflict in the results of adjudications, does
not, without more, warrant staying exercise of federal jurisdiction. See
Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 64 S.Ct. 7, 88 L.Ed. 9 (1943); Kline
v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 43 S.Ct. 79, 67 L.Ed. 226 (1922);
McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 30 S.Ct. 501, 54 L.Ed. 762 (1910). The
potential conflict here, involving state claims and federal claims, would not be
such as to impair impermissibly the State's effort to effect its policy respecting
the allocation of state waters. Nor would exercise of federal jurisdiction here
interrupt any such efforts by restraining the exercise of authority vested in state
officers. See Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 55 S.Ct. 380, 79 L.Ed.
841 (1935); Hawks v. Hamill, supra.

27

(c) Finally, abstention is appropriate where, absent bad faith, harassment, or a

patently invalid state statute, federal jurisdiction has been invoked for the
purpose of restraining state criminal proceedings, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S.
157, 63 S.Ct. 877, 87 L.Ed. 1324 (1943);22 state nuisance proceedings
antecedent to a criminal prosecution, which are directed at obtaining the closure
of places exhibiting obscene films, Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 95

S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975); or collection of state taxes, Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 63 S.Ct. 1070, 87 L.Ed. 1407
(1943). Like the previous two categories, this category also does not include
this case. We deal here neither with a criminal proceeding, nor such a nuisance
proceeding, nor a tax collection. We also do not deal with an attempt to restrain
such actions23 or to seek a declaratory judgment as to the validity of a state
criminal law under which criminal proceedings are pending in a state court.
C
28

Although this case falls within none of the abstention categories, there are
principles unrelated to considerations of proper constitutional adjudication and
regard for federal-state relations which govern in situations involving the
contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdictions, either by federal courts
or by state and federal courts. These principles rest on considerations of "(w)ise
judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and
comprehensive disposition of litigation." Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire
Equipment Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183, 72 S.Ct. 219, 221, 96 L.Ed. 200, 203
(1952). See Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security National Bank, 173
U.S.App.D.C. 403, 525 F.2d 620 (1975). Generally, as between state and
federal courts, the rule is that "the pendency of an action in the state court is no
bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having
jurisdiction . . . ." McClellan v. Carland, supra, 217 U.S. at 282, 30 S.Ct. at
505, 54 L.Ed., at 767. See Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 84 S.Ct.
1579, 12 L.Ed.2d 409 (1964). As between federal district courts, however,
though no precise rule has evolved, the general principle is to avoid duplicative
litigation. See Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., supra;
Steelman v. All Continent Corp., 301 U.S. 278, 57 S.Ct. 705, 81 L.Ed. 1085
(1937); Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254, 57 S.Ct. 163, 165,
81 L.Ed. 153, 158 (1936). This difference in general approach between statefederal concurrent jurisdiction and wholly federal concurrent jurisdiction stems
from the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the
jurisdiction given them. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,
375 U.S. 411, 415, 84 S.Ct. 1, 464, 11 L.Ed.2d 440, 444 (1964); McClellan v.
Carland, supra, 217 U.S., at 281, 30 S.Ct. at 504, 54 L.Ed. at 766; Cohens v.
Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821) (dictum). Given this
obligation, and the absence of weightier considerations of constitutional
adjudication and state-federal relations, the circumstances permitting the
dismissal of a federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding
for reasons of wise judicial administration are considerably more limited than
the circumstances appropriate for abstention. The former circumstances,
though exceptional, do nevertheless exist.

29

It has been held, for example, that the court first assuming jurisdiction over
property may exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.
Donovan v. City of Dallas, supra, 377 U.S. at 412, 84 S.Ct. at 413, 12 L.Ed.2d
at 1582; Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466, 59 S.Ct. 275, 280, 83
L.Ed. 285, 291 (1939); United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296
U.S. 463, 477, 56 S.Ct. 343, 347, 80 L.Ed. 331, 338 (1936). But cf. Markham v.
Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 66 S.Ct. 296, 90 L.Ed. 256 (1946); United States v. Klein,
303 U.S. 276, 58 S.Ct. 536, 82 L.Ed. 840 (1938). This has been true even where
the Government was a claimant in existing state proceedings and then sought to
invoke district-court jurisdiction under the jurisdictional provision antecedent to
28 U.S.C. 1345. United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., supra, 296
U.S. at 479, 56 S.Ct. at 348, 80 L.Ed. at 339. But cf. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v.
United States, 352 U.S. 220, 227-228, 77 S.Ct. 287, 291-292, 1 L.Ed.2d 267,
274 (1957). In assessing the appropriateness of dismissal in the event of an
exercise of concurrent jurisdiction, a federal court may also consider such
factors as the inconvenience of the federal forum, cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947); the desirability of avoiding
piecemeal litigation, cf. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 495, 62 S.Ct.
1173, 1175, 86 L.Ed. 1620, 1625 (1942); and the order in which jurisdiction
was obtained by the concurrent forums, Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Oregon Water
Bd., 241 U.S. 440, 447, 36 S.Ct. 637, 640, 60 L.Ed. 1084, 1096 (1916). No one
factor is necessarily determinative; a carefully considered judgment taking into
account both the obligation to exercise jurisdiction and the combination of
factors counselling against that exercise is required. See Landis v. North
American Co., supra, 299 U.S. at 254-255, 57 S.Ct. at 165-166, 81 L.Ed. at
158. Only the clearest of justifications will warrant dismissal.

30

Turning to the present case, a number of factors clearly counsel against

concurrent federal proceedings. The most important of these is the McCarran
Amendment itself. The clear federal policy evinced by that legislation is the
avoidance of piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a river system. This
policy is akin to that underlying the rule requiring that jurisdiction be yielded to
the court first acquiring control of property, for the concern in such instances is
with avoiding the generation of additional litigation through permitting
inconsistent dispositions of property. This concern is heightened with respect to
water rights, the relationships among which are highly interdependent. Indeed,
we have recognized that actions seeking the allocation of water essentially
involve the disposition of property and are best conducted in unified
proceedings. See Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Oregon Water Bd., supra, 241 U.S.,
at 449, 36 S.Ct., at 641, 60 L.Ed., at 1096. The consent to jurisdiction given by
the McCarran Amendment bespeaks a policy that recognizes the availability of
comprehensive state systems for adjudication of water rights as the means for

achieving these goals.

31

As has already been observed, the Colorado Water Rights Determination and
Administration Act established such a system for the adjudication and
management of rights to the use of the State's waters. As the Government
concedes24 and as this Court recognized in Eagle County and Water Div. 5, the
Act established a single continuous proceeding for water rights adjudication
which antedated the suit in District Court. United States v. District Court for
Eagle County, 401 U.S., at 525, 91 S.Ct., at 1002, 28 L.Ed.2d at 282; United
States v. District Court for Water Div. 5, 1 U.S., at 529, 91 S.Ct., at 1004, 28
L.Ed.2d at 285. That proceeding "reaches all claims, perhaps month by month
but inclusively in the totality." Ibid. Additionally, the responsibility of
managing the State's waters, to the end that they be allocated in accordance
with adjudicated water rights, is given to the State Engineer.

32

Beyond the congressional policy expressed by the McCarran Amendment and

consistent with furtherance of that policy, we also find significant (a) the
apparent absence of any proceedings in the District Court, other than the filing
of the complaint, prior to the motion to dismiss,25 (b) the extensive involvement
of state water rights occasioned by this suit naming 1,000 defendants, (c) the
300-mile distance between the District Court in Denver and the court in
Division 7, and (d) the existing participation by the Government in Division 4,
5, and 6 proceedings. We emphasize, however, that we do not overlook the
heavy obligation to exercise jurisdiction. We need not decide, for example,
whether, despite the McCarran Amendment, dismissal would be warranted if
more extensive proceedings had occurred in the District Court prior to
dismissal, if the involvement of state water rights were less extensive than it is
here, or if the state proceeding were in some respect inadequate to resolve the
federal claims. But the opposing factors here, particularly the policy underlying
the McCarran Amendment, justify the District Court's dismissal in this
particular case.26

33

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the judgment of the
District Court dismissing the complaint is affirmed for the reasons here stated.

34

It is so ordered.

35

Judgment of Court of Appeals reversed and judgment of District Court

affirmed.

36

Mr. Justice STEWART, with whom Mr. Justice BLACKMUN and Mr. Justice

STEVENS concur, dissenting.

37

The Court says that the United States District Court for the District of Colorado
clearly had jurisdiction over this lawsuit. I agree.1 The Court further says that
the McCarran Amendment "in no way diminished" the District Court's
jurisdiction. I agree.2 The Court also says that federal courts have a "virtually
unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them." I agree.3 And
finally, the Court says that nothing in the abstention doctrine "in any of its
forms" justified the District Court's dismissal of the Government's complaint. I
agree.4 These views would seem to lead ineluctably to the conclusion that the
District Court was wrong in dismissing the complaint. Yet the Court holds that
the order of dismissal was "appropriate." With that conclusion I must
respectfully disagree.

38

In holding that the United States shall not be allowed to proceed with its
lawsuit, the Court relies principally on cases reflecting the rule that where
"control of the property which is the subject of the suit (is necessary) in order to
proceed with the cause and to grant the relief sought, the jurisdiction of one
court must of necessity yield to that of the other." Penn General Casualty Co. v.
Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader, 294 U.S. 189, 195, 55 S.Ct. 386, 388, 79 L.Ed.
850, 855. See also Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 84 S.Ct. 1579, 12
L.Ed.2d 409; Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 59 S.Ct. 275, 83 L.Ed.
285; United States v. Bank of New York Co., 296 U.S. 463, 56 S.Ct. 343, 80
L.Ed. 331. But, as those cases make clear, this rule applies only when exclusive
control over the subject matter is necessary to effectuate a court's judgment. 1A
J. Moore, Federal Practice P 0.214 (1974). Here the federal court did not need
to obtain In rem or Quasi in rem jurisdiction in order to decide the issues before
it. The court was asked simply to determine as a matter of federal law whether
federal reservations of water rights had occurred, and, if so, the date and scope
of the reservations. The District Court could make such a determination without
having control of the river.

39

The rule invoked by the Court thus does not support the conclusion that it
reaches. In the Princess Lida case, for example, the reason for the surrender of
federal jurisdiction over the administration of a trust was the fact that a state
court had already assumed jurisdiction over the trust estate. But the Court in
that case recognized that this rationale "ha(d) no application to a case in a
federal court . . . wherein the plaintiff seeks merely an adjudication of his right
or his interest as a basis of a claim against a fund in the possession of a state
court . . . ." 305 U.S., at 466, 59 S.Ct., at 281, 83 L.Ed., at 291. The Court
stressed that "(n)o question is presented in the federal court as to the right of
any person to participate in the res or as to the quantum of his interest in it." Id.,

at 467, 59 S.Ct., at 281, 83 L.Ed., at 292. Similarly, in the Bank of New York
case, supra, the Court stressed that the "object of the suits is to take the
property from the depositaries and from the control of the state court, and to
vest the property in the United States . . . ." 296 U.S., at 478, 56 S.Ct., at 347,
80 L.Ed., at 339. "The suits are not merely to establish a debt or a right to share
in property, and thus to obtain an adjudication which might be had without
disturbing the control of the state court." Ibid5 See also Markham v. Allen, 326
U.S. 490, 66 S.Ct. 296, 90 L.Ed. 256; United States v. Klein, 303 U.S. 276, 58
S.Ct. 536, 82 L.Ed. 840. See generally 1A J. Moore, Federal Practice P 0.222
(1974); 14 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure
3631, pp. 19-22 (1976).
40

The precedents cited by the Court thus not only fail to support the Court's
decision in this case, but expressly point in the opposite direction. The present
suit, in short, is not analogous to the administration of a trust, but rather to a
claim of a "right to participate," since the United States in this litigation does
not ask the court to control the administration of the river, but only to determine
its specific rights in the flow of water in the river. This is an almost exact
analogue to a suit seeking a determination of rights in the flow of income from
a trust.

41

The Court's principal reason for deciding to close the doors of the federal
courthouse to the United States in this case seems to stem from the view that its
decision will avoid piecemeal adjudication of water rights.6 To the extent that
this view is based on the special considerations governing In rem proceedings,
it is without precedential basis, as the decisions discussed above demonstrate.
To the extent that the Court's view is based on the realistic practicalities of this
case, it is simply wrong, because the relegation of the Government to the state
courts will not avoid piecemeal litigation.

42

The Colorado courts are currently engaged in two types of proceedings under
the State's water-rights law. First, they are processing new claims to water
based on recent appropriations. Second, they are integrating these new awards
of water rights with all past decisions awarding such rights into one allinclusive tabulation for each water source. The claims of the United States that
are involved in this case have not been adjudicated in the past. Yet they do not
involve recent appropriations of water. In fact, these claims are wholly
dissimilar to normal state water claims, because they are not based on actual
beneficial use of water but rather on an intention formed at the time the federal
land use was established to reserve a certain amount of water to support the
federal reservations. The state court will, therefore, have to conduct separate
proceedings to determine these claims. And only after the state court

adjudicates the claims will they be incorporated into the water source
tabulations. If this suit were allowed to proceed in federal court the same
procedures would be followed, and the federal court decree would be
incorporated into the state tabulation, as other federal court decrees have been
incorporated in the past. Thus, the same process will occur regardless of which
forum considers these claims. Whether the virtually identical separate
proceedings take place in a federal court or a state court, the adjudication of the
claims will be neither more nor less "piecemeal." Essentially the same process
will be followed in each instance.7
43

As the Court says, it is the virtual "unflagging obligation" of a federal court to

exercise the jurisdiction that has been conferred upon it. Obedience to that
obligation is particularly "appropriate" in this case, for at least two reasons.

44

First, the issues involved are issues of federal law. A federal court is more
likely than a state court to be familiar with federal water law and to have had
experience in interpreting the relevant federal statutes, regulations, and Indian
treaties. Moreover, if tried in a federal court, these issues of federal law will be
reviewable in a federal appellate court, whereas federal judicial review of the
state courts' resolution of issues of federal law will be possible only on review
by this Court in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction.

45

Second, some of the federal claims in this lawsuit relate to water reserved for
Indian reservations. It is not necessary to determine that there is no state-court
jurisdiction of these claims to support the proposition that a federal court is a
more appropriate forum than a state court for determination of questions of lifeand-death importance to Indians. This Court has long recognized that " '(t)he
policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply
rooted in the Nation's history.' " McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n,
411 U.S. 164, 168, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 1260, 36 L.Ed.2d 129, 133, quoting Rice v.
Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789, 65 S.Ct. 989, 991, 89 L.Ed. 1367, 1369.

46

The Court says that "(o)nly the clearest of justifications will warrant dismissal"
of a lawsuit within the jurisdiction of a federal court. In my opinion there was
no justification at all for the District Court's order of dismissal in this case.

47

I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

48

Mr. Justice STEVENS, dissenting.

49

While I join Mr. Justice STEWART's dissenting opinion, I add three brief

comments:
50

First, I find the holding that the United States may not litigate a federal claim in
a federal court having jurisdiction thereof particularly anomalous. I could not
join such a disposition unless commanded to do so by an unambiguous statutory
mandate or by some other clearly identifiable and applicable rule of law. The
McCarran Amendment to the Department of Justice Appropriation Act of 1953,
66 Stat. 560, 43 U.S.C. 666, announces no such rule.

51

Second, the Federal Government surely has no lesser right of access to the
federal forum than does a private litigant, such as an Indian asserting his own
claim. If this be so, today's holding will necessarily restrict the access to federal
court of private plaintiffs asserting water rights claims in Colorado. This is a
rather surprising byproduct of the McCarran Amendment; for there is no basis
for concluding that Congress intended that Amendment to impair the private
citizen's right to assert a federal claim in a federal court.

52

Third, even on the Court's assumption that this case should be decided by
balancing the factors weighing for and against the exercise of federal
jurisdiction, I believe we should defer to the judgment of the Court of Appeals
rather than evaluate those factors in the first instance ourselves. In this case the
District Court erroneously dismissed the complaint on abstention grounds and
the Court of Appeals found no reason why the litigation should not go forward
in a federal court. Facts such as the number of parties, the distance between the
courthouse and the water in dispute, and the character of the Colorado
proceedings are matters which the Court of Appeals sitting in Denver is just as
able to evaluate as are we.

53

Although I agree with Parts I, II, III-A, and III-B of the opinion of the Court, I
respectfully dissent from the decision to reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

The McCarran Amendment (also known as, the McCarran Water Rights Suit
Act), 43 U.S.C. 666, as codified, provides in full text:
"(a) Consent is hereby given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit
(1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other
source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the
United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by
appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the

United States is a necessary party to such suit. The United States, when a party
to any such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any right to plead that the
State laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not amenable thereto by
reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the judgments, orders, and
decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances: Provided, That no judgment for costs shall be entered against
the United States in any such suit.
"(b) Summons or other process in any such suit shall be served upon the
Attorney General or his designated representative.
"(c) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the joinder of the
United States in any suit or controversy in the Supreme Court of the United
States involving the right of States to the use of the water of any interstate
stream."
See also Infra, at 807.
Title 28 U.S.C. 1345 provides:
"Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the
United States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by
Act of Congress."
2

See, E. g., Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. 45-102 to 45-106, 45-141 to 45-154, 45-180

to 45-193, 45-231 to 45-245 (1956 and Supp. 1975); Cal.Water Code 17192, 1000-5108 (1971 and Supp. 1976); Nev.Rev.Stat. 533.010 Et seq.
(1973); N.M.Stat.Ann. 75-1-1 to 75-6-3 (1968 and Supp. 1975).

Colo.Rev.Stat.Ann. 37-92-101 Et seq. (1974).

37-92-201.

See 37-92-302 to 37-92-303.

37-92-303.

37-92-304.

37-92-301.

Colo.Const. Art. XVI, 5, 6; Colo.Rev.Stat.Ann. 37-92-102 to 37-92-306

(1974); Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).

10

See City of Colorado Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961);
City of Colorado Springs v. Yust, 126 Colo. 289, 249 P.2d 151 (1952).

11

Jurisdiction in the specific District Court suit was based on 28 U.S.C. 1345.
See United States v. Fallbrook Public Util. Dist., 101 F.Supp. 298
(S.D.Cal.1951).

12

H.R. 7691, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); H.R. 5735, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951);
H.R. 5368, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).

13

S.Rep.No.755, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1951).

14

Id., at 9.

15

The District Court also would have had jurisdiction of this suit under the
general federal-question jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. 1331. For the same reasons,
the McCarran Amendment did not affect jurisdiction under 1331 either.

16

S.Rep.No.755, Supra, at 4-5.

17

Indeed, if exclusion of Indian rights were the conclusion, conflicts between

Indian and non-Indian rights, as well as practical matters of adjudication, might
have the effect of requiring district-court adjudication of non-Indian along with
Indian rights, thereby effectively vitiating our construction of the Amendment
in Eagle County and Water Div. 5.

18

See Hearings on S. 18 before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on

the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 6-7, 67-68 (1951).

19

S.Rep.No.755, Supra, at 2, 7-8.

20

To be sure, 25 U.S.C. 1322(b) and 28 U.S.C. 1360(b) provide that nothing

in those sections "shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in
probate proceedings or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of (any
real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any
Indian tribe . . . that is held in trust by the United States)." This provision in
both sections, however, only qualifies the import of the general consent to state
jurisdiction given by those sections. It does not purport to limit the special
consent to jurisdiction given by the McCarran Amendment. A contrary
conclusion is foreclosed by the principle of construction that "(w)here there is
no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified
by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment." Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535, 550-551, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 2483, 41 L.Ed.2d 290, 301 (1974).

21

We note that Burford v. Sun Oil Co., and Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v.
Southern R. Co., differ from Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodaux, and County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., in that the former
two cases, unlike the latter two, raised colorable constitutional claims and were
therefore brought under federal-question, as well as diversity jurisdiction.
While abstention in Burford and Alabama Public Service had the effect of
avoiding a federal constitutional issue, the opinions indicate that this was not an
additional ground for abstention in those cases. See Alabama Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. Southern R. Co., 341 U.S., at 344, 71 S.Ct., at 765, 95 L.Ed., at
1006; Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S., at 334, 63 S.Ct., at 1107, 87 L.Ed., at
1435; H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1005
(2d ed. 1973) ("The two groups of cases share at least one common
characteristic: the Pullman purpose of avoiding the necessity for federal
constitutional adjudication is not relevant"). We have held, of course, that the
opportunity to avoid decision of a constitutional question does not alone justify
abstention by a federal court. See Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 85 S.Ct.
1177, 14 L.Ed.2d 50 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 84 S.Ct. 1316, 12
L.Ed.2d 377 (1964). Indeed, the presence of a federal basis for jurisdiction may
raise the level of justification needed for abstention. See Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., supra, 319 U.S., at 318 n. 5, 63 S.Ct., at 1099, 87 L.Ed., at 1426; Hawks v.
Hamill, 288 U.S., at 61, 53 S.Ct., at 243, 77 L.Ed., at 618.

22

Where a case is properly within this category of cases, there is no discretion to

grant injunctive relief. See Younger v. Harris. But cf. Samuels v. Mackell, 401
U.S. 66, 73, 91 S.Ct. 764, 768, 27 L.Ed.2d 688, 693 (1971).

23

Our reasons for finding abstention inappropriate in this case make it

unnecessary to consider when, if at all, abstention would be appropriate where
the Federal Government seeks to invoke federal jurisdiction. Cf. Leiter
Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 77 S.Ct. 287, 1 L.Ed.2d 267
(1957).

24

See Brief for United States 46-49.

25

As we have observed, the complaint was filed in District Court on November

14, 1972. The Federal Government was served in the state proceedings on
January 3, 1973. Shortly thereafter, on February 13, 1973, a motion to dismiss
was filed in District Court. Up to this point, it does not appear the District Court
dealt in any other manner with the suit pending before it.

26

Whether similar considerations would permit dismissal of a water suit brought

by a private party in federal district court is a question we need not now decide.

"Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall have

original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the

United States . . . ." 28 U.S.C. 1345.
2

Nothing in the McCarran Amendment or in its legislative history can be read as

limiting the jurisdiction of the federal courts. That law operates as no more than
a Pro tanto waiver of sovereign immunity. United States v. District Court for
Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 91 S.Ct. 998, 28 L.Ed.2d 278; United States v.
District Court for Water Div. 5, 401 U.S. 527, 91 S.Ct. 1003, 28 L.Ed.2d 284.

See England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-416, 84 S.Ct. 461, 464465, 11 L.Ed.2d 440, 444-445; Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 64
S.Ct. 7, 88 L.Ed. 9.

See Ante, at 813-817.

Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 84 S.Ct. 1579, 12 L.Ed.2d 409, has
relevance only insofar as the Court's opinion there contained a brief summary
of the discussion in the Princess Lida case.

The Court lists four other policy reasons for the "appropriateness" of the
District Court's dismissal of this lawsuit. All of those reasons are insubstantial.
First, the fact that no significant proceedings had yet taken place in the federal
court at the time of the dismissal means no more than that the federal court was
prompt in granting the defendants' motion to dismiss. At that time, of course, no
proceedings involving the Government's claims had taken place in the state
court either. Second, the geographic distance of the federal court from the rivers
in question is hardly a significant factor in this age of rapid and easy
transportation. Since the basic issues here involve the determination of the
amount of water the Government intended to reserve rather than the amount it
actually appropriated on a given date, there is little likelihood that live
testimony by water district residents would be necessary. In any event, the
Federal District Court in Colorado is authorized to sit at Durango, the
headquarters of Water Division 7. 28 U.S.C. 85. Third, the Government's
willingness to participate in some of the state proceedings certainly does not
mean that it had no right to bring this action, unless the Court has today
unearthed a new kind of waiver. Finally, the fact that there were many
defendants in the federal suit is hardly relevant. It only indicates that the federal
court had all the necessary parties before it in order to issue a decree finally
settling the Government's claims. Indeed, the presence of all interested parties
in the federal court made the lawsuit the kind of unified proceeding envisioned
by Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S. 440, 447-449, 36 S.Ct. 637, 640641, 60 L.Ed. 1084, 1096.

It is true, as the Court notes, that the relationship among water rights is

interdependent. When water levels in a river are low, junior appropriators may
not be able to take any water from the river. The Court is mistaken, however, in
suggesting that the determination of a priority is related to the determination of
other priorities. When a priority is established, the holder's right to take a
certain amount of water and the seniority (date) of his priority is established.
That determination does not affect and is not affected by the establishment of
other priorities.