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PEPSI-COLA

PRODUCTS
PHILIPPINES,
INC., Petitioner,
vs.
ANECITO MOLON, AUGUSTO TECSON, JONATHAN VILLONES, BIENVENIDO
LAGARTOS, JAIME CADION, EDUARDO TROYO, RODULFO MENDIGO,
AURELIO MORALITA, ESTANISLAO MARTINEZ, REYNALDO VASQUEZ,
ORLANDO GUANTERO, EUTROPIO MERCADO, FRANCISCO GABON,
ROLANDO ARANDIA, REYNALDO TALBO, ANTONIO DEVARAS, HONORATO
ABARCA, SALVADOR MAQUILAN, REYNALDO ANDUYAN, VICENTE CINCO,
FELIX RAPIZ, ROBERTO CATAROS, ROMEO DOROTAN, RODOLFO ARROPE,
DANILO
CASILAN,
and
SAUNDER
SANTIAGO
REMANDABAN
III, Respondents.
G.R. No. 175002

February 18, 2013

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS: In 1999, Pepsi adopted a company-wide retrenchment program


denominated as Corporate Rightsizing Program. On July 13, 1999, Pepsi notified
the DOLE of the initial batch of forty-seven (47) workers to be retrenched.Among
these employees were six (6) elected officers and twenty-nine (29) active
members of the LEPCEU-ALU, including herein respondents.
On July 19, 1999, LEPCEU-ALU filed a Notice of Strike before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) due to Pepsis alleged acts of union
busting/ULP. It claimed that Pepsis adoption of the retrenchment program was
designed solely to bust their union so that come freedom period, Pepsis company
union, the Leyte Pepsi-Cola Employees Union-Union de Obreros de Filipinas would garner the majority vote to retain its exclusive bargaining status.
ISSUE: Whether Pepsi committed ULP in the form of union busting
HELD: NO.
Under Article 276(c) of the Labor Code, there is union busting when the existence
of the union is threatened by the employers act of dismissing the formers
officers who have been duly-elected in accordance with its constitution and bylaws.
On the other hand, the term unfair labor practice refers to that gamut of offenses
defined in the Labor Codewhich, at their core, violates the constitutional right of
workers and employees to self-organization, with the sole exception of Article
257(f) (previously Article 248[f]).
Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers' right to
organize. The prohibited acts are related to the workers' right to self-organization
and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, no matter how
unfair, are not unfair labor practices. The only exception is Article 257(f).

VILLAMARIA
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND BUSTAMANTE
GR No. 165881

April 19, 2006

Callejo, Sr. J.

FACTS: Oscar Villamaria, Jr. was the owner of Villamaria Motors, a sole
proprietorship engaged in assembling passenger jeepneys with a public utility
franchise to operate along the Baclaran-Sucat route. By 1995, Villamaria stopped
assembling jeepneys and retained only nine, four of which operated by employing
drivers on a boundary basis. One of those drivers was respondent Bustamante.
Bustamante remitted 450 a day to Villamaria as boundary and kept the residue of
his daily earnings as compensation for driving the vehicle. In August 1997,
Villamaria verbally agreed to sell the jeepney to Bustamante under a boundaryhulog scheme, where Bustamante would remit to Villamaria P550 a day for a
period of 4 years; Bustamane would then become the owner of the vehicle and
continue to drive the same under Villamarias franchise, but with Php 10,000
downpayment. On August 7, 1997, Villamaria executed a contract entitled
Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Sasakyan sa Pamamagitan ng Boundary Hulog. The
parties agreed that if Bustamante failed to pay the boundary- hulog for 3 days,
Villamaria Motors would hold on to the vehicle until Bustamante paid his arrears,
including a penalty of 50 a day; in case Bustamante failed to remit the daily
boundary-hulog for a period of one week, the Kasunduan would cease to have the
legal effect and Bustamante would have to return the vehicle to Villamaria
motors. In 1999, Bustamante and other drivers who also had the same
arrangement failed to pay their respective boundary-hulog. This prompted
Villamaria to serve a Paalala. On July 24, 2000. Villamaria took back the jeepney
driven by Bustamante and barred the latter from driving the vehicle. Bustamante
filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal.
ISSUES: WON the existence of a boundary-hulog agreement negates the
employer-employee relationship between the vendor and vendee
HELD:
NO.
Under the boundary-hulog scheme, a dual juridical relationship is created; that of
employer- employee and vendor-vendee. The Kasanduan did not extinguish the
employer employee relationship of the parties existing before the execution of
said deed.
a. Under this system the owner/operator exercises control and supervision over
the driver. It is unlike in lease of chattels where the lessor loses complete control
over the chattel leased but the lessee is still ultimately responsible for the
consequences of its use. The management of the business is still in the hands of
the owner/operator, who, being the holder of the certificate of public convenience,
must see to it that the driver follows the route prescribed by the franchising and
regulatory authority, and the rules promulgated with regard to the business
operations.
b. The driver performs activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the owner/operator. Under the Kasunduan, respondent
was required to remit Php 550 daily to petitioner, an amount which represented
the boundary of petitioner as well as respondents partial payment (hulog) of the
purchase price of the jeepney. Thus, the daily remittances also had a dual
purpose: that of petitioners boundary
and respondents partial payment (hulog) for the vehicle.

c. The obligation is not novated by an instrument that expressly recognizes the


old one,
changes only the terms of payment and adds other obligations not incompatible
with the old
provisions or where the contract merely supplements the previous one.
d. The existence of an employment relation is not dependent on how the worker is
paid but on the presence or absence of control over the means and method of the
work. The amount earned in excess of the boundary hulog is equivalent to
wages and the fact that the power of dismissal was not mentioned in the
Kasunduan did not mean that private respondent never exercised such power, or
could not exercise such power.

SAINT MARY'S UNIVERSITY, represented by its President REV. JESSIE M.


HECHANOVA, CICM, Petitioners,
v.
COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Twelfth Division), NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division) and MARCELO A. DONELO,
Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 157788. March 08, 2005]
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts: Respondent Marcelo Donelo started teaching on a contractual basis at St.
Mary's University in 1992. In 1995, he was issued an appointment as an Assistant
Professor I. He was promoted to Assistant Professor III. He taught until the first
semester of school year 1999-2000 when the school discontinued giving him
teaching assignments. Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
the university. Petitioner St. Mary's University showed that respondent was merely
a part-time instructor and, except for three semesters, carried a load of less than
eighteen units. Petitioner argued that respondent never attained permanent or
regular status for he was not a full-time teacher. Further, petitioner showed that
respondent was under investigation by the university for giving grades to
students who did not attend classes. The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent was
lawfully dismissed because he had not attained permanent or regular status
pursuant to the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. The Labor Arbiter held
that only full-time teachers with regular loads of at least 18 units, who have
satisfactorily completed three consecutive years of service qualify as permanent
or regular employees. On appeal by respondent, the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) reversed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered the
reinstatement of respondent without loss of seniority rights and privileges with full
backwages from the time his salaries were withheld until actual reinstatement. 4 It
held that respondent was a full-time teacher as he did not appear to have other
regular remunerative employment and was paid on a regular monthly basis
regardless of the number of teaching hours. As a full-time teacher and having
taught for more than 3 years, respondent qualified as a permanent or regular
employee of the university. Petitioner sought for reconsideration and pointed out
that respondent was also working for the Provincial Government of Nueva Vizcaya
from 1993 to 1996. Nevertheless, the NLRC denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the Decision of the NLRC.
Issue: Whether or not private respondent is a permanent regular employee, full
time, and was illegally dismissed.
Held: No. Section 93 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools,
provides that full-time teachers who have satisfactorily completed their
probationary period shall be considered regular or permanent. 6 Furthermore, the
probationary period shall not be more than six consecutive regular semesters of
satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level.7 Thus, the following requisites
must concur before a private school teacher acquires permanent status: (1) the
teacher is a full-time teacher; (2) the teacher must have rendered three
consecutive years of service; and (3) such service must have been satisfactory. 8

Section 45 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools provides that
full-time academic personnel are those meeting all the following requirements:
a. Who possess at least the minimum academic qualifications prescribed by the
Department under this Manual for all academic personnel;
b. Who are paid monthly or hourly, based on the regular teaching loads as
provided for in the policies, rules and standards of the Department and the
school;
c. Whose total working day of not more than eight hours a day is devoted to the
school;
d. Who have no other remunerative occupation elsewhere requiring regular hours
of work that will conflict with the working hours in the school; andcralawlibrary
e. Who are not teaching full-time in any other educational institution.
All teaching personnel who do not meet the foregoing qualifications are
considered part-time.
With respondents teaching load of twelve units or less, he could not claim he
worked for the number of hours daily as prescribed by Section 45 of the Manual.
Furthermore, the records also indubitably show he was employed elsewhere from
1993 to 1996. Since there is no showing that respondent worked on a full-time
basis for at least three years, he could not have acquired a permanent status. 11 A
part-time employee does not attain permanent status no matter how long he has
served the school.12 And as a part-timer, his services could be terminated by the
school without being held liable for illegal dismissal.
Yet, this is not to say that part-time teachers may not have security of tenure. The
school could not lawfully terminate a part-timer before the end of the agreed
period without just cause. But once the period, semester, or term ends, there is no
obligation on the part of the school to renew the contract of employment for the
next period, semester, or term.
That petitioner did not give any teaching assignment to the respondent during a
given term or semester, even if factually true, did not amount to an actionable
violation of respondent's rights. It did not amount to illegal dismissal of the parttime teacher.

BECTON DICKINSON PHILS., INC. and WILFREDO


JOAQUIN,
Petitioners,

- versus -

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,


HON. LABOR ARBITER EDGARDO M. MADRIAGA
and REINERIO Z. ESMAQUEL,
Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 159969 & 160116


Present:
PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:
November 15, 2005

Justice Garcia
Facts:
In 1989, Becton, Phils. had two (2) main divisions, namely: (a) the
Medical Division; and (b) the Diagnostics Division. Jesus Fargas headed the
Medical Division, while the position of head of the Diagnostics Division was
vacant. Also vacant was the position of Country Manager of Becton, Phils. On
September 12, 1989, private respondent Reinerio Z. Esmaquel started his stint
with Becton, Phils. as Director of Sales and Marketing of the Diagnostics Division.
He held this position until March 1998. As Sales and Marketing Director of the
companys Diagnostics Division, respondent reported to Becton, Asias Vice
President of Diagnostics Sector. He was in charge of the overall supervision of
twenty-three (23) employees working under the sales and marketing organization.
In March, 1998, Jesus Fargas was promoted to the position of Country Manager for
Becton, Phils. Respondent, on the other hand, was appointed Business Director
thereof, reporting, this time, to the Country Manager instead of the Vice President
of Diagnostics Sector of Becton, Asia. Respondent was responsible for sales and
marketing of Infectious Disease Diagnostic, Immunocytometry System, and

Instrument Service for the Asia Pacific Region. He held this position up to
December, 1999.
In January, 2000, Becton, Phils. reorganized under the concept of Go To
Market. For purposes of selling its products, Becton, Phils. had organized two (2)
divisions, namely, the Sales Division and the Marketing Division, and designated
respondent as the Director of Sales. As such, respondent was responsible for the
whole sales force for all products of the company. Under the foregoing
reorganization, the Sales Division was responsible for in-market sales or the sale
of all the products of the company to the distributors. The distributors who buy
the products at wholesale, in turn, are the ones selling the products to the end
users. The company is, however, generally responsible for the sale promotions of
the companys products to the end users.
Eventually, respondent was also appointed one of the members of the
Becton Dickinson (BD) Philippines Leadership Team, a group within Becton, Phils.,
which was responsible for the formulation of policies and rules of the company.
In November, 2000, pursuant to its established policies and guidelines for
terminating employees, Becton, Phils. retrenched nine (9) employees, giving them
separation benefits in accordance with such guidelines. Its very own Country
Manager, Jesus Fargas, was among those whose services were terminated.
Accordingly, each of them received separation benefits. In addition thereto, the
nine (9) terminated employees were also paid retirement benefits.
On May 16, 2001, Becton, Asia announced the appointment of petitioner
Wilfredo Joaquin, a former Filipino citizen who later acquired American
citizenship, as the new Country Manager of Becton, Phils. Being a stranger to the
companys operations, as well as to the customers of Becton, Phils., Joaquin
sought respondents assistance to address serious problems of the company, and
to orient him in the mechanics of the companys sales and marketing efforts in the
Philippines.
Then, on that fateful day of July 10, 2001 or barely two (2) months from Joaquins
assumption of his position as Country Manager, Becton, Phils. served upon
respondent a notice of termination[13] of employment effective August 10, 2001,
on the ground that his position has been declared redundant.
Respondent was terminated and required to sign a Release and Quitclaim, [14]
otherwise, his separation pay and retirement benefits will be withheld.
Respondent found no other alternative but to give in, and reluctantly signed the
document.
Issue: Whether or not private respondent Esmaquel is illegally dismissed.
Held: Yes. Petitioners utterly failed to establish by substantial evidence that
indeed, respondents position in the company became redundant due to concrete
and real factors recognized by law and relevant jurisprudence. Redundancy is one
of the authorized causes of dismissal. Redundancy in an employers personnel
force necessarily or even ordinarily refers to duplication of work. That no other
person was holding the same position that private respondent held prior to the
termination of his services, does not show that his position had not become
redundant. Indeed, in any well organized business enterprise, it would be
surprising to find duplication of work and two (2) or more people doing the work of
one person. We believe that redundancy, for purposes of the Labor Code, exists
where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded
by the actual requirements of the enterprise. Succinctly put, a position is
redundant where it is superfluous, and superfluity of a position or
positions may be the outcome of a number of factors, such as overhiring
of workers, decrease in volume of business, or dropping of a particular
product line or service activity previously manufactured or undertaken
by the enterprise.

Furthermore, the managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be


exercised without grave abuse of discretion, bearing in mind the basic
elements of justice and fair play. Having the right should not be confused with the
manner in which that right is exercised. Thus, it cannot be used as a subterfuge
by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable worker.
A lowly employee or a sales manager, as in the present case, who is confronted
with the same dilemma of whether signing a release and quitclaim and accept
what the company offers them, or refusing to sign and walk out without receiving
anything, may do succumb to the same pressure, being very well aware that it is
going to take quite a while before he can recover whatever he is entitled to,
because it is only after a protracted legal battle starting from the labor arbiter
level, all the way to this Court, can he receive anything at all. The Court
understands that such a risk of not receiving anything whatsoever, coupled with
the probability of not immediately getting any gainful employment or means of
livelihood in the meantime, constitutes enough pressure upon anyone who is
asked to sign a release and quitclaim in exchange of some amount of money
which may be way below what he may be entitled to based on company practice
and policy or by law.
It may likewise be noted that what respondent received when he signed the
Release and Quitclaim was less than half of what he is entitled to under the
circumstances, as correctly computed by the Labor Arbiter in his March 26, 2002
decision. This is another reason why the Court cannot rely upon such Release and
Quitclaim to validly bar respondent from thereafter claiming additional benefits
from petitioner Becton, Phils..

[G.R. NO. 152843 : July 20, 2006]


INTERCONTINENTAL BROADCASTING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v.
REYNALDO BENEDICTO, deceased, substituted by his surviving spouse
LOURDES V. BENEDICTO, and children, namely: REYNALDO V. BENEDICTO,
SHIRLEY V. BENEDICTO-TAN, EDGAR V. BENEDICTO and LILIBETH V.
BENEDICTO-DE LA VICTORIA,*, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Facts: Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation is a government-owned and
controlled corporation.6 It is engaged in the business of mass media
communications. Reynaldo Benedicto was appointed by Ceferino Basilio, the
general manager8 then of petitioner, as marketing manager. In a letter dated
October 11, 1994 signed by Tomas Gomez III, at that time the president of
petitioner, Benedicto was terminated from his position. Benedicto filed a
complaint with the NLRC for illegal dismissal and damages. He alleged that after
his appointment, he was able to increase the televiewing, listening and audience
ratings of petitioner which resulted in its improved competitive financial
strength.11 He claimed that he successfully initiated, pursued and consummated
an advertising contract with VTV Corporation for a period of five years involving

the amount of P600 million.12 However, on October 11, 1994, he was terminated
from his position without just or authorized cause. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor
of Benedicto finding that he was indeed illegally dismissed. Finding the award
excessive, petitioner, on October 15, 1998, filed with the NLRC its memorandum
on appeal with motion to re-compute the award on which the appeal bond was to
be based. The NLRC dismissed the appeal and ruled that petitioner failed to
perfect its appeal since it did not file the appeal bond within the reglementary
period. The CA affirmed the NLRC's decision.
Issue: Whether or not Benedicto was illegally dismissed.
Held: Yes. The labor arbiter found that Benedicto was an employee (the marketing
manager) of petitioner.34 He also determined that there was no just or authorized
cause for Benedicto's termination. Neither did petitioner comply with the twonotice requirement for valid termination under the law. He therefore concluded
that Benedicto was illegally dismissed.35
These factual findings of the NLRC, confirmed by the CA, are binding on us since
they are supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner, aside from merely stating
that Benedicto's appointment was unauthorized, 36 did not extensively deal with
the issue of whether Benedicto was in fact its employee. Besides, it is estopped
from denying such fact considering its admission that its former President, Tomas
Gomez III, wrote him a letter of termination on October 11, 1994. 37 Petitioner,
furthermore, never contested the finding of illegal dismissal. Accordingly, there
are no strong reasons for us to again delve into the facts.