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25 U.S. 2136 L.Ed. 60612 Wheat. 212
OGDEN, Plaintiff in Error,
against 
 SAUNDERS,Defendant in Error.
 February 19, 1827 
1ERROR to the District Court of Louisiana.2This was an action of assumpsit, brought in the Court below by the defendant inerror, Saunders, a citizen of Kentucky, against the plaintiff in error, Ogden, acitizen of Louisiana. The plaintiff below declared upon certain bills of exchange, drawn on the 30th of September, 1806, by one Jordan, at Lexington,in the State of Kentucky, upon the defendant below, Ogden, in the city of New-York, (the defendant then being a citizen and resident of the State of New-York,) accepted by him at the city of New-York, and protested for non- payment.3The defendant below pleaded several pleas, among which was a certificate of discharge under the act of the legislature of the State of New-York, of April 3d,1801, for the relief of insolvent debtors, commonly called the
three-fourths act 
.4The jury found the facts in the form of a special verdict, on which the Courtrendered a judgment for the plaintiff below, and the cause was brought by writof error before this Court. The question, which arose under this plea as to thevalidity of the law of New-York as being repugnant to the constitution of theUnited States, was argued at February term, 1824, by Mr.
Clay
, Mr.
 D. B.Ogden
, and Mr.
 Haines
, for the plaintiff in error, and by Mr.
Webster 
 and Mr.
Wheaton
, for the defendant in error, and the cause was continued for advisement until the present term. It was again argued at the present term, (inconnexion with several other causes standing on the calendar, and involving thegeneral question of the validity of the State bankrupt, or insolvent laws,) by Mr.
Webster 
 and Mr.
Wheaton
, against the validity, and by the
 Attorney General 
,Mr.
 E. Livingston
, Mr.
 D. B. Ogden
, Mr.
 Jones
, and Mr.
Sampson
, for thevalidity.5The editor has endeavoured to incorporate the substance both of the former andthe present argument, into the following summaries.
 
 Feb.
 19
th
, 20
th
, 21
 st 
, 22
d.
6Mr.
Wheaton
 argued, that the State laws now in question were repugnant to theconstitution of the United States, upon two grounds:71st. That the power of establishing 'uniform laws on the subject of bankruptciesthroughout the United States,' was exclusively vested in Congress.82d. That the State laws in question were 'laws impairing the obligation of contracts,' the power of passing which was expressly prohibited to the States.91. The State laws, the validity of which is now drawn in question, are, the act of the legislature of New-York of the 3d of April, 1801, for the relief of insolventdebtors on the application of three fourths of their creditors, by dischargingtheir persons, and future property, from liability for their debts, upon a
cessiobonorum
, and the act of the 3d of April, 1813, granting the same relief upon theapplication of two thirds of the creditors. The judgment of one of the learned judges of this Court, in the case of
Golden
 v.
 Prince
, was referred to in this partof the argument, and its reasoning relied upon, to show that the power of establishing uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the Unionwas, from its nature, an exclusive power, and that the exercise of a similar  power on the part of the States was inconsistent.
a
102. These legislative acts are laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Thatthey are such, in respect to contracts in existence when the laws are passed, hasalready been determined by the Court upon solemn argument.
 b
 It was alsosupposed to have been decided, that, in such a case, it was immaterial whether the contract was made before or after the passage of the law.
c
 But the wholequestion might now be considered as open for discussion.11To determine it, the nature and terms of the constitutional prohibition must beexamined. '
 No State,' &c. 'shall 
 coin money, emit bills of credit, make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in the payment of debts,
 pass any
 bill of attainder,
ex post facto
 law, or
law impairing the obligation of contracts
.' Theseare comprehensive terms, studiously designed to restrain the State legislaturesfrom acts of injustice, both in criminal and civil matters. And (1.) the prohibition of issuing
bills of credit 
, or making any thing but
 gold and silver coin
 a tender in the payment of debts, was intended to cut up paper money bythe roots. The commercial credit of the nation had severely suffered from thisfatal scourge; and the anxiety to be relieved from it, was one of the most pressing motives which induced the formation of the new constitution. It might,
 
 perhaps, be doubted, whether the power of coining money, which was given toCongress, and denied to the States, taken in connexion with the prohibition tothem to emit bills of credit, or make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in the payment of debts, was not intended to give to Congress the exclusive power of regulating the whole currency of the country; although the framers of the constitution probably did not foresee how completely this provision would be evaded by the multiplication of banking corporations in the different States.The term 'bills of credit,' alone, would reach the ordinary case of paper money; but the prohibition of tender laws was meant to expand the same thought so asto reach valuation and appraisement laws, and all that prolific brood of similar  pernicious enactments which disfigure the pages of our history from the peaceof 1783 until the establishment of the present constitution in 1789. (2.) 'Bills of attainder, and
ex post facto
 laws,' were prohibited, in order to restrain the Statelegislatures from oppressing individuals by arbitrary sentences, clothed with theforms of legislation, and from making retrospective laws applicable to criminalmatters.
d
 (3.) The prohibition of 'laws impairing the obligation of contracts,'was intended to prevent the remaining mischiefs which experience had shownto flow from legislative interferences with contracts, and to establish a greatconservative principle, under which they might be protected from unjust acts of legislation in any form.12To give complete effect to this last salutary prohibition, the Court hasconstantly given it an interpretation sufficiently broad and liberal to accomplishthe ends which the framers of the constitution had in view. For this purpose the prohibition has been considered as extending to contracts
executed 
, as well as
executory;
 to conveyances of land, as well as commercial contracts; to publicgrants from the State to corporations and individuals, as well as privatecontracts between citizens; to grants and charters in existence when theconstitution was adopted, as well as those existing previously, and even beforethe revolution; and to compacts between the different States themselves.
e
 Inmost of these cases, the impairing act was applied to a specific contract or grant, and affected only the rights of particular individuals. But the principleslaid down by the Court apply to whole classes of contracts; and surely it willnot be pretended, that a law repealing all charters of a certain description, or impairing a general description of contracts, or abolishing all debts of a certainnature, would not be reached by the prohibition. The constitution necessarilydealt in general terms; and such is the intrinsic ambiguity of all humanlanguage, that it could not entirely avoid difficulties of interpretation. But thefault of tautology has never been imputed to this instrument, and terms of suchsignificant import would hardly have been added to this clause, if it had beenintended merely to repeat and amplify the same thought which had already beenexpressed in the prohibition of paper money, and other tender laws. On the

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