Hume and Representation

Introduction
We can think of ourselves in ordinary life as having two quite different ways of
conveying information. One is by verbal description and the other is by example. These
distinct methods correspond, as we have seen, to two different theses about the minds
relation to the environment. On each account theorists talk about representations, but the
two are of very different kinds. One sort of representation, coming from language as a
model, has semantic properties such as reference or aboutness. The other does not.
In this chapter and the next we will look at the history of the example model,
instances of which we have been calling Aristotelian representations, and some recent
commentary on it. Doing so serves a number of ends. One is that it shows how very
deeply entrenched in contemporary thinking the language-based account has become.
Another thing we learn is that the Aristotelian theory appears in a number of different
guises and makes substantial contributions to theses of philosophers important in Western
tradition. In addition, Hume gives us a major addition to the theory. Finally, seeing the
basic idea of Aristotelian representations showing up over the centuries increases ones
intuitive grasp to the theorys potential in explaining mindedness.
We will see the recent critical reactions to Aristotle and Aquinas, and we will note
briefly that at least a remnant of the Aristotelian theory shows up in Descartes. After
considering a very questionable assumption about intentionality that can be found in
recent exegesis of a range of philosophers of the early modern period, we will focus on
the empiricists, and particularly Hume. We will examine closely Humean
representations, and we will close this chapter by rejecting an alternative interpretation of
Hume which sees Humes ideas as more Fodorian than Aristotelian.
In the next two sections we will look at examples of statements by historians of
philosophy. The point is not to provide a survey of exegetical opinions; rather, doing this
will reveal a very serious problem at the heart of the common idea that philosophers of
previous centuries were concerned with the problem of intentionality. That is, such a
thesis lacks a determinate meaning.
As we look at the historical philosophers it is well to remind ourselves that they
may well not entertain an inference that our philosophical age has largely adopted
enthusiastically. To see the inference, consider someone who says that George W. Bush
is the son of George Herbert Walker Bush. The statement certainly has aboutness and
satisfaction-conditions. It is true. There are proper names that refer to individuals, and
the statement says the individuals are in a particular relationship. We are certainly
entitled, let us suppose, to say that the utterer believes George W. Bush is the son of
George Herbert Walker Bush. In saying this, are we committed to saying that the utterer
has an internal state that has aboutness and is true? Many philosophers would say that
1

they are, and they would also say that any account of the mind has to include this sort of
internal state. It is, however, a mistake to take this view uncritically to the historical
philosophers.
That it is a mistake is easily seen. We just need to remind ourselves that the
philosopher may in fact be intending simply to give a causal account of what underlies
abilities that make it correct to call one a believer. It is far from obvious that in order to
make assertions about the Bushes one needs to have the proposition realized inside of one
in some sense. As we might put it, we need not assume that the semantic features of the
explanadum get realized in the explanans.

Modern responses to Aristotle and Aquinas

Much of the discussion of the historical figures that we will look at refers to
Brentanos conception of intentionality. His explanation of intentionality is generally
taken to occur in the following famous statement:
EverymentalphenomenonischaracterizedbywhattheScholastics
oftheMiddleAgescalledtheintentional(ormental)inexistenceof
an object, and what we might call, though not wholly
unambiguously,referencetoacontent,directiontowardanobject
(which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or
immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes
somethingasobjectwithinitself...
(Brentano1973)
The Scholastic terminology originates with Aquinas, and it refers to the realization in a
subject of the Aristotelian representation. Given Brentano is concerned with the
Scholastic view and inexistence, the passage has to be about Aristotelian representations.
However, so interpreted, the passage is not completely consistent with other things he
said. He also later provided another interpretation (Huemer 2009), which appears to
allow that an intentional object might be an object external to the mind. So understood,
intentionality is not Scholastic, but is rather Fodorian. Brentano is routinely interpreted
in terms of the latter. As Tuomo Aho notes:
Inpresentdayelementaryexpositions,thetypicaldefinitionof
intentionalityhasbeen,andstillis,directednesstosomething.This
formulahasbecomesofamiliarthatitishardlyevennoticedhowthe
directionmetaphorisquitedifferentfromtheoriginalinbeing
metaphor.(203)
As we will see, one problem that arises from this lack of clarity is that commentators may
well employ the notion of Fodorian intentionality in explicating ancient and medieval
thought. Hence, we need to be clear about how we understand certain phrases. We will
2

take Fodorian intentionality to encompass reference to an external object or objects.

Aristotelian intentionality, like that explicit in Aquinas, will mean that that there is an
internal object, such as the realization of a form.
There is no doubt that for Aristotle perception consists at least in part in an
organs receiving a form, for example, red corresponding to its proportion. Since each
color is an admixture of black and white for Aristotle, the final phrase refers to the
precise proportions had by the color of the object. Christopher Shields (Shields 2007)
suggests that for Aristotle in perception the organ becomes isomorphic with the objects
sensible form. Shields takes this to mean literally that the form is realized in the organ;
the eye becomes red, for example.
Shields maintains, however, that a better account takes the isomorphism not
literally but intentionally. Though he cites Brentano on intentionality, the implication of
understanding isomorphism intentionally is that the organs state represents an external
object. The change from internal to external object means we have the Fodorian reading
of intentionality, not the Aristotelian reading. Shields does see both the literal and the
Fodorian readings of the passage leave us with problematic theories. What is important
for us is that very Twentieth Century conceptions are being read into the ancient text.
There is really no evidence that internal forms in Aristotles philosophy have Fodorian
intentionality.
That recent discussions of representation have affected modern readings of
medieval theories seems indicated by remarks such as:
Ofcourse,claimingthatamentalrepresentationrepresentsbecausethe
objectrepresentedhasintentionalexistenceintheminddoesnotreally
leadtoasatisfactoryaccountofmentalrepresentation,butseemsonly
tointroduceafurtherelementrequiringexplanation...(Lagerlund2008;
cf.King2007)
The problem with the view that quotation presents is that while the claim may not
yield a satisfactory account of Fodorian representations, that does not mean it fails as an
account of Aristotelian representations. Of course, a critical analytic philosopher might
insist that nonetheless there are certain features any account of representation must have.
It particular, it might be said, there has to be more of a connection with the object that is
being perceived, for example. The answer to this is that it depends on what kind of
account is being given. If one is giving a non-reductive causal account of what is going
on in an individual when they perceived, then it is not correct to ask that all the logical
features of the explanadum are accounted for in the explanans
In contrast, Stumps more sympathetic account (Stump 2003) interprets Aquinass
account as appealing to a kind of structural isomorphism that one can find in maps and
charts. However, her recurring remarks to the effect that the representations encode
information sound more on the Fodorian side than the Aristotelian one. Still, we saw in
Chapter Three that neuroscientists may use the terminology of encoding where they
clearly do not have a language-based account in mind.
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Stumps account is very far from the accusation of extensive fallacious reasoning
that Pasnau levels against Aquinas (Pasnau 1998). Pasnau maintains that Aquinas
commits the content fallacy, which consists in conflating features about the content of a
thought with intrinsic features of a thought. For Pasnau, a good example of the content
fallacy occurs in an inference from John is thinking about a red sports car to Johns
thought is red.
One warning sign about labeling such an argument as fallacious is that a similar
argument about an example or sample is not fallacious at all. John has an example of a
red spots car appears indeed to imply John has an example which is red (in part).
Thus, if we are thinking of thoughts as involving something like examples, as indeed we
have been, then the argument looks at least less fallacious.
The situation, as Pasnau notes, is complicated with Aquinas in part because an
accidental form realized in ones sensory system is not realized in the same way that it is
realized in ordinary objects such as apples. However, once the ontology of modern
science casts doubt on forms, theorists using Aristotelian representations may indeed
think that thoughts or ideas literally instantiate sensory qualities. For Hume, as we will
see, ideas literally have color, size and shape.
Given this, we can read backwards and use Hume to address one of the issues
Pasnau raises; namely, Aquinass insistence on the fact that the senses are material means
the senses cannot cognize universals. Pasnau takes this view as the conclusion of a
fallacious inference from the features of sensory ideas to the features of sensory contents.
That is, Aquinas seems to be inferring from the individual nature of sensory states to the
individual contents of sensory ideas, which Pasnau thinks is fallacious. Hume, however,
has an explanation of why the inference is right, and it is plausibly close to what Aquinas
had in mind. To perceive a universal is to perceive it without the individuating features
of any one material realization. An idea of a triangle has a shape, for Hume, but if it is
genuinely abstract, the shape cannot have all its angles equal. Neither, however, can it
have unequal angles. Correspondingly, any form realized in our sensory matter will have
such individuating notes. The sensible species will have, for example, the intentional
(in Aristotles sense) correlates of size and shape. The result is that it will be the idea of a
instance of a particular triangle, as opposed to a genuinely universal idea of triangle.
Aquinass version of the argument explicit in Hume is necessitated by his view of
the relation between form and matter. A sensible form involves a form realized in matter,
though in the sensory system it is realized in a way different from how it is realized in,
say, apple skin. Matter always limits form; it particularizes it. That is why there can be
many different red things and many different cats. Creatures lacking matter, such as
angels, have each to have different forms. Consequently, any realization of a form which
is not restricted, limited and particular cannot be realized in matter. Since these
principles are so fundamental to Aquinas philosophy, it seems reasonable to think that
Pasnau was distracted by the modern terminology and concepts particularly content from taking the claims about Aristotelian representations literally. The content and the
intrinsic features of an Aristotelian representation are not dissociated in the way a words
inscribed shape and its content are.
4

Intentionality in Early Modern Philosophy

We might expect that the conception of perception we have been looking at would
disappear with a mechanistic view of material reality, but it in fact it could and did
survive the demise of the ontology of matter and form. Though we have not yet
considered Aristotelian representations in higher cognitive functions, a similar picture is
given by both Aristotle and Aquinas of cognition. Further, Descartes discussion of ideas
in the Third Meditation clearly reflects that idea that there is an ontological tie
between a cognizer and what is cognized, though his terminology reflects the
Suarezian versions of Aristotelian representations that he was trained on. His notion
of objective reality, and his very vexed idea of material falsity, look very close to the
problem we have seen many others grapple with; that is, there seems to be a sense is
which an Aristotelian representation cannot represent falsely.i
The idea that the early modern philosophers were concerned with intentionality is
prevalent among recent historians. One of the chief early advocates, Stephen Nadler
(Nadler 1989), of this relatively new reading of early modern theories of ideas maintains:
On [Brentanos] view, all mental phenomena are intentional, or
object-directed. This does not necessarily imply that the object of
thought or consciousness actually exists outside the consciousness.
It means simply that there is no act of consciousness which is not
directed toward, aiming at, or pointing to something. In other
words, every mental act is characterized by directedness toward an
object, whether or nor (sic) a corresponding ordinary object
exists (in space and time). (146.)
According to Nadler, the object of thought may exist outside of consciousness. In fact,
he says, In many cases, what the mind is directed toward is a real external object (146).
Further, an act intends this particular object, and not another, because this is the object
prescribed by the acts content (146).
According to Nadlers picture, which may have originated with John Yolton,
many theorists in the distant past recognized a kind of intentionality as a feature of
mental states and explained it by attributing language-like characteristics to internal
states. Given how intentionality has been part of the interpretation, we can say that they
are held to be concerned with Fodorian intentionality, as opposed to Aristotelian
intentionality.
The interpretation of early modern philosophers as concerned with Fodorian
intentionality has served another very important purpose that may have led to its
entrenchment today. The further purpose was to distinguish between theorists who
thought of internal states as standing in between us and our environment and those who
did not. As we have seen, Aquinas said that species were not that which were sensed or
cognized; rather they were that by which the world was sensed and cognized. In the later

parlance of the new interpretation, Aquinas would be said to hold that mental states are
acts, not objects. They are not objects because they do not provide us the knowledge for
formulating premises in arguments for the existence of various things in our environment.
Rather, we have internal and contentful acts that connect us to our environment.
More generally, the act/object distinction delivers a label for philosophers who
seemed to invite a sceptical picture of perceptions by seeing us as receiving images from
a world and trying to figure out what the cognitively separate world is really like; they are
object-theorists. In contrast, those who think of us as simply able to perceive and
know about the world are act-theorists. The result is that commentators can maintain
that some Early Modern Philosophers are act theorists whose thought does not invite an
endless search for a solution to skepticism.
There is, however, a serious exegetical difficulty arising from the resulting
dichotomy of act and object theorist. The problem is that historical figures who have and
employ a conception of Aristotelian representations become hard to understand. Aquinas,
for example, appears in fact to be both an act theorist and an object theorist. He counts as
the first because he says the realized features are merely means by which we perceive,
but he becomes the second since his theory of forms cannot be plausibly interpreted as a
theory of content. The forms that get instantiated in us have a lot of non-content work to
do in his philosophy; for example, what allows us to cognize the catness before us also
has to supply that very catness in the world.
Hume, along with Locke and Berkeley, was also capable of using represents in
ways not well understood by seeing it to mean a Fodorian represents. For example, for
Berkeley and Hume, resemblance or coinstantiation is not just sufficient for
representing; it is required for the representing that ideas do. Thus, Humes argues
As every idea is derived from a precedent impression, had we any
idea of the substance of our minds, we must also have an
impression of it, which is very difficult, if not impossible, to be
conceived. For how can an impression represent a substance,
otherwise than by resembling it? (Treatise, Bk. 1 Pt. 4 Sec. 5 Para.
3/35 p. 232.)
This argument is strongly reminiscent of one Berkeley gives about spirits:
Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit; for all
ideas whatever, being passive and inert (vide sect. 25), they
cannot represent unto us, by way of image or LIKENESS,
that which acts. A little attention will make it plain to any
one, that to have an idea which shall be like that active
principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely
impossible. (Principles #28)

What is interesting about this is that both were aware that signs can be signs of
something without resembling it. In requiring similarity, the representing done by ideas
seems to be of a different kind. It is true that for all that has been said so far, it is
possible that signs and ideas do the same kind of representing but do it by different
means. But to suppose the philosophers thought this would mean that they had missed
the very different kinds of success that examples and descriptions can have. Providing
one with a sample of a color for ones walls and giving a description of it have quite
profoundly different kinds of cognitive success. Among other things, examples or
samples can carry with them causal properties of other things in a way that descriptions
generally do not.
Locke also thinks that ideas as representations may be copies of things. Thus:
Now those ideas [of substances] have in the mind a double
reference: 1. Sometimes they are referred to a supposed real
essence of each species of things. 2. Sometimes they are only
designed to be pictures and representations in the mind of things
that do exist by ideas of those qualities that are discoverable in
them. In both which ways, these copies of those originals and
archetypes are imperfect and inadequate. Locke: ECHU Bk. 2 Ch.
31 Sec. 6 Para. 2/2 np. 378 dp. 506
Further, the properties mentioned in the first condition - of standing for and being
referred to - are additional things the mind can do with representations:
Of our real ideas, some are adequate, and some are inadequate. Those I
call adequate, which perfectly represent those archetypes which the
mind supposes them taken from; which it intends them to stand for,
and to which it refers them. Inadequate ideas are such, which are but a
partial or incomplete representation of those archetypes to which they
are referred.
Locke: ECHU Bk. 2 Ch. 31 Sec. 2 np. 375 dp. 502 My stress.
A major point about Fodorian representations is that they stand for things; the mind does
not use them to do that.
Those who understand representation in terms of Fodorian intentional content
typically think that representations can misrepresent; this is one reason why solving the
disjunction problem has been so important recently for naturalistic accounts of such
content. But, of course, an example of red cannot really misrepresent red, even though
one might use an example of one kind of red to misinform someone about another. (For
example, one might use a sample of a pale red to mislead someone about the actual color
of a dark red coat.) If Hume is thinking of ideas as instantiations of properties, then a
change in an idea gives a change in what is represented, rather than a misrepresentation.
And as we saw in Chapter One, Hume says:

Our ideas are copied from our impressions, and represent them in all
their parts. When you would any way vary the idea of a particular
object, you can only encrease or diminish its force and vivacity. If you
make any other change on it, it represents a different object or
impression. The case is the same as in colours. A particular shade of
any colour may acquire a new degree of liveliness or brightness
without any other variation. But when you produce any other variation,
it is no longer the same shade or colour; so that as belief does nothing
but vary the manner in which we conceive any object, it can only
bestow on our ideas an additional force and vivacity.
(Treatise, Bk. 1 Pt. 3 Sec. 7 Para. 5/8 p. 96; stress mine.)
And here he is following Locke:
Anyideathenwhichwehaveinourminds,whetherconformableor
nottotheexistenceofthings,ortoanyideainthemindsofothermen,
cannotproperlyforthisalonebecalledfalse.Forthese
representations,iftheyhavenothinginthembutwhatisreallyexisting
inthingswithout,cannotbethoughtfalse,beingexactrepresentations
ofsomething:Noryet,iftheyhaveanythinginthemdifferingfrom
therealityofthings,cantheyproperlybesaidtobefalse
representations,orideasofthingstheydonotrepresent.(Locke:
ECHUPT2Ch.32.21)
AndAristotle:
Perception (1) of the special objects of sense is never in error
or admits the least possible amount of falsehood. (2) That of
the concomitance of the objects concomitant with the
sensible qualities comes next: in this case certainly we may
be deceived; for while the perception that there is white
before us cannot be false, the perception that what is white is
this or that may be false.
In sum, there are three clues that represents in these philosophers at least sometimes
does not mean Fodorially represents. One is that the representations involve copying
or require similarity; secondly, they are not truth-evaluable; thirdly, referring to items
outside the mind is done with the representations, not by them.

3. Humean Representations
Hume does tell us that simple ideas copy and so represent their impressions, and
there has been a great deal of attention paid to Humes copy principle. However, little
attention has been given to the precise nature of the copying and Humes descriptions of

the way in which ideas manage to represent; (Baxter 2001) is an exception, but Baxter
explicitly takes Humes use of similarity to ground intentional representations, unlike the
central thesis proposed here. Once we look at Humes descriptions of the copying,
what we quickly see is that representation requires resemblance and resemblance
discussed in the context of representation is always constituted by a coinstantiation.
Ideas are copies of impressions, but the copying is a very restricted and precise
sort where the only difference is in strength and vivacity. Ideas that are copies simply
reproduce the features of the impressions. A first step in seeing this in Hume is to see
that impressions and ideas do have features, and, further, ones we attribute to objects:
For example, early in the Treatise Hume tells us that both an idea and its source
may have extension and color:
Suppose that, in the extended object, or composition of coloured
points, from which we first received the idea of extension, the points
were of a purple colour; it follows, that in every repetition of that idea
we would not only place the points in the same order with respect to
each other, but also bestow on them that precise colour with which
alone we are acquainted. (Treatise, Bk. 1 Pt. 2 Sec. 3 Para. 5/17 p. 34.)
Similarly, objects, impressions and ideas can instantiate size:
We may hence discover the error of the common opinion, that the
capacity of the mind is limited on both sides, and that it is impossible
for the imagination to form an adequate idea of what goes beyond a
certain degree of minuteness as well as of greatness. Nothing can be
more minute than some ideas which we form in the fancy; and images
which appear to the senses; since there are ideas and images perfectly
simple and indivisible. (Treatise, Bk. 1 Pt. 2 Sec. 1 Para. 5/5 p. 28.)
Impressions and objects also have the same sorts of relations:
We have no idea of any quality in an object, which does not agree to,
and may not represent a quality in an impression; and that because all
our ideas are derived from our impressions. We can never therefore
find any repugnance betwixt an extended object [and its substance]
unless that repugnance takes place equally betwixt the perception or
impression of that extended object [and its substance]. Every idea of a
quality in an object passes through an impression; and therefore
every perceivable relation, whether of connexion or repugnance,
must be common both to objects and impressions. (Treatise, Bk. 1
Pt. 4 Sec. 5 Para. 21/35 p. 242.)
Additionally, if we are to have an idea of a feature, we need to have an impression
that contains that feature. All ideas are derived from and represent impressions.
We never have any impression that contains any power or efficacy. We never,
therefore, have any idea of power (T 160).
9

The resemblance between ideas and impressions is, then, a resemblance of

features or, as Hume will put it, circumstances:
The first circumstance that strikes my eye, is the great resemblance
betwixt our impressions and ideas in every other particular, except
their degree of force and vivacity. The one seems to be, in a manner,
the reflection of the other; so that all the perceptions of the mind are
double, and appear both as impressions and ideas. When I shut my
eyes, and think of my chamber, the ideas I form are exact
representations of the impressions I felt; nor is there any circumstance
of the one, which is not to be found in the other. In running over my
other perceptions, I find still the same resemblance and representation.
Ideas and impressions appear always to correspond to each other.
(Treatise, Bk. 1 Pt. 1 Sec. 1 Para. 3/12 p. 2; my stress.)
And it is this exact resemblance, or coinstantiation of circumstances, that
constitutes representation:
The full examination of this question is the subject of the present
treatise; and, therefore, we shall here content ourselves with
establishing one general proposition, That all our simple ideas in their
first appearance, are derived from simple impressions, which are
correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent.
(Treatise, Bk. 1 Pt. 1 Sec. 1 Para. 7/12 p. 4.)
This view of the relation between impressions and ideas is no early flourish. We
find it in later sections, such as,

All the perceptions of the mind are of two kinds, viz.

impressions and ideas, which differ from each other only
in their different degrees of force and vivacity. Our ideas
are copied from our impressions, and represent them in
all their parts. (Treatise, Bk. 1 Pt. 3 Sec. 7 Para. 5/8 p. 96;
underlining mine.)
Co-instantiation and other similar phrases may seem to signal a realism about
universals that is not in Hume. However, Hume himself talks about circumstances
being found in both an idea and an impression, and of the two being in (almost) every
respect the same. We will see him say that every perceivable relation has to be common
to objects and impressions. Clearly, Hume has a conception of coinstantiation that he
feels does not commit him to realism about universals, and so he should. A nominalist
needs to explain how, for example, two people can correctly be said to have bought the
same book, or how two books covers can correctly be said to be of the same color, rather
than just forego the use of such expressions.

10

4. Hume and Content

It is important to see that taking ideas to have the sort of features impressions and
objects can have is not to endorse the thesis that all ideas are in some literal sense images.
John Yolton rightly questions whether we can have an image of an emotion, which is a
paradigm case of a Humean impression. It seems at least odd to say that our idea of
anger would be an image of anger. However, it can be phenomenologically accurate to
say that remembering or imagining an emotion involves getting a faint copy of that
emotion, one that instantiates at least many of the features of the emotion, including some
obviously involving our bodies. Humes account of sympathy in fact involves the thesis
that ideas of emotions just are faint copies of emotions that can be enlivened and become
emotions.
Yolton also presents two kinds of arguments for saying that Humean ideas are
mental contents, and so quite unlike their impressions. We have seen three reasons for
thinking that the representing done by ideas is different from that done by mental
contents. In addition, we have seen, and will continue to see, a number of passages in
which Hume insists that ideas share features of impressions and objects, such as size. It
is difficult to see how mental contents can have sizes. We are also about to encounter
another argument for the interpretation of Humean ideas as Aristotelian representations,
and that is the readings capacity for illuminating some of Humes arguments.
Nonetheless, we must consider Yoltons influential views.
One of Yoltons arguments contains the claim that Hume applies logical terms
to ideas, in addition to quantitative ones. Though Yolton does not explain what logical
and quantitative mean in this context, the point is that logical terms apply because of
something like semantic properties, and Hume applies them to ideas. The conclusion is
to be that ideas are or have semantic contents, or something like that. Anderson, who is
one of Yoltons targets, tellingly points out that objects also can enter into logical
relations, and so Yoltons argument fails on the grounds that Hume is willing to apply
logical terms to non-semantical objects. Andersons counter-claim is decisive; nothing
can be claimed about semantic contents from Humes application of logical terms.
A second sort of argument is what we can think of as Yoltons argument from
specific passages. Yolton takes a substantive number of passages from Book One of the
Treatise to demonstrate his thesis that ideas are meanings, not things with the same sorts
of properties as impressions. His reading are, however, more debatable than he appears
to think. We can see this from two examples:
(1) Yolton takes the following passage from Hume to contrast an idea of a number
with an image of a number:
When you tell me of the thousandth and ten thousandth part of a grain
of sand, I have a distinct idea of these numbers and of their different
proportions; but the images which I form in my mind to represent the
things themselves, are nothing different from each other, nor inferior to

11

that image, by which I represent the grain of sand itself, which is

supposed so vastly to exceed them.
Hume: THN Bk. 1 Pt. 2 Sec. 1 Para. 4/5 p. 27
If he is right, then Humes contrast is between an idea of X and an image of X. Yolton
would then have a strong argument for saying that Humean ideas are not images with the
sorts of properties they have seemed to have. However, Yolton appears to have
misunderstood Humes contrast, which is between an idea of number and an image of a
part of a grain of sand. Ideas of numbers, Hume tells us elsewhere, are generally ideas of
decimals (T 23). The contrast is not, then, between ideas and images in general, but
rather between an idea of X and an image of Y.
(2) Yolton takes the following passage to say that the idea of itself is or has a
meaning:
First, as to the principle of individuation, we may observe, that the
view of any one object is not sufficient to convey the idea of identity.
For in that proposition, an object is the same with itself, if the idea
expressed by the word object were no ways distinguished from that
meant by itself; we really should mean nothing, nor would the
proposition contain a predicate and a subject, which, however, are
implied in this affirmation. One single object conveys the idea of unity,
not that of identity.
Hume: THN Bk. 1 Pt. 4 Sec. 2 Para. 27/57 p. 200
However, the passage is rather about the ideas that words express or mean, and the
passage makes perfect sense if Hume is just talking about the ideas that words refer to or
call to mind. Over the centuries, many different things have said to provide meanings,
including pictures and use; hence, while Hume notoriously forges a very close
connection between the meaning of words and ideas derived from impressions, nothing
commits him to saying that ideas are never images. Consequently, nothing in this
passage forces on us the further interpretation that ideas are semantic contents.
Thus the argument that Humean ideas are semantic contents has not been made
compellingly. But more importantly, there is another positive reason for taking ideas to
have the features that impressions have. This is that the resulting relation between
impressions and ideas underlies many of Humes other theories, and seeing this
illuminates some of his most difficult arguments. Many of Humes arguments invoke the
principle that since impressions and ideas realize properties or features, they will have to
satisfy the necessary conditions for realizing such features. In particular, as we will see
in the case of duration, an idea of F will have to meet the conditions for realizing F in
either objects or impressions. Accordingly, if the necessary conditions for realizing a
feature cannot be found in ideas, then that feature is literally unrepresentable or, as we
shall see, it is at best a fiction, a language-like creation that explains a tendency to claim
to have a belief that we cannot find literally intelligible.

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AsfarasIamaware,mostrecentdiscussionsofDescartesonmateriallyfalseideasdonotdrawona

distinctioncomparabletotheAristotelianFodorianone.Foranexpositionofrecenttheories,see(Wee
2006).