Evidence Page 1

EVIDENCE
ATTY. NESTOR M. LEYNES, III
I. Definition and Scope

Sections 1-2, Rule 128
TUASON, J.:
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that
court for trial, praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice
of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner
might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with
their testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of
the accused. The motion was denied and that denial is the subject matter of
this proceeding.
RULE 128
General Provisions
Section 1. Evidence defined. Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these
rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of
fact. (1)
Section 2. Scope. The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts
and in all trials and hearings, except as otherwise provided by law or these
rules. (2a)
Bustos v. Lucero, 81 Phil 640 (1948)
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2068
October 20, 1948
DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of
Pampanga, respondent.
E. M. Banzali for petitioner.
Acting Provincial Fiscal Albino L. Figueroa and Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Marcelo L. Mallari for respondent.
According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to the

Court of First Instance in support of his motion, the accused, assisted by
counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the
justice of the peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded
guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his
counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and
her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and
form provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected,
invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In view
thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right
to present evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the
court of first instance.
Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing his right to
present evidence, and by reason of that waiver he was committed to the
corresponding court for trial, is estopped, we are of the opinion that the
respondent judge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of
discretion in refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the record for
the purpose set out therein. In Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R.
No. L-1336, recently promulgated, in which case the respondent justice of
the peace had allowed the accused, over the complaint's objection, to recall
the complainant and her witnesses at the preliminary investigation so that
they might be cross-examined, we sustained the justice of the peace's order.
We said that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of
the justice of the peace on the matter. We said that "while section 11 of Rule
108 defines the bounds of the defendant's right in the preliminary
investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority,
inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably
calculated to bring out the truth."
But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right, compel
the complaint and his witnesses to repeat in his presence what they had said
at the preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest." We

called attention to the fact that "the constitutional right of an accused to be
confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary
hearings' nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be an
infringement of his right to confront witnesses." As a matter of fact,
preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing
the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair
trial.
The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went
farther than the majority and denied even any discretion on the part of the
justice of the peace or judge holding the preliminary investigation to compel
the complainant and his witnesses to testify anew.
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of

their judicial functions. (1a)
Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the
court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its
intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon.
Baguio v. Vda. De Jalagat, 42 SCRA 337 (1971)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with

costs against the petitioner.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.
II. When Not Required
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28100 November 29, 1971
Judicial Notice
RULE 129
What Need Not Be Proved
Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial
notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial
extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of
nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world
and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions. (1a)
Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial
notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable to
GABRIEL BAGUIO, plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
TEOFILA L. VDA. DE JALAGAT, for herself and in representation of her
minor children, DOMINADOR, LEA and TEONIFE all surnamed
JALAGAT; ANABELLA JALAGAT and EMMANUEL
JALAGAT, defendants-appellees.
Bonifacio P. Legaspi for plaintiff-appellant.
Cecilio P. Luminarias for defendants-appellees.
FERNANDO, J.:
The specific legal question raised in this appeal from an order of dismissal by
the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, presided by the Hon.
Benjamin K. Gorospe, one which has not as yet been the subject of a
definitive ruling is whether or not on a motion to dismiss on the ground of res
judicata that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment, a lower court
may take judicial notice of such previous case decided by him resulting in the
prior judgment relied upon. Judge Gorospe answered in the affirmative. So

do we. An affirmance is thus called for.
The case started with the complaint for the quieting of title to real property
filed by plaintiff, now appellant, Gabriel Baguio, on February, 14, 1966. There
was on March 7, 1966 a motion to dismiss filed by defendants, now
appellees, on the ground that the cause of action is barred by a prior
judgment. This was the argument advanced: "The instant complaint or case,
besides being clearly unfounded and malicious, is identical to or the same as
that Civil Case No. 1574 filed by the same plaintiff and against Melecio alias
Mening Jalagat, now deceased and whose legal heirs and successors in
interest are the very defendants in the instant complaint or Civil Case No.
2639. Said Civil Case No. 1574 was filed on October 7, 1958 for 'Recovery of
Possession and Ownership of Real Estate' and entitled Gabriel Baguio,
plantiff, versus Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, defendant, involving practically
the same property and practically the same parties as defendants are the
widow and the children, respectively, thus the legal or forced heirs of the
deceased Melecio Jalagat. That the said Case No. 1574, which is identical to
or is the same case as the instant one, has already been duly and finally
terminated as could be clear from [an] order of this Honorable Court [dated
December 6, 1965]." 1 There was an opposition on the part of plaintiff made
on March 26, 1966 on the ground that for prior judgment or res judicata to
suffice as a basis for dismissal it must be apparent on the face of the
complaint. It was then alleged that there was nothing in the complaint from
which such a conclusion may be inferred. Then, on September 26, 1966,
came the order complained of worded thus: "Acting on the motion to dismiss
filed by counsel for the defendants under date of March 4, 1966, anchored on
the ground that plaintiff's cause of action is barred by a prior judgement
which this Court finds to be well-founded as it has already dismissed
plaintiff's complaint in Civil Case No. 1574 against Melecio Jalagat alias
Mening Jalagat, defendants predecessor in interest from whom they have
derived their rights, in an order dated December 6, 1965, pursuant to Section
3 of Rule 17 of the new Rules of Court, which case involved the same parcel
of land as the one in the instant case, as prayed for, Civil Case No. 2639
should be as it is hereby [dismissed]. The Court's previous dismissal of Civil
Case No. 1574 has the effect of an adjudication upon the merits and
consequently is a bar to and may be pleaded in abatement of any
subsequent action against the same parties over the same issues and the
same subject-matter by the same plaintiff. [So ordered]" 2 Hence, this appeal.
The order of dismissal, as noted at the outset, must be sustained. It is in
accordance with law.
1. The sole error assigned is that a bar by prior judgement cannot be raised
in a motion to dismiss when such ground does not appear on the face of the
complaint. What immediately calls attention in the rather sketchy and in
conclusive discussion in the six-page brief of applicant is that there was no
denial as to the truth of the statement made by Judge Gorospe that there
was a previous dismissal the same plaintiff's complaint against the
predecessor-in-interest of defendants, who as expressly admitted by
appellant was the deceased husband of one of them and father of the rest.
There was no denial either of the property involved being the same and of
the finality of the decsion in the previous case which would show that
appellant's claim was devoid of any support in law. It would be therefore futile
for the court to continue with the case as there had been such a prior
judgment certainly binding on appellant. What then was there for the lower
court to do? Was there any sense in its being engaged in what was
essentially a fruitless, endeavor as the outcome was predictible?
Certainly, the law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if the Rules of
Court would sanction such a proceeding distinguished by nothing but its
futility. It ought to be clear even to appellant that under the circumstances,
the lower court certainly could take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment
in a case that was previously pending and thereafter decided by it. That was
all that was done by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly
such an order is not contrary to law. A citation from the comments of former
Chief Justice Moran is relevant. Thus: "Courts have also taken judicial notice
of previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot
one, or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under
consideration." 3
2. There is another equally compelling consideration. Appellant undoubtedly
had recourse to a remedy which under the law then in force could be availed
of. It would have served the cause of justice better, not to mention the
avoidance of needless expense on his part and the vexation to which
appellees were subjected if he did reflect a little more on the matter. Then the
valuable time of this Tribunal would not have been frittered away on a
useless find hopeless appeal. It has, ever been the guiding principle
from Alonso v. Villamor, 4 a 1910 decision, that a litigant should not be
allowed to worship at the altar of technicality. That is not to dispense justice
according to law. Parties, and much more so their counsel, should ever keep
such an imperative of our legal system in mind. 5
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of September 26, 1966 is hereby
affirmed. With costs against plaintiff.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Villamor and

Makasiar, JJ., concur.
in the names of his heirs, the defendants in this case, namely Meden Jack,
Joker, Nonito and Zeferino, Jr., all surnamed Arroyo.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result.
On March 6, 1956 said heirs filed in the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur a petition (L.R.C. No. 144; G.L.R.O. No. 1025; Special Proceedings No.
900) in which they claimed that the technical description set forth in their
transfer certificate of title and in the original certificate of their predecessor
did not conform with that embodied in the decision of the land registration
court, and was less in area by some 157 square meters. They therefore
prayed that said description be corrected pursuant to Section 112 of the Land
Registration Act; that their certificate of title be cancelled and another one
issued to them containing the correct technical description. The petition was
filed in the registration record but was docketed as Special Proceedings No.
900.
Prieto v. Arroyo, 14 SCRA 549 (1965)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17885
June 30, 1965
GABRIEL P. PRIETO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MEDEN ARROYO, JACK ARROYO, NONITO ARROYO and ZEFERINO
ARROYO, JR., defendants-appellees.
Prila, Pardalis and Pejo for plaintiff-appellant.
Quijano and Azores and J. P. Arroyo for defendants-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Gabriel P. Prieto appealed to the Court of Appeals from the order of the Court
of First Instance of Camarines Sur dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No.
4280. Since only questions of law are involved the appeal has been certified
to this Court.
In 1948 Zeferino Arroyo, Sr. filed in the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur a petition for registration of several parcels of land, including Lot No. 2,
Plan Psu-106730 (L.R.C. No. 144; G.L.R.O. No. 1025). After the proper
proceedings Original Certificate of Title No. 39 covering said lot was issued in
his name. The same year and in the same Court Gabriel P. Prieto filed a
petition for registration of an adjoining parcel of land, described as Lot No. 3,
Plan Psu-117522 (L.R.C. No. 173; G.L.R.O. No. 1474). As a result Original
Certificate of Title No. 11 was issued in his name.
After the death of Zeferino Arroyo, Sr., Original Certificate of Title No. 39 was
cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 227 was issued
On May 23, 1956 the court issued an order directing the Register of Deeds of
Camarines Sur to "change, upon payment of his fees, the description in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 227 of Lot 2 in Plan Psu-106730 so as to
make it conform to that embodied in the decision of the Court on March 8,
1950, and to correct therein the spelling of the name of one of the petitioners
from 'Miden Arroyo' to 'Meden Arroyo'.
On November 29, 1956 Prieto filed against the defendants in the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur (in the original registration records of the two
lots) a petition to annul the order of May 23 in Special Proceedings No. 900.
At the hearing of the petition on July 12, 1957 neither he nor his counsel
appeared. Consequently, the trial court on the same day issued an order
dismissing the petition for failure to prosecute. A motion for reconsideration of
that order was denied on September 5, 1957.
On September 2, 1958 Prieto filed against the same defendants the present
action for annulment of Special Proceedings No. 900 and the order therein
entered on May 23, 1956. He also prayed that the 157 square meters
allegedly taken from his lot by virtue of said order be reconveyed to him.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata.
Plaintiff opposed, and on January 15, 1959 the court granted the motion. It is
from the order of dismissal, plaintiff having failed to secure its
reconsideration, that the appeal has been taken.
Appellant maintains that the institution of Special Proceedings No. 900 was
irregular and illegal mainly because he was not notified thereof and the same
was instituted almost six years after the issuance of the decree and title
sought to be corrected, and hence the order of the court dated May 23, 1956
for the correction of the technical description in appellees' title is void ab
initio.
The issue here, however, is not the validity of said Special Proceedings No.
900 but the propriety of the dismissal of appellant's complaint on the ground
of res adjudicata. The validity of the said proceedings was the issue in the
first case he filed. But because of his failure and that of his counsel to attend
the hearing the court dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. Since no
appeal was taken from the order of dismissal it had the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, the court not having provided otherwise (Rule
30, Section 3).
Appellant contends that said order could not have the effect of a judgment
because the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the
respondents therein, defendants-appellees here, as they did not file any
opposition or responsive pleading in that case. Appellees, on the other hand,
allege that they had voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction after they
were served copies of the petition. This allegation finds support in the record,
particularly in the following statement of appellant in his brief:
This petition was originally set for hearing on December 8, 1956, but
was postponed to January 14, 1957, due to lack of notice to the
respondents. Upon motion for postponements of respondents, now
defendants-appellees, the hearing of January 14, 1957 was
postponed to May 16, 1957. The hearing set for May 16, 1957 was
again postponed upon motion of the respondents to July 12, 1957.
Appellant next points out that the lower court should not have dismissed his
first petition for annulment because no "parole" evidence need be taken to
support it, the matters therein alleged being parts of the records of L.R.C. No.
144, G.L.R.O. No. 1025, and L.R.C. 173, G.L.R.O. No. 1474, which were well
within the judicial notice and cognizance of the said court.
hearing, which the court correctly denied. Finally, the point raised by counsel
is now academic, as no appeal was taken from the order dismissing his first
petition, and said order had long become final when the complaint in the
present action was filed.
The contention that the causes of action in the two suits are different is
untenable.
Both are based on the alleged nullity of Special Proceedings No. 900; in both
appellant seeks that the order of correction of the title of appellees be set
aside. Of no material significance is the fact that in the complaint in the
instant case there is an express prayer for reconveyance of some 157
square meters of land, taken from appellant as a result of such correction of
title. For that area would necessarily have reverted to appellant had his first
petition prospered, the relief asked for by him being that "the Register of
Deeds of Camarines Sur be ordered to amend Certificate of Title No. 332 by
incorporating therein only and solely the description of Lot No. 2, plan Psu106730 as appearing in the Decree No. 5165 and maintaining consequently
the description limits and area of the adjoining land of the herein petitioner,
Lot No. 3, plan Psu-117522, in accordance with Decree No. 2301 of Land
Registration No. 173." The claim for damages as well as for other additional
and alternative reliefs in the present case are not materially different from his
prayer for "such other remedies, just and equitable in the premises"
contained in the former one.
There being identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between
the two cases, the order of dismissal issued in the first constitutes a bar to
the institution of the second.
The appealed order is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon,
Regala,
Bengzon,
J.P.,
and
Zaldivar,
JJ.,
concur.
Barrera, J., is on leave.
In the first place, as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of
other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the
same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been
tried or are actually pending before the same judge (Municipal Council of San
Pedro, Laguna, et al. v. Colegio de San Jose, et al., 65 Phil. 318). Secondly,
if appellant had really wanted the court to take judicial notice of such records,
he should have presented the proper request or manifestation to that effect
instead of sending, by counsel, a telegraphic motion for postponement of
Tabuena v. CA, 196 SCRA 650 (1991)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 85423
May 6, 1991
JOSE TABUENA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA, JR., respondents.
Ramon Dimen for petitioner.
Dionisio A. Hernandez for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the
respondent court, for lack of basis. It is argued that the lower courts should
not have taken into account evidence not submitted by the private
respondent in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting of about
440 square meters and situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an
action for recovery of ownership thereof was filed in the Regional Trial Court
of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena, the herein
petitioner. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the
defendant was required to vacate the disputed lot. 1
As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime in
1926 to Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the United States. Tabernilla
returned to the Philippines in 1934, and Damasa Timtiman, acting upon her
son Juan's instruction, conveyed the subject land to Tabernilla. At the same
time, she requested that she be allowed to stay thereon as she had been
living there all her life. Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes
on the property, which she promised to do, and did. She remained on the
said land until her death, following which the petitioner, her son and halfbrother of Juan Peralta, Jr., took possession thereof. The complaint was filed
when demand was made upon Tabuena to surrender the property and he
refused, claiming it as his own.
The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the lot,
which he inherited from his parents, who acquired it even before World War II
and had been living thereon since then and until they died. Also disbelieved
was his contention that the subject of the sale between Peralta and Tabernilla
was a different piece of land planted to coconut trees and bounded on three
sides by the Makato River.
Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in arriving at its
factual findings, the trial court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A",
"B" and "C", which had been marked by the plaintiff but never formally
submitted in evidence. The trial court also erred when, to resolve the
ownership of the subject lot, it considered the proceedings in another case
involving the same parties but a different parcel of land.
The said exhibits are referred to in the pre-trial order as follows:
Plaintiff proceeded to mark the following exhibits: Exh. "A", letter
dated October 4, 1921 addressed in Makato, Capiz, Philippines; Exh.
"A-1", paragraph 2 of the letter indicating that the amount of P600.00
the first P300.00 and then another P300.00 as interest since
October 4, 1921; Exh. "A-2", is paragraph 3 of the letter; Exh. "B", a
Spanish document; Exh. "C", deed of conveyance filed by Tomasa
Timtiman and Alfredo Tabernilla in 1923; and Exh. "C-1", paragraph 4
of Exh. "C".
In sustaining the trial court, the respondent court held that, contrary to the
allegations of the appellant, the said exhibits were in fact formally submitted
in evidence as disclosed by the transcript of stenographic notes, which it
quoted at length. 2 The challenged decision also upheld the use by the trial
court of testimony given in an earlier case, to bolster its findings in the
second case.
We have examined the record and find that the exhibits submitted were not
the above-described documents but Exhibits "X" and "T" and their submarkings, which were the last will and testament of Alfredo Tabernilla and the
order of probate. It is not at all denied that the list of exhibits does not include
Exhibits "A", "B" and "C". In fact, the trial court categorically declared that
"Exhibits "A-1, "A-2", "B", "C" and "C-l," were not among those documents or
exhibits formally offered for admission by plaintiff-administratrix." This is a
clear contradiction of the finding of the appellate court, which seems to have
confused Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" with Exhibits "X" and "Y", the evidence
mentioned in the quoted transcript.
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as follows:
Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.The court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not
mean it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. It
is true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were marked at the pre-trial of the case
below, but this was only for the purpose of identifying them at that time. They
were not by such marking formally offered as exhibits. As we said
in Interpacific Transit, Inc. vs. Aviles, 3 "At the trial on the merits, the party
may decide to formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will advance its
cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event,
such documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any
evidentiary value."
Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule thus:
. . . The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his
findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the patties at the trial. 4
We did say in People vs. Napat-a 5 that even if there be no formal offer of an
exhibit, it may still be admitted against the adverse party if, first, it has been
duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it has itself been
incorporated in the records of the case. But we do not find that these
requirements have been satisfied in the case before us. The trial court said
the said exhibits could be validly considered because, even if they had not
been formally offered, one of the plaintiffs witnesses, Cunegunda Hernandez,
testified on them at the trial and was even cross-examined by the defendant's
counsel. We do not agree. Although she did testify, all she did was identify
the documents. Nowhere in her testimony can we find a recital of the
contents of the exhibits.
Thus, her interrogation on Exhibit "A" ran:
LEGASPI: That is this Exh. "A" about ?
A The translation of the letter.

Q What is the content of this Exh. "A", the letter of the sister of Juan
Peralta to Alfredo Tabernilla?
Court: The best evidence is the document. Proceed.
She also did not explain the contents of the other two exhibits.
The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no reversible
error in taking judicial notice of Tabuena's testimony in a case it had
previously heard which was closely connected with the case before it. It
conceded that as a general rule "courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of
the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are
pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may
have been heard or are actually pending b before the same
judge. 7 Nevertheless, it applied the exception that:
. . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all
parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original
record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case
pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party,
reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in
some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the
original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually
withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or
with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record
of the case then pending. 8
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence
of objection," "with the knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or
with the consent of the parties," the case is clearly referred to or "the original
or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives"
and "admitted as part of the record of the case then pending." These
conditions have not been established here. On the contrary, the petitioner
was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being
considered by the trial court in the case then pending before it. As the
petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly
sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract.
The respondent court said that even assuming that the trial court improperly
took judicial notice of the other case, striking off all reference thereto would
not be fatal to the plaintiff's cause because "the said testimony was merely
corroborative of other evidences submitted by the plaintiff." What "other
evidences"? The trouble with this justification is that the exhibits it intends to
corroborate, to wit, Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", have themselves not been
formally submitted.
Considering the resultant paucity of the evidence for the private respondent,
we feel that the complaint should have been dismissed by the trial court for
failure of the plaintiff to substantiate its allegations. It has failed to prove that
the subject lot was the same parcel of land sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. to
Alfredo Tabernilla and not another property, as the petitioner contends. Even
assuming it was the same lot, there is no explanation for the sale thereof by
Juan Peralta, Jr., who was only the son of Damasa Timtiman. According to
the trial court, "there is no question that before 1934 the land in question
belonged to Damasa Timtiman." Juan Peralta, Jr. could not have validly
conveyed title to property that did not belong to him unless he had
appropriate authorization from the owner. No such authorization has been
presented.
It is true that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, as
we have held in many cases.1wphi1However, that rule is also not absolute
and yields to the accepted and well-known exception. In the case at bar, it is
not even disputed that the petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest have
possessed the disputed property since even before World War II. In light of
this uncontroverted fact, the tax declarations in their name become weighty
and compelling evidence of the petitioner's ownership. As this Court has
held:
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by
prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
property. 9
It is only where payment of taxes is accompanied by actual
possession of the land covered by the tax declaration that such
circumstance may be material in supporting a claim of ownership. 10
The tax receipts accompanied by actual and continuous possession
of the subject parcels of land by the respondents and their parents
before them for more than 30 years qualify them to register title to
the said subject parcels of land. 11
The Court can only wonder why, if Alfredo Tabernilla did purchase the
property and magnanimously allowed Damasa Timtiman to remain there, he
did not at least require her to pay the realty taxes in his name, not hers. The
explanation given by the trial court is that he was not much concerned with
the property, being a bachelor and fond only of the three dogs he had bought
from America. That is specious reasoning. At best, it is pure conjecture. If he
were really that unconcerned, it is curious that he should have acquired the
property in the first place, even as dacion en pago. He would have
demanded another form of payment if he did not have the intention at all of
living on the land. On the other hand, if he were really interested in the
property, we do not see why he did not have it declared in his name when the
realty taxes thereon were paid by Damasa Timtiman or why he did not object
when the payments were made in her own name.
In comparison, all the acts of Damasa Timtiman and Jose Tabuena indicate
that they were the owners of the disputed property. Damasa Timtiman and
her forebears had been in possession thereof for more than fifty years and,
indeed, she herself stayed there until she died. 12 She paid the realty taxes
thereon in her own name. 13 Jose Tabuena built a house of strong materials
on the lot. 14 He even mortgaged the land to the Development Bank of the
Philippines and to two private persons who acknowledged him as the
owner. 15 These acts denote ownership and are not consistent with the
private respondent's claim that the petitioner was only an overseer with mere
possessory rights tolerated by Tabernilla.
It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings
of the courts below and even to regard them as conclusive where there is no
showing that they have been reached arbitrarily. The exception is where such
findings do not conform to the evidence on record and appear indeed to have
no valid basis to sustain their correctness. As in this case.
The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits "A", "B" and
"C", which had not been formally offered as evidence and therefore should
have been totally disregarded, conformably to the Rules of Court. The trial
court also erred when it relied on the evidence submitted in Civil Case No.
1327 and took judicial notice thereof without the consent or knowledge of the
petitioner, in violation of existing doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings
here challenged are as an edifice built upon shifting sands and should not
have been sustained by the respondent court.
Our own finding is that the private respondent, as plaintiff in the lower court,
failed to prove his claim of ownership over the disputed property with
evidence properly cognizable under our adjudicative laws. By contrast, there
is substantial evidence supporting the petitioner's contrary contentions that

should have persuaded the trial judge to rule in s favor and dismiss the
complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs against the private respondent. It is
so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
City of Manila v. Garcia, 19 SCRA 413 (1967)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26053
February 21, 1967
CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GERARDO GARCIA CARMENCITA VILLANUEVA, MODESTA
PARAYNO NARCISO PARAYNO, JUAN ASPERAS, MARIA TABIA
SIMEON DILIMAN, AQUILINO BARRIOS LEONORA RUIZ, LAUREANO
DIZO, BERNABE AYUDA LEOGARDA DE LOS SANTOS, ISABELO
OBAOB ANDREA RIPARIP, JOSE BARRIENTOS, URBANO
RAMOS,1 ELENA RAMOS, ESTEFANIA NEPACINA, MODESTA
SANCHEZ, MARCIAL LAZARO, MARCIANA ALANO, HONORIO BERIO
SEDORA ORAYLE, GLORIA VELASCO, WILARICO RICAMATA,
BENEDICTO DIAZ, ANA DEQUIZ (MRS.) ALUNAN, LORENZO
CARANDANG, JUAN PECAYO, FELICIDAD MIRANDA EMIGDIO
EGIPTO, defendants-appellants.
Mauricio Z. Alunan for defendants-appellants.
City Fiscal's Office for plaintiff-appellee.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area,
bordering Kansas, Vermont and Singalong streets in Malate, Manila, and
covered by Torrens Titles Nos. 49763, 37082 and 37558. Shortly after
liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon these premises
without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They built houses of second-class
materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and without the
necessary building permits from the city. There they lived thru the years to
the present.
In November, 1947, the presence of defendants having previously been
discovered, defendants Felicidad Miranda (Emigdio Egipto), Modesta C.
Parayno, Benedicto Diaz, Laureano Dizo, Jose Barrientos, Elena Ramos,
Estefania Nepacina, Modesta Sanchez, Honorio Berio, Gloria Velasco, Ana
Dequis Alunan and Benedicto Ofiaza (predecessor of defendant Carandang)
were given by Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso written permits each labeled
"lease contract" to occupy specific areas in the property upon conditions
therein set forth. Defendants Isabelo Obaob and Gerardo Garcia (in the
name of Marta A. Villanueva) received their permits from Mayor Manuel de la
Fuente on January 29 and March 18, respectively, both of 1948. The rest of
the 23 defendants exhibited none.
For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals.1wph1.t
Following are the rentals due as of February, 1962:
NAME
Area
Monthly
in sq.m. Rental
Amt. due from

date of delinquency
to Feb. 1962
1. Gerardo Garcia
66.00
P7.92
P1,628.97
2. Modesta C. Parayno
87.75
10.53
379.08
3. Juan Asperas
39.00
4.68
9.36
4. Maria Tabia
35.20
5.76
570.24
5. Aquilino Barrios
(Leonora Ruiz)
54.00
4.32
99.36
6. Laureano Dizo
35.00
2.80
22.40
7. Bernabe Ayuda
39.60
3.17
323.34
8. Isabelo Obaob
75.52
9.06
208.38
9. Jose Barrientos
39.53
4.74
744.18
10. Cecilia Manzano in

lieu of Urbano Ramos (deceased)
46.65
5.60
Paid up to
Feb. 1962.
11. Elena Ramos
34.80
2.78
186.26
12. Estefania Nepacina
41.80
3.34
504.34
13. Modesta Sanchez
33.48
2.68
444.88
14. Marcial Lazaro
22.40
1.79
688.32
15. Marciana Alano
25.80
2.06
255.44
16. Honorio Berio
24.00
1.92
188.16
17. Gloria Velasco
32.40
2.59
56.98
18. Wilarico Ricamata
45.83
3.67
739.68
19. Benedicto Diaz
40.20
4.82
Paid up to
March 1962.
20. Ana Dequis Alunan
64.26
7.71
30.84
21. Lorenzo Carandang
45.03
5.40
437.40
22. Juan N. Pecayo
25.52
3.06
30.60
23. Felicidad Miranda
48.02
5.76
132.48
P7,580.69
Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to

the property. Came the need for this school's expansion; it became pressing.
On September 14, 1961, plaintiff's City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's
directive to clear squatters' houses on city property, gave each of defendants
thirty (30) days to vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the
premises. This was followed by the City Treasurer's demand on each
defendant, made in February and March, 1962, for the payment of the
amount due by reason of the occupancy and to vacate in fifteen (15) days.
Defendants refused. Hence, this suit to recover possession. 2
The judgment below directed defendants to vacate the premises; to pay the
amounts heretofore indicated opposite their respective names; and to pay
their monthly rentals from March, 1962, until they vacate the said premises,
and the costs. Defendants appealed.
1. We are called upon to rule on the forefront question of whether the
trial court properly found that the city needs the premises for school
purposes.
The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board. That
document recites that the amount of P100,000.00 had been set
aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962-1963 Manila City Budget, for the
construction of an additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos
Elementary School. It is indeed correct to say that the court below, at
the hearing, ruled out the admissibility of said document. But then, in
the decision under review, the trial judge obviously revised his views.
He there declared that there was need for defendants to vacate the
premises for school expansion; he cited the very document, Exhibit
E, aforesaid.
It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the
case is within its power, to make it conformable to law and
justice.3 Such was done here. Defendants' remedy was to bring to
the attention of the court its contradictory stance. Not having done
so, this Court will not reopen the case solely for this purpose. 4
Anyway, elimination of the certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would
not profit defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could
well have taken because the was duty bound to take judicial
notice5 of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that the city charter of
Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all
ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila.6 And,
Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an
appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for the "construction of
additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.
Furthermore, defendants' position is vulnerable to assault from a
third direction. Defendants have absolutely no right to remain in the
premises. The excuse that they have permits from the mayor is at
best flimsy. The permits to occupy are recoverable on thirty days'
notice. They have been asked to leave; they refused to heed. It is in
this factual background that we say that the city's need for the
premises is unimportant. The city's right to throw defendants out of
the area cannot be gainsaid. The city's dominical right to possession
10
is paramount. If error there was in the finding that the city needs the
land, such error is harmless and will not justify reversal of the
judgment below.7
2. But defendants insist that they have acquired the legal status of
tenants. They are wrong.
They entered the land, built houses of second-class materials
thereon without the knowledge and consent of the city. Their homes
were erected without city permits.
These constructions are illegal. In a language familiar to all,
defendants are squatters:
Since the last global war, squatting on another's property in this
country has become a widespread vice. It was and is a blight.
Squatters' areas pose problems of health, sanitation. They are
breeding places for crime. They constitute proof that respect for the
law and the rights of others, even those of the government, are being
flouted. Knowingly, squatters have embarked on the pernicious act of
occupying property whenever and wherever convenient to their
interests without as much as leave, and even against the will, of
the owner. They are emboldened seemingly because of their belief
that they could violate the law with impunity. The pugnaciousness of
some of them has tied up the hands of legitimate owners. The latter
are thus prevented from recovering possession by peaceful means.
Government lands have not been spared by them. They know, of
course, that intrusion into property, government or private, is wrong.
But, then, the mills of justice grind slow, mainly because of lawyers
who, by means, fair or foul, are quite often successful in procuring
delay of the day of reckoning. Rampancy of forcible entry into
government lands particularly, is abetted by the apathy of some
public officials to enforce the government's rights. Obstinacy of these
squatters is difficult to explain unless it is spawned by official
tolerance, if not outright encouragement or protection. Said squatters
have become insensible to the difference between right and wrong.
To them, violation of law means nothing. With the result that
squatting still exists, much to the detriment of public interest. It is
high time that, in this aspect, sanity and the rule of law be restored. It
is in this environment that we look into the validity of the permits
granted defendants herein.
These permits, erroneously labeled "lease" contracts, were issued by

the mayors in 1947 and 1948 when the effects of the war had
simmered down and when these defendants could have very well
adjusted themselves. Two decades have now elapsed since the
unlawful entry. Defendants could have, if they wanted to, located
permanent premises for their abode. And yet, usurpers that they are,
they preferred to remain on city property.
Defendants' entry as aforesaid was illegal. Their constructions are as
illegal, without permits.8 The city charter enjoins the mayor to
"safeguard all the lands" of the City of Manila. 9
Surely enough, the permits granted did not "safeguard" the city's
land in question. It is our considered view that the Mayor of the City
of Manila cannot legalize forcible entry into public property by the
simple expedient of giving permits, or, for that matter, executing
leases.
Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of
the city officials will elevate it into a lawful act. In principle, a
compound of illegal entry and official permit to stay is obnoxious to
our concept of proper official norm of conduct. Because, such permit
does not serve social justice; it fosters moral decadence. It does not
promote public welfare; it abets disrespect for the law. It has its roots
in vice; so it is an infected bargain. Official approval of squatting
should not, therefore, be permitted to obtain in this country where
there is an orderly form of government.
We, accordingly, rule that the Manila mayors did not have authority to
give permits, written or oral, to defendants, and that the permits
herein granted are null and void.
3. Let us look into the houses and constructions planted by
defendants on the premises. They clearly hinder and impair the use
of that property for school purposes. The courts may well take
judicial notice of the fact that housing school children in the
elementary grades has been and still is a perennial problem in the
city. The selfish interests of defendants must have to yield to the
general good. The public purpose of constructing the school building
annex is paramount.10
In the situation thus obtaining, the houses and constructions
aforesaid constitute public nuisance per se. And this, for the reason
11
that they hinder and impair the use of the property for a badly
needed school building, to the prejudice of the education of the youth
of the land.11 They shackle the hands of the government and thus
obstruct performance of its constitutionally ordained obligation to
establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public
education, and more, to "provide at least free public primary
instruction".12
EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and KOREAN AIRLINES, respondent.
Reason dictates that no further delay should be countenanced. The

public nuisance could well have been summarily abated by the city
authorities themselves, even without the aid of the courts.13
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 61000 dismissing the petition
for certiorari and mandamus filed by Expertravel and Tours, Inc. (ETI).
4. Defendants challenge the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance

of Manila. They say that the case should have been started in the
municipal court. They prop up their position by the averment that
notice for them to vacate was only served in September, 1961, and
suit was started in July, 1962. Their legal ground is Section 1, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court. We have reached the conclusion that their
forcible entry dates back to the period from 1945 to 1947. That entry
was not legalized by the permits. Their possession continued to
remain illegal from incipiency. Suit was filed long after the one-year
limitation set forth in Section 1 of Rule 70. And the Manila Court of
First Instance has jurisdiction.14
The Antecedents
Upon the premises, we vote to affirm the judgment under review. Costs
against defendants-appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.
Expertravel & Tours v. CA, 459 SCRA 147 (2005)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 152392
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Korean Airlines (KAL) is a corporation established and registered in the

Republic of South Korea and licensed to do business in the Philippines. Its
general manager in the Philippines is Suk Kyoo Kim, while its appointed
counsel was Atty. Mario Aguinaldo and his law firm.
On September 6, 1999, KAL, through Atty. Aguinaldo, filed a
Complaint2 against ETI with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, for the
collection of the principal amount of P260,150.00, plus attorneys fees and
exemplary damages. The verification and certification against forum
shopping was signed by Atty. Aguinaldo, who indicated therein that he was
the resident agent and legal counsel of KAL and had caused the preparation
of the complaint.
ETI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo
was not authorized to execute the verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping as required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. KAL
opposed the motion, contending that Atty. Aguinaldo was its resident agent
and was registered as such with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) as required by the Corporation Code of the Philippines. It was further
alleged that Atty. Aguinaldo was also the corporate secretary of KAL.
Appended to the said opposition was the identification card of Atty.
Aguinaldo, showing that he was the lawyer of KAL.
During the hearing of January 28, 2000, Atty. Aguinaldo claimed that he had
been authorized to file the complaint through a resolution of the KAL Board of
Directors approved during a special meeting held on June 25, 1999. Upon
his motion, KAL was given a period of 10 days within which to submit a copy
May 26, 2005
12
of the said resolution. The trial court granted the motion. Atty. Aguinaldo
subsequently filed other similar motions, which the trial court granted.
Finally, KAL submitted on March 6, 2000 an Affidavit 3 of even date, executed
by its general manager Suk Kyoo Kim, alleging that the board of directors
conducted a special teleconference on June 25, 1999, which he and Atty.
Aguinaldo attended. It was also averred that in that same teleconference, the
board of directors approved a resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to
execute the certificate of non-forum shopping and to file the complaint. Suk
Kyoo Kim also alleged, however, that the corporation had no written copy of
the aforesaid resolution.
4
On April 12, 2000, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion to
dismiss, giving credence to the claims of Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim
that the KAL Board of Directors indeed conducted a teleconference on June
25, 1999, during which it approved a resolution as quoted in the submitted
affidavit.
ETI filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order, contending that it was
inappropriate for the court to take judicial notice of the said teleconference
without any prior hearing. The trial court denied the motion in its Order 5dated
August 8, 2000.
ETI then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, assailing the orders of
the RTC. In its comment on the petition, KAL appended a certificate signed
by Atty. Aguinaldo dated January 10, 2000, worded as follows:
SECRETARYS/RESIDENT AGENTS CERTIFICATE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
I, Mario A. Aguinaldo, of legal age, Filipino, and duly elected and
appointed Corporate Secretary and Resident Agent of KOREAN
AIRLINES, a foreign corporation duly organized and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of Korea and also duly
registered and authorized to do business in the Philippines, with
office address at Ground Floor, LPL Plaza Building, 124 Alfaro St.,
Salcedo Village, Makati City, HEREBY CERTIFY that during a
special meeting of the Board of Directors of the Corporation held on
June 25, 1999 at which a quorum was present, the said Board
unanimously passed, voted upon and approved the following
resolution which is now in full force and effect, to wit:
RESOLVED, that Mario A. Aguinaldo and his law firm M.A.

Aguinaldo & Associates or any of its lawyers are hereby
appointed and authorized to take with whatever legal action
necessary to effect the collection of the unpaid account of
Expert Travel & Tours. They are hereby specifically
authorized to prosecute, litigate, defend, sign and execute
any document or paper necessary to the filing and
prosecution of said claim in Court, attend the Pre-Trial
Proceedings and enter into a compromise agreement
relative to the above-mentioned claim.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this
10th day of January, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines.
(Sgd.)
MARIO A. AGUINALDO
Resident Agent
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 10th day of January,
1999, Atty. Mario A. Aguinaldo exhibiting to me his Community Tax
Certificate No. 14914545, issued on January 7, 2000 at Manila,
Philippines.
Doc. No. 119;
Page No. 25;
Book No. XXIV
Series of 2000.
(Sgd.)
ATTY. HENRY D. ADASA
Notary Public
Until December 31, 2000
PTR #889583/MLA 1/3/20006
On December 18, 2001, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition,

ruling that the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping executed by
Atty. Aguinaldo was sufficient compliance with the Rules of Court. According
to the appellate court, Atty. Aguinaldo had been duly authorized by the board
resolution approved on June 25, 1999, and was the resident agent of KAL.
As such, the RTC could not be faulted for taking judicial notice of the said
teleconference of the KAL Board of Directors.
ETI filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the CA
denied. Thus, ETI, now the petitioner, comes to the Court by way of petition
for review on certiorari and raises the following issue:
13
DID PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DEPART FROM

THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT RENDERED ITS QUESTIONED
DECISION AND WHEN IT ISSUED ITS QUESTIONED
RESOLUTION, ANNEXES A AND B OF THE INSTANT PETITION?7
The petitioner asserts that compliance with Section 5, Rule 7, of the Rules of
Court can be determined only from the contents of the complaint and not by
documents or pleadings outside thereof. Hence, the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, and the CA
erred in considering the affidavit of the respondents general manager, as
well as the Secretarys/Resident Agents Certification and the resolution of
the board of directors contained therein, as proof of compliance with the
requirements of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner also
maintains that the RTC cannot take judicial notice of the said
teleconferencewithout prior hearing, nor any motion therefor. The petitioner
reiterates its submission that the teleconference and the resolution adverted
to by the respondent was a mere fabrication.
The respondent, for its part, avers that the issue of whether modern
technology is used in the field of business is a factual issue; hence, cannot
be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. On the merits of the petition, it insists that Atty. Aguinaldo, as the
resident agent and corporate secretary, is authorized to sign and execute the
certificate of non-forum shopping required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules
of Court, on top of the board resolution approved during the teleconference
of June 25, 1999. The respondent insists that "technological advances in this
time and age are as commonplace as daybreak." Hence, the courts may take
judicial notice that the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc.
had provided a record of corporate conferences and meetings through
FiberNet using fiber-optic transmission technology, and that such technology
facilitates voice and image transmission with ease; this makes constant
communication between a foreign-based office and its Philippine-based
branches faster and easier, allowing for cost-cutting in terms of travel
concerns. It points out that even the E-Commerce Law has recognized this
modern technology. The respondent posits that the courts are aware of this
development in technology; hence, may take judicial notice thereof without
need of hearings. Even if such hearing is required, the requirement is
nevertheless satisfied if a party is allowed to file pleadings by way of
comment or opposition thereto.
In its reply, the petitioner pointed out that there are no rulings on the matter of
teleconferencing as a means of conducting meetings of board of directors for
purposes of passing a resolution; until and after teleconferencing is

recognized as a legitimate means of gathering a quorum of board of
directors, such cannot be taken judicial notice of by the court. It asserts that
safeguards must first be set up to prevent any mischief on the public or to
protect the general public from any possible fraud. It further proposes
possible amendments to the Corporation Code to give recognition to such
manner of board meetings to transact business for the corporation, or other
related corporate matters; until then, the petitioner asserts, teleconferencing
cannot be the subject of judicial notice.
The petitioner further avers that the supposed holding of a special meeting
on June 25, 1999 through teleconferencing where Atty. Aguinaldo was
supposedly given such an authority is a farce, considering that there was no
mention of where it was held, whether in this country or elsewhere. It insists
that the Corporation Code requires board resolutions of corporations to be
submitted to the SEC. Even assuming that there was such a teleconference,
it would be against the provisions of the Corporation Code not to have any
record thereof.
The petitioner insists that the teleconference and resolution adverted to by
the respondent in its pleadings were mere fabrications foisted by the
respondent and its counsel on the RTC, the CA and this Court.
The petition is meritorious.
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or
principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a)
that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or
claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if
he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim
has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5)
days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be
curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
14
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.
The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of
the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court,
without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful
and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for
summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
limitations or restrictions which may be imposed by special charter,

by-law, or statutory provisions, the same general principles of law
which govern the relation of agency for a natural person govern the
officer or agent of a corporation, of whatever status or rank, in
respect to his power to act for the corporation; and agents once
appointed, or members acting in their stead, are subject to the same
rules, liabilities and incapacities as are agents of individuals and
private persons."
It is settled that the requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is

mandatory8 and that the failure to comply with this requirement cannot be
excused. The certification is a peculiar and personal responsibility of the
party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other
pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of
action. Hence, the certification must be accomplished by the party himself
because he has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar
actions or proceedings in different courts or tribunals. Even his counsel may
be unaware of such facts.9 Hence, the requisite certification executed by the
plaintiffs counsel will not suffice.10
In a case where the plaintiff is a private corporation, the certification may be
signed, for and on behalf of the said corporation, by a specifically authorized
person, including its retained counsel, who has personal knowledge of the
facts required to be established by the documents. The reason was
explained by the Court in National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals,11 as
follows:
Unlike natural persons, corporations may perform physical actions
only through properly delegated individuals; namely, its officers
and/or agents.
For who else knows of the circumstances required in the

Certificate but its own retained counsel. Its regular officers, like its
board chairman and president, may not even know the details
required therein.
Indeed, the certificate of non-forum shopping may be incorporated in the
complaint or appended thereto as an integral part of the complaint. The rule
is that compliance with the rule after the filing of the complaint, or the
dismissal of a complaint based on its non-compliance with the rule, is
impermissible. However, in exceptional circumstances, the court may allow
subsequent compliance with the rule. 12 If the authority of a partys counsel to
execute a certificate of non-forum shopping is disputed by the adverse party,
the former is required to show proof of such authority or representation.
In this case, the petitioner, as the defendant in the RTC, assailed the
authority of Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the requisite verification and certificate
of non-forum shopping as the resident agent and counsel of the respondent.
It was, thus, incumbent upon the respondent, as the plaintiff, to allege and
establish that Atty. Aguinaldo had such authority to execute the requisite
verification and certification for and in its behalf. The respondent, however,
failed to do so.
The corporation, such as the petitioner, has no powers except those

expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those that are
implied by or are incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation
exercises said powers through its board of directors and/or its dulyauthorized officers and agents. Physical acts, like the signing of
documents, can be performed only by natural persons dulyauthorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by specific act of
the board of directors. "All acts within the powers of a corporation
may be performed by agents of its selection; and except so far as
The verification and certificate of non-forum shopping which

incorporated in the complaint and signed by Atty. Aguinaldo reads:
was
I, Mario A. Aguinaldo of legal age, Filipino, with office address at

Suite 210 Gedisco Centre, 1564 A. Mabini cor. P. Gil Sts., Ermita,
Manila, after having sworn to in accordance with law hereby deposes
and say: THAT -
15
1. I am the Resident Agent and Legal Counsel of the plaintiff in the

above entitled case and have caused the preparation of the above
complaint;
2. I have read the complaint and that all the allegations contained
therein are true and correct based on the records on files;
3. I hereby further certify that I have not commenced any other action
or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal
or agency. If I subsequently learned that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any tribunal or
agency, I will notify the court, tribunal or agency within five (5) days
from such notice/knowledge.
(Sgd.)
MARIO A. AGUINALDO
Affiant
CITY OF MANILA
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 30th day of August,
1999, affiant exhibiting to me his Community Tax Certificate No.
00671047 issued on January 7, 1999 at Manila, Philippines.
Doc. No. 1005;
Page No. 198;
Book No. XXI
Series of 1999.
(Sgd.)
ATTY. HENRY D. ADASA
Notary Public
Until December 31, 2000
PTR No. 320501 Mla. 1/4/9913
As gleaned from the aforequoted certification, there was no allegation that

Atty. Aguinaldo had been authorized to execute the certificate of non-forum
shopping by the respondents Board of Directors; moreover, no such board
resolution was appended thereto or incorporated therein.
While Atty. Aguinaldo is the resident agent of the respondent in the
Philippines, this does not mean that he is authorized to execute the requisite
certification against forum shopping. Under Section 127, in relation to Section
128 of the Corporation Code, the authority of the resident agent of a foreign
corporation with license to do business in the Philippines is to receive, for
and in behalf of the foreign corporation, services and other legal processes in
all actions and other legal proceedings against such corporation, thus:
SEC. 127. Who may be a resident agent. A resident agent may
either be an individual residing in the Philippines or a domestic
corporation lawfully transacting business in the Philippines: Provided,
That in the case of an individual, he must be of good moral character
and of sound financial standing.
SEC. 128. Resident agent; service of process. The Securities and
Exchange Commission shall require as a condition precedent to the
issuance of the license to transact business in the Philippines by any
foreign corporation that such corporation file with the Securities and
Exchange Commission a written power of attorney designating some
persons who must be a resident of the Philippines, on whom any
summons and other legal processes may be served in all actions or
other legal proceedings against such corporation, and consenting
that service upon such resident agent shall be admitted and held as
valid as if served upon the duly-authorized officers of the foreign
corporation as its home office.14
Under the law, Atty. Aguinaldo was not specifically authorized to execute a
certificate of non-forum shopping as required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court. This is because while a resident agent may be aware of
actions filed against his principal (a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines), such resident may not be aware of actions initiated by its
principal, whether in the Philippines against a domestic corporation or private
individual, or in the country where such corporation was organized and
registered, against a Philippine registered corporation or a Filipino citizen.
The respondent knew that its counsel, Atty. Aguinaldo, as its resident agent,
was not specifically authorized to execute the said certification. It attempted
to show its compliance with the rule subsequent to the filing of its complaint
by submitting, on March 6, 2000, a resolution purporting to have been
approved by its Board of Directors during a teleconference held on June 25,
1999, allegedly with Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim in attendance.
However, such attempt of the respondent casts veritable doubt not only on its
claim that such a teleconference was held, but also on the approval by the
Board of Directors of the resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the
certificate of non-forum shopping.
In its April 12, 2000 Order, the RTC took judicial notice that because of the
onset of modern technology, persons in one location may confer with other
16
persons in other places, and, based on the said premise, concluded that Suk
Kyoo Kim and Atty. Aguinaldo had a teleconference with the respondents
Board of Directors in South Korea on June 25, 1999. The CA, likewise, gave
credence to the respondents claim that such a teleconference took place, as
contained in the affidavit of Suk Kyoo Kim, as well as Atty. Aguinaldos
certification.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be
well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must
be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts
evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. [15] Moreover, a
judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that
it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable. 16
and (3) audio-conferencing-verbal communication via the telephone with

optional capacity for telewriting or telecopying. 19
A teleconference represents a unique alternative to face-to-face (FTF)
meetings. It was first introduced in the 1960s with American Telephone and
Telegraphs Picturephone. At that time, however, no demand existed for the
new technology. Travel costs were reasonable and consumers were unwilling
to pay the monthly service charge for using the picturephone, which was
regarded as more of a novelty than as an actual means for everyday
communication.20 In time, people found it advantageous to hold
teleconferencing in the course of business and corporate governance,
because of the money saved, among other advantages include:
1. People (including outside guest speakers) who wouldnt normally
attend a distant FTF meeting can participate.
2. Follow-up to earlier meetings can be done with relative ease and
little expense.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial matters coming

to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences
of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as
true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts
which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias,
dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are of
such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be
regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the
common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular
facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common
knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part,
is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court
has no constructive knowledge.17
3. Socializing is minimal compared to an FTF meeting; therefore,

meetings are shorter and more oriented to the primary purpose of
the meeting.
In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that
business transactions may be made by individuals through teleconferencing.
Teleconferencing is interactive group communication (three or more people in
two or more locations) through an electronic medium. In general terms,
teleconferencing can bring people together under one roof even though they
are separated by hundreds of miles.18 This type of group communication may
be used in a number of ways, and have three basic types: (1) video
conferencing - television-like communication augmented with sound; (2)
computer conferencing - printed communication through keyboard terminals,
7. Participants are generally better prepared than for FTF meetings.
4. Some routine meetings are more effective since one can audioconference from any location equipped with a telephone.
5. Communication between the home office and field staffs is
maximized.
6. Severe climate and/or unreliable transportation may necessitate
teleconferencing.
8. It is particularly satisfactory for simple problem-solving, information

exchange, and procedural tasks.
9. Group members participate more equally in well-moderated
teleconferences than an FTF meeting.21
On the other hand, other private corporations opt not to hold teleconferences
because of the following disadvantages:
17
1. Technical failures with equipment, including connections that arent

made.
2. Unsatisfactory for complex interpersonal communication, such as
negotiation or bargaining.
3. Impersonal, less easy to create an atmosphere of group rapport.
4. Lack of participant familiarity with the equipment, the medium
itself, and meeting skills.
5. Acoustical problems within the teleconferencing rooms.
6. Difficulty in determining participant speaking order; frequently one
person monopolizes the meeting.
7. Greater participant preparation time needed.
8. Informal, one-to-one, social interaction not possible. 22
Indeed, teleconferencing can only facilitate the linking of people; it does not
alter the complexity of group communication. Although it may be easier to
communicate via teleconferencing, it may also be easier to miscommunicate.
Teleconferencing cannot satisfy the individual needs of every type of
meeting.23
In the Philippines, teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members of
board of directors of private corporations is a reality, in light of Republic Act
No. 8792. The Securities and Exchange Commission issued SEC
Memorandum Circular No. 15, on November 30, 2001, providing the
guidelines to be complied with related to such conferences. 24 Thus, the Court
agrees with the RTC that persons in the Philippines may have a
teleconference with a group of persons in South Korea relating to business
transactions or corporate governance.
Even given the possibility that Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim participated
in a teleconference along with the respondents Board of Directors, the Court
is not convinced that one was conducted; even if there had been one, the
Court is not inclined to believe that a board resolution was duly passed
specifically authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to file the complaint and execute the
required certification against forum shopping.
The records show that the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that the respondent failed to comply with Section 5, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court. The respondent opposed the motion on December 1,
1999, on its contention that Atty. Aguinaldo, its resident agent, was duly
authorized to sue in its behalf. The respondent, however, failed to establish
its claim that Atty. Aguinaldo was its resident agent in the Philippines. Even
the identification card25 of Atty. Aguinaldo which the respondent appended to
its pleading merely showed that he is the company lawyer of the
respondents Manila Regional Office.
The respondent, through Atty. Aguinaldo, announced the holding of the
teleconference only during the hearing of January 28, 2000; Atty. Aguinaldo
then prayed for ten days, or until February 8, 2000, within which to submit the
board resolution purportedly authorizing him to file the complaint and execute
the required certification against forum shopping. The court granted the
motion.26 The respondent, however, failed to comply, and instead prayed for
15 more days to submit the said resolution, contending that it was with its
main office in Korea. The court granted the motion per its Order 27 dated
February 11, 2000. The respondent again prayed for an extension within
which to submit the said resolution, until March 6, 2000. 28 It was on the said
date that the respondent submitted an affidavit of its general manager Suk
Kyoo Kim, stating, inter alia, that he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended the said
teleconference on June 25, 1999, where the Board of Directors supposedly
approved the following resolution:
RESOLVED, that Mario A. Aguinaldo and his law firm M.A. Aguinaldo
& Associates or any of its lawyers are hereby appointed and
authorized to take with whatever legal action necessary to effect the
collection of the unpaid account of Expert Travel & Tours. They are
hereby specifically authorized to prosecute, litigate, defend, sign and
execute any document or paper necessary to the filing and
prosecution of said claim in Court, attend the Pre-trial Proceedings
and enter into a compromise agreement relative to the abovementioned claim.29
But then, in the same affidavit, Suk Kyoo Kim declared that the respondent
"do[es] not keep a written copy of the aforesaid Resolution" because no
records of board resolutions approved during teleconferences were kept.
This belied the respondents earlier allegation in its February 10, 2000 motion
for extension of time to submit the questioned resolution that it was in the
custody of its main office in Korea. The respondent gave the trial court the
impression that it needed time to secure a copy of the resolution kept in
Korea, only to allege later (via the affidavit of Suk Kyoo Kim) that it had no
18
such written copy. Moreover, Suk Kyoo Kim stated in his affidavit that the
resolution was embodied in the Secretarys/Resident Agents Certificate
signed by Atty. Aguinaldo. However, no such resolution was appended to the
said certificate.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Acting C.J., (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.
Tinga, J., out of the country.
The respondents allegation that its board of directors conducted a

teleconference on June 25, 1999 and approved the said resolution (with Atty.
Aguinaldo in attendance) is incredible, given the additional fact that no such
allegation was made in the complaint. If the resolution had indeed been
approved on June 25, 1999, long before the complaint was filed, the
respondent should have incorporated it in its complaint, or at least appended
a copy thereof. The respondent failed to do so. It was only on January 28,
2000 that the respondent claimed, for the first time, that there was such a
meeting of the Board of Directors held on June 25, 1999; it even represented
to the Court that a copy of its resolution was with its main office in Korea,
only to allege later that no written copy existed. It was only on March 6, 2000
that the respondent alleged, for the first time, that the meeting of the Board of
Directors where the resolution was approved was held via teleconference.
Worse still, it appears that as early as January 10, 1999, Atty. Aguinaldo had
signed a Secretarys/Resident Agents Certificate alleging that the board of
directors held a teleconference on June 25, 1999. No such certificate was
appended to the complaint, which was filed on September 6, 1999. More
importantly, the respondent did not explain why the said certificate was
signed by Atty. Aguinaldo as early as January 9, 1999, and yet was notarized
one year later (on January 10, 2000); it also did not explain its failure to
append the said certificate to the complaint, as well as to its Compliance
dated March 6, 2000. It was only on January 26, 2001 when the respondent
filed its comment in the CA that it submitted the Secretarys/Resident Agents
Certificate30 dated January 10, 2000.
The Court is, thus, more inclined to believe that the alleged teleconference
on June 25, 1999 never took place, and that the resolution allegedly
approved by the respondents Board of Directors during the said
teleconference was a mere concoction purposefully foisted on the RTC, the
CA and this Court, to avert the dismissal of its complaint against the
petitioner.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61000 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is hereby ORDERED to
dismiss, without prejudice, the complaint of the respondent.
Social Justice Society v. Atienza G.R. No. 156052, 13

February 2008

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 156052
February 13, 2008
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO

and BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON,petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of
Manila, respondent.
x----------------------x
CHEVRON PHILIPPINES INC., PETRON CORPORATION and PILIPINAS
SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION,movants-intervenors.
x----------------------x
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, movant-intervenor.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
After we promulgated our decision in this case on March 7, 2007, Chevron
Philippines Inc. (Chevron), Petron Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell
19
Petroleum Corporation (Shell) (collectively, the oil companies) and the

Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Energy (DOE),
filed their respective motions for leave to intervene and for reconsideration of
the decision.
Chevron1 is engaged in the business of importing, distributing and marketing
of petroleum products in the Philippines while Shell and Petron are engaged
in the business of manufacturing, refining and likewise importing, distributing
and marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines. 2 The DOE is a
governmental agency created under Republic Act (RA) No. 7638 3 and tasked
to prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs,
projects and activities of the government relative to energy exploration,
development, utilization, distribution and conservation. 4
The facts are restated briefly as follows:
Petitioners Social Justice Society, Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio
S. Tumbokon, in an original petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then
mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. This ordinance
was enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila on November 20,
2001,5 approved by respondent Mayor on November 28, 2001, 6 and became
effective on December 28, 2001 after publication.7 Sections 1 and 3 thereof
state:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and
ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the residents of
Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use
of [those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north,
PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong
St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pandacan in the west[,] PNR
Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the
[n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the
southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River,
Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby
reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I.
xxx
xxx
xxx
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the

operation of which are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof,
are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of
effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the
operation of businesses which are hereby in consequence,

disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed
under the reclassification to cease and desist from operating their businesses
within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the
businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of
the oil companies.
On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE)
entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) 8 with the oil
companies. They agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals
[was] the most viable and practicable option." The Sangguniang
Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.9 In the same resolution,
the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six
months starting July 25, 2002.10 Thereafter, on January 30, 2003,
the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 1311extending the validity of
Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing the mayor of Manila to
issue special business permits to the oil companies.12
This was the factual backdrop presented to the Court which became the
basis of our March 7, 2007 decision. We ruled that respondent had the
ministerial duty under the Local Government Code (LGC) to "enforce all laws
and ordinances relative to the governance of the city," 13 including Ordinance
No. 8027. We also held that we need not resolve the issue of whether the
MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent
resolutions passed by the Sanggunian could amend or repeal Ordinance No.
8027 since the resolutions which ratified the MOU and made it binding on the
City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003.
We concluded that there was nothing that legally hindered respondent from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.
After we rendered our decision on March 7, 2007, the oil companies and
DOE sought to intervene and filed motions for reconsideration in intervention
on March 12, 2007 and March 21, 2007 respectively. On April 11, 2007, we
conducted the oral arguments in Baguio City to hear petitioners, respondent
and movants-intervenors oil companies and DOE.
The oil companies called our attention to the fact that on April 25, 2003,
Chevron had filed a complaint against respondent and the City of Manila in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 39, for the annulment of
Ordinance No. 8027 with application for writs of preliminary prohibitory
20
injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction.14 The case was docketed as

civil case no. 03-106377. On the same day, Shell filed a petition for
prohibition and mandamus likewise assailing the validity of Ordinance No.
8027 and with application for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction.15 This was docketed as civil case no. 03106380. Later on, these two cases were consolidated and the RTC of Manila,
Branch 39 issued an order dated May 19, 2003 granting the applications for
writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory
injunction:
WHEREFORE, upon the filing of a total bond of TWO MILLION (Php
2,000,000.00) PESOS, let a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction
be issued ordering [respondent] and the City of Manila, their officers,
agents, representatives, successors, and any other persons
assisting or acting in their behalf, during the pendency of the case, to
REFRAIN from taking steps to enforce Ordinance No. 8027, and let
a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction be issued ordering
[respondent] to issue [Chevron and Shell] the necessary Business
Permits to operate at the Pandacan Terminal.16
Petron likewise filed its own petition in the RTC of Manila, Branch 42, also
attacking the validity of Ordinance No. 8027 with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO). This
was docketed as civil case no. 03-106379. In an order dated August 4, 2004,
the RTC enjoined the parties to maintain the status quo. 17
Thereafter, in 2006, the city council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8119,
also known as the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning
Ordinance of 2006.18 This was approved by respondent on June 16, 2006. 19
Aggrieved anew, Chevron and Shell filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila,
Branch 20, asking for the nullification of Ordinance No. 8119. 20 This was
docketed as civil case no. 06-115334. Petron filed its own complaint on the
same causes of action in the RTC of Manila, Branch 41. 21 This was docketed
as civil case no. 07-116700.22 The court issued a TRO in favor of Petron,
enjoining the City of Manila and respondent from enforcing Ordinance No.
8119.23
Meanwhile, in civil case no. 03-106379, the parties filed a joint motion to
withdraw complaint and counterclaim on February 20, 2007. 24 In an order
dated April 23, 2007, the joint motion was granted and all the claims and
counterclaims of the parties were withdrawn.25
Given these additional pieces of information, the following were submitted as

issues for our resolution:
1. whether movants-intervenors should be allowed to intervene in
this case;26
2. whether the following are impediments to the execution of our
March 7, 2007 decision:
(a) Ordinance No. 8119, the enactment and existence of
which were not previously brought by the parties to the
attention of the Court and
(b) writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary
mandatory injunction and status quo order issued by the
RTC of Manila, Branches 39 and 42 and
3. whether the implementation of Ordinance No. 8027 will unduly
encroach upon the DOEs powers and functions involving energy
resources.
During the oral arguments, the parties submitted to this Courts power to rule
on the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 8027 despite the
pendency of consolidated cases involving this issue in the RTC. 27 The
importance of settling this controversy as fully and as expeditiously as
possible was emphasized, considering its impact on public interest. Thus, we
will also dispose of this issue here. The parties were after all given ample
opportunity to present and argue their respective positions. By so doing, we
will do away with the delays concomitant with litigation and completely
adjudicate an issue which will most likely reach us anyway as the final arbiter
of all legal disputes.
Before we resolve these issues, a brief review of the history of the Pandacan
Terminals is called for to put our discussion in the proper context.
History Of The Pandacan Oil Terminals
Pandacan (one of the districts of the City of Manila) is situated along the
banks of the Pasig river. At the turn of the twentieth century, Pandacan was
unofficially designated as the industrial center of Manila. The area, then
largely uninhabited, was ideal for various emerging industries as the nearby
river facilitated the transportation of goods and products. In the 1920s, it was
21
classified as an industrial zone.28 Among its early industrial settlers were the
oil companies. Shell established its installation there on January 30,
1914.29 Caltex (now Chevron) followed suit in 1917 when the company began
marketing its products in the country.30 In 1922, it built a warehouse depot
which was later converted into a key distribution terminal. 31 The corporate
presence in the Philippines of Esso (Petrons predecessor) became more
keenly felt when it won a concession to build and operate a refinery in
Bataan in 1957.32 It then went on to operate a state-of-the-art lube oil
blending plant in the Pandacan Terminals where it manufactures lubes and
greases.33
On December 8, 1941, the Second World War reached the shores of the
Philippine Islands. Although Manila was declared an open city, the Americans
had no interest in welcoming the Japanese. In fact, in their zealous attempt
to fend off the Japanese Imperial Army, the United States Army took control
of the Pandacan Terminals and hastily made plans to destroy the storage
facilities to deprive the advancing Japanese Army of a valuable logistics
weapon.34 The U.S. Army burned unused petroleum, causing a frightening
conflagration. Historian Nick Joaquin recounted the events as follows:
After the USAFFE evacuated the City late in December 1941, all
army fuel storage dumps were set on fire. The flames spread,
enveloping the City in smoke, setting even the rivers ablaze,
endangering bridges and all riverside buildings. For one week
longer, the "open city" blazeda cloud of smoke by day, a pillar of
fire by night.35
The fire consequently destroyed the Pandacan Terminals and rendered its
network of depots and service stations inoperative. 36
After the war, the oil depots were reconstructed. Pandacan changed as
Manila rebuilt itself. The three major oil companies resumed the operation of
their depots.37 But the district was no longer a sparsely populated industrial
zone; it had evolved into a bustling, hodgepodge community. Today,
Pandacan has become a densely populated area inhabited by about 84,000
people, majority of whom are urban poor who call it home. 38 Aside from
numerous industrial installations, there are also small businesses, churches,
restaurants, schools, daycare centers and residences situated
there.39 Malacaang Palace, the official residence of the President of the
Philippines and the seat of governmental power, is just two kilometers
away.40 There is a private school near the Petron depot. Along the walls of
the Shell facility are shanties of informal settlers. 41 More than 15,000
students are enrolled in elementary and high schools situated near these
facilities.42 A university with a student population of about 25,000 is located

directly across the depot on the banks of the Pasig river.43
The 36-hectare Pandacan Terminals house the oil companies distribution
terminals and depot facilities.44 The refineries of Chevron and Shell in
Tabangao and Bauan, both in Batangas, respectively, are connected to the
Pandacan Terminals through a 114-kilometer45 underground pipeline
system.46 Petrons refinery in Limay, Bataan, on the other hand, also services
the depot.47 The terminals store fuel and other petroleum products and
supply 95% of the fuel requirements of Metro Manila, 48 50% of Luzons
consumption and 35% nationwide.49 Fuel can also be transported through
barges along the Pasig river or tank trucks via the South Luzon Expressway.
We now discuss the first issue: whether movants-intervenors should be
allowed to intervene in this case.
Intervention Of The Oil Companies And The DOE Should Be Allowed In
The Interest of Justice
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the
proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or
preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such
proceedings.50 The pertinent rules are Sections 1 and 2, Rule 19 of the Rules
of Court:
SEC. 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by
a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors
rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
SEC. 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at
any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the
pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served
on the original parties.
Thus, the following are the requisites for intervention of a non-party:
22
(1) Legal interest

(a) in the matter in controversy; or
(b) in the success of either of the parties; or
I against both parties; or
(d) person is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of
the court or of an officer thereof;
(2) Intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
rights of original parties;
(3) Intervenors rights may not be fully protected in a separate
proceeding51 and
(g)The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition
of judgment by the trial court.
For both the oil companies and DOE, the last requirement is definitely
absent. As a rule, intervention is allowed "before rendition of judgment" as
Section 2, Rule 19 expressly provides. Both filed their separate motions after
our decision was promulgated. In Republic of the Philippines v. Gingoyon,52 a
recently decided case which was also an original action filed in this Court, we
declared that the appropriate time to file the motions-in-intervention was
before and not after resolution of the case.53
The Court, however, has recognized exceptions to Section 2, Rule 19 in the
interest of substantial justice:
The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure, is intended
to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for
justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of rival
claims overriding technicalities on the timeliness of the filing
thereof.54
The oil companies assert that they have a legal interest in this case because
the implementation of Ordinance No. 8027 will directly affect their business
and property rights.55
[T]he interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between

other parties must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and
immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by
direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if
persons not parties to the action were allowed to intervene,
proceedings would become unnecessarily complicated, expensive
and interminable. And this would be against the policy of the law. The
words "an interest in the subject" means a direct interest in the cause
of action as pleaded, one that would put the intervenor in a legal
position to litigate a fact alleged in the complaint without the
establishment of which plaintiff could not recover.56
We agree that the oil companies have a direct and immediate interest in the
implementation of Ordinance No. 8027. Their claim is that they will need to
spend billions of pesos if they are compelled to relocate their oil depots out of
Manila. Considering that they admitted knowing about this case from the time
of its filing on December 4, 2002, they should have intervened long before
our March 7, 2007 decision to protect their interests. But they did
not.57 Neither did they offer any worthy explanation to justify their late
intervention.
Be that as it may, although their motion for intervention was not filed on time,
we will allow it because they raised and presented novel issues and
arguments that were not considered by the Court in its March 7, 2007
decision. After all, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court before which the case is
pending.58 Considering the compelling reasons favoring intervention, we do
not think that this will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of rights of
the original parties. In fact, it will be expedited since their intervention will
enable us to rule on the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027 instead of
waiting for the RTCs decision.
The DOE, on the other hand, alleges that its interest in this case is also direct
and immediate as Ordinance No. 8027 encroaches upon its exclusive and
national authority over matters affecting the oil industry. It seeks to intervene
in order to represent the interests of the members of the public who stand to
suffer if the Pandacan Terminals operations are discontinued. We will tackle
the issue of the alleged encroachment into DOEs domain later on. Suffice it
to say at this point that, for the purpose of hearing all sides and considering
the transcendental importance of this case, we will also allow DOEs
intervention.
23
The Injunctive Writs Are Not Impediments To The Enforcement Of

Ordinance No. 8027
We now proceed to the issue of whether the injunctive writs are legal
impediments to the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027.
Under Rule 65, Section 359 of the Rules of Court, a petition

for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.
According to the oil companies, respondent did not unlawfully fail or neglect
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 because he was lawfully prevented from
doing so by virtue of the injunctive writs and status quo order issued by the
RTC of Manila, Branches 39 and 42.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction:
First, we note that while Chevron and Shell still have in their favor the writs of
preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction, the status quo
order in favor of Petron is no longer in effect since the court granted the joint
motion of the parties to withdraw the complaint and counterclaim. 60
Second, the original parties failed to inform the Court about these injunctive
writs. Respondent (who was also impleaded as a party in the RTC cases)
defends himself by saying that he informed the court of the pendency of the
civil cases and that a TRO was issued by the RTC in the consolidated cases
filed by Chevron and Shell. It is true that had the oil companies only
intervened much earlier, the Court would not have been left in the dark about
these facts. Nevertheless, respondent should have updated the Court, by
way of manifestation, on such a relevant matter.
In his memorandum, respondent mentioned the issuance of a TRO. Under
Section 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a TRO issued by the RTC is
effective only for a period of 20 days. This is why, in our March 7, 2007
decision, we presumed with certainty that this had already
lapsed.61 Respondent also mentioned the grant of injunctive writs in his
rejoinder which the Court, however, expunged for being a prohibited
pleading. The parties and their counsels were clearly remiss in their duties to
this Court.
In resolving controversies, courts can only consider facts and issues pleaded
by the parties.62 Courts, as well as magistrates presiding over them are not
omniscient. They can only act on the facts and issues presented before them
in appropriate pleadings. They may not even substitute their own personal
knowledge for evidence. Nor may they take notice of matters except those
expressly provided as subjects of mandatory judicial notice.
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. A

preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the
whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act
or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant; or
(g) IThat a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or
is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act
or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting
the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.
There are two requisites for the issuance of a preliminary injunction: (1) the
right to be protected exists prima facieand (2) the acts sought to be enjoined
are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be
prevented will cause an irreparable injustice.
The act sought to be restrained here was the enforcement of Ordinance No.
8027. It is a settled rule that an ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity
and, as such, cannot be restrained by injunction. 63 Nevertheless, when the
validity of the ordinance is assailed, the courts are not precluded from issuing
an injunctive writ against its enforcement. However, we have declared that
the issuance of said writ is proper only when:
... the petitioner assailing the ordinance has made out a case of
unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind of
the judge, the presumption of validity, in addition to a showing of
a clear legal right to the remedy sought....64 (Emphasis supplied)
24
Judge Reynaldo G. Ros, in his order dated May 19, 2003, stated his basis for
issuing the injunctive writs:
The Court, in resolving whether or not a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction should be issued, is guided by
the following requirements: (1) a clear legal right of the complainant;
(2) a violation of that right; and (3) a permanent and urgent necessity
for the Writ to prevent serious damage. The Court believes that these
requisites are present in these cases.
There is no doubt that the plaintiff/petitioners have been legitimately
operating their business in the Pandacan Terminal for many years
and they have made substantial capital investment therein. Every
year they were issued Business Permits by the City of Manila. Its
operations have not been declared illegal or contrary to law or
morals. In fact, because of its vital importance to the national
economy, it was included in the Investment Priorities Plan as
mandated under the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of
1988 (R.A. 8479). As a lawful business, the plaintiff/petitioners have
a right, therefore, to continue their operation in the Pandacan
Terminal and the right to protect their investments. This is a clear and
unmistakable right of the plaintiff/petitioners.
The enactment, therefore, of City Ordinance No. 8027 passed by the
City Council of Manila reclassifying the area where the Pandacan
Terminal is located from Industrial II to Commercial I and requiring
the plaintiff/petitioners to cease and desist from the operation of their
business has certainly violated the rights of the plaintiff/petitioners to
continue their legitimate business in the Pandacan Terminal and
deprived them of their huge investments they put up therein. Thus,
before the Court, therefore, determines whether the Ordinance in
question is valid or not, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and a Writ of
Mandatory Injunction be issued to prevent serious and irreparable
damage to plaintiff/petitioners.65
Nowhere in the judges discussion can we see that, in addition to a
showing of a clear legal right of Chevron and Shell to the remedy
sought, he was convinced that they had made out a case of
unconstitutionality or invalidity strong enough to overcome the
presumption of validity of the ordinance. Statutes and ordinances are
presumed valid unless and until the courts declare the contrary in clear and
unequivocal terms.66 The mere fact that the ordinance is alleged to be
unconstitutional or invalid will not entitle a party to have its enforcement
enjoined.67 The presumption is all in favor of validity. The reason for this is
obvious:
The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be
lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be
familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with
all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and
necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the
ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are
essential to the well being of the people . . . The Judiciary should not
lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion
of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation. 68
Xxx
...[Courts] accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide
by the Constitution but also because the judiciary[,] in the
determination of actual cases and controversies[,] must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.69
The oil companies argue that this presumption must be set aside when the
invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance
itself.70 We see no reason to set aside the presumption. The ordinance, on its
face, does not at all appear to be unconstitutional. It reclassified the subject
area from industrial to commercial. Prima facie, this power is within the
power of municipal corporations:
The power of municipal corporations to divide their territory into
industrial, commercial and residential zones is recognized in almost
all jurisdictions inasmuch as it is derived from the police power itself
and is exercised for the protection and benefit of their inhabitants. 71
Xxx
There can be no doubt that the City of Manila has the power to divide
its territory into residential and industrial zones, and to prescribe that
offensive and unwholesome trades and occupations are to be
established exclusively in the latter zone.
25
xxx
xxx
xxx
Likewise, it cannot be denied that the City of Manila has the

authority, derived from the police power, of forbidding the appellant to
continue the manufacture of toyo in the zone where it is now
situated, which has been declared residential....72
Courts will not invalidate an ordinance unless it clearly appears that it is
unconstitutional. There is no such showing here. Therefore, the injunctive
writs issued in the Manila RTCs May 19, 2003 order had no leg to stand on.
We are aware that the issuance of these injunctive writs is not being assailed
as tainted with grave abuse of discretion. However, we are confronted with
the question of whether these writs issued by a lower court are impediments
to the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027 (which is the subject of
the mandamus petition). As already discussed, we rule in the negative.
Ordinance No. 8027 Was Not Superseded By Ordinance No. 8119
The March 7, 2007 decision did not take into consideration the passage of
Ordinance No. 8119 entitled "An Ordinance Adopting the Manila
Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Regulations of 2006 and
Providing for the Administration, Enforcement and Amendment thereto" which
was approved by respondent on June 16, 2006. The simple reason was that
the Court was never informed about this ordinance.
While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by
Congress, the rule with respect to local ordinances is different. Ordinances
are not included in the enumeration of matters covered by mandatory judicial
notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. 73
Although, Section 50 of RA 40974 provides that:
SEC. 50 Judicial notice of ordinances. - All courts sitting in the city
shall take judicial notice of the ordinances passed by the
[Sangguniang Panglungsod].
This cannot be taken to mean that this Court, since it has its seat in the City
of Manila, should have taken steps to procure a copy of the ordinance on its
own, relieving the party of any duty to inform the Court about it.
Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial notice of
municipal ordinances, a court is not required to take judicial notice of
ordinances that are not before it and to which it does not have access. The
party asking the court to take judicial notice is obligated to supply the court
with the full text of the rules the party desires it to have notice of. 75 Counsel
should take the initiative in requesting that a trial court take judicial notice of
an ordinance even where a statute requires courts to take judicial notice of
local ordinances.76
The intent of a statute requiring a court to take judicial notice of a local
ordinance is to remove any discretion a court might have in determining
whether or not to take notice of an ordinance. Such a statute does not direct
the court to act on its own in obtaining evidence for the record and a party
must make the ordinance available to the court for it to take notice. 77
In its defense, respondent claimed that he did not inform the Court about the
enactment of Ordinance No. 8119 because he believed that it was different
from Ordinance No. 8027 and that the two were not inconsistent with each
other.78
In the same way that we deem the intervenors late intervention in this case
unjustified, we find the failure of respondent, who was an original party here,
inexcusable.
The Rule On Judicial Admissions Is Not Applicable Against Respondent
The oil companies assert that respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance
No. 8027 was repealed by Ordinance No. 8119 in civil case no. 03-106379
(where Petron assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027) when the
parties in their joint motion to withdraw complaint and counterclaim stated
that "the issue ...has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the
passage of [Ordinance No. 8119]."79 They contend that such admission
worked as an estoppel against the respondent.
Respondent countered that this stipulation simply meant that Petron was
recognizing the validity and legality of Ordinance No. 8027 and that it had
conceded the issue of said ordinances constitutionality, opting instead to
question the validity of Ordinance No. 8119.80 The oil companies deny this
and further argue that respondent, in his answer in civil case no. 06-115334
(where Chevron and Shell are asking for the nullification of Ordinance No.
8119), expressly stated that Ordinance No. 8119 replaced Ordinance No.
8027:81
26
... Under Ordinance No. 8027, businesses whose uses are not in
accord with the reclassification were given six months to cease [their]
operation. Ordinance No. 8119, which in effect, replaced
Ordinance [No.] 8027, merely took note of the time frame provided
for in Ordinance No. 8119.... Ordinance No. 8119 thus provided for
an even longer term, that is[,] seven years; 82 (Emphasis supplied)
Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written,
made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case,
does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. (Emphasis supplied)
Zone (R-3/MXD)"87 whereas Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the same area
from Industrial II to Commercial I:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and
ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the residents of
Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of [those]
portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track
in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and
Estero de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area,
Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr.
M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the
Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are
herebyreclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I. (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Ordinance No. 8119 provides for a phase-out of seven years:
While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently

take a position contrary to or inconsistent with what was pleaded, 83 the
aforestated rule is not applicable here. Respondent made the statements
regarding the ordinances in civil case nos. 03-106379 and 06-115334 which
are not "the same" as this case before us.84 To constitute a judicial
admission, the admission must be made in the same case in which it is
offered.
Hence, respondent is not estopped from claiming that Ordinance No. 8119
did not supersede Ordinance No. 8027. On the contrary, it is the oil
companies which should be considered estopped. They rely on the argument
that Ordinance No. 8119 superseded Ordinance No. 8027 but, at the same
time, also impugn its (8119s) validity. We frown on the adoption of
inconsistent positions and distrust any attempt at clever positioning under
one or the other on the basis of what appears advantageous at the moment.
Parties cannot take vacillating or contrary positions regarding the validity of a
statute85 or ordinance. Nonetheless, we will look into the merits of the
argument of implied repeal.
Ordinance No. 8119 Did Not Impliedly Repeal Ordinance No. 8027
Both the oil companies and DOE argue that Ordinance No. 8119 repealed
Ordinance No. 8027. They assert that although there was no express
repeal86 of Ordinance No. 8027, Ordinance No. 8119 impliedly repealed it.
According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8119 reclassified the area
covering the Pandacan Terminals to "High Density Residential/Mixed Use
SEC. 72. Existing Non-Conforming Uses and Buildings. - The lawful

use of any building, structure or land at the time of the adoption of
this Ordinance may be continued, although such use does not
conform with the provision of the Ordinance, provided:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(g) In case the non-conforming use is an industrial use:

xxx
xxx
xxx
d. The land use classified as non-conforming shall

program the phase-out and relocation of the nonconforming use within seven (7) years from the date of
effectivity of this Ordinance. (Emphasis supplied)
This is opposed to Ordinance No. 8027 which compels affected entities to
vacate the area within six months from the effectivity of the ordinance:
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the
operation of which are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof,
are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of
effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the
operation of businesses which are hereby in consequence,
disallowed.
27
Ordinance No. 8119 also designated the Pandacan oil depot area as a
"Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD)":
SEC. 23. Use Regulations in Planned Unit Development/Overlay
Zone (O-PUD). O-PUD Zones are identified specific sites in the
City of Manila wherein the project site is comprehensively planned as
an entity via unitary site plan which permits flexibility in planning/
design, building siting, complementarily of building types and land
uses, usable open spaces and the preservation of significant natural
land features, pursuant to regulations specified for each particular
PUD. Enumerated below are identified PUD:
xxx
xxx
xxx
6. Pandacan Oil Depot Area

xxx
xxx
xxx
Enumerated below are the allowable uses:

1. all uses allowed in all zones where it is located
2. the [Land Use Intensity Control (LUIC)] under which zones are
located shall, in all instances be complied with
3. the validity of the prescribed LUIC shall only be [superseded] by
the development controls and regulations specified for each PUD as
provided for each PUD as provided for by the masterplan of
respective PUDs.88 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent claims that in passing Ordinance No. 8119, the Sanggunian did
not intend to repeal Ordinance No. 8027 but meant instead to carry over
8027s provisions to 8119 for the purpose of making Ordinance No. 8027
applicable to the oil companies even after the passage of Ordinance No.
8119.89 He quotes an excerpt from the minutes of the July 27, 2004 session
of the Sanggunian during the first reading of Ordinance No. 8119:
Member GARCIA: Your Honor, iyong patungkol po roon sa oil depot
doon sa amin sa Sixth District sa Pandacan, wala pong nakalagay
eith sa ordinansa rito na taliwas o kakaiba roon sa ordinansang
ipinasa noong nakaraang Konseho, iyong Ordinance No. 8027. So
kung ano po ang nandirito sa ordinansa na ipinasa ninyo last time,
iyon lang po ang ni-lift eithe at inilagay eith. At eith eith ordinansang
iyong naipasa ng huling Konseho, niri-classify [ninyo] from
Industrial II to Commercial C-1 ang area ng Pandacan kung nasaan
ang oil depot. So ini-lift lang po [eithe] iyong definition, density, at
saka po yon pong ng noong ordinansa ninyo na siya eith
naming inilagay eith, iniba lang po naming iyong title. So wala po
kaming binago na taliwas o nailagay na taliwas doon sa
ordinansang ipinasa ninyo, ni-lift lang po [eithe] from Ordinance
No. 8027."90 (Emphasis supplied)
We agree with respondent.
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later
date clearly reveals the intention of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on
the subject, that intention must be given effect.91
There are two kinds of implied repeal. The first is: where the provisions in the
two acts on the same subject matter are irreconcilably contradictory, the
latter act, to the extent of the conflict, constitutes an implied repeal of the
earlier one.92 The second is: if the later act covers the whole subject of the
earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the
earlier law.93 The oil companies argue that the situation here falls under the
first category.
Implied repeals are not favored and will not be so declared unless the intent
of the legislators is manifest.94 As statutes and ordinances are presumed to
be passed only after careful deliberation and with knowledge of all existing
ones on the subject, it follows that, in passing a law, the legislature did not
intend to interfere with or abrogate a former law relating to the same subject
matter.95 If the intent to repeal is not clear, the later act should be construed
as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the earlier act. 96
These standards are deeply enshrined in our jurisprudence. We disagree
that, in enacting Ordinance No. 8119, there was any indication of the
legislative purpose to repeal Ordinance No. 8027. 97 The excerpt quoted
above is proof that there was never such an intent. While it is true that both
ordinances relate to the same subject matter,i.e. classification of the land use
of the area where Pandacan oil depot is located, if there is no intent to repeal
the earlier enactment, every effort at reasonable construction must be made
to reconcile the ordinances so that both can be given effect:
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter
as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an
28
implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute may merely be
cumulative or a continuation of the old one. What is necessary is a
manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal. 98
For the first kind of implied repeal, there must be an irreconcilable conflict
between the two ordinances. There is no conflict between the two
ordinances. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the Pandacan area from
Industrial II to Commercial I. Ordinance No. 8119, in Section 23, designated it
as a "Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD)." In its Annex C
which defined the zone boundaries,99 the Pandacan area was shown to be
within the "High Density Residential/Mixed Use Zone (R-3/MXD)." These
zone classifications in Ordinance No. 8119 are not inconsistent with the
reclassification of the Pandacan area from Industrial to Commercial in
Ordinance No. 8027. The "O-PUD" classification merely made Pandacan a
"project site ... comprehensively planned as an entity via unitary site plan
which permits flexibility in planning/design, building siting, complementarity of
building types and land uses, usable open spaces and the preservation of
significant natural land features...."100 Its classification as "R-3/MXD" means
that it should "be used primarily for high-rise housing/dwelling purposes and
limited complementary/supplementary trade, services and business
activities."101 There is no conflict since both ordinances actually have a
common objective, i.e., to shift the zoning classification from industrial to
commercial (Ordinance No. 8027) or mixed residential/commercial
(Ordinance No. 8119).
Moreover, it is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that a subsequent
general law does not repeal a prior special law on the same subject unless it
clearly appears that the legislature has intended by the latter general act to
modify or repeal the earlier special law. Generalia specialibus non
derogant (a general law does not nullify a specific or special law). 102 This is
so even if the provisions of the general law are sufficiently comprehensive to
include what was set forth in the special act.103 The special act and the
general law must stand together, one as the law of the particular subject and
the other as the law of general application.104 The special law must be taken
as intended to constitute an exception to, or a qualification of, the general act
or provision.105
The reason for this is that the legislature, in passing a law of special
character, considers and makes special provisions for the particular
circumstances dealt with by the special law. This being so, the
legislature, by adopting a general law containing provisions
repugnant to those of the special law and without making any
mention of its intention to amend or modify such special law, cannot
be deemed to have intended an amendment, repeal or modification

of the latter.106
Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law107 since it deals specifically with a
certain area described therein (the Pandacan oil depot area) whereas
Ordinance No. 8119 can be considered a general law108 as it covers the
entire city of Manila.
The oil companies assert that even if Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law,
the existence of an all-encompassing repealing clause in Ordinance No.
8119 evinces an intent on the part of the Sanggunian to repeal the earlier
ordinance:
Sec. 84. Repealing Clause. All ordinances, rules, regulations in
conflict with the provisions of this Ordinance are hereby
repealed; PROVIDED, That the rights that are vested upon the
effectivity of this Ordinance shall not be impaired.
They cited Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, Cebu City v. Department of
Agrarian Reform:109
The presence of such general repealing clause in a later statute
clearly indicates the legislative intent to repeal all prior inconsistent
laws on the subject matter, whether the prior law is a general law or
a special law... Without such a clause, a later general law will
ordinarily not repeal a prior special law on the same subject. But with
such clause contained in the subsequent general law, the prior
special law will be deemed repealed, as the clause is a clear
legislative intent to bring about that result.110
This ruling in not applicable here. The repealing clause of Ordinance No.
8119 cannot be taken to indicate the legislative intent to repeal all prior
inconsistent laws on the subject matter, including Ordinance No. 8027, a
special enactment, since the aforequoted minutes (an official record of the
discussions in the Sanggunian) actually indicated the clear intent to preserve
the provisions of Ordinance No. 8027.
To summarize, the conflict between the two ordinances is more apparent
than real. The two ordinances can be reconciled. Ordinance No. 8027 is
applicable to the area particularly described therein whereas Ordinance No.
8119 is applicable to the entire City of Manila.
29
Mandamus Lies To Compel Respondent Mayor To Enforce Ordinance

No. 8027
The oil companies insist that mandamus does not lie against respondent in
consideration of the separation of powers of the executive and
judiciary.111 This argument is misplaced. Indeed,
[the] Courts will not interfere by mandamus proceedings with the
legislative [or executive departments] of the government in the
legitimate exercise of its powers, except to enforce mere
ministerial acts required by law to be performed by some officer
thereof.112 (Emphasis Supplied)
since this is the function of a writ of mandamus, which is the power to compel
"the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from office, trust or station."113
They also argue that petitioners had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy to
compel respondent to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 which was to seek relief
from the President of the Philippines through the Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) by virtue of the
Presidents power of supervision over local government units. Again, we
disagree. A party need not go first to the DILG in order to compel the
enforcement of an ordinance. This suggested process would be
unreasonably long, tedious and consequently injurious to the interests of the
local government unit (LGU) and its constituents whose welfare is sought to
be protected. Besides, petitioners resort to an original action
for mandamus before this Court is undeniably allowed by the Constitution. 114
Ordinance No. 8027 Is Constitutional And Valid
Having ruled that there is no impediment to the enforcement of Ordinance
No. 8027, we now proceed to make a definitive ruling on its constitutionality
and validity.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. For an ordinance to be
valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and
be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene
the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must
not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy and (6) must not be
unreasonable.115
The City of Manila Has The Power To Enact Ordinance No. 8027
Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila
in the exercise of its police power. Police power is the plenary power vested
in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people.116 This power flows from the recognition that salus populi est
suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law). 117 While police
power rests primarily with the national legislature, such power may be
delegated.118 Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause,
encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments: 119
Section 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for
its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential
to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective
territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and
support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of
culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to
a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain
peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants.
LGUs like the City of Manila exercise police power through their respective
legislative bodies, in this case, theSangguniang Panlungsod or the city
council. Specifically, the Sanggunian can enact ordinances for the general
welfare of the city:
Section. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a)
The sangguniang panglungsod, as the legislative branch of the city,
shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds
for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code xxxx
This police power was also provided for in RA 409 or the Revised Charter of
the City of Manila:
Section 18. Legislative powers. The [City Council] shall have the
following legislative powers:
30
xxx
xxx
xxx
(g) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the
sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the
promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience,
and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others
as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred by this chapter xxxx 120
Specifically, the Sanggunian has the power to "reclassify land within the
jurisdiction of the city."121
The Enactment Of Ordinance No. 8027 Is A Legitimate Exercise Of
Police Power
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly
exercised their police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject
and a lawful method.122
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted "for the purpose of promoting sound urban
planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare" 123 of the
residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to
protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a
terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective,
the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from industrial
to commercial.
The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing, Resettlement
and Urban Development of the City of Manila which recommended the
approval of the ordinance:
(1) the depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly flammable and
highly volatile products which include petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum gas,
aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil among others;
(2) the depot is open to attack through land, water or air;
(3) it is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacaang Palace

and
(4) in case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire could spread
to the neighboring communities.124
The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and
safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. 125 The
depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western
interests which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it there is such a
target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became
necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the threat. According to
respondent:
Such a public need became apparent after the 9/11 incident which
showed that what was perceived to be impossible to happen, to the
most powerful country in the world at that, is actually possible. The
destruction of property and the loss of thousands of lives on that
fateful day became the impetus for a public need. In the aftermath of
the 9/11 tragedy, the threats of terrorism continued [such] that it
became imperative for governments to take measures to combat
their effects.126
Wide discretion is vested on the legislative authority to determine not only
what the interests of the public require but also what measures are
necessary for the protection of such interests. 127 Clearly, the Sanggunian was
in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents.
In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the
government.128 Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and
occupations to promote the general welfare.129However, the interference
must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the
methods or means used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare
must have a reasonable relation to the end in view.130
The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning
ordinance which reclassified the area where the depot is situated from
industrial to commercial. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or
municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and
apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and
future projection of needs.131 As a result of the zoning, the continued
31
operation of the businesses of the oil companies in their present location will
no longer be permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial,
commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is
exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a
locality.132 Consequently, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within the
power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any
resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to be unjust:
There can be no doubt that the City of Manila has the power to divide
its territory into residential and industrial zones, and to prescribe that
offensive and unwholesome trades and occupations are to be
established exclusively in the latter zone.
"The benefits to be derived by cities adopting such regulations
(zoning) may be summarized as follows: They attract a desirable and
assure a permanent citizenship; they foster pride in and attachment
to the city; they promote happiness and contentment; they stabilize
the use and value of property and promote the peace, [tranquility],
and good order of the city. We do not hesitate to say that the
attainment of these objects affords a legitimate field for the exercise
of the police power. He who owns property in such a district is not
deprived of its use by such regulations. He may use it for the
purposes to which the section in which it is located is dedicated. That
he shall not be permitted to use it to the desecration of the
community constitutes no unreasonable or permanent hardship and
results in no unjust burden."
xxx
xxx
xxx
"The 14th Amendment protects the citizen in his right to engage in

any lawful business, but it does not prevent legislation intended to
regulate useful occupations which, because of their nature or
location, may prove injurious or offensive to the public." 133
We entertain no doubt that Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power
measure because there is a concurrence of lawful subject and lawful method.
Ordinance No. 8027 Is Not Unfair, Oppressive Or Confiscatory Which
Amounts To Taking Without Compensation
According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8027 is unfair and oppressive
as it does not only regulate but also absolutely prohibits them from
conducting operations in the City of Manila. Respondent counters that this is
not accurate since the ordinance merely prohibits the oil companies from
operating their businesses in the Pandacan area.
Indeed, the ordinance expressly delineated in its title and in Section 1 what it
pertained to. Therefore, the oil companies contention is not supported by the
text of the ordinance. Respondent succinctly stated that:
The oil companies are not forbidden to do business in the City of
Manila. They may still very well do so, except that their oil storage
facilities are no longer allowed in the Pandacan area. Certainly, there
are other places in the City of Manila where they can conduct this
specific kind of business. Ordinance No. 8027 did not render the oil
companies illegal. The assailed ordinance affects the oil companies
business only in so far as the Pandacan area is concerned. 134
The oil companies are not prohibited from doing business in other
appropriate zones in Manila. The City of Manila merely exercised its power to
regulate the businesses and industries in the zones it established:
As to the contention that the power to regulate does not include the
power to prohibit, it will be seen that the ordinance copied above
does not prohibit the installation of motor engines within the
municipality of Cabanatuan but only within the zone therein fixed. If
the municipal council of Cabanatuan is authorized to establish said
zone, it is also authorized to provide what kind of engines may be
installed therein. In banning the installation in said zone of all
engines not excepted in the ordinance, the municipal council of
Cabanatuan did no more than regulate their installation by means of
zonification.135
The oil companies aver that the ordinance is unfair and oppressive because
they have invested billions of pesos in the depot.136 Its forced closure will
result in huge losses in income and tremendous costs in constructing new
facilities.
Their contention has no merit. In the exercise of police power, there is a
limitation on or restriction of property interests to promote public welfare
which involves no compensable taking. Compensation is necessary only
when the states power of eminent domain is exercised. In eminent domain,
property is appropriated and applied to some public purpose. Property
condemned under the exercise of police power, on the other hand, is noxious
or intended for a noxious or forbidden purpose and, consequently, is not
compensable.137 The restriction imposed to protect lives, public health and
32
safety from danger is not a taking. It is merely the prohibition or abatement of

a noxious use which interferes with paramount rights of the public.
Property has not only an individual function, insofar as it has to provide for
the needs of the owner, but also a social function insofar as it has to provide
for the needs of the other members of society.138 The principle is this:
Police power proceeds from the principle that every holder of
property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it
under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of
their property, nor injurious to the right of the community. Rights of
property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to
reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from
being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations
established by law as the legislature, under the governing and
controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think
necessary and expedient.139
In the regulation of the use of the property, nobody else acquires the use or
interest therein, hence there is no compensable taking. 140 In this case, the
properties of the oil companies and other businesses situated in the affected
area remain theirs. Only their use is restricted although they can be applied
to other profitable uses permitted in the commercial zone.
Ordinance No. 8027 Is Not Partial And Discriminatory
The oil companies take the position that the ordinance has discriminated
against and singled out the Pandacan Terminals despite the fact that the
Pandacan area is congested with buildings and residences that do not
comply with the National Building Code, Fire Code and Health and Sanitation
Code.141
This issue should not detain us for long. An ordinance based on reasonable
classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal
protection of the law.142 The requirements for a valid and reasonable
classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing
conditions only and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same
class.143
The law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class
provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class
from another.144 Here, there is a reasonable classification. We reiterate that

what the ordinance seeks to prevent is a catastrophic devastation that will
result from a terrorist attack. Unlike the depot, the surrounding community is
not a high-value terrorist target. Any damage caused by fire or explosion
occurring in those areas would be nothing compared to the damage caused
by a fire or explosion in the depot itself. Accordingly, there is a substantial
distinction. The enactment of the ordinance which provides for the cessation
of the operations of these terminals removes the threat they pose. Therefore
it is germane to the purpose of the ordinance. The classification is not limited
to the conditions existing when the ordinance was enacted but to future
conditions as well. Finally, the ordinance is applicable to all businesses and
industries in the area it delineated.
Ordinance No. 8027 is Not Inconsistent With RA 7638 And RA 8479
The oil companies and the DOE assert that Ordinance No. 8027 is
unconstitutional because it contravenes RA 7638 (DOE Act of 1992) 145 and
RA 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Law of 1998). 146 They argue
that through RA 7638, the national legislature declared it a policy of the state
"to ensure a continuous, adequate, and economic supply of energy" 147 and
created the DOE to implement this policy. Thus, under Section 5 I, DOE is
empowered to "establish and administer programs for the exploration,
transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling,
and storage of energy resources." Considering that the petroleum products
contained in the Pandacan Terminals are major and critical energy
resources, they conclude that their administration, storage, distribution and
transport are of national interest and fall under DOEs primary and exclusive
jurisdiction.148
They further assert that the terminals are necessary for the delivery of
immediate and adequate supply of oil to its recipients in the most economical
way.149 Local legislation such as Ordinance No. 8027 (which effectively calls
for the removal of these terminals) allegedly frustrates the state policy of
ensuring a continuous, adequate, and economic supply of energy expressed
in RA 7638, a national law.150 Likewise, the ordinance thwarts the
determination of the DOE that the terminals operations should be merely
scaled down and not discontinued.151They insist that this should not be
allowed considering that it has a nationwide economic impact and affects
public interest transcending the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Manila. 152
According to them, the DOEs supervision over the oil industry under RA
7638 was subsequently underscored by RA 8479, particularly in Section 7
thereof:
33
SECTION 7. Promotion of Fair Trade Practices. The Department

of Trade and Industry (DTI) and DOE shall take all measures to
promote fair trade and prevent cartelization, monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade, and any unfair competition in the
Industry as defined in Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code, and
Articles 168 and 169 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as
the "Intellectual Property Rights Law".The DOE shall continue
to encourage certain practices in the Industry which serve the
public interest and are intended to achieve efficiency and cost
reduction, ensure continuous supply of petroleum
products, and enhance environmental protection. These practices
may include borrow-and-loan agreements, rationalized depot and
manufacturing operations, hospitality agreements, joint tanker and
pipeline utilization, and joint actions on oil spill control and fire
prevention. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent counters that DOEs regulatory power does not preclude LGUs
from exercising their police power.153
Indeed, ordinances should not contravene existing statutes enacted by
Congress. The rationale for this was clearly explained in Magtajas vs. Pryce
Properties Corp., Inc.:154
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not
contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only
agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the
national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a
heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts
of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first
place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
"Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers
and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the
breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may
destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is
some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a
single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so
great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal
corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it.
We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation
themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere

tenants at will of the legislature."
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local
government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in
the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without
meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress
retains control of the local government units although in significantly
reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The
power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to
grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are
certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct
conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which
cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however,
the national legislature is still the principal of the local government
units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. 155
The question now is whether Ordinance No. 8027 contravenes RA 7638 and
RA 8479. It does not.
Under Section 5 I of RA 7638, DOE was given the power to "establish and
administer programs for the exploration, transportation, marketing,
distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and storage of energy
resources." On the other hand, under Section 7 of RA 8749, the DOE "shall
continue to encourage certain practices in the Industry which serve the public
interest and are intended to achieve efficiency and cost reduction, ensure
continuous supply of petroleum products." Nothing in these statutes prohibits
the City of Manila from enacting ordinances in the exercise of its police
power.
The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in and zealously protected
under the Constitution. In Article II, Section 25 thereof, the people expressly
adopted the following policy:
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments.
An entire article (Article X) of the Constitution has been devoted to
guaranteeing and promoting the autonomy of LGUs. The LGC was specially
promulgated by Congress to ensure the autonomy of local governments as
mandated by the Constitution:
34
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy

of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the
State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to
enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the
attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby
local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall
proceed from the National Government to the local government
units. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not see how the laws relied upon by the oil companies and DOE
stripped the City of Manila of its power to enact ordinances in the exercise of
its police power and to reclassify the land uses within its jurisdiction. To guide
us, we shall make a brief survey of our decisions where the police power
measure of the LGU clashed with national laws.
In Tan v. Perea,156 the Court ruled that Ordinance No. 7 enacted by the
municipality of Daanbantayan, Cebu allowing the operation of three cockpits
was invalid for violating PD 449 (or the Cockfighting Law of 1974) which
permitted only one cockpit per municipality.
In Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,157 the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Batangas City enacted Resolution No. 210 granting Batangas
CATV, Inc. a permit to operate a cable television (CATV) system in Batangas
City. The Court held that the LGU did not have the authority to grant
franchises to operate a CATV system because it was the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) that had the power under EO Nos.
205 and 436 to regulate CATV operations. EO 205 mandated the NTC to
grant certificates of authority to CATV operators while EO 436 vested on the
NTC the power to regulate and supervise the CATV industry.
In Lina, Jr. v. Pao,158 we held that Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995 of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna could not be used as justification
to prohibit lotto in the municipality of San Pedro, Laguna because lotto was
duly authorized by RA 1169, as amended by BP 42. This law granted a
franchise to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and allowed it to
operate lotteries.
In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.,159 the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City passed Ordinance Nos. 3353 and 3375-
93 prohibiting the operation of casinos in the city. We ruled that these

ordinances were void for contravening PD 1869 or the charter of the
Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation which had the power to
operate casinos.
The common dominator of all of these cases is that the national laws were
clearly and expressly in conflict with the ordinances/resolutions of the LGUs.
The inconsistencies were so patent that there was no room for doubt. This is
not the case here.
The laws cited merely gave DOE general powers to "establish and administer
programs for the exploration, transportation, marketing, distribution,
utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and storage of energy resources" and
"to encourage certain practices in the [oil] industry which serve the public
interest and are intended to achieve efficiency and cost reduction, ensure
continuous supply of petroleum products." These powers can be exercised
without emasculating the LGUs of the powers granted them. When these
ambiguous powers are pitted against the unequivocal power of the LGU to
enact police power and zoning ordinances for the general welfare of its
constituents, it is not difficult to rule in favor of the latter. Considering that the
powers of the DOE regarding the Pandacan Terminals are not categorical,
the doubt must be resolved in favor of the City of Manila:
SECTION 5. Rules of Interpretation. In the interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply:
(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be
liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question
thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the
lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local
government unit concerned;
xxx
xxx
xxx
(g) IThe general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally

interpreted to give more powers to local government units in
accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life
for the people in the community xxxx
The least we can do to ensure genuine and meaningful local
autonomy is not to force an interpretation that negates powers
explicitly granted to local governments. To rule against the power of
35
LGUs to reclassify areas within their jurisdiction will subvert the

principle of local autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution. 160As we
have noted in earlier decisions, our national officials should not only
comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but
should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these
provisions are based.161
The DOE Cannot Exercise The Power Of Control Over LGUs
Another reason that militates against the DOEs assertions is that Section 4
of Article X of the Constitution confines the Presidents power over LGUs to
one of general supervision:
SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. Xxxx
Consequently, the Chief Executive or his or her alter egos, cannot exercise
the power of control over them.162Control and supervision are distinguished
as follows:
[Supervision] means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the
latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or
step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control,
on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter.163
Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere
oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority
over such body.164 It does not allow the supervisor to annul the acts of the
subordinate.165 Here, what the DOE seeks to do is to set aside an ordinance
enacted by local officials, a power that not even its principal, the President,
has. This is because:
Under our present system of government, executive power is vested
in the President. The members of the Cabinet and other executive
officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power
of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be
removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed,
suspended or reversed. In contrast, the heads of political
subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers
emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable.

By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the Presidents supervision
only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere
of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not
withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the
Constitution and the law.166
Thus, the President and his or her alter egos, the department heads, cannot
interfere with the activities of local governments, so long as they act within
the scope of their authority. Accordingly, the DOE cannot substitute its own
discretion for the discretion exercised by the sanggunian of the City of
Manila. In local affairs, the wisdom of local officials must prevail as long as
they are acting within the parameters of the Constitution and the law.167
Ordinance No. 8027 Is Not Invalid For Failure To Comply With RA 7924
And EO 72
The oil companies argue that zoning ordinances of LGUs are required to be
submitted to the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) for
review and if found to be in compliance with its metropolitan physical
framework plan and regulations, it shall endorse the same to the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Their basis is Section 3 (e) of RA
7924:168
SECTION 3. Scope of MMDA Services. Metro-wide services
under the jurisdiction of the MMDAare those services which have
metro-wide impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail
huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services
to be provided by the individual [LGUs] comprising Metropolitan
Manila. These services shall include:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(g) Urban renewal, zoning, and land use planning, and shelter
services which include the formulation, adoption and implementation
of policies, standards, rules and regulations, programs and projects
to rationalize and optimize urban land use and provide direction to
urban growth and expansion, the rehabilitation and development of
slum and blighted areas, the development of shelter and housing
facilities and the provision of necessary social services thereof.
(Emphasis supplied)
Reference was also made to Section 15 of its implementing rules:
36
Section 15. Linkages with HUDCC, HLURB, NHA, LGUs and Other
National Government Agencies Concerned on Urban Renewal,
Zoning and Land Use Planning and Shelter Services. Within the
context of the National Housing and Urban Development Framework,
and pursuant to the national standards, guidelines and regulations
formulated by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board [HLURB]
on land use planning and zoning, the [MMDA] shall prepare a
metropolitan physical framework plan and regulations which shall
complement and translate the socio-economic development plan for
Metro Manila into physical or spatial terms, and provide the basis for
the preparation, review, integration and implementation of local land
use plans and zoning, ordinance of cities and municipalities in the
area.
Said framework plan and regulations shall contain, among others,
planning and zoning policies and procedures that shall be observed
by local government units in the preparation of their own plans and
ordinances pursuant to Section 447 and 458 of RA 7160, as well as
the identification of sites and projects that are considered to be of
national or metropolitan significance.
Cities and municipalities shall prepare their respective land use
plans and zoning ordinances and submit the same for review
and integration by the [MMDA] and indorsement to HLURB in
accordance with Executive Order No. 72 and other pertinent
laws.
In the preparation of a Metropolitan Manila physical framework plan
and regulations, the [MMDA] shall coordinate with the Housing and
Urban Development Coordinating Council, HLURB, the National
Housing Authority, Intramuros Administration, and all other agencies
of the national government which are concerned with land use and
zoning, urban renewal and shelter services. (Emphasis supplied)
They also claim that EO 72169 provides that zoning ordinances of cities and
municipalities of Metro Manila are subject to review by the HLURB to ensure
compliance with national standards and guidelines. They cite Section 1,
paragraphs I, (e), (f) and (g):
SECTION 1. Plan formulation or updating.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(g) Cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila shall

continue to formulate or update their
respective comprehensive land use plans, in accordance
with the land use planning and zoning standards and
guidelines prescribed by the HLURB pursuant to EO 392, S.
of 1990, and other pertinent national policies.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(e) Pursuant to LOI 729, S. of 1978, EO 648, S. of 1981, and RA

7279, the comprehensive land use plans of provinces, highly
urbanized cities and independent component cities shall be reviewed
and ratified by the HLURB to ensure compliance with national
standards and guidelines.
(f) Pursuant to EO 392, S. of 1999, the comprehensive land use
plans of cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila shall be
reviewed by the HLURB to ensure compliance with national
standards and guidelines.
(g) Said review shall be completed within three (3) months upon
receipt thereof otherwise, the same shall be deemed consistent with
law, and, therefore, valid. (Emphasis supplied)
They argue that because Ordinance No. 8027 did not go through this review
process, it is invalid.
The argument is flawed.
RA 7942 does not give MMDA the authority to review land use plans and
zoning ordinances of cities and municipalities. This was only found in its
implementing rules which made a reference to EO 72. EO 72 expressly
refers to comprehensive land use plans (CLUPs) only. Ordinance No. 8027 is
admittedly not a CLUP nor intended to be one. Instead, it is a very specific
ordinance which reclassified the land use of a defined area in order to
prevent the massive effects of a possible terrorist attack. It is Ordinance No.
8119 which was explicitly formulated as the "Manila [CLUP] and Zoning
Ordinance of 2006." CLUPs are the ordinances which should be submitted to
the MMDA for integration in its metropolitan physical framework plan and
approved by the HLURB to ensure that they conform with national guidelines
and policies.
37
Moreover, even assuming that the MMDA review and HLURB ratification are
necessary, the oil companies did not present any evidence to show that
these were not complied with. In accordance with the presumption of validity
in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in
the absence of proof showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not
observed. The burden of proof is on the oil companies which already had
notice that this Court was inclined to dispose of all the issues in this case. Yet
aside from their bare assertion, they did not present any certification from the
MMDA or the HLURB nor did they append these to their pleadings. Clearly,
they failed to rebut the presumption of validity of Ordinance No. 8027. 170
Conclusion
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They
allege that they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However,
based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to life
enjoys precedence over the right to property.171 The reason is obvious: life is
irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or LGUs exercise of police
power clashes with a few individuals right to property, the former should
prevail.172
Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and validity of
Ordinance No. 8027. Without a doubt, there are no impediments to its
enforcement and implementation. Any delay is unfair to the inhabitants of the
City of Manila and its leaders who have categorically expressed their desire
for the relocation of the terminals. Their power to chart and control their own
destiny and preserve their lives and safety should not be curtailed by the
intervenors warnings of doomsday scenarios and threats of economic
disorder if the ordinance is enforced.
Secondary to the legal reasons supporting the immediate implementation of
Ordinance No. 8027 are the policy considerations which drove Manilas
government to come up with such a measure:
... [The] oil companies still were not able to allay the apprehensions
of the city regarding the security threat in the area in general. No
specific action plan or security measures were presented that would
prevent a possible large-scale terrorist or malicious attack especially
an attack aimed at Malacaang. The measures that were installed
were more directed towards their internal security and did not include
the prevention of an external attack even on a bilateral level of
cooperation between these companies and the police and military.
xxx
xxx
xxx
It is not enough for the city government to be told by these oil

companies that they have the most sophisticated fire-fighting
equipments and have invested millions of pesos for these
equipments. The city government wants to be assured that its
residents are safe at any time from these installations, and in the
three public hearings and in their position papers, not one statement
has been said that indeed the absolute safety of the residents from
the hazards posed by these installations is assured. 173
We are also putting an end to the oil companies determination to prolong
their stay in Pandacan despite the objections of Manilas residents. As early
as October 2001, the oil companies signed a MOA with the DOE obliging
themselves to:
... undertake a comprehensive and comparative study ... [which]
shall include the preparation of a Master Plan, whose aim is to
determine the scope and timing of the feasible location of the
Pandacan oil terminals and all associated facilities and infrastructure
including government support essential for the relocation such as the
necessary transportation infrastructure, land and right of way
acquisition, resettlement of displaced residents and environmental
and social acceptability which shall be based on mutual benefit of the
Parties and the public.174
Now that they are being compelled to discontinue their operations in the
Pandacan Terminals, they cannot feign unreadiness considering that they
had years to prepare for this eventuality.
Just the same, this Court is not about to provoke a crisis by ordering the
immediate relocation of the Pandacan Terminals out of its present site. The
enforcement of a decision of this Court, specially one with far-reaching
consequences, should always be within the bounds of reason, in accordance
with a comprehensive and well-coordinated plan, and within a time-frame
that complies with the letter and spirit of our resolution. To this end, the oil
companies have no choice but to obey the law.
A Warning To Petitioners Counsel
We draw the attention of the parties to a matter of grave concern to the legal
profession.
38
Petitioners and their counsel, Atty. Samson Alcantara, submitted a four-page

memorandum that clearly contained either substance nor research. It is
absolutely insulting to this Court.
We have always tended towards judicial leniency, temperance and
compassion to those who suffer from a wrong perception of what the majesty
of the law means. But for a member of the bar, an officer of the court, to file
in this Court a memorandum of such unacceptable quality is an entirely
different matter.
It is indicative less of a personal shortcoming or contempt of this Court and
more of a lawyers sorry descent from a high sense of duty and responsibility.
As a member of the bar and as an officer of the court, a lawyer ought to be
keenly aware that the chief safeguard of the body politic is respect for the law
and its magistrates.
There is nothing more effective than the written word by which counsel can
persuade this Court of the righteousness of his cause. For if truth were selfevident, a memorandum would be completely unnecessary and superfluous.
We reiterate our order to respondent Mayor of the City of Manila to enforce

Ordinance No. 8027. In coordination with the appropriate agencies and other
parties involved, respondent Mayor is hereby ordered to oversee the
relocation and transfer of the Pandacan Terminals out of its present site.
To ensure the orderly transfer, movement and relocation of assets and
personnel, the intervenors Chevron Philippines Inc., Petron Corporation and
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation shall, within a non-extendible period of
ninety (90) days, submit to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 39, the
comprehensive plan and relocation schedule which have allegedly been
prepared. The presiding judge of Manila RTC, Branch 39 will monitor the
strict enforcement of this resolution.
Atty. Samson Alcantara is hereby ordered to explain within five (5) days from
notice why he should not be disciplined for his refusal, or inability, to file a
memorandum worthy of the consideration of this Court.
Treble costs against petitioners counsel, Atty. Samson Alcantara.
SO ORDERED.
The inability of counsel to prepare a memorandum worthy of this Courts

consideration is an ejemplo malo to the legal profession as it betrays no
genuine interest in the cause he claims to espouse. Or did counsel think he
can earn his moment of glory without the hard work and dedication called for
by his petition?
Qualified By
A Final Word
On Wednesday, January 23, 2008, a defective tanker containing 2,000 liters
of gasoline and 14,000 liters of diesel exploded in the middle of the street a
short distance from the exit gate of the Pandacan Terminals, causing death,
extensive damage and a frightening conflagration in the vicinity of the
incident. Need we say anthing about what will happen if it is the estimated
162 to 211 million liters175 of petroleum products in the terminal complex
which blow up?
WHEREFORE, the motions for leave to intervene of Chevron Philippines
Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, and the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Energy, are
hereby GRANTED. Their respective motions for reconsideration are
hereby DENIED. The Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 39
is ORDERED to DISMISS the consolidated cases of Civil Case No. 03106377 and Civil Case No. 03-106380.
RULE 132
Presentation of Evidence
Section 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose,
may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by
the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (25a)
39
Section 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a

document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the
official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (26a)
Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 736 (1988)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and, (d)
they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the
intestate estate of the deceased [Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy
Yun Chen who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he
married on January 19, 1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors are the
legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is
the eldest among them and is competent, willing and desirous to become the
administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat [Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13; Rollo, p.
107.] After hearing, the probate court, finding among others that:
(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp.
12-27; Rollo, pp. 49-64;]
(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the
legitimate children of Yao Kee with Sy Mat [CFI decision, pp.
28-31; Rollo. pp. 65-68;] and,
G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988

YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN
YEN, petitioners,
vs.
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO
SY, and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Montesa, Albon, & Associates for petitioners.
De Lapa, Salonga, Fulgencio & De Lunas for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City
where he was then residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here
in the Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo
Sy filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration docketed as
Special Proceedings Case No. C-699 of the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal Branch XXXIII, Caloocan City. In said petition they alleged among
others that (a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego;
(b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy
(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and

Rodolfo Sy are the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of
Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego [CFI decision, pp. 27-28; Rollo,
pp. 64- 65.]
held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed Sze Sook
Wah as the administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [CFI
decision, pp. 68-69; Rollo, pp. 105-106.]
On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the
probate court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower
Court is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE and a new
judgment rendered as follows:
(1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy,
Teresita Sy- Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy acknowledged natural
children of the deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego, an
unmarried woman with whom he lived as husband and wife
without benefit of marriage for many years:
40
(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and
Sze Chun Yen, the acknowledged natural children of the
deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese wife Yao Kee, also known
as Yui Yip, since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy
Mat to Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to
the laws of the Chinese People's Republic of China (sic);
(3) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on
December 7, 1976 in favor of Tomas Sy (Exhibit "G-1",
English translation of Exhibit "G") of the Avenue Tractor and
Diesel Parts Supply to be valid and accordingly, said
property should be excluded from the estate of the deceased
Sy Kiat; and
(4) Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook
Wah as judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased.
[CA decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 36- 37.]
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was
however denied by respondent court. They thus interposed their respective
appeals to this Court.
Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. No.
56045 entitled "Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and
Rodolfo Sy v. Court of Appeals, Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and
Sy Chun Yen" questioning paragraphs (3) and (4) of the dispositive portion of
the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court however resolved to deny
the petition and the motion for reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982 entry
of judgment was made in G.R. No. 56045. **
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of
the dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals. This petition
was initially denied by the Supreme Court on June 22, 1981. Upon motion of
the petitioners the Court in a resolution dated September 16, 1981
reconsidered the denial and decided to give due course to this petition.
Herein petitioners assign the following as errors:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT TO
YAO YEE AS NOT HAVE (sic) BEEN PROVEN VALID IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED

IN DECLARING AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY,
TERESITA SY-BERNABE AND RODOLFO SY AS NATURAL
CHILDREN OF SY KIAT WITH ASUNCION GILLEGO.
[Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 6.]
I. Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance
with Chinese law and custom was conclusively proven. To buttress this
argument they rely on the following testimonial and documentary evidence.
First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as follows:
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January
19, 1931 in Fookien, China; that she does not have a
marriage certificate because the practice during that time
was for elders to agree upon the betrothal of their children,
and in her case, her elder brother was the one who
contracted or entered into [an] agreement with the parents of
her husband; that the agreement was that she and Sy Mat
would be married, the wedding date was set, and invitations
were sent out; that the said agreement was complied with;
that she has five children with Sy Kiat, but two of them died;
that those who are alive are Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho,
and Sze Chun Yen, the eldest being Sze Sook Wah who is
already 38 years old; that Sze Sook Wah was born on
November 7, 1939; that she and her husband, Sy Mat, have
been living in FooKien, China before he went to the
Philippines on several occasions; that the practice during the
time of her marriage was a written document [is exchanged]
just between the parents of the bride and the parents of the
groom, or any elder for that matter; that in China, the custom
is that there is a go- between, a sort of marriage broker who
is known to both parties who would talk to the parents of the
bride-to-be; that if the parents of the bride-to-be agree to
have the groom-to-be their son in-law, then they agree on a
date as an engagement day; that on engagement day, the
parents of the groom would bring some pieces of jewelry to
the parents of the bride-to-be, and then one month after that,
a date would be set for the wedding, which in her case, the
wedding date to Sy Kiat was set on January 19, 1931; that
during the wedding the bridegroom brings with him a couch
(sic) where the bride would ride and on that same day, the
parents of the bride would give the dowry for her daughter
41
and then the document would be signed by the parties but

there is no solemnizing officer as is known in the Philippines;
that during the wedding day, the document is signed only by
the parents of the bridegroom as well as by the parents of
the bride; that the parties themselves do not sign the
document; that the bride would then be placed in a carriage
where she would be brought to the town of the bridegroom
and before departure the bride would be covered with a sort
of a veil; that upon reaching the town of the bridegroom, the
bridegroom takes away the veil; that during her wedding to
Sy Kiat (according to said Chinese custom), there were
many persons present; that after Sy Kiat opened the door of
the carriage, two old ladies helped her go down the carriage
and brought her inside the house of Sy Mat; that during her
wedding, Sy Chick, the eldest brother of Sy Kiat, signed the
document with her mother; that as to the whereabouts of that
document, she and Sy Mat were married for 46 years
already and the document was left in China and she doubt if
that document can still be found now; that it was left in the
possession of Sy Kiat's family; that right now, she does not
know the whereabouts of that document because of the
lapse of many years and because they left it in a certain
place and it was already eaten by the termites; that after her
wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived immediately together as
husband and wife, and from then on, they lived together; that
Sy Kiat went to the Philippines sometime in March or April in
the same year they were married; that she went to the
Philippines in 1970, and then came back to China; that again
she went back to the Philippines and lived with Sy Mat as
husband and wife; that she begot her children with Sy Kiat
during the several trips by Sy Kiat made back to China. [CFI
decision, pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp. 50-52.]
Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who
stated that he was among the many people who attended the wedding of his
sister with Sy Kiat and that no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese
government, a document signed by the parents or elders of the parties being
sufficient
[CFI
decision,
pp.
15-16;
Rollo,
pp.
52-53.]
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before
the trial court to the effect that (a) Sy Mat was married to Yao Kee according
to Chinese custom; and, (b) Sy Kiat's admission to her that he has a Chinese
wife whom he married according to Chinese custom [CFI decision, p. 17;

Rollo, p. 54.]
Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan City on
October 3, 1972 where the following entries are found: "Marital status
Married"; "If married give name of spousesYao Kee"; "Address-China;
"Date of marriage1931"; and "Place of marriageChina" [Exhibit "SS-1".]
Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on January
12, 1968 where the following entries are likewise found: "Civil status
Married"; and, 'If married, state name and address of spouseYao Kee
Chingkang, China" [Exhibit "4".]
And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the
Embassy of the People's Republic of China to the effect that "according to
the information available at the Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat a Chinese national and
Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui Yip also Chinese were married on January 19, 1931
in Fukien, the People's Republic of China" [Exhibit "5".]
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee
and Sy Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said
marriage in accordance with Chinese law or custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts,
uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory"
[In the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name
"Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon, Mabanta and Reyes", July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12
citing JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Phil. Civil Law, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p.
7.] The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to
the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court had
occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right can not be
considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established
by competent evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390,
395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be
required of a foreign custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code
which states that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were performed and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous
42
marriages, as determined by Philippine law. (Emphasis

supplied.) ***
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid
foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the
foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by
convincing evidence [Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).]
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With
respect to an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.The oral testimony of witnesses,
skilled therein, is admissible as evidence of the unwritten law
of a foreign country, as are also printed and published books
of reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if
proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule
132 section 25, thus:
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.An official record
or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may
be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept
in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign
country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the
testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law
[Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher 110 Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing
Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471 (1935).]
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative
to the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan
Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage
not
only
because
they
are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are
competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law
or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with
said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not
duty bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof
had been taken by this Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil.
137 (1910).]
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the
principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
They must be alleged and proved as any other fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector
of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915); Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the
foreign marriage presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that
matrimonial letters mutually exchanged by the contracting parties constitute
the essential requisite for a marriage to be considered duly solemnized in
China. Based on his testimony, which as found by the Court is uniformly
corroborated by authors on the subject of Chinese marriage, what was left to
be decided was the issue of whether or not the fact of marriage in
accordance with Chinese law was duly proven [Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy
Quia, supra., at p. 160.]
Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed
taken judicial notice of the law of China on marriage in the aforecited case,
petitioners however have not shown any proof that the Chinese law or
custom obtaining at the time the Sy Joc Lieng marriage was celebrated in
1847 was still the law when the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took
place in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years later.
Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633
(1916)] as being applicable to the instant case. They aver that the judicial
pronouncement in the Memoracion case, that the testimony of one of the
contracting parties is competent evidence to show the fact of marriage, holds
true in this case.
The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as said
case did not concern a foreign marriage and the issue posed was whether or
not the oral testimony of a spouse is competent evidence to prove the fact of
marriage in a complaint for adultery.
43
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it

should be presumed that it is the same as ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo,
G.R. No. L-21076, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee
admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is known
here in the Philippines [See Article 56, Civil Code] when her alleged marriage
to Sy Mat was celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14; Rollo, p. 51], it therefore
follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this
jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]
II. The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status of private
respondents.
Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners' filiation:
(1) Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the
following are entered: "Children if any: give number of
childrenFour"; and, "NameAll living in China" [Exhibit
"SS-1";]
(2) the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that
she had five children with Sy Kiat, only three of whom are
alive namely, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chin Yan
[TSN, December 12, 1977, pp. 9-11;] and,
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's

acknowledged natural children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom
he lived for twenty-five (25) years without the benefit of marriage. They have
in their favor their father's acknowledgment, evidenced by a compromise
agreement entered into by and between their parents and approved by the
Court of First Instance on February 12, 1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only
acknowleged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made
provisions for their support and future inheritance, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law
husband and wife and that out of such relationship, which
they have likewise decided to definitely and finally terminate
effective immediately, they begot five children, namely: Aida
Sy, born on May 30, 1950; Manuel Sy, born on July 1, 1953;
Teresita Sy, born on January 28, 1955; Ricardo Sy now
deceased, born on December 14, 1956; and Rodolfo Sy,
born on May 7, 1958.
3. With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND DIESEL
PARTS SUPPLY ... , the parties mutually agree and
covenant that
(a) The stocks and merchandize and the
furniture and equipments ..., shall be divided
into two equal shares between, and
distributed to, Sy Kiat who shall own
one-half of the total and the other half to
Asuncion Gillego who shall transfer the
same to their children, namely, Aida Sy,
Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy.
(3) an affidavit executed on March 22,1961 by Sy Kiat for

presentation to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila to support
Sze Sook Wah's application for a marriage license, wherein
Sy Kiat expressly stated that she is his daughter [Exhibit "3".]
Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy Kiat told
her he has three daughters with his Chinese wife, two of whomSook Wah
and Sze Kai Choshe knows, and one adopted son [TSN, December
6,1977, pp. 87-88.]
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy
Mat according to the laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of
legitimate children but only that of acknowledged natural children. Petitioners
are natural children, it appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee
and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by any impediment to marry one another
[See Art. 269, Civil Code.] And they are acknowledged children of the
deceased because of Sy Kiat's recognition of Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3"] and
its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who are her sisters of the full
blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.]
(b) the business name and premises ... shall

be retained by Sy Kiat. However, it shall be
his obligation to give to the aforenamed
children an amount of One Thousand Pesos
( Pl,000.00 ) monthly out of the rental of the
two doors of the same building now
occupied by Everett Construction.
xxx xxx xxx
44
(5) With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of

the
common-law husband-and-wife relationship between the
parties, of the real estates and properties registered and/or
appearing in the name of Asuncion Gillego ... , the parties
mutually agree and covenant that the said real estates and
properties shall be transferred in equal shares to their
children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and
Rodolfo Sy, but to be administered by Asuncion Gillego
during her lifetime ... [Exhibit "D".] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court of record
by which a child may be voluntarily acknowledged [See Art. 278, Civil Code.]
Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy Mat's
marriage to Yao Kee and the paternity and filiation of the parties should have
been ventilated in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic Act No.
5502, entitled "An Act Revising Rep. Act No. 3278, otherwise known as the
Charter of the City of Caloocan', with regard to the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court:
SEC. 91-A. Creation and Jurisdiction of the Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary
notwithstanding, the court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption,
revocation of adoption, paternity and acknowledgment;
(3) Annulment of marriages, relief from marital obligations,
legal separation of spouses, and actions for support;
(4) Proceedings brought under the provisions of title six and

title seven, chapters one to three of the civil code;
xxx xxx xxx
and the ruling in the case of Bartolome v. Bartolome [G.R. No. L-23661, 21
SCRA 1324] reiterated in Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L-42615, 72 SCRA
307.]
With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Courts were abolished. Their functions and jurisdiction are now vested with
the Regional Trial Courts [See Section 19 (7), B.P. Blg. 129 and Divinagracia
v. Belosillo, G.R. No. L-47407, August 12, 1986, 143 SCRA 356, 360] hence
it is no longer necessary to pass upon the issue of jurisdiction raised by
petitioners.
Moreover, even without the exactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 we find
in Rep. Act No. 5502 sec. 91-A last paragraph that:
xxx xxx xxx
If any question involving any of the above matters should
arise as an incident in any case pending in the ordinary
court, said incident shall be determined in the main case.
xxx xxx xxx
As held in the case of Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L42615. August 10,
1976, 72 SCRA 307]:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act
No.
4834 **** a case
involving
paternity
and
acknowledgment may be ventilated as an incident in the
intestate or testate proceeding (See Baluyot vs. Ines
Luciano, L-42215, July 13, 1976). But that legal provision
presupposes that such an administration proceeding is
pending or existing and has not been terminated. [at pp.
313-314.] (Emphasis supplied.)
45
xxx xxx xxx
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (2a)
The reason for ths rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of conflicting
rulings on the same issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court" [Vda. de Baluyut v. Luciano, G.R. No. L-42215,
July 13, 1976, 72 SCRA 52, 63] but more importantly to prevent multiplicity of
suits. Accordingly, this Court finds no reversible error committed by
respondent court.
Lucido v. Calupitan, 27 Phil 48 (1914)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur
G.R. No. L-8200
Section 46, Rule 130
March 17, 1914
LEONARD LUCIDO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GELASIO CALUPITAN, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
RULE 130
Pedro Guevara for appellants.
Ramon Diokno for appellee.
Rules of Admissibility
Section 46. Learned treatises. A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet
on a subject of history, law, science, or art is admissible as tending to prove
the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a
witness expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the statement in the
treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as
expert in the subject. (40a)
Judicial Admissions
Section 4, Rule 129
RULE 129
What Need Not Be Proved
Section 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by
the party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require
TRENT, J.:
In this case it appears that some chattels and real estate belonging to the
plaintiff, Lucido, were regularly sold at an execution sale on February 10,
1903, to one Rosales, who the text day transferred a one-half interest in the
property of Zolaivar. On March 30, 1903, a public document was executed
and signed by all of the above parties and the defendant, Gelasio Calupitan,
wherein it was stated that Rosales and Zolaivar, with the consent of Lucido,
sold all their rights had obligation pertaining to the property in question to
Calupitan for the amount of the purchase price together with 1 per cent per
month interest thereon up to the time of redemption, or 1,687 Mexican
dollars, plus 33.74 Mexican dollars, the amount of the interest. It will be
observed that the computation of the transfer price is in accordance with
section 465 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the same day Lucido and
Calupitan executed the following document:
I, Gelasio Calupitan y Agarao, married, certify that I have delivered
this statement to Leonardo Lucido y Vidal to witness that his lands,
which appear in the instrument I hold from the deputy sheriff and for
46
which he has accepted money from me, I have ceded to him all the
irrigated lands until such time as he may repurchase all said lands
from me (not only he irrigated ones), as also the Vienna chairs, the
five-lamp chandelier, a lamp stand, two wall tables, and a marble
table; no coconut tree on said irrigated land is included. Apart from
this, our real agreement is to permit three (3) whole year to elapse,
reckoned from the date of this instrument, which has been drawn up
n duplicate, before he may redeem or repurchase them from me.
The lower court held that this document constituted a sale with the right to
conventional redemption set forth in articles 1507 et seq. of the Civil Code.
The present action not having been instituted until February 17, 1910, the fur
the question arose as to whether the redemption period had expired, which
the lower court decided in the negative. The lower court further found as a
fact that Lucido had prior to the institution of the action offered the
redemption price to the defendant, who refused it, and that this offer was a
sufficient compliance with article 1518 of the Civil Code. The decision of the
lower court was that the property in question should be returned to the
plaintiff. From this judgment the defendant appealed, and all three of the
above rulings of the court are assigned as errors.
1. Considerable doubt might arise as to the correctness of the ruling of the
lower court upon the first question, if the document executed by the
execution purchasers and the parties to this action stood alone. In that
document it appears that Calupitan acquired the rights and obligations of the
execution purchasers pertaining to the property in question. These rights and
obligations are defined in the Code of Civil Procedure to be the ownership of
the property sold, subject only to the right of redemption on the part of the
judgment debtor or a redemptioner, within one year from the date of the sale.
(Secs. 463-465, Code Civ. Proc.) Were this the nature of the transaction
between the parties, however, the intervention of Lucido in the transfer would
be wholly unnecessary. Hence, the fact that he intervened as an interested
party is at least some indication that the parties intended something more or
different by the document in question than a simple assignment of the rights
and obligations of the execution purchasers to a third person.
Any doubt, however, as to the character of this transaction is removed by the
agreement entered into between Lucido and calupitan on the same day. In
this document it is distinctly stipulated that the right to redeem the property is
preserved to Lucido, to be exercised after the expiration of three years. The
right to repurchase must necessary imply a former ownership of the property.
Further indication that Calupitan himself considered this transaction as a sale

with the right to conventional redemption is to be found in his original answer
to the complaint. This original answer was introduced in evidence by the
plaintiff over the objection of the defendant. Its admission was proper,
especially in view of the fact that it was signed by Calupitan himself, who was
the time acting as his own attorney.
Jones on evidence (secs. 272, 273), after remarking that the earlier cases
were not in harmony on the point, says:
Many of the cases holding that pleadings inadmissible as admissions
were based on the theory that most of the allegations were merely
pleader's matter -- fiction stated by counsel and sanctioned by the
courts. The whole modern tendency is to reject this view and to treat
pleadings as statements of the real issues in the cause and hence as
admissions of the parties, having weight according to the
circumstances of each case. But some of the authorities still hold
that if the pleading is not signed by the party there should be some
proof that he has authorized it.
On the same principles where amended pleadings have been filed,
allegations in the original pleadings are held admissible, but in such
case the original pleadings can have no effect, unless formally
offered in evidence.
In this original answer it was expressly stated that the transaction was one of
sale with the right to repurchase governed by the provisions of articles
1507 et seq. of the Civil Code.
It further appears from the uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff that he
furnished $20 Mexican of the account necessary to redeem the property from
the execution purchasers. It therefore appears beyond dispute that the
redemption of the property from the execution purchasers was made by the
plaintiff himself by means of a loan furnished by the defendant Calupitan,
who took possession of the major portion of the land as his security for its
redemption. The ruling of the lower court the transaction between Lucido and
Calupitan was one of purchase and sale with the right to redeem was
therefore correct.
2. By the terms of his agreement with Calupitan the plaintiff could not
exercise his right to redeem the property within three years from March 30,
1903; and the lower court arrived at the date upon which the right to redeem
expired by computing five years from March 30, 1906, on the ground that
47
there was no express agreement as to how long the right to repurchase,

once available, should continue. Counsel for the appellant admits in his brief
that the complaint was filed forty-three days before the expiration of this
period. In accordance with our decision inRosales vs. Reyes and
Ordoveza (25 Phil. Rep., 495), we hold that this ruling of the court was
correct.
3. The court held that the plaintiff had actually tendered the redemption price
to the defendant Calupitan. After an examination of the evidence of record as
to this finding of fact, we concur therein. We discussed the legal sufficiency of
such tender in the above-cited case of Rosales vs. Reyes and Ordoveza,
and held that it was sufficient. This assignment of error must therefore be
held to be unfounded.
4. The defendants Oreta and Bueno have no interest in the subject matter of
this action. it appears that the defendant Dorado purchased the land from his
codefendant Calupitan subsequent to the tender of the redemption price to
the latter by the plaintiff. It does not appear that the property was ever
registered by any one, nor was the document of sale with the right to
repurchase registered by either Calupitan or Lucido. No evidence of the
purchase of the land from Calupitan by Dorado is of record with the
exception of the oral testimony although it may be taken as established that
such a sale actually took place, since all the parties interested agree on this
point. Dorado himself testified that he purchased the property with the
knowledge that Calupitan had purchased the property from Lucido subject to
the right of redemption and insists that he purchased with the knowledge and
consent of Lucido. Lucido denies that he was aware of the sale of Dorado
until after it had taken place. Upon this state on facts, it is clear that the
following provisions of article 1510 of the Civil Code are applicable:
The vendor may bring his action against every possessor whose
right arises that of the vendee, even though in the second contract
no mention should have been made of the conventional redemption;
without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law with regard
to third persons.
The provisions of the Mortgage Law with regard to third persons are clearly
not applicable to Dorado. (Manresa, vol., 10, p. 317.)
5. The lower court ordered the redelivery of the land to the plaintiff upon his
payment to Calupitan of P1,600, plus the costs entailed in the execution of
the document of repurchase. The amount paid to the purchaser at the
execution sale for the redemption of the property was $1,720.74 Mexican. Of
this amount the plaintiff furnished $120 Mexican, and Calupitan the balance
of $1,600.74 Mexican. No amount is fixed in the document of purchase and
sale above set forth, but the amount borrowed from Calupitan to redeem the
land from the execution sale being thus clearly established no objection can
be or is made to the plaintiff's paying this amount. In ordering the payment of
this amount to the defendant the lower court failed to reduce it to Philippine
currency. On this appeal plaintiff alleges that this amount in Mexican currency
exceeds the amount he actually owes to the defendant by about P100, but
that rather than spend the time and incur the expense attendant to new trial
for the purpose of determining the equivalent of his amount in Philippine
currency he is agreeable to pay the defendant P1,600.74 Philippine currency,
as the redemption price of the property. In view of this offer and in case it is
accepted by the defendant it will be unnecessary to go through formality of a
new trial for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of the fact that it is
claimed that Calupitan has sold the land in question to his codefendant,
Macario Dorado, and it not clearly appearing to whom the plaintiff should pay
the P1.600.74, we think this amount should be turned over to the clerk of the
Court of First Instance of the Province of Laguna to be held by him until it is
determined in the proper manner who is the owner of this amount, Calupitan
for Dorado.
For the foregoing reasons, judgment will be entered directing the defendants
Calupitan and Dorado to deliver the possession of the land in question to the
plaintiff upon the plaintiff's depositing with the clerk of the court the sum of
P1,600.74, to be disposed of in the manner above set forth. In all other
respects the judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the
appellants Calupitan and Dorado.
Arellano, C.J., Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Torres v. CA, 131 SCRA 24 (1984)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37420 July 31, 1984
MACARIA A. TORRES, petitioner,
vs.
48
COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO NARCISO,

TOMAS NARCISO, AMADO NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO, DEMETRIA
NARCISO and ADELINA NARCISO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-37421 July 31, 1984
MACARIA A. TORRES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO NARCISO,
SALUD NARCISO, BALDOMERO BUENAVENTURA, DEMETRIA
NARCISO, LEONARDO QUINTO, ADELINA NARCISO, CESARIO
PUNZALAN, TOMAS NARCISO and AMADO NARCISO, respondents.
Juan R. Liwag for petitioner.
Cesar Nocon for respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, treated as a special civil
action. 1 prays that the judgment rendered by the then Court of Appeals in
the consolidated cases, CA-G.R. NO. 34998-R entitled "Macaria A. Torres,
plaintiff-appellee vs. Vicente Santillan, et al., defendants-appellants", and
CA-G.R. No. 34999-R entitled "Vicente Santillan, et al., plaintiffs-appellants
vs. Macaria A. Bautista, et al., defendants-appellees and the Resolution
denying the Motion for Reconsideration and Petition for New Trial, be set
aside; and that, instead, The Order of the Court of First Instance of August 7,
1963 be affirmed, or, in the alternative, that the case be remanded to it for
new trial.
Involved in this controversy are the respective claims of petitioner and private
respondents over Lot No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate (part of the
friar lands) in Tanza, Cavite, with an area of approximately 1,622 square
meters. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6804 issued in the
name of the legal heirs of Margarita Torres.
The facts of the case cover three generations. The propositus, Margarita
Torres, during the Spanish regime, was married to Claro Santillan. Vicente
and Antonina were begotten of this union. Claro died leaving Margarita a
widow. Antonina married and had six children, namely: Alfredo, Salud
(married to Baldomero Buenaventura), Demetria (married to Leonardo

Quinto), Adelina (married to Cesario Punzalan), Tomas and Amado all
surnamed Narciso, who, together with Vicente Santillan, are the private
respondents. Antonina died before the institution of the cases while Vicente
died on June 4, 1957, 2 during the pendency of the cases in the Trial Courts,
without progeny .
After the death of her husband, Margarita Torres cohabited with Leon Arvisu
Arbole, without benefit of marriage. Out of their cohabitation, petitioner
Macaria Torres (later married to Francisco Bautista) was born on June 20,
1898, and baptized on June 26, 1898. In a Certificate of Baptism issued by
the Parish Priest of Tanza, Cavite, Leon Arvisu Arbole and Margarita Torres
were named as father and mother of petitioner whose name was listed as
Macaria Arvisu", (Exhibit "C" Another Baptismal Certificate, however, listed
her name as Macaria Torres, while her father's name was left blank (Exhibit
"4"). Subsequently, or on June 7, 1909, Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres
were married (Exhibit "A"). Petitioner lived with and was reared by her
parents. Margarita, the mother, died on December 20, 1931 (Exhibit "D"),
while Leon, the father, passed away on September 14, 1933 (Exhibit " E ").
Lot No. 551, an urban lot with an area of 1,622 sq. ms., more or less, had
been leased temporarily by the Government (Lease No. 17) to Margarita
Torres who was the actual occupant of the lot. The date of the lease cannot
be determined with exactitude from the records. On December 13, 1910, the
Government, through the Director of Lands, issued to Margarita Torres, Sale
Certificate No. 222 (Exhibit "B") over the said lot at the price of P428.80,
payable in 20 annual installments of P20.00 each. The rental/s previously
paid of P17.40 was credited to the purchase price. Testimonial evidence is to
the effect that Leon Arbole paid the installments out of his earnings as a
water tender at the Bureau of Lands, Tanza, Cavite. The last installment,
however, was paid on December 17, 1936, or three (3) years after his death.
On August 25, 1933, twenty (20) days before his death, Leon Arbole sold and
transferred in a notarial deed all his rights and interest to the one-half (1/2)
portion of Lot No. 551 in favor of petitioner, for the sum of P300.00. 3
On June 6, 1953, Vicente Santillan executed an Affidavit claiming possession
of Lot No. 551 and asking for the issuance of title in his name, which he filed
with the Bureau of Lands. Based thereon, the Bureau of Lands issued the
corresponding patent in the name of the legal heirs of Margarita Torres.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6804 was eventually issued by the Register
of Deeds of Cavite on November 7, 1957, also in the name of said heirs.
49
On June 3, 1954, private respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for

Forcible Entry, with the Justice of the Peace Court of Tanza, Cavite, alleging
that petitioner had entered a portion of Lot No. 551 without their consent,
constructed a house. and refused to vacate upon demand. For her part,
petitioner claimed that she is a co-owner of the lot in question, being one of
the daughters of Margarita Torres. The ejectment case was decided against
petitioner and the latter appealed to the then Court of First Instance of
Cavite, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 5547 (Ejectment Case).
On June 8, 1954, petitioner instituted an action for partition of Lot No. 551
before the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No.
5505 (Partition Case), alleging that said lot was conjugal property of the
spouses Margarita Torres and Leon Arbole, and that she is their legitimated
child. Private respondents filed an Answer alleging that the lot belonged
exclusively to Margarita Torres; that they are her only heirs, and that the
complaint for partition should be dismissed.
The Ejectment Case and the Partition Case were jointly tried and decided on
November 20, 1958 with a finding that Lot No. 551 is the paraphernal
property of Margarita Torres and adjudicating to private respondents twothirds (2/3) of the property in equal shares, and to petitioner a one-third (1/3)
portion. 4 Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which private respondents
opposed. Pending its resolution, the Provincial Capitol of Cavite was burned,
resulting in the complete destruction of the records of the two cases, which,
however, were later partially reconstituted.
On August 7, 1963, the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch 1,
issued an Order granting reconsideration and amending the Decision of
November 20, 1958. The positive portion thereof reads as follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in Civil Case No. .
5505:
(1) Declaring Macaria A. Torres as the legitimated child of the
spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres;
(2) Declaring that Lot No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon
Estate is a conjugal partnership property of the spouses
Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres;
(3) Adjudicating four-sixths (4/6th of Lot No. 551 of S.C. de
Malabon Estate to Macaria Torres, and two-sixths (2/6th) in
equal shares to Alfredo, Tomas, Amado, Salud, Demetria
and Adelina, all surnamed Narciso, legitimate children and

heirs of the deceased Antonina Santillan, since Vicente
Santillan is already dead. The parties may make the partition
among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance,
subject to confirmation by the Court. In fairness, however, to
the parties, each party should be alloted that portion of the
lot where his or her house has been constructed, as far as
this is possible. In case the parties are unable to agree upon
the partition, the Court shall appoint three commissioners to
make the partition.
As to Civil Case No. 5547, the same is hereby dismissed.
Without costs in both cases. 5
In concluding that petitioner is a legitimated child, the Trial Court opined:
It is undisputed that when Macaria A. Torres was born on
June 20, 1898, her parents, Leon Arbole and Margarita
Torres, had the capacity to marry each other. There was no
legal impediment for them to marry It has also been
established that Macaria A. Torres had been taken care of,
brought up and reared by her parents until they died. The
certificate of baptism (Exh. "G") also shows that Macaria
Torres was given the family name of Arvisu, which is also the
family name of her father, Leon Arbole, and that her father is
Leon Arvisu and her mother is Margarita Torres. Such being
the case, Macaria A. Torres possessed the status of an
acknowledged natural child. And when her parents were
married on June 7, 1909, she became the legitimated
daughter of on Arbole and Margarita Torres. 6
Private respondents appealed. On April 2, 1973, the then Court of
Appeals 7 rendered the judgment sought to be set aside herein, the decretal
part of which states:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in Civil Case No.
5505:
(1) Declaring that Macaria A. Torres is not the legitimated
child of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres;
50
(2) Declaring that Lot No. 551 of the Sta Cruz de Malabon
Estate is a conjugal partnership property of the spouses
Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres; and
(3) Adjudicating one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 551 of S.C. de
Malabon Estate to Macaria Torres, and the other half (1/2) in
equal shares to Alfredo, Tomas, Amado, Salud, Demetria
and Adelina, an surnamed Narciso, legitimate children and
heirs of Antonina Santillan, since Vicente Santillan is already
dead. The parties may make the partition among themselves
by proper instruments of conveyance, subject to confirmation
by the Court. In fairness, however, to the parties, each party
should be alloted that portion of the lot where his or her
house has been constructed, as far as this is possible. In
case the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the
Court shall appoint three commissioners to make the
partition.
As to Civil Case No. 5547, the same is hereby dismissed.
Without costs in both cases. 8
The Appellate Court was of the opinion that:
Macaria A. Torres (Exhibit "C") is not the record of birth

referred to in Article 131. This article of the old Civil Code
'requires that unless the acknowledgement is made in a will
or other public document, it must be made in the record of
birth, or in other words, in the civil register (Samson vs.
Corrales Tan, 48 PhiL 406). 9
A Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial, dated April 16, 1973, was
filed by petitioner. In support thereof, petitioner submitted a typewritten
Sworn Statement, dated March 5, 1930, of spouses Leon Arvisu (Arbole) and
Margarita Torres, 10 reading in full as follows:
SWORN STATEMENT
We, Leon Arvisu and Margarita Torres husband and wife
respectively, of majority age, and residents of the
Municipality of Tanza, Province of Cavite, P.I., after being
duly sworn to according to law depose and say
That Macaria de Torres is our legitimized daughter she being
born out of wedlock on the 26 th of June 1898 all Tanza,
Cavite, but as stated she was legitimized by our subsequent
marriage.
Macaria A. Torres is not a legitimated daughter of Leon

Arvisu Arbole and Margarita Torres, the former not having
been legally acknowledged before or after the marriage of
her parents. As correctly pointed out by the appellants in
their brief, the fact that she was taken cared of, brought up
and reared by her parents until they died, and that the
certificate of baptism (Exhibit "C") shows that she was given
the family name of Arvisu did not bestow upon her the status
of an acknowledged natural child.
That at the time of her birth or conception, we, her parents

could have married without dispensation had we desired.
Under Article 121 of the old Civil Code, the governing law on
the matter, children shall be considered legitimated by
subsequent marriage only when they have been
acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration
thereof, and Article 131 of the same code provides that the
acknowledgement of a natural child must be in the record of
birth, in a will or in some public document. Article 131 then
prescribed the form in which the acknowledgment of a
natural child should be made. The certificate of baptism of
Wherefore, it is respectfully requested to anybody concerned

that proper remedy be made for the change of the surname
of said Macaria de Torres as desired.
That as natural child our aforesaid daughter was surnamed

de Torres after that of her mother's at the time she was
baptized as per record on file in the Church.
That as a legitimized daughter she should now be surnamed
Arvisu after her father's family name.
In testimony hereof, we hereunto signed out names at

Tanza, Cavite, this 5th day of March 1930.
51
(Thumbmarked) (Thumbmarked)
LEON ARVISU MARGARITA TORRES
should be granted in respect of the sworn statement of March 5, 1930. A

Special Division of five was then formed, composed of Justices Antonio
Lucero Magno S. Gatmaitan, Lourdes P. San Diego, Jose N. Leuterio and
Luis B. Reyes (Justice Perez having retired or having disqualified himself). In
a minute resolution of August 24, 1973, the Division of five, by a vote of three
or two, denied both reconsideration and new trial.
Signed in the prsence of:

(Sgd.) Illegible (Sgd.) Macaria Bautista
x----------------------------------------------------x
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS )
MUNICIPALITY OF TANZA ) ss
PROVINCE OF CAVITE )
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of March 1930. The affiant
Leon Arvisu exhibited to me no cedula certificate being exempt on account of
going over 60 years of age and Margarita Torres having exhibited no cedula
certificate being exempt on account of her sex.
Witness my hand and seal of office on the date and place aforesaid.
CONSTANCIO
Notary
Until Dec. 31, 1930.
T.
Public,
Not.
Reg.
P.
Book No. III Series of 1930. 11
Cavite
No.
No.
VELASCO
Province
56
2
The reason given for the non-production of the notarial document during trial
was that the same was only found by petitioner's daughter, Nemensia A.
Bautista, among the personal belongings of private respondent, Vicente
Santillan, an adverse party, after his death and who may have attempted to
suppress it. Private respondents, for their part, argued against new trial, and
contended that it is not newly discovered evidence which could not have
been produced during the trial by the exercise of due diligence.
The Decision of the Appellate Court was rendered by a Division of three,
composed of Justices Jesus Y. Perez, Jose N. Leuterio and Luis B.
Reyes, ponente. When the Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial was
considered, there was disagreement, possibly as to whether or not new trial
To warrant review, petitioner, has summarized her submission based on two

assignments of error. The first was expressed as follows:
Although the Court of Appeals is correct in declaring that
Macaria A. Torres is not the legitimated child of the spouses
Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres, it has overlooked to
include in its findings of facts the admission made by Vicente
Santillan and the heirs of Antonina Santillan (herein
respondents) that Macaria A. Torres and Vicente Santillan
and Antonina Santillan are brother and sisters with a
common mother Margarita Torres and they are the legal
heirs and nearest of relatives of Margarita Torres, and as a
consequence thereof, the Court of Appeals had drawn an
incorrect conclusion in adjudicating the entire share of
Margarita Torres in the conjugal property solely to Vicente
Santillan and the heirs of Antonina Santillan. (emphasis
supplied)
As we understand it, petitioner has conceded, with which we concur, that,
without taking account of the sworn statement of March 5, 1930, she cannot
be considered a legitimated child of her parents. Continuous possession of
the status of a natural child, fact of delivery by the mother, etc. will not
amount to automatic recognition, but an action for compulsory recognition is
still necessary, which action may be commenced only during the lifetime of
the putative parents, subject to certain exceptions. 12
The admission adverted to appears in paragraph 3 of private respondents'
original complaint in the Ejectment Case reading:
the plaintiffs and the defendant Macaria A. Bautista are the
legal heirs and nearest of kins of Margarita Torres, who died
in Tanza, Cavite on December 20, 1931. (Emphasis
supplied).
52
The statement, according to petitioner, is an admission of her legitimation

and is controlling in the determination of her participation in the disputed
property.
We are not persuaded. In the Amended Complaint filed by private
respondents in the same Ejectment Case, the underlined portion was deleted
so that the statement simply read:
That the plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of kin of
Margarita Torres, who died at Tanza, Cavite, on December
20, 1931.
In virtue thereof, the Amended Complaint takes the place of the original. The
latter is regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any further function
as a pleading. The original complaint no longer forms part of the record. 13
If petitioner had desired to utilize the original complaint she should have
offered it in evidence. Having been amended, the original complaint lost its
character as a judicial admission, which would have required no proof, and
became merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as
evidence, required its formal offer. Contrary to petitioner's submission,
therefore there can be no estoppel by extrajudicial admission made in the
original complaint, for failure to offer it in evidence. 14
procedural due process, a new trial would resolve such vital considerations
as (1) whether or not said Sworn Statement qualifies as the public document
prescribed in Article 131 of the old Civil Code; 15 (2) whether or not it
conforms to an act of acknowledgment by the parents after the celebration of
their marriage as required by Article 121 of the same code; 16 and (3)
whether or not petitioner's signature as a witness to said document was the
equivalent of the consent necessary for acknowledgment of an adult person
under Article 133 of that Code. 17 Affirmative answers would confer upon
petitioner the status of a legitimated child of her parents, and would entitle
her to enjoy hereditary rights to her mother's estate.
Private respondents stress that since petitioner signed as a witness to the
document she should be chargeable with knowledge of its existence, and,
therefore, the Sworn Statement was not newly discovered evidence. In our
view, the document can reasonably qualify as newly discovered evidence,
which could not have been produced during the trial even with the exercise of
due diligence; specially if it really had been in the possession of Vicente
Santillan, an adverse party who, it was alleged, suppressed the document.
In the interest of judicial expediency, the new trial can be conducted by
respondent Appellate Court, now empowered to do so under Section 9 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
It should be noted that in the Partition Case private respondents, in their

Answer (parag. 4), denied the legitimacy of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby remanded to the now Intermediate

Appellate Court for new trial, and depending on its outcome, said Court shall
also resolve the respective participation of the parties in the disputed
property, inclusive of the estate of the deceased Vicente Santillan. No costs.
The second error attributed to the Appellate Court has been pleaded as
follows:
SO ORDERED.
Also, the Court of Appeals has gravely abused its discretion

when it denied the petition for new trial, knowing as it does
that the judgment is clearly erroneous in view of the
evidence which is offered and no amount of diligence on the
part of the petitioner could it be produced in court at any time
before it was offered as it was found from the personal
belongings of Vicente Santillan, an adverse party, after his
death.
It is our considered opinion that new trial was warranted to prevent a possible
miscarriage of justice. Assuming that the genuineness and due execution of
the Sworn Statement of March 5, 1930 is established in accordance with
Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
Qualified By
Section 7, Rule 18
RULE 18
Pre-Trial
53
Section 7. Record of pre-trial. The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be

recorded. Upon the termination thereof, the court shall issue an order which
shall recite in detail the matters taken up in the conference, the action taken
thereon, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements or
admissions made by the parties as to any of the matters considered. Should
the action proceed to trial, the order shall, explicitly define and limit the
issues to be tried. The contents of the order shall control the subsequent
course of the action, unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice.
(5a, R20)
Sections 2, 4, Rule 118

RULE 118
Pre-Trial
Section 2. Pre-trial agreement. All agreements or admissions made or
entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed
by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the
accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this
Rule shall be approved by the court. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)
Section 4. Pre-trial order. After the pre-trial conference, the court shall
issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence
marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not
disposed of, and control the course of the action during the trial, unless
modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice. (3)
Pp v. Hernandez, 260 SCRA 25 (1996)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 108028 July 30, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CRISTINA M HERNANDEZ, accused-appellant.
FRANCISCO, J.:p
Accused-appellant Cristina Hernandez was charged with the crime of
illegal recruitment committed in large scale in violating of Article 38
(a) and (b) in relation to Article 13 (b) and (c) of the New Labor
Code 1, committed as follows:
That in or about and during the period comprised between
December 14, 1988 to December 24, 1988, inclusive in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused representing
herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport
Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there
willfully and unlawfully for a fee, recruit and promise
employment/job placement abroad to the following persons
to wit: ROGELIO N. LEGASPI, ULDARICO P. LEGASPI,
SONNY P. BERNABE, ARNEL B. MENDOZA, BENITO L.
BERNABE, ARNOLD P. VALENZUELA, ARMANDO P.
PAGULAYAN, GREGORIO P. MENDOZA, JR., RONALD T.
CORREA, DANILO PALAD and ROBERT P. VELASQUEZ
(herein known as private complainants) without first having
secured the required license or authority from the
POEA. 2 (Emphasis supplied.)
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the
merits ensued. Of the fourteen (14) private complainants, four (4)
were presented as witnesses for the prosecution, namely: Benito L.
Bernabe, Robert P. Velasquez, Gregorio P. Mendoza and Arnel
Mendoza. They testified to the following essential facts: Private
complainants' first encounter with the appellant was on December
12, 1988 when one Josefa Cinco accompanied them to the office of
the Philippine Thai Association, Inc. (Philippine-Thai) in Ermita,
Manila to meet the appellant. Introducing herself as the general
manager of Philippine-Thai, appellant asserted that her company
recruited workers for placement abroad and asked private
complainants if they wanted to work as factory workers in Taipeh.
Enticed by the assurance of immediate employment and an $800 per
month salary, private complainants applied. Appellant required
54
private complainants to pay placement and passport fees in the total

amount of P22,500.00 per applicant, to be paid in three installments,
to wit: P1,500 on December 14, 1988, P10,000.00 on December 16,
1988, and P11,000.00 on December 22, 1988. When the
complainants-witnesses paid the first two installments, they were
issued receipts by Liza Mendoza, the alleged treasurer of PhilippineThai signed by the latter in the presence of the appellant. The
receipts for the last installment paid by them were signed by Liza
Mendoza, and the appellant. After having received the entire
amount 3 from the witnesses, appellant assured them that they would
be able to leave for Taipeh sometime before the end of December,
1988. But contrary to appellant's promise, complainants-witnesses
were unable to leave for abroad. They demanded for the return of
their money but to no avail. Appellant's unfulfilled promise of
employment and her refusal to return the money that had been paid
by way of placement and passport fees, triggered the filing of the
complaint.
For its part, the defense presented as its lone witness, the appellant
whose testimony consisted mainly in denying the charges against
her. Appellant claimed that she never met any of the complainants
nor did she ever recruit any of them. She likewise denied having
received money from anyone and asserted that she did not know any
Liza Mendoza who is the alleged treasure of Philippine-Thai.
Appellant maintained that although she had an office in Ermita
Building located at Arquiza Street, Ermita, Manila, the said office
belonged to B.C. Island Wood Products Corporation which was
engaged in the logging business. However, when questioned further,
appellant admitted being the president of Philippine-Thai but only in
a nominal capacity, and claimed that as nominee-president, she did
not participate in any of its transactions. Appellant likewise insisted
that Philippine-Thai was engaged solely in the barong tagalog
business.
After careful calibration of the evidence presented by the prosecution
and the defense, the court a quorendered a decision holding that the
defense of "denial" interposed by the accused could not prevail over
the positive and clear testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which
had established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. 4 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby finds
that the accused CRISTINA HERNANDEZ, (sic) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment,

committed in large scale, as defined in Article 38(a) & (b) of
Presidential Decree No. 1412, . . . in relation to Article 13(b)
and (c) . . . , accordingly, sentences the accused to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment (RECLUSION PERPETUA) with
the accessory penalties provided for by law; to pay a fine of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to
return and pay to BENITO L. BERNABE the amount of
TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED
(P28,500) PESOS; to ROBERT P. VELASQUEZ the amount
of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED
(P22,500.00) PESOS; to GREGORIO P. MENDOZA the
amount of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
(22,500.00) PESOS; to ARNEL MENDOZA the amount of
TWENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P22,500.00)
PESOS also without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, November 29, 1991. 5
Appellant comes to this Court for the reversal of the judgment of
conviction assigning the following errors against the lower court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED
"LIABLE OF (sic) ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT COMMITTED
IN A LARGE SCALE AND BY A SYNDICATE (sic)" FOR
HAVING "MAINTAINED OFFICE WITHOUT LICENSE OR
REGISTRATION FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
THRU ITS OFFICE, THE PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA)."
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE
OF THE "FACT THAT ACCUSED CRISTINA M.
HERNANDEZ HAD BEEN CHARGED . . . OF ANOTHER
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT . . . DOCKETED AS CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 88-62599" AND IN CONSIDERING THE
55
PENDENCY THEREOF AS EVIDENCE OF THE "SCHEME

AND STRATEGY ADOPTED BY THE ACCUSED . . . AND
PRACTICED WITH THE HELP OF HER AGENTS AND
OTHER PERSONS WORKING UNDER THE SHADE OF
HER PROTECTION."
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE
OR WEIGHT TO THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED. 6
The first assignment of error is anchored on the contention that the
prosecution failed to prove one of the essential elements of the crime
of illegal recruitment that the offender is a non-licensee or nonholder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers. 7 The aforementioned element, specifically the
fact that neither appellant nor Philippine-Thai was licensed or
authorized to recruit workers as shown by the records of the POEA,
was the subject of a stipulation proposed by the prosecution and
admitted by the defense during trial. Appellant assails as erroneous
the reliance placed by the prosecution on the said stipulation of facts
in dispensing with the presentation of evidence to prove the said
element of the crime of illegal recruitment. Appellant argues that: (1)
the stipulation of facts was not tantamount to an admission by the
appellant of the fact of non-possession of the requisite authority or
license from the POEA, but was merely an admission that the Chief
Licensing Officer of the POEA, if presented in court, would testify to
this fact, and (2) the stipulation of facts is null and void for being
contrary to law and public policy. Appellant posits the foregoing
arguments to bolster her contention that the stipulation of facts did
not relieve the prosecution of its duty to present evidence to prove all
the elements of the crime charged to the end that the guilt of the
accused may be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
At the outset, it should be said that the above contention and the
arguments are insignificant in view of the fact that records disclose
that the prosecution had in fact presented evidence to prove the said
element of the crime of illegal recruitment. "EXHIBIT I", a certification
issued by the Chief Licensing Branch of the POEA, attesting to the
fact that neither appellant nor Philippine-Thai is licensed/authorized
to recruit workers for employment abroad, was offered and admitted
in evidence without the objection of the appellant. 8
Although appellant's arguments find no significant bearing in the face

of the existence of "EXHIBIT I", they nonetheless require deeper
scrutiny and a clear response for future application. Hence, the
following discussion.
Appellant correctly distinguishes between an admission that a
particular witness if presented in court would testify to certain facts,
and an admission of the facts themselves. According to the
appellant, what was stipulated on between the prosecution and
defense counsel at the hearing on June 6, 1990 was "merely that
the testimony of the Chief Licensing Officer of the POEA would be to
the effect that appellant is not licensed nor authorized to recruit
workers", 9 Thus:
Prosecutor
. . . Before we call on our first witness, we propose some
stipulations regarding the testimony of the Chief Licensing
Branch of the POEA that Cristina Hernandez is not a (sic)
licensed nor authorized by the Department of Labor to recruit
workers abroad.
Court
Would you agree?
Atty. Ulep (Counsel for the Accused): Agreed, Your Honor. 10
She claims that the foregoing clearly indicate that there was no judicial
admission of the fact of non-possession of a license/authority but rather a
mere admission that the witness, if presented, would testify to such fact. This
being the case, it remained incumbent upon the prosecution to present
evidence of such fact. To buttress her position, the following was cited to note
the distinction:
Suppose a case is set for trial and one of the parties moves
for a continuance because of the absence of W, an important
witness. His opponent, who is anxious to go to trial; asks
what are the facts to which W would testify. The other
attorney tells him, adding: "If I consent to the overruling of
my motion, will you stipulate that those are the facts?" The
attorney who is pressing for trial says: "No but I will stipulate
56
that if W were called in this case as a witness, he would so

testify." What is the difference between the two stipulations?
consistent ruling of this Court on the matter. Thus, as held in the case
of U.S. vs. Donato: 14
In the first stipulation proposed there is a judicial admission

of the facts, and they cannot be contradicted. But the second
stipulation proposed will only have the same effect as if the
witness had testified to the facts. Such testimony the party is
free to contradict. 11
Agreements between attorneys for the prosecution and for

the defense in criminal cases, by which it is stipulated that
certain witnesses, if present, would testify to certain facts
prevent a review of the evidence by the Supreme Court and
arc in violation of the law. 15
The distinction, though cogent, is unfortunately inapplicable to the case at

bar. Conveniently omitted from the appellant's reply chief is the ensuing
statement made by the court after counsel for the accused, Atty. Ulep agreed
to the stipulation proposed by the prosecution, to wit:
The above ruling was reiterated in a subsequent case where the accused
was convicted solely on the basis of an agreement between the fiscal and
the counsel for the accused that certain witnesses would testify confirming
the complaint in all its parts. In reversing the judgment of conviction, this
Court held that:
Atty. Ulep (counsel for the accused): Agreed, Your Honor.

Court
The prosecution and the defense agreed to stipulate/admit
that from the record of the POEA Licensing and Regulation
Office, Dept. of Labor and Employment, accused Cristina
Hernandez/Phil. etc., Ass. . . . is neither licensed nor
authorized by the office to recruit workers overseas
abroad andthat if the duly authorized representative from the
POEA Administration is to take the witness stand, he will
confirm to this fact as borne by the records. 12 (Emphasis
supplied.)
From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution and the defense
counsel stipulated on two things: that ". . . from the record of the POEA, . . .
accused Cristina Hernandez, Phil. etc. Ass. . . . is neither licensed nor
authorized by that office to recruit workers for overseas abroad and that if the
duly authorized representative from the POEA Administration (sic) is to take
the witness stand, he will confirm to this fact . . . ." 13 The claim that the lower
court mistakenly interpreted defense counsel's acquiescence to the
prosecution's proposed stipulation as an admission of non-possession of the
requisite POEA license or authority is belied by the fact that after the above
enunciation by the court, no objection was interposed by defense counsel.
Appellant further contends that granting arguendo that defense counsel had
in fact agreed to the above stipulation of facts, the same is null and void for
being contrary to the well-established rule that a stipulation of facts is not
allowed in criminal cases. To bolster this contention, appellant cited the
It is neither proper nor permissible to consider a case closed,

or to render judgment therein, by virtue of an agreement
entered into between the provincial fiscal and the counsel for
the accused with reference to facts, some of which are
favorable to the defense, and others related to the
prosecution, without any evidence being adduced or
testimony taken from the witnesses mentioned in the
agreement; such practice is not authorized and defeats the
purposes of criminal law; it is an open violation of the rules of
criminal procedure . . . . 16
The rule prohibiting the stipulation of facts in criminal cases is grounded on
the fundamental right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty, and corollary duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. It is therefor advanced that the prosecution being
duty-bound to prove all the elements of the crime, may not be relieve of this
obligation by the mere expedient of stipulating with defense counsel on a
matter constitutive of an essential elements of the crime charged.
The rationale behind the proscription against this class of agreements
between prosecution and defense was enunciated in the case
of U.S. vs. Manlimos: 17
It is not supposed to be within the knowledge or competence
of counsel to predict what a proposed witness shall say
under the sanction of his oath and the test of crossexamination. A conviction for crime should not rest upon
mere conjecture. Nor is it possible for a trial court to weigh
57
with exact nicety the contradictory declaration of witnesses

not produced so as to be subjected to its observation and its
judgment as to their credibility. 18
However, in the light of recent changes in our rules on criminal procedure,
particularly the pre-trial provisions found in Rule 118, the prohibition against a
stipulation of facts in criminal cases no longer holds true. Rule 118 provides
the following:
Sec. 1. Pre-trial; when proper To expedite trial, where the
accused and counsel agree, the court shall conduct a pretrial conference on the matters enunciated in Section 2
hereof, without impairing the rights of the accused.
Sec. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects . . . The pre-trial
conference shall consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
By virtue of the foregoing rule, a stipulation facts in criminal cases is now
expressly sanctioned by law. In further pursuit of the objective of expediting
trial by dispensing with the presentation of evidence on matters that the
accused is willing to admit, a stipulation of fact should be allowed not only
during pre-trial but also and with more reason, during trial proper itself.
Parenthetically, although not expressly sanctioned under the old rules of
court, a stipulation of facts by the parties in criminal cases has long been
allowed and recognized as declarations constituting judicial admissions,
hence, binding upon the parties. In the case of People vs. Mapa 19 where the
accused was charged with illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution and
the defense stipulated on the fact that the accused was found in possession
of gun without the requisite permit or license. More at point is the case
of People vs.Bocar 20 wherein the fiscal proposed the admission by the
accused of the affidavits and other exhibits already presented by the
prosecution to dispense with oral testimonies on the matter. Holding that the
admissions made by the parties were binding, this Court stated that:
. . . [T]here is nothing unlawful or irregular about the above
procedure. The declarations constitute judicial admission,
which are binding on the parties, by virtue of which the

prosecution dispensed with the introduction of additional
evidence and the defense waived the right to contest or
dispute the veracity of the statements contained in the
exhibits. 21 (Emphasis supplied.)
American jurisprudence has established the acceptability of the practice of
stipulating during the trial of criminal cases, and categorically stated
in People vs. Hare 22 that:
The record discloses that the defense counsel stipulated to
what certain witnesses would testify if they were present in
court. . . .
. . . The defendant contends that it was error for his counsel
to make these stipulations. This court has held that an
accused may by stipulation waive the necessity of a proof of
all or any part of the case which the people have alleged
against him and that having done so, he cannot complain in
this Court of evidence which he has stipulated into the
record. 23
The collorally issue left for the determination of this Court is whether or not
Section 4 of Rule 118requiring an agreement or admission made or
entered during the pre-trial conference to be reduced in writing and signed
by the accused and his counsel before the same may be used in evidence
against the accused-equally applies to a stipulation of facts made during trial.
We resolved this issue in the negative.
A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel
during trial in open court is automatically reduced into writing and contained
in the official transcript of the proceedings had in court. The conformity of the
accused in the form of his signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in view of
the fact that: ". . . an attorney who is employed to manage a party's conduct
of a lawsuit . . . has prima facie authority to make relevant admissions by
pleadings, by oral or written stipulation, . . . which unless allowed to be
withdrawn are conclusive." 24 (Emphasis supplied.) In fact, "judicial admission
are frequently those of counsel or of the attorney of record, who is, for the
purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions are made .
. . for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, . . . they bind the
client, whether made during, or even after, the trial." 25
58
The foregoing find basis in the general rule that a client is bound by the acts
of his counsel who represents him. 26For all intents and purposes, the acts of
a lawyer in the defense of a case are the acts of his client. The rule extends
even to the mistakes and negligence committed by the lawyer except only
when such mistakes would result in serious injustice to the client. 27 No
cogent reason exists to make such exception in this case. It is worth noting
that Atty. Ulep, appellant's counsel in the lower court, agreed to the
stipulation of facts proposed by the prosecution not out of mistake nor
inadvertence, but obviously because the said stipulation of facts was also in
conformity of defense's theory of the case. It may be recalled that throughout
the entire duration of the trial, appellant staunchly denied ever having
engaged in the recruitment business either in her personal capacity or
through Philippine-Thai. Therefore, it was but logical to admit that the POEA
records show that neither she nor Philippine-Thai was licensed or authorized
to recruit workers.
It is true that the rights of an accused during trial are given paramount
importance in our laws on criminal procedure. Among the fundamental rights
of the accused is the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against
him. 28 But the right of confrontation guaranteed and secured to the accused
is a personal privilege which may be waived. 29Thus, in the case
of U.S. vs. Anastasio, 30 this Court deemed as a waiver of the right of
confrontation, the admission by the accused that witnesses if present would
testify to certain facts stated in the affidavit of the prosecution. 31
In the same vein, it may be said that such an admission is a waiver of the
right of an accused to present evidence on his behalf. Although the right to
present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself for the
protection of the accused, this right may be waived expressly or
impliedly. 32 This is in consonance with the doctrine of waiver which
recognizes that ". . . everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the
advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the
individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished
without infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community
at large." 33
The abovementioned doctrine is squarely applicable to the case at bar.
Appellant was never prevented from presenting evidence contrary to the
stipulation of facts. If appellant believed that the testimony of the Chief
Licensing Officer of the POEA would be beneficial to her case, then it is the
defense who should have presented him. Her continuous failure to do so
during trial was a waiver of her right to present the pertinent evidence to
contradict the stipulation of facts and establish her defense.
In view of the foregoing, the stipulation of facts proposed during trial by
prosecution and admitted by defense counsel is tantamount to a judicial
admission by the appellant of the facts stipulated on. Controlling, therefore, is
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which provides that:
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that
no such admission was made.
We now go to appellant's second and third assignment of errors. In her
second assignment of error, appellant makes much ado of the "judicial
notice" taken by the lower court of the fact that appellant had been charged
with another illegal recruitment case, 34 and in considering the pendency
thereof as evidence of the scheme and strategy adopted by the accused.
Appellant cites a violation of Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
which provides that before the court may take judicial notice of any matter,
the parties shall be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material
issue in the case. It is claimed that the lower court never announced its
intention to take judicial notice of the pendency of the other illegal recruitment
case nor did it allow the accused to be heard thereon.
It is true that as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases
have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the
fact that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the
same judge. 35 However, this rule is subject to the exception that:
. . . in the absence of objection and as a matter of
convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or
any part of the original record of the case filed in its archives
as read into the records of a case pending before it,
when with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is
made to it, by name and number or in some other manner by
which it is sufficiently designated, . . . 36 (emphasis supplied.)
The judicial notice taken by the lower court of the pendency of another illegal
recruitment case against the appellant falls squarely under the above
59
exception in view of the fact that it was the appellant herself who introduced
evidence on the matter when she testified in open court as follows:
Q: You mean to say . . . by the way, where
(sic) were you at the NBI when Mrs. Cinco
inquired from you about placement abroad?
A: I was just invited by the personnel of the
NBI and I was not allowed to go home.
Q: Whey were you invited by the NBI?
A: They told me that there was a complaint
against me.
Q: Complaint about what?
A: The same case.
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You made mention that an illegal
recruitment case which was supposed to be
the cause of your detention at the NBI . . .
I am not referring to this case, Mrs.
Hernandez what happened to that case,
what is the status of that case?
A: It is also in this sala.
is
already
submitted
Anent the last assignment of error, suffice it to say that we do not find any
compelling reason to reverse the findings of the lower court that appellant's
bare denials cannot overthrow the positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses against her.
Well established is the rule that denials if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence are negative, self-serving evidence which deserve no
weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 38 That she
did not merely deny, but likewise raised as an affirmative defense her
appointment as mere nominee-president of Philippine-Thai is a futile attempt
at exculpating herself and is of no consequence whatsoever when weighed
against the positive declarations of witnesses that it was the appellant who
executed the acts of illegal recruitment as complained of.
Finally, under Article 39 of the New Labor Code, the penalty for illegal
recruitment committed in large scale is life imprisonment and a fine of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00). As previously held by this
Court, life imprisonment is not synonymous with reclusion perpetua. 39 The
lower court erred in imposing "the penalty of life imprisonment
(reclusion perpetua) with the accessory penalties provided for by
law; . . . 40 (Emphasis supplied)
Q: You mean illegal recruitment also?
COURT: It
decision. 37
conviction was not based on the existence of another illegal recruitment case
filed against appellant by a different group of complainants, but on the
overwhelming evidence against her in the instant case.
for
Even assuming, however, that the lower court improperly took judicial notice
of the pendency of another illegal recruitment case against the appellant, the
error would not be fatal to the prosecution's cause. The judgment of
WHEREFORE, appellant's conviction of the crime of illegal recruitment in

large scale is hereby AFFIRMED, and the penalty imposed MODIFIED as
follows: the court sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) PESOS without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; to return and pay to BENITO L. BERNABE the amount of
TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P28,500.00) PESOS; to
ROBERT P. VELASQUEZ the amount of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED (P22,500.00) PESOS; to GREGORIO P. MENDOZA the amount
of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P22,500.00) PESOS; to
ARNEL MENDOZA the amount of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED (P22,000.00) PESOS also without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
60
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
III. Kinds
Object / Real
Section 1, Rule 130
RULE 130
Section 1. Object as evidence. Objects as evidence are those addressed
to the senses of the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it
may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court. (1a)
Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil 62 (1920)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 16444
September 8, 1920
EMETERIA VILLAFLOR, petitioner,

vs.
RICARDO SUMMERS, sheriff of the City of Manila, respondent.
Alfredo Calupitan, and Gibbs, McDonough & Johnson for petitioner.
Assistant City of Fiscal Felix for respondent.
MALCOLM, J.:
The petitioner prays that a writ of habeas corpus issue to restore her to her
liberty.
The facts are not dispute. In a criminal case pending before the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are
charged with the crime of adultery. On this case coming on for trial before the
Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon the petitioner of the
assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court ordered the defendant
Emeteria Villaflor, nor become the petitioner herein, to submit her body to the
examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was
pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that
such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision
relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court
and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the
medical examination required by the court.
The sole legal issue from the admitted facts is whether the compelling of a
woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if she
is pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights and that
portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure which find their origin in the
Constitution of the United States and practically all state constitutions and in
the common law rules of evidence, providing that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. (President's
Instructions to the Philippine Commission; Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
section 5, paragraph 3; Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, section 3;
paragraph 3; Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 [4]; United States
Constitution, fifth amendment.) Counsel for petitioner argues that such bodily
exhibition is an infringement of the constitutional provision; the representative
of the city fiscal contends that it is not an infringement of the constitutional
provision. The trial judge in the instant case has held with the fiscal; while it is
brought to our notice that a judge of the same court has held on an identical
question as contended for by the attorney for the accused and petitioner.
The authorities are abundant but conflicting. What may be termed the
conservative courts emphasize greatly the humanitarianism of the
constitutional provisions and are pleased to extend the privilege in order that
its mantle may cover any fact by which the accused is compelled to make
evidence against himself. (Compare State vs. Jacobs [1858], 50 N. C., 259
with State vs. Ah Chuey [1879], 14 Nev., 79. See further State vs. Ah
Nordstrom [1893], 7 Wash., 506; State vs. Height [1902]. 117 Iowa., 650;
Thornton vs. State [1903], 117 Wis., 338.) A case concordant with this view
and almost directly in point is People vs. McCoy ([1873], 45 How. Pr., 216). A
woman was charged with the crime of infanticide. The corner directed two
physicians to go to the jail and examine her private parts to determine
whether she had recently been delivered of a child. She objected to the
examination, but being threatened with force, yielded, and the examination
was had. The evidence of these physicians was offered at the trial and ruled
61
out. The court said that the proceeding was in violation of the spirit and
meaning of the Constitution, which declares that "no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Continuing,
the court said: "They might as well have sworn the prisoner, and compelled
her, by threats, to testify that she had been pregnant, and had been delivered
of a child, as to have compelled her, by threats, to allow them to look into her
person, with the aid of a speculum, to ascertain whether she had been
pregnant and been delivered of a child. . . . Has this court the right to compel
the prisoner now to submit to an examination they are of the opinion she is
not a virgin, and has had a child? It is not possible that this court has that
right; and it is too clear to admit of argument that evidence thus obtained
would be inadmissible against the prisoner."
It may be revealing a judicial secret, but nevertheless we cannot refrain from
saying that, greatly impressed with the weight of these decisions, especially
the one written by Mr. Justice McClain, in State vs. Height, supra, the instant
case was reported by the writer with the tentative recommendation that the
court should lay down the general rule that a defendant can be compelled to
disclose only those parts of the body which are not usually covered. Buth
having disabused our minds of a too sensitive appreciation of the rights of
accused persons, and having been able, as we think, to penetrate through
the maze of law reports to the policy which lies behind the constitutional
guaranty and the common law principle, we have come finally to take our
stand with what we believe to be the reason of the case.
In contradistinction to the cases above-mentioned are others which seem to
us more progressive in nature. Among these can be prominently mentioned
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court of
these Islands. Thus, the always forward looking jurist, Mr. Justice Holmes, in
the late case of Holt vs. United States ([1910], 218 U. S., 245), in resolving
an objection based upon what he termed "an extravagant extension of the
Fifth Amendment," said: "The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal
court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his
body as evidence when it may be material." (See also, of same general
tenor, decision of Mr. Justice Day in Adams vs. New York [1903], 192 U. S.,
585.) The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, in two decisions, has
seemed to limit the protection to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial
self-incrimination. The constitutional limitation was said to be "simply a
prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips,
against his will, an admission of his guilt." (U. S. vs. Tan Teng [1912], 23
Phil., 145; U. S. vs. Ong Siu Hong [1917], 36 Phil., 735, and the derivatory
principle announced in 16 Corpus Juris, 567, 568, citing the United States
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands as

authority.)
Although we have stated s proposition previously announced by this court
and by the highest tribunal in the United States, we cannot unconcernedly
leave the subject without further consideration. Even in the opinion Mr.
Justice Holmes, to which we have alluded, there was inserted the careful
proviso that "we need not consider how far a court would go in compelling a
man to exhibit himself." Other courts have likewise avoided any attempt to
determine the exact location of the dividing line between what is proper and
what is improper in this very broad constitutional field. But here before us is
presented what would seem to be the most extreme case which could be
imagined. While the United States Supreme Court could nonchalantly decree
that testimony that an accused person put on a blouse and it fitted him is not
a violation of the constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court of
Nuevada could go so far as to require the defendant to roll up his sleeve in
order to disclose tattoo marks, and while the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands could permit substances taken from the person of an accused to be
offered in evidence, none of these even approach in apparent harshness an
order to make a woman, possibly innocent, to disclose her body in all of its
sanctity to the gaze of strangers. We can only consistently consent to the
retention of a principle which would permit of such a result by adhering
steadfastly to the proposition that the purpose of the constitutional provision
was and is merely to prohibit testimonial compulsion.
So much for the authorities. For the nonce we would prefer to forget them
entirely, and here in the Philippines, being in the agrreable state of breaking
new ground, would rather desire our decision to rest on a strong foundation
of reason and justice than on a weak one blind adherence to tradition and
precedent. Moreover, we believe that an unbiased consideration of the
history of the constitutional provisions will disclose that our conclusion is in
exact accord with the causes which led to its adoption.
The maxim of the common law, Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, was
recognized in England in early days, but not in the other legal systems of the
world, in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack. A legal shield was
raised against odious inquisitorial methods of interrogating an accused
person by which to extort unwilling confessions with the ever present
temptation to commit the crime of perjury. The kernel of the privilege as
disclosed by the textwriters was testimonial compulsion. As forcing a man to
be a witness against himself was deemed contrary to the fundamentals of
republican government, the principle was taken into the American
Constitutions, and from the United States was brought to the Philippine
62
Islands, in exactly as wide but no wider a scope as it existed in old

English days. The provision should here be approached in no blindly
worshipful spirit, but with a judicious and a judicial appreciation of both its
benefits and its abuses. (Read the scholarly articles of Prof. Wigmore in 5
Harvard L. R. [1891], p. 71, and 15 Harvard L. R., 1902, p. 610 found in 4
Wigmore on Evidence, pp. 3069 et seq., and U. S. vs. Navarro [1904], Phil.,
143.)
Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of our position is to go back
once more to elements and ponder on what is the prime purpose of a
criminal trial. As we view it, the object of having criminal laws is to purgue the
community of persons who violate the laws to the great prejudice of their
fellow men. Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence, and constitutional
provisions, are then provided, not to protect the guilty but to protect the
innocent. No rule is intemended to be so rigid as to embarrass the
administration of justice in its endeavor to ascertain the truth. No accused
person should be afraid of the use of any method which will tend to establish
the truth. For instance, under the facts before us, to use torture to make the
defendant admit her guilt might only result in including her to tell a falsehood.
But no evidence of physical facts can for any substantial reason be held to
be detrimental to the accused except in so far as the truth is to be avoided in
order to acquit a guilty person.
Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due process of
law cause of the Constitution every person has a natural and inherent right to
the possession and control of his own body. It is extremely abhorrent to one's
sense of decency and propriety to have the decide that such inviolability of
the person, particularly of a woman, can be invaded by exposure to another's
gaze. As Mr. Justice Gray in Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. Botsford ([1891],
141 U. S., 250) said, "To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay
bare the body, or to submit to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority,
is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass." Conceded, and yet, as well
suggested by the same court, even superior to the complete immunity of a
person to be let alone is the inherent which the public has in the orderly
administration of justice. Unfortunately, all too frequently the modesty of
witnesses is shocked by forcing them to answer, without any mental evasion,
questions which are put to them; and such a tendency to degrade the
witness in public estimation does not exempt him from the duty of disclosure.
Between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal considerations,
between a disregard of the public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law
and justice cannot hesitate.
The protection of accused persons has been carried to such an unwarranted

extent that criminal trials have sometimes seemed to be like a game of
shuttlecocks, with the judge as referee, the lawyers as players, the criminal
as guest of honor, and the public as fascinated spectators. Against such a
loose extension of constitutional guaranties we are here prepared to voice
our protest.
Fully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case in a sense, which
on first impression is a shock to one's sensibilities, we must nevertheless
enforce the constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in accord with the policy
and reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences. Once
again we lay down the rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is
limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The
corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the
accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture of force shall be avoided.
Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its corollary and proviso
must, of course, be decided as cases arise.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and
disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to
embarass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no
objection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the
accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen.
Although the order of the trial judge, acceding to the request of the assistant
fiscal for an examination of the person of the defendant by physicians was
phrased in absolute terms, it should, nevertheless, be understood as subject
to the limitations herein mentioned, and therefore legal. The writ of habeas
corpus prayed for is hereby denied. The costs shall be taxed against the
petitioner. So ordered.
Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Avancea, Moir and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Sison v. Pp, 250 SCRA 58 (1995)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
63
G.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995

ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS
SANTOS, and JOSELITO TAMAYO,petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 114931-33 November 16, 1995
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANNIE FERRER, accused, ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN,
RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS, and JOSELITO TAMAYO, accusedappellants.
PUNO, J.:
The case before us occurred at a time of great political polarization in the
aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution. This was the time when the newlyinstalled government of President Corazon C. Aquino was being openly
challenged in rallies, demonstrations and other public fora by "Marcos
loyalists," supporters of deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Tension
and animosity between the two (2) groups sometimes broke into violence. On
July 27, 1986, it resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a known
"Coryista."
From August to October 1986, several informations were filed in court
against eleven persons identified as Marcos loyalists charging them with the
murder of Salcedo. Criminal Case No. 86-47322 was filed against Raul
Billosos y de Leon and Gerry Nery y Babazon; Criminal Case No. 86-47617
against Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe and Joel Tan y Mostero;
Criminal Case No. 86-47790 against Richard de los Santos y Arambulo;
Criminal Case No. 86-48538 against Joselito Tamayo y Ortia; and Criminal
Case No. 86-48931 against Rolando Fernandez y Mandapat. Also filed were
Criminal Cases Nos. 86-49007 and 86-49008 against Oliver Lozano and
Benjamin Nuega as well as Annie Ferrer charging them as accomplices to
the murder of Salcedo.
The cases were consolidated and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XLIX, Manila. All of the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial
ensued accordingly. The prosecution presented twelve witnesses, including
two eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, and the police
officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the incident. In support of their
testimonies, the prosecution likewise presented documentary evidence
consisting of newspaper accounts of the incident and various photographs
taken during the mauling.
The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to
be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Earlier, they applied for a
permit to hold the rally but their application was denied by the authorities.
Despite this setback, three thousand of them gathered at the Rizal
Monument of the Luneta at 2:30 in the afternoon of the scheduled day. Led
by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega, both members of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, the loyalists started an impromptu singing contest, recited
prayers and delivered speeches in between. Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, then
Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District, arrived and asked the
leaders for their permit. No permit could be produced. Colonel Dula Torres
thereupon gave them ten minutes to disperse. The loyalist leaders asked for
thirty minutes but this was refused. Atty. Lozano turned towards his group
and said "Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators." Atty. Nuega
added "Sige, sige gulpihin ninyo!" The police then pushed the crowd, and
used tear gas and truncheons to disperse them. The loyalists scampered
away but some of them fought back and threw stones at the police.
Eventually, the crowd fled towards Maria Orosa Street and the situation later
stabilized. 1
At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese
Garden, Phase III of the Luneta. There, they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular
movie starlet and supporter of President Marcos, jogging around the
fountain. They approached her and informed her of their dispersal and Annie
Ferrer angrily ordered them "Gulpihin ninyo and mga Cory hecklers!" Then
she continued jogging around the fountain chanting "Marcos pa rin, Marcos
pa rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, Pabalikin si Marcos, Bugbugin ang mga
nakadilaw!" The loyalists replied "Bugbugin!" A few minutes later, Annie
Ferrer was arrested by the police. Somebody then shouted "Kailangang
gumanti, tayo ngayon!" A commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, a
cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking persons in yellow, the color of
the "Coryistas." Renato took off his yellow shirt. 2 He then saw a man wearing
a yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of persons shouting "Iyan, habulin
iyan. Cory iyan!" The man in the yellow t-shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers
appeared to be Marcos loyalists. They caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked
and mauled him. Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the group but they
64
again pounced on him and pummelled him with fist blows and kicks hitting
him on various parts of his body. Banculo saw Ranulfo Sumilang, an
electrician at the Luneta, rush to Salcedo's aid. Sumilang tried to pacify the
maulers so he could extricate Salcedo from them. But the maulers pursued
Salcedo unrelentingly, boxing him with stones in their fists. Somebody gave
Sumilang a loyalist tag which Sumilang showed to Salcedo's attackers. They
backed off for a while and Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from
them. But accused Raul Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as another
man boxed Salcedo on the head. Accused Richard de los Santos also boxed
Salcedo twice on the head and kicked him even as he was already
fallen. 3 Salcedo tried to stand but accused Joel Tan boxed him on the left
side of his head and ear. 4 Accused Nilo Pacadar punched Salcedo on his
nape, shouting: "Iyan, Cory Iyan. Patayin!" 5Sumilang tried to pacify Pacadar
but the latter lunged at the victim again. Accused Joselito Tamayo boxed
Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked him as he once more fell. Banculo saw
accused Romeo Sison trip Salcedo and kick him on the head, and when he
tried to stand, Sison repeatedly boxed him. 6 Sumilang saw accused Gerry
Neri approach the victim but did not notice what he did. 7
Abrasions: 4.0 x 2.0 cm., left elbow; 2.0 x 1.5 cm., right knee.
Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and wipe off the
blood from his face. He sat on some cement steps 8 and then tried to flee
towards Roxas boulevard to the sanctuary of the Rizal Monument but
accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the
process. Salcedo pleaded for his life exclaiming "Maawa na kayo sa akin.
Tulungan ninyo ako." He cried: "Pulis, pulis. Wala bang pulis?" 9
The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press

people, both local and foreign. The press took pictures and a video of the
event which became front-page news the following day, capturing national
and international attention. This prompted President Aquino to order the
Capital Regional Command and the Western Police District to investigate the
incident. A reward of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) was put up by
Brigadier General Alfredo Lim, then Police Chief, for persons who could give
information leading to the arrest of the killers. 11 Several persons, including
Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, cooperated with the police, and on
the basis of their identification, several persons, including the accused, were
apprehended and investigated.
The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas
Boulevard until Salcedo collapsed and lost consciousness. Sumilang flagged
down a van and with the help of a traffic officer, brought Salcedo to the
Medical Center Manila but he was refused admission. So they took him to
the Philippine General Hospital where he died upon arrival.
Salcedo died of "hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic." He sustained various
contusions, abrasions, lacerated wounds and skull fractures as revealed in
the following post-mortem findings:
Cyanosis, lips, and nailbeds.
Contused-abrasions: 6.0 x 2.5 cm., and 3.0 x 2.4 cm., frontal
region, right side; 6.8 x 4.2 cm., frontal region, left side; 5.0 x
4.0 cm., right cheek; 5.0 x 3.5 cm., face, left side; 3.5 x 2.0
cm., nose; 4.0 x 2.1 cm., left ear, pinna; 5.0 x 4.0 cm. left
suprascapular region; 6.0 x 2.8 cm., right elbow.
Lacerated wounds: 2.2 cm., over the left eyebrow; 1.0 cm.,
upper lip.
Hematoma, scalp; frontal region, both sides; left parietal
region; right temporal region; occipital region, right side.
Fractures, skull; occipital bone, right side; right posterior
cranial fossa; right anterior cranial fossa.
Hemorrhage, subdural, extensive.
Other visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, about 1/2 filled with grayish brown food materials
and fluid. 10
For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the
mauling of the victim and offered their respective alibis. Accused Joselito
Tamayo testified that he was not in any of the photographs presented by the
prosecution 12 because on July 27, 1986, he was in his house in Quezon
City. 13 Gerry Neri claimed that he was at the Luneta Theater at the time of
the
incident. 14 Romeo Sison, a commercial photographer, was allegedly at his
office near the Luneta waiting for some pictures to be developed at that
time. 15 He claimed to be afflicted with hernia impairing his mobility; he cannot
run normally nor do things forcefully. 16 Richard de los Santos admits he was
at the Luneta at the time of the mauling but denies hitting Salcedo. 17 He said
that he merely watched the mauling which explains why his face appeared in
65
some of the photographs.18 Unlike the other accused, Nilo Pacadar admits
that he is a Marcos loyalist and a member of the Ako'y Pilipino Movement
and that he attended the rally on that fateful day. According to him, he saw
Salcedo being mauled and like Richard de los Santos, merely viewed the
incident. 19 His face was in the pictures because he shouted to the maulers to
stop hitting Salcedo. 20 Joel Tan also testified that he tried to pacify the
maulers because he pitied Salcedo. The maulers however ignored him. 21
The other accused, specifically Attys. Lozano and Nuega and Annie Ferrer
opted not to testify in their defense.
On December 16, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo
Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo
guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by treachery and
sentenced them to 14 years 10 months and 20 days of reclusion temporal as
minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Annie Ferrer was
likewise convicted as an accomplice. The court, however, found that the
prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the other accused and thus acquitted
Raul Billosos, Gerry Nery, Rolando Fernandez, Oliver Lozano and Benjamin
Nuega. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered in the
aforementioned cases as follows:
1. In "People versus Raul Billosos and Gerry Nery," Criminal
Case No. 86-47322, the Court finds that the Prosecution
failed to prove the guilt of the two (2) Accused beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime charged and hereby acquits
them of said charge;
2. In "People versus Romeo Sison, et al.," Criminal Case
No. 86-47617, the Court finds the Accused Romeo Sison,
Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan, guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
as principals for the crime of Murder, defined in Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, and, there being no other
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, hereby imposes on
each of them an indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN
(14)YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS,
of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) DAYS,
of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, to TWENTY (20)
YEARS ofReclusion Temporal, as Maximum;
3. In "People versus Richard de los Santos," Criminal Case

No. 86-47790, the Court finds the Accused Richard de los
Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the
crime of Murder defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code and, there being no other extenuating circumstances,
the Court hereby imposes on him an indeterminate penalty
of from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and
TWENTY (20) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Minimum, to
TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum;
4. In "People versus Joselito Tamayo," Criminal Case No.
86-48538 the Court finds the Accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal, for the crime of "Murder"
defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
imposes on him an indeterminate penalty of from
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY
(20) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Minimum, to TWENTY
(20) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum;
5. In "People versus Rolando Fernandez," Criminal Case
No. 86-4893l, the Court finds that the Prosecution failed to
prove the guilt of the Accused for the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt and hereby acquits him of said charge;
6. In "People versus Oliver Lozano, et al.," Criminal Case
No. 86-49007, the Court finds that the Prosecution failed to
prove the guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime charged and hereby acquits them of said charge;
7. In "People versus Annie Ferrer," Criminal Case No. 8649008, the Court finds the said Accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as accomplice to the crime of Murder
under Article 18 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby imposes on her an indeterminate
penalty of NINE (9) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS
of Prision Mayor, as Minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS,
FIVE (5) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of Reclusion
Temporal, as Maximum.
The Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Richard de los
Santos, Joel Tan, Joselito Tamayo and Annie Ferrer are
hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of
Stephen Salcedo the total amount of P74,000.00 as actual
66
damages and the amount of P30,000.00 as moral and

exemplary damages, and one-half (1/2) of the costs of suit.
The period during which the Accused Nilo Pacadar, Romeo
Sison, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo
had been under detention during the pendency of these
cases shall be credited to them provided that they agreed in
writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and
regulations of the City Jail.
The Warden of the City Jail of Manila is hereby ordered to
release the Accused Gerry Nery, Raul Billosos and Rolando
Fernandez from the City Jail unless they are being detained
for another cause or charge.
The Petition for Bail of the Accused Rolando Fernandez has
become moot and academic. The Petition for Bail of the
Accused Joel Tan, Romeo Sison and Joselito Tamayo is
denied for lack of merit.
The bail bonds posted by the Accused Oliver Lozano and
Benjamin Nuega are hereby cancelled. 22
with the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of

superior strength and, as a consequence, an indeterminate
penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor as
Minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as
Maximum is hereby imposed upon him;
3. Accused-appellant Annie Ferrer is hereby ACQUITTED of
being an accomplice to the crime of Murder.
CONSIDERING that the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua has
been imposed in the instant consolidated cases, the said
cases are now hereby certified to the Honorable Supreme
Court for review. 24
Petitioners filed G.R. Nos. 108280-83 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court inasmuch as Joselito Tamayo was not sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. G.R. Nos. 114931-33 was certified to us for automatic review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals against the four accused-appellants
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Before this court, accused-appellants assign the following errors:
I
On appeal, the Court of Appeals 23 on December 28, 1992, modified the

decision of the trial court by acquitting Annie Ferrer but increasing the penalty
of the rest of the accused, except for Joselito Tamayo, to reclusion perpetua.
The appellate court found them guilty of murder qualified by abuse of
superior strength, but convicted Joselito Tamayo of homicide because the
information against him did not allege the said qualifying circumstance. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is
hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y
Abe, Joel Tan y Mostero and Richard de los Santos are
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder
and are each hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo y Oria is hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY

ERRED WHEN IT NOTED THAT THE ACCUSED FAILED
TO CITE ANYTHING ON RECORD TO SUPPORT THEIR
AVERMENT THAT THERE WERE NO WITNESSES WHO
HAVE COME FORWARD TO IDENTIFY THE PERSONS
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF STEPHEN
SALCEDO.
II
ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE,
DOUBTFUL, SUSPICIOUS AND INCONCLUSIVE
TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESS RANULFO
SUMILANG.
III
67
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE

ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY WHEN
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT ANY OF
THE ACCUSED CARRIED A HARD AND BLUNT
INSTRUMENT, THE ADMITTED CAUSE OF THE
HEMORRHAGE RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF THE
DECEASED.
IV
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE EXISTS CONSPIRACY
AMONG THE PRINCIPAL ACCUSED.
V
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED IS
MURDER AND NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) CAUSED IN A
TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY. 25
In their additional brief, appellants contend that:
I
ERRED IN REACHING A CONCLUSION OF FACT
UTILIZING SPECULATIONS, SURMISES, NON-SEQUITUR
CONCLUSIONS, AND EVEN THE DISPUTED DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT, TO UPHOLD THE VALIDITY OF
THE VERY SAME JUDGMENT, ALL CONTRARY TO THE
RULES OF EVIDENCE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
ADMITTING EXHIBITS "D", "G", "O", "P", "V", TO "V-48",
"W" TO "W-13", ALL OF WHICH WERE NOT PROPERLY
IDENTIFIED.
III

ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED
IN THE CASE AT BAR DISREGARDING ALTOGETHER
THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
IV
ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS
MURDER, NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) IN TUMULTUOUS
AFFRAY SIDESTEPPING IN THE PROCESS THE
FACTUAL GROUNDS SURROUNDING THE INCIDENT. 26
Appellants mainly claim that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining
the testimonies of the two in prosecution eyewitnesses, Ranulfo
Sumilang and Renato Banculo, because they are unreliable, doubtful
and do not deserve any credence. According to them, the
testimonies of these two witnesses are suspect because they
surfaced only after a reward was announced by General Lim. Renato
Banculo even submitted three sworn statements to the police geared
at providing a new or improved version of the incident. On the
witness stand, he mistakenly identified a detention prisoner in
another case as accused Rolando Fernandez. 27 Ranulfo Sumilang
was evasive and unresponsive prompting the trial court to reprimand
him several times. 28
There is no proof that Banculo or Sumilang testified because of the reward
announced by General Lim, much less that both or either of them ever
received such reward from the government. On the contrary, the evidence
shows that Sumilang reported the incident to the police and submitted his
sworn statement immediately two hours after the mauling, even before
announcement of any reward. 29 He informed the police that he would
cooperate with them and identify Salcedo's assailants if he saw them
again. 30
The fact that Banculo executed three sworn statements does not make them
and his testimony incredible. The sworn statements were made to identify
more suspects who were apprehended during the investigation of Salcedo's
death. 31
The records show that Sumilang was admonished several times by the trial
court on the witness stand for being argumentative and evasive. 32 This is not
enough reason to reject Sumilang's testimony for he did not exhibit this
68
undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony. On the whole, his testimony
was correctly given credence by the trial court despite his evasiveness at
some instances. Except for compelling reasons, we cannot disturb the way
trial courts calibrate the credence of witnesses considering their visual view
of the demeanor of witnesses when on the witness stand. As trial courts, they
can best appreciate the verbal and non-verbal dimensions of a witness'
testimony.
Banculo's mistake in identifying another person as one of the accused does
not make him an entirely untrustworthy witness. 33 It does not make his whole
testimony a falsity. An honest mistake is not inconsistent with a truthful
testimony. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from persons with
imperfect senses. In the court's discretion, therefore, the testimony of a
witness can be believed as to some facts but disbelieved with respect to the
others. 34
We sustain the appellate and trial courts' findings that the witnesses'
testimonies corroborate each other on all important and relevant details of
the principal occurrence. Their positive identification of all petitioners jibe with
each other and their narration of the events are supported by the medical
and documentary evidence on record.
Dr. Roberto Garcia, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, testified that the victim had various wounds on his body which
could have been inflicted by pressure from more than one hard object. 35 The
contusions and abrasions found could have been caused by punches, kicks
and blows from rough stones. 36 The fatal injury of intracranial hemorrhage
was a result of fractures in Salcedo's skull which may have been caused by
contact with a hard and blunt object such as fistblows, kicks and a blunt
wooden instrument. 37
Appellants do not deny that Salcedo was mauled, kicked and punched.
Sumilang in fact testified that Salcedo was pummeled by his assailants with
stones in their hands. 38
Appellants also contend that although the appellate court correctly
disregarded Exhibits "D," "G," and "P," it erroneously gave evidentiary weight
to Exhibits "O," "V," "V-1" to "V-48," "W," "W-1" to "W-13." 39 Exhibit "O" is the
Joint Affidavit of Pat. Flores and Pat. Bautista, the police intelligenceoperatives who witnessed the rally and subsequent dispersal operation. Pat.
Flores properly identified Exhibit "O" as his sworn statement and in fact gave
testimony corroborating the contents thereof. 40 Besides, the Joint Affidavit
merely reiterates what the other prosecution witnesses testified to.
Identification by Pat. Bautista is a surplusage. If appellants wanted to

impeach the said affidavit, they should have placed Pat. Flores on the
witness stand.
Exhibits "V," "V-1" to "V-48" are photographs taken of the victim as he was
being mauled at the Luneta starting from a grassy portion to the pavement
at the Rizal Monument and along Roxas Boulevard, 41 as he was being
chased by his assailants 42 and as he sat pleading with his
assailants. 43 Exhibits "W", "W-1" to "W-13" are photographs of Salcedo and
the mauling published in local newspapers and magazines such as the
Philippine Star, 44 Mr. and Ms. Magazine, 45 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 46 and
the Malaya. 47 The admissibility of these photographs is being questioned by
appellants for lack of proper identification by the person or persons who took
the same.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence,
must be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to
the circumstances under which they were produced. 48 The value of this kind
of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the
original, 49 and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the
scene at the time of the crime. 50 The photographer, however, is not the only
witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. 51 The correctness of the
photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can
be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or
by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to
impeachment as to its accuracy. 52 Photographs, therefore, can be identified
by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its
exactness and accuracy. 53
This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part of
its evidence, appellants, through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected to
their admissibility for lack of proper identification. 54 However, when the
accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove Dumayas, counsel for
accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-48" to
prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not
have participated in the mauling of the victim. 55 The photographs were
adopted by appellant Joselito Tamayo and accused Gerry Neri as part of the
defense exhibits. And at this hearing, Atty. Dumayas represented all the other
accused per understanding with their respective counsels, including Atty.
Lazaro, who were absent. At subsequent hearings, the prosecution used the
photographs to cross-examine all the accused who took the witness
stand. 56 No objection was made by counsel for any of the accused, not until
69
Atty. Lazaro appeared at the third hearing and interposed a continuing

objection to their admissibility.57
The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is
anchored on the fact that the person who took the same was not presented
to identify them. We rule that the use of these photographs by some of the
accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission
of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful
representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when appellants
Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves
therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat. 58
An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's testimonies reveal
that only three of the appellants, namely, Richard de los Santos, Nilo
Pacadar and Joel Tan could be readily seen in various belligerent poses
lunging or hovering behind or over the victim. 59 Appellant Romeo Sison
appears only once and he, although afflicted with hernia is shown merely
running
after
the
victim. 60Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of the pictures.
The absence of the two appellants in the photographs does not exculpate
them. The photographs did not capture the entire sequence of the killing of
Salcedo but only segments thereof. While the pictures did not record Sison
and Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were unequivocally identified by Sumilang
and
Banculo 61Appellants' denials and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball
identification.
Appellants claim that the lower courts erred in finding the existence of
conspiracy among the principal accused and in convicting them of murder
qualified by abuse of superior strength, not death in tumultuous affray.
Death in a tumultuous affray is defined in Article 251 of the Revised Penal
code as follows:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. When,
while several persons, not composing groups organized for
the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused
and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray
someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually
killed the deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted
serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or
persons shall be punished by prison mayor.
If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical

injuries on the deceased, the penalty ofprision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed upon all those who shall have used violence upon
the person of the victim.
For this article to apply, it must be established that: (1) there be
several persons; (2) that they did not compose groups organized for
the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one
another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (4) someone was
killed in the course of the affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained who
actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the person or persons who
inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be
identified. 62
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several
persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course
of which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be
ascertained. 63
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one
distinct group and one individual. Confusion may have occurred because of
the police dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion subsided eventually
after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while later after
said dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one
defenseless individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting
punches, kicks and blows on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous
quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the
incident. 64
As the lower courts found, the victim's assailants were numerous by as much
as fifty in number 65 and were armed with stones with which they hit the
victim. They took advantage of their superior strength and excessive force
and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and free himself. They
followed Salcedo from the Chinese Garden to the Rizal Monument several
meters away and hit him mercilessly even when he was already fallen on the
ground. There was a time when Salcedo was able to get up, prop himself
against the pavement and wipe off the blood from his face. But his attackers
continued to pursue him relentlessly. Salcedo could not defend himself nor
could he find means to defend himself. Sumilang tried to save him from his
assailants but they continued beating him, hitting Sumilang in the process.
Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they ignored his pleas until he finally lost
70
consciousness. The deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a

defenseless victim qualifies the killing to murder.
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan

and Richard de los Santos are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder without any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance and are each hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated in the instant

case. There is no proof that the attack on Salcedo was deliberately and
consciously chosen to ensure the assailants' safety from any defense the
victim could have made. True, the attack on Salcedo was sudden and
unexpected but it was apparently because of the fact that he was wearing a
yellow t-shirt or because he allegedly flashed the "Laban" sign against the
rallyists, taunting them into mauling him. As the appellate court well found,
Salcedo had the opportunity to sense the temper of the rallyists and run
away from them but he, unfortunately, was overtaken by them. The essence
of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest
provocation on the part of the person being attacked. 66
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo is found GUILTY

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide with the
generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength and, as a consequence, he is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision
mayoras minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion
temporal as maximum;
3. All accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay jointly
and severally the heirs of Stephen Salcedo the following
amounts:
The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged in the

information against Joselito Tamayo. Evident premeditation cannot be
appreciated in this case because the attack against Salcedo was sudden and
spontaneous, spurred by the raging animosity against the so-called
"Coryistas." It was not preceded by cool thought and reflection.
We find however the existence of a conspiracy among appellants. At the time
they were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed a unity of
purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of Salcedo.
Where a conspiracy existed and is proved, a showing as to who among the
conspirators inflicted the fatal wound is not required to sustain a
conviction. 67 Each of the conspirators is liable for all acts of the others
regardless of the intent and character of their participation, because the act
of one is the act of all. 68
The trial court awarded the heirs of Salcedo P74,000.00 as actual damages,
P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and one half of the costs of
the suit. At the time he died on July 27, 1986, Salcedo was twenty three
years old and was set to leave on August 4, 1986 for employment in Saudi
Arabia. 69 The reckless disregard for such a young person's life and the
anguish wrought on his widow and three small children, 70 warrant an
increase in moral damages from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00. The indemnity
of P50,000.00 must also be awarded for the death of the victim. 71
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed and
modified as follows:
(a) P74,000.00 as actual damages;

(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
(c) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of
the victim.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Francisco, J., is on leave.
Torralba v. Pp, 467 SCRA 552 (2005)

SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
71
G. R. No. 153699 August 22, 2005

CIRSE FRANCISCO "CHOY" TORRALBA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 promulgated on 22
May 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24818 which affirmed,
with modification, the trial courts2 decision finding petitioner Cirse Francisco
"Choy" Torralba guilty of the crime of libel in Criminal Case No. 9107.
Culled from the records are the following facts:
Petitioner Torralba was the host of a radio program called "Tug-Ani ang
Lungsod" which was aired over the radio station DYFX in Cebu City. On 12
September 1994, an information for libel was filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City against petitioner Torralba. The information
states:
AGAPITO HONTANOSAS AND CASTOR HONTANOSAS, ARE

COLLABORATORS DURING THE WAR. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY ARE
TRAITORS TO THE LAND OF THEIR BIRTH." X X X. "THE FATHER OF
MANOLING HONTANOSAS HAD TREACHEROUS BLOOD," and other
words of similar import, thereby maliciously exposing the family of the late
Judge Agapito Hontanosas including Atty. Manuel L. Hontanosas, 3 one of the
legitimate children of [the] late CFI Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas to public
hatred, dishonor, discredit, contempt and ridicule causing the latter to suffer
social humiliation, embarrassment, wounded feelings and mental anguish, to
the damage and prejudice of said Atty. Manuel L. Hontanosas in the amount
to be proved during the trial of the case.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 353 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Article 355 of the same Code.
City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, September 8, 1994.
(SGD.) ADRIANO P. MONTES
City Prosecutor II
APPROVED:
The undersigned, City Prosecutor II, City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, hereby

accuses CIRSE FRANCISCO "CHOY" TORRALBA for the crime of Libel,
committed as follows:
(SGD) MARIANO CAPAYAS
That, on or about the 11th day of April, 1994, in the City of Tagbilaran,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
deliberate and malicious intent of maligning, impeaching and discrediting the
honesty, integrity, reputation, prestige and honor of late CFI Judge Agapito Y.
Hontanosas, who was during his [lifetime] a CFI Judge of Cebu and a man of
good reputation and social standing in the community and for the purpose of
exposing him to public hatred, contempt, disrespect and ridicule, in his radio
program "TUG-ANI AND LUNGSOD" (TELL THE PEOPLE) over radio station
DYFX, openly, publicly and repeatedly announce[d] the following: "KINING
MGA
HONTANOSAS,
AGAPITO
HONTANOSAS
UG
CASTOR
HONTANOSAS, MGA COLLABORATOR SA PANAHON SA GUERRA. SA
ATO PA, TRAYDOR SA YUTANG NATAWHAN." X X X. "DUNAY DUGO
NGA
PAGKATRAYDOR
ANG
AMAHAN
NI
MANOLING
HONTANOSAS," which in English means: "THESE HONTANOSAS,
Upon arraignment on 12 March 1996, petitioner Torralba pleaded not guilty to

the crime he was charged with.5
City Prosecutor4
On 14 May 1998, petitioner Torralba filed before the RTC, Branch 1,

Tagbilaran City, where Crim. Case No. 9107 was raffled off, a motion for
consolidation6 alleging therein that private complainant Atty. Manuel
Hontanosas (Atty. Hontanosas) filed a total of four (4) criminal cases for libel
against petitioner Torralba, three of which Crim. Cases No. 8956, No. 8957,
and No. 8958 were then pending with the RTC, Branch III, Tagbilaran City.
As the evidence for the prosecution as well as the defense were substantially
the same, petitioner Torralba moved that Crim. Case No. 9107 be
consolidated with the three other cases so as to save time, effort, and to
facilitate the early disposition of these cases.
72
In its order dated 25 May 1998, 7 the motion for consolidation filed by
petitioner Torralba was granted by the RTC, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City.
During the trial on the merits of the consolidated cases, the prosecution
presented as witnesses Segundo Lim, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas,
and Gabriel Sarmiento.
Lim testified that he was one of the incorporators of the Tagbilaran Maritime
Services, Inc. (TMSI) and was at that time the assigned manager of the port
in Tagbilaran City. According to him, sometime during the Marcos
administration, petitioner Torralba sought TMSIs sponsorship of his radio
program. This request was approved by private complainant Atty.
Hontanosas who was then the president of TMSI. During the existence of
said sponsorship agreement, the management of TMSI noticed that
petitioner Torralba was persistently attacking former Bureau of Internal
Revenue Deputy Director Tomas Toledo and his brother Boy Toledo who was
a customs collector. Fearing that the Toledos would think that TMSI was
behind the incessant criticisms hurled at them, the management of TMSI
decided to cease sponsoring petitioner Torralbas radio show. In effect, the
TMSI sponsored"Tug-Ani ang Lungsod" for only a month at the cost
of P500.00.
Soon thereafter, petitioner Torralba took on the management of TMSI. Lim
testified that petitioner Torralba accused TMSI of not observing the minimum
wage law and that said corporation was charging higher handling rates than
what it was supposed to collect.
On 17 December 1993, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas went on-air in
petitioner Torralbas radio program to explain the side of TMSI. The day after
said incident, however, petitioner Torralba resumed his assault on TMSI and
its management. It was petitioner Torralbas relentless badgering of TMSI
which allegedly prompted Lim to tape record petitioner Torralbas radio
broadcasts. Three of the tape recordings were introduced in evidence by the
prosecution, to wit:
Exhibit B - tape recording of 19 January 19948
Exhibit C - tape recording of 25 January 19949
Exhibit D - tape recording of 11 April 199410
During his testimony, Lim admitted that he did not know how to operate a
tape recorder and that he asked either his adopted daughter, Shirly Lim, or
his housemaid to record petitioner Torralbas radio program. He maintained,
however, that he was near the radio whenever the recording took place and
had actually heard petitioner Torralbas radio program while it was being
taped. This prompted petitioner Torralba to pose a continuing objection to the
admission of the said tape recordings for lack of proper authentication by the
person who actually made the recordings. In the case of the subject tape
recordings, Lim admitted that they were recorded by Shirly Lim. The trial
court provisionally admitted the tape recordings subject to the presentation
by the prosecution of Shirly Lim for the proper authentication of said pieces
of evidence. Despite petitioner Torralbas objection to the formal offer of
these pieces of evidence, the court a quo eventually admitted the three tape
recordings into evidence.11
It was revealed during Lims cross-examination 12 that petitioner Torralba
previously instituted a criminal action for libel 13 against the former arising
from an article published in the Sunday Post, a newspaper of general
circulation in the provinces of Cebu and Bohol. In said case, Lim was found
guilty as charged by the trial court14 and this decision was subsequently
affirmed, with modification, by the Court of Appeals in its decision
promulgated on 29 July 1996 in CA-G.R. CR No. 16413 entitled, "People of
the Philippines v. Segundo Lim and Boy Guingguing." 15 In our resolution of
04 December 1996, we denied Lims petition for review on certiorari.16
For his part, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas testified that he was at
that time the chairman and manager of TMSI; that on 20 January 1994, Lim
presented to him a tape recording of petitioner Torralbas radio program aired
on 18 January 1994 during which petitioner Torralba allegedly criticized him
and stated that he was a person who could not be trusted; that in his radio
show on 25 January 1994, petitioner Torralba mentioned that "he was now
[wary] to interview any one because he had a sad experience with someone
who betrayed him and this someone was like his father who was a
collaborator"; that on 12 April 1994, Lim brought to his office a tape recording
of petitioner Torralbas radio program of 11 April 1994 during which petitioner
Torralba averred that the Hontanosas were traitors to the land of their birth;
that Judge Agapito Hontanosas and Castor Hontanosas were collaborators
during the Japanese occupation; and that after he informed his siblings
regarding this, they asked him to institute a case against petitioner Torralba. 17
When he was cross-examined by petitioner Torralbas counsel, private
complainant Atty. Hontanosas disclosed that he did not actually hear
73
petitioner Torralbas radio broadcasts and he merely relied on the tape

recordings presented to him by Lim as he believed them to be genuine. 18
Sarmiento testified that he was the former court stenographer and interpreter
of RTC, Branch 3, Tagbilaran City, and that he translated the contents of the
tape recordings in 1994 upon the request of private complainant Atty.
Hontanosas.
The defense presented, as its sole witness, petitioner Torralba himself.
Petitioner Torralba maintained that he was a member of the Kapisanan ng
mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas and other civic organizations in Cebu. In the
course of his profession as a radio broadcaster, he allegedly received
complaints regarding the services of TMSI particularly with respect to the
laborers low pay and exhorbitant rates being charged for the arrastre
services. As he was in favor of balanced programming, petitioner Torralba
requested TMSI to send a representative to his radio show in order to give
the corporation an opportunity to address the issues leveled against it; thus,
the radio interview of private complainant Atty. Hontanosas on
17 December 1993.
When petitioner Torralba was cross-examined by private complainant Atty.
Hontanosas,19 he denied having called former CFI Judge Hontanosas a
traitor during his 11 April 1994 radio broadcast. Petitioner Torralba admitted,
though, that during the 17 December 1993 appearance of private
complainant Atty. Hontanosas in his radio program, he did ask the latter if he
was in any way related to the late CFI Judge Hontanosas. Petitioner Torralba
averred that he posed said question as mere backgrounder on his
interviewee.
However, the Court finds the same accused GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt in Crim. Case No. 9107 for his unwarranted blackening of the memory
of the late Hon. CFI Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas through the air lanes in his
radio program resulting to the dishonor and wounded feelings of his children,
grandchildren, relatives, friends, and close associates. For this, the Court
hereby sentences the accused to imprisonment for an indeterminate period
of FOUR MONTHS of Arresto Mayor to THREE YEARS of Prision
Correccional medium period pursuant to Art. 353 in relation to Art. 354 and
Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code under which the instant case falls.
Furthermore, he is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Judge Agapito Y.
Hontanosas for moral damages suffered in the amount of ONE MILLION
PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as prayed for, considering their good reputation
and high social standing in the community and the gravity of the dishonor
and public humiliation caused.21
Petitioner Torralba seasonably filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals
which, in the challenged decision before us, affirmed, with modification, the
findings of the court a quo, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with
the modification that accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor to two (2) years, eleven
(11) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional and to pay moral
damages in the amount of P100,000.00.22
Hence, the present recourse where petitioner Torralba raises the following
issues:
I
On 24 August 2000, the trial court rendered an omnibus decision 20 acquitting

petitioner Torralba in Crim. Cases No. 8956, No. 8957, and No. 8958 but
holding him guilty of the crime of libel in Crim. Case No. 9107. The
dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby ACQUITS from
criminal liability herein accused Cirse Francisco Choy Torralba of the charges
alluded in Criminal Cases Nos. 8956, 8957, and 8958 being an exercise of
legitimate self-defense, as afore-discussed. Consequently, the corresponding
cash bonds of the accused in said cases as shown by OR No. 5301156, No.
5301157, and No. 5301158, all dated February 23, 2000, issued by the Clerk
of Court of Multiple Salas in the amount of P4,200.00 each representing cash
deposits therefore are hereby cancelled and released.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKING THROUGH ITS

SPECIAL FIFTEENTH DIVISION GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT A QUO (WITH MODIFICATION),
CONVICTING PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] FOR THE CRIME
OF LIBEL AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLES 353 AND 355
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE BASED SOLELY ON THE ALLEGED
TESTIMONY OF SEGUNDO LIM . . . AS BORNE OUT BY THE
STENOGRAPHIC NOTES WOULD NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT
HE TESTIFIED ON THE MALICIOUS IMPUTATIONS PURPORTEDLY
MADE BY PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] IN CRIMINAL CASE
NO. 9107.
II
74
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY COMMITTED AN

ERROR IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE AN UNAUTHENTICATED AND
SPURIOUS TAPE RECORD OF A RADIO BROADCAST (EXHIBIT "D")
ALLEGEDLY BY HEREIN PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] ON THE
BASIS OF WHICH THE LATTER WAS CONVICTED FOR THE CRIME OF
LIBEL.
III
ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT PETITIONER-APPELLANT
[TORRALBA] MADE UTTERANCES CONTAINED IN THE TAPE RECORD
MARKED AS EXHIBIT "D," THE HONORABLE COURT SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE PRIVILEGE[D] NATURE OF HIS
ALLEGED STATEMENTS IN FEALTY ADHERRENCE TO THE LANDMARK
DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN BORJAL VS. CA,
301 SCRA 01 (JAN. 14, 1999).
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN
AWARDING DAMAGES AGAINST THE PETITIONER ABSENT ANY
SHOWING OF EVIDENT BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONERAPPELLANT [TORRALBA] WHO ACTED WITH UBERIMA
FIDES (OVERWHELMING GOOD FAITH) IN EXERCISING THE
CONSTITUTIONALLY ENSHRINED FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (ARTICLE
2220, NEW CIVIL CODE).23
(1) a showing that the recording device was capable of taking testimony;
(2) a showing that the operator of the device was competent;
(3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the recording;
(4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made;
(5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of the recording;
(6) identification of the speakers; and
(7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without any
kind of inducement.26
In one case, it was held that the testimony of the operator of the recording
device as regards its operation, his method of operating it, the accuracy of
the recordings, and the identities of the persons speaking laid a sufficient
foundation for the admission of the recordings. 27 Likewise, a witness
declaration that the sound recording represents a true portrayal of the voices
contained therein satisfies the requirement of authentication. 28 The party
seeking the introduction in evidence of a tape recording bears the burden of
going forth with sufficient evidence to show that the recording is an accurate
reproduction of the conversation recorded.29
This Court deems it proper to first resolve the issue of the propriety of the
lower courts admission in evidence of the 11 April 1994 tape recording.
Oddly, this matter was not addressed head-on by the Office of the Solicitor
General in its comment.
These requisites were laid down precisely to address the criticism of

susceptibility to tampering of tape recordings. Thus, it was held that the
establishment of a proper foundation for the admission of a recording
provided adequate assurance that proper safeguards were observed for the
preservation of the recording and for its protection against tampering. 30
Petitioner Torralba vigorously argues that the court a quo should not have
given considerable weight on the tape recording in question as it was not
duly authenticated by Lims adopted daughter, Shirly Lim. Without said
authentication, petitioner Torralba continues, the tape recording is
incompetent and inadmissible evidence. We agree.
In the case at bar, one can easily discern that the proper foundation for the
admissibility of the tape recording was not adhered to. It bears stressing that
Lim categorically admitted in the witness stand that he was not familiar at all
with the process of tape recording31 and that he had to instruct his adopted
daughter to record petitioner Torralbas radio broadcasts, thus:
It is generally held that sound recording is not inadmissible because of its

form24 where a proper foundation has been laid to guarantee the
genuineness of the recording. 25 In our jurisdiction, it is a rudimentary rule of
evidence that before a tape recording is admissible in evidence and given
probative value, the following requisites must first be established, to wit:
ATTY. HONTANOSAS:
q Was this radio program of the accused recorded on April 11, 1994?
75
a Yes, sir.
q Who recorded the same radio program of April 11, 1994?
a It was my adopted daughter whom I ordered to tape recorded the radio
program of Choy Torralba.32
Clearly, Shirly Lim, the person who actually recorded petitioner Torralbas
radio show on 11 April 1994, should have been presented by the prosecution
in order to lay the proper foundation for the admission of the purported tape
recording for said date. Without the requisite authentication, there was no
basis for the trial court to admit the tape recording Exhibit "D" in
evidence.
In view of our disallowance of the 11 April 1994 tape recording, we are
constrained to examine the records of this case in order to determine the
sufficiency of evidence stacked against petitioner Torralba, bearing in mind
that in criminal cases, the guilt of the accused can only be sustained upon
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
In his comprehensive book on evidence, our former colleague, Justice
Ricardo Francisco, wrote that "[e]vidence of a message or a speech by
means of radio broadcast is admissible as evidence when the identity of the
speaker is established either by the testimony of a witness who saw him
broadcast his message or speech, or by the witness recognition of the voice
of the speaker."33
The records of this case are bereft of any proof that a witness saw petitioner
Torralba broadcast the alleged libelous remarks on 11 April 1994. Lim,
however, stated that while petitioner Torralbas radio program on that date
was being tape recorded by his adopted daughter, he was so near the radio
that he could even touch the same. 34In effect, Lim was implying that he was
listening to "Tug-Ani ang Lungsod" at that time. In our view, such bare
assertion on the part of Lim, uncorroborated as it was by any other evidence,
fails to meet the standard that a witness must be able to "recognize the voice
of the speaker." Being near the radio is one thing; actually listening to the
radio broadcast and recognizing the voice of the speaker is another. Indeed,
a person may be in close proximity to said device without necessarily
listening to the contents of a radio broadcast or to what a radio commentator
is saying over the airwaves.
by the latter with the crime of libel and for which he was found guilty as
charged by the court. Surely then, Lim could not present himself as an
"uninterested witness" whose testimony merits significance from this Court.
Nor is this Court inclined to confer probative value on the testimony of private
complainant Atty. Hontanosas particularly in the light of his declaration that
he did not listen to petitioner Torralbas radio show subject of this petition. He
simply relied on the tape recording handed over to him by Lim.
Time and again, this Court has faithfully observed and given effect to the
constitutional presumption of innocence which can only be overcome by
contrary proof beyond reasonable doubt -- one which requires moral
certainty, a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience
of those who are to act upon it.35 As we have so stated in the past
Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with
guilt, the prosecution must overthrow the presumption of innocence with
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To meet this standard, there is need
for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the State, both oral and
documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused.
Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion
that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under
such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus
required that every circumstance favoring innocence be duly taken into
account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.36
Confronted with what the State was able to present as evidence against
petitioner Torralba, this Court is compelled to overturn the decision of the
Court of Appeals due to insufficiency of evidence meriting a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision promulgated on 22
May 2002 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the omnibus decision dated 24
August 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Tagbilaran City, is
hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Instead, a
new
one
is
entered ACQUITTING petitioner Cirse Francisco "Choy" Torralba of the
crime of libel. The cash bond posted by said petitioner is ordered released to
him subject to the usual auditing and accounting procedures. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
What further undermines the credibility of Lims testimony is the fact that he
had an ax to grind against petitioner Torralba as he was previously accused
76
Rule on DNA Evidence, A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC
(2 October 2007)
RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE
RESOLUTION
Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson and Members of the
Subcommittee on Evidence submitting for the Courts consideration and
approval the proposed Rule on DNA Evidence, the Court Resolved to
APPROVE the same.
This Resolution shall take effect on October 15, 2007 following its publication
in a newspaper of general circulation.
October 2, 2007.
RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE
SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply whenever DNA evidence, as
defined in Section 3 hereof, is offered, used, or proposed to be offered or
used as evidence in all criminal and civil actions as well as special
proceedings.
Sec. 2. Application of other Rules on Evidence. In all matters not
specifically covered by this Rule, the Rules of Court and other pertinent
provisions of law on evidence shall apply.
a. Biological sample means any organic material originating from a

persons body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible
to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva and other body fluids,
tissues, hairs and bones;
b. DNA means deoxyribonucleic acid, which is the chain of molecules
found in every nucleated cell of the body. The totality of an
individuals DNA is unique for the individual, except identical twins;
c. DNA evidence constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles, results
and other genetic information directly generated from DNA testing of
biological samples;
d. DNA profile means genetic information derived from DNA testing of
a biological sample obtained from a person, which biological sample
is clearly identifiable as originating from that person;
e. DNA testing means verified and credible scientific methods which
include the extraction of DNA from biological samples, the generation
of DNA profiles and the comparison of the information obtained from
the DNA testing of biological samples for the purpose of determining,
with reasonable certainty, whether or not the DNA obtained from two
or more distinct biological samples originates from the same person
(direct identification) or if the biological samples originate from
related persons (kinship analysis); and
f. Probability of Parentage means the numerical estimate for the
likelihood of parentage of a putative parent compared with the
probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals in a given
population.
Sec. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at
any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue
after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:
a. A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
b. The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of
DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA
testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons;
c. The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
d. The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new
information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
e. The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider
as potentially affecting the accuracy of integrity of the DNA testing.
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule, the following terms
shall be defined as follows:
77
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court
order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before
a suit or proceeding is commenced.
Sec. 5. DNA Testing Order. If the court finds that the requirements in
Section 4 hereof have been complied with, the court shall
a. Order, where appropriate, that biological samples be taken from any
person or crime scene evidence;
b. Impose reasonable conditions on DNA testing designed to protect
the integrity of the biological sample, the testing process and the
reliability of the test results, including the condition that the DNA test
results shall be simultaneously disclosed to parties involved in the
case; and
c. If the biological sample taken is of such an amount that prevents the
conduct of confirmatory testing by the other or the adverse party and
where additional biological samples of the same kind can no longer
be obtained, issue an order requiring all parties to the case or
proceedings to witness the DNA testing to be conducted.
An order granting the DNA testing shall be immediately executory and shall
not be appealable. Any petition for certiorari initiated therefrom shall not, in
any way, stay the implementation thereof, unless a higher court issues an
injunctive order. The grant of DNA testing application shall not be construed
as an automatic admission into evidence of any component of the DNA
evidence that may be obtained as a result thereof.
Sec. 6. Post-conviction DNA Testing. Post-conviction DNA testing may
be available, without need of prior court order, to the prosecution or any
person convicted by final and executory judgment provided that (a) a
biological sample exists, (b) such sample is relevant to the case, and (c) the
testing would probably result in the reversal or modification of the judgment
of conviction.
Sec. 7. Assessment of probative value of DNA evidence. In assessing
the probative value of the DNA evidence presented, the court shall consider
the following:
a. The chair of custody, including how the biological samples were
collected, how they were handled, and the possibility of
contamination of the samples;
b. The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, the advantages and disadvantages of the
procedure, and compliance with the scientifically valid standards in

conducting the tests;
c. The forensic DNA laboratory, including accreditation by any reputable
standards-setting institution and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests. If the laboratory is not accredited, the relevant
experience of the laboratory in forensic casework and credibility shall
be properly established; and
d. The reliability of the testing result, as hereinafter provided.
The provisions of the Rules of Court concerning the appreciation of evidence
shall apply suppletorily.
Sec. 8. Reliability of DNA Testing Methodology. In evaluating whether
the DNA testing methodology is reliable, the court shall consider the
following:
a. The falsifiability of the principles or methods used, that is, whether
the theory or technique can be and has been tested;
b. The subjection to peer review and publication of the principles or
methods;
c. The general acceptance of the principles or methods by the relevant
scientific community;
d. The existence and maintenance of standards and controls to ensure
the correctness of data generated;
e. The existence of an appropriate reference population database; and
f. The general degree of confidence attributed to mathematical
calculations used in comparing DNA profiles and the significance and
limitation of statistical calculations used in comparing DNA profiles.
Sec. 9. of DNA Testing Results. In evaluating the results of DNA testing,
the court shall consider the following:
a. The evaluation of the weight of matching DNA evidence or the
relevance of mismatching DNA evidence;
b. The results of the DNA testing in the light of the totality of the other
evidence presented in the case; and that
c. DNA results that exclude the putative parent from paternity shall be
conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of the Probability of
Paternity is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA testing shall be
considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of the Probability
of Paternity is 99.9% or higher there shall be a disputable
presumption of paternity.
78
Sec. 10. Post-conviction DNA Testing Remedy if the Results Are

Favorable to the Convict. The convict or the prosecution may file a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of origin if the results of the postconviction DNA testing are favorable to the convict. In the case the court,
after due hearing finds the petition to be meritorious, if shall reverse or
modify the judgment of conviction and order the release of the convict,
unless continued detention is justified for a lawful cause.
A similar petition may be filed either in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court, or with any member of said courts, which may conduct a hearing
thereon or remand the petition to the court of origin and issue the appropriate
orders.
Sec. 11. Confidentiality. DNA profiles and all results or other information
obtained from DNA testing shall be confidential. Except upon order of the
court, a DNA profile and all results or other information obtained from DNA
testing shall only be released to any of the following, under such terms and
conditions as may be set forth by the court:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Person from whom the sample was taken;

Person from whom the sample was taken;
Lawyers of private complainants in a criminal action;
Duly authorized law enforcement agencies; and
Other persons as determined by the court.
i.
ii.
a. In all other cases, until such time as the decision in the case where
the DNA evidence was introduced has become final and executory.
The court may allow the physical destruction of a biological sample before
the expiration of the periods set forth above, provided that:
a. A court order to that effect has been secured; or
b. The person from whom the DNA sample was obtained has
consented in writing to the disposal of the DNA evidence.
Sec. 13. Applicability to Pending Cases. Except as provided in Section 6
and 10 hereof, this Rule shall apply to cases pending at the time of its
effectivity.
Sec. 14. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on October 15, 2007,
following publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Rule on Electronic Evidence, A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC
Whoever discloses, utilizes or publishes in any form any information

concerning a DNA profile without the proper court order shall be liable for
indirect contempt of the court wherein such DNA evidence was offered,
presented or sought to be offered and presented.
Where the person from whom the biological sample was taken files a written
verified request to the court that allowed the DNA testing for the disclosure of
the DNA profile of the person and all results or other information obtained
from the DNA testing, he same may be disclosed to the persons named in
the written verified request.
Sec. 12. Preservation of DNA Evidence. The trial court shall preserve the
DNA evidence in its totality, including all biological samples, DNA profiles and
results or other genetic information obtained from DNA testing. For this
purpose, the court may order the appropriate government agency to preserve
the DNA evidence as follows:
for not less than the period of time that any person is
under trial for an offense; or
in case the accused is serving sentence, until such
time as the accused has served his sentence;

SUPREME COURT
Manila
A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC
July 17, 2001
RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

Acting on the Memorandum dated 18 June 2001 of the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules of Court to Draft the Rules on E-Commerce Law [R.A.
No. 8792] submitting the Rules on Electronic Evidence for this Court's
consideration and approval, the Court Resolved to APPROVED the same.
The Rules on Electronic Evidence shall apply to cases pending after their
effectivity. These Rules shall take effect on the first day of August 2001
a. In criminal cases:
79
following thier publication before the 20th of July in two newspapers of

general circulation in the Philippines
significant characteristics of the person who holds a particular key

pair.
17th July 2001.
(d) "Computer" refers to any single or interconnected device or

apparatus, which, by electronic, electro-mechanical or magnetic
impulse, or by other means with the same function, can receive,
record, transmit, store, process, correlate, analyze, project, retrieve
and/or produce information, data, text, graphics, figures, voice,
video, symbols or other modes of expression or perform any one or
more of these functions.
RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

Rule 1
COVERAGE
Section 1. Scope. Unless otherwise provided herein, these Rules shall
apply whenever an electronic document or electronic data message, as
defined in Rule 2 hereof, is offered or used in evidence.
Section 2. Cases covered. These Rules shall apply to all civil actions and
proceedings, as well as quasi-judicial and administrative cases.
Section 3. Application of other rules on evidence. In all matters not
specifically covered by these Rules, the Rules of Court and pertinent
provisions of statutes containing rules on evidence shall apply.
Rule
DEFINITION OF TERMS AND CONSTRUCTION
Section 1. Definition of terms. For purposes of these Rules, the following

terms are defined, as follows:
(a) "Asymmetric or public cryptosystem" means a system capable of
generating a secure key pair, consisting of a private key for creating
a digital signature, and a public key for verifying the digital signature.
(b) "Business records" include records of any business, institution,
association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind,
whether or not conducted for profit, or for legitimate or illegitimate
purposes.
(c) "Certificate" means an electronic document issued to support a
digital signature which purports to confirm the identity or other
(e) "Digital signature" refers to an electronic signature consisting of a

transformation of an electronic document or an electronic data
message using an asymmetric or public cryptosystem such that a
person having the initial untransformed electronic document and the
signer's public key can accurately determine:
i. whether the transformation was created using the private
key that corresponds to the signer's public key; and
ii. whether the initial electronic document had been altered
after the transformation was made.
(f) "Digitally signed" refers to an electronic document or electronic
data message bearing a digital signature verified by the public key
listed in a certificate.
(g) "Electronic data message" refers to information generated, sent,
received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means.
(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation
of information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written
expression, described or however represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be
proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes
digitally signed documents and any print-out or output, readable by
sight or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic data
message or electronic document. For purposes of these Rules, the
term "electronic document" may be used interchangeably with
"electronic data message".
80
(i) "Electronic key" refers to a secret code which secures and

defends sensitive information that crosses over public channels into
a form decipherable only with a matching electronic key.
(j) "Electronic signature" refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic
and/or sound in electronic form, representing the identity of a person
and attached to or logically associated with the electronic data
message or electronic document or any methodology or procedure
employed or adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such
person with the intention of authenticating, signing or approving an
electronic data message or electronic document. For purposes of
these Rules, an electronic signature includes digital signatures.
(k) "Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone
conversations, text messages, chatroom sessions, streaming audio,
streaming video, and other electronic forms of communication the
evidence of which is not recorded or retained.
(l) "Information and communication system" refers to a system for
generating, sending, receiving, storing or otherwise processing
electronic data messages or electronic documents and includes the
computer system or other similar devices by or in which data are
recorded or stored and any procedure related to the recording or
storage of electronic data messages or electronic documents.
(m) "Key pair" in an asymmetric cryptosystem refers to the private
key and its mathematically related public key such that the latter can
verify the digital signature that the former creates.
(n) "Private key" refers to the key of a key pair used to create a
digital signature.
(o) "Public key" refers to the key of a key pair used to verify a digital
signature.
Section 2. Construction. These Rules shall be liberally construed to assist
the parties in obtaining a just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination of
cases.
The interpretation of these Rules shall also take into consideration the
international origin of Republic Act No. 8792, otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act.
Rule 3
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
Section 1. Electronic documents as functional equivalent of paper-based
documents. Whenever a rule of evidence refers to the term writing,
document, record, instrument, memorandum or any other form of writing,
such term shall be deemed to include an electronic document as defined in
these Rules.
Section 2. Admissibility. An electronic document is admissible in evidence
if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court
and related laws and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by these
Rules.
Section 3. Privileged communication. The confidential character of a
privileged communication is not lost solely on the ground that it is in the form
of an electronic document.
Rule 4
BEST EVIDENCE RULE
Section 1. Original of an electronic document. An electronic document
shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best
Evidence Rule if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means,
shown to reflect the data accurately.
Section 2. Copies as equivalent of the originals. When a document is in
two or more copies executed at or about the same time with identical
contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the
original, or from the same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording,
or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which
accurately reproduces the original, such copies or duplicates shall be
regarded as the equivalent of the original.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, copies or duplicates shall not be admissible to
the same extent as the original if:
(a) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original;
or
(b) in the circumstances it would be unjust or inequitable to admit the
copy in lieu of the original.
81
Rule 5
AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. The person seeking to introduce
an electronic document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its
authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.
Section 2. Manner of authentication. Before any private electronic
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must
be proved by any of the following means:
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person
purported to have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices
as may be authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for
authentication of electronic documents were applied to the
document; or
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the
satisfaction of the judge.
(c) By any other means satisfactory to the judge as establishing the

genuineness of the electronic signature.
Section 3. Disputable presumptions relating to electronic signatures. Upon
the authentication of an electronic signature, it shall be presumed that:
(a) The electronic signature is that of the person to whom it
correlates;
(b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the
intention of authenticating or approving the electronic document to
which it is related or to indicate such person's consent to the
transaction embodied therein; and
(c) The methods or processes utilized to affix or verify the electronic
signature operated without error or fault.
Section 4. Disputable presumptions relating to digital signatures. Upon the
authentication of a digital signature, it shall be presumed, in addition to those
mentioned in the immediately preceding section, that:
(a) The information contained in a certificate is correct;
Section 3. Proof of electronically notarized document. A document

electronically notarized in accordance with the rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court shall be considered as a public document and proved as a
notarial document under the Rules of Court.
Rule 6
ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES
Section 1. Electronic signature. An electronic signature or a digital
signature authenticated in the manner prescribed hereunder is admissible in
evidence as the functional equivalent of the signature of a person on a
written document.
Section 2. Authentication of electronic signatures. An electronic signature
may be authenticated in any of the following manner:
(a) By evidence that a method or process was utilized to establish a
digital signature and verify the same;
(b) The digital signature was created during the operational period of
a certificate;
(c) No cause exists to render a certificate invalid or revocable;
(d) The message associated with a digital signature has not been
altered from the time it was signed; and,
(e) A certificate had been issued by the certification authority
indicated therein.
Rule 7
EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
Section 1. Factors for assessing evidentiary weight. In assessing the
evidentiary weight of an electronic document, the following factors may be
considered:
(b) By any other means provided by law; or
82
(a) The reliability of the manner or method in which it was generated,

stored or communicated, including but not limited to input and output
procedures, controls, tests and checks for accuracy and reliability of
the electronic data message or document, in the light of all the
circumstances as well as any relevant agreement;
(b) The reliability of the manner in which its originator was identified;
(c) The integrity of the information and communication system in
which it is recorded or stored, including but not limited to the
hardware and computer programs or software used as well as
programming errors;
(d) The familiarity of the witness or the person who made the entry
with the communication and information system;
to the proceedings and who did not act under the control of the party
using it.
Rule
BUSINESS RECORDS AS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE
Section 1. Inapplicability of the hearsay rule. A memorandum, report,

record or data compilation of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses,
made by electronic, optical or other similar means at or near the time of or
from transmission or supply of information by a person with knowledge
thereof, and kept in the regular course or conduct of a business activity, and
such was the regular practice to make the memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation by electronic, optical or similar means, all of which are
shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witnesses, is
excepted from the rule on hearsay evidence.
(e) The nature and quality of the information which went into the
communication and information system upon which the electronic
data message or electronic document was based; or
Section 2. Overcoming the presumption. The presumption provided for in

Section 1 of this Rule may be overcome by evidence of the untrustworthiness
of the source of information or the method or circumstances of the
preparation, transmission or storage thereof.
(f) Other factors which the court may consider as affecting the
accuracy or integrity of the electronic document or electronic data
message.
Rule 9
METHOD OF PROOF
Section 2. Integrity of an information and communication system. In any

dispute involving the integrity of the information and communication system
in which an electronic document or electronic data message is recorded or
stored, the court may consider, among others, the following factors:
Section 1. Affidavit evidence. All matters relating to the admissibility and

evidentiary weight of an electronic document may be established by an
affidavit stating facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiant or based on
authentic records. The affidavit must affirmatively show the competence of
the affiant to testify on the matters contained therein.
(a) Whether the information and communication system or other

similar device was operated in a manner that did not affect the
integrity of the electronic document, and there are no other
reasonable grounds to doubt the integrity of the information and
communication system;
Section 2. Cross-examination of deponent. The affiant shall be made to

affirm the contents of the affidavit in open court and may be cross-examined
as a matter of right by the adverse party.
(b) Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored by a

party to the proceedings with interest adverse to that of the party
using it; or
(c) Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored in the
usual and ordinary course of business by a person who is not a party
Rule 10
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
Section 1. Electronic testimony. After summarily hearing the parties
pursuant to Rule 9 of these Rules, the court may authorize the presentation
of testimonial evidence by electronic means. Before so authorizing, the court
shall determine the necessity for such presentation and prescribe terms and
83
conditions as may be necessary under the circumstances, including the

protection of the rights of the parties and witnesses concerned.
Section 2. Transcript of electronic testimony. When examination of a
witness is done electronically, the entire proceedings, including the questions
and answers, shall be transcribed by a stenographer, stenotypist or other
recorder authorized for the purpose, who shall certify as correct the transcript
done by him. The transcript should reflect the fact that the proceedings,
either in whole or in part, had been electronically recorded.
Section 2. Effectivity. These Rules shall take effect on the first day of
August 2001 following their publication before the 20th of July 2001 in two
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
Documentary
Section 2, Rule 130
Section 3. Storage of electronic evidence. The electronic evidence and

recording thereof as well as the stenographic notes shall form part of the
record of the case. Such transcript and recording shall be deemed prima
facie evidence of such proceedings.
Rule
AUDIO, PHOTOGRAPHIC, VIDEO, AND EPHEMERAL EVIDENCE
RULE 130
B. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
11
Section 1. Audio, video and similar evidence. Audio, photographic and

video evidence of events, acts or transactions shall be admissible provided it
shall be shown, presented or displayed to the court and shall be identified,
explained or authenticated by the person who made the recording or by
some other person competent to testify on the accuracy thereof.
Section 2. Documentary evidence. Documents as evidence consist of

writing or any material containing letters, words, numbers, figures, symbols
or other modes of written expression offered as proof of their contents. (n)
Section 2. Ephemeral electronic communications. Ephemeral electronic

communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a
party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof. In the absence or
unavailability of such witnesses, other competent evidence may be admitted.
A recording of the telephone conversation or ephemeral electronic
communication shall be covered by the immediately preceding section.
If the foregoing communications are recorded or embodied in an electronic
document, then the provisions of Rule 5 shall apply.
Rule 12
EFFECTIVITY
Section 1. Applicability to pending cases. These Rules shall apply to cases
pending after their effectivity.
RULE 132
B. AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS
Section 19. Classes of Documents. For the purpose of their presentation
evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers,
whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills
and testaments; and
84
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents

required by law to the entered therein.
All other writings are private. (20a)
U.S. v. Orera, 11 Phil 596 (1907)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3810
October 18, 1907
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DAMIAN ORERA (alias KIM CUAN), defendant-appellant.
Del-Pan, Ortigas and Fisher for appellant.
Attorney-General Araneta for appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
Damian Orera (alias Kim Cuan) was convicted by the Court of First Instance
of the city of Manila, of the crime charged in the complaint, namely, of having
falsified, to the damages of a Chinese theatrical company of the Philippine
Islands, called Eng Ning, "a Chinese theater ticket which entitled the bearer
thereof to admission to a performance held in the theater of the above
company at Manila, on the 7th of October, 1906, by counterfeiting and
simulating the signature and rubric of Eng Ning on the ticket the same
figures, letters, dragons, ornaments and signatures, as placed by Eng Ning
and the above mentioned Chinese theatrical company . . ." The accused was
sentenced to be imprisoned at the Insular Prison of Bilibid for the period of
six months and one day, to pay a fine of 625 pesetas, Philippine currency,
and the costs of the suit, from which the judgment the accused appealed.
The appeal having been heard, this court holds:

1. That, in effect, as argued by the appellant, he could not be
convicted of the falsification of six tickets, as declared and held in the
judgment appealed from, inasmuch as the complaint was restricted
to one ticket only.lawphil.net
2. That the court below did not err in qualifying such ticket as a
document in order to prosecute and punish the crime of falsification,
the subject-matter of the complaint, because if, according to the
authority cited by the appellant, a document is a "deed, instrument or
other duly authorized paper by which something is proved,
evidenced or set forth," and a private document is, according to
another authority cited by the appellant, "every deed or instrument
executed by a private person, without the intervention of a public
notary or of other person legally authorized, by which document
some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth," it
follows that the ticket in question, being an authorized document
evidencing an agreement for the rent of a place in a theater to
enable the possessor to witness a theatrical performance, is a
private document.
The error has been in the penalty imposed, an error which necessarily must
be remedied by this court in the present appeal, in order that the judgment
may be in conformity with the law. Said penalty, according to the provisions
of article 304 of the Penal Code, should be that of presidio correccional in its
minimum and medium degrees, and a fine, plus the corresponding
indemnification for the damage caused, which in the present case was P1,
the price of the true ticket.
We, therefore, sentence Damian Orera (alias Kim Cuan) to one year, eleven
months, and twenty one days ofpresidio correccional, and to pay a fine of
625 pesetas, as imposed in the judgment, with the accessory penalty
provided for in article 58, the indemnification of P1 to the offended party, or,
in default thereof, to subsidiary imprisonment, and the payment of the costs
of both instances. So ordered.
Torres, Johnson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.
Testimonial
85
RULE 130
C. TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
1. Qualification of Witnesses
Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next
succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
their known perception to others, may be witnesses.
IV. Offer and Objection

RULE 132
C. OFFER AND OBJECTION
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a

witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become
reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after
notice of the unless a different period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified. (36a)
Section 37. When repetition of objection unnecessary. When it becomes
reasonably apparent in the course of the examination of a witness that the
question being propounded are of the same class as those to which objection
has been made, whether such objection was sustained or overruled, it shall
not be necessary to repeat the objection, it being sufficient for the adverse
party to record his continuing objection to such class of questions. (37a)
Section 38. Ruling. The ruling of the court must be given immediately
after the objection is made, unless the court desires to take a reasonable
time to inform itself on the question presented; but the ruling shall always be
made during the trial and at such time as will give the party against whom it
is made an opportunity to meet the situation presented by the ruling.
The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not be stated.
However, if the objection is based on two or more grounds, a ruling
sustaining the objection on one or some of them must specify the ground or
grounds relied upon. (38a)
Section 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered
must be specified. (35)
Section 39. Striking out answer. Should a witness answer the question
before the adverse party had the opportunity to voice fully its objection to the
same, and such objection is found to be meritorious, the court shall sustain
the objection and order the answer given to be stricken off the record.
Section 35. When to make offer. As regards the testimony of a witness,

the offer must be made at the time the witness is called to testify.
On proper motion, the court may also order the striking out of answers which
are incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise improper. (n)
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a

party's testimonial evidence. Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed
by the court to be done in writing. (n)
Section 36. Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made
immediately after the offer is made.
Pp v. Yatco, 97 Phil 940 (1955)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
86
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9181
November 28, 1955
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City Branch, and JUAN CONSUNJI and ALFONSO
PANGANIBAN, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Solicitor Meliton G. Soliman,
City Attorney Pedro R. Revilla and Assistant City Attorney Julian E. Lustre for
petitioner.
Estanislao A. Fernandez, Augusto Ilagan, Claro T. Almeda and Rufino
Navarro for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
In an amended information filed by the City Attorney of Quezon City on
March 22, 1955, Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose
identity is still unknown, were charged with having conspired together in the
murder of one Jose Ramos (Criminal Case No. Q-1637 of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City). Trial of the case started on May 3, 1955, and in
several hearings the prosecution had been presenting its evidence. During
the progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was
questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of
Investigation, in connection with the making of a certain extra-judicial
confession (allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the
witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban interposed a
general objection to any evidence on such confession on the ground that it
was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused
Panganiban. The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected
to, but on an altogether different ground: that the prosecution could not be
permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and
Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of
such conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances.
Thereafter, according to the transcript, the following remarks were made:
FISCAL LUSTRE:
May we know from counsel if he is also objecting to the admissibility
of the confession of Consunji as against the accused Consunji
himself?
COURT:
That would be premature because there is already a ruling of the
Court that you cannot prove a confession unless you prove first
conspiracy thru a number of indefinite acts, conditions and
circumstances as required by law. Annex "B" of the petition, p. 9
The prosecution then moved in writing for a reconsideration of the order of
exclusion, but again the motion was denied. Wherefore, this petition for
certiorari was brought before this Court by the Solicitor General, for the
review and annulment of the lower Court's order completely excluding any
evidence on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and
Alfonso Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy.
We believe that the lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
ordering the complete exclusion of the prosecution's evidence on the alleged
confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the trial when the
ruling was made.
Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of the
extrajudicial confession of an accused, freely and voluntarily made, as
evidence against him.
SEC. 14. Confession. The declaration of an accused expressly
acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to the offense charged, may
be given in evidence against him.
Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's
confession may not be competent as against his co-accused Panganiban,
being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without
the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of
Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's own
guilt (U. S. vs. Vega, 43 Phil. 41; People vs. Bande, 50 Phil. 37; People vs.
Buan, 64 Phil. 296), and should have been admitted as such.
The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered
evidence is Sec. 12 of Rule 123, providing that:
The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence may be given in evidence against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration.
87
Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the
pendency of the unlawful enterprises("during its existence") and in
furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long
after the conspiracy had been brought to an end (U. S. vs. Empeinado, 9
Phil., 613; U. S. vs. Raymundo, 14 Phil., 416; People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil.,
718; People vs. Nakpil, 52 Phil., 985).
Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove
conspiracy between the two accused, nor as evidence against both of them.
In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape recordings) had
not yet even been identified (the presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely for
the purpose of identifying the confessions), much less formally offered in
evidence. For all we know, the prosecution might still be able to adduce other
proof of conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban before their
confessions are formally offered in evidence. Assuming, therefore, that
section 12 of Rule 123 also applies to the confessions in question, it was
premature for the respondent Court to exclude them completely on the
ground that there was no prior proof of conspiracy.
It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proferred confessions
was not made on the basis of the objection interposed by Panganiban's
counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which the Court
issuedmotu proprio. Panganiban's counsel objected to Consunji's confession
as evidence of the guilt of the other accused Panganiban, on the ground that
it was hearsay as to the latter. But the Court, instead of ruling on this
objection, put up its own objection to the confessions that it could not be
admitted to prove conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban without
prior evidence of such conspiracy by a number of indefinite acts, conditions,
circumstances, etc. and completely excluded the confessions on that ground.
By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege
which the parties may waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not
reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no
power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence (Marcella vs. Reyes, 12
Phil., 1).
We see no need for the present to discuss the question of the admissibility of
the individual extrajudicial confessions of two or more accused for the
purpose of establishing conspiracy between them through the identity of the
confessions in essential details. After all, the confessions are not before us
and have not even been formally offered in evidence for any purpose. Suffice
it to say that the lower Court should have allowed such confessions to be
given in evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and admit
the same conditionally to establish conspiracy, in order to give the
prosecution a chance to get into the record all the relevant evidence at its
disposal to prove the charges. At any rate, in the final determination and
consideration of the case, the trial Court should be able to distinguish the
admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of
evidence, should be excluded.
Once more, attention should be called to the ruling of this Court in the case
of Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance Co., 52 Phil., 807, 816-817:
In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is
most effectively and expeditiously administered in the courts where
trial objections to the admission of proof are received with least favor.
The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its
materiality or technical objections to the form of the questions should
be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of
first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to
know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and
where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the Attorney
offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the
testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered
will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the
heat of the battle over which the presides, a judge of first instance
may possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof where
a fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake
is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court,
upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to
correct the effects of the error without returning the case for a new
trial, a step which this Court is always very loath to take. On the
other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if
the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can
never result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is
supposed to know the law; and it is duty, upon final consideration of
the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant
and immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted
to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this Court then has all the
material before it necessary to make a correct judgment.
There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where
questions arise as to admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the
unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no
longer appeal.
88
Wherefore, the order excluding the confessions of the accused Juan

Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban is annulled and set aside and the Court
below is directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with law and this
opinion. Costs against respondents Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban.
So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista
Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ.,concur.
Catuira v.CA, 236 SCRA 398 (1994)
cover the same, which checks upon presentment for payment were
dishonored by the drawee bank. 2
After the prosecution had presented its evidence, petitioner Concepcion M.
Catuira filed a Motion to Dismiss (by way of Demurrer to Evidence) under
Sec. 15, Rule 119, of the 1985 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. 3Petitioner contended that the testimony of private respondent
Ocampo was inadmissible in evidence since it was not properly introduced
when she was called to testify as mandated in Sec. 35, Rule 132, of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. Petitioner also argued that even if the testimony
of private respondent was considered, the evidence of the prosecution still
failed to prove that the checks were issued in payment of an obligation.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
On 26 July 1991, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
On 18 October 1991, it likewise denied the motion to reconsider its denial of
the motion to dismiss.
FIRST DIVISION
On 4 November 1991 petitioner elevated her case to the Court of Appeals

through a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. In a similar move,
the appellate court rejected her petition and sustained the trial court in its
denial of the motion to dismiss. Hence, this recourse seeking to annul the
decision of the Court of Appeals rendered on 27 February 1992 as well as its
resolution of 1 June 1992. 4
G.R. No. 105813 September 12, 1994

CONCEPCION M. CATUIRA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Arnold V. Guerrero & Associates for petitioner.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Is the testimony of a witness inadmissible in evidence if not formally offered
at the time the witness is called to testify, as required in Sec. 35, in relation to
Sec. 34, Rule 132, of the Revised Rules on Evidence? 1
On 8 June 1990, two (2) Informations for estafa were filed against petitioner
Concepcion M. Catuira with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, for
having issued two (2) checks in payment of her obligation to private
complainant Maxima Ocampo when petitioner had no sufficient funds to
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred when it accepted the
testimony of private respondent despite the undisputed fact that it was not
offered at the time she was called to testify; her testimony should have been
stricken off the record pursuant to Sec. 34, Rule 132, which prohibits the
court from considering evidence which has not been formally offered; and, it
was error for respondent appellate court to declare that petitioner's objection
was not done at the proper time since under Sec. 36, Rule 132, 5 objection to
evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made.
Evidently, petitioner could not have waived her right to object to the
admissibility of the testimony of private respondent since the rule requires
that it must be done only at the time such testimony is presented and the
records plainly show that the opportunity for petitioner to object only came
when the prosecution attempted, albeit belatedly, to offer the testimony after
it has rested its case. 6
The petition is devoid of merit. The reason for requiring that evidence be
formally introduced is to enable the court to rule intelligently upon the
objection to the questions which have been asked. 7 As a general rule, the
proponent must show its relevancy, materiality and competency. Where the
89
proponent offers evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse party to be

inadmissible for any reason, the latter has the right to object. But such right is
a mere privilege which can be waived. Necessarily, the objection must be
made at the earliest opportunity, lest silence when there is opportunity to
speak may operate as a waiver of objections. 8
Thus, while it is true that the prosecution failed to offer the questioned
testimony when private respondent was called to the witness stand,
petitioner waived this procedural error by failing to object at the appropriate
time, i.e., when the ground for objection became reasonably apparent the
moment private respondent was called to testify without any prior offer
having been made by the proponent. Most apt is the observation of the
appellate court:
While it is true that the prosecution failed to offer in evidence
the testimony of the complaining witness upon calling her to
testify and that it was only after her testimony and after the
petitioner moved that it be stricken that the offer was made,
the respondent Court did not gravely err in not dismissing
the case against the petitioner on the ground invoked. For,
she should have objected to the testimony of the
complaining witness when it was not first offered upon calling
her and should not have waited in ambush after she had
already finished testifying. By so doing she did not save the
time of the Court in hearing the testimony of the witness that
after all according to her was inadmissible. And for her
failure to make known her objection at the proper time, the
procedural
error
or
defect
was
waived. 9
dismissed. 11 But even assuming that petitioner's objection was timely, it was
at best pointless and superfluous. For there is no debating the fact that the
testimony of complaining witness is relevant and material in the criminal
prosecution of petitioner for estafa. It is inconceivable that a situation could
exist wherein an offended party's testimony is immaterial in a criminal
proceeding. Consequently, even if the offer was belatedly made by the
prosecution, there is no reason for the testimony to be expunged from the
record. On the contrary, the unoffered oral evidence must be admitted if only
to satisfy the court's sense of justice and fairness and to stress that
substantial justice may not be denied merely on the ground of technicality. 12
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the order of
the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Br. 35, denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss (by way of demurrer to evidence) is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., is on leave.
Interpacific Transit v. Aviles, 186 SCRA 385 (1990)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
Indeed, the rationale behind Sec. 34, Rule 132, is manifest in the minutes of
the Revision of Rules Committee. 10Thus
The new rule would require the testimony of a witness to
offer it at the time the witness is called to testify. This is the
best time to offer the testimony so that the court's time will
not be wasted. Since it can right away rule on whether the
testimony is not necessary because it is irrelevant or
immaterial.
If petitioner was genuinely concerned with the ends of justice being served,
her actuations should have been otherwise. Instead, she attempted to
capitalize on a mere technicality to have the estafa case against her
G.R. No. 86062 June 6, 1990

INTERPACIFIC TRANSIT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
RUFO AVILES and JOSEPHINE AVILES, respondents.
Balane, Barican, Cruz, Alampay Law Office for petitioner.
90
Francisco G. Mendoza private respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
This case hinges on the proper interpretation and application of the rules on
the admissibility of documentary evidence and the viability. of a civil action for
damages arising from the same acts imputed to the defendant in a criminal
action where he has been acquitted.
In the information filed against Rufo and Josephine Aviles, the private
respondents herein, it was alleged that being then sub-agents of Interpacific
Transit, Inc. and as such enjoying its trust and confidence, they collected
from its various clients payments for airway bills in the amount of
P204,030.66 which, instead of remitting it to their principal, they unlawfully
converted to their own personal use and benefit. 1
At the trial, the prosecution introduced photocopies of the airway bills
supposedly received by the accused for which they had not rendered proper
accounting. This was done in, the course of the direct examination of one of
the prosecution witnesses. 2 The defense objected to their presentation,
invoking the best evidence rule. The prosecution said it would submit the
original airway bills in due time. Upon such undertaking, the trial court
allowed the marking of the said documents a s Exhibits "B" to "OO." The e
prosecution n did submit the original airway bills nor did it prove their loss to
justify their substitution with secondary evidence. Nevertheless, when the
certified photocopies of the said bills formally were offered, 3 in evidence, the
defense interposed no objection.
In acquitting the accused, Judge Herminio I. Benito of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati rejected the agency theory of the prosecution and held that
the relationship between the petitioner and Rufo Aviles was that of creditor
and debtor only. "Under such relationship,' it declared, "the outstanding
account, if any, of the accused in favor of ITI would be in the nature of an
indebtedness, the non- payment of which does not Constitute estafa." 4
The court' also held that the certified photocopies of the airway by were not
admissible under the rule that "there can be no evidence of a writing the
content of which is the subject of inquiry other' than the writing itself." Loss of
the originals had not been proved to justify the exception to the rule as one of
the prosecution witness had testified that they were still in the ITI bodega.
Neither had it been shown that the originals had been "recorded in an
existing record a certified copy of which is made evidence by law."
In its order denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court declared
that it "had resolved the issue of whether the accused has civil obligation to
ITI on the basis of the admissibility in evidence of the xerox copies of the
airway bills." 5
Right or wrong, the acquittal on the merits of the accused can no longer be
the subject of an appeal under the double jeopardy rule. However, the
petitioner seeks to press the civil liability of the private respondents, on the
ground that the dismissal of the criminal action did not abate the civil claim
for the recovery of the amount. More to the point, ITI argues that the
evidence of the airways bills should not have been rejected and that it had
sufficiently established the indebtedness of the private respondents to it.
The Court of Appeals 6 affirmed, the decision of the trial court in toto, adding
that the existing record spoken of in Section 2 (e) and (d) of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court must be in the custody, of a public officer only. It also declared
that:
Since no evidence of civil liability was presented, no
necessity existed on the part of the private respondents to
present evidence of payment of an obligation which was not
shown to exist.
The petitioner now asks this Court to annul that judgment as contrary to law
and the facts established at the As in the courts below, it is insisting on the
admissibility of its evidence to prove the civil liability of the private
respondents.
We agree with the petitioner. The certified photocopies of the airway bills
should have been considered.
In assessing this evidence, the lower courts confined themselves to the best
evidence rule and the nature of the documents being presented, which they
held did not come under any of the exceptions to the rule. There is no
question that the photocopies were secondary evidence and as such were
not admissible unless there was ample proof of the loss of the originals; and
neither were the other exceptions allowed by the Rules applicable. The
trouble is that in rejecting these copies under Rule 130, Section 2, the
respondent court disregarded an equally important principle long observed in
our trial courts and amply supported by jurisprudence.
91
This is the rule that objection to documentary evidence must be made at the
time it is formally offered. as an exhibit and not before. Objection prior to that
time is premature.
It is instructive at this paint to make a distinction between Identification of
documentary evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. The first is done in
the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence an
an exhibit. The second is done only when the party rests its case and not
before. The mere fact that a particular document is Identified and marked as
an exhibit does not mean it will be or has been offered as part of the
evidence of the party. The party may decide to formally offer it if it believes
this will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In
the latter event, the trial court is, under Rule 132, Section 35, not authorized
to consider it.
Objection to the documentary evidence must be made at the time it is
formally offered, not earlier. The Identification of the document before it is
marked as an exhibit does not constitute the formal offer of the document as
evidence for the party presenting it. Objection to the Identification and
marking of the document is not equivalent to objection to the document when
it is formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the objection to the
document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit.
In the case at bar, the photocopies of the airway bills were objected to by the
private respondents as secondary evidence only when they, were being
Identified for marking by the prosecution. They were nevertheless marked as
exhibits upon the promise that the original airway bills would be submitted
later. it is true that the originals were never produced. Yet, notwithstanding
this omission, the defense did not object when the exhibits as previously
marked were formally offered in evidence. And these were subsequently
admitted by the trial court. 7
In People v. Teodoro, 8 a document being Identified by a prosecution witness
was objected to as merely secondary, whereupon the trial judge ordered the
testimony stricken out. This Court, in holding the objection to be premature,
said:
It must be noted that the Fiscal was only Identifying the
official records of service of the defendant preparatory to
introducing them as evidence. ... The time for the
presentation of the records had not yet come; presentation
was to be made after their Identification. For what purpose
and to what end the Fiscal would introduce them as
evidence was not yet stated or disclosed. ... The objection of

counsel for the defendant was, therefore, premature,
especially as the Fiscal had not yet stated for what purpose
he would introduce the said records. ...
The time for objecting the evidence is when the same is
offered. (Emphasis supplied).
The objection of the defense to the photocopies of the airway bins while they
were being Identified and marked as exhibits did not constitute the objection
it should have made when the exhibits were formally offered in evidence by
the prosecution. No valid and timely objection was made at that time. And it
is no argument to say that the earlier objection should be considered a
continuing objection under Sec. 37 of Rule 132, for that provision obviously
refers to a single objection to a class of evidence (testimonial or
documentary) which when first offered is considered to encompass the rest
of the evidence. The presumption is, of course, that there was an offer and a
seasonable objection thereto. But, to repeat, no objection was really made in
the case before us because it was not made at the proper time.
It would have been so simple for the defense to reiterate its former objection,
this time seasonably, when the formal offer of exhibits was made. It is curious
that it did not, especially so since the objections to the formal offer of exhibits
was made in writing. In fact, the defense filed no objection at all not only to
the photocopies but to all the other exhibits of the prosecution.
The effect of such omission is obvious. The rule is that evidence not objected
to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving
at its judgment. 9 This is true even if by its nature the evidence is
inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged
at the proper time.
The records certainly would have been the, beet proof of
such former conviction. The certificate was not the best
proof. There seems to be no justification for the presentation
of proof of a character. ... Under an objection upon the
ground that the said certificate was not the best proof, it
should have been rejected. Once admitted, however, without
objection, even though not admissible under an objection,
we are not inclined now to reject it. If the defendant had
opportunely presented an objection to the admissibility of
said certificate, no doubt the prosecution would have
92
presented the best proof upon the questions to which said

certificate relates. 10
In Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 12 we held:

There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate
civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to be
proved in the civil case have already been established in the
criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. He
was, in fact, exonerated of the charge. The constitutional
presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on
the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a
keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious
implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by
the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and
precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because
the accused was I acquitted would mean needless clogging
of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation
with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the
part of all concerned.
(It) is universally accepted that when secondary or

incompetent evidence is presented and accepted without
any objection on the part of the other party, the latter is
bound thereby and the court is obliged to grant it the
probatory value it deserves. 11
We hold therefore that it was erroneous for the lower courts to reject the
photocopies of the airway bills to prove the liability of the private respondents
to the petitioner. While we may agree that there was really no criminal liability
that could attach to them because they had no fiduciary relationship with ITI,
the rejected evidence sufficiently established their indebtedness to the
petitioner. Hence, we must reverse the ruling below that "on account of the
inadmissibility of the prosecution's Exhibits 'B' and 'OO', coupled with the
denial made by the accused, there appears to be no concrete proof of such
accountability."
Accoording to Rule 120, Section 2, of the Rules of Court:
In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the
act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the
judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the
accused in favor of the offended party.
By the same token, we find that remand of this case to, the trial court for
further hearings would be a needless waste of time and effort to the prejudice
of the speedy administration of justice. Applying the above ruling, we hereby
declare therefore, on the basis of the evidence submitted at the trial as
reflected in the records before us, that the private respondents are liable to
the petitioner in the sum of P204,030.66, representing the cost of the airway
bills.
With the admission of such exhibits pursuant to the ruling above made, we
find that there is concrete proof of the defendant's accountability. More than
this, we also disbelieve the evidence of the private respondents that the said
airway bills had been paid for. The evidence consists only of check stubs
corresponding to payments allegedly made by the accused to the ITI, and we
find this insufficient.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of the

Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered ORDERING the
private respondents to. pay to the petitioner the sum of P204,030.66, with 6%
interest from November 16, 1981, plus the costs of this suit.
As it is Aviles who has alleged payment, it is for him to prove that allegation.
He did not produce any receipt of such payment. He said that the cancelled
payment checks had been lost and relied merely on the check stubs, which
are self-serving. The prosecution correctly stressed in its motion for
reconsideration that the accused could have easily secured a certification
from the bank that the checks allegedly issued to ITI had been honored. No
such certification was presented. In short, the private respondents failed to
establish their allegation that payment for the airway bills delivered to them
had been duly remitted to ITI.
Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco and Medialdea, concur.
SO ORDERED.
Grio-Aquino, J., is on leave.
Qualified By
Dizon v. CTA, G.R. No. 140944, 30 April
2008
93

SUPREME COURT
Manila
Gonzales wrote a letter9addressed to the BIR Regional Director for San

Pablo City and filed the estate tax return10 with the same BIR Regional Office,
showing therein a NIL estate tax liability, computed as follows:
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 140944
April 30, 2008
RAFAEL ARSENIO S. DIZON, in his capacity as the Judicial

Administrator of the Estate of the deceased JOSE P.
FERNANDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents.
DECISION
COMPUTATION OF TAX
Conjugal Real Property (Sch. 1)
Conjugal Personal Property (Sch.2)
P10,855,020.00
3,460,591.34
Taxable Transfer (Sch. 3)

Gross Conjugal Estate
Less: Deductions (Sch. 4)
14,315,611.34
187,822,576.06
Net Conjugal Estate
NIL
Less: Share of Surviving Spouse
NIL.
Net Share in Conjugal Estate
NIL
xxx
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision2 dated April 30, 1999 which affirmed the Decision3 of the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA) dated June 17, 1997.4
The Facts
On November 7, 1987, Jose P. Fernandez (Jose) died. Thereafter, a petition
for the probate of his will 5 was filed with Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila (probate court).[6] The probate court then appointed retired
Supreme Court Justice Arsenio P. Dizon (Justice Dizon) and petitioner, Atty.
Rafael Arsenio P. Dizon (petitioner) as Special and Assistant Special
Administrator, respectively, of the Estate of Jose (Estate). In a letter 7dated
October 13, 1988, Justice Dizon informed respondent Commissioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of the special proceedings for the Estate.
Petitioner alleged that several requests for extension of the period to file the
required estate tax return were granted by the BIR since the assets of the
estate, as well as the claims against it, had yet to be collated, determined
and identified. Thus, in a letter8 dated March 14, 1990, Justice Dizon
authorized Atty. Jesus M. Gonzales (Atty. Gonzales) to sign and file on behalf
of the Estate the required estate tax return and to represent the same in
securing a Certificate of Tax Clearance. Eventually, on April 17, 1990, Atty.
Net Taxable Estate
NIL.
Estate Tax Due
NIL.11
On April 27, 1990, BIR Regional Director for San Pablo City, Osmundo G.
Umali issued Certification Nos. 2052[12]and 2053[13] stating that the taxes due
on the transfer of real and personal properties[14] of Jose had been fully paid
and said properties may be transferred to his heirs. Sometime in August
1990, Justice Dizon passed away. Thus, on October 22, 1990, the probate
court appointed petitioner as the administrator of the Estate. 15
Petitioner requested the probate court's authority to sell several properties
forming part of the Estate, for the purpose of paying its creditors, namely:
Equitable Banking Corporation (P19,756,428.31), Banque de L'Indochine et.
de Suez (US$4,828,905.90 as of January 31, 1988), Manila Banking
Corporation (P84,199,160.46 as of February 28, 1989) and State Investment
House, Inc. (P6,280,006.21). Petitioner manifested that Manila Bank, a major
creditor of the Estate was not included, as it did not file a claim with the
probate court since it had security over several real estate properties forming
part of the Estate.16
However, on November 26, 1991, the Assistant Commissioner for Collection
of the BIR, Themistocles Montalban, issued Estate Tax Assessment Notice
No. FAS-E-87-91-003269,17 demanding the payment of P66,973,985.40 as
deficiency estate tax, itemized as follows:
94
Deficiency Estate Tax- 1987

Estate tax
7,967,103.62
late payment
7,967,103.62
Interest
25,000.00
non payment
25,000.00
no notice of death
15.00
no CPA Certificate
300.00
Total amount due & collectible
Claims against the estate filed by Equitable Banking Corp.

with the probate Court in the amount ofP19,756,428.31 as of
March 31, 1988, together with the Annexes to the claim (pp.
64-88, BIR records);
6.
Claim filed by Banque de L' Indochine et de Suez with the

probate Court in the amount of US $4,828,905.90 as of
January 31, 1988 (pp. 262-265, BIR records);
7.
Claim of the Manila Banking Corporation (MBC) which as of

November 7, 1987 amounts to P65,158,023.54, but
recomputed as of February 28, 1989 at a total amount
ofP84,199,160.46; together with the demand letter from
MBC's lawyer (pp. 194-197, BIR records);
8.
Demand letter of Manila Banking Corporation prepared by

Asedillo, Ramos and Associates Law Offices addressed to
Fernandez Hermanos, Inc., represented by Jose P.
Fernandez, as mortgagors, in the total amount
ofP240,479,693.17 as of February 28, 1989 (pp. 186-187,
BIR records);
9.
Claim of State Investment House, Inc. filed with the RTC,

Branch VII of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 86-38599
entitled "State Investment House, Inc., Plaintiff, versus
Maritime Company Overseas, Inc. and/or Jose P.
Fernandez, Defendants," (pp. 200-215, BIR records);
10.
Letter dated March 14, 1990 of Arsenio P. Dizon addressed

to Atty. Jesus M. Gonzales, (p. 184, BIR records);
11.
Letter dated April 17, 1990 from J.M. Gonzales addressed to

the Regional Director of BIR in San Pablo City (p. 183, BIR
records);
12.
Estate Tax Return filed by the estate of the late Jose P.

Fernandez through its authorized representative, Atty. Jesus
M. Gonzales, for Arsenio P. Dizon, with attachments (pp.
177-182, BIR records);
13.
Certified true copy of the Letter of Administration issued by

RTC Manila, Branch 51, in Sp. Proc. No. 87-42980
appointing Atty. Rafael S. Dizon as Judicial Administrator of
the estate of Jose P. Fernandez; (p. 102, CTA records) and
14.
Certification of Payment of estate taxes Nos. 2052 and 2053,
P66,973,985.4018
In his letter19 dated December 12, 1991, Atty. Gonzales moved for the
reconsideration of the said estate tax assessment. However, in her
letter20 dated April 12, 1994, the BIR Commissioner denied the request and
reiterated that the estate is liable for the payment of P66,973,985.40 as
deficiency estate tax. On May 3, 1994, petitioner received the letter of denial.
On June 2, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for review 21 before respondent
CTA. Trial on the merits ensued.
As found by the CTA, the respective parties presented the following pieces of
evidence, to wit:
In the hearings conducted, petitioner did not present testimonial
evidence but merely documentary evidence consisting of the
following:
Nature of Document (sic)
3.
5.
19,121,048.68
Compromise-non filing
2.
Attachment to Exh. "C" which is the detailed and complete

listing of the properties of the deceased (pp. 89-105, BIR
rec.);
P31,868,414.48
25% surcharge- late filing
1.
4.
Letter dated October 13, 1988 from Arsenio P. Dizon

addressed to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
informing the latter of the special proceedings for the
settlement of the estate (p. 126, BIR records);
Petition for the probate of the will and issuance of letter of
administration filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 87-42980 (pp. 107-108,
BIR records);
Pleading entitled "Compliance" filed with the probate Court
submitting the final inventory of all the properties of the
deceased (p. 106, BIR records);
95
both dated April 27, 1990, issued by the Office of the

Regional Director, Revenue Region No. 4-C, San Pablo City,
with attachments (pp. 103-104, CTA records.).
Respondent's [BIR] counsel presented on June 26, 1995 one
witness in the person of Alberto Enriquez, who was one of the
revenue examiners who conducted the investigation on the
estate tax case of the late Jose P. Fernandez. In the course of
the direct examination of the witness, he identified the
following:
Documents/Signatures
1.
Estate Tax Return prepared by the BIR;
2.
Signatures of Ma. Anabella Abuloc and Alberto Enriquez, Jr.

appearing at the lower Portion of Exh. "1";
3.
Memorandum for the Commissioner, dated July 19, 1991,

prepared by revenue examiners, Ma. Anabella A. Abuloc,
Alberto S. Enriquez and Raymund S. Gallardo; Reviewed by
Maximino V. Tagle
4.
Signature of Alberto S. Enriquez appearing at the lower

portion on p. 2 of Exh. "2";
5.
Signature of Ma. Anabella A. Abuloc appearing at the lower

Revenue, demanding payment of the amount

ofP66,973,985.40; and
14.
Assessment Notice FAS-E-87-91-00

The CTA's Ruling
On June 17, 1997, the CTA denied the said petition for review. Citing this
Court's ruling in Vda. de Oate v. Court of Appeals,23 the CTA opined that the
aforementioned pieces of evidence introduced by the BIR were admissible in
evidence. The CTA ratiocinated:
Although the above-mentioned documents were not formally offered as
evidence for respondent, considering that respondent has been declared to
have waived the presentation thereof during the hearing on March 20, 1996,
still they could be considered as evidence for respondent since they were
properly identified during the presentation of respondent's witness, whose
testimony was duly recorded as part of the records of this case. Besides, the
documents marked as respondent's exhibits formed part of the BIR records
of the case.24
Nevertheless, the CTA did not fully adopt the assessment made by the BIR
and it came up with its own computation of the deficiency estate tax, to wit:
Conjugal Real Property
P 5,062,016.00
6.
Signature of Raymund S. Gallardo appearing at the Lower

Conjugal Personal Prop.
33,021,999.93
7.
Signature of Maximino V. Tagle also appearing on p. 2 of

Exh. "2";
Gross Conjugal Estate
38,084,015.93
Less: Deductions
26,250,000.00
8.
Summary of revenue Enforcement Officers Audit Report,

dated July 19, 1991;
9.
Signature of Alberto Enriquez at the lower portion of Exh. "3";
Net Share in Conjugal Estate
10.
Signature of Ma. Anabella A. Abuloc at the lower portion of

Exh. "3";
Add: Capital/Paraphernal
11.
Signature of Raymond S. Gallardo at the lower portion of

Exh. "3";
12.
Signature of Maximino V. Tagle at the lower portion of Exh.

"3";
13.
Demand letter (FAS-E-87-91-00), signed by the Asst.

Commissioner for Collection for the Commissioner of Internal
Net Conjugal Estate

Less: Share of Surviving Spouse
P 11,834,015.93
5,917,007.96
P 5,917,007.96
Properties P44,652,813.66
Less: Capital/Paraphernal
Deductions
Net Taxable Estate
44,652,813.66
P 50,569,821.62
============
96
Estate Tax Due P 29,935,342.97

Add: 25% Surcharge for Late Filing
7,483,835.74
Add: Penalties for-No notice of death
15.00
No CPA certificate
Total deficiency estate tax
300.00
P 37,419,493.71
============
exclusive of 20% interest from due date of its payment until full
payment thereof
[Sec. 283 (b), Tax Code of 1987].25
Thus, the CTA disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, viewed from all the foregoing, the Court finds the
petition unmeritorious and denies the same. Petitioner and/or the
heirs of Jose P. Fernandez are hereby ordered to pay to respondent
the amount of P37,419,493.71 plus 20% interest from the due date
of its payment until full payment thereof as estate tax liability of the
estate of Jose P. Fernandez who died on November 7, 1987.
SO ORDERED.26
Aggrieved, petitioner, on March 2, 1998, went to the CA via a petition for
review.27
The CA's Ruling
On April 30, 1999, the CA affirmed the CTA's ruling. Adopting in full the CTA's
findings, the CA ruled that the petitioner's act of filing an estate tax return with
the BIR and the issuance of BIR Certification Nos. 2052 and 2053 did not
deprive the BIR Commissioner of her authority to re-examine or re-assess
the said return filed on behalf of the Estate. 28
On May 31, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 29 which the
CA denied in its Resolution30 dated November 3, 1999.
Hence, the instant Petition raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not the admission of evidence which were not formally

offered by the respondent BIR by the Court of Tax Appeals which
was subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeals is contrary to the
Rules of Court and rulings of this Honorable Court;
2. Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals
erred in recognizing/considering the estate tax return prepared and
filed by respondent BIR knowing that the probate court appointed
administrator of the estate of Jose P. Fernandez had previously filed
one as in fact, BIR Certification Clearance Nos. 2052 and 2053 had
been issued in the estate's favor;
erred in disallowing the valid and enforceable claims of creditors
against the estate, as lawful deductions despite clear and convincing
evidence thereof; and
erred in validating erroneous double imputation of values on the very
same estate properties in the estate tax return it prepared and filed
which effectively bloated the estate's assets.31
The petitioner claims that in as much as the valid claims of creditors against
the Estate are in excess of the gross estate, no estate tax was due; that the
lack of a formal offer of evidence is fatal to BIR's cause; that the doctrine laid
down in Vda. de Oate has already been abandoned in a long line of cases
in which the Court held that evidence not formally offered is without any
weight or value; that Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence
requiring a formal offer of evidence is mandatory in character; that, while
BIR's witness Alberto Enriquez (Alberto) in his testimony before the CTA
identified the pieces of evidence aforementioned such that the same were
marked, BIR's failure to formally offer said pieces of evidence and depriving
petitioner the opportunity to cross-examine Alberto, render the same
inadmissible in evidence; that assuming arguendo that the ruling in Vda. de
Oate is still applicable, BIR failed to comply with the doctrine's requisites
because the documents herein remained simply part of the BIR records and
were not duly incorporated in the court records; that the BIR failed to
consider that although the actual payments made to the Estate creditors
were lower than their respective claims, such were compromise agreements
reached long after the Estate's liability had been settled by the filing of its
estate tax return and the issuance of BIR Certification Nos. 2052 and 2053;
and that the reckoning date of the claims against the Estate and the
settlement of the estate tax due should be at the time the estate tax return
97
was filed by the judicial administrator and the issuance of said BIR
Certifications and not at the time the aforementioned Compromise
Agreements were entered into with the Estate's creditors. 32
On the other hand, respondent counters that the documents, being part of
the records of the case and duly identified in a duly recorded testimony are
considered evidence even if the same were not formally offered; that the
filing of the estate tax return by the Estate and the issuance of BIR
Certification Nos. 2052 and 2053 did not deprive the BIR of its authority to
examine the return and assess the estate tax; and that the factual findings of
the CTA as affirmed by the CA may no longer be reviewed by this Court via a
petition for review.33
The Issues
Mate36 on the admission and consideration of exhibits which were not

formally offered during the trial. Although in a long line of cases many of
which were decided after Vda. de Oate, we held that courts cannot consider
evidence which has not been formally offered,37 nevertheless, petitioner
cannot validly assume that the doctrine laid down in Vda. de Oate has
already been abandoned. Recently, in Ramos v. Dizon,38 this Court, applying
the said doctrine, ruled that the trial court judge therein committed no error
when he admitted and considered the respondents' exhibits in the resolution
of the case, notwithstanding the fact that the same were not formally offered.
Likewise, in Far East Bank & Trust Company v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue,39 the Court made reference to said doctrine in resolving the issues
therein. Indubitably, the doctrine laid down in Vda. De Oate still subsists in
this jurisdiction. In Vda. de Oate, we held that:
The Petition is impressed with merit.
From the foregoing provision, it is clear that for evidence to be

considered, the same must be formally offered. Corollarily, the mere
fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit
does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the
evidence of a party. In Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles[186 SCRA
385], we had the occasion to make a distinction between
identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an
exhibit. We said that the first is done in the course of the trial and is
accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit while the
second is done only when the party rests its case and not before. A
party, therefore, may opt to formally offer his evidence if he believes
that it will advance his cause or not to do so at all. In the event he
chooses to do the latter, the trial court is not authorized by the Rules
to consider the same.
Under Section 8 of RA 1125, the CTA is categorically described as a court of

record. As cases filed before it are litigated de novo, party-litigants shall
prove every minute aspect of their cases. Indubitably, no evidentiary value
can be given the pieces of evidence submitted by the BIR, as the rules on
documentary evidence require that these documents must be formally
offered before the CTA.34 Pertinent is Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence which reads:
However, in People v. Napat-a [179 SCRA 403] citing People v.

Mate [103 SCRA 484], we relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed
evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by
the trial court provided the following requirements are present,
viz.: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony
duly recorded and, second, the same must have been
incorporated in the records of the case.40
There are two ultimate issues which require resolution in this case:
First. Whether or not the CTA and the CA gravely erred in allowing the
admission of the pieces of evidence which were not formally offered by the
BIR; and
Second. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the CTA in the latter's
determination of the deficiency estate tax imposed against the Estate.
The Courts Ruling
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence

which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
The CTA and the CA rely solely on the case of Vda. de Oate, which
reiterated this Court's previous rulings inPeople v. Napat-a35 and People v.
From the foregoing declaration, however, it is clear that Vda. de Oate is

merely an exception to the general rule. Being an exception, it may be
applied only when there is strict compliance with the requisites mentioned
therein; otherwise, the general rule in Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court should prevail.
98
In this case, we find that these requirements have not been satisfied. The
assailed pieces of evidence were presented and marked during the trial
particularly when Alberto took the witness stand. Alberto identified these
pieces of evidence in his direct testimony.41 He was also subjected to crossexamination and re-cross examination by petitioner.42 But Albertos account
and the exchanges between Alberto and petitioner did not sufficiently
describe the contents of the said pieces of evidence presented by the BIR. In
fact, petitioner sought that the lead examiner, one Ma. Anabella A. Abuloc, be
summoned to testify, inasmuch as Alberto was incompetent to answer
questions relative to the working papers.43 The lead examiner never testified.
Moreover, while Alberto's testimony identifying the BIR's evidence was duly
recorded, the BIR documents themselves were not incorporated in the
records of the case.
A common fact threads through Vda. de Oate and Ramos that does not
exist at all in the instant case. In the aforementioned cases, the exhibits were
marked at the pre-trial proceedings to warrant the pronouncement that the
same were duly incorporated in the records of the case. Thus, we held
in Ramos:
In this case, we find and so rule that these requirements have been
satisfied. The exhibits in question were presented and marked
during the pre-trial of the case thus, they have been
incorporated into the records. Further, Elpidio himself explained
the contents of these exhibits when he was interrogated by
respondents' counsel...
xxxx
But what further defeats petitioner's cause on this issue is that
respondents' exhibits were marked and admitted during the pre-trial
stage as shown by the Pre-Trial Order quoted earlier.44
While the CTA is not governed strictly by technical rules of evidence, 45 as
rules of procedure are not ends in themselves and are primarily intended as
tools in the administration of justice, the presentation of the BIR's evidence is
not a mere procedural technicality which may be disregarded considering
that it is the only means by which the CTA may ascertain and verify the truth
of BIR's claims against the Estate.46 The BIR's failure to formally offer these
pieces of evidence, despite CTA's directives, is fatal to its cause. 47 Such
failure is aggravated by the fact that not even a single reason was advanced
by the BIR to justify such fatal omission. This, we take against the BIR.
Per the records of this case, the BIR was directed to present its evidence 48 in
the hearing of February 21, 1996, but BIR's counsel failed to appear.49 The
CTA denied petitioner's motion to consider BIR's presentation of evidence as
waived, with a warning to BIR that such presentation would be considered
waived if BIR's evidence would not be presented at the next hearing. Again,
in the hearing of March 20, 1996, BIR's counsel failed to appear.50 Thus, in its
Resolution51 dated March 21, 1996, the CTA considered the BIR to have
waived presentation of its evidence. In the same Resolution, the parties were
directed to file their respective memorandum. Petitioner complied but BIR
failed to do so.52 In all of these proceedings, BIR was duly notified. Hence, in
this case, we are constrained to apply our ruling in Heirs of Pedro Pasag v.
Parocha:53
A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest
their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable
the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the
proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows
opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its
admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will
not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by
the trial court.
Strict adherence to the said rule is not a trivial matter. The Court
in Constantino v. Court of Appeals ruled that the formal offer of
one's evidence is deemed waived after failing to submit it within
a considerable period of time. It explained that the court cannot
admit an offer of evidence made after a lapse of three (3)
months because to do so would "condone an inexcusable laxity
if not non-compliance with a court order which, in effect, would
encourage needless delays and derail the speedy
administration of justice."
Applying the aforementioned principle in this case, we find that the
trial court had reasonable ground to consider that petitioners had
waived their right to make a formal offer of documentary or object
evidence. Despite several extensions of time to make their formal
offer, petitioners failed to comply with their commitment and allowed
almost five months to lapse before finally submitting it. Petitioners'
failure to comply with the rule on admissibility of evidence is
anathema to the efficient, effective, and expeditious
dispensation of justice.
99
Having disposed of the foregoing procedural issue, we proceed to discuss

the merits of the case.
Ordinarily, the CTA's findings, as affirmed by the CA, are entitled to the
highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that
the lower courts committed gross error in the appreciation of facts. 54 In this
case, however, we find the decision of the CA affirming that of the CTA
tainted with palpable error.
It is admitted that the claims of the Estate's aforementioned creditors have
been condoned. As a mode of extinguishing an obligation, 55 condonation or
remission of debt56 is defined as:
an act of liberality, by virtue of which, without receiving any
equivalent, the creditor renounces the enforcement of the obligation,
which is extinguished in its entirety or in that part or aspect of the
same to which the remission refers. It is an essential characteristic of
remission that it be gratuitous, that there is no equivalent received for
the benefit given; once such equivalent exists, the nature of the act
changes. It may become dation in payment when the creditor
receives a thing different from that stipulated; or novation, when the
object or principal conditions of the obligation should be changed; or
compromise, when the matter renounced is in litigation or dispute
and in exchange of some concession which the creditor receives. 57
Verily, the second issue in this case involves the construction of Section
7958 of the National Internal Revenue Code59 (Tax Code) which provides for
the allowable deductions from the gross estate of the decedent. The specific
question is whether the actual claims of the aforementioned creditors may be
fully allowed as deductions from the gross estate of Jose despite the fact that
the said claims were reduced or condoned through compromise agreements
entered into by the Estate with its creditors.
"Claims against the estate," as allowable deductions from the gross estate
under Section 79 of the Tax Code, are basically a reproduction of the
deductions allowed under Section 89 (a) (1) (C) and (E) of Commonwealth
Act No. 466 (CA 466), otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue
Code of 1939, and which was the first codification of Philippine tax laws.
Philippine tax laws were, in turn, based on the federal tax laws of the United
States. Thus, pursuant to established rules of statutory construction, the
decisions of American courts construing the federal tax code are entitled to
great weight in the interpretation of our own tax laws. 60
It is noteworthy that even in the United States, there is some dispute as to

whether the deductible amount for a claim against the estate is fixed as of
the decedent's death which is the general rule, or the same should be
adjusted to reflect post-death developments, such as where a settlement
between the parties results in the reduction of the amount actually paid. 61 On
one hand, the U.S. court ruled that the appropriate deduction is the "value"
that the claim had at the date of the decedent's death. 62 Also, as held in
Propstra v. U.S., 63 where a lien claimed against the estate was certain and
enforceable on the date of the decedent's death, the fact that the claimant
subsequently settled for lesser amount did not preclude the estate from
deducting the entire amount of the claim for estate tax purposes. These
pronouncements essentially confirm the general principle that post-death
developments are not material in determining the amount of the deduction.
On the other hand, the Internal Revenue Service (Service) opines that postdeath settlement should be taken into consideration and the claim should be
allowed as a deduction only to the extent of the amount actually
paid.64Recognizing the dispute, the Service released Proposed Regulations
in 2007 mandating that the deduction would be limited to the actual amount
paid.65
In announcing its agreement with Propstra,66 the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of
Appeals held:
We are persuaded that the Ninth Circuit's
decision...in Propstra correctly apply the Ithaca Trust date-of-death
valuation principle to enforceable claims against the estate. As we
interpret Ithaca Trust, when the Supreme Court announced the dateof-death valuation principle, it was making a judgment about the
nature of the federal estate tax specifically, that it is a tax imposed on
the act of transferring property by will or intestacy and, because the
act on which the tax is levied occurs at a discrete time, i.e., the
instance of death, the net value of the property transferred should be
ascertained, as nearly as possible, as of that time. This analysis
supports broad application of the date-of-death valuation rule. 67
We express our agreement with the date-of-death valuation rule, made
pursuant to the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United
States.68 First. There is no law, nor do we discern any legislative intent in our
tax laws, which disregards the date-of-death valuation principle and
particularly provides that post-death developments must be considered in
determining the net value of the estate. It bears emphasis that tax burdens
are not to be imposed, nor presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statute
100
expressly and clearly imports, tax statutes being construed strictissimi

juris against the government.69 Any doubt on whether a person, article or
activity is taxable is generally resolved against taxation. 70 Second. Such
construction finds relevance and consistency in our Rules on Special
Proceedings wherein the term "claims" required to be presented against a
decedent's estate is generally construed to mean debts or demands of a
pecuniary nature which could have been enforced against the deceased in
his lifetime, or liability contracted by the deceased before his
death.71Therefore, the claims existing at the time of death are significant to,
and should be made the basis of, the determination of allowable deductions.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed
Decision dated April 30, 1999 and the Resolution dated November 3, 1999 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 46947 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Bureau of Internal Revenue's deficiency estate tax assessment
against the Estate of Jose P. Fernandez is hereby NULLIFIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Heirs of Saves v. Heirs of Saves, 632 SCRA 236 (2010)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 152866
October 6, 2010
THE HEIRS OF ROMANA SAVES, namely: FIDELA ALMAIDA, EMILIANO

ALMAIDA, JESUS ALMAIDA, CATALINA ALMAIDA, ALFREDO RAMOS,
GINA RAMOS, LUZ ALMAIDA, ANITA ALMAIDA, PETRA GENERAL,
EDNA GENERAL, ESTHER ALMAIDA, DIONISIA ALMAIDA, CORNELIA
ALMAIDA, FELIMON ALMAIDA (represented by SINFROSA ALMAIDA);
The Heirs of RAFAELA SAVES, namely: JULIANA DIZON, HILARIA
DIZON, JOVENCIO DIZON, MAURA DIZON, BABY DIZON & ULDARICO
AMISTOSO (represented by ULDARICO AMISTOSO); The Heirs of
JANUARIA SAVES, namely: FELICIDAD MARTINEZ, MARLOU
MARTINEZ, ROWENA MARTINEZ, BABY LOU MARTINEZ, BOBERT
MARTINEZ, JERRY MARTINEZ (represented by FELICIDAD MARTINEZ);
The Heirs of MAXIMO SAVES, namely: ELPIDIO AMIGO, CELESTINA
DEMETRIA AMIGO, MEREN (daughter of SEVERA SAVES), FRUTO

ROSARIO (represented by ELPIDIO AMIGO); The Heirs of BENEDICTA
SAVES, namely: AUTEMIA JUCOM, CATALINA JUCOM, DOLORES
JUCOM, SERGIA JUCOM, BENEDICTA JUCOM, JOSEFINA JUCOM,
FLORDIVIDA REMETILLO, FELINA REMETILLO and ANNA MARIE
REMETILLO, (represented by AUTEMIA JUCOM), Petitioners,
vs.
THE HEIRS OF ESCOLASTICO SAVES, namely: REMEDIOS SAVESADAMOS, LUZ SAVES-HERNANDEZ and DODONG SAVES, and
ENRIQUETA CHAVES-ABELLA, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
from the Decision1 promulgated on June 28, 2001 by the Court of Appeals, in
CA-G.R. CV No. 51058, entitled "The Heirs of Romana Saves, et al. v. The
Heirs of Escolastico Saves, et al.," reversing the Decision2 dated May 23,
1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City, Branch 39 in Civil
Case No. 7678, in favor of the petitioners.
The facts of this case as narrated in the assailed Court of Appeals Decision
are as follows:
Sometime on January 1921, several persons filed their respective claims
before the then, Court of First Instance of the province of Oriental Negros for
the titling of the respective lots they occupy, among them were Severo
Chaves and Benedicta Chaves, who filed their claim for Lot No. 382, to be
titled in their names, together with Escolastico Saves, Maximo Saves,
Romana Saves, Rafaela Saves, and Januaria Saves, in Cadastral Case No.
15.
On April 22, 1921, a Decision was rendered by the court, adjudicating several
parcels of land to different claimants, among the lots adjudicated, were as
follows:
1. Lote No. 382 Se adjudica pro indiviso y en partes iguales a los
hermanos Benedicta Saves, Escolastico Saves, Romana Saves,
finado Rafaela Saves, Januaria Saves y Maximo Saves finado en la
proindiviso de una sixta parte cada uno. La parte que corresponde a
los difuntos Romana Saves y Maximo Saves perteneceran a sus
hijos respectivos;
101
2. Lote No. 383 Se adjudica con las mejores existentes en el a la

acciedad conyugal formada por Escolastico Saves y Gaudencia
Valencia;
3. Lote No. 386 Se adjudica con las mejoras ixistentes en el a la
acciedad conyugal formada por Escolastico Saves y Gaudencia
Valencia;
Also on April 22, 1921, Decree No. 177831 was issued by the United States
of America for the Court of First Instance of the Province of Negros ordering
the registration of Lot No. 382 in the names of Benedicta Saves, Escolastica
Saves, the sons of Romana Saves, deceased, Rafaela Saves, Januaria
Saves, and the sons of Maximo Saves, deceased.
Thereafter, Severo Saves died intestate, leaving his wife, Teresa Ramirez,
his four (4) surviving children, and the heirs of his two children who
predeceased him.
On June 21, 1941, Adelaida S. Martinez and Felicidad S. Martinez, who were
the heirs of Januaria Saves, who predeceased them, sold their 1/6 share in
Lot No. 382 to a certain Gaudencia Valencia evidenced by a public
instrument, with Doc. No. 1029, Page 46, Book IV, Series of 1941, of the
notarial register, per allegation in a Motion for the Issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title, filed by Gaudencia Valencia.
On June 30, 1941, a Deed of Sale was executed by the heirs of Romana
Saves, namely: Sinforosa Alimayda, Juan Alimayda, Vicente Alimayda,
Felimon Alimayda and Porferia Alimayda; the sole heir of Rafaela Saves,
Pablo Saves Dizon; and the sole heir of Escolastico Saves, Teodoro Saves,
their respective 1/6 share in Lot No. 382, or 3/6 of the property, to Gaudencia
Valencia.
On June 6, 1947, Benedicta Saves and Marcela Saves, the sole heir of
Maximo Saves, sold their respective 1/6 share in Lot No. 382, also to
Gaudencia Valencia, or 2/6 of the property, as embodied in a Deed of
Absolute Sale.
Considering that all the 1/6 share, rights, and participation of each co-owner
in Lot No. 382 were already sold to Gaudencia Valencia, she initiated the
titling of the said property under her name in a Motion for Issuance of
Transfer Certificate of Title before the Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 148 was issued by
the Register of Deeds for Negros Oriental in the name of Gaudencia

Valencia.
Sometime in 1961, Gaudencia Valencia sold the entire property to Enriqueta
Chavez Abella, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 110 was issued in the
name of Enriqueta Chavez, who was married to Charles Abella.1avvphi1
In 1979, Meleriana Saves, who was then residing in Cebu, wrote her
relatives in Negros Oriental, the herein appellees, asking them to verify from
the Register of Deeds information pertaining to Lot 382, as they were among
the heirs entitled to said property.
On March 17, 1981, a case for Reconveyance, Partition, and Damages was
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental by plaintiffsappellees, alleging, inter alia, that Lot No. 382 was fraudulently acquired by
Gaudencia Valencia, and that Gaudencia Valencia fictitiously sold the lot to
her grandchild Enriqueta Chaves Abella.
The complaint was amended twice by plaintiffs considering that the original
plaintiffs and defendants were all deceased.
The parties failed to arrive to an amicable settlement during the pre-trial
stage, but have agreed to exclude Lot 386 in the litigation and limited the
issues as to the ownership of lots 382 and 383, thus, trial ensued. 3 (Citations
omitted.)
The trial court rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioners, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is rendered
1. Dismissing defendants counterclaim;

2. Declaring the Deed of Sale and Deed of Absolute Sale null and
void ab initio; and being derived from a polluted source, whatever
documents Gaudencia Valencia executed in favor of defendant
Enriquita Chavez Abella in relation to Lot No. 382, Dumaguete
Cadastre and the issuance of TCT No. 110 covering said lot, suffers
the same legal infirmity that of a total nullity;
102
3. Ordering defendant Enriquita Chavez Abella to convey and deliver

unto the plaintiffs their shares of Lot No. 382, Dumaguete Cadastre
in the proportion of their respective rights and interests thereto which
they are entitled to participate and succeed from the shares of their
predecessors-in-interest who are the original registered owners of
the aforesaid lot; and after which, the parties are ordered to effect
physical division and partition of the lot in question to avoid further
animosity between and among themselves;
(a) Can the Court of Appeals, in the exercise of its appellate

jurisdiction, consider as evidence exhibits not formally offered as
such by the defendants (now respondents) in the trial court?
4. Ordering defendant Enriquita Chavez Abella to pay

plaintiffs P6,000.00 as litigation expenses andP2,500.00 as plaintiffs
counsel court appearances as well as moral damages in the sum
of P120,000.00;
(c) Is it legally correct to consider a rule of evidence simply as a rule

of procedure? x x x.8
5. Dismissing plaintiffs claim of Lot No. 383, Dumaguete Cadastre,

for lack of merit, the same is originally titled in the name of
Escolastico Saves, married to Gaudencia Valencia; and
6. Defendant Enriquita Chavez Abella is ordered to pay the
costs.4 (Citations omitted.)
Respondents appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals which
reversed and set aside the same in the herein assailed Court of Appeals
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated, May 23, 1995
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 39, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered, declaring
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 110 in the name of Enriqueta Chaves Abella
as valid and subsisting, and the complaint filed by the plaintiffs is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.5
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the
Court of Appeals in a Resolution 6promulgated on March 7, 2002, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered,
Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.7
the
Motion
for
Unperturbed by the adverse Court of Appeals Decision, petitioners come

before this Court and raise the following issues:
(b) Are exhibits (Exhibits "7", "8" and "13") not formally offered as
evidence by the defendants in the trial court subject to judicial notice
by the Court of Appeals for the purpose of utilizing the same as basis
for the reversal of the trial courts decision?
Petitioners also put into issue the failure of the Court of Appeals to consider
respondent Enriquita Chaves-Abella (hereinafter "Abella") a purchaser and
registrant in bad faith9 and the reasonableness of its declaration that, even if
petitioners are indeed co-owners of Lot No. 382, they are already barred due
to the equitable principle of estoppel by laches in asserting their rights over
the same.10
We find the instant petition to be without merit.
The first three issues propounded by petitioners can be summed up into the
question of whether or not the Court of Appeals can consider evidence not
formally offered in the trial court as basis for the herein assailed Court of
Appeals ruling.
Petitioners draw attention to the fact that respondents did not formally offer
Exhibits "7," "8" and "13" at the trial court proceedings. In accordance with
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, 11 the trial court did not
consider them as evidence. Despite this, the Court of Appeals allegedly
utilized the same as basis for reversing and setting aside the trial courts
decision.
It is a basic procedural rule that the court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered
must be specified.12 A formal offer is necessary because judges are
mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly
upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable
the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is
presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to
examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates
review as the appellate court will not be required to review documents not
previously scrutinized by the trial court.13
103
However, in People v. Napat-a,14 citing People v. Mate,15 we relaxed the

foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and
considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are
present,viz: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly
recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records
of the case.16
In the case at bar, the records would show that the above requisites have
been satisfactorily complied with respect to Exhibit "7."
With regard to Exhibit "7," which is a document entitled "Motion for the
Issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title" filed by Gaudencia Valencia
(hereinafter "Valencia") in the same trial court that led to the issuance of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 148, the records would show that it is
the same document that petitioners witness Fruto Rosario identified in his
March 5, 1984 testimony and marked as petitioner-plaintiffs Exhibit "I." He
testified as follows:
Empleo Here is another document, Mr. Rosario, which appears to be a
motion for issuance of transfer certificate of title, dated March 9, 1948, in 3
pages. Will you please go over this certified true copy of the motion in Cad.
Case No. 1, GLRO Rec. No. 140, Lot 382, and find out if these are among
the documents which you have obtained in connection with your verification?
A Yes, this is the one, these are among the documents.
Empleo We request that this certified true copy of the motion for issuance of
transfer certificate of title in Cad. Case No. 1, GLRO Rec. No. 140, Lot 382,
be marked as Exhibit "I" for page one; "I-1" for page two and "I-2" for page 3.
Appearing on Exh. I is a third paragraph, which states, "that Maximo Saves,
owner of 1/6 of Lot 382 is now dead, upon his death Marcela Saves is the
only heiress and successor of his rights and interest in and over 1/6 portion
of said lot." Do you understand that?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Is it true that Maximo Saves left only one heir named Marcela Saves?
A No, Sir, it is not true.
Q Why is it not true?
A Because Maximo had two children, Sir.

Empleo We request that paragraph 3 be marked as Exhibit "I-3".
Court (to witness): Who died ahead Severa or Maximo?
A Maximo, Sir.
Court Who died ahead Marcela or Severa?
A Severa.
Court Did Severa die before 1948?
A No, Sir, because she died before the war; she died in 1940.
Court So, when this motion for issuance of certificate of title was filed on
March 10, 1948, Severa had already died?
A Yes, Sir.
Court And when this motion was filed on March 10, 1948, Marcela was still
alive?
A Yes.
Court That is why the motion and which resulted to a certificate of title had
only claim Marcela as a surviving heir of Maximo?
A That is not so, Sir, because what about us the children of Severa?
Court ORDER
The hour of noon having come, continuance of the direct examination of fifth
plaintiffs witness Fruto Rosario, as already scheduled, will be done tomorrow
at 10:30 a.m.17
Verily, Exhibit "7" was incorporated and made part of the records of this case
as a common exhibit of the parties. 18That only plaintiffs were able to formally
offer the said motion as Exhibit "I" most certainly does not mean that it can
only be considered by the courts for the evidentiary purpose offered by
104
plaintiffs. It is well within the discretion of the courts to determine whether an

exhibit indeed serves the probative purpose for which it is offered.
Likewise, Exhibit "13," which is TCT No. 11019 or the Torrens title that was
issued to respondent Abella after she bought Lot No. 382 from Valencia,
complies with the requirements enunciated in Napat-a and Mate.
The records of the case bear out that Exhibit "13" was identified by
respondent Abella during the continuation of her direct examination on March
15, 1988. This much was noted even by the trial court in its Decision dated
May 23, 1995, to wit:
During the continuation of the direct examination, witness Enriquita Chavez
Abella testified and identified the TCT No. 110 of Lot No. 382 registered in
the name of Enriquita Chavez which priorly reserved and now marked Exh.
"13." x x x.20 (Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, it cannot be denied that Exhibit "13" was included in the records
that was elevated to the Court of Appeals. 21 In fact, the Court of Appeals
correctly noted Abellas testimony regarding this document in resolving
petitioners motion for reconsideration.22
It is likewise worth emphasizing that under the Revised Rules on Evidence,
an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof such admission may
be contradicted only by showing that it is made through palpable mistake or
that no such admission was made.23
The existence of Exhibit "13" was not only known to petitioners but it was
expressly alleged in their Appellees Brief 24 filed with the Court of Appeals
and their Petition for Review 25 filed with this Court that Lot No. 382 is
registered in the name of respondent Abella.
Indeed, petitioners did not merely acknowledge the existence of TCT No. 110
(respondents Exhibit "13"), but in fact relied upon it in order to put forward
their main theory that the sale from Valencia to respondent Abella is fictitious
or void because, according to petitioners, it appears from the said title that
respondent Abella was supposedly only nine years old at the time of the
transaction. Verily, it is inconsistent for petitioners to claim that Exhibit "13"
proves its theory and in the same breath assail it as inadmissible.
Lastly, petitioners present objection to Exhibit "8" hardly deserves any credit.
Exhibit "8" is a rather innocuous document which has no bearing on any of
the significant issues in this case. Its existence was only referred to in the
second paragraph of page 7 of the RTC Decision wherein it is identified as
an "Order of the Hon. Court dated May 11, 1948." 26 Though it never formed
part of the records of this case upon appeal, a careful perusal of the assailed
Court of Appeals Decision would reveal that Exhibit "8" was not in any way
used or referred to by the Court of Appeals in arriving at the aforementioned
ruling.
Anent the issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in failing to
consider that respondent Abella is a purchaser in bad faith, petitioner insists
that "for failing to exercise prudent (sic) and caution in buying the property in
question,"27 respondent Abella is a buyer in bad faith. She did not investigate
closely the basis of the ownership of Gaudencia Valencia, her grandmother,
over Lot No. 382 which a buyer in good faith should have done under the
circumstances. She did not even bother to know the persons from whom her
grandmother acquired the parcel in question. 28
Respondents argue that the issue of good faith or bad faith of Enriquita
Chaves-Abella was not raised in the Complaint filed by petitioners in the
RTC. Petitioners original theory of the case is that the sale by Gaudencia
Valencia to Enriquita Chaves-Abella was fictitious because the latter was
only nine years old at the time of the sale. However, during trial, it was clearly
established by common evidence that Enriquita was already married to
Charles Abella when she bought the lot in 1961, and, as a matter of fact, the
purchase money was provided by her husband, Charles. Confronted with the
above situation which completely destroyed their theory of the case,
petitioners switched from their "fictitious sale to a 9-year old" theory to an
entirely different theory, to wit: that Enriquita Chaves-Abella is a purchaser in
bad faith.29
Despite this, the RTC declared that respondent Abella is a purchaser in bad
faith because "[s]he did not investigated (sic) closely the basis of the
ownership of Gaudencia Valencia over Lot No. 382 which a buyer in good
faith should have done under the circumstances."30
The Court of Appeals reversed the above finding and ruled that respondent
Abella is an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith because the
"[r]ecords reveal that appellant derived her title of Lot No. 382 from the title of
Gaudencia Valencia, who sold the entire property to the former. Appellant
relied on the face of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 148 in the name of
105
Gaudencia Valencia,
annotation."31
which
was
free
from
any
encumbrances
or
We agree with the Court of Appeals ruling in this regard.

It is a well-settled doctrine that one who deals with property registered under
the Torrens system need not go beyond the same, but only has to rely on the
certificates of title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims
as are annotated on the certificates.32
In the case at bar, TCT No. 110, which represented proof of respondent
Abellas ownership of Lot No. 382, did not contain any encumbrance or
annotation that was transferred from its title of origin - TCT No. 148. It must
be recalled that the plaintiffs called Abella as one of their witnesses during
the trial of this case. It is Abellas unrebutted testimony, elicited as a hostile
witness for the plaintiffs, that her predecessor-in-interests (Valencias) title
was clean when she (Abella) purchased the property.33 To be sure, the
burden to prove that Abella had notice of any defect in the title of her
predecessor lies with the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs failed to substantiate their
contention. On the contrary, their own evidence tended to prove that Abella
was a purchaser in good faith of the property.
Likewise, there is no cogent reason or legal compulsion for respondent
Abella to inquire beyond Valencias title over the property at issue since the
latter had been in possession of Lot No. 382 prior to the sale. Settled is the
rule that a buyer of real property in possession of persons other than the
seller must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession,
for without such inquiry the buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good
faith and cannot have any right over the property.34 As pointed out by the
assailed Court of Appeals Decision, Valencia had been occupying the
property prior to its sale to respondent Abella. Herein petitioners were never
in possession of the property from the very start, nor did they have any idea
that they were entitled to the fruits of the property not until co-petitioner
Meleriana Saves wrote her relatives, co-petitioners in this case, about the
possibility of having a claim to the property. 35
Neither does the plaintiffs insistence that Exhibits "G" and "H" (the deeds of
sale executed in favor of Valencia) were void support their theory that Abella
is a purchaser in bad faith. To begin with, we agree with the Court of Appeals
ruling that the purported irregularities in Exhibits "G" and "H" relied upon by
the trial court hardly suffice to deem the said contracts as null and void.
There is no need to repeat the Court of Appeals comprehensive and apt
discussions on this point here. What must be highlighted, however, is the fact
that Abella had no participation in the execution of Exhibits "G" and "H" which
were signed by the parties thereto when she was very young. Like any
stranger to the said transactions, it was reasonable for Abella to assume that
these public documents were what they purport to be on their face in the
absence of any circumstance to lead her to believe otherwise.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property without notice that some
other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays its fair price
before he has notice of the adverse claims and interest of another person in
the same property.36 Clearly, the factual circumstances surrounding
respondent Abellas acquisition of Lot No. 382 makes her an innocent
purchaser for value or a purchaser in good faith.
Finally, on the issue of whether or not petitioners, in the remote possibility
that they are co-owners of Lot No. 382, are barred from asserting their claims
over the same because of estoppel by laches, petitioners argue that they are
not guilty of unreasonable and unexplained delay in asserting their rights,
considering that they filed the action within a reasonable time after their
discovery of the allegedly fictitious deeds of sale, which evinced Lot No.
382s transfer of ownership to Valencia, in 1980. They maintain that the delay
in the discovery of the simulated and fictitious deeds was due to the fact that
Escolastico Saves with spouse Valencia committed the acts surreptitiously by
taking advantage of the lack of education of plaintiffs ascendants. 37
Respondents counter petitioners claims by underscoring the fact that, since
the 1940s when their predecessors-in-interest sold their shares in and over
Lot No. 382 up to the filing of this case in 1981, petitioners had never taken
possession of Lot No. 382 nor did they file any claim adverse to the
ownership of Gaudencia Valencia. Since the sale of Lot No. 382 by Valencia
to respondent Abella in 1961 up to 1981 when this case was filed, petitioners
had continued to sleep on their professed rights. As found by the Court of
Appeals, "[p]laintiffs were never in possession of the property from the very
start, nor did they have any inkling that they were entitled to the fruits of the
property, not until one of the plaintiffs wrote her relatives about the possibility
of being heirs to the property."38
On this issue, we again hold in favor of respondents.
Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. 39 In the case at bar,
plaintiffs, assuming that they or their predecessors-in-interest had rights over
the land in question, obviously neglected to exercise these rights by failing to
106
assert any adverse claim over the property or demand any share of its fruits
for many years. Not unlike their predecessors, petitioners never interposed
any challenge to Valencias continued possession under title of ownership
over Lot No. 382 ever since the entire property was sold to her in 1947 which
led to the issuance of TCT No. 148 in her name. Likewise, petitioners and
their predecessors-in-interest did not mount any opposition to the sale of Lot
No. 382 by Valencia to respondent Abella in 1961 which prompted the
issuance of TCT No. 110. It was not only until 1981, or 34 years from
Valencias acquisition of the entire lot and 20 years from the transfer of
ownership over the same to respondent Abella, that petitioners decided to
assert their alleged rights over the property in a proper action in court.
Petitioners contend that the delay is attributable to the surreptitious manner
by which Valencia acquired Lot No. 382 from their predecessors-in-interest
but, on this point, petitioners evidence gravely lacks credibility and weight as
shown by the records. Instead, the evidence thus presented by both parties,
as found by the Court of Appeals, would lean towards the conclusion that
petitioners inaction for the past so many years belies any present conviction
on their part that they have any existing interest over the property at all.
Thus, even if we grant that petitioners are co-owners of the property at issue,
it is only fair and reasonable for this Court to apply the equitable principle of
estoppel by laches against them in order to avoid an injustice to respondent
Abella who is the innocent purchaser for value in this case. 40
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated June 28, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 51058, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Tender of Excluded Evidence

RULE 132
Section 40. Tender of excluded evidence. If documents or things offered
in evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same
attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the
offeror may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances
of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony. (n)
Lamagan v. De la Cruz, 40 SCRA 101 (1971)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27950 July 29, 1971

TORIBIA LAMAGAN, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL DE LA CRUZ, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, and COSME O. FOLLOSCO, respondents-appellees.
Moises C. Kallos for petitioner-appellant.
Reyes & Dy-Liacco for respondent-appellee Cosme O. Follosco.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing the
petition for certiorari filed with said court by appellant seeking to set aside a
formal ruling issued by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur during
the course of the trial of the ejectment case below sustaining the adverse
party's objection of evidence preferred * by appellant as defendant therein
and indicating the nature of evidence that would be deemed admissible and
competent against the adverse party's torrens title.
As narrated in the petition itself, a complaint for ejectment and damages was
filed on September 12, 1963 by respondent Cosme O. Follosco as plaintiff
against petitioner Toribia Lamagan and her husband Ambrosio Leonor (now
deceased) as defendants in the lower court presided by respondent
judge. 1 Follosco prayed of the lower court that it order defendants to vacate
the 48-hectare portion of his land "illegally occupied" by them and to restore
possession thereof to him. The disputed portion of land is part of several lots
107
totaling over 500 hectares, of which Follosco is the registered owner by virtue
of original certificate of title No. 178 issued by the Camarines Sur register of
deeds in April, 1950.
In answer to Follosco's complaint, petitioner Lamagan and her late husband
as defendants claimed that they and their predecessors-in-interest were in
open and adverse possession of the property since 1890; that Follosco's title
was acquired through fraud and deceit, and that the land should be deemed
held in trust by Follosco for them, and that the suit was brought by Follosco
"only after many years since he obtained his title thereto to hide from
defendants' knowledge that the latter's land was in fact covered by
(Follosco's) title." 2 As counterclaim, defendants prayed for the reconveyance
of the disputed land to them on the theory that the same should be deemed
as held in trust by Follosco for them.
The issues having been joined, Follosco as plaintiff presented through
counsel his evidence, oral and documentary, and closed his case.
Defendants then presented as their first witness petitioner's late husband in
support of their defense and counterclaim for reconveyance. In the course of
his direct examination by petitioner's counsel, Follosco's counsel objected to
a question dealing with the ownership of the land and manifested a
continuing objection to all similar questions which would elicit evidence of
alleged ownership of defendants, on the ground that Follosco's title was
already indefeasible and beyond judicial review.
The question was apparently extensively argued and respondent court
adjourned the trial at noon and issued his three-page written resolution of
August 15, 1966, ruling that any claims of defendants based on an alleged
pre-existing right prior to the alleged fraudulent issuance of the title in favor of
Follosco was already barred under section 38 of Act 496 and that since no
petition to reopen and review the decree of registration on the ground of
fraud had been filed within one year from issuance of the decree, Follosco's
title had become indefeasible and could no longer be attacked collaterally.
Respondent court therefore ruled that "the court so resolves that all
questions tending to elicit proof of ownership other than those which will
prove a better and earlier issued Torrens Title duly registered in favor of the
defendants or any of the defendants shall be barred and be not heard" and
sustained Follosco's objection to defendants' line of questioning, holding that
"(T)his court, without attempting to decide the case at its present stage, will,
therefore, entertain from the defendants proofs and evidence which will
indomitably (sic) show a better and earlier Torrens Title issued to the
defendants, if there is any."
Petitioner-defendant claims that the effect of respondent court's questioned

resolution was to totally prevent her from adducing at the trial any further
evidence in support of her defense to the action for ejectment and of her
counterclaim for reconveyance of the disputed land, such as her
documentary evidence, allegedly consisting, inter alia, of a possessory
information title in the name of one Mariano Lamagan dated November 21,
1891, deed of sale by Mariano Lamagan in favor of Nicolas Cambiado dated
April 13, 1909, deed of sale by Nicolas Cambiado in favor of Leoncio
Lamagan (petitioner's father) dated August 7, 1913, tax declarations, etc. Her
motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court's order of
September 29, 1966, she asked respondent court to suspend further
proceedings in the case below pending her elevation of the disputed ruling
for review by the appellate courts, and respondent court acceded
accordingly.
Petitioner accordingly filed her petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, 3 which handed down its minute resolution of June 21, 1967,
dismissing the same for failure to state a sufficient cause of action for the
following principal reasons: "... (b) in the [respondent court's] resolution of
August 15, 1966, the petitioner is permitted to present evidence which will
indubitably show a better right; and (c) the issue does not appear to be within
the ambit of a writ of certiorari." The appellate court in its August 2, 1967
resolution, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of its dismissal
order, further noted that "the counterclaim for reconveyance has already
prescribed (J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Adolfo Magangal, G.R. No. L-15539,
January 30, 1962)."
Hence this appeal to which the Court gave due course on the strength of
petitioner's urgent plea for relief from the "virtual refusal of the trial court to
hear defendants in their defense, violative of due process."
The crux of the issues presented by petitioner-appellant in the appeal is
basically procedural with particular reference to the rules governing the
admission or exclusion of evidence: did the appellate court commit any grave
error, correctible by certiorari, in refusing to review on certiorari the trial
court's disputed ruling in the case below rejecting petitioner's contested
evidence and dismissing the petition filed for the purpose, on the principal
ground that such ruling is an interlocutory matter and any question as to the
correctness thereof does not fall "within the ambit of a writ of certiorari" and
may only be reviewed on appeal taken from a decision rendered on the
merits of the case.
108
The appellate court's dismissal of the petition was in full accord with the rules
and applicable jurisprudence of the Court and must be affirmed.
been." No equally compelling reason has been advanced by petitioner as

would place her case within the exceptions.
1. As petitioner-appellant concedes in her petition and brief, it is beyond

question that rulings of the trial court on procedural questions and on
admissibility of evidence during the course of the trial are interlocutory in
nature and may not be the subject of separate appeal or review on certiorari,
but are to be assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken
from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case. If the
rule were otherwise, there simply would be no end to the trial of cases, for
any litigant, not satisfied with the trial court's ruling admitting or excluding any
proferred (sic) oral or documentary evidence, would then indefinitely tie up
the trial while elevating the ruling for review by the appellate court.
3. Petitioner may have reason in law to complain against the trial court's
ruling that it would admit from her only evidence of "a better and earlier
issued torrens title duly registered in favor of the defendants or any of
(them)", since it merely held petitioner's one-year period to reopen the
decree in favor of respondent Follosco on the ground of fraud to have
already lapsed, but did not take into account petitioner's action in equity (by
way of her counterclaim) for the reconveyance of the land on the principle of
constructive trust. Such an action precisely concedes that the adverse party
wrongfully succeeded in obtaining a torrens title but prays that such title
should be ordered canceled and reconveyed in favor of the claimant as the
true beneficiary rightfully entitled thereto.
2. Neither has petitioner made out a case for her claim that she should be
permitted the special recourse of seeking a review of the trial court's ruling
by certiorari, since it virtually ruled out all her evidence in support of her
defense to the ejectment and of her counterclaim for reconveyance, and
hence, appeal in due course was not an adequate remedy.
The true and special function of writ of certiorari was defined by the Court
in Fernando vs. Vasquez 4 thus: "A line must be drawn between errors of
judgment and errors of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction
renders an order or judgment void or voidable. Errors of jurisdiction are
reviewable on certiorari; errors of judgment, only by appeal. Let us not lose
sight of the true function of the writ of certiorari "to keep an inferior court
within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction." And, abuse of
discretion must be so grave and patent to justify the issuance of the writ."
The Court likewise cited therein the exceptional cases where certiorari had
been entertained despite the existence of the remedy of an appeal. "But in
those cases, either public welfare and the advancement of public policy so
dictate, or the broader interests of justice so require, or the orders
complained of were found to be completely null and void, or appeal was not
considered the appropriate remedy, such as in appeals from orders of
preliminary attachment or appointment of receiver." 5 Thus, in People vs.
Abalos, 6 the Court granted as an exception a writ ofcertiorari against the trial
court's ruling rejecting rebuttal evidence for the prosecution, pointing out that
"once the accused has been acquitted, there is no means to secure a review
by appeal, no matter how erroneous the action of the lower court may have
Assuming that the trial court erred in rejecting petitioner's proferred (sic)
evidence, petitioner's recourse is clear under the long established rules, to
wit, to make a formal offer of the evidence under Rule 132, section 35,
stating on the record what a party or witness would have testified to were his
testimony not excluded, as well as attaching to the record any rejected
exhibits. The Court has long noted that "it is the better practice to unite with
the record exhibits ... which have been rejected," 7 and that such rejected or
excluded exhibits "should have been permitted by the judge a quo to be
attached to the record even if not admitted in evidence, so that in case of an
appeal ... the court ad quem may thus be able to examine said exhibits and
to judge whether or not their rejection was erroneous." 8
4. The validity of the cited rule, i.e. to bring up to the appellate court the
rejected exhibits upon a proper appeal from a decision on the merits of the
case, enabling the appellate court to examine all the exhibits and evidence of
record and judge accordingly whether the trial court erred in rejecting the
excluded exhibits was evident in the very case at bar. Here, petitioner sought
to attach to the records here the exhibits which she intended to present to the
trial court but were ruled out by it. Since there has been no decision rendered
as yet by the trial court and respondent has denounced the proferred (sic)
documents as "gross and careless forgery" 9 which should be passed upon
by the trial court in the first instance, the Court had to order said documents
expunged from the records of the case at bar. 10
Again, respondent has cited the 1953 case of Follosco vs. Director of
Lands, 11 wherein the appeal of petitioner Lamagan and her other coappellants (as homestead claimants) from the lower court's order denying
their petition to set aside its judgment of August 27, 1948 declaring
109
respondent Follosco the owner of the land subject of the registration

proceedings was turned down by this Court. This fact places in grave doubt
the veracity of petitioner's allegation that Follosco had sought to hide from
her the fact of his having secured title to the land in question, and appears to
provide ample justification for the appellate court's pronouncement in its
August 2, 1967 resolution as to her counterclaim for reconveyance having
"already prescribed."
At any rate, all these questions will have first to be necessarily passed upon
and resolved by the trial court in the decision that it has yet to render
which serves but to demonstrate the impropriety and prematurity of
petitioner's present action.
5. Finally, it seems in order, nevertheless, to reiterate the Court's admonitions
to trial courts, as in Abalos, 12 citing the 1929 case of Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix
Insurance Co., 13 that "(I)n the course of long experience we have observed
that justice is most effectively and expeditiously administered in the courts
where trivial objections to the admission of proof are received with least
favor. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its
materiality or technical objections to the form of the questions should be
avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance,
in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with certainty
whether testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad
faith on the part of the attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule
safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof
offered will be connected later." In other words, where there is no indication
of bad faith on the part of the party offering the evidence or of a design to
unduly prolong the trial, the Court has counseled trial courts to be liberal in
accepting proferred (sic) evidence, since even if they were to refuse to
accept the evidence, the affected party should nevertheless be allowed to
spread the excluded evidence on the record, for review on appeal, as
indicated in paragraph 3 supra.
In any event, should the trial court exclude evidence that it deems clearly
irrelevant and inadmissible, it should not in the absence of an injunction
order from the appellate courts or of strong compelling reasons above
indicated - order the suspension of the trial pending the outcome of any
recourse sought by the affected party from the higher courts but should
continue with the trial and render in due course its judgment, which may then
be properly appealed from. Needless delay in the trial and determination of
the case would thus be avoided, unlike in the case at bar where the trial court
erroneously acceded to suspending the trial below pending the outcome of
this proceeding. It should be sufficient in such cases that the trial court afford
the affected party a reasonable period and opportunity to secure from the
higher courts a preliminary injunction order against the continuation of the
trial, and thereafter proceed with the trial and judgment of the case upon the
party's failure to secure such injunctive order.
ACCORDINGLY, the resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed and the
petition is dismissed. With costs against petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Barredo,
Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Dizon and Castro, JJ., are on leave.
As pointed out in Prats, supra "the admission of proof in a court of first

instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is
doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial
judge is supposed to know the law; and it is its duty, upon final consideration
of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and
immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the
Supreme Court upon appeal, this court then has all the material before it
necessary to make a correct judgment."
110

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EVIDENCE

ATTY. NESTOR M. LEYNES, III

I. Definition and Scope

Bustos v. Lucero, 81 Phil 640 (1948)

Republic of the Philippines

October 20, 1948

DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, petitioner,

According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to the

at the preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest." We

unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of

Baguio v. Vda. De Jalagat, 42 SCRA 337 (1971)

Republic of the Philippines

Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with

II. When Not Required

G.R. No. L-28100 November 29, 1971

GABRIEL BAGUIO, plaintiff-Appellant,

prior judgment relied upon. Judge Gorospe answered in the affirmative. So

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Villamor and

Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result.

Prieto v. Arroyo, 14 SCRA 549 (1965)

June 30, 1965

GABRIEL P. PRIETO, plaintiff-appellant,

Tabuena v. CA, 196 SCRA 650 (1991)

Republic of the Philippines

JOSE TABUENA, petitioner,

A The translation of the letter.

is substantial evidence supporting the petitioner's contrary contentions that

City of Manila v. Garcia, 19 SCRA 413 (1967)

Republic of the Philippines

February 21, 1967

CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee,

Amt. due from

10. Cecilia Manzano in

11. Elena Ramos

12. Estefania Nepacina

13. Modesta Sanchez

14. Marcial Lazaro

15. Marciana Alano

16. Honorio Berio

17. Gloria Velasco

18. Wilarico Ricamata

19. Benedicto Diaz

20. Ana Dequis Alunan

21. Lorenzo Carandang

22. Juan N. Pecayo

23. Felicidad Miranda

Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to

These permits, erroneously labeled "lease" contracts, were issued by

EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS, INC., petitioner,

Reason dictates that no further delay should be countenanced. The

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of

4. Defendants challenge the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance

Expertravel & Tours v. CA, 459 SCRA 147 (2005)

Republic of the Philippines

Korean Airlines (KAL) is a corporation established and registered in the

May 26, 2005

RESOLVED, that Mario A. Aguinaldo and his law firm M.A.

On December 18, 2001, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition,

DID PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DEPART FROM

purposes of passing a resolution; until and after teleconferencing is

limitations or restrictions which may be imposed by special charter,

It is settled that the requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is

For who else knows of the circumstances required in the