methodological tool for the design of the human, or perhaps not just a tool but rather

further characterization of the ontological status of humanity itself. So structuralism was a

movement, a doctrine, a concept
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the human rival of that other that emphasized a tradition much more directly connected
with modernity, if we understand that modernity has as one of its pillars to Cartesian or
Kantian, or both. So there we have a paradigm in which consciousness and selfawareness are crucial elements for the conception of the human, so the clash was
inevitable. On the one hand we have a philosophy of consciousness and the other a
philosophy of structure. But there is a third element found in this issue and what role does
the elements that do not play for either. These elements may be superseders of this
dichotomy between self-consciousness and structure. More specifically I'm referring to the
element of what we call history. Why? Because philosophy appears as a construction or
development of thinking not essentially determined by history, or history resisted. It not
that its historical rootedness is not recognized, historical conditioning, but we're talking
about something deeper is that the very conception of philosophy as such is confronted
with this thing called history which in turn should be determined by thought. By essentially
determine the human or man as a historical formation, or that it is who has a history or for
which history plays an important role, what derived for the thought of this dichotomization
between self-consciousness and structure ?, for be historical, reached with the
explanations through the structure can give this we are, whatever it is what we are ?, or is
there anything in that history provides self-understanding? Levi Strauss's work was
essential to the whole issue, and this author chose as an adversary, to define more clearly,
the thought of Sartre.
But the thought of Sartre was already established by this time, although an ahistorical
mode while in discussion with Levi Strauss Sartre's thought has become a very historical
thinking, because it is a historical consciousness, collective , builder of reality and built by
the reality of society through class struggle, in the configuration of a Marxist thought that
Sartre covered. The Levi Strauss arguing with Sartre is a second trying to reconcile the
historical point of view and the point of view of the structure without sacrificing the
Cartesian following a subjective point of view.
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But now I want to go a little further back, starting from the middle so to speak. I think that in
this way the core that can be used for you to enter the organization of the program is
reached. This discussion between Sartre and Levi Strauss seems to me that they can
serve to organize themselves so as to go to the first core and knowing, anticipating what
will come next, and go to the third core to which is inevitably better get understanding the
second. So I think that has a strategic role see this as the most strategic program
background: the dichotomy we were pointing between the natural and the unnatural, selfconsciousness between the structure and history, between the individual and the
collective. All this comes together in this core will go through with the help of these
readings (Sartre, Levi Strauss and texts on this discussion). I am also interested to see
what was happening in Argentina at the time of philosophy. I think here in Argentina are
not massively sell books of philosophy, but nevertheless we are always up to date, we
have dialogue with important references of the philosophy of Italy, France, Germany and

even the United States. We are known for keeping abreast of what is being thought and be
written in the core countries of production of philosophical thought, while we have very little
original knowledge and memory of what have been our own testimonies, contributions,
some of them within the same time . The Argentinean contemporary, about what European
or American contemporary, contemporary is not we almost never. There are always many
Argentine thinkers unknown to ourselves, which also happens with many Latin American
thinkers also.
Let us name for instance Oscar Masotta, who in the mid-60s wrote texts on the
relationship between consciousness and structure. If a text Masota can teach us more
than our own relationship with the texts of Sartre and Levi Strauss with which also related
to make your own way I leave aside. I think that in any case we must address the
contributions of those who thought the same latitude, wrote in similar conditions in which
we are studying, teaching, writing, thinking, and see how they did it, to where they came
from, how they introduced On it.
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The route of Masota is parallel to at least the first two cores of the program because it
starts to be a Sartrean, and once settled as Sartrean becomes anti-Sartrean. It is
introduced to the world of ideas as Sartrean, and although he did not abandon the
sartrismo, then had to work critically under the umbrella of the contribution of structuralism
in its most varied forms. The answer is finally Masota Lacanian psychoanalysis, which is
crossed by the structuralism psychoanalysis. And that was the way consciousness and
integrated structure ended in a work like Masota. Maybe add text to Masota as mandatory,
but then we will talk more about the program. In the literature in fact they have an
anthology prepared in the sixties. It is a book of Jos Sazbn, former holder of this chair.
His work had a lot to do with how the reception of Marxist thought was going through this
discussion conscience and structure. But now I want to invite you to make a jump a little
behind. Let's talk about the first core on that discussion between the point of view of the ahistorical or historical consciousness and structure, which was reached at a much earlier
stage. This allows me return to the question of the beginning of contemporary philosophy:
where to begin contemporary philosophy? The easiest, most clear, but in turn more risky
because it requires working with a complexity too large for any teacher, would start from
the post-Kantianism. Ie would be to study the various ways in which the philosophy of Kant
Kant later thought to be willing. That draws us a very comprehensive picture ranging from
modernity to contemporaneity.
So now I invite you to go a little further back to get to that first nucleus that will lead after
the second that just presented quickly. Let's retrodecer enough in time and in the history of
thought. Perhaps it can be said that one of the determining or very easily instrumental
features to characterize the entire period of modern philosophy is one that would say this:
the subject or subjective point of view or something called subjectivity enters in an
essential way, determining, in philosophy as such, the very condition of philosophizing.
This operation has a massive scope for future philosophy we call modernity,
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It is still the name of the clearest Descartes to illustrate this operation by which subjectivity
enters in a strategic manner in relation philosophizing. It could also be said that enters
reference to a subject, and a subject which in turn is conceived in the form of self-

consciousness. In much of modern philosophy is a problematic development of selfconsciousness, the relationship of self-consciousness with that other than herself, with
another if. And that way of thinking the philosophical question somehow conditioned many
other own questions of tradition. Philosophy itself as such can be seen as a tradition
among others. Besides talking about philosophical traditions we might think that
philosophy is a tradition. Then a philosophical work is partly because it adopts a point of
view within that called philosophy as a tradition of writing, of thought, of culture. In that
tradition, anyone who writes to philosophize renewing ends, linking production with the
great questions of always.
Therefore the change that modernity implies is no break with medieval or ancient in terms
of a radical change of subject. Descartes questions are partly the same as Plato and
Aristotle had done. The novelty of introducing the point of view of subjectivity in the way
Descartes introduces is that from Descartes's nothing subjectivizes. I think it occurs at the
beginning of modernity is a kind of subjectivity of nowhere, something difficult to explain,
because imagine that already has all the weirdness and grammatical noise usually has the
philosophy. Because it is arguably a meaningless phrase from an optical Carnap, who
criticized Heidegger to use the word "nothing" as used. I only use that phrase knowing that
it is a phrase rather go unpunished. But I think over the development of the program is to
understand that it can mean "subjectivation of nowhere". There is a book called History of
nowhere Adriana Hidalgo and makes a journey that goes back to the beginning of
philosophy. This means that the question of philosophy is nothing inherent to philosophy.
However, the fact that subjetivice, a sort of identification between subject and nothing is
done, that it can be a very special twist of modernity. The text par excellence, the most
important work of Sartre, Sartre the first moment of our program, the first controversial
anti-humanism humanism is called Being and Nothingness, which is no accident. I think
that would have called Knowledge and nothingness. But anyway, in the first period as
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in the second time and perhaps also in the present, in the third stage of our program is one
aspect of the present and philosophizing contemporary, remains the question of nowhere
or the relation of thought or the thinking subject with all the more relevant topic. So I say
that the question of nowhere behind largely not totally say, the novelty introduced
modernity. Because it is not only a subjective point of view, is the point of view both
relativizacin a perspective, interests, all elements that may be excessive or defective also
in relation to the concept in relation to the universal, which is already Plato, in the
discussion of the sophists. This means that the question of the universal and the particular,
the absolute and relative, objective and subjective, ideological and non-ideological, is in
the heart and in the beginning of philosophizing. There's no news from that point of view.
Plato's Parmenides questions the relationship between being and nothingness. Plato's
Sophist wonders how there can be discourse about the false, and responded "because
there is and is not." Although you can not think non-being, this can be said. How can we
not think of not being but if we can say? If anything was nothing more than anything, how
could this situation be? These are questions and Plato.
Therefore we must not forget that when writing his philosophical works, Descartes, Kant,
etc. perhaps they have had historical knowledge of philosophy or not. Consider that before
Hegel was not very typical of those who were formed for each time philosophizing
teachers. Not very own very historicist, there was not much historical consciousness. It is

mostly from Hegel that history of philosophy always ends up being a philosophical chapter
of philosophy that is done. Today we already feel that without consciousness of our own
history, the history of philosophy as a tradition, one should not be allowed to philosophize
easily. While this is problematizable, this is the post-Hegelian trend. But once it was not
so, and Kant did not need to know the history of philosophy, did not need, did not in any
case to do their own thinking. Nor Descartes, who was most interested in discussing with
immediate medieval philosophy had to differentiate. But in that work always late and early
masters they meet again, as Plato and Aristotle.
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The novelty is rather have subjectivized nothing. Not so much that the problem had
nothing, because that was already, it is concomitant with the origin of philosophizing. The
very beginning of philosophy is marked by these problems. The novelty is to have
constituted something called subjective, or subject, the question of nowhere. And you can
always address the thoughts through various configurations. Today at this juncture of this
kind I propose to do to address the first nucleus of a controversial program about nothing.
It is often done on the subject, between Sartre and one of the major reference XX silgo
thought of Martin Heidegger. The dispute humanism / anti-humanism between Sartre and
Heidegger, and I'm talking about the year 40, has to do with a dispute about anything, or if
they want about being and nothingness, about the subject and nothingness, how the
relation of thought to recover nothing, it is largely the first configuration that our program
will put consideration and study between humanism and anti-humanism.
But as I said, that is more behind and actually could reach Descartes. We could not put
Descartes point of view nothing as identical with self-consciousness? Because notice that
I'm not respecting the Cartesian terminology, since no talk of self-consciousness, subject,
did not speak of nothing. When Descartes says "What are we ?, I will not say I'm a rational
animal," he could have said any other determination, he could have said I will not say I'm
this or that, I will not say I'm something rather than nothing, I will not say what am this, I
am this thinking, I'm thinking the act she might have said. One who makes all this
meditation to seek certainty, it is himself in the act of being pursuing this meditation
because he wonders if the evil genius could deceive him. But he may be wrong, ie it can
not be connected to anything that means the cogito (thinking, feeling, say, etc.). It may be
that when we believe we are not willing, or when we think we are not thinking, but "I think
they think" is different from "I think"? So, ultimately, to be witnessing something that can be
disconnected from everything except itself, the act itself to be that which is in the course of
his take, now that I can not leave because that is not to be just. So Descartes introduced
not by introducing the point of view of subjectivity, the subjectivity of nowhere? That is not
what he does when he says "I will not say I'm an animal, or rational or anything in
particular,
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I will imagine that even I was not born, I have no parents, no body, no nothing, "what is
that, but it's just a nothing that testifies of itself? We can find in Descartes and
configuration we will have to give account and then analyze almost opposite movement
with the appearance of the development of critical empiricism, which is a provocation for a
new answer in this story of the subjectivity out of nowhere, and there a qualitative leap in
the work of Kant, the transcendental turn. Without the latter can not understand the

contemporary debate, so I say that the contemporaneity we refer you to the ways in which
philosophy continued after Kant, a decisive summit this story of subjectivity of the
nothingness from which I speak. When Descartes has to define things and finish what
began gives us a metaphysical interpretation where that point of view that introduced
becomes positive. If one would criticize everything Descartes about the pineal gland, the
mind-body dichotomy, characterization of the body as merely extensive and mechanical,
Descartes could continue arguing that the cogito is essentially that, and that can not
receive any positive determination , but for all other budgets that Descartes introduces his
philosophy to make a positive theory. And had a physical, had a psychology, say that
thesis had then would have to be carried forward to a scientific thought. There was neither
the social sciences, psychology did not even exist as an independent discipline. Descartes
did much of that. But what remains as a philosophy? Is the method, are the ultimate
questions if you like, which are in Discourse on Method and Meditations similarly. I think
that Descartes if possible refer to the subjectivity of nowhere we talked about before taking
the plunge of sustancializar.
it was not very difficult to Sartre, Descartes that Descartes, talk about no substantial
absolute. When he characterizes consciousness, says no substantial absolute. And it is he
who conceives that consciousness as no other. So that step from Cartesianism is
consistent with Descartes himself, only avoids any metaphysical substantiation, which is
also in Descartes. But I speak of that other aspect which is also in Descartes
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and that can lead to no substantial philosophy and metaphysics not as I think it has tried to
be that of Sartre. Kant clearly is much easier to show that no object, that which is
established as a transcendental turn and that will be the method par excellence of
philosophy, the opening of thought to what is called the conditions of possibility of all
possible experience and all object of possible experience, ie everything that can be
determined as being positive and being knowable, the conditions of possibility. Philosophy
is what opens us is a thought of the conditions of possibility of every object, of every
thinking determination of all experience of that object. So there clearly the condition of
possibility, that where for herself the condition of possibility is given, philosophical thought
as such can not be any object. You can not turn the thought itself, the thinking subject
himself to object, because it is on the side of the conditions of any object, and as such is
not accessible as an object. I would say that there is nothing that subjectivizes with
Descartes, progresses and gives a qualitative leap and came to Hegel from that
development. Therefore see in Hegel, a thinker of the negative and somehow it is built, it's
natural, and it comes from something already. Hegel does not introduce anything in
modern thought. In any case we should think, but I do not authorize me to do so because
Hegel is not an input of my own philosophizing, if Hegel might be otherwise, a kind of
repositivizacin of nowhere. But I leave it as a hypothesis that I share with you. However,
in Kant change it is radical. The subject is not object. It is not objectified, and is of another
order, it is not of the same order as the objects. Hegel makes a way and the way of Hegel
and his way to determine why the call as dialectic, we have many leads, including the most
influential for the first decade of the twentieth century, which develops Marx, who makes
the materialistic interpretation of that Hegel did turn from Kant. That's one of the arms that
leads to contemporaneity, and you have to refer to Kant.
In parallel with the development of Marxism some philosophies that can be seen as the

post-Hegelian idealism, and others that can be seen as neo-Kantianism they are given.
Here we are already late nineteenth century and early twentieth century with all
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derived from the philosophy of Kant, within which you can score three post-Kantian more
references that make the configuration of contemporary thought. All of which would be
violent analyzed in terms of how they are positioned in relation to the subjectivity of
nowhere that characterizes modernity. That would seem too violent: wanting all brought
those issues. Not so well, each has its particular. But we can mention Schopenhauer, who
strongly influences two important philosophers of the twentieth century. It influences one
essential way: Nietzsche. And in another of a less essentially, only partly in his first work,
ie Wittgenstein. The latter was a reader and a connoisseur of Schopenhauer and there is
something of this author in his first period of thought. Schopenhauer is also a critical output
of Kantianism, and is different from the Hegelian. Then it will impact on Nietzsche, who
remains a contemporary thinker. Let's talk about the semantic tradition, which will lead to
what is usually called analytic philosophy. It also derives from a critique of Kant. The oldest
names of this critical relationship with Kantian heritage that gives rise to this new tradition,
are Bolzano and Frege. The latter work has been essential to other philosophers who
make the history of contemporary philosophy, such as Bertrand Russell in England, and
also in the Germanic world of philosophizing, more precisely in Wittgenstein. The latter is a
thinker and has an influence of Schopenhauer, has a primary influence of Frege, making it
a complex philosopher, since it can lead to Schopenhauer and on the other side to Frege,
in addition to its own appropriations .
I need to mention phenomenology, whose great representative is Husserl, who also
somehow respond to that originally Cartesian operation that made a qualitative leap with
Kant and then results in different currents of contemporary philosophy. I'm not saying that
all the currents of contemporary philosophy differ from one another based on differences
set out in subjectivisation thinking of nothing. That would be unreasonable, but the first
core humanism / anti-humanism is greatly influenced by the issue of subjectivity or the
conception of the relationship between subject and nothing, and the situation of
philosophy. That is how
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that has a philosophical goal, derivation because that in turn makes caracterizable
philosophy as that thought is that, unlike any other. Heidegger is the great articulator within
the first half of the twentieth century this question, we read some sections of Being and
Time. This is a work of 1927, which Heidegger, in an effort to recover what he considers
the true philosophical question, begins a path that then the same formulation as thought of
nothing. Because after Being and Time he comes to this formulation, something like "being
is nothing," the ontological difference spoken of Heidegger. But that's the way Heidegger
determines that human callable condition, and we will read in Letter on Humanism. There
Heidegger realizes the need to think in terms of being nothing, and that's crucial to
conceive the human condition. And again we have to Sartre as an example of greater
continuity between contemporaneity and modernity. While in Heidegger there is a more
pronounced break. In fact Heidegger when he wants to nurture your own philosophizing of
a force of renewal to the pre-Socratic it refers. He wants to rediscover the true
philosophizing in pre-Socratic. Thoughts of Heidegger and Sartre are formed in very

different ways in relation to the history of philosophy. But in the case of Sartre we have
continuity with Descartes that is explicit. Sartre can be seen as a variant of Cartesianism in
terms of the first Sartre, and as a problematization of Marxism in its second stage. But not
wanting to stop being quite Cartesian, is very complex situation that Sartre was in the '60s.
They were many open proposals should resume in the book Critique of Dialectical
Reason, and for this I invite you to read a text that is in the program quoted from an old
anthology of the '60s but reedited by editions Colihue dealing Levi Strauss and
structuralism. There is playing what I always thought it was essential to understand all that
period of French philosophy, a text rightly called "The vocation of nowhere" where the
question of nowhere is in the title essay text. It is a complex text, which must be read again
but broken down the road is paradigmatically embodied what the discussion between
Sartre and Levi Strauss at this time.
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But the question of nowhere is present and comes from above, comes from the first core
antihumanism humanism. And it's very interesting to see the immediate passage of
Heidegger's Being and Time. It is rather the beginning of this book which aims to
characterize the question of being in no subjective terms. Because what it is is to
overcome all metaphysics, also the subject. It is that it is a thought of being that is the
thinking being that new or renovated and original at the same time, the power of nothing,
to nothing as a power, as a printed or intrinsic power the way to be same about being
thought and think philosophizing. Heidegger language does one speak of a twisted way,
it's no one's fault that. One has to start activating all the time grammar. As a thought that
throws a-gramaticalidad full, it can not be grammatical and Heidegger. When one wants to
understand Heidegger's thought has to accept the a-gramaticalidad. We accept the agramaticalidad at least for a while when we talk about Heidegger. At the very beginning of
Being and Time Heidegger can not avoid saying that the dasein (the configuration in each
case being displayed, the phenomenon, the appearance of being) is in each case mine. a
'mine "appears, grammar imposes a subjectivity that Heidegger does not want to
recognize. Then the discussion is obvious at this level. Sartre maintains a conception of
anything in terms of self-consciousness, which is not reflective, something specific Sartre
we'll see, but self at last. However, how they relate ontic and the ontological remains an
important problem to develop.
But I can not avoid mentioning the problem of identification or identity problem, the
problem of how nothing can be one. Because one thing is nothing, but there can be
nothing? Sartre is a grammatical thinker, and this can be said in his favor and against.
Methodologically controversy between Sartre and Heidegger can say that between a
grammatical way to deal with anything and grammatical way to deal with nothing. So in
Heidegger there is a strong poetic vocation. And poetry is a legitimate place togramaticalidad, the question is whether it is philosophy. Heidegger had a poetic and
mystical spirit, taking into account the characters. William James said that the philosophy
of every philosopher should be distinguished by the character of the philosopher. I would
say that Heidegger is a philosopher who has a lot of poet and mystic,
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while Sartre has a more anti-anti-poetic and mystical spirit. Therefore these two authors
temperaments collision occurs. I do not mean to people, but to philosophy. The Sartrean

temperament and temperament Heideggerian oppose as such, and also determine that
other opposition to which I referred earlier, the relationship between subject and nothing.
This marks the first lot of the core of our program. The second and presented it at the
beginning and of course the bridge between the two is Sartre himself. The third core aims
to: expose some of the discussions and contemporary developments in the current sense,
today, in philosophy. I think it's good to play these hypotheses in the light of this history
humanism / anti-humanism of the first two cores. But here intervenes the influence of who
to me gives us a methodological and substantive instrument that helps enormously to
reframe the question, I refer to some aspects of the philosophy of Wittgenstein, we will
present and use the third core then see a thinker I live as Giorgio Agamben. This author
indicated read a text called "History and structure." This text speaks of the core of our
question and Levi Strauss. And a then a text that is at the end of Infancy and History,
which is independent called "Experimentum linguae". This text Agamben formulates
clearly how this whole set can redirect the program tries to address more or less
schematically. What the course aims to leave as thesis is the linguistic condition that
allows us to redefine more clearly the place where wonder about the continuity or
discontinuismo about the conception of the human. The continuistas could say "linguistic
condition produces no discontinuity or rupture with the condition that fits him as a species
to humans".
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