PHILCOM EEs UNION v PHIL GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS

GR N.O. 144315; July 17, 2006

CARPIO, J.
Prohibited Strikes
The union and the company started the negotiations for the renewal of their CBA. While
negotiations were ongoing, PEU filed with the NCMB a Notice of Strike due to perceived unfair
labor practice committed by the company. In view of the filing of the Notice of Strike, the
company suspended negotiations on the CBA which moved the union to file another Notice of
Strike on the ground of bargaining deadlock. The parties agreed to consolidate the two (2)
Notices of Strike.
However, while the union and the company officers and representatives were meeting, the
remaining union officers and members staged a strike at the company premises, barricading the
entrances and egresses thereof and setting up a stationary picket at the main entrance of the
building. The following day, the company immediately filed a petition for the SOLE to assume
JD over the labor dispute. SOLE issued an order assuming JD over the dispute.
SOLE issued an order requiring all the striking workers are directed to return to work within 24
hours from receipt of this Order and Philcom and/or Philcom Corporation are hereby directed
to unconditionally accept back to work all striking Union officers and members under the same
terms and conditions prior to the strike. The parties are directed to cease and desist from
committing any acts that may aggravate the situation. MR by PEU -- denied. 65 by PEU to SC,
SC referred the case to CA. CA -- denied.
ISSUE: 1. Did the SOLE correctly assumed JD, and in doing so, correctly issued the Return to
Work Order?
2. Is the strike illegal?
1. YES. The SOLE properly took cognizance of the issue on the legality of the strike. As the CA
correctly pointed out, since the very reason of the SOLEs assumption of JD was PEUs
declaration of the strike, any issue regarding the strike is not merely incidental to, but is
essentially involved in, the labor dispute itself. The powers granted to the SOLE under Article
263(g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of the police power of the State,
with the aim of promoting public good. When the SOLE exercises these powers, he is granted
great breadth of discretion in order to find a solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of
these powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has
already taken place. In this case, the SOLE assumed JD over the dispute because it falls in an
industry indispensable to the national interest.
It is of no moment that PEU never acquiesced to the submission for resolution of the issue on
the legality of the strike. PEU cannot prevent resolution of the legality of the strike by merely

refusing to submit the issue for resolution. It is also immaterial that this issue, as PEU asserts,
was not properly submitted for resolution of the SOLE. The authority of the SOLE to assume JD
over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to
national interest includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising from such labor
dispute. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and
efficiently dispose of the dispute.
2. YES. The strike is ILLEGAL.
2.1 Philcom is engaged in a vital industry protected by Presidential Decree No. 823 (PD 823), as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 849, from strikes and lockouts.

2.2 The SOLE had already assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. Despite the issuance of the
returntowork orders dated 19 November and 28 November 1997, the striking EEs failed to
return to work and continued with their strike. A returntowork order is immediately effective
and executory despite the filing of a motion for reconsideration. It must be strictly complied
with even during the pendency of any petition questioning its validity. A returntowork order
imposes a duty that must be discharged more than it confers a right that may be waived. While
the workers may choose not to obey, they do so at the risk of severing their relationship with
their employer.
2.3 PEU staged the strike using unlawful means and methods. Even if the strike in the present
case was not illegal per se, the strike activities that PEU had undertaken, especially the
establishment of human barricades at all entrances to and egresses from the company premises
and the use of coercive methods to prevent company officials and other personnel from leaving
the company premises, were definitely illegal. The right to strike, while constitutionally
recognized, is not without legal constrictions. Article 264(e) of the Labor Code, on prohibited
activities, provides:

2.4 PEU declared the strike during the pendency of preventive mediation proceedings at the
NCMB. On 17 November 1997, while a conciliation meeting was being held at the NCMB, PEU
went on strike. It should be noted that in their meeting on 11 November 1997, both Philcom and
PEU were even advised to maintain the status quo. Such disregard of the mediation proceedings
was a blatant violation of Section 6, Book V, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code, which explicitly obliges the parties to bargain collectively in good faith and
prohibits them from impeding or disrupting the proceedings.

2.5 PEU staged the strike in utter disregard of the grievance procedure established in the CBA.
BIFLEX INC LABOR UNION v FILFLEX and BIFLEX
GR N.O. 155679; December 19, 2006
CARPIO MORALES, J.
Prohibited Strikes
Petitioners are members of the respective unions of Biflex and Filflex, sister corporations.
Situated in one big compound along with another sister company, General Garments
Corporation (GGC), they have a common entrance. The labor sector staged a welga ng bayan to
protest the accelerating prices of oil. On even date, petitioner unions, led by their officers, staged
a work stoppage which lasted for several days, prompting the ERs to file a petition to declare the
work stoppage illegal for failure to comply with procedural requirements.
LA -- work stoppage/strike illegal.
NLRC --reversed LAs decision, that there was no strike to speak of as no labor or industrial
dispute existed between the parties.
CA --work stoppage/strike illegal.
ISSUE: 1. Is the work stoppage/strike illegal?
2. Was there an illegal lockout?
RULING: YES. Stoppage of work due to welga ng bayan is in the nature of a general strike, an
extended sympathy strike. It affects numerous employers including those who do not have a
dispute with their employees regarding their terms and conditions of employment. Employees
who have no labor dispute with their employer but who, on a day they are scheduled to work,
refuse to work and instead join a welga ng bayan commit an illegal work stoppage.
Even if petitioners joining the welga ng bayan were considered merely as an exercise of their
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly or freedom to petition the government for redress
of grievances, the exercise of such rights is not absolute. For the protection of other significant
state interests such as the "right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to
expansion and growth"18 enshrined in the 1987 Constitution must also be considered,
otherwise, oppression or selfdestruction of capital in order to promote the interests of labor
would be sanctioned. And it would give imprimatur to workers joining demonstrations/rallies
even before affording the employer an opportunity to make the necessary arrangements to
counteract the implications of the work stoppage on the business, and ignore the novel
"principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers" aimed at fostering
industrial peace.
There being no showing that petitioners notified respondents of their intention, or that they
were allowed by respondents, to join the welga ng bayan on October 24, 1990, their work
stoppage is beyond legal protection.

2. NONE. Petitioners, nonetheless, assert that when they returned to work the day following the
welga ng bayan on October 24, 1990, they were refused entry by the management, allegedly as
punishment for their joining the welga. Hence, they claim that they were illegally locked out by
respondents. If there was illegal lockout, why, indeed, did not petitioners file a protest with the
management or a complaint therefor against respondents? As the Labor Arbiter observed, "[t]he
inaction of [petitioners] betrays the weakness of their contention for normally a lockedout union
will immediately bring management before the bar of justice."20 Even assuming arguendo that
in staging the strike, petitioners had complied with legal formalities, the strike would just the
same be illegal, for by blocking the free ingress to and egress from the company premises, they
violated Article 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides that "[n]o person engaged in picketing
shall obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employers premises for lawful purposes,
or obstruct public thoroughfares."
In fine, the legality of a strike is determined not only by compliance with its legal formalities but also by
the means by which it is carried out.