1.

ST. MARYS ACADEMY VS. WILLIAM

CARPITANOS AND LUCIA S. CARPITANOS,
GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES
DANIEL, SR., AND VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA,
G.R. NO. 143363, FEBRUARY 6, 2002
(Mentions and discusses: [1] Liability of schools
exercising special parental authority under
Articles 218 and 219 of the Family Code, [2]
remote cause vis--vis proximate cause, [3]
death indemnity, moral damages, attorneys
fees, and [4] the liability of the registered
owners of vehicles for injuries caused to third
persons while the vehicle was being driven in
the streets and highways)
Facts:
St. Marys Academy, a High School of
Dipolog
City,
conducted
an
enrollment
campaign and visited schools where prospective
enrollees were studying. As a student of St.
Marys, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the
campaigning group. They headed out for
Larayan Elementary School, Dapitan City, in a
Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva,
and driven at the time by his grandson Ched
Villanueva. Ched allowed James Daniel II, one of
Sherwins classmates, to drive the jeep. The
jeep turned turtle, causing the death of
Sherwin. Sherwins parents then filed a suit for
damages against James Daniel II, his parents
the Daniel spouses, Vivencio Villanueva, and St.
Marys Academy. In making St. Marys primarily
liable, the Carpitanos bases were Articles 218
and 219 of the Civil Code:
Article 218. The school, its administrators
and teachers, or the individual, entity or
institution engaged in child care shall have
special parental authority and responsibility
over the minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply
to all authorized activities whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution.
Article 219. Those given the authority and
responsibility under the preceding Article
shall be principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by the acts or omissions of
the unemancipated minor. The parents,
judicial guardians or the persons exercising
substitute parental authority over said minor
shall be subsidiarily liable.
The Carpitanos argued that because the
enrollment campaign was an authorized school
activity, then St. Marys exercised special
parental authority when the incident happened.
They asserted that St. Marys was primarily
liable for their sons death because it allowed
James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep, and

in not having a teacher accompany the minor

students inside the jeep. The Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dipolog City ruled in favor of the
Carpitanos, and ordered St. Marys Academy as
primarily liable to pay to the Carpitanos: (1)
P50,000 death indemnity for the loss of
Sherwins life, (2) P40,000 actual damages
incurred by the Carpitanos for the burial and
related expenses, (3) P10,000 attorneys fees,
(4) P500,000 moral damages, and to pay the
costs of the suit. The Daniel spouses were made
subsidiarily liable in the event that St. Marys
was insolvent, and their son James Daniel II was
absolved from paying damages because he was
a minor at the time. The owner of the vehicle,
Vivencio Villanueva, was likewise absolved.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)
reduced the actual damages to P25,000, but
otherwise affirming the decision a quo, in toto.
Hence, this appeal by certiorari.
Issues:
I.
Whether or not petitioner St. Marys was liable
for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
II.
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the
award of moral damages against petitioner St.
Marys.
Ruling:
Associate Justice Pardo, writing for the
Supreme Court, disposed of the issues as
follows:
I.
No, petitioner St. Marys Academy is not
liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. In
order for there to be liability under Article 219
of the Family Code, it must first be shown that
the negligence committed by St. Marys was the
proximate cause of the injury, because there
must be a causal connection between the
negligence and the injury. For, negligence, no
matter in what it consists, cannot create a right
of action unless it is the proximate cause of the
injury complained of. And the proximate cause
of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have
occurred. In the case at bench, the Court finds
that the immediate and proximate cause of the
death of the victim was a mechanical defect in
the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva: the detachment
of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. The
Daniel spouses and Vivencio Villanueva
admitted to the documentary exhibits that that
was the cause of the accident. The Carpitanos
did not refute the report and testimony of the
traffic investigator, who stated that the cause of
the accident was the detachment of the
steering wheel guide, which caused the jeep to
turn turtle. Neither were the Carpitanos able to
present any evidence establishing that James

Daniel II drove negligently and caused the

accident. They were also not able to present
any evidence that St. Marys allowed James
Daniel II to drive the jeep, nor of any evidence
of St. Marys negligence. It was Ched Villanueva
who was in possession and control of the jeep at
the time, and it was he who allowed James
Daniel II to drive. So the Carpitanos reliance on
Article 219 of the Family Code that those
given the authority and responsibility under
Article 218 shall be principally and solidarily
liable for damages caused by acts or omissions
of the unemancipated minor was unfounded.
The Court therefore holds that the
liability for the accident, whether caused by the
negligence of the minor driver James Daniel II or
the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep, should be pinned primarily on the
Daniel spouses. The negligence of St. Marys
Academy is only a remote cause: and between
the remote cause and the injury, there
intervened the negligence of the Daniel spouses
or the detachment of the steering wheel guide
of the jeep. Incidentally, the registered owner of
the vehicle was Vivencio Villanueva, and he
admitted to this during trial. The Court has held
in the past that the registered owner of any
vehicle, even if not used for public service,
would primarily be responsible to the public or
to third persons for injuries caused to the latter
while the vehicle was being driven on the
highways or streets (Aguilar, Sr. vs. Commercial
Savings Bank, G.R. No. 128705, June 29, 2001;
Erezo vs. Jepte, 102 Phil. 103, 107 [1957]). With
the overwhelming evidence that the accident
occurred because of the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the
school, but the registered owner of the vehicle
who shall be held responsible for damages for
the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. And
considering that the negligence of the minor
driver or the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep were events over which the
petitioner St. Marys Academy had no control,
and either of which were the proximate cause of
the accident, then St. Marys may not be held
liable for the death resulting from such
accident.
II.
Yes, the CA erred in affirming the award
of moral damages against St. Marys. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendants wrongful act
or omission. In this case, the proximate cause of
the accident is not attributable to petitioner St.
Marys. So, also, the obligation of St. Marys to
pay death indemnity may also be deleted.
Moreover, the grant of attorneys fees as part of
damages is the exception rather than the rule.
The power of the court to award attorneys fees
under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands
factual, legal and equitable justification. Thus,
the grant of attorneys fees against St. Marys is
likewise deleted.

All in all, the Supreme Court reverses

and sets aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals, and remands the case to the trial court
for determination of the liability of the Daniel
Spouses and Vivencio Villanueva. St. Marys
Academy is absolved from any liability, and is
excluded from the trial.
2. CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION
vs. VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR
FACTS:
On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to
2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez, was
driving a motorcycle around Fuente Osmea
Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise,
(the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but
without any protective helmet or goggles. He
was also only carrying a Student's Permit to
Drive at the time. Upon the other hand,
Benjamin Abad, manager of Castilex Industrial
Corporation, registered owner of a Pick-up,
drove the said company car out of a parking lot
but instead of going around the Osmea
rotunda he made a short cut against the flow of
the traffic in proceeding to his route.
In the process, the motorcycle of
Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with
each other causing severe injuries to the
former. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought
Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and
later to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital.
On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at
the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. It was there that
Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible
Party wherein he agreed to pay whatever
hospital bills, professional fees and other
incidental charges Vasquez may incur.
After
the
police
authorities
had
conducted the investigation of the accident, a
Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which
was subsequently dismissed for failure to
prosecute. So, the present action for damages
was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and
Luisa So Vasquez, parents of the deceased
Romeo So Vasquez, against Abad and Castilex
Industrial Corporation. In the same action, Cebu
Doctor's Hospital intervened to collect unpaid
balance for the medical expense given to
Romeo So Vasquez.
Trial Court: ruled in favor of private
respondents Vicente and Luisa Vasquez and
ordered Abad and petitioner Castilex Industrial
Corporation to pay jointly and solidarily Spouses
Vasquez and Cebu Doctor's Hospital.
CA: affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding
ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held that the
liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not
solidary" with the former; reduced the award of
moral damages in view of the deceased's
contributory negligence.
Catilex claims that as a managerial employee,
Abad was deemed to have been always acting

within the scope of his assigned task even

outside office hours because he was using a
vehicle issued to him by petitioner.
On the other hand, respondents Spouses
Vasquez argue that their son's death was
caused by the negligence of petitioner's
employee who was driving a vehicle issued by
petitioner and who was on his way home from
overtime work for petitioner; and that petitioner
is thus liable for the resulting injury and
subsequent death of their son on the basis of
the fifth paragraph of Article 2180. Even if the
fourth paragraph of Article 2180 were applied,
petitioner cannot escape liability therefor.
Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply
to instances where the employer is not engaged
in business or industry. Since it is engaged in
the business of manufacturing and selling
furniture it is therefore not covered by said
provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph should
apply.
Art. 2180 (4) The owners and managers
of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused
by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
(5) Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
ISSUE:
1. WON the Court of Appeals erred in
applying to the case the fifth paragraph
of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, instead
of the fourth paragraph thereof;
2. WON the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that petitioner had the burden to prove
that the employee was not acting within
the scope of his assigned task;
3. WON Castilex may be held vicariously
liable for the death resulting from the
negligent operation by Abad of a
company-issued vehicle.
RULING:
1. No.
Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph
is not accurate. The phrase "even though the
former are not engaged in any business or
industry" found in the fifth paragraph should be
interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for
the employer to be engaged in any business or
industry to be liable for the negligence of his
employee who is acting within the scope of his
assigned task.
A distinction must be made between the two
provisions to determine what is applicable. Both
provisions apply to employers: the fourth
paragraph, to owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise; and the fifth

paragraph, to employers in general, whether or

not engaged in any business or industry. The
fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of
employees committed either in the service of
the branches or on the occasion of their
functions,
while
the
fifth
paragraph
encompasses negligent acts of employees
acting within the scope of their assigned task.
The latter is an expansion of the former in both
employer coverage and acts included. Negligent
acts of employees, whether or not the employer
is engaged in a business or industry, are
covered so long as they were acting within the
scope of their assigned task, even though
committed neither in the service of the
branches nor on the occasion of their functions.
For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear
different hats. They perform functions which are
beyond their office, title or designation but
which, nevertheless, are still within the call of
duty.
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, it is
necessary to establish the employer-employee
relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must
show, to hold the employer liable, that the
employee was acting within the scope of his
assigned task when the tort complained of was
committed. It is only then that the employer
may find it necessary to interpose the defense
of due diligence in the selection and supervision
of the employee.
2. Yes.
It was not incumbent upon the petitioner to
prove the same. It was enough for petitioner
CASTILEX to deny that ABAD was acting within
the scope of his duties; petitioner was not under
obligation to prove this negative averment. Ei
incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (He
who asserts, not he who denies, must prove).
The Court has consistently applied the ancient
rule that if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the
burden of proving his cause of action, fails to
show in a satisfactory manner facts which he
bases his claim, the defendant is under no
obligation to prove his exception or defense.
3. No.
The mere fact that ABAD was using a service
vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is
not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with
liability for the negligent operation of said
vehicle unless it appears that he was operating
the vehicle within the course or scope of his
employment.
It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production
Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of
the tort occurrence. As to whether he was
acting within the scope of his assigned task is a
question of fact, which the SC ruled in the
negative.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD
did some overtime work at the petitioner's
office. Thereafter, he went to Goldie's
Restaurant which is about seven kilometers
away from petitioner's place of business. At the
Goldie's Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks
and had a chat with friends. It was when ABAD

was leaving the restaurant that the incident in

question occurred. That same witness for the
private respondents testified that at the time of
the vehicular accident, ABAD was with a woman
in his car, who then shouted: "Daddy,
Daddy!" This woman could not have been
ABAD's daughter, for ABAD was only 29 years
old at the time.
To the mind of the Court, ABAD was engaged in
affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal
purpose not in line with his duties at the time
he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then
about 2:00 a.m. way beyond the normal
working hours. ABAD's working day had ended;
his overtime work had already been completed.
His being at a place which, as petitioner put it,
was known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps,
and drug pushers and addicts," had no
connection to petitioner's business; neither had
it any relation to his duties as a manager.
Rather, using his service vehicle even for
personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit
or one of the perks attached to his position.
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD
was acting within the scope of the functions
entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no
duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in providing ABAD with a
service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require
that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability
for the consequences of the negligence of ABAD
in driving its vehicle.
Petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation is
absolved of any liability for the damages caused
by its employee, Jose Benjamin Abad.

3. G.R. No. L-25142 March 25, 1975

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and
FELIX PANGALANGAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC.,
ARCHIMEDES J. BALINGIT and FERNANDO
PINEDA, defendants-appellees.

complaint against Balingit on the ground that

he is not the manager of an establishment
contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code
making
owners
and
managers
of
an
establishment responsible for damages caused
by their employees, since Balingit himself may
be regarded as an employee of the PhilAmerican Forwarders, Inc. On appeal, plaintiffs
urged that the veil of corporate fiction should be
pierced, the Phil-American Forwarders Inc. being
merely a business conduit of Balingit, since he
and his wife are the controlling stockholders.
The Supreme Court held that this issue cannot
be entertained on appeal, because it was not
raised in the lower court.

Order of dismissal affirmed.

FACTS:

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix

Pangalangan appealed on pure questions of law
from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac, dismissing their complaint against
Archimedes J. Balingit.

The dismissal was based on the ground that

Balingit as the manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc., which together with Fernando
Pineda and Balingit, was sued for damages in
an action based on quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana, is not the manager of an
establishment contemplated in article 2180 of
the Civil Code (Civil Case No. 3865).

Angel A. Sison for plaintiffs-appellants.

Fidel Zosimo U. Canilao for defendantsappellees.

SYNOPSIS

As a result of a vehicular accident, complaint for

damages based on culpa-aquitiana was filed
against the Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.,
Fernando Pineda, and Balingit as manager of
the company. The trial court dismissed the

In the complaint for damages filed by the Bus

Company and Pangalangan against PhilAmerican Forwarders, Inc., Balingit and Pineda,
it was alleged that on November 24, 1962,
Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned
by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the
national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The
truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan,
which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping,
Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was
damaged and could not be used for seventynine days, thus depriving the company of
earnings amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was
the manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.

Among the defenses interposed by the

defendants in their answer was that Balingit
was not Pineda's employer.

Balingit moved that the complaint against him

be dismissed on the ground that the bus
company and the bus driver had no cause of
action against him. As already stated, the lower
court dismissed the action as to Balingit. The
bus company and its driver appealed.

ISSUE:

whether the terms "employers" and "owners

and managers of an establishment or
enterprise" (dueos o directores de un
establicimiento o empresa) used in article 2180
of the Civil Code, formerly article 1903 of the
old Code, embrace the manager of a
corporation owning a truck, the reckless
operation of which allegedly resulted in the
vehicular accident from which the damage
arose.

The Civil Code provides:

ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by
article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
The owners and managers of an
establishment
or
enterprise
are
likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the
latter are employed or on the occasion
of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this
article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
(1903a)

HELD:

NO.
We are of the opinion that those terms do not
include the manager of a corporation. It may be
gathered from the context of article 2180 that
the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish
version) is used in the sense of "employer".

Hence, under the allegations of the

complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual
liability can be fastened on Balingit as
manager of Phil-American Forwarders,
Inc., in connection with the vehicular
accident already mentioned because he
himself may be regarded as an employee
or dependiente of his employer, PhilAmerican Forwarders, Inc.

The bus company and its driver, in their

appellants' brief, injected a new factual issue
which was not alleged in their complaint. They
argue that Phil- American Forwarders, Inc. is
merely a business conduit of Balingit because
out of its capital stock with a par value of
P41,200, Balingit and his wife had subscribed
P40,000 and they paid P10,000 on their
subscription, while the other incorporators,
namely, Rodolfo Limjuco, Ponciano Caparas and
Rafael Suntay paid P250.25 and P25,
respectively.

That argument implies that the veil of corporate

fiction should be pierced and that Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit and his wife should
be treated as one and the same civil
personality.
We cannot countenance that argument in this
appeal. It was not raised in the lower court. The
case has to be decided on the basis of the
pleadings filed in the trial court where it was
assumed that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
has a personality separate and distinct from
that of the Balingit spouses.

The legal issue, which the plaintiffs-appellants

can ventilate in this appeal, is one which was
raised in the lower court and which is within the
issues framed by the parties (Sec. 18, Rule 46,
Rules of Court).

When a party deliberately adopts a certain

theory and the case is decided upon that theory
in the court below, he will not be permitted to
change his theory on appeal because, to permit
him to do so, could be unfair to the adverse
party (2 Moran's Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1970 Ed. p. 505).

The lower court's order of dismissal is affirmed.

Costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.

3.
APPEAL; ISSUES NOT RAISED IN THE
LOWER COURT CANNOT BE ENTERTAINED ON
APPEAL. A new factual issue injected in the
brief which was not alleged in the complaint or
raised in the trial court cannot be entertained
on appeal. An appeal has to be decided on the
basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court, and
appellants can ventilate on appeal only those
legal issues raised in the lower court and those
within the issues framed by the parties.

4.
ID.; ID.; CHANGE OF THEORY; PARTYLITIGANT CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO CHANGE
THEORY OF CASE ON APPEAL. When a party
deliberately adopts a certain theory and the
case is decided upon that theory in the court
below, he will not be permitted to change his
theory on appeal because that would be unfair
to the adverse party.

4. ERNESTO MARTIN vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS and MANILA ELECTRIC
COMPANY
G.R. No. 82248 January 30, 1992

This case turns on the proper application of

the familiar rule that he who alleges must
prove his allegation.

SYLLABUS
1.
QUASI-DELICT;
EMPLOYER
AND
EMPLOYEES; "EMPLOYER" AND "OWNER AND
MANAGER OF ESTABLISHMENT OF ENTERPRISE"
DO NOT INCLUDE MANAGER OF CORPORATION.
The terms "employer" and "owner and
manager of establishment or enterprise" as
used in Article 2180 of the Civil Code do not
include the manager of a corporation owning a
truck the reckless operation of which allegedly
resulted in the vehicular accident from which
the damage arose.

2.
WORDS AND PHRASES; "MANAGER"
UNDER SEC. 2180 OF CIVIL CODE USED IN THE
SENSE OF "EMPLOYER." Under Article 2180
the term "manager" is used in the sense of
"employer" and does not embrace a "manager"
who may himself be regarded as an employee
or dependiente of his employer.

FACTS:

The private car of Ernesto Martin was being

driven by Nestor Martin when it crashed into
a Meralco electric post. The car was wrecked
and the pole severely damaged. Thus,
Meralco demanded reparation from Ernesto
Martin, but the demand was rejected. It
thereupon sued him for damages, alleging
inter alia that he was liable as the employer
of Nestor Martin. The petitioner's main
defense was that Nestor Martin was not his
employee.
It is important to stress that the complaint
for damages was filed by the private
respondent against only Ernesto Martin as

alleged employer of Nestor Martin, the

driver of the car at the time of the accident.
Nestor Martin was not impleaded. The action
was based on tort under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, providing in part that:
Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
The defendant moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that no evidence
had been adduced to show that Nestor
Martin was his employee. The motion was
denied. The RTC held in favor of the plaintiff.
The CA affirmed it in toto.
ISSUE: WON Ernesto is
damage caused by Nestor.

liable

for

the

HELD: NO.
Whether or not engaged in any business or
industry, the employer under Article 2180 is
liable for the torts committed by his
employees within the scope of their
assigned task. But it is necessary first to
establish the employment relationship. Once
this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold
the employer liable, that the employee was
acting within the scope of his assigned task
when the tort complained of was committed.
It is only then that the defendant, as
employer, may find it necessary to interpose
the defense of due diligence in the selection
and supervision of the employee as allowed
in that article.
In the case at bar, no evidence whatsoever
was adduced by the plaintiff to show that
the defendant was the employer of Nestor
Martin at the time of the accident. The trial
court merely presumed the existence of the
employer-employee relationship and held
that the petitioner had not refuted that
presumption. It noted that although the
defendant alleged that he was not Nestor
Martin's employer, "he did not present any
proof to substantiate his allegation."
A PRESUMPTION is defined as an
inference as to the existence of a fact
not actually known, arising from its usual
connection with another which is known,
or a conjecture based on past
experience as to what course human
affairs ordinarily take. 5 It is either a

presumption juris, or of law, or a

presumption hominis, or of fact.
There is no law directing the deduction
made by the courts below from the
particular facts presented to them by the
parties. Such deduction is not among the
conclusive presumptions under Section 2
or the disputable presumptions under
Section 3 of Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court. In other words, it is not a
presumption juris.
Neither is it a presumption hominis,
which is a reasonable deduction from the
facts proved without an express direction
of law to that effect. The facts proved, or
not denied, viz., the ownership of the car
and the circumstances of the accident,
are not enough bases for the inference
that the petitioner is the employer of
Nestor Martin.
In the present case, the plausible
assumption is that Nestor Martin is a close
relative of Ernesto Martin and on the date in
question borrowed the car for some private
purpose. Nestor would probably not have
been accommodated if he were a mere
employee for employees do not usually
enjoy the use of their employer's car at two
o'clock in the morning.
As the employment relationship between
Ernesto Martin and Nestor Martin could not
be presumed, it was necessary for the
plaintiff to establish it by evidence. Meralco
had the burden of proof, or the duty "to
present evidence on the fact in issue
necessary to establish his claim" as required
by Rule 131, Section 1 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Failure to do this was fatal to its
action.
It was enough for the defendant to deny the
alleged employment relationship, without
more, for he was not under obligation to
prove this negative averment. Ei incumbit
probatio qui dicit, non qui negat. This Court
has consistently applied the ancient rule
that "if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the
burden of proving his cause of action, fails
to show in a satisfactory manner the facts
upon which he bases his claim, the
defendant is under no obligation to prove his
exception or defense."
The
above
observations
make
it
unnecessary to examine the question of the
driver's alleged negligence or the lack of

diligence on the part of the petitioner in the

selection and supervision of his employee.
These questions have not arisen because
the employment relationship has not been
established.

funeral and death expenses; to pay the said

legal heirs of the amount of P200,000.00 as
moral
damages,
without
subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs. Accused Almario Rosas is acquitted of
the offense charged. CA affirmed the decision.

Heirs of Diaz-Leus vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.

No. 77716, February 17, 1988

ISSUE:
Whether ROSAS should be held for damages.
Whether the owners of the vehicles should be
subsidiarily liable to the heirs of Dra. Diaz-Leus

5. HEIRS OF DIAZ-LEUS VS. COURT OF

APPEALS, G.R. NO. 77716, FEBRUARY
17, 1988
Almario Rosas and Hernani Melvida were
charged of the crime of Reckless Imprudence
resulting in Double Homicide, Serious and Slight
Physical Injuries and Damage to Property.
FACTS:
A Plymouth car driven by accused
Hernani Melvida and the passengers were the
victims Mrs. Leonisa Gali and the deceased Dra.
Corazon Diaz-Leus, wife of complainant Atty.
Cleto Leus and Florencio Carbilledo came from a
Quezon City hospital and was on its way home
to Bulacan taking the North Expressway.
Accused Melvida drove the car at a fast speed
and in a negligent manner causing it to swerve
to the left, traversing the grassy island which
separates the North and the South lanes of the
Expressway until it reached a portion of the left
lane more or less two (2) feet from the
asphalted portion of the south lane on the left
side facing South going to Manila when it was
bumped on the rear portion by a Victory Liner
bus and dragged about 50 meters off the
cemented road to the grassy island where it
was crashed-landed on by the front portion of
said Victory Liner bus. Said bus was driven by
accused Almario Rosas, travelling South
towards Manila in an imprudent and negligent
manner without due regard to traffic rules and
regulations and to the weather condition which
was then stormy.
It also appears that before the accident,
the bus driven by accused Rosas overtook the
car of Dr. Romeo San Diego which was running
at the speed of 80 kilometers per hour. The said
bus when it overtook the car of Dr. San Diego
was running at a fast speed thus creating a
whizzing sound. As a result of the vehicular
accident, Dra. Corazon Diaz-Leus was pinned to
death inside the car together with another
passenger Carbilledo."cralaw virtua1aw library
Upon arraignment Rosas and Melvida
entered a plea of not guilty and after trial a
decision was rendered by the trial court which
found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
and to indemnify the legal heirs of the deceased
Dra. Corazon Diaz-Leus and Florencio Carbilledo
the sum of P12,000.00. each; to pay the legal
heirs of Dra. Leus the amount of P14,000.00 as

RULING:
No. The findings of the Court of Appeals were a
complete
exoneration
of
Rosas.
Since
petitioners appeal on the civil aspect is
predicated upon Rosas alleged negligence
which has been found not to exist, this Court
must likewise uphold the Court of Appeals
ruling that Rosas acquittal in the criminal case
carries with it the extinction of his civil liability
which bars herein petitioners from recovering
damages from Rosas. Since Rosas is absolved
from any act of negligence which in effect
prevents further recovery of any damages, the
same is likewise true with respect to his
employer Victory Liner, Inc. which at most
would have been only subsidiarily liable.
Nor can the spouses Jesus Gali and
Leonisa Gali as employers of respondent
Hernani Melvida be subsidiarily liable. Art. 103
of the Revised Penal Code provides:j
:chanrobles.com.ph
"The subsidiary liability established in
the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of
their duties." In order that employers may be
held liable under the above quoted provision of
law, the following requisites must exist:
1. virtual
1aw
library
(1) That an employee has committed a
crime in the discharge of his duties;
(2) that said employee is insolvent and
has not satisfied his civil liability; and
(3) that the employer is engaged in
some kind of industry.
The preceding requisites are not present
in the case of the Gali spouses. They are not
engaged in any kind of industry. Industry has
been defined as any department or branch of
art, occupation or business, especially, one
which employs much labor and capital and is a
distinct branch of trade, as the sugar industry.
Thus, the Gali spouses cannot be held
subsidiarily liable. As We stated in a previous
case:" "Where the defendant is admittedly a
private person who has no business or industry,
and uses his automobile for private purposes,

he is not also subsidiarily liable to the plaintiff

for the damages to the latters car caused by
the reckless imprudence of his insolvent driver."
6. DUAVIT v COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 82318; May 18, 1989
FACTS:
The jeep being driven by defendant
Sabiniano collided with another jeep, which
had then 2 passengers on it. As a result of
the collision the passengers of the other
jeep suffered injury and the automobile
itself had to be repaired because of the
extensive damage.
A case was filed against Sabiniano as driver
and against Duavit as owner of the jeep.
Duavit admitted ownership of the jeep but
denied that Sabiniano was his employee.
Sabiniano himself admitted that he took
Duavits jeep from the garage without
consent or authority of the owner. He
testified further that Duavit even filed
charges against him for theft of the jeep, but
which Duavit did not push through as the
parents of Sabiniano apologized to Duavit on
his behalf.
Trial Court found Sabiniano negligent in
driving the vehicle but absolved Duavit on
the ground that there was no employeremployee relationship between them, and
that former took the vehicle without
consent or authority of the latter.
CA held the two of
severally liable.

them jointly

and

ISSUE:
Won the owner of a private vehicle which
figured in an accident can be held liable
under Article2180 of the CC when the said
vehicle was neither driven by an employee
of the owner nor taken with the consent of
the latter.
HELD:
NO
In Duquillo v Bayot (1939), SC ruled that an
owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for
an accident involving a vehicle if the same
was driven without his consent or
knowledge and by a person not employed
by him. This ruling is still relevant and
applicable, and hence, must be upheld.
CAs reliance on the cases of Erezo v Jepte
and Vargas v Langcay is misplaced and
cannot be sustained. In Erezo v Jepte
case, defendant Jepte was held liable for the
death of Erezo even if he was not really the
owner of the truck that killed the latter
because he represented himself as its owner

to the Motor Vehicles Office and had it

registered under his name; he was thus
estopped from later on denying such
representation. In Vargas, Vargas sold her
jeepney to a 3rd person, but she did not
surrender to the Motor VehiclesOffice the
corresponding AC plates. So when the
jeepney later on figured in an accident, she
was held liable by the court. Holding that
the operator of record continues to be the
operator of vehicle incontemplation of law,
as regards the public and 3rd persons.
The circumstances of the above cases are
entirely different from those in the present
case. Hereinpetitioner does not deny
ownership of vehicle but denies having
employed
or
authorized
the
driver Sabiniano. The jeep was virtually
stolen from the petitioners garage.
Decision and resolution annulled and set
aside.
7. CHARMINA B. BANAL, petitioner, vs.
THE HON. TOMAS V. TADEO, JR.,
Presiding Judge, RTC-Quezon City,
Branch 105 and Rosario Claudio,
respondents. G.R. No. 78911-25 |
1987-12-11
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to review and
set aside the orders of the respondent RTC,
which rejected the appearance of Atty.
Nicolito L. Bustos as private prosecutor in
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-40909 to Q-40913
where respondent Rosario Claudio is the
accused for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22; and (2) 31 March 1987 which denied the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration and
for mandamus to allow Atty. Bustos to enter
his appearance as private prosecutor in the
aforestated criminal cases.
It appears that fifteen (15) separate
informations for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law,
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 4090940913, were filed against respondent
Claudio before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City and originally assigned to
Branch 84.
The presiding judge of Branch 84 inhibited
himself when respondent Claudio, through
counsel, filed a petition for recuse dated
May 19,1986. The cases were re-raffled and
consequently assigned on June 25, 1986 to
Branch 105 which was then presided over
by Judge Johnico G. Serquina. During these
proceedings, respondent Claudio was finally
arraigned on November 20, 1986 where she
pleaded not guilty to the charges. Pre-trial
was then set on January 8, 1987.

In the meantime Judge Tomas V. Tadeo, Jr.

replaced Judge Serquina as presiding judge
of Branch 105.
the respondent court issued an order
rejecting the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L.
Bustos as private prosecutor on the ground
that the charge is for the violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 which does not provide
for any civil liability or indemnity and hence,
"it is not a crime against property but public
order."
The petitioner, through counsel filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order
dated 8 January 1987 on March 10, 1987.
Respondent Claudio filed her opposition to
the motion for reconsideration on March 25,
1987. In an order dated 31 March 1987, the
respondent court denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition questioning the orders
of the respondent Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Court acted
with grave abuse of discretion or in excess
of its jurisdiction in rejecting the appearance
of a private prosecutor.
HELD:
The respondents make capital of the fact
that Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punishes the
act of knowingly issuing worthless checks as
an offense against public order. As such, it is
argued that it is the State and the public
that are the principal complainants and,
therefore, no civil indemnity is provided for
by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for which a
private party or prosecutor may intervene.
On the other hand, the petitioner, relying on
the legal axiom that "Every man criminally
liable is also civilly liable," contends that
indemnity may be recovered from the
offender regardless of whether or not Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 so provides.
A careful study of the concept of civil
liability allows a solution to the issue in the
case at bar.
Generally, the basis of civil liability
arising from crime is the fundamental
postulate of our law that "Every man
criminally liable is also civilly liable"
(Art. 100, The Revised Penal Code).
Underlying this legal principle is the
traditional theory that when a person
commits a crime he offends two
entities namely (1) the society in
which he lives in or the political entity
called the State whose law he had

violated; and (2) the individual

member of that society whose person,
right, honor, chastity or property was
actually
or
directly
injured
or
damaged by the same punishable act
or omission. However, this rather
broad and general provision is among
the most complex and controversial
topics in criminal procedure. It can be
misleading
in
its
implications
especially where the same act or
omission may be treated as a crime in
one instance and as a tort in another
or where the law allows a separate
civil action to proceed independently
of the course of the criminal
prosecution with which it is intimately
intertwined. Many legal scholars treat
as a misconception or fallacy the
generally accepted notion that, the
civil liability actually arises from the
crime when, in the ultimate analysis,
it does not. While an act or omission
is felonious because it is punishable
by law, it gives rise to civil liability not
so much because it is a crime but
because it caused damage to another.
Viewing things pragmatically, we can
readily see that what gives rise to the
civil liability is really the obligation
and the moral duty of everyone to
repair or make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of his
own
act
or
omission,
done
intentionally or negligently, whether
or not the same be punishable by law.
In other words, criminal liability will
give rise to civil liability only if the
same felonious act or omission results
in damage or injury to another and is
the direct and proximate cause
thereof. Damage or injury to another
is evidently the foundation of the civil
action. Such is not the case in
criminal actions for, to be criminally
liable, it is enough that the act or
omission complained of is punishable,
regardless of whether or not it also
causes material damage to another.
(See Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts
and Damages, 1978, Revised Edition,
pp. 246-247).
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Every person who, contrary to law,
wilfully or negligently causes damage
to another, shall indemnify the latter
for the same.
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a
special law so provides, indemnification of
the offended party may be had on account
of the damage, loss or injury directly
suffered as a consequence of the wrongful
act of another. The indemnity which a
person is sentenced to pay forms an integral

part of the penalty imposed by law for the

commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of
Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v.
Director of Prisons, 84 Phil. 692). Every
crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action
for the punishment of the guilty party, and
also to civil action for the restitution of the
thing,
repair
of
the
damage,
and
indemnification for the losses. (United
States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265).
Indeed one cannot disregard the private
party in the case at bar who suffered the
offenses committed against her. Not only
the State but the petitioner too is entitled to
relief as a member of the public which the
law seeks to protect. She was assured that
the checks were good when she parted with
money, property or services. She suffered
with the State when the checks bounced.
In Lozano v. Hon. Martinez (G.R. No. 63419,
December 18, 1986) and the cases
consolidated therewith, we held that "The
effects of a worthless check transcend the
private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touch the
interests of the community at large." Yet, we
too recognized the wrong done to the
private party defrauded when we stated
therein that "The mischief it creates is
not only a wrong to the payee or the
holder, but also an injury to the public."
Civil liability to the offended private
party cannot thus be denied, the payee
of the check is entitled to receive the
payment of money for which the
worthless check was issued. Having
been caused the damage, she is
entitled to recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the
intendment of the framers of Batas
Pambansa Big. 22 to leave the offended
private party defrauded and empty- handed
by excluding the civil liability of the
offender, giving her only the remedy, which
in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of
having to file a separate civil suit. To do so,
may leave the offended party unable to
recover even the face value of the check
due her, thereby unjustly enriching the
errant drawer at the expense of the payee.
The protection which the law seeks to
provide would, therefore, be brought to
naught.
The
petitioner's
intervention
in
the
prosecution of Criminal Cases 40909 to
40913 is justified not only for the protection
of her interests but also in the interest of the
speedy and inexpensive administration of
justice mandated by the Constitution
(Section 16, Article III, Bill of Rights,
Constitution of 1987). A separate civil action

for the purpose would only prove to be

costly, burdensome, and time-consuming for
both parties and further delay the final
disposition of the case. This multiplicity of
suits must be avoided. Where petitioner's
rights may be fulIy adjudicated in the
proceedings before the trial court, resort t o
a separate action to recover civil liability is
clearly unwarranted.
WHEREFORE
the
petition
is
hereby
GRANTED. The respondent court is ordered
to permit the intervention of a private
prosecutor in behalf of petitioner Charmina
B. Banal, in the prosecution of the civil
aspect of Criminasl Cases Nos. 40909 to
40913. The temporary restraining order
issued by this court a quo for further
proceedings. This decision is immediately
executory.

8. SPOUSES FRANCISCO M.
HERNANDEZ and ANICETA ABELHERNANDEZ and JUAN GONZALES,
petitioners, vs. SPOUSES LORENZO
DOLOR and MARGARITA DOLOR,
FRED PANOPIO, JOSEPH SANDOVAL,
RENE CASTILLO, SPOUSES FRANCISCO
VALMOCINA and VIRGINIA VALMOCINA,
SPOUSES VICTOR PANOPIO and
MARTINA PANOPIO, and HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 160286
July 30, 2004

FACTS:
Lorenzo Menard Boyet Dolor, Jr. (Boyet
Dolor) was driving an owner-type jeepney
owned by her mother, Margarita, towards
Anilao, Batangas. As he was traversing
uphill the road at Barangay Anilao East,
Mabini, Batangas, his vehicle collided with a
passenger jeepney driven by petitioner Juan
Gonzales and owned by his co-petitioner
Francisco Hernandez, which was travelling
downhill towards Batangas City. Boyet Dolor
and his passenger, Oscar Valmocina, died as
a result of the collision. Fred Panopio, Rene
Castillo and Joseph Sandoval, who were also
on board the owner-type jeep, which was
totally
wrecked,
suffered
physical
injuries. The collision also damaged the
passenger jeepney of Francisco Hernandez
and caused physical injuries to its
passengers, namely, Virgie Cadavida, Fiscal
Artemio Reyes and Francisca Corona.

Consequently, respondents commenced an

action for damages against petitioners
before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas
City, alleging that driver Juan Gonzales was
guilty of negligence and lack of care and
that the Hernandez spouses were guilty of
negligence in the selection and supervision
of their employees. Petitioners countered
that the proximate cause of the death and
injuries sustained by the passengers of both
vehicles was the recklessness of Boyet
Dolor, the driver of the owner-type jeepney,
who was driving in a zigzagging manner
under the influence of alcohol. Petitioners
also alleged that Gonzales was not the
driver-employee of the Hernandez spouses
as the former only leased the passenger
jeepney on a daily basis (boundary system;
lessor-lessee relationship). The Hernandez
spouses further claimed that even if an
employer-employee relationship is found to
exist between them, they cannot be held
liable because as employers they exercised
due care in the selection and supervision of
their employee.
During the trial of the case, it was
established that the drivers of the two
vehicles were duly licensed to drive and that
the road where the collision occurred was
asphalted and in fairly good condition. It was
further established that the owner-type jeep
was moderately moving and had just passed
a road bend when its passengers, private
respondents Joseph Sandoval and Rene
Castillo, saw the passenger jeepney at a
distance of three meters away. The
passenger jeepney was traveling fast when
it bumped the owner type jeep. Moreover,
the evidence presented by respondents
before the trial court showed that petitioner
Juan Gonzales obtained his professional
drivers license only three months before the
accident. Prior to this, he was holder of a
student drivers permit.
RTC ruling: Rendered a decision in favor of
respondents.
Premises duly considered and the plaintiffs
having
satisfactorily
convincingly
and
credibly
presented
evidence
clearly
satisfying
the
requirements
of
preponderance of evidence to sustain the
complaint, this Court hereby declares
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants. Defendants-spouses
Francisco Hernandez and Aniceta Abel
Hernandez and Juan Gonzales are therefore
directed to pay jointly and severally, the
following:

1) To spouses Lorenzo Dolor and Margarita

Dolor:
a) P50,000.00 for the death of their son,
Lorenzo Menard Boyet Dolor, Jr.;
b) P142,000.00 as actual and
necessary funeral expenses;
c) P50,000.00 reasonable value of
the totally wrecked owner-type jeep
with plate no. DEB 804 Phil 85;
d) P20,000.00 as moral damages;
e) P20,000.00 as reasonable litigation
expenses and attorneys fees.
2) To spouses Francisco
Virginia Valmocina:

Valmocina

and

a) P50,000.00 for the death of their

son, Oscar Balmocina (sic);
b) P20,000.00 as moral damages;
c) P18,400.00 for funeral expenses;
d) P10,000.00
for
litigation
expenses and attorneys fees.
3) To spouses Victor Panopio and Martina
Panopio:
a) P10,450.00 for the cost of the artificial
leg and crutches being used by their son
Fred Panopio;
b) P25,000.00
for
hospitalization
and
medical expenses they incurred for the
treatment of their son, Fred Panopio.
4) To Fred Panopio:
a) P25,000.00 for the loss of his
right leg;
b) P10,000.00 as moral damages.
5) To Joseph Sandoval:
a) P4,000.00 for medical treatment.
The defendants are further directed to pay
the costs of this proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
CA ruling: Affirmed the RTC ruling with
modifications as to the amount of damages,
actual expenses and attorneys fees awarded
to the private respondents.
WHEREFORE,
the
foregoing
premises
considered,
the
appealed
decision
is AFFIRMED. However, the award for
damages,
actual
expenses
and
attorneys fees shall be MODIFIED as
follows:
1) To spouses Lorenzo Dolor and Margarita
Dolor:

a) P50,000.00 civil indemnity for their son

Lorenzo Menard Dolor, Jr.;
b) P58,703.00 as actual and
necessary funeral expenses;
c) P25,000,00
as
temperate
damages;
d) P100,000.00
as
moral
damages;
e) P20,000.00 as reasonable litigation
expenses and attorneys fees.
2) To Spouses Francisco Valmocina and
Virginia Valmocina:
a) P50,000.00 civil indemnity for the
death of their son, Oscar Valmocina;
b) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
c) P10,000.00
as
temperate
damages;
d) P10,000.00 as reasonable litigation
expenses and attorneys fees.
3) To Spouses Victor Panopio and Martina
Panopio:
a) P10,352.59 as actual hospitalization
and medical expenses;
b) P5,000.00 as temperate damages.
4) To Fred Panopio:
a) P50,000.00 as moral damages.
5) To Joseph Sandoval:
a) P3,000.00 as temperate damages.

specify the fact and the law on which it is

based.
RULING:
(1) YES.
Petitioners contend that the absence of the
Hernandez spouses inside the passenger
jeepney at the time of the collision militates
against holding them solidarily liable with
their co-petitioner, Juan Gonzales, invoking
Article 2184 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
ARTICLE 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps,
the owner is solidarily liable with his driver,
if the former, who was in the vehicle, could
have, by the use of the due diligence,
prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he
had been found guilty of reckless driving or
violating traffic regulations at least twice
within the next preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle,
the provisions of article 2180 are applicable.
The Hernandez spouses argues that since
they were not inside the jeepney at the time
of the collision, the provisions of Article
2180 of the Civil Code, which does not
provide for solidary liability between
employers and employees, should be
applied.
The Court is not persuaded.
Article 2180 provides:

SO ORDERED.
Hence the present petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals was
correct when it pronounced the Hernandez
spouses as solidarily liable with Juan
Gonzales, although it is of record that they
were not in the passenger jeepney driven by
latter when the accident occurred;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals was
correct in awarding temperate damages to
private respondents namely the Spouses
Dolor, Spouses Valmocina and Spouses
Panopio and to Joseph Sandoval, although
the grant of temperate damages is not
provided for in decision of the court a quo;
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals was
correct in increasing the award of moral
damages to respondents, Spouses Dolor,
Spouses Valmocina and Fred Panopio;
(4) Whether the Court of Appeals was
correct in affirming the grant of attorneys
fees to Spouses Dolor and to Spouses
Valmocina although the lower court did not

ARTICLE 2180. The obligation imposed by

article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for
the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by
the minors or incapacitated persons who are
under their authority and live in their
company.
The
owners
and
managers
of
an
establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner

when it acts through a special agent; but
not when the damage has been caused by
the official to whom the task done properly
pertains, in which case what is provided in
article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments
of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article
shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (Underscoring supplied)
On the other hand, Article 2176 provides
ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
While the above provisions of law do not
expressly provide for solidary liability, the
same can be inferred from the wordings of
the first paragraph of Article 2180 which
states that the obligation imposed by
article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
Moreover, Article 2180 should be read with
Article 2194 of the same Code, which
categorically states that the responsibility
of two or more persons who are liable
for quasi-delict is solidary. In other
words, the liability of joint tortfeasors is
solidary. Verily, under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, an employer may be held
solidarily liable for the negligent act of
his employee.
The solidary liability of employers with
their employees for quasi-delicts having
been established, the next question is
whether Julian Gonzales is an employee of
the Hernandez spouses. The Court holds
that
an
employer-employee
relationship
exists
between
the
Hernandez
spouses
and
Julian
Gonzales.
Indeed to exempt from liability the owner of
a public vehicle who operates it under the
boundary system on the ground that he is a
mere lessor would be not only to abet
flagrant violations of the Public Service Law,

but also to place the riding public at the

mercy of reckless and irresponsible drivers
reckless because the measure of their
earnings depends largely upon the number
of trips they make and, hence, the speed at
which they drive; and irresponsible because
most if not all of them are in no position to
pay the damages they might cause.
(2) YES. The Court holds that the appellate
court committed no reversible error in
awarding temperate damages to the
respondents.
Temperate or moderate damages are
damages which are more than nominal but
less than compensatory which may be
recovered when the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot, from the nature of the case,
be
proved
with
certainty. Temperate
damages are awarded for those cases
where, from the nature of the case, definite
proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered,
although the court is convinced that there
has been such loss. A judge should be
empowered to calculate moderate damages
in such cases, rather than the plaintiff
should suffer, without redress, from the
defendants wrongful act. The assessment of
temperate damages is left to the sound
discretion of the court provided that such an
award
is
reasonable
under
the
circumstances.
In the case at bar, the Court finds that
respondents
suffered
losses
which
cannot be quantified in monetary
terms. These losses came in the form of the
damage sustained by the owner type jeep of
the Dolor spouses; the internment and burial
of Oscar Valmocina; the hospitalization of
Joseph Sandoval on account of the injuries
he sustained from the collision and the
artificial leg and crutches that respondent
Fred Panopio had to use because of the
amputation of his right leg. The Court
further finds that the amount of temperate
damages awarded to the respondents were
reasonable under the circumstances.
(3) YES. Under Article 2206, the spouse,
legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral damages for mental anguish for the
death of the deceased. The reason for the
grant of moral damages has been explained,
thus:
...the award of moral damages is aimed at a
restoration, within the limits possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it
must be proportionate to the suffering

inflicted. The
intensity
of
the
pain
experienced by the relatives of the victim is
proportionate to the intensity of affection for
him and bears no relation whatsoever with
the wealth or means of the offender.
Moral damages are emphatically not
intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense
of the defendant. They are awarded to allow
the former to obtain means, diversion or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he has undergone due to the
defendants culpable action and must,
perforce, be proportional to the suffering
inflicted. Truly, the pain of the sudden loss of
ones offspring, especially of a son who was
in the prime of his youth, and who holds so
much promise waiting to be fulfilled is
indeed a wellspring of intense pain which no
parent should be made to suffer. While it is
true that there can be no exact or uniform
rule for measuring the value of a human life
and the measure of damages cannot be
arrived at by a precise mathematical
calculation,[21] we hold that the Court of
Appeals award of moral damages of
P100,000.00 each to the Spouses Dolor and
Spouses Valmocina for the death of their
respective sons, Boyet Dolor and Oscar
Valmocina, is in full accord with prevailing
jurisprudence.
(4) NO. The Court finds no sufficient basis
was established for the grant thereof.
It is well settled that attorneys fees should
not be awarded in the absence of stipulation
except under the instances enumerated in
Article 2208 of the Civil Code. As held
in Rizal Surety and Insurance Company v.
Court of Appeals:
Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows
attorneys fees to be awarded by a court
when its claimant is compelled to litigate
with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his interest by reason of an
unjustified act or omission of the party from
whom
it
is
sought. While
judicial
discretion is here extant, an award
thereof
demands,
nevertheless,
a
factual,
legal
or
equitable
justification. The matter cannot and should
not be left to speculation and conjecture
(Mirasol vs. De la Cruz, 84 SCRA 337;
Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 619).
In the case at bench, the records do not
show enough basis for sustaining the award
for attorneys fees and to adjudge its
payment by petitioner. x x x.

Likewise, this Court held in Stronghold

Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals that:
In Abrogar v. Intermediate Appellate Court
[G.R. No. 67970, January 15, 1988, 157
SCRA 57], the Court had occasion to state
that [t]he reason for the award of
attorneys fees must be stated in the
text of the courts decision, otherwise,
if it is stated only in the dispositive
portion of the decision, the same must
be disallowed on appeal. x x x.[24]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The

assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
grant of attorneys fees is DELETED for lack
of basis.

9. Ernesto Syki vs. Salvador Begasa,

G.R. No. 149149, October 23, 2003
(Mentions and discusses: How does an
employer prove that he was able to exercise
the diligence of a good father of a family in
the supervision and selection of his
employees)
Facts:
Salvador Begasa and three companions
flagged down a jeepney driven by Joaquin
Espina and owned by Aurora Pisuena. While
Begasa was boarding the passenger jeepney
(his right foot already inside while his left
foot still on the boarding step of the
passenger jeepney), a truck driven by
Elizalde Sablayan and owned by petitioner
Ernesto Syki bumped the rear end of the
passenger
jeepney.
Begasa
fell
and
fractured his left thigh bone (femur). He also
suffered lacerations and abrasions in his left
leg. He filed a complaint for damages for
breach of common carriers contractual
obligations and quasi-delict against Aurora
Pisuena, the owner of the passenger
jeepney, herein petitioner Ernesto Syki, the
owner of the truck, and Elizalde Sablayan,
the driver of the truck. The trial court
dismissed the complaint against Aurora
Pisuena, but ordered Ernesto Syki and his
truck driver, Elizalde Sablayan, to pay
Begasa, jointly and severally, actual and
moral damages plus attorneys fees. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
the decision a quo, in toto. Syki now brings
this issue before the Supreme Court via
petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
First, Syki argues that he was not negligent
in the selection and supervision of his driver

Sablayan. He had testified before the trial

court that before he hired Sablayan, he
required him to submit a police clearance in
order to determine if he was ever involved
in any vehicular accident. He also required
Sablayan to undergo a driving test
conducted by his mechanic, Esteban Jaca.
Syki claimed that he, in fact, accompanied
Sablayan during the driving test; and that
during the test, Sablayan was taught to read
and understand traffic signs like Do Not
Enter, One Way, Left Turn and Right Turn.
Sykis mechanic Esteban Jaca, on the other
hand, testified that Sablayan passed the
driving test and never figured in any
vehicular accident except the one in
question. He also testified that he
maintained in good condition all the trucks
of Syki by checking the brakes, horns and
tires thereof before providing hauling
services. According to Syki, all these were
sufficient evidence to prove that he
observed the diligence of a good father of a
family in selecting and supervising his
employee Sablayan. Therefore, the CA erred
in holding him liable via Article 2180 of the
Civil Code as a negligent employer.

family in the selection and supervision of his

employee truck driver Elizalde Sablayan.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides in
part: Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or
industry. x x x The responsibility treated in
this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
So, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of an employee, a legal
presumption instantly arises that the
employer was negligent in the selection
and/or supervision of said employee. The
said presumption may be rebutted only by a
clear showing on the part of the employer
that he exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee. If the employer
successfully
overcomes
the
legal
presumption of negligence, he is relieved of
liability. In other words, the burden of proof
is on the employer.

Lastly, Syki contends that his truck driver

Sablayan was caught unaware when the
passenger jeepney hailed by Begasa
suddenly stopped at the intersection of a
national highway. Had Begasa flagged down
the jeepney at a proper place, then the
accident couldve been avoided. Syki asserts
that, even if he was found guilty as a
negligent employer, then the award for
damages against him should be mitigated
because Begasa himself was guilty of
contributory negligence.

The question is: how does an employer

prove that he indeed exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of his employee? The Court
was able to answer this in two previous
cases, both involving an employer named
Metro Manila Transit Corporation (MMTC).
Says the Court in those cases: In the
selection
of
prospective
employees,
employers are required to examine them as
to their qualifications, experience, and
service records. On the other hand, with
respect to the supervision of employees,
employers
should
formulate
standard
operating
procedures,
monitor
their
implementation, and impose disciplinary
measures for breaches thereof. To establish
these factors in a trial involving the issue of
vicarious liability, employers must submit
concrete proof, including documentary
evidence.
(Metro
Manila
Transit
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA
495 [1998]). In those two prior cases, the
MMTC was able to present only testimonial
evidence, without being supported by
documentary evidence. The Court, in both
cases, held that MMTCs witness testimonies
dwelt only on generalities, and that the
same should have been buttressed by
documentary or object evidence so as to
obviate the apparent biased nature of the
testimonies. In both cases, MMTC was
adjudged as a negligent employer for failing
to dispute this legal presumption under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Based therefore on jurisprudential law,
the employer must not merely present

Issues:
I.
Whether or not Syki was able to present
sufficient evidence that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee
Sablayan.
II.
If Syki is found to be a negligent
employer, then whether or not Begasa was
guilty of contributory negligence so as to
mitigate the award of damages against Syki.
Ruling:
Ponente
Associate
Justice
Renato
Corona, speaking for the Supreme Court,
enunciated thus:
I.
No, Ernesto Syki was not able to present
sufficient evidence to prove that he
exercised the diligence of a good father of a

testimonial evidence to prove that he

observed the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of his
employee, but he must also support such
testimonial evidence with concrete or
documentary evidence. The reason for this
is to obviate the biased nature of the
employers testimony or that of his
witnesses. In the case at bench, petitioner
Sykis evidence consisted entirely of
testimonial evidence. He never presented
the police clearance that was allegedly
given to him by Sablayan, nor the results of
Sablayans driving test. Also, he did not
present records of the regular inspections
that his mechanic Esteban Jaca allegedly
conducted. The unsubstantiated and selfserving testimonies of Syki and his
mechanic were, without doubt, insufficient
to overcome the legal presumption that he
was negligent in the selection and
supervision of his driver. The Court
emphasizes that the legal obligation of
employers to observe due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees
provided in Article 2180 of the Civil Code is
not an empty provision or a mere formalism,
since the non-observance thereof actually
becomes the basis of the employers
vicarious
liability.
Employers
should
seriously observe such a degree of diligence
(and prove it in court by sufficient and
concrete evidence) that would exculpate
them from liability. Therefore, the Supreme
Court affirms the ruling of the Court of
Appeals that petitioner Syki is liable for the
injuries suffered by respondent Begasa.
II.
No, Salvador Begasa was not guilty of
contributory negligence so as to mitigate
the award of damages against Ernesto Syki.
Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides:
When the plaintiffs own negligence was
the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendants lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but
the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded.
The underlying precept of the above article
on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff
who is partly responsible for his own injury
should not be entitled to recover damages
in full, but must bear the consequences of
his own negligence. The defendant must
thus be held liable only for the damages
actually caused by his negligence.
In the case at bench, there was no evidence
that respondent Salvador Begasa and his
three companions flagged down the
passenger jeepney in a prohibited area. No
city resolution, traffic regulation or DPWH
memorandum was presented to show that
the passenger jeepney picked up Begasa

and his three companions in a prohibited

area.
In sum, the sole and proximate cause of the
accident was the negligence of Sykis driver
who, as found by the lower courts, did not
slow down even when he was already
approaching a busy intersection within the
city proper. The passenger jeepney had long
stopped to pick up Begasa and his three
companions and, in fact, Begasa was
already partly inside the jeepney when truck
driver Sablayan rear-ended it. The impact
was so strong that Begasa fell and fractured
his left thigh bone (femur), and suffered
severe wounds in his left knee and leg. No
doubt Sykis driver was reckless. Since the
negligence of Sykis employee was the sole
and proximate cause of the accident, then
as the employer, Syki is liable under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, to pay damages to
respondent Begasa for the injuries sustained
by him.
10. Cristino vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 116100, February 9, 1996
SPOUSES CUSTODIO and SPOUSES
SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA
Facts:
A civil case for the grant of an easement of
right of way was filed by Pacifico Mabasa
against the Custodios and Santoses. The
original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died during
the pendency of this case and was
substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving
spouse and children.
Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a twodoor apartment erected thereon. Said
property may be described to be surrounded
by other immovables pertaining to the
Custodios and Santoses. When said property
was purchased by Mabasa, there were
tenants occupying the premises and who
were
acknowledged
by
Mabasa
as
tenants. However, one of said tenants
vacated the apartment and when Mabasa
went to see the premises, he saw that there
had been built an adobe fence constructed
by Santos in the first passageway making it
narrower in width.
RTC: Ordered the Custodios and Santoses to
give Mabasa permanent access to the public
street; ordered Mabasa to pay Custodios and
Santoses as indemnity for the permanent
use of the passageway.
Mabasa, represented by his heirs, went to
the Court of Appeals raising the sole issue of
whether or not the lower court erred in not
awarding damages in their favor based on
the fact of loss in the form of unrealized

rentals on the property due to the adobe

wall restricting access.
CA: The appealed decision is affirmed to all
respects; WITH MODIFICATION only insofar
as the grant of actual, moral and exemplary
damages to Mabasa; denied the motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
WON the award of damages is in order.
RULING:
No. The award of damages has no
substantial legal basis. A reading of the
decision of the Court of Appeals will show
that the award of damages was based solely
on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico
Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of
unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated
the leased premises by reason of the closure
of the passageway.
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff
suffered losses does not give rise to a right
to recover damages. To warrant the recovery
of damages, there must be both a right of
action for a legal wrong inflicted by the
defendant, and damage resulting to the
plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage,
or damage without wrong, does not
constitute a cause of action, since damages
are merely part of the remedy allowed for
the injury caused by a breach or wrong
There is a material distinction between
damages and injury. Injury is the illegal
invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss,
hurt, or harm which results from the injury;
and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which
the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. These situations are
often called damnum absque injuria.
In order that a plaintiff may maintain an
action for the injuries of which he complains,
he must establish that such injuries resulted
from a breach of duty which the defendant
owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury
to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the
person causing it. The underlying basis for
the award of tort damages is the premise
that
an
individual
was
injured
in
contemplation of law. Thus, there must first
be the breach of some duty and the
imposition of liability for that breach before
damages may be awarded; it is not
sufficient to state that there should be tort
liability merely because the plaintiff suffered
some pain and suffering.
In other words, in order that the law will give
redress for an act causing damage, that act
must be not only hurtful, but wrongful.
There must be damnum et injuria. If, as may
happen in many cases, a person sustains

actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his

person or property, without sustaining any
legal injury, that is, an act or omission which
the law does not deem an injury, the
damage is regarded as damnum absque
injuria.
In the case at bar, although there was
damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary
to the claim of herein private respondents,
herein petitioners could not be said to have
violated the principle of abuse of right. In
order that the principle of abuse of right
provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can
be applied, it is essential that the following
requisites concur:
(1) The defendant should have acted in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy;
(2) The acts should be willful; and
(3) There was damage or injury to the
plaintiff.
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence
within their lot is a valid exercise of their
right as owners, hence not contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy. The
law recognizes in the owner the right to
enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other
limitations than those established by law. It
is within the right of petitioners, as owners,
to enclose and fence their property. Article
430 of the Civil Code provides that "(e)very
owner may enclose or fence his land or
tenements by means of walls, ditches, live
or dead hedges, or by any other means
without detriment to servitudes constituted
thereon."
At the time of the construction of the fence,
the lot was not subject to any servitudes.
There was no easement of way existing in
favor of private respondents, either by law
or by contract. The fact that private
respondents had no existing right over the
said passageway is confirmed by the very
decision of the trial court granting a
compulsory right of way in their favor after
payment of just compensation. It was only
that
decision
which
gave
private
respondents the right to use the said
passageway
after
payment
of
the
compensation and imposed a corresponding
duty on petitioners not to interfere in the
exercise of said right.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had
an absolute right over their property and
their act of fencing and enclosing the same
was an act which they may lawfully perform
in the employment and exercise of said
right. Whatever injury or damage may have
been sustained by private respondents by
reason of the rightful use of the said land by
petitioners is damnum absque injuria. The
courts can give no redress for hardship to an
individual resulting from action reasonably
calculated to achieve a lawful means.

11.MARITER MENDOZA,
Petitioner,vs.ADRIANO CASUMPANG,
JENNIFER ADRIANE and JOHN ANDRE,
all surnamed CASUMPANG,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 197987 | 2012-03-19
FACTS:
On February 13, 1993 Josephine
underwent hysterectomy and myomectomy
that Dr. Mendoza performed on her at the
Iloilo Doctors Hospital. After her operation,
Josephine experienced recurring fever,
nausea, and vomiting. Three months after
the operation, she noticed while taking a
bath something protruding from her genital.
She tried calling Dr. Mendoza to report it but
the latter was unavailable.
Josephine
instead went to see another physician, Dr.
Edna Jamandre-Gumban, who extracted a
foul smelling, partially expelled rolled gauze
from her cervix.
The discovery of the gauze and the
illness
she
went
through
prompted
Josephine to file a damage suit against Dr.
Mendoza before the RTC of Iloilo City.
Because Josephine died before trial could
end, her husband and their children
substituted her in the case. She was a
housewife and 40 years old when she died.
On March 7, 2005 the RTC rendered
judgment, finding Dr. Mendoza guilty of
neglect that caused Josephines illness and
eventual death and ordering her to pay
plaintiffs
heirs
actual
damages
of
P50,000.00, moral damages of P200,000.00,
and attorneys fees of P20,000.00 plus costs
of suit.
On motion for reconsideration,
however, the RTC reversed itself and
dismissed the complaint in an order dated
June 23, 2005.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)
rendered a decision on March 18, 2011,
reinstating the RTCs original decision. The
CA held that Dr. Mendoza committed a
breach of her duty as a physician when a
gauze remained in her patients body after
surgery.
The CA denied her motion for
reconsideration on July 18, 2011, prompting
her to file the present petition.
However, Petitioner claims that no
gauze or surgical material was left in
Josephines body after her surgery as
evidenced by the surgical sponge count in
the hospital record.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Dr. Mendoza is liable for the
death of Josephine.
HELD:
YES.
She (Dr. Mendoza) raises at this Courts level
a question of fact when parties may raise
only questions of law before it in petitions
for review on certiorari from the CA. With
few exceptions, the factual findings of the
latter court are generally binding. None of
those exceptions applies to this case.
Josephine did not undergo any other
surgical operation. And it would be much
unlikely for her or for any woman to inject a
roll of gauze into her cervix. As the Court
held in Professional Services, Inc. v. Agana:
An operation requiring the placing of
sponges in the incision is not
complete until the sponges are
properly removed, and it is settled
that the leaving of sponges or other
foreign substances in the wound after
the incision has been closed is at least
prima facie negligence by the
operating surgeon. To put it simply,
such act is considered so inconsistent
with due care as to raise an inference
of negligence. There are even legions
of authorities to the effect that such
act is negligence per se.
The Court notes, however, that
neither the CA nor the RTC awarded
exemplary damages against Dr. Mendoza
when, under Article 2229 of the Civil Code,
exemplary damages are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good, in
addition to moral damages.
Exemplary
damages may also be awarded in cases of
gross negligence.
A surgical operation is the
responsibility
of
the
surgeon
performing it.
He must personally
ascertain
that
the
counts
of
instruments and materials used before
the surgery and prior to sewing the
patient up have been correctly done.
To provide an example to the medical
profession and to stress the need for
constant vigilance in attending to a
patients
health,
the
award
of
exemplary damages in this case is in
order.
Further, in view of Josephines death
resulting from petitioners negligence, civil

indemnity under Article 2206 of the Civil

Code should be given to respondents as
heirs. The amount of P50,000.00 is fixed by
prevailing jurisprudence for this kind.
The Court also deems it just and equitable
under Article 2208 of the Civil Code to
increase the award of attorneys fees from
P20,000.00 to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the Court entirely AFFIRMS the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated
March 18, 2011 with the MODIFICATION
ordering petitioner Mariter Mendoza to pay
respondents Adriano, Jennifer Adriane and
John Andre, all surnamed Casumpang, an
additional
P50,000.00
as
exemplary
damages,
additional
P30,000.00
as
attorneys fees and civil indemnity arising
from death in the amount of P50,000.00.

12.CRESENCIA ACHEVARA, ALFREDO

ACHEVARA, and BENIGNO VALDEZ vs.
ELVIRA RAMOS, JOHN ARNEL RAMOS,
and KHRISTINE CAMILLE RAMOS
G.R. No. 175172 September 29, 2009

FACTS:

In their Complaint, respondents alleged that

Benigno Valdez was driving a passenger
jeep heading north on the national highway
in a reckless, careless, and negligent
manner. He tried to overtake a motorcycle,
causing the passenger jeep to encroach on
the opposite lane and bump the oncoming
vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. The
injuries sustained by Arnulfo Ramos caused
his death, notwithstanding prompt medical
assistance.
Respondents
alleged
that
Crescencia Achevara failed to exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of
Benigno Valdez as driver of the passenger
jeep. Respondents sought to recover actual
damages for medical expenses and funeral
expenses, as well as moral and exemplary
damages, lost earnings, attorney's fees and
litigation expenses. Alfredo Achevara was
impleaded as the husband of the operator
and as the administrator of the conjugal
partnership properties of the Spouses
Achevara.

In
their
Answer,
petitioners
denied
respondents allegation that Benigno Valdez
overtook a motorcycle and bumped the
vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. They
alleged that Benigno Valdez was driving
southward at a moderate speed when he
saw an owner-type jeep coming from the
south and heading north, running in a zigzag
manner, and encroaching on the west lane
of the road. To avoid a collision, Valdez
drove the passenger jeep towards the
shoulder of the road, west of his lane, but
the owner-type jeep continued to move
toward the western lane and bumped the
left side of the passenger jeep. Petitioners
alleged that it was Arnulfo Ramos who was
careless and negligent in driving a motor
vehicle, which he very well knew had a
mechanical defect. Hence, respondents had
no cause of action against petitioners.

RTCs Decision: The doctrine of last clear

chance was applicable to this case; that the
driver of the passenger jeep, Benigno
Valdez, having seen the risk exhibited by the
wiggling of the front wheels of the ownertype jeep, causing it to run in a zigzag
manner, should have parked his vehicle on
the right shoulder of the road so that the
mishap could have been prevented. Since
he ignored to take this reasonable
precaution, the omission and/or breach of
this duty on his part was the constitutive
legal cause of the mishap. The doctrine of
last clear chance, as applied to this case,
implied a contributory negligence on the
part of the late Arnulfo Ramos, who knew of
the mechanical defect of his vehicle.
Further, the trial court held that the
evidence of the Spouses Achevara failed to
show that they exercised due diligence in
the selection and supervision of Benigno
Valdez as driver of their passenger jeep.

CAs Decision: Affirmed with modification

the Decision of the trial court. Defendantsappellants are ordered to pay, jointly and
severally,
the
plaintiffs-appellees
as
indemnity for the death of Arnulfo Ramos;
the moral damages and attorney's fees
awarded by the trial court are REDUCED,
while the awards made by the trial court for
exemplary damages and "for actual and
other costs of litigation" are DELETED.

ISSUE:

WON petitioners are liable to respondents

for damages incurred as a result of the
vehicular accident.

HELD:

NO.
Foreseeability is the fundamental test of
negligence. To be negligent, a defendant
must have acted or failed to act in such a
way that an ordinary reasonable man would
have realized that certain interests of
certain
persons
were
unreasonably
subjected to a general but definite class of
risks.
The acts of negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and
Benigno Valdez were contemporaneous
when Ramos continued to drive a wiggling
vehicle on the highway despite knowledge
of its mechanical defect, while Valdez did
not immediately veer to the rightmost side
of the road upon seeing the wiggling vehicle
of Ramos perhaps because it still kept to
its lane and Valdez did not know the extent
of its mechanical defect. However, when the
owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of
the passenger jeep, Valdez realized the peril
at hand and steered the passenger jeep
toward the western shoulder of the road to
avoid a collision. It was at this point that it
was perceivable that Ramos must have lost
control of his vehicle, and that it was Valdez
who had the last opportunity to avoid the
collision by swerving the passenger jeep
towards the right shoulder of the road.

The doctrine of last clear chance applies to a

situation where the plaintiff was guilty of
prior or antecedent negligence, but the
defendant who had the last fair chance to
avoid the impending harm and failed to do
so is made liable for all the consequences
of the accident, notwithstanding the prior
negligence of the plaintiff. However, the
doctrine does not apply where the party
charged is required to act instantaneously,
and the injury cannot be avoided by the

application of all means at hand after the

peril is or should have been discovered.

The doctrine of last clear chance does not

apply to this case, because even if it can be
said that it was Benigno Valdez who had the
last chance to avoid the mishap when the
owner-type jeep encroached on the western
lane of the passenger jeep, Valdez no longer
had the opportunity to avoid the collision.
The Answer of petitioners stated that when
the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane
of the passenger jeep, Benigno Valdez
maneuvered his vehicle towards the western
shoulder of the road to avoid a collision, but
the owner-type jeep driven by Ramos
continued to move to the western lane and
bumped the left side of the passenger jeep.
Thus, petitioners assert in their Petition that
considering that the time the owner-type
jeep encroached on the lane of Valdez to the
time of impact was only a matter of
seconds, he no longer had the opportunity
to avoid the collision. Although the records
are bereft of evidence showing the exact
distance between the two vehicles when the
owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of
the passenger jeep, it must have been near
enough, because the passenger jeep driven
by Valdez was unable to avoid the collision.
Hence, the doctrine of last clear chance
does not apply to this case.

Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides:

When the plaintiffs own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if
his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendants lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but
the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded.
In this case, both Arnulfo Ramos and
Benigno Valdez failed to exercise reasonable
care and caution that an ordinarily prudent
man would have taken to prevent the
vehicular
accident.
Since
the
gross
negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and the
inexcusable negligence of Benigno Valdez
were the proximate cause of the vehicular
accident,
respondents
cannot
recover
damages pursuant to Article 2179 of the
Civil Code.

breathing and was rushed to the intensive

care unit. Further tests confirmed that she
was suffering from Diabetes Mellitus Type
II. Insulin was administered on the patient,
but the medication might have arrived too
late. Due to complications induced by
diabetes, Teresita died.
Respondents instituted an action for
damages against Dr. Fredelicto Flores and
Dr. Felicisima Flores (collectively referred to
as the petitioner spouses) before the RTC of
Nueva Ecija.
13.FLORES VS. PINEDA, G.R. NO.
158996, NOVEMBER 14, 2008
FACTS:
Teresita Pineda (Teresita) was a 51-year
old unmarried woman living in Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija. She consulted Dr.
Fredelicto Flores regarding her general body
weakness, loss of appetite, frequent
urination and thirst, and on-and-off vaginal
bleeding. Dr. Flores advised her to return the
following week or to go to the United
Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) in Quezon
City for a general check-up. As for her other
symptoms, he suspected that Teresita might
be suffering from diabetes and told her to
continue her medications.
Teresita did not return the next week as
advised. However, when her condition
persisted, she went to further consult Dr.
Flores at his UDMC clinic. When Dr. Flores
arrived, he did a routine check-up and
ordered
Teresitas
admission
to
the
hospital. In the admission slip, he directed
the hospital staff to prepare the patient for
an
on
call D&C operation
(conducted
principally to diagnose the cause of the
vaginal bleeding) to be performed by his
wife, Dr. Felicisima Flores (Dr. Felicisima).
The D&C operation lasted for about 10 to 15
minutes.
A day after the operation, Teresita was
subjected to an ultrasound examination as a
confirmatory procedure. The results showed
that she had an enlarged uterus and myoma
uteri. Dr. Felicisima, however, advised
Teresita that she could spend her recovery
period at home. Still feeling weak, Teresita
opted for hospital confinement.
Teresitas complete laboratory examination
results came only on that day. Teresitas
urinalysis showed a three plus sign (+++)
indicating that the sugar in her urine was
very high. She was then placed under the
care of Dr. Amado Jorge, an internist.
A day after,
worsened. She

Teresitas condition had

experienced difficulty in

The RTC ruled in favor of Teresitas family

and awarded actual, moral, and exemplary
damages, plus attorneys fees and costs. The
CA affirmed the judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether herein petitioners exercised due
care and prudence in the performance of
their duties as medical professionals and
thus, should not be held liable for damages.
RULING:
No.
Medical negligence case is a type of
claim to redress a wrong committed by a
medical professional, that has caused bodily
harm to or the death of a patient. There are
four elements involved in a medical
negligence case, namely: duty, breach,
injury, and proximate causation.
Duty refers to the standard of behavior
which
imposes
restrictions
on
ones
conduct. The standard in turn refers to the
amount of competence associated with the
proper discharge of the profession. A
physician is expected to use at least the
same level of care that any other reasonably
competent doctor would use under the
same circumstances. Breach of duty occurs
when the physician fails to comply with
these professional standards. If injury results
to the patient as a result of this breach, the
physician is answerable for negligence.
We find that reasonable prudence would
have
shown that diabetes and its
complications were foreseeable harm that
should have been taken into consideration
by the petitioner spouses. If a patient
suffers from some disability that
increases the magnitude of risk to him,
that disability must be taken into
account so long as it is or should have
been known to the physician. And when
the patient is exposed to an increased risk,
it is incumbent upon the physician to take
commensurate and adequate precautions.
Because the D&C was merely an elective
procedure,
the
patients
uncontrolled

hyperglycemia presented a far greater risk

than her on-and-off vaginal bleeding. The
presence of hyperglycemia in a surgical
patient is associated with poor clinical
outcomes, and aggressive glycemic control
positively impacts on morbidity and
mortality. Elective surgery in people with
uncontrolled diabetes should preferably be
scheduled after acceptable
glycemic
control has been achieved. According to Dr.
Mercado, this is done by administering
insulin on the patient. In this case, there was
no evidence that insulin was administered
on Teresita prior to or during the D&C
operation. Insulin was only administered two
days after the operation. The above facts,
point only to one conclusion that the
petitioner spouses failed, as medical
professionals, to comply with their duty to
observe the standard of care to be given to
hyperglycemic/diabetic patients undergoing
surgery.
Injury and Causation
The decision to proceed with the D&C
operation
notwithstanding
Teresitas
hyperglycemia and without adequately
preparing her for the procedure, was
contrary to the standards observed by the
medical profession. Deviation from this
standard amounted to a breach of duty
which resulted in the patients death. Due to
this negligent conduct, liability must attach
to the petitioner spouses.
We similarly affirm the grant of exemplary
damages. Exemplary damages are imposed
by way of example or correction for the
public good. Because of the petitioner
spouses negligence in subjecting Teresita to
an operation without first recognizing and
addressing her diabetic condition, the
appellate
court
awarded exemplary
damages to the respondents in the amount
of P100,000.00. Public policy requires such
imposition to suppress the wanton acts of an
offender.
14.Bank of America vs. Philippine
Racing Club
G.R. 150228 July 30, 2009
Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J:
Facts:
Plaintiff PRCI is a domestic corporation
which maintains a current account with
petitioner Bank of America. Its authorized
signatories are the company President and
Vice-President. By virtue of a travel abroad
for these officers, they pre-signed checks to
accommodate any expenses that may come
up while they were abroad for a business
trip. The said pre-signed checks were left for

safekeeping by PRCs accounting officer.

Unfortunately, the two (2) of said checks
came into the hands of one of its employees
who managed to encash it with petitioner
bank. The said check was filled in with the
use of a check-writer, wherein in the blank
for the 'Payee', the amount in words was
written, with the word 'Cash' written above
it.
Clearly there was an irregularity with the
filling up of the blank checks as both
showed similar infirmities and irregularities
and yet, the petitioner bank did not try to
verify with the corporation and proceeded to
encash the checks.
PRC filed an action for damages against the
bank. The lower court awarded actual and
exemplary damages. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the lower court's decision and held
that the bank was negligent. Hence this
appeal. Petitioner contends that it was
merely doing its obligation under the law
and contract in encashing the checks, since
the signatures in the checks are genuine.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can be held
liable for negligence and thus should pay
damages to PRC
Held:
Both parties are held to be at fault but the
bank has the last clear chance to prevent
the fraudulent encashment hence it is the
one foremost liable.
There was no dispute that the signatures in
the checks are genuine but the presence of
irregularities on the face of the check should
have alerted the bank to exercise caution
before encashing them. It is well-settled that
banks are in the business impressed with
public interest that they are duty bound to
protect their clients and their deposits at all
times. They must treat the accounts of
these clients with meticulousness and a
highest degree of care considering the
fiduciary nature of their relationship. The
diligence required of banks are more than
that of a good father of a family.
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot evade
responsibility for the loss by attributing
negligence on the part of respondent
because, even if we concur that the latter
was indeed negligent in pre-signing blank
checks, the former had the last clear chance
to avoid the loss. To reiterate, petitioners
own operations manager admitted that they
could have called up the client for
verification or confirmation before honoring
the dubious checks. Verily, petitioner had

the final opportunity to avert the injury that

befell the respondent. Failing to make the
necessary verification due to the volume of
banking transactions on that particular day
is a flimsy and unacceptable excuse,
considering that the banking business is so
impressed with public interest where the
trust and confidence of the public in general
is of paramount importance such that the
appropriate standard of diligence must be a
high degree of diligence, if not the utmost
diligence. Petitioners negligence has been
undoubtedly established and, thus, pursuant
to Art. 1170 of the NCC,it must suffer the
consequence of said negligence.
In the interest of fairness, however, we
believe it is proper to consider respondents
own negligence to mitigate petitioners
liability. Article 2179 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art.
2179. When
the
plaintiffs
own
negligence
was
the
immediate
and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages. But if his negligence was
only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the
defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff
may recover damages, but the courts shall
mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Explaining this provision in Lambert v. Heirs
of Ray Castillon,[25] the Court held:
The underlying precept on contributory
negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly
responsible for his own injury should not be
entitled to recover damages in full but must
bear the consequences of his own
negligence. The defendant must thus be
held liable only for the damages actually
caused by his negligence. xxx xxx xxx
The PRC officers' practice of pre-signing
checks is a seriously negligent and highly
risky behavior which makes them also
contributor to the loss. It's own negligence
must therefore mitigate the petitioner's
liability. Moreover, the person who stole the
checks is also an employee of the plaintiff, a
cleck in its accounting department at that.
As the employer, PRC supposedly should
have control and supervision over its own
employees.
The court held that the petitioner is liable for
60% of the total amount of damages while
PRC should shoulder 40% of the said
amount.
15.CORINTHIAN GARDENS
ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
versus SPOUSES REYNALDO and
MARIA LUISA TANJANGCO, and
SPOUSES FRANK and TERESITA

CUASO, Respondents, G.R. No.

160795 | 2008-06-27
FACTS:
Respondents-spouses Reynaldo and Maria
Luisa Tanjangco (the Tanjangcos) own Lots
68 and 69, located at Corinthian Gardens
Subdivision, Quezon City, which is managed
by
petitioner
Corinthian
Gardens
Association, Inc. (Corinthian). On the other
hand,
respondents-spouses Frank and
Teresita Cuaso (the Cuasos) own Lot 65
which is adjacent to the Tanjangcos' lots.
Before the Cuasos constructed their house
on Lot 65, a relocation survey was
necessary. Corinthian referred Engr. De Dios
to the Cuaso as Geodetic Engineer who
conducted all the previous surveys for the
subdivision's developer. Before, during and
after the construction of the said house,
Corinthian
conducted
periodic
ocular
inspections
in
order
to
determine
compliance with the approved plans
pursuant to the Manual of Rules and
Regulations of Corinthian. Unfortunately,
after the Cuasos constructed their house
employing the services of C.B. Paraz &
Construction Co., Inc. as builder, their
perimeter
fence
encroached
on
the
Tanjangcos' Lot 69 by 87 square meters.
No amicable settlement was reached
between the parties. Thus, the Tanjangcos
demanded that the Cuasos demolish the
perimeter fence but the latter failed and
refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to file
with the RTC a suit against the Cuasos for
Recovery of Possession with Damages.
Eventually, the Cuasos filed a Third-Party
Complaint against Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and
Engr. De Dios. The Cuasos ascribed
negligence to C.B. Paraz for its failure to
ascertain the proper specifications of their
house, and to Engr. De Dios for his failure to
undertake an accurate relocation survey,
thereby, exposing them to litigation. The
Cuasos also faulted Corinthian for approving
their relocation survey and building plans
without verifying their accuracy and in
making representations as to Engr. De Dios'
integrity and competence. The Cuasos
alleged that had Corinthian exercised
diligence in performing its duty, they would
not have been involved in a boundary
dispute with the Tanjangcos. Thus, the
Cuasos opined that Corinthian should also
be held answerable for any damages that
they might incur as a result of such
construction.
DECISION: the RTC rendered a Decision in
favor of the Tanjangcos. It ruled that the
Cuasos' perimeter wall encroached on the

land of the Tanjangos by 87 square meters.

It, however, ruled that the Cuasos were
builders in good faith, and gave the
Tanjangcos the option to sell and the Cuasos
the option to buy the encroaching portion of
the land, at a price to be agreed upon by the
parties. In the event that the Cuasos were
unable and unwilling to purchase the said
portion, the perimeter wall should be
demolished at the latter's expense. The RTC
also ordered the Cuasos to pay monthly
rentals of P2,000.00 commencing from the
time of the filing of the complaint. The RTC
likewise held that C.B. Paraz was grossly
negligent in not taking into account the
correct boundaries of Cuasos' lot when it
constructed the house. It, thus, ordered C.B.
Paraz to pay moral and exemplary damages
as well as attorney's fees to the Tanjangcos
and the Cuasos. The third-party complaint
against Corinthian and Engr. De Dios, on the
other hand, was dismissed for lack of cause
of action.
CA RULING: CA reversed and set aside the
RTC Decision. It held that the Cuasos acted
in bad faith in land-grabbing the 87 square
meter-portion of Lot 69 as of April 5, 1989.
Correlatively, the CA allowed the Tanjangcos
to exercise the rights granted under Articles
449, 450, 451 and 549 of the New Civil
Code, which include the right to demand the
demolition of the offending perimeter wall
after reimbursing the Cuasos the necessary
expenses for the preservation of the
encroached area. The Cuasos were ordered
to pay monthly rentals of P10,000.00 for the
use, enjoyment and occupancy of the lot up
to the time they vacate the property
considering the location and category of the
same. They were, likewise, ordered to pay
the Tanjangcos moral, exemplary damages,
and attorney's fees. The CA also imposed six
percent (6%) interest per annum on all the
awards.

and impleading the Cuasos as one of the

respondents being the third-party plaintiffs
in the RTC.
The Tanjangcos moved for partial entry of
judgment of the CA Decision which was
granted by the CA. The Tanjangcos then
moved for the execution of the judgment
against
the
Cuasos,
specifically
the
demolition of the perimeter fence. The
Cuasos prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
preliminary injunction before this Court to
enjoin the demolition of the perimeter fence.
The Tanjangcos opposed the Cuasos'
application for TRO.
ISSUE:
Whether Corinthian was negligent under the
circumstances and, if so, whether such
negligence contributed to the injury suffered
by the Tanjangcos.
HELD:
Yes.
A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may
be merely carelessly done from a lack of
ordinary prudence and may be one which
creates
a
situation
involving
an
unreasonable risk to another because of the
expectable action of the other, a third
person, an animal, or a force of nature. A
negligent act is one from which an ordinary
prudent person in the actor's position, in the
same or similar circumstances, would
foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to
others as to cause him not to do the act or
to do it in a more careful manner.

The Cuasos' appeal against the Tanjangcos,

on the other hand, was dismissed for lack of
merit. On the third-party complaints,
Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios
were all found negligent in performing their
respective duties and so they were ordered
to contribute five percent (5%) each, or a
total of fifteen percent (15%) to all judgment
sums and amounts that the Cuasos shall
eventually pay under the decision, also with
interest of six percent (6%) per annum.

The test to determine the existence of

negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in
committing the alleged negligent act use
that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinary person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the
standard supplied by the imaginary conduct
of the discreet paterfamilias in Roman law.
The existence of negligence in a given case
is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the
situation before him. The law considers what
would
be
reckless,
blameworthy,
or
negligent in a man of ordinary intelligence
and prudence, and determines liability
according to that standard.

Only
Corinthian
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration.
No
motion
for
reconsideration was filed by the Cuasos,
C.B. Paraz and/or Engr. De Dios. The CA
denied
Corinthian's
Motion
for
Reconsideration. Hence, Corinthian filed the
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
assailing the CA Decision and Resolution,

By this test, we find Corinthian

negligent.
While the issue of Corinthian's alleged
negligence is factual in character, a review
by this Court is proper because the CA's
factual findings differ from those of the
RTC's.[39] Thus, after a meticulous review of
the evidence on record, we hold that the CA

committed no reversible error when it

deviated from the findings of fact of the RTC.
The CA's findings and conclusions are
substantiated by the evidence on record and
are more in accord with law and reason.
Indeed, it is clear that Corinthian failed to
exercise the requisite diligence in insuring
that the Cuasos abide by its Manual of Rules
and Regulations, thereby resulting in the
encroachment on the Tanjangcos' property.
It goes without saying that this Manual of
Rules and Regulations applies to all - or it
does not apply at all.
To borrow a popular expression, what is
sauce for the gander is sauce for the goose or ought to be. To put it matter-of-factly and
bluntly, thus, its so-called "table inspection"
approval of the Cuasos' building plans is no
less of an approval, as approvals come and
go. And since it is an approval tainted with
negligence, the necessary and inevitable
consequences which law and justice attach
to such negligence must, as a matter of law
and justice, also necessarily attach to
Corinthian.
In sum, Corinthian's failure to prevent the
encroachment of the Cuasos' perimeter wall
into Tanjangcos' property - despite the
inspection
conducted
constitutes
negligence and, at the very least,
contributed to the injury suffered by the
Tanjangcos.

16.LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY &

RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners, vs.
MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late
NICANOR NAVIDAD &
PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY, respondents.
G.R. No. 145804
February 6, 2003

FACTS:
Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the
EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token
(representing payment of the fare). While
Navidad was standing on the platform near the
LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard
assigned to the area approached Navidad. A
misunderstanding or an altercation between the
two apparently ensued that led to a fist
fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to
indicate how the fight started or who, between
the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad
later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact
moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train,
operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was
coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving
train, and he was killed instantaneously.

The widow of Nicanor, herein respondent

Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed
a complaint for damages against Junelito
Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro
Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and
Prudent Security Agency (Prudent) for the death
of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a
counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim
against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its
answer, denied liability and averred that it had
exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its security guards.
The LRTA and Roman presented their
evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of
presenting
evidence,
filed
a
demurrer
contending that Navidad had failed to prove
that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task.
RTC ruling:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants Prudent Security and Junelito
Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiffs the following:
a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;
2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;
3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor
Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00;
b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;
c) Attorneys fees of P20,000;
d) Costs of suit.
The complaint against defendants LRTA and
Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack of merit.
The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and
Roman are likewise dismissed.[1]

CA ruling:
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is
hereby MODIFIED, by exonerating the
appellants (Prudent and Escartin) from any
liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad,
Jr. Instead, appellees Rodolfo Roman and the
Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) are held
liable for his death and are hereby
directed to pay jointly and severally to the
plaintiffs-appellees, the following amounts:
a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;
b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;
c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the
deceased; and
e) P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.
Hence the petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Prudent and Escartin are
liable for the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr.

(2) Whether or not Rodolfo Roman is liable for

the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr.
(3) Whether or not nominal damages can coexist with compensatory damages.
RULING:
(1) NO.
The premise for the employers liability is
negligence or fault on the part of the
employee. Once such fault is established, the
employer can then be made liable on the basis
of the presumption juris tantum (rebuttable
presumption) that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families (diligence
of a good father of a family) in the selection and
supervision of its employees. The liability is
primary and can only be negated by showing
due diligence in the selection and supervision of
the employee, a factual matter that has not
been shown. Absent such a showing, the
liability of a common carrier and an
independent contractor would be solidary. A
contractual obligation can be breached by
tort and when the same act or omission
causes the injury, one resulting in culpa
contractual and
the
other
in culpa
aquiliana, Article 2194[ of the Civil Code
can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort
may arise even under a contract, where
tort
is
that
which
breaches
the
contract. Stated differently, when an act
which constitutes a breach of contract
would have itself constituted the source of
a quasi-delictual liability had no contract
existed between the parties, the contract
can be said to have been breached by tort,
thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the
surviving spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor
Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual
finding of the Court of Appeals that there is
nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor
(Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of
its employee, Escartin, has not been duly
proven x x x.
(2) NO.
There being, similarly, no showing that
petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of
any culpable act or omission, he must also be
absolved from liability. Needless to say, the
contractual tie between the LRTA and Navidad is
not itself a juridical relation between the latter
and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable
only for his own fault or negligence.
(2) NO.
The award of nominal damages in addition to
actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages

are adjudicated in order that a right of the

plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by
the
defendant,
may
be
vindicated
or
recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered
by him.[It is an established rule that nominal
damages cannot co-exist with compensatory
damages.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the
appellate court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
but only in that (a) the award of nominal
damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo
Roman is absolved from liability. No costs.

17.Oscar del Carmen, Jr. vs. Geronimo

Bacoy, guardian and representing
the children, namely: Mary Marjorie
B. Monsalud, Eric B. Monsalud,
Metzie Ann B. Monsalud, Kareen B.
Monsalud, Leonardo B. Monsalud,
Jr., and Cristina B. Monsalud, G.R.
No. 173870, April 15, 2012
(Mentions and discusses: [1] The doctrine of res
ipsa loquitor, [2] the doctrine that the
registered owner of a vehicle is primarily liable
for injuries caused to third persons while it is
being driven along the highways and streets,
and [3] meritorious defenses against the latter
doctrine)
Facts:
At dawn on New Years day of 1993,
spouses Emilia Bacoy Monsalud and Leonardo
Monsalud, Sr., with their daughter Glenda
Monsalud, were on their way home from a
Christmas party when they were run over by a
Fuso passenger jeep driven by Allan Maglasang. The
jeep was registered in the name of Oscar del Carmen,
Jr. and used as a public utility vehicle. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) declared the driver Allan Maglasang
as guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Reckless
Imprudence resulting in Multiple Homicide.
During the pendency of the criminal case,
Emilias father Geronimo Bacoy filed an independent
civil action for damages based on culpa aquiliana in
behalf of the minor children of the Monsaluds. As the
defendant therein, Oscar, Jr. countered that he
employed Allan Maglasang not as a driver but as the
conductor, and that it was Allans brother Rodrigo
whom he employed as the jeep driver. Oscar, Jr.s
main defense in the civil action is that on the night of
the accident, Allan and five of his friends stole the
jeep while it was parked at the house of Rodrigo, and
allegedly took it for a joyride. Oscar, Jr. even filed a
criminal case for carnapping against the five, but the
case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Oscar, Jr. and his mechanic testified that the jeep can
easily be started without the ignition key, if at least
five persons pushed it. The jeeps engine can then
run, but without headlights on. Since the ignition key

was always with Rodrigo as the driver, then Oscar, Jr.

implied that Allan and five of his friends stole the jeep
by pushing it. To support this theory, he presented the
testimony of two of Allans friends, who stated that
while they were with Allan during the joyride, the
jeeps headlights were turned off. Lastly, Oscar, Jr.
argued that Allan Maglasang was no longer employed
as his conductor at the time of the accident. Hence,
the vicarious liability of an employer for the
negligence of his employee under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code will not apply to him.
The RTC adjudged Allan Maglasang as
primarily liable to pay damages, and Oscar, Jr. as
subsidiarily liable. The RTC anchored its ruling on the
principle of res ipsa loquitur, i.e., that a presumption
of negligence on the part of a defendant may be
inferred if the thing that caused an injury is shown to
be under his management and that in the ordinary
course of things, the accident would not have
happened had there been an exercise of care. Oscar,
Jr., as the registered owner of the jeep, managed and
controlled the same through his driver Rodrigo, in
whose house the jeep was usually parked. Since both
Oscar, Jr. and Rodrigo were well aware that the jeep
could easily be started by a mere push even without
the ignition key, they should have taken the
necessary precaution to prevent the vehicle from
being used by unauthorized persons like Allan. The
RTC concluded that such lack of proper precaution,
due care and foresight constituted negligence.
Oscar, Jr. filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
contending that the provision on subsidiary liability of
the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
required the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, and that the employee was acting within
the scope of his employment when the tort occurred.
He stressed that even assuming that Allan was his
employee, he was hired not as a driver but as a
conductor. So, Allan acted beyond the scope of his
employment when he drove the jeep. Oscar, Jr. also
stressed that the fact that the jeep was running
without its headlights on at the time of the accident
indubitably shows that the same was stolen. The RTC
was convinced by Oscar, Jr.s MR, set aside its earlier
ruling, and absolved Oscar, Jr. from civil liability. It
cited Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides that in order for an employer to be
subsidiarily liable for the criminal acts of his
employee, the latter should have committed the
same in the discharge of his duties. The court agreed
with Oscar, Jr. that this condition was wanting in
Allans case, as he was not acting in the discharge of
his duties as a conductor when he drove the jeep. The
court also declared the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
inapplicable since the property owner cannot be
made responsible for the damages caused by his
property by reason of the criminal acts of another. It
then adjudged that only Allan should bear the
consequences of his criminal acts.
Geronimo appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA). The CA set aside the ruling of the RTC, and
declared Oscar, Jr. and Allan Maglasang as solidarily
liable for damages. The CA anchored its ruling on the
principle that the registered owner of a vehicle is
directly and primarily responsible for the injuries or
death of third parties caused by the operation of such

vehicle. It disbelieved Oscar, Jr.s defense that the

jeep was stolen: not only because the carnapping
case filed against Allan and his companions was
dismissed, but also because Oscar, Jr. is deemed to
have given Allan the implied permission to use the
subject vehicle. To support its conclusion, the CA cited
the following circumstances: siblings Rodrigo and
Allan were both employees assigned to the said jeep;
after a days work, said vehicle would be parked just
beside Rodrigos house where Allan also lived; the
jeep could easily be started even without the use of
an ignition key; and the said parking area was not
fenced or secured to prevent the unauthorized use of
the vehicle. Hence, the present petition.
Issues:
I.
Is Oscar, Jr. presumed negligent under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor?
II.
Is Oscar, Jr. liable as the registered owner of the
jeepney?
Ruling:
Through the pen of Associate Justice Del
Castillo, the Supreme Court decides the case as
follows.
I.
Yes, Oscar, Jr. is presumed negligent
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor. The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor provides that a
presumption of negligence on the part of a defendant
may be inferred if the thing that caused an injury is
shown to be under his management and that in the
ordinary course of things, the accident would not
have happened had there been an exercise of care.
The Court reminds that this doctrine is merely
evidentiary: a mode of proof, or a mere procedural
convenience. It relieves the plaintiff of the burden of
producing a specific proof of negligence. All that the
plaintiff needs to do is to present proof of the accident
coupled with enough attending circumstances in
order to create an inference or presumption of
negligence, and thereby place on the defendant the
burden of proving that there was no negligence on his
part. The doctrine is based partly on the theory that
the defendant in charge of the instrumentality that
caused the injury either knows the cause of the
accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it,
while the plaintiff has no such knowledge and is
therefore compelled to allege negligence in general
terms.
The requisites of res ipsa loquitor as
established by jurisprudence are as follows:
1. The accident is of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
2. The cause of the injury [i.e. a vehicle] was
under the exclusive control of the person in
charge; and

3. The injury suffered must not have been due

to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the person injured.
In the case at bench, all of the above requisites
are present. First, no person just walking along the
road would suddenly be sideswiped and run over by
an on-rushing vehicle, unless the one in charge of the
said vehicle had been negligent (first requisite met).
Second, the jeep that caused the injury was under
the exclusive control of Oscar, Jr. as its owner. When
Oscar, Jr. entrusted the ignition key to Rodrigo, he had
the power to instruct him with regard to the specific
restrictions of the jeeps use, including who or who
may not drive it. Since he knows that the jeep may
run without the ignition key, he also has the
responsibility to park it safely and securely, and to
instruct his driver Rodrigo to observe the same
precaution (second requisite met). Lastly, there was
no showing that the death of the victims was due to
any voluntary action or contribution on their part
(third and final requisite met). There now arises a
presumption of negligence against Oscar, Jr., which
he could have overcome by evidence that he
exercised due care and diligence in preventing
strangers from using his jeep. Unfortunately, he failed
to do so. The Supreme Court gave credence to the
conclusion of the CA that Oscar, Jr. gave his implied
permission for Allan to use the jeep. This is because
Oscar, Jr. failed to show that he made sure the
parking area was well secured. And also, Oscar, Jr. did
not give Rodrigo any specific restrictions as to who
may or may not use the jeep. Therefore, Rodrigo was
deemed given the absolute discretion as to the
vehicles operation, including the discretion to allow
his brother Allan to use it.

II.
Yes, Oscar, Jr. is liable as the registered owner
of the jeep. He contends that the vicarious liability of
employers for the negligent acts of their employees
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not apply to
him, since Allan drove the jeep outside of the scope of
his assigned task as the conductor, and that Allan
drove the jeep in his private capacity. According to the
Supreme Court, this contention was already rejected
in Aguilar, Sr. vs. Commercial Savings Bank (412 Phil.
834 [2001]). It was in that case that the Supreme
Court enunciated this doctrine: the registered owner
of any vehicle, even if not used for public service,
would primarily be responsible to the public or to third
persons for injuries caused to the latter while the
vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to
identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or
any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the
public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed
on a definite individual: the registered owner. There
have been many instances when the owners of
vehicles running on public highways and causing
accidents cannot be identified. It is to forestall these
circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the
public, that the motor vehicle registration was
primarily ordained: in the interest of the

determination of persons responsible for damages or

injuries caused on public highways.
The Court presented two defenses to this
doctrine: (1) an unauthorized use of the registered
vehicle, or (2) the vehicle was stolen. However, as
already discussed, Oscar, Jr. impliedly gave Allan
permission to use the jeep (first defense not met).
Second, the Supreme Court appreciated the
findings of the CA that Allan and five of his
friends could not have stolen the jeep. For
instance, the carnapping case was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence. And most important,
even the preponderance of evidence was
lacking and failed to support Oscar, Jr.s story
that the jeep was stolen. According to the
testimonies, only two persons were joyriding
with Allan Maglasang when the accident
happened. Since it took at least five persons to
push the jeep without the ignition key, then
Oscar, Jr.s story is disproved. Also, assuming
arguendo that Allan had stolen the jeep, then
the ignition key should still be with Rodrigo. But
based on the testimonies, the ignition key was
not with Rodrigo, and was instead turned over
to the police later on for reasons unexplained.
Lastly, the fact that the headlights were off cannot
be exclusively attributed to the lack of the ignition key
in starting the jeep, as there may be other
possibilities: electrical problems, broken headlights, or
that they were simply turned off. Thus, the Court did
not subscribe to Oscar, Jr.s story that the jeep was
stolen. His story presented more questions than
answers (second defense not met).
All told, the Supreme Court affirmed the CAs
decision in making Oscar, Jr. and Allan Maglasang
solidarily liable for damages to the minor heirs of the
Monsaluds: with the additional imposition of 6%
interest per annum on the amount of the damages
awarded computed from the time the RTC rendered
its decision, and 12% per annum on the amount
thereof computed from the time of the finality of this
Supreme Court decision until the payment thereof.

18.Bontilao vs. Gerona, G.R. No. 176675,

September 25, 2010
FACTS:
On December 28, 1991, respondent Dr.
Carlos Gerona, an orthopedic surgeon, treated
petitioners' son, 8 year-old Allen Key Bontilao
(Allen), for a fractured right wrist. Respondent
administered a "U-splint" and immobilized
Allen's wrist with a cast, then sent Allen home.
On June 4, 1992, Allen re-fractured the same
wrist and was brought back to the hospital.
Respondent performed a closed reduction
procedure, with Dr. Vicente Jabagat (Dr. Jabagat)
as the anesthesiologist. He allowed Allen to go
home after the post reduction x-ray showed
that the bones were properly aligned, but
advised Allen's mother, petitioner Sherlina

Bontilao (Sherlina), to bring Allen back for retightening of the cast not later than June 15,
1992.
Allen, however, was brought back to the
hospital only on June 22, 1992. By then,
because the cast had not been re-tightened, a
rotational deformity had developed in Allen's
arm so it was agreed that an open reduction
surgery will be conducted on June 24, 1992 by
respondent, again with Dr. Jabagat as the
anesthesiologist.
On the said date, Dr. Jabagat failed to
intubate the patient so anesthesia was
administered through a gas mask. Respondent
asked Dr. Jabagat if the operation should be
postponed given the failure to intubate, but Dr.
Jabagat said that it was alright to proceed.
Respondent verified that Allen was breathing
properly before proceeding with the surgery.
Later, Sherlina was informed that her son had
died on the operating table. The cause of death
was "asphyxia due to congestion and edema of
the epiglottis."
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages
against both respondent and Dr. Jabagat in the
RTC of Cebu City alleging negligence and
incompetence on the part of the doctors.
RTC: decided in favor of the petitioners; it held
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was
applicable in establishing respondent's liability;
asphyxia or cardiac arrest does not normally
occur in an operation on a fractured bone in the
absence of negligence in the administration of
anesthesia and the use of an endotracheal
tube; held that respondent and Dr. Jabagat were
solidarily liable for they failed to prove that they
were not negligent.
CA: held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
does not apply; the trial court erred in applying
the "captain of the ship" doctrine to make
respondent liable even though he was the lead
surgeon; DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT IN SO FAR
AS THE SURGEON, Dr. Carlos Gerona is
concerned after concluding that he is not
solidarily liable with his co-defendant, Dr.
Vicente Jabagat, the anesthesiologist, in the
absence of any negligent act on his part.
Petitioners contend that respondent, being the
lead surgeon, should be held liable for the
negligence of the physicians and nurses
working with him during the operation.
ISSUE:
WON respondent is liable for damages for
Allen's death.
RULING:
No. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot
apply to pin liability on respondent for Allen's
death. Res ipsa loquitur is a rebuttable

presumption or inference that the defendant

was negligent. Under this doctrine, the
happening of an injury permits an inference of
negligence where the plaintiff produces
substantial evidence that the injury was caused
by an agency or instrumentality under the
exclusive control and management of the
defendant, and that the injury was such that in
the ordinary course of things would not happen
if reasonable care had been used.
As held in Ramos v. Court of Appeals, the real
question is whether or not in the process of the
operation, any extraordinary incident or unusual
event outside of the routine performance
occurred which is beyond the regular scope of
professional activity in such operations, and
which, if unexplained, would themselves
reasonably speak to the average man as the
negligent cause or causes of the untoward
consequence.
Here, the SC finds that the CA correctly found
that petitioners failed to present substantial
evidence of any specific act of negligence on
respondent's part or of the surrounding facts
and circumstances which would lead to the
reasonable inference that the untoward
consequence was caused by respondent's
negligence. In fact, under the established facts,
respondent appears to have observed the
proper amount of care required under the
circumstances. Having seen that Dr. Jabagat
failed in the intubation, respondent inquired
from the latter, who was the expert on the
matter of administering anesthesia, whether the
surgery should be postponed considering the
failure to intubate.
That respondent decided to continue with the
surgery even though there was a failure to
intubate also does not tend to establish liability,
contrary to the trial court's ruling. Petitioners
failed to present substantial proof that
intubation was an indispensable prerequisite for
the operation and that it would be grave error
for any surgeon to continue with the operation
under such circumstances. There was also no
indication in the records that respondent saw or
should have seen that something was wrong as
to prompt him to act differently than he did in
this case. The anesthesia used in the operation
was the same anesthesia used in the previous
closed reduction procedure, and Allen did not
register any adverse reaction to it.
Moreover, we note that in the instant case, the
instrument which caused the damage or injury
was not even within respondent's exclusive
management and control as Dr. Jabagat was
exclusively in control and management of the
anesthesia and the endotracheal tube. The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere
existence of an injury to justify a presumption of
negligence on the part of the person who

controls the instrument causing the injury,

provided that the following requisites concur:
(1) The accident is of a kind which
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone's negligence;
(2) It is caused by an instrumentality
within the exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants; and
(3) The possibility of contributing
conduct which would make the plaintiff
responsible
is
eliminated.
Here, the respondent could only supervise Dr.
Jabagat to make sure that he was performing
his duties. But respondent could not dictate
upon Dr. Jabagat the particular anesthesia to
administer, the dosage thereof, or that it be
administered in any particular way not deemed
appropriate by Dr. Jabagat. Respondent's
specialization not being in the field of
anesthesiology, it would be dangerous for him
to substitute his judgment for Dr. Jabagat's
decisions in matters that fall appropriately
within the scope of Dr. Jabagat's expertise.
The Court cannot properly declare that
respondent failed to exercise the required
standard of care as lead surgeon as to hold him
liable
for
damages for
Allen's
death.
In civil cases, the burden of proof to be
established by preponderance of evidence is on
the plaintiff who is asserting the affirmative of
an issue. Unless the party asserting the
affirmative of an issue sustains the burden of
proof, his or her cause will not succeed.

19.BENJAMIN SALVOSA and BAGUIO

COLLEGES FOUNDATION,
petitioners, vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
EDUARDO B. CASTRO, DIOMEDES B.
CASTRO, VIRGINIA B. CASTRO and
RODOLFO B. CASTRO., respondents.
G.R. No. 70458
October 5, 1988
FACTS:
Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an
academic institution, as well as an institution of
arts and trade. It has so advertised itself
through its brochure which shows that BCF has
a full-fledged technical-vocational department
offer Communication, Broadcast and Teletype
Technician courses as well as Electronics
Serviceman and Automotive Mechanics courses.
These courses divest BCF of the nature or
character of being purely or exclusively an
academic institution.
Within the premises of the BCF is an
ROTC Unit, the Baguio Colleges Foundation
Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) Unit,

which is under the fifth control of the Armed

Forces of the Philippines. The ROTC Unit, by way
of accommodation to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), pursuant to Department Order
No. 14, Series of 1975 of the Department of
Education and Culture, is provided by the BCF
an office and an armory located at the
basement of its main building.
The BCF ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon
as its duly appointed armorer. As armorer of the
ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his
appointment from the AFP. Not being an
employee of the BCF, he also received his salary
from the AFP, as well as orders from Captain
Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of the
Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit,
concurrent Commandant of other ROTC units in
Baguio and an employee (officer) of the
AFP. Jimmy B. Abon was also a commerce
student of the BCF.
On 3 March 1977, in the parking space of
BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a
student of the University of Baguio with an
unlicensed firearm which the former took from
the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a
result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon
was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime
of Homicide by Military Commission No. 30, AFP.
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro
sued for damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon,
Roberto C.
Ungos
(ROTC
Commandant)
Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of
the Board of BCF), Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice
President of BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio (Dean of
the College of Education and Executive Trustee
of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc.
as party defendants.
RTC ruling: The trial court rendered a decision,
(1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B. Abon,
Benjamin
Salvosa
and
Baguio
Colleges
Foundation, Inc., jointly and severally, to pay
private respondents, as heirs of Napoleon
Castro:
(a) P12,000.00 for the death of Napoleon
Castro,
(b) P316,000.00 as indemnity for the loss
of earning capacity of the deceased,
(c) P5,000.00 as moral damages,
(d) P6,000.00 as actual damages, and
(e) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus
costs;
(2) absolving the other defendants; and
(3) dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for
lack of merit.
IAC ruling: Affirmed with modification the
decision of the trial court.. The modification
consisted in reducing the award for loss of
earning capacity of the deceased from
P316,000.00 to P30,000.00 by way of

temperate damages, and increasing the

indemnity for the death of Napoleon Castro
from P12,000.00 to P30,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners Salvosa and BCF can
be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for
damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
RULING: NO.
Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180
of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades are liable for
"damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody." The rationale of
such liability is that so long as the student
remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter
"stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as
to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the
[student]." Likewise, "the phrase used in Art.
2180 'so long as (the students) remain in
their custody means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its
heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and
students for as long as they are at attendance
in the school, including recess time."
In the case at bar, in holding that Jimmy
B. Abon was in the protective and supervisory
custody of the Baguio Colleges Foundation
when he shot Napoleon Castro, the respondent
IAC ruled that:
it is true that Abon was not attending
any class or school function at the time
of the shooting incident, which was at
about 8 o'clock in the evening; but
considering that Abon was employed as
an armorer and property custodian of
the BCF ROTC unit, he must have been
attending night classes and therefore
that hour in the evening was just about
dismissal time for him or soon
thereafter. The time interval is safely
within the "recess time" that the trial
court spoke of and envisioned by the
Palisoc case, supra.
In line with the case of Palisoc, a
student not "at attendance in the school"
cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the
concept is embraced in the phrase "at
attendance in the school," contemplates a
situation of temporary adjournment of school
activities where the student still remains within
call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave
the school premises, or the area within which
the school activity is conducted. Recess by its
nature does not include dismissal. Likewise,

the mere fact of being enrolled or being in

the premises of a school without more
does not constitute "attending school" or
being in the "protective and supervisory
custody' of the school, as contemplated in
the law.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the
Court holds that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be
considered to have been "at attendance in
the school," or in the custody of BCF, when
he
shot
Napoleon
Castro.
Logically,
therefore, petitioners cannot under Art.
2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity
liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages
resulting from his acts. Besides, the record
shows that before the shooting incident,
Roberto B. Ungos ROTC Unit Commandant, AFP,
had instructed Jimmy B. Abon "not to leave the
office and [to keep the armory] well
guarded." Apart from negating a finding that
Jimmy B. Abon was under the custody of the
school when he committed the act for which the
petitioners are sought to be held liable, this
circumstance shows that Jimmy B. Abon was
supposed to be working in the armory with
definite instructions from his superior, the ROTC
Commandant, when he shot Napoleon Castro.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
hereby REVERSED in so far as it holds
petitioners solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon
for his tortious act in the killing of Napoleon
Castro. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

20. JOSEPH SALUDAGA,- versus -FAR

EASTERN UNIVERSITY and EDILBERTOC. DE
JESUS in his capacity as President of FEU,
[G.R. No. 179337, April 30, 2008]
FACTS:
Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student
of respondent Far Eastern University when he
was shot by Alejandro Rosete, one of the
security guards on duty at the school premises
on August 18, 1996. He was rushed to FEU-Dr.
Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation(FEU-NRMF)
due to the wound he sustained. Meanwhile,
Rosete was brought to the police station where
he explained that the shooting was accidental.
He was eventually released considering that no
formal complaint was filed against him. Salduga
thereafter filed a complaint for damages against
respondents on the ground that they breached
their obligation to provide students with a safe
and secure environment and an atmosphere
conducive to learning.
Far Eastern University and Edilberto De Jesus
(as president) in turn, filed a Third-Party

Complaint against Galaxy Development and

Management
Corporation,
the
agency
contracted by respondent FEU to provide
security services within its premises and
Mariano D. Imperial (Galaxy's President,) to
indemnify them. On the other hand, Galaxy and
Imperial filed a Fourth-Party Complaint against
AFP General Insurance.
On November 10, 2004, the trial court rendered
a decision in favor of petitioner. Respondents
appealed to the Court of Appeals which
rendered the assailed Decision .Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied
hence, the instant petition
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the school is liable for
breach of contract
2. Whether or not Far Eastern University is
liable
HELD:
1. YES, It is settled that in culpa contractual, the
mere proof of the existence of the contract and
the failure of its compliance justify, prim afacie,
a corresponding right of relief. In the instant
case, we find that, when petitioner was shot
inside the campus by no less the security guard
who was hired to maintain peace and secure
the premises, there is a prima facie showing
that respondents failed to comply with its
obligation to provide a safe and secure
environment to its students.
2.YES, the defense of Caso Fortuito cannot be
sustained. After
a thorough
review of
the

records, we find that respondents failed to

discharge the burden of proving that they
exercised due diligence in providing a safe
learning environment for their students. They
failed to prove that they ensured that the
guards assigned in the campus met the
requirements stipulated in the Security Service
Agreement. FEU also failed to show that they
undertook steps to ascertain and confirm that
the security guards assigned to them actuall
ypossess the qualifications required in the
Security Service Agreement. Consequently,
respondents' defense of Force majeure must
fail. In order for force majeure to be considered,
respondents must show that no negligence or
misconduct was committed that may have
occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be
invoked to protect a person who has failed to
take steps to forestall the possible adverse
consequences of such a loss. One's negligence
may have concurred with an act of God in
producing damage and injury to another.
Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that
those who are negligent in the performance of
their obligations are liable for damages.
Accordingly, for breach of contract due to
negligence in providing a safe learning
environment, respondent FEU is liable to
petitioner for damages. It is essential in the
award of damages that the claimant must have
satisfactorily proven during the trial the
existence of the factual basis of the damages
and its causal connection to defendant's acts