Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Quite a lot is known about the nature and use of authority in traditional hierarchical organizations. Authority is defined as the given right
to perform roles; such rights are legitimated by consensual decisions
codified in constitutions, contracts, charters, rulings, and other accepted
institutional sanctions (Cartwright, 1965; Gilman, 1962; Katz & Kahn,
1987). Work organizations depend on members occupying roles of authority to ensure the predictable performance of organizational tasks (Simon,
1947). It is when organization members occupy their work roles (i.e., identify themselves with the authority mandated to those roles) that they have
the legitimate power to pursue their rights, duties, and obligations in the
service of their tasks. Authority offers a legitimate base to have power
and from which to influence others and bring about the completion of
work tasks. It is legitimate power vested in particular people or positions
for system purposes (Weber, 1947).
This definition of authority is particularly well suited to traditional
hierarchical organizations that operate according to powers vested in
specific offices and, therefore, officeholders. Organization members' tra17
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Researchers know little else directly about authorizing and deauthorizing processes in work organizations. However, there is a long
tradition of research and theory on authority relations (which generally
does not include the new collaborative organization forms), which points
to two fundamental types of influencessifuafionaJ and individualon
how organization members define and create their authority relations.
Each of these influences shapes the dynamics of authority and power
(Bass, 1990; House, 1988). The situational factors generally focus on how
organization members are externally driven to conform with existing
norms of thought and action, with a primary focus on "followership." The
literature on individual factors generally relates to how individuals are
internally driven toward power in certain ways, with a primary focus on
leadership. Each influence offers clues to key components of authorizing
and de-authorizing processes.
Situational factors. Research in the domain of situational factors has
been focused on how the social structure of situations presses individuals
to create and obey rules of hierarchical authority. Perhaps the most wellknown research is Milgram's (1974) set of experiments showing the conditions under which subjects obeyed authority figures to the extent that
they acted inhumanely toward others while disavowing responsibility for
their actions. In the initial experiment, 65 percent of the subjects followed
the authority figure's instructions to continue punishing the "learner"
(i.e., confederate) until they had reached the maximum shock intensity of
450 volts. Milgram noted that the key variable was the sense of diminished responsibility that subjects felt: They felt that they were agents (of
the authority figure) rather than actors responsible for their behaviors.
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Variations on the basic experiment showed that manipulations that increased the psychological distance between "teacher" and "learner" decreased subjects' perceptions of personal responsibility, which increased
their obedience to authority. Milgram's experiments indicated the power
that social situations have to dictate how members enacted their roles as
both subordinates (to legitimate authority) and authority figures (to
"learners"). They showed how even temporary social systems exert pressures on people to act as if they have no choice but to create and reinforce
particular types of authority relations.
Another classic social psychological experiment attests to the power
of situations to determine how people create and respond within authority
relations through the roles they assume. Zimbardo's (Haney, Banks, &
Zimbardo, 1973) experiment involved the creation of a temporary system,
a prison, and the randomly assigned casting of individuals into system
roles, "prisoner" or "guard." In little time the prisoners accepted themselves as inferior and acted passively, whereas the guards accepted
themselves as superior and engaged in episodes of abusive, authoritarian behavior. The subjects thus projected themselves emotionally and
cognitively into the roles into which they were physically placed, on the
basis of their stereotypic understandings of the norms by which prisoners
and guards act and prison systems operate. On the basis of accepting
those norms, Zimbardo's subjects created and enacted stereotypic relations of authority between the powerful and the powerless. The experimenters halted the experiment six days into a planned two-week simulation because of the emotional force with which the subjects took up their
roles as superior and subordinate. The experiment's duration was enough
to show how powerfully the roles that individuals occupyeven in temporary social systemsshape the relations of authority they create and
enact. It also showed how drawn people are to adopt norms to help them
define their situations and themselves, regulate their behaviors, locate
themselves hierarchically, and create authority relations.
These classic studies indicate the power of roles and norms to shape
people's experiences and behaviors in authority relations. Organizations
rely on people occupying given roles to reduce the variability, instability,
and unpredictability accompanying human behavior and to withstand
personnel turnover (Katz & Kahn, 1987). Also, they traditionally have relied on predictable authority relationships between superior and subordinate that follow accepted norms of relative power and powerlessness,
respectively (Simon, 1947). Although these authority relations typically
are neither so brutally polarized as those evidenced in Zimbardo's experiment nor so explicitly fraught with anxiety and pain as those evidenced
in Milgram's work, they are nevertheless subject to similar social, role,
and normative pressures (and may lead to equally brutal results; cf.
Arendt's [1965] banality of evil). The more contemporary variable of organizational culture (Schein, 1985) maintains the focus on the complexity of
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the research is that members who are high on such self-concept dimensions are better able to create and push toward goals, and they display
(and gain) leadership characteristics (Bennis & Nanus, 1985). A related
research stream has focused on the personal characters of leaders and
executives, in whom certain tendencies toward defensiveness (Argyris,
1982, 1990) or personal achievement (Kaplan, 1991) lead toward the creation of particular (and variously effective) authority relations. There also
is a more unconscious, psychopathological relation between character
and leadership style, as was noted by Kets de Vries and Miller (1987).
They describe how neurotic styles of leaders, based on unconscious fantasies, create shared pathologies in their systems mirroring those fantasies (e.g., persecution, helplessness, narcissism, compulsiveness, schizoid detachment). The vehicles by which these neurotic styles are enacted
and shared are the authority relations established by leaders and members as they interact.
The individual factors described here help explain how organization
members engage in particular types of leadership behaviors, based on
personality attributes and self-concepts, that offset some of the situational influences reviewed above. The literature reviewed here suggests
that individuals are internally motivated to repeatedly develop certain
types of authority relations that enable them to use or react to power in
ways that are comfortable or necessary for them, for whatever conscious
or unconscious reasons. The authority relations that individuals create
are thus the vehicles through which they satisfy their needs or express
their attributes.
Implications. This brief review of the traditional literatures on authority relations suggests particular gaps in knowledge. First, it seems
that the theory and research about situational influences on authority
relations is more developed than that about individual-level influences;
for example, researchers have not yet conceptualized an individual difference variable that would speak directly to what drives people to authorize and de-authorize themselves and others in patterned ways. Second, it is clear that researchers have, as noted above, generally linked
followership (i.e., obedience) to situational influences and leadership to
individual difference influences, and they have kept the two domains
separate (for an important exception, see Burns, 1978). It is likely, however, that followership and leadership are more tightly linked within individuals; that is, people have particular stances toward authority relations that affect their actions as hierarchical superiors and subordinates
alike, and in the more collaborative work arrangement, as co-workers
(Hirschhom, 1990). This article begins to fill these gaps in knowledge by
building on two implications from the literature reviewed above.
First, the situational literature implies that authorizing is related to
the allowing of personal thoughts, feelings, and beliefsone's own and
othersto be brought into the performance of work roles. There is a
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TABLE 1
Three Internal Models of Authority
Dependent
Stance toward
nature oi
authority
Emphasizes hieiaichical
roles of superior and
subordinate, whose
relationships are
governed by the rules of
iormal organizations.
Counterdependent
Undermines or dismisses
hierarchical roles of
superior and
subordinate.
Interdependent
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We define the dependent model of authority in terms of people's dependency on the rules and roles of formal hierarchy. People whose internal models are of dependency tend to establish relationships in which the
dependency of the hierarchical subordinate on the superior is highlighted, sought, and valued. In Schein's (1979) terms, people seek conformity with established patterns of thought and behavior; in Turner's
(1976) terms, they adopt an "institutional" focus for their self. As subordinates, these people seek dependency on those in formal authority, deauthorizing themselves to take responsibility for managing themselves.
As superiors, these people seek the dependency of others over whom they
have authority, de-authorizing others to assume responsibility for managing themselves. They seek to structure relationships in terms of formalized relations between the roles that people occupy rather than between
the people themselves. As both superiors and subordinates, people with
dependent models of authority suppress their personal selves within such
role-based interactions. We suggest that this suppression is based partly
on their assumption that such personal dimensions inevitably undermine
the strict relations of authority on which they depend to guide their work
and work relationships. Given that assumption, they seek to split the
person away from the role and leave personal dimensions outside role
performances.
We also suggest that such dependency is based partly on people's
sense that they will find their identities only within the context of hierarchical relationships; that is, that their personal selves will find definition
only through the roles they occupy. Such self-definition is external. Employing this internal model, people depend on externally determined
rules and roles to guide their behaviors, beliefs, and feelings in relation
to others. It is within those role relations that people "find themselves,"
and it is outside those relations that people feel "lost." The dependence is
on the scripts attached to hierarchical roles that offer characters to portray (i.e., stereotypical characters of "boss" and "employee"), lines to say,
and plays to enact (cf. Fiske & Taylor, 1984). This model echoes the anxious resistant pattern of attachment (Ainsworth, 1973; Bowlby, 1980), in
which infants who are uncertain about the availability of parents or primary caregivers tend to cling to those figures. These infants have anxiety
about exploring their world and wish to remain connected to authority
figures. Unless this type of internal model is replaced with another one,
the adults into which these children grow will maintain the desire to
remain connected both to authority figures and to authority itself, and
they will feel disconnected from internal guides of feelings, ideas, beliefs, and values.
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We posit that people with dependent models of authority have operating strategies to maintain their dependency and that of others. Their
strategies involve emphasizing the status differences between themselves and others with whom they are hierarchically affiliated and acting
in ways to reinforce such differences: Superiors act in ways that disempower or de-skill subordinates so they will be needed by those subordinates, and subordinates act in ways that disempower or de-skill themselves so that they consistently feel the need for their superiors. In doing
so, both superiors and subordinates with dependent models idealize authority and those in whom it is formally vested by organizations, and they
disparage the personal thoughts and feelings that people bring to relations of authority. In such a case, the ongoing deference to authority
one's own and that of othersis maintained at the expense of people
using their own thoughts, feelings, and beliefs to help guide their work.
What is left is simply the ongoing deference to authority. Behaviorally,
this means that people will suppressin themselves and othersreal
thoughts and feelings, spontaneously generated ideas, and the questioning of decisions based on personal values and ethical principles.
Counterdependent Model of Authority
We define the counterdependent model of authority in terms of people's resistance to the rules and roles of formal hierarchy. People whose
internal models are of counterdependency tend to establish relationships
in which authority itself is minimized, undermined, and de-valued (cf.
Schein, 1979, on rebellion). In Turner's (1976) terms, such people are "impulsives," who create their selves via spontaneous and often deviant
acts. As subordinates, these people dismiss or undermine hierarchically
determined role interactions; as superiors, these people similarly seek to
step outside the boundaries of role-determined relations. In each case,
hierarchical relations are de-authorized; that is, people are not given the
right to do work in the context of hierarchical relations. This deauthorization assumes various forms, ranging from the outright refusal to
cooperate in authority relationships (Schein, 1979) to the more subtle but
equally undermining substitution of personal connections for role-related
interactions with others (Hirschhorn, 1985, 1990), that is, undermining the
authority relations while maintaining or even emphasizing personal connections. As both superiors and subordinates, people with counterdependent models of authority thus seek to suppress authority.
Such counterdependency is based partly on people's sense that they
will find their identities only outside the context of hierarchical relationships and that they will be lost if fused with the roles they occupy (i.e.,
personal identity becomes de-constructed rather than constructed in rolebased relations). In such a case, the desired means of self-definition is to
resist external demands and to substitute countervailing personal behaviors, beliefs, and feelings. The scripts attached to hierarchical roles that
offer people characters to portray are ignored at all costs. This model
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mance of shared tasks (Gould, 1993; Hirschhorn, 1988, 1990). People with
this internal model trust in the value of both role and person, and they
believe in the usefulness of both authority and self-expression. Such people perceive hierarchical systems as offering different and complementary vantage points for perceiving, learning, and acting. It follows that
these people would seek to collaborate with others and value what they
offer from their own roles as subordinates and superiors. We believe the
two types of interdependencies are linked: As people seek to bring their
individual voices into the performance of their hierarchical roles, they
seek out the voices of others who are hierarchically linked to them.
Such interdependency is based partly on people's sense that they will
find their identities by being both inside and outside the context of hierarchical relationships. The premise is that people define themselves (i.e.,
construct their identities) partly in connection to established systems of
roles, boundaries, and authority, and partly in separation (even rebellion)
from those systems. Self-definition is achieved by both accepting and
resisting connections to authority (one's own and others'), just as people
define themselves partly in relation to and separate from others in close
relations (Smith & Berg, 1987). The image here is of actors who draw on
both given stage directions and their internal sense of the characters they
portray to enact their roles. This model echoes the secure pattern of attachment (Ainsworth, 1973; Bowlby, 1980), in which infants feel confident
that parents or primary caregivers are consistently available and responsive to their needs while they maintain appropriate boundaries. These
infants are able to feel both self-sufficient and trusting in primary caregivers. The adults into which these children grow maintain the ability to
simultaneously connect with and remain separate from authority figures
and from authority itself.
People with interdependent models of authority act in ways, based on
their operating strategies, to emphasize the person-in-role. They do so by
using their own thoughts, feelings, and beliefs to help guide their task
performances and work interactions without discounting their roles or
those of others linked to them hierarchically (Kahn, 1990a). People's
voices and energies are employed in the context of roles and the service
of the tasks. In such cases, collaborations within and across levels of
responsibility and influence are sought. This means that people with
interdependent models of authority emphasize their simultaneous dependence on and independence from others. Such people acknowledge status
differences without making them so prominent that personal dimensions
(in self and others) are lost. Superiors and subordinates with interdependent models use the structure and boundaries provided by authority relations without letting themselves and their relations be dictated by those
systems.
It is clear from these descriptions that we conceive of the interdependent model of authority as containing the positive but not the negative
dimensions of the dependent and counterdependent models. Organiza-
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tion members with interdependent models of authority are able to emphasize both personal and role dimensions without sacrificing the integrity of either dimension in relations involving the use of authority. Organization members with either of the other two internal models will split
personal and role dimensions, emphasizing one at the cost of the other,
and they will not fully engage themselves in tasks and relationships at
work. We are making a clear normative statement here: People with interdependent models of authority are better able to authorize relevant
personal dimensions of themselves and others to work in roles of superior
and subordinate than people with either of the two other internal models
of authority we identify. Additionally, people with interdependent models
are better suited to the demands of the high involvement (Lawler, 1988)
and the postindustrial organization (Hirschhorn, 1988, 1990), which depend on the joint negotiation of duty and authority and the collaborations
that ensue.
LINKING INTERNAL MODELS OF AUTHORITY TO
BEHAVIORAL OUTCOMES
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does the need for employees to simply release energies and effort in the
service of directed tasks. Increasingly, employees need to create new
methods and ideas, to direct themselves, to collaborate across roles and
hierarchical levels, and to think more critically and autonomously
(Handy, 1989; Hirschhorn, 1990; Lawler, 1988). To do so, organization members must be more psychologically present at work. They must feel and be
attentive and connected to their tasks and others, have various parts of
themselves accessible rather than split off and inaccessible to their work,
and focus on bringing those parts to the primary task. Most important,
they must be recognized and rewarded for being present in such ways.
The new language is of presence, which subsumes the vocabulary of
work motivation.
There are various influences on the extent to which organization
members are psychologically present at any moment in time. Kahn (1992)
described both systemic (or situational) and individual influences, the
latter including internal models that individuals have of themselves in
their roles (i.e., models of themselves as psychologically present or absent). He noted that individuals vary in terms of how much they authorize
themselves to bring their personal selves into their task performances,
and he suggested that such "self-authorizations" are based partly on internal models on which people consciously or unconsciously depend to
guide their work relations. We extend that argument here, first noting
that there are actually two authorizing dynamics involved: authorizing of
the role (i.e., supporting role-dictated behaviors) and authorizing of the
person (i.e., supporting the bringing to bear of personal dimensions
thoughts, feelings, creative impulses, values, and beliefsto tasks). We
suggest that each of the three internal models of authority has particular
implications for the extent to which organization members authorize the
presence of role and personal dimensions during task performances, for
themselves and others.
More specifically, we suggest that people with dependent models
will tend to authorize themselves and others to act from their roles during
task performances, and they will de-authorize themselves and others to
draw on personal dimensions in guiding those performances. These people will accept the parameters of given rolestheir own and others'
and will seek direction from existing norms of thought and action rather
than create new methods and ideas, direct themselves, and think critically and autonomously. People with counterdependent models, conversely, will tend to de-authorize work rolestheir own and others'by
directing behaviors away from the purposes of given roles. Such people
may do so through clear rebellion (e.g., simply doing or encouraging
things contrary to role purposes) or through more subtle underminings
(e.g., playing upon personal relationships to reshape expected role behaviors). These people are more likely to create new methods and ideas,
to direct themselves, and to think critically and autonomously (i.e., authorize personal dimensions of oneself and others), but often in the ser-
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the completion of assigned tasks. When both members of the dyad have
interdependent models of authority, they are able to construct a relationship that guards against these dangers. In these relationships, each person is able to engage the relevant personal dimensions of himself or
herself and the other within the context of their respective roles.
Proposition 4: When both dyad membeis hold either dependent or counferdependenf internal models of authority, the relationship will undermine task performance
through the joint suppression of persona] dimensions of
selves or denial of responsibiiity and expertise.
Even though hierarchical dyads will be limited in their effectiveness
when either dependent or counterdependent models are imported by both
members, there is a degree of fit because both parties' assumptions, expectations, and strategies are complementary. When dyad members
bring different models of authority to the relationship (i.e., a poor fit), we
can anticipate quite different results (Gabarro & Kotter, 1980). For example, if an organization member wishes to undermine authority and his or
her superior wishes to emphasize authority, the two will construct a relationship in which each is at odds with the other; a play will commence
whose plot is insubordination and whose resolution will involve the undermining of participants, the relationship, and the work itself. Similarly,
if a subordinate wishes to cling to a superior who eschews his or her own
authority and those who demand it, the effectiveness of each is again
undermined along with their relationship and their work. In each of these
cases (and in the other possible combinations of the three internal models
previously described) the operating principle is the same: The lack of fit
between the superior's internal model and that of the subordinate creates
actual relationships that undermine rather than support their work.
Proposition 5: Dyad members will experience inteipeisonal conflict, dissatisfaction, and difficulties with task
performance when membeis biing different internai
models of authority to the ielationship.
The internal models that organization members hold also influence
the extent to which they seek out and maintain mentoring relationships,
which hold the promise of substantial task and personal learning (Hall &
Kram, 1981; Kram, 1988; Kram & Bragar, 1992; McCall et al., 1988; Schein,
1978). In the early career years, novices face the challenges of establishing a work identity and niche, developing self-confidence, acquiring relevant competencies and knowledge, and preparing for advancement and
growth (Hall, 1976; Schein, 1978). Dependent individuals will readily seek
mentors' advice and counsel, whereas counterdependent individuals are
more likely to attempt to master these same challenges alone. It may also
be that those with dependent stances are resistant to entering the separation phase of the relationship, holding on to a dependency that thwarts
independence and growth over time. Alternatively, whereas counterde-
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and task forces, where formal authority is not prescribed, and, instead,
group members must coUaboratively work toward accomplishing tasks
while authority is shared among members. In order for such individuals
to effectively contribute in this context and also facilitate other members'
contributions, they will have to contend with considerable discomfort and
move beyond the dependent stance.
Proposition 8; Group members with dependent models
of authority will simultaneously desire direction and
support from the boss (and other formal authority), and
they will discount their own authority and that of their
peers.
In contrast to dependent individuals, the group member who holds a
counterdependent model of authority will welcome the opportunity to participate in a self-managing group where members are expected to operate
autonomously. However, it is also likely that while embracing their own
skills, voice, and authority, such members will resist other members'
attempts to provide leadership for the group. Also, if most members hold
this stance, there is a good likelihood that the group will distance itself
from its formal leaders and sever lines of support and communication that
are important to its task effectiveness.
Proposition 9: Group members with counterdependent
models of authority will distance themselves from their
formal leaders, resist the authority of other group members, and may. to varying extents, embrace their own
voices and creative energies.
This analysis suggests that group members with either internaJ
model of authoritydependence or counterdependenceare likely to
undermine (to some degree) the potential of traditional work groups, task
forces, and self-managing work groups. The implication here is that
members who hold an interdependent model of authority will be most
effective in maximizing effective task performance in groups. Such individuals seek collaborative relations between hierarchical levels: They
are able to draw upon formal systems of authority, communication, and
control for support, guidance, structure, and resources. At the same time,
they also are able to assume ownership for task processes and outputs,
and they will encourage their peers to do the same. This sense of ownership seems particularly important to the success of self-managing
groups, whose members must take personal responsibility for work outcomes, monitor their own performances, take corrective actions when
necessary, actively seek guidance from their organizations when necessary, and help other people in other areas to improve their performances
(Hackman, 1986). Self-managing groups need members who are willing
and able to take ownership of their own processes, and in doing so authorize both themselves and others. As organizations necessarily rely
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more and more on self-managing teams for innovation, quality, and productivity, they will need members who bring an interdependent stance to
teamwork.
Proposition 10: Group members who hold an interdependent model of authority are most capable of utilizing
resources within and outside the group toward achieving teamwork and organizational objectives.
This set of propositions offers a way to begin mapping the influence
that organization members' internal models of authority have on their
work and work relationships.
TRIGGERING AND CHANGING INTERNAL MODELS OF AUTHORITY
In explicating the nature and influence of internal models of authority, we have simplified the three models, treating them as though they are
constant and enduring (i.e., always operating and impervious to modification from birth). Neither point is accurate; the reality is more subtle and
complex. Next, we offer propositions about how internal models of authority might be triggered and how they might change at work.
Triggering Internal Models of Authority
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We have suggested that when internal models of authority are triggered, individuals act automatically. The point of changing these models, then, is to offer individuals a more conscious choice about how they
wish to behave in particular situations (i.e., to expand the range of behaviors they may apply to different situations). We assume that each of
the three internal models is adaptive in certain situations and maladaptive in others. For example, for newcomers to organizations, it is adaptive
to initially adopt a dependent stance; for members who are placed in
situations that call for them to be whistle-blowers on unethical behaviors
(and will penalize them if they do not), it is adaptive to adopt a counterdependent stance; and for members of self-managing teams, it is adaptive to adopt an interdependent stance. Changing internal models of authority thus means learning how to escape the automatic application of
any single set of operating strategies and learning to act in ways that
meet one's needs and situational demands.
Attachment theorists (Bowlby, 1980; Main et al., 1985; Sroufe & Fleeson, 1986) emphasize that changing early models of attachment is difficult
because such models operate out of immediate awareness, resist change,
and defend against emotional pain. This idea is underscored by the work
of Chris Argyris (1982, 1990; Argyris & Schon, 1978), who developed theory
and interventions to enable organization members to become aware of
their theories-in-practice and the defenses they establish to maintain
those implicit theories. Both streams of research suggest the following
proposition, the components of which are elaborated in the following
paragraphs.
Proposition 14: Changing internal models is a two-stage
process consisting of developing awareness of one's patterns of thought and behavior (and to varying extents
the psychological defenses used to maintain them) and
developing new ways of relating with others.
The less that people are aware of their internal models, the less they
are able to alter actions that derive from these models. Individuals generally develop such self-awareness in the context of relationships, in
which they receive direct or indirect feedback about how the ways they
consistently frame authority relations may be inappropriate to or ineffective in current situations. Such feedback informs people who are able to
understand that they are acting in ways that served them in the past but
are no longer always relevant. As noted previously, the internal models
that people developed to guide their reactions to primary caregivers were
accurate responses to previous contexts (cf. Bowlby, 1980; Main et al.,
1985). When people leave those early environments behind, they must
change internal models that guided their behavior and they must adapt to
new environments to ensure realistic and effective authority relations.
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This process occurs when people receive feedback about the effectiveness
and lack thereof of their behaviors in relations of authority, in the context
of therapeutic or otherwise significant personal and professional relations (see Egeland et al., 1988; Greenspan & Lieberman, 1988) and work
relationships involving significant feedback and challenging assignments (McCall et al., 1988).
People change internal models not simply through feedback and selfawareness but through the different ways they experience being in authority relations. For example, an individual with a counterdependent
model of authority relations may experience interdependence when joining a boss, group, and organization that values, reinforces, and promotes
(literally and symbolically) such interdependence. Through that experience, the individual may feel what it is like to engage both self and role
in the exercise of formal authority and have those feelings validated
externally by other group and organization members. Slowly the individual may transform the counterdependent model into an interdependent
model as previous perceptions and behaviors become unusable and current perceptions and behaviors are reinforced in the context of supportive
relationships. Indeed, this kind of transformation frequently occurs in the
context of some mentor relationships; over time a dependent or counterdependent stance may evolve into interdependence as the relationship
becomes more peerlike or mutual (Kram, 1988). This movement also is
partly a function of adult development because people often progress
through both dependent and counterdependent phases in their relations
with authority figures (i.e., parents and other transferential figures) while
they move toward interdependence (see Erikson, 1980; Kegan, 1982; Levinson et al., 1978). Such a progression occurs in the context of meaningful
relations of hierarchical and negotiated authority with others.
RESEARCH STRATEGY
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aware of their models and the situations in which the models are triggered.
Behavioral Outcomes
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formances, when the tasks are triggered, and the resulting implications
for their work. The concluding step would be to develop an overall rating
for individuals that summarized their general tendencies in relation to the
authorizing and de-authorizing of role and personal dimensions. Testing
the propositions is a matter of comparing those general tendencies to
those predicted by each person's internal model of authority.
Hierarchical dyads. The empirical examination of our propositions
about how organization members' internal models of authority influence
hierarchical and mentoring relationships builds on the methods described in the previous section. The focus is on how members authorize
and de-authorize role and personal dimensions in patterned ways in their
dyadic relationships and the resulting implications for those relationships. Given that focus, sequences of observations (open-ended and directed) and interviews would be used to generate data about authorizing
and de-authorizing behaviors across situations in which members of dyads interact (i.e., the presence or absence of behaviors that show the
encouraging, supporting, joining in, and reinforcing of role and/or personal dimensions). Researchers would also collect data about the quality
of the dyadic relationship (i.e., the extent to which each member receives
useful feedback, grows personally, professionally and so on [see Kram,
1988]). Finally, researchers would look at the implications of the relationship for task performances (i.e., how well the internal and external constituencies receive the members' work, singly and jointly). Combined
with data about each member's internal model of authority, researchers
would link these data to offer empirical testing of the propositions articulated in this article, namely, what occurs when members of hierarchical
dyads hold the same or different internal models and the effects that
internal models have on the development and growth of people within
mentoring relationships.
Teamwork. Testing our propositions about the influence that people's
internal models of authority have on their interactions in teams is a matter of linking data about their authorizing and deauthorizing of themselves and others (on role and personal dimensions) with their participation as group members. More specifically, researchers would focus on the
extent to which members of groups (e.g., from standing departments to
task forces to self-managing teams) invest in and divest from the encouraging, supporting, joining in, and reinforcing of role and/or personal dimensions as group members. More specifically, this means gathering
data about the extent to which individuals (a) authorize themselves and
other group members to use their thoughts and feelings to create new
methods and ideas, (b) direct themselves and think critically and autonomously, (c) authorize themselves and other members to remain connected to existing parameters, methods, and systems of communication
and control related to system leaders. Researchers would also collect
data about the quality of the group's process (i.e., the extent to which each
member receives useful feedback personally, grows professionally, and
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Our purpose in this article has been to develop a conceptual framework that links theory and research about authority in traditionally hierarchical organizations to that in increasingly collaborative work arrangements. In both types of systems, organization members authorize and
de-authorize themselves and others to perform roles and to bring personal
dimensions into their work. We chose to focus on what it is about organization members, psychologically, that shapes the patterned ways in
which they each authorize and de-authorize themselves and others.
Hence, the concept of internal models of authority, which speaks directly
1994
47
to how and why individuals consistently frame and enact formal and
negotiated relations of authority (in hierarchical and collaborative work
settings). We believe that, in conjunction with existing literatures on the
situational and structural dimensions of authority in organizations, this
concept has a great deal of potential for explaining individual behavior in
organizations. Ultimately, systematic study of the propositions outlined
in this article should enhance the understanding of how authority dynamics shape innovation and teamwork, which are increasingly becoming
central to the success of postindustrial organizations.
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