Diplomacy & Statecraft

ISSN: 0959-2296 (Print) 1557-301x (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdps20

A Fragile Relationship: The United States and the

Republic Of Korea
Juergen Kleiner
To cite this article: Juergen Kleiner (2006) A Fragile Relationship: The United States and the
Republic Of Korea, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 17:2, 215-235, DOI: 10.1080/09592290600695235
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592290600695235

Published online: 22 Sep 2006.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 102

View related articles

Citing articles: 1 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fdps20
Download by: [National Taiwan Ocean University]

Date: 15 May 2016, At: 07:49

Diplomacy and Statecraft, 17: 215235, 2006

Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN 0959-2296
DOI: 10.1080/09592290600695235

0000-0000 and Statecraft

0959-2296
FDPS
Diplomacy
Statecraft, Vol. 17, No. 02, April 2006: pp. 00

Downloaded by [National Taiwan Ocean University] at 07:49 15 May 2016

A FRAGILE RELATIONSHIP: THE UNITED STATES

AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The United
Juergen
Kleiner
States and the Republic of Korea

Juergen Kleiner

As South Korea became economically and militarily stronger and developed democratic institutions, the country was in a position to assume
more responsibilities in its partnership with the United States. The necessary changes could be achieved only with difficulties. The efforts of the
US administration to stop the nuclear proliferation by North Korea and
South Koreas attempts to develop a policy of engagement towards the
DPRK resulted in friction between the allies. The dissonance was amplified by efforts of the Rho Moo Hyun government to pursue a foreign policy
that was less dependent upon the United States. The change of atmosphere was underlined by anti-American outbursts in South Korea. A
new effort to strengthen the partnership is, however, reasonable. For
South Korea the United States is still the indispensable ally as long as an
attack by North Korea that probably has nuclear weapons cannot be ruled
out. For the United States this alliance contributes to maintain Americas
paramount influence in East Asia. If both countries agree with this rationale they should take steps to accept basic assumptions and policies of the
other side. To find a common position towards the nuclear efforts of North
Korea is crucial. Even if both sides try to harmonize their policies, success
is not guaranteed. Korean nationalism and American dynamics combined
with occasional high-handedness are difficult obstacles.

CLOSENESS
The United States and the Republic of Korea fought a war side by side,
even before formally concluding a military alliance. Both countries were
the main contributors to the United Nations Command during the Korean
War (195053) and suffered the heaviest losses. Not until the 1st of
October 1953, after the war had come to an end, did the two countries
agree on a Mutual Defense Treaty that has been the basis of South
Koreas defense against threats from North Korea ever since.1 The United
States assisted in building up the South Korean forces and left US troops
stationed in Korea. The Republic of Korea acted in the spirit of the

Downloaded by [National Taiwan Ocean University] at 07:49 15 May 2016

216

Juergen Kleiner

Mutual Defense Treaty by sending combat troops to Vietnam in the late

1960s though this was an out of area mission.
The interaction between Americans and South Koreans in other fields
was also of an extraordinary nature. Originally the relationship was
totally unbalanced. The United States helped South Korea to develop its
economy, first by huge amounts of economic assistance and later by
opening the large American market for products of the South Korean
export industry. During the collapse of the South Korean economy in
1997 it was again the United States that inspired the rescue operation.
American-South Korean cooperation was based on a tremendous
exchange of people. American soldiers, government officials, businessman,
scholars, students, Peace Corps members, and private citizens came to
Korea. Thousands of Koreans went to the United States to learn, to study,
and to do business. Many of them returned to Korea, carrying their newly
acquired knowledge and Western ideas with them. The South Koreans
viewed things American as modern, exemplary and desirable. They
admired the American way of life though their countrys traditions differed
much from that of the great partner. The Republic of Korea would have
deserved to be called the ally of the allies of the United States.2
ADJUSTMENTS
Relations between states are rarely stable as conditions change. The harmony between South Korea and the United States lasted more or less until
the end of the 1970s. Changes were caused because South Korea became
economically and militarily stronger and succeeded in reforming its institutions on the way to democratic government. It, therefore, demanded
more of a say in its own destiny. The United States on the other hand pursued its own interests in the Far East that oscillated between containment,
engagement, and various forms of disengagement. As a superpower the
United States expected South Korea to follow the changing definitions of
US foreign policy.
In the military sphere reasonable adjustments that were acceptable to
both sides were reached. In spite of endless discussions of American
troop withdrawal from Korea, the United States continued to maintain
troops on the peninsula. They amounted in the summer of 2004 to 37,000,
including the Second Infantry Division and some airforce units.3 Since
South Korea could afford a larger defense budget its forces increased to
nearly 700,000 troops. The South Korean forces could, therefore, assume
larger responsibilities within the alliance.4 The Republic of Korea has
become well integrated into joint command structures. In 1978 a US/
ROK Combined Forces Command was established, headed by the Commander-in-Chief of US forces in Korea and a Korean deputy. Bi-national

Downloaded by [National Taiwan Ocean University] at 07:49 15 May 2016

The United States and the Republic of Korea

217

manning was implemented throughout the command structure. In 1994

peacetime operational control over those South Korean units, still under
US control, was transferred to South Korea. The South Korean government complained that according to an agreement with the United States
concluded in 1979 Korea was allowed to only have missiles with a range
of only 180 km. Korea asked for a change. After South Korea joined the
Missile Technology Control regime in 2001 the United States agreed that
the ally might develop missiles with ranges up to 300 km.5
Cost sharing contributions from South Korea have also been a controversial subject. The South Koreans complained that their partner did not
fully acknowledge the support of Korean forces to augment US forces
(KATUSA) and the provision of land for US bases as South Korean contribution.6 There is no doubt, however, that South Korean contributions
have increased steadily. According to US statistics, in 2001 South Korea
offset approximately 39% of US non-personnel stationing costs and these
offsets promised to increase further.7 The status of US forces in Korea
used to be a bone of contention because the original agreement gave the
United States far reaching jurisdiction over its own service personnel. The
conflict intensified since crime is relatively low in Korea with the result
that crimes committed by US personnel, though small in numbers,
became very visible. Revisions in February 1991 and in January 2001
aimed at meeting Korean concerns.8 It was agreed that criminal jurisdiction of the United States over its servicemen is restricted to cases that
occur while they discharge official duties or when the crime is committed
against other US personnel. These manifold changes indicated that the US
forces in Korea were going to assume a more modest role.
The surprising rise of the Republic of Korea from a poor developing
country via a newly industrialized country (NIC) to membership in
OECD, made a readjustment of trade relations with the United States
inevitable. Liberalization of the Korean market and a better protection of
intellectual property rights were particularly urgent. The South Korean
government gave in to American demands only reluctantly and slowly.
The international clearing-up efforts after the collapse of the South
Korean economy in 1997 provided additional opportunities to insist on
improved access to South Koreas market and better investment opportunities. Korean public opinion adopted the unjustified attitude to cry foul
whenever the United States asked for a removal of trade restrictions.
That the Koreans were so sensitive to American pressure had its reasons. However hard they tried, they always remained the little brother.
They had built up impressive military forces, but it was basically the firepower of US forces and of the US nuclear shield that guaranteed South
Koreas security. The Republic of Korea had been accepted in the club of
the industrialized countries, OECD, but when its economy collapsed the

Downloaded by [National Taiwan Ocean University] at 07:49 15 May 2016

218

Juergen Kleiner

country depended on the goodwill of others, particularly on that of the

United States. The asymmetry of the relations continued to exist and
made itself felt from time to time.
In the 1980s the civil society in South Korea developed. Public opinion
turned to democratic ideas and, in 1987, to democratic forms of government. One should have thought that this development would facilitate
relations with the United States. The contrary, however, was true. Koreans
started to question why the United States administrations had cooperated
for so many years with succeeding authoritarian leaders of South Korea.
Remarks by President Chun Doo Hwan had made them particularly suspicious. In 1980 he had spread the news that the United States had been
informed in advance of his seizure of power in 1979 and of the declaration
of full martial law in May 1980. Therefore, many Koreans assumed that the
US administration had tacitly approved Chuns coup dtat and the bloody
suppression of the rebellion against the military dictatorship in Kwangju.
Chuns assertions were false, but the United States did not succeed in invalidating them. A considerable number of those Koreans who demanded
democratic reforms believed that the United States government was on the
side of those in power. These assumptions together with the feelings of
remaining the underdog that was bullied by big brother, gave rise to an
anti-American mood. This attitude found its expression in numerous attacks
on American institutions in the 1980s. The days when America appeared
identical with progress were gone.
SHIFTS
For decades the joint mission to deter the threat from the North had
dominated the relationship between the United States and the Republic of
Korea. When both countries started engaging the secluded country, differences between the allies began to show.
In the period after the Korean War, the US administrations had only
occasionally negotiated with North Korea when need arose because
Americans or American equipment had been seized by the North. The
best-known example are the talks for the release of the crew of the
spyship USS Pueblo in 1968. The decisive negotiations, held bilaterally
between the United States and the DPRK though within the framework of
the Military Armistice Commission, were dominated by the spirit of the
Cold War. How sensitive the South Korean government considered the
bilateral talks of their American ally with the North Korea became obvious
at that time. South Korea was concerned that it was excluded from the talks
fearing that the DPRKs status might be improved by negotiations with the
United States.9 The Johnson administration, however, succeeded in reassuring its ally of American willingness to continue protecting the South.

Downloaded by [National Taiwan Ocean University] at 07:49 15 May 2016

The United States and the Republic of Korea

219

When the Clinton administration tried to freeze the North Korean

nuclear program, it negotiated with the DPRK for a prolonged period of
time, that is, from June 1993 until October 1994. The administration had
no consistent plan that it followed but developed its policy over time
wavering between a tough and a soft approach. It was aware of the necessity to coordinate its North Korea policy with the South Korean ally and
tried to do so. For South Korea it was difficult to react to the changing
American ideas. To compound matters, the government of President Kim
Yong Sam (19931998) also showed a lack of consistency that extended
to its North Korea policy. Thus, the coordination between the allies was
rather difficult and led to tensions.10 When the Agreed Framework that
shut down the North Korean plutonium program in exchange for rewards
was finally concluded the South Korean government officially commended
it. In a White Paper published in 1996 the Kim Yong Sam government even
claimed that the Agreed Framework was the result of the efforts by the
ROK government and the support of the international community.11 The
South Korean concerns could, however, have been seen from the same
paper when it stressed that in implementing the light water reactor project
promised to North Korea in the Agreed Framework Seoul should take the
central role.12 This was a problem indeed. The United States had now
recognized the DPRK as a partner causing South Korean concerns that
Americans might negotiate about the peninsulas future directly and with
the exclusion of its ally.13 The daily Chosun Ilbo reflected this mood
accurately when it suggested in October 1994 breaking away from the
single track diplomacy of depending only upon the United States.14
The South Korean concerns persisted, though the policies towards North
Korea of President Kim Dae Jung (19982003) and President Clinton were
more in sync.15 The sunshine policy of Kim Dae Jung was based on the
willingness to tolerate the DPRKs existence. Like the US government he
considered North Korea a partner whom he wanted to engage with the hope
that the neighbor would slowly change so that tensions would be reduced.
The Clinton administration supported the sunshine policy. It continued
talking to the DPRK trying to freeze the countrys missile program. The
United States furthermore joined South Korea in providing food for the
suffering people in the DPRK. These activities made close coordination
between the two allies necessary. The relations of the United States and the
Republic of Korea towards the DPRK became more and more the dominant
factor in the relationship between the two allies.
DISSONANCE
When President Kim Dae Jung visited Washington in March 2001 to meet
the new American President, he had succeeded in getting inter-Korean

Downloaded by [National Taiwan Ocean University] at 07:49 15 May 2016

220

Juergen Kleiner

relations moving. He had his summit with Chairman Kim Jong Il in June
2000 and was expecting the return visit of the North Korean leader. The
Nobel Peace Price winner was in for a surprise. In a press conference
following the summit with the Korean president on 7 March 2001,
President George W. Bush made various remarks about North Korea.16
He said that he was skeptic about the North Korean leader and about the
reliability of North Korea, keeping all terms of all agreements. He
insisted on complete verification of agreements. He further put off a
dialogue with North Korea to the future. Whatever his intentions may
have been, Bushs attitude caused a setback for the sunshine policy of
Kim Dae Jung.
The South Korean president should not have been too surprised by the
subdued reception that he received in Washington. Only a week before his
trip to the United States, he had publicly agreed with Russian President
Putin that the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty was a cornerstone of
strategic stability.17 This was exactly the treaty that President Bush
wanted to scrap in order build a national missile defense system (NMD)
for which North Koreas missiles served as justification. The South
Korean president may have had good reasons to oppose the stationing of
Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems on Korean soil. By indirectly
expressing his opposition he had, however, publicly taken sides against an
important strategic plan of his ally that was aimed at protecting the US
territory against missile attacks.
The sunshine policy was not only intended to warm the North Koreans
but included a cautious, still minor effort of breaking away from the
American patronage. The Joint Declaration of 15 June 2000 stated that
the North and the South agreed to solve the question of reunification
independently by the concerted efforts of the Korean nation responsible
for it.18 There were old North Korean efforts behind that formula.
The South could, however, easily agree to the formula: Though other
countries, like the United States, would have to be involved in the process,
unification wasin the view of both Koreasbasically a national task.
It was the policy towards North Korea during the second nuclear crisis
that caused a rift between the Republic of Korea and the United States.19
The South Korean government supported the demand that North Korea
should abandon its nuclear programs. It preferred, however, an approach
that left the aims of the sunshine policy intact. President Roh Moo Hyun,
like his predecessor, insisted on a peace-first, unification-later
approach.20 South Korea excluded any military solution since a war on the
peninsula would bring destruction and suffering also to the South. Nor did
the South Korean government support the collapse of North Korea as
President Roh Moo Hyun has repeatedly stated.21 The South Korean
government was afraid that a sudden unification would be too expensive

Downloaded by [National Taiwan Ocean University] at 07:49 15 May 2016

The United States and the Republic of Korea

221

and socially too demanding.22 The Roh government also hesitated about
bringing the North Korean nuclear issue before the UN Security Council.
South Korea was even not willing to include specific military measures
into a contingency plan of how to deal with a possible internal turmoil in
North Korea.23 The South Korean government was also willing to meet
North Korean demands with a view to keeping the channel of communication open. In the summer of 2005 the South Korean government offered
to provide 2 million kilowatts of electricity annually to the North in order
to encourage the DPRK to end its boycott of the six-party talks.24 An
interesting reversal can be observed. While the Kim Young Sam
government had complained that the US administration was too soft on
North Korea, the present South Korean government feels that the administration is too hawkish.25 Both cases have, however, common ground.
They show a significant difference in the assessment of and approach
toward the DPRK by the two allies. Since the sunshine policy has gained
broad support in South Korea, the gap has become wider. While South
Korea tries first of all to promote reconciliation with North Korea and is
no longer too afraid of a North Korean attack, the United States considers
the North Korean leadership a tyrannical regime that contributes dangerously to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The US administration
discards up-front incentives and keeps the option of economic sanctions
open, also those to be imposed by the UN Security Council.
In view of the South Korean sensitivities it would have been appropriate for the Bush administration to consider the ties with the Republic of
Korea a high maintenance relationship.26 This did not happen.
Secretary Rumsfelds remark during a news briefing on 23 December
2002 disregarded Korean concerns. At a moment when the United States
was increasing military pressure on Iraq, the Secretary of Defense was
asked whether the US was capable of pursuing the war against terror,
Iraq, and North Korea at the same time. He answered in the affirmative:
We are capable of fighting two major regional conflicts.27 It made
Seoul also nervous that the administration did not hide its preference for a
collapse of the DPRK.
South Korea tried to keep the bilateral talks and negotiation with the
DPRK going. The South Korean government answered the North Korean
roller-coaster policy of refusal and giving in with a policy of appeasement
and prior concessions. Even after the DPRK on 10 February 2005, for the
first time, did not only speak of its nuclear deterrent but also of having
manufactured nukes, the South Korean government tried to downplay
the North Korean statement.28 Unification Minister Chung Dong Young
said on 14 February 2005 that it was too early to claim North Korea as a
nuclear state and that there was no reason to immediately change our
policies towards North Korea.29 In April 2005, the South Korean

Downloaded by [National Taiwan Ocean University] at 07:49 15 May 2016

222

Juergen Kleiner

government made it known that substantive economic support was only

possible after the nuclear problem was solved.30 This statement, however,
was quickly forgotten. Only weeks later South Korea started delivering
200,000 tons of fertilizer to North Korea and in the summer of 2005
offered the North an aid package that included the delivery of 500,000
tons of rice.31 Cooperation in the Kaesong Industrial Park, built north of
the demilitarized zone, got started. The South Korean government tried
hard not to hurt the feelings of the North Koreans. This was clearly
demonstrated when, on 14 April 2005, the South Korean delegation to the
UN Commission on Human Rights abstained from voting on a resolution
condemning North Korean human rights abuses.32 On 17 November 2005
South Korea equally abstained from voting on a similar resolution by the
UN General Assembly.33 This did not go unnoticed by the American ally.
Jay Lefkowitz, US Special Envoy on Human Rights in North Korea,
expressed his hope, during a conference on 9 December 2005 in Seoul,
that in the future South Korea would join a vote on similar resolutions.34
In the fall of 2005 the US government banned the activities of the Banco
Delta Asia SARL, a bank in Macao, in the United States because it had
cooperated with North Korea in money laundering.35 It also banned the
activities of eight North Korean companies that supported the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.36 The South Korean ally considered
these actions obstacles to the six-party talks and demanded removal
immediately.37 After the US ambassador to Seoul, in defense of the
sanctions taken by his government, had described the North Korean
government as a criminal regime, the Speaker of the South Korean
National Assembly called his remark undesirable.38 In view of the fact
that the DPRK used vile language to describe the United States for
decades on a daily basis, this was an astonishing statement. Apparently,
even the use of tough language towards the North by the US government
made the South Korean side nervous.
Seoul tried to influence the attitude of the allies towards North Korea.
Shortly after the beginning of the new nuclear crisis, President Kim Dae
Jung had suggested that the United States should guarantee North Koreas
right to exist in return for abandoning the nuclear weapons program.39
This proposal had aimed at the heart of the matter. The North Korean
leadership was not sure about the goals of the new administration. It had
reason to feel that the US government intended to remove the DPRKs
system. Under the formula of safeguarding the countrys sovereignty the
DPRK leadership tried to receive guarantees for its survival. The Joint
Statement issued at the end of the Six-party talks in September 2005
promised North Korea international recognition. It also mentioned
economic benefits in exchange for an end to North Koreas nuclear
programs.40 This statement was, however, not a breakthrough because it

Downloaded by [National Taiwan Ocean University] at 07:49 15 May 2016

The United States and the Republic of Korea

223

described aims but not a roadmap. Therefore, it was not astonishing that
the talks quickly lost momentum again.
South Korea would have preferred that the Agreed Framework be
maintained and renegotiated.41 This was an excellent idea. At the beginning of the crisis the United States should have focused on keeping the
Agreed Framework alive. It was bad enough that a new nuclear issue had
appeared, namely whether North Korea had a program to enrich uranium.
Therefore, efforts should have been concentrated on keeping the plutonium
issue frozen. This could only be achieved if the remnants of the Agreed
Framework were maintained and thus North Koreas access to the plutonium contained in the 8000 spent fuel rods was blocked. The administration
made only weak efforts to save the remnants of the Agreed Framework.
The suspension of the oil deliveries to North Korea in November 2002
implied that the administration treated the Agreed Framework as
scrapped. In January 2000, Condoleezza Rice had characterized the
Agreed Framework as an attempt to bribe North Korea into forsaking
nuclear weapons.42 The Agreed Framework had, however, succeeded in
freezing North Koreas plutonium program. It would have been wise, as
South Korea proposed, to maintain that freeze. The Perry Report had
suggested exactly the same: Unfreezing Yongbyon is North Koreas
quickest and surest path to acquisition of nuclear weapons. The Agreed
Framework, therefore, should be preserved and implemented by the
United States and its allies.43 The Bush administration, however, discarded the Agreed Framework with the result that efforts to contain North
Koreas plutonium program had to be started from scratch.
President Roh Moo Hyun had demanded a leading role for his country
in resolving the nuclear crisis. He admitted, however, that the United
Stated had the final key to the six-party talks.44 Indeed, the views of the
US administration regularly prevailed. The differences between the two
allies could not be bridged. Neither side hid its disappointment. President
Rho Moo Hyun even showed understanding for the claim by the North
Koreans that nuclear weapons and missiles were a means of safeguarding
their security.45 The differences with the United States resulted in a sort of
backlash in South Korea. President Roh Moo Hyun had envisaged a foreign policy that was not completely dependent on the United States. He
said that he would try to enhance relations to a more balanced level
based on reciprocity.46 Though his government could not carry through
its ideas on how the talks with North Korea should proceed, President
Roh went so far as to demand that the United States-South Korea relations
should stand on an independent and equal footing.47 President Rohs
policy towards the United States was later called a new independent
policy.48 Immediate cause was a bureaucratic infighting between officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade who favored the

Downloaded by [National Taiwan Ocean University] at 07:49 15 May 2016

224

Juergen Kleiner

traditional cooperation with the United States and had ridiculed the
presidents policy on the one side, and the presidents staff on the other
side. The results of the National Assembly elections of 15 April 2004 that
gave the presidents Uri Party a strong majority, confirmed public support
for a progressive policy. Since then the South Korean government has
been playing with varying formulas. Foreign Minister Ban Ki Moon used
the formula of a horizontal relationship.49 President Rho demanded a
balancing role for his country in Northeast Asia.50 Later on, the South
Korean government made it clear that an independent policy includes
wartime operational control over its forces. In December 2005 the two
allies agreed to establish a task force to discuss the transfer of wartime
command of the Korean forces from the United States to the Republic of
Korea.51 The problem is that as far as questions of security are concerned,
South Korea still has to rely on the United States. This became once again
obvious when dramatic changes in the military set-up were discussed.
In June 2004 the administration informed the South Korean government
of its plan to reduce the number of US troops in Korea by a third (i.e.,
12,500 troops) calling this realignment a result of the Global Defense
Posture Review.52 Not much was left for the South Korean government
but to ask for a review of this decision or at least a delay. The first US
troops leaving Korea were the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division
which moved to Iraq in the summer of 2004, a move that had been
announced already in May 2004.53 After long discussions within The
Future of the Alliance (FOTA) framework, the allies reached agreement
in 2004 about the relocation of US troops in Korea. US troops now
stationed in Seoul and the 2nd Infantry Division, now stationed north of
Seoul, will move to bases south of the Han River.54 Accordingly a
number of US military bases were closed.55 Various missions will be
transferred to South Korean forces. In the Joint Security Area in the
Demilitarized Zone, for example, South Korean forces took over patrol
duties.56 The really interesting move is that of the 2nd US Division from
positions close to the DMZ to areas south of the Han River. When this
move is completed, the US forces in Korea will be outside the artillery
range of North Korean forces. They will not automatically get involved in
an attack by North Korea. Thus, they will no longer serve as trip wire. It is
surprising that the two allies agreed on such a fundamental change.
Apparently both allies felt that the likelihood of a North Korean attack is
low and/or that they could cope with it with the new military setup. The
relocation of the 8th Army to areas south of the Han River can also be
justified by the argument that the administration wanted to have its forces
stationed in safer positions in case it decides for the military option.57
The South Korean government reacted by talking about advancing its
self-defense schedule. Indeed, South Korea needs better capabilities for

The United States and the Republic of Korea

225

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance as well as a stronger air

force and navy.58 In spite of all its efforts to strengthen its military capabilities, South Korea will remain the junior partner.59

Downloaded by [National Taiwan Ocean University] at 07:49 15 May 2016

FRICTIONS
The recent differences between the South Korean and the American governments were accompanied by anti-American outbursts in South Korea.
The disqualification of a South Korean skater in favor of an American
skater during the Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games in February 2002
caused significant anti-American sentiments.60 The fiercest outburst was
triggered by the accidental killing of two schoolgirls in June 2002 by a US
Army tank during an exercise near Uijongbu.61 Other actions were
directed against American policies, some showed outright hostility, the
bounders being fluid. Vigils against a possible American attack on North
Korea or against the presence of US troops in Korea were held.62 American
flags were burnt. An Oh! NoUSA festival as well as a comic audio
clip featuring a simulated telephone conversation between Kim Dae Jung
and George W. Bush amused many Koreans. A novel by Kim Jin Myung
The Third Scenario, depicting the US as wanting to suppress Koreans,
became very popular. Anti-American activities and feelings were of
changing strength, and Pro-American rallies were held to counter the antiAmerican demonstrations. Cardinal Stephen Kim, well known for his
integrity, expressed concern about the anti-American and pro-North
Korean sentiments of South Koreas youth.63
Various elements of this anti-Americanism are new. As Cardinal Kim has
correctly remarked, anti-Americanism is strong among the youth. According
to a Pew Global Attitude Survey of May 2003, 71% of the 1829 years olds
had an unfavorable opinion of the United States, while a year earlier the
percentage stood at 57%.64 Of the South Koreans who held unfavorable
views of the US, 72% expressed general hostility and not just disagreement with the policies of the Bush administration. One has to add that
among the younger South Koreans the better educated tend to have particularly unfavorable views of the United States.65 Among the Koreans of
50 years and older favorable opinions about the United States prevailed:
In May 2003 the percentage stood at 63%. Thus there is a generation gap
among Koreans with regard to their attitude towards the United States.66
Those who remember the great support of the United States since the
founding of the Republic of Korea, and particularly during the Korean
War and thereafter in developing their country, retain a positive memory
of their ally. The younger generation that has no personal recollection of
that period is critical of the United States. Their views are strengthened by
a changed threat perception. They have little tendency to fear an attack by

Downloaded by [National Taiwan Ocean University] at 07:49 15 May 2016

226

Juergen Kleiner

North Korea.67 The negative attitude by South Koreans toward the United
States was confirmed by a public opinion survey done in January 2005
according to which 395 of the respondents named the US as the country
most threatening to South Korea and 33% North Korea.68 Probably it was
the administrations policy of preemption, converted into prevention in
Iraq, which has considerably harmed American prestige among South
Koreans. They suspect that a similar US policy towards North Korea
could result in a catastrophe on the peninsula.
Under the influence of the sunshine policy another gap among South
Koreans has developed that is more of an ideological character, namely
one between liberals and conservatives.69 This gap only partly overlaps
the generation gap. The confrontation between these two groups is to a
certain extent reflected in the confrontation between the Uri Party and the
Grand National Party. Liberals ( jinbo) consider North Koreans first of all
as cousins in distress who deserve support.70 The South Korea Media
Rating Board, appointed by the President, banned US made video games
that depicted the North Koreans as bad guys since it is no longer fashionable to consider the North Koreans enemies.71 Liberals try to minimize
the military threat from the North and, consequently, have a critical, often
negative view of US forces in South Korea. What they, however, fail to
notice is the fact that they have partly become the victims of clever North
Korean nationalist propaganda. It was particularly worrisome that in the fall
of 2003 38% of respondents thought President Bush was more threatening
to peace in Korea compared to 42,1% for Kim Jong Il.72 Conservatives
(bosu) on the other hand consider the DPRK as still dangerous, insist on a
more balanced relationship with the North Koreans, and plead for a
continuation of strong ties with the United States.
Some voices in the United States showed consternation with regard to
the anti-American sentiments in South Korea. During the Congressional
Hearing with Assistant Secretary Kelly on 13 February 2003, various
representatives showed disappointment about the lack of appreciation of
the decades of American assistance.73 A surveynot a scientific poll
by FOX Television done in mid 2004 showed that 825 persons of those
Americans who took part agreed that the withdrawal of one-third of US
forces from South Korea was a good idea.74 The American disappointment is understandable. Gratitude is, however, not a political category.
One has, furthermore, to note that the Bush administrations lack of
respect for Korean sensitivities contributed to the negative feelings
among Koreans towards the United States. A case in point is the axis of
evil statement by President Bush. The South Koreans reacted negatively
regarding it as inappropriate.75
The way in which the administration handled the nuclear crisis created
further distrust in South Korea. According to the Pew Survey mentioned

The United States and the Republic of Korea

227

above 76% of the South Koreans believed in May 2003 that the United
States does not take into account South Koreans interests when making
international policy decisions. The administration should have treated the
ally with sensitivity. Instead it did not pay much attention to the intentions
and aspirations of the South Koreans.

Downloaded by [National Taiwan Ocean University] at 07:49 15 May 2016

ANOTHER TRY?
Both governments have repeatedly assured that the relationship is in great
shape. The fact, however, is that both countries have contributed to making the relationship a fragile one. Countries can of course define their
interests as they see fit. If both sides come to the conclusion that it is in
their interest to preserve the alliance, they must energetically try to reactivate and deepen the relationship.76 Since the urgency of the next step
regularly defies efforts for a long-term strategy that has to take many
variables into account, the allies considerations will probably focus on
current problems.77 The unification tunnel cannot been seen yet.78 Is
strengthening of the alliance in the interest of both allies?
In official publications by the South Korean government the importance of the alliance with the United States is sometimes played down.
The general remarks on the Blue House website, for example, do not
mention the alliance at all.79 If the South Korean government were to
reconsider the situation, it would likely come to recognize that good relations with its only ally are crucial. The United States remains the decisive
partner for manifold exchanges, for trade, for technology, for investment,
and for higher education. It is still the indispensable ally as long as an
attack by the North cannot be ruled out definitely. As has rightly been
pointed out, the intelligence capability of US forces in Korea alone is
crucial to keep North Korea in check.80 If the DPRK has indeed nuclear
weapons, South Korea has to rely on the nuclear shield provided by the
United States. It is still unknown whether North Korea has nuclear weapons,
but Siegfried Hecker, one of the best experts who has visited North
Korean nuclear installations twice, stated recently that one has to assume
that the DPRK has nuclear bombs.81 Perhaps South Korea might consider
producing its own nuclear arsenal and thus become independent from
American protection.82 In view of the many complications involved, this
is, however, a remote option.
Since it is, therefore, necessary to maintain the alliance with the United
States the South Korean government should actively try to improve the
climate for a strong cooperation. It should opt for a more mature, steady
course of its foreign policy. The South Korean government should accept
the fact that a split between its own policies and those of the US administration towards the DPRK enlarges the options for Kim Jong Il. Realpolitik,

Downloaded by [National Taiwan Ocean University] at 07:49 15 May 2016

228

Juergen Kleiner

not dreams is in demand. Not the United States but the DPRK stands in
the way of reunification. The South Korean government should realize
that its present policy which gives absolute priority to an engagement of
North Korea means that a leader remains in power who brutally suppresses
his people. The South Korean government should realize that in spite of all
efforts and many prior concessions, the DPRK did not change internally,
that no real reduction of tensions on the peninsula was achieved, and that
South-North relations do not yet follow any steady trend. Proliferation
has to be taken seriously. Cooperation with the United States should
return as the leitmotiv for the South Korean foreign policy. South Korea
has made a move to act once again in the spirit of the Mutual Defense
Treaty by sending troops to Iraq in the spring of 2003. The mission of
these forces was twice extended, but in December 2005 with the proviso
that 1,000 of the 3,200 military personnel will be withdrawn.83 In addition, South Koreas top politicians should publicly speak out for such a
policy and not just confide their good ideas to government websites.84
Public opinion should be won for continuing close ties with the United
States. The South Korean government should take the lead and try to
oppose erroneous public assumptions about the relationship with the
United States. It has already defended the latest revision of the Status of
Forces Agreement.85 It will have to get over possible local opposition
against the relocation of US forces to the Osan-Pyontaek area. The South
Korean government should also fight the symptoms of anti-Americanism.
This should not be too difficult. As Jinwung Kim has shown, South Koreans
have ambivalent views of the US military presence. Polls show that
many South Koreans are skeptical of the American military presence in
their country but still feel a need for it.86 The ambivalence of the South
Korean attitude towards the United States became also obvious when the
Rho Moo Hyun government, though it was looking for a self-reliant
defense, asked the administration not to withdraw military forces from the
peninsula.87 Thus it demonstrated the same reflex that all preceding South
Korean governments had shown when a withdrawal of US troops was
threatening. This situation is an excellent starting point for reviving closer
ties with the United States.
For the United States the alliance does not have the same importance as
for the South Korean partner. It has even been suggested that South Korea
has little security relevance for the United States and that a war on the
peninsula would be irrelevant to the US.88 The South, this argument continues, could defend itself alone. Therefore, the subsidies for South Korea,
including its military free-ride, should be ended, the American military
withdrawn from the peninsula, and the Mutual Defense Treaty cancelled.
The estimates of the costs for raising and maintaining US units in
South Korea and their reinforcements vary between $15 and $30 billion

Downloaded by [National Taiwan Ocean University] at 07:49 15 May 2016

The United States and the Republic of Korea

229

annually.89 A withdrawal of US troops from Korea would only diminish

the burden of the American taxpayer if it were accompanied by an similar
reduction of overall military forces of the United States. As long as fighting continues in Afghanistan and Iraq, this is not likely to happen. To
move the troops now stationed in Korea to bases in the United States
would not help to save costs. On the contrary, there will no longer be
anybody available who helps out with cost sharing.
Disengagement is not in sight. It can be assumed that the Bush
administration will stick to its National Security Strategy. As long as
North Korea is a troublemaker in Northeast Asia the United States will
maintain vigilance towards the North and will develop the alliance with
the Republic of Korea to contribute to the broader stability of the
region.90 The United States will maintain forces in the region as a
symbol of its commitment and to contend with uncertainty.91 Indeed,
the United States has maintained forces in Korea not only to defend its
ally, but also to satisfy its own interests. Ever since US forces were
deployed to South Korea in 1945, this part of the peninsula has been
inside the American strategic defensive perimeter, declarations to the
contrary notwithstanding. The alliance guarantees American predominance by keeping the Republic of Korea within the US imperium. A war
on the peninsula might not pose a threat to the security of the United
States, because it would be fought far away from the US homeland. It
would, however, affect the political position of the United States as the
dominant pacific power. The United States would react in the same way it
did in 1953: it would oppose an attack on a country that belongs to its
sphere of influence. By completely withdrawing its troops from Korea the
United States would give up its most valuable instrument of influencing
developments on the peninsula. The day may come when little brother
will propagate such a development. For the time being, however, both
sides seem to prefer that the present setup be continued.
As long as the uncertainties about North Korea prevail, it is a sensible
strategy to provide for a worst case scenario. The administration should,
however, take the South Korean efforts of reconciliation seriously. It should
abstain from hurting the feelings of the South Koreans. Some important
steps in that direction have already been taken. The relocation of the US
garrison from Seoul to Pyontaek removes an irritant to the population of
South Korea since it occupied precious real estate in the heart of the city.92
The relocation of the 7th Division to a rear area leaves the mission to man
defenses directly behind the DMZ to the South Korean forces.
In his press conference on 13 April 2004, President Bush talked about
his vision to change the world for the better.93 A large part of his second
inaugural address on 20 January 2005 was devoted to the idea of spreading
liberty in the world. The president said, The best hope for peace in

Downloaded by [National Taiwan Ocean University] at 07:49 15 May 2016

230

Juergen Kleiner

our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.94 He added that the
United States would support the growth of democratic movements with
the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. This vision is noble, but
it is unclear what actions are envisaged. It comes to mind that moral values
have often been used to justify American interventions. Translated to the
situation on the Korean peninsula it is unrealistic to assume that foreigners
could undertake the task of fundamentally changing the relationship
between the two Koreas. Only the Korean people can decide about the
track that it wishes to follow. The general idea is clearly expressed in
the Friendly Relations Resolution of the UN General Assembly.95 The
resolution states that all peoples have the right freely to determine,
without external interference, their political status and to pursue their
economic, social and cultural development. In the eyes of the Koreans
the relationship between South and North is an issue of self-determination.
Korea, they feel belongs to the Koreans, and it is not up to the United
States government to decide Koreas fate. The United States, however,
is used to being deeply involved in Koreas fate. The American role in
the Korean War, that had basically started as a civil war, and the subsequent support for South Korea had expanded American involvement.
The United States can reassert its influence on the peninsula only if it
respects the Koreans right to self-determination. Rhetoric is not good
enough. It will be an upward battle to regain the trust of a majority of
South Koreans. The doubts of American allies worldwide about the
course of the administrations foreign policy and its reasoning have
spread to the peninsula.
This means in concrete terms that the administration should return its
focus on Korea and be willing to discuss basic South Korean assumptions
for the policy towards North Korea. Perhaps the strategic consultations on
a ministerial level that got started in January 2006 provide a basis for
meaningful discussions.96 The US government should abandon the option
of working for a collapse of the North, not because the North has suddenly changed its ugly face, but because the South Koreans are strictly
against such a turn of events. The responsibility assumed by the United
States and the DPRK in the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 to
respect each others sovereignty should be translated into reality immediately. The new attitude should be reflected in the way both sides treat
and talk publicly about each other. The US government should accept
South Korean suggestions to show more flexibility. It is difficult to see
that any meaningful progress can be reached without demonstrating to the
North Koreans that their security is not in danger.
The efforts by the governments should be supported by track two
diplomacy.97 Citizens and private organizations from South Korea and the
United States should get together and focus on ways to improve the ties

The United States and the Republic of Korea

231

between their countries. As private persons they are not bound by instructions and have more leeway in coming to results. They should first of all
discuss a reasonable approach to solving the nuclear problems posed by
the DPRK.

Downloaded by [National Taiwan Ocean University] at 07:49 15 May 2016

PERSPECTIVES
To maintain a strengthened bilateral alliance is also in the long-term
interest of both allies. A united Korea will be preoccupied with the
problems arising from the task of unifying the country. During transition, a period of uncertainty, it will appreciate a continuation of US
backing and support. To have a united Korea as an ally is in the strategic
interest of the United States, less in the name of military redundancy but
more with a view to strengthening Americas position as a pacific
power. Forward-deployed US forces on the Korean peninsula are a clear
symbol of power projection.
It would be a good idea to transform the two separate alliances of the
United States with Korea and Japan into a trilateral partnership. With a
view to the track record of KoreanJapanese relations it seems, however,
unlikely that the historical enmity of Korea against Japan can be surmounted. Whether it will be attractive for Seoul to become a party to a
loose coalition of allies of the United States in Asia remains to be seen.
During transition a united Korea will be afraid of being dragged into any
conflict. Neither will counter-terrorism be a convincing argument to draw
Korea into a coalition of willing allies.98 The Republic of Korea has
suffered from terrorism, namely state terrorism by North Korea, and
coped with it. This kind of terrorism will be gone after reunification. The
terrorism of other groups, particularly of the dangerous type that are
based on common ethnicity, history, and religious fervor, has so far not
been directed against Korea.
Thus the two allies might focus on transforming their bilateral military
cooperation. These talks will be difficult enough since they will have to
deal with sensitive issues, off-peninsula missions of US forces stationed
in Korea, wartime operational control by the South over its own forces,
the future of the Combined Forces Command, and perhaps even offpeninsula missions of Korean forces.
Even if both sides, the Republic of Korea and the United States of
America, are willing to try a new learning curve, success is not guaranteed. Korean nationalism and the dynamism of the present American
foreign policy with its occasional traces of overestimating the possible are
obstacles that are hard to overcome.

232

Juergen Kleiner

Downloaded by [National Taiwan Ocean University] at 07:49 15 May 2016

NOTES
1. For details see Chapter 18 South Koreas Great Partner in Juergen Kleiner,
Korea. A Century of Change, Singapore 2001, pp. 307322.
2. The term was used for the original United StatesPakistan relationship.
3. Department of State, Background Notes: South Korea (October 2004), on the
Web site of the State Department; Combined Forces Command, on the Web
site of US Forces Korea.
4. In 2002 South Korea used 2.8% of its GNP for defense, see the Report on Allied
Contributions to the Common Defense, A Report to United States Congress by
the Secretary of Defense, July 2003, Part I-3, II-5 and II-19 (on the Department
of Defense Web site).
5. Arms Control Association, The Missile Technology Control Regime at a
Glance, September 2004 (at www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/mtcr.asp).
6. Jin Young Chung, Cost Sharing for USFK in Transition: Whither the USROK Alliance? in Donald W. Boose, Jr., Balbina Y. Hwang, Patrick Morgan,
Andrew Scobell, Recalibrating The US-Republic of Korea Alliance, May 2003,
pp. 4445.
7. See the Report, mentioned in footnote 5.
8. Web site of US Forces in Korea: US-ROK SOFA and Related Agreements.
9. Chuck Downs, Over the Line. North Koreas Negotiating Strategy, Washington
1999, pp. 130131.
10. Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb, New York 1995, pp. 109112
and 169171; Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers, Nuclear Diplomacy with North
Korea, Princeton 1998, pp. 8689 and 193.
11. Peace and Cooperation, White Paper on Korean Unification 1996, Ministry of
National Unification, Republic of Korea, Seoul 1996, p. 60, similarly p. 122.
12. Ibid. p. 123.
13. Ryan J. Barilleaux, Andrew Ilsu Kim, Clinton, Korea, and Presidential Diplomacy, World Affairs, Summer 1999, Vol. 162, Iss. 1, p. 29.
14. Quoted by Mazarr p. 176, and footnote 93.
15. Hong Nack Kim, Foreign Relations under the Kim Dae-Jung Government, in
Kongdan Oh, Korea Briefing 19971999, pp. 148155; Edward A. Olsen, US
Policy Toward the Inter-Korean Dialogue, in Kongdan Oh and Ralph C.
Hassig, Korea Briefing 20002001, pp. 149179.
16. Remarks by President Bush and President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea,
7 March 2001 (on the White House Web site).
17. New York Times, 28 February 2001.
18. Text in Peoples Korea, 15 June 2000.
19. Juergen Kleiner, The Bush Administration and the Nuclear Challenges by
North Korea, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 16 (June 2005), pp. 203226.
20. Speech on 31 October 2002 (on the Chongwadae Web site).
21. See for example his statements on 31 October 2002 (on the Chongwadae Web
site) and on 13 April 2005 (Korea Herald, 14 April 2005).
22. With regard to the costs see Marcus Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse. The Future
of the Two Koreas, Washington 2000, p. 285 et seq.

Downloaded by [National Taiwan Ocean University] at 07:49 15 May 2016

The United States and the Republic of Korea

233

23. Korea Herald, 16 April and 6 June 2005.

24. Washington Post, 12 July 2005, Korea Herald, 14 July 2005, International Herald
Tribune, 13 July 2005.
25. For details on South Korean reactions see for example Jinwung Kim (2001),
p. 187 et seq.
26. The term was coined by William M. Drennan, The US Role in Korean Reunification, Korea and World Affairs, Vol. 22 (Summer 1989), p. 172.
27. Department of Defense News Briefing, 23 December 2002 (on the Department
of Defense Web site).
28. KCNA, 10 February 2005.
29. Korea Herald, 15 February 2005.
30. Reuters quoting President Roh Moo Hyun on 13 April 2005.
31. Washington Post, 23 May 2005, Korea Herald, 13 July 2005.
32. Korea Herald, 15 April 2005.
33. Korea Herald, 19 November 2005.
34. Korea Herald, 10 December 2005.
35. US Department of the Treasury, Press Release, dated 15 September 2005 (on
the Treasury Department Web site, accessed on 18 December 2005; see also
John K. Cooley, The Rogue money printers of Pyongyang, International
Herald Tribune, 25 October 2005.
36. Reuters, 20 October 2005 (english.epochtimes.com/news/51022/33618.html,
accessed on 18 December 2005).
37. Korea Herald, 5 and 29 December 2005.
38. Korea Herald, 7 and 16 December 2005, International Herald Tribune,
21 December 2005.
39. New York Times, 23 November 2002.
40. Text of the statement: Washington Post, 19 September 2005.
41. New York Times, 25 October 2002; Kim Sung Han, 1994 Agreed Framework
Should Be Maintained, Korea Times, 5 November 2002.
42. Condoleeza Rice, Promoting the National Interest, Foreign Affairs, January/
February 2000, p. 61.
43. Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations, Unclassified Report by Dr. William Perry, 12 October, 1999 (on
the Department of State Web site).
44. New York Times, 23 January 2003, Washington Post, 18 July 2005.
45. See President Rohs speech in Los Angeles on 12 November 2004 that summarized his view on the nuclear crisis (on the Blue House Web site).
46. Press Conference, 4 December 2002 (on the Chongwadae Web site).
47. Interview, 23 January 2003 (on the Chongwadae Web site).
48. Korea Herald, 16 January 2004.
49. Korea Herald, 11 November 2004.
50. Speech at the Military Academy on 22 March 2005 (on the Blue House Web site).
51. Korea Herald, 8 December 2005.
52. Reuters, 7 June 2004.
53. Department of State Washington File, EPF206, 18 May 2004 (on the Web).
54. US Department of Defense, News Releases No.70604 and 99504, 23 July and
6 October 2004; see also the Joint Communiqu: 36th Annual US-ROK

234

55.
56.
57.
58.

Downloaded by [National Taiwan Ocean University] at 07:49 15 May 2016

59.
60.

61.
62.

63.
64.

65.
66.

67.
68.
69.
70.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Juergen Kleiner
Security Consultative Meeting, 25 October 2004 (Department of State
Washington File EPF 109, on the Departments Web site).
Korea Herald, 26 December 2005.
Korea Herald, 1 November 2004.
Ted Galen Carpenter and Doug Bandow, The Korean Conundrum. Americas
Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, New York 2004, p. 93.
Kang Choi, Restructuring the Alliance for Regional and Global Challenges,
(http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS53491).
See also Lee Sang Hyun, Past, Present, and Future of the Korea-US Alliance,
East Asia Review, Vol. 15, No.2 (Summer 2003), pp. 8283.
Eric V. Larson, Norman D. Levin with Seonhae Baik, Bogdan Savych, Ambivalent Allies? A Study of South Korean Attitudes Toward the United States,
RAND Corporation March 2004, p. 75, Table 4.3.
Donald Kirk, US and South Korea start a new dance, The World and I, May
2003, Vol. 18, Issue. 5, p. 62.
For the examples mentioned in the text see New York Times, 13 December 2002,
5 January and 31 March 2003; Korea Times, 30 April 2002; for the difficulties
concerning a definition of anti-Americanism see Balbina Y. Hwang, AntiAmericanism in Korea: Implications for the Future of the US-ROK Alliance,
East Asia 20, No. 2, Summer 2003, p.60.
Korea Herald, 3 February 2004.
For these and the following figures see Pew Research Center for the Peoples and
the Press: International Public Concern about North Korea, but Growing antiAmericanism in South Korea (on the PEW Web site); see also the poll conducted
by Seoul National University in January 2003 (Korea Herald, 11 April 2003).
Larson and Levin, p. 75, Table 4.7, and pp. 9599.
See also the Chungang Ilbo poll of 13 January 2003, quoted by Jinwung Kim,
Ambivalent Allies: Recent South Korean Perceptions of the United States
Forces Korea (USFK), Asian Affairs, Washington, Winter 2004, Vol. 30, Iss. 4,
p. 268; Stephen W Linton, US policy on Korean peninsula needs an overhaul,
Korea Herald, 23 July 2004.
Balbina Y. Hwang, loc. cit. p. 68.
Washington Post, 12 May 2005.
Taewoo Kim, Perceptions of North Korea and Polarization of ROK Society,
in Boose and others, loc. cit., pp. 139159.
Similarly Donald P. Gregg, The United States and South Korea: An Alliance
Adrift, in Michael H. Armacost and Daniel I. Okimoto, The Future of Americas Alliances in Northeast Asia, Stanford, 2004, p. 148.
New York Times, 7 December 2005.
Lee Chung Min, p. 212.
US Congress Hearing with Jim Kelly, 13 February 2003 (on the Web site of the
Federal News Service, 13 February 2003).
Korea Herald, 10 June 2004.
Katrin A. Fraser, Reflections on Anti-American Sentiment in Korea, The
Korea Society Quarterly, Spring 2002, pp. 1516 with footnote 10.
Different C. S. Eliot Kang, Restructuring the US-South Korea alliance to deal
with the second Korean nuclear crisis, Australian Journal of International

The United States and the Republic of Korea

77.

78.

Downloaded by [National Taiwan Ocean University] at 07:49 15 May 2016

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

84.
85.
86.

87.
88.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

235

Affairs, Vol. 57, No.2 (July 2003), pp. 309324, who recommends more distance
in the alliance.
For an overview over the discussions of the future of the alliance see Charles M.
Perry, Jacquelyn K. Davis, James L. Schoff, Toshi Yoshihara, Alliance Diversification and the Future of the U.S.-Korean Security Alliance, 2004, particularly pp.
3651. The authors focus on policies for the post-North Korea period.
For the term unification tunnel see Lee Chung Min, Domestic Politics and
the Changing Contours of the ROK-US Alliance: The End of the Status Quo,
in Armacost and Okimoto, p. 216 footnote 14.
http://english.president.go.kr/warp/en/news/goals.php (accessed on 4 January
2006).
Lee Sang Hyun, Past, Present, and Future of the Korea-US Alliance, East
Asian Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, Summer 2003. p. 82.
Washington Post, 9 November 2005.
An option favored by and Bandow loc. cit pp. 84100.
KOIS: Activities of Korean Troops in Iraq, on the KOIS Web site, July 2004;
JoongAng Daily, 27 December 2004; Washington Post, 31 December 2004;
Washington Post, 30 December 2005.
See the chapter ROK-US Relations on Korea.net that suggests a mature
KoreanAmerican relationship.
Facts and Current Developments of Korea-US Status of Forces Agreement,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 11 April 2002 (on Korea.net).
Jinwung Kim loc. cit. in footnote 54; Jinwung Kim, From American gentlemen to Americans: Changing Perceptions of the United States in South Korea
in Recent Years, Korea Journal, 41 Issue 4, Winter 2001, p. 179; see also Victor
D. Cha, America and South Korea: The ambivalent alliance? Current History,
September 2003, Vol.102, Issue 665, p. 279; Larson, pp. 5159.
Korea Herald, 7 March 2003.
This idea has been advanced Carpenter and Bandow from the Cato Institute
since many years, recently in the book quoted in footnote 57, passim, particularly chapters 4 and 5.
Carpenter and Bandow p. 118; Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 1997, p. 311.
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September,
p. 26 (on the White House Web site).
Ibid. p. 29.
C. Rice, quoted by The Korea Herald, 20 August 2004.
President Addresses the Nation in Prime Time Press Conference (on the White
House Web site).
New York Times, 21 January 2005.
A/Res.2025 (XXV) of 24 October 1970.
Korea Herald, 11 and 21 January 2006.
For example by Lee Sang Hyun (mentioned in footnote 58), p. 85.
Different Charles M. Perry a. o. p. 59 et seq.

Downloaded by [National Taiwan Ocean University] at 07:49 15 May 2016