Chapter 14 of the new Constitution sets out the provision for local governance in Zimbabwe.

Analyze this section and explain if the new constitution went far enough in providing a basis
for the creation of a devolved or decentralized system of local governance? Outline and
discuss arguments in support for and against the assertion that it does make adequate
provision for devolution. In what ways if any does the new constitution promote a better
system of local governance than what earlier existed in Zimbabwe given the objectives of
decentralization from literature? (Reference and cite from scholarly literature and the new
constitution) (25 marks)

Contents
Contents......................................................................................................................................1
Introduction................................................................................................................................1
Key design principles for decentralisation.................................................................................5
Decentralisation in Zimbabwe...................................................................................................5
Security of existence...............................................................................................................5
Clearly demarcated and relevant powers................................................................................5
Revenue raising powers..........................................................................................................6
Budget and Expenditure control.............................................................................................6
Administrative autonomy.......................................................................................................7
Local Democracy....................................................................................................................7
Supervision.............................................................................................................................8
Intergovernmental cooperation...............................................................................................8
Role of the Constitutional Court.............................................................................................8
Comparison of current constituition to the previous one...........................................................9
Conclusion..................................................................................................................................9
References..................................................................................................................................9

Introduction
Intellectual proponents in support of decentralization cite allocative efficiency (public goods
aligned to local preferences), improved productive efficiency and integrity, and superior cost
recovery. The possible shortcomings of decentralization documented in the discourse include
potential failures of policy coordination, tendencies toward elite capture of local
governments, and disappointments stemming from inadequate capacities in local government.

Rondinelli and Nellis (1986) summarized decentralization into four main practices, namely,
administrative; political; fiscal and market types. Crawford (2009) observed that several
African governments have chosen to implement political decentralisation known as
devolution as well as administrative decentralisation (deconcentration). Johnson et al. (2005)
contests that deconcentration is the frequently encountered form of decentralisation in most
African countries. They gave an example of passport offices located in the provincial foci of
the countries. Deconcentration means that critical decisions are the only ones which will be
referred to the headquarters. In contrast, delegation pertains to the handing over of
responsibilities of administration and finance to semi-autonomous bodies such as parastatals
and the state universities. Divestment or privatisation is a market-type involving the
government turning over its obligations to private companies.

Ribot (2004) commented that devolved systems of government are perceived and applauded
as more democratic. Chirisa et al. (2013) witnessed that devolution has been understood as
the conception of comparatively autonomous realms of authority, responsibility and
entitlement, with a primary accountability to the localities themselves. They defined it as the
transference of power and authority from central governments to legally established, locally
elected political establishments for development. This coincides with Dennis A Rondinellis
view that it is the handover of responsibility for strategic management and resource
mobilisation and distribution from the central government and its agencies to: (a) field units
of central government ministries or agencies, (b) subordinate units or levels of government,
(c) semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, (d) area-wide, regional or functional
authorities, or (e) non-governmental private or voluntary organizations. Devolution
therefore is theoretically a path to citizen participation and better service delivery. Zimbabwe,
mainly on the instigation of the opposition parties embarked on constitutional reforms.

Zimbabwes new Constitution adopted in May 2013 states that governmental powers and
responsibilities must be devolved between the national government, provincial and
metropolitan councils and local authorities. These three tiers or structures (as ZANU PF
wants them called) are projected to guarantee good governance through effectiveness,
transparency, accountability and responsiveness to the needs of local people. This
introduction of devolution as a governance model in Zimbabwe replaces deconcentration on
the proposition that the former is a more democratic, citizen-responsive, participatory leading
to more transparency, accountability and locally applicable development focussed governance
system.

These views are shared and further promoted across Africa by the World Bank Report
(2000/1) which guides that citizen participation in local matters generates a virtuous circle
that warrants that majority needs are heard and seeks to increase the voice of
marginalised people in local undertakings.

A case for devolution

Devolution is appreciated as one of the mechanisms that empower the public to contribute
effectively in the management of public concerns and is consequently beneficial to local
democracy according to Chikulo (1998). However, as Goetz and Gaventa (in Crawford,
2001) discern, participation and the manifestation of voice do not inescapably translate to
being heard or listened to. People can simply be ignored.

Rondinelli, Nellis & Cheema (1983) conclude that devolution empowers national levels of
government to respond to challenges of a purely local nature negating the need for policy
instructions and directives from the central government. These issues should not be interjurisdictional. Barnett, Minis & Van Sant (1997) argue that a devolved system accentuates the
existence of mechanisms for rational local political competition, transparency, and
accountability with public processes that are accessible to the public. These mechanisms have
to be accountable to the public and administered by the rule of law. Decentralisation is not a
panacea to the challenges of governance. On itself, decentralisation is necessary but not
sufficient; authors have noted that certain conditions have to exist for decentralisation to
achieve its theoretical benefits. The next section discusses these principles that ensure
successful decentralisation.

Key design principles for decentralisation

The tangible yield of decentralisation, to a substantial degree, is contingent on certain
circumstances that are explicitly or implicitly assumed in conventional analyses, particularly
the presence of key institutional disciplines. Azfar, Khknen, and Meagher (2001) focused
on three kinds of institutional disciplines:
Civic disciplines are those related with the ability and opportunities of citizens, media, and
nongovernmental organizations present their views known to the government (voice), and
to switch to other neighbourhoods or suppliers of services (exit).
Intergovernmental disciplines pertain to relationships between the different echelons of
government. This can be central government oversight of local government processes, or
fiscal constraints (or restrictions to taxing authority) enforced by the centre on lower levels of
government.
Public sector management disciplines are the techniques in which each government entity
regulates and restrains the behaviour of its own official such as anticorruption procedures.

These three do not have clear distinctions amongst them but overlap.

Visser and Chigwata (2013) discussed eight prominent design principles which are listed
below and discussed under the three types of institutional disciplines mentioned above.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.

Security of existence
Clearly delimited and relevant powers
Revenue-mobilisation powers
Clear rules for budget and expenditure control
Administrative autonomy
Local democracy
Rules-based supervision, including redeployment of resources
Intergovernmental cooperation

Local democracy would lie under civil disciplines while intergovernmental disciplines
include security of existence, revenue generating powers and intergovernmental cooperation.
Furthermore, evidently delineated and relevant powers can be taken under both
intergovernmental and public sector management disciplines. Public sector management
components imply rules based supervision, administrative autonomy and unambiguous rules
for budget and expenditure control. This paper will now focus on how these disciplines apply
to the situation in Zimbabwe.
Decentralisation in Zimbabwe
Security of existence
The 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe identifies three 'tiers' of government- national
government, provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities. This safeguards the
existence of provincial and local government as levels of government. Moreover, the life of
each single provincial/metropolitan council is also protected by the constitution. What is not
obvious if the local authorities are immune to arbitrary changes by the ruling party.
Unilateral changes consolidating power and authority in the executive have been known to
occur in Zimbabwe. This constitution is a substantial deviation from the status quo even
though Acts of Parliament have to be promulgated.
Clearly demarcated and relevant powers
Section 270 of the Constitution does not explicitly define the Provincial governments roles
of 'planning', 'implementing', 'promoting', 'evaluating' government programmes as they relate
to central government influence or manipulation. In addition, the fact that functions of local
authorities not provided in the Constitution ''may be conferred by an Act of Parliament
points towards maintenance of the status quo. S276 Constitution claims local authorities have
the right to govern' and that they have 'all the powers necessary for it to do so'. It is not
certain which powers are meant here.

Revenue raising powers

The constitution fails to acknowledge the revenue-generation powers of provincial and local
government. While S 276(2) (b) Constitution notes that an Act of Parliament 'may' confer
taxing powers to local authorities, this again does not change the present status of
administration. This leaves governments without protected taxing powers. The chief sources
of income for local authorities are service charges (such as water charges), rates on property
and land, and several fees and levies. The Urban Councils Act and the Rural
District Councils Act authorise councils to enact by-laws that permit authorities to generate
revenue through a number of charges made for any services, amenities or facilities provided
by council.
Budget and Expenditure control
The new Constitution makes no pronouncement on financial management. Parliament will
control the budget and expenditure. This again shows no deviation from present state of
affairs. It brings into doubt the principle of budget autonomy of the lower tiers of
government. Certain rural district councils have sub-offices for road maintenance and
revenue collection, while central government is represented through several sector ministries
in wards and villages, sometimes by more than one officer at ward level. The heavy
comprehensive representation of Ministries such as the Ministry of Youth, Ministry of
Women Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture is a strong suggestion that personnel and
resources are not being decentralised to designated local authorities.
Under the existing establishment arrangements, provincial and local authorities do not have a
budgetary allocation in their own right by virtue of being sub-structures of the Ministry of
Local Government, Public Works and National Housing. Even though the Constitution
requires that at least 5% of national revenue be allocated to local government, it fails to
clarify the mechanism for achieving this. Case in point, is the 5% allocation to be deducted
from gross revenue or computed after national interest and debt payment have been
subtracted? Besides, apprehensions arise in trying to decipher why only 5% of the revenue
should be allocated to local government which is the government closest to the people and
delivers the majority of services. In addition, it is not indicated how the 5% grant will be
shared between provincial authorities and local authorities.
Administrative autonomy
Local governments are not constitutionally mandated to perform human resources
procedures. It is an Act of Parliament that determines staffing issues of provincial and local
governments together with determining internal procedures of provincial governments. This
cements the status quo. It is apparent that the lower systems are not self-regulating in terms of
administration. They cannot escape the influence of central government. The Zimbabwe
Report (2014) reasons that while local authorities are accountable to local communities
central government ( as the creator of local authorities) is accountable for the combined
performance of local authorities. As a result, the report claims, local authorities should not be
misunderstood as self-governing centres of power. It goes on to argue that although local
government seeks to create participatory and popularly elected structures that recognize and
guarantee provision of services, local government has never been a sovereign sphere of the
larger central governmental structure.
Both the Urban Councils Act and the Rural District Councils Act document numerous
illustrations where the Minister and/or the President can intervene in the operations of local

authorities. In light of this degree of ministerial intervention, it is uncertain whether

meaningful devolution can be realised. The situation in the City of Harare (or any other city
for that matter) is a case in point, where the councils operations are regularly directed from
the Ministers office, usually in express disrespect of the provisions of the Urban Councils
Act.
Local Democracy
It is worth noting that there are now directly elected councillors and mayors rather than more
appointees. The challenges however come to provincial and metropolitan councils where the
majority of members are indirectly elected. This casts doubt on the level of local democracy.
This is compounded by the fact that elections are held concurrently. Another key change is
the safeguard against the arbitrary removal of councillors.
Supervision
The 2013 Constitution is not explicit in providing for regulation, monitoring, support and
intervention while parliament decides the nature and extent of supervision. There is obscurity
when it comes to constitutional limits to this supervision thus bringing into question again the
autonomy of provincial and local governments.
Intergovernmental cooperation
Regarding intergovernmental cooperation between provincial and metropolitan councils and
local authorities, the constitution does provide for. Surprisingly, it states that an Act of
Parliament will provide for coordination rather than cooperation among the three tiers of
government. This apparently fails to recognise organised local government. It is not clear
how consultations nor participation and engagement will be guaranteed given the silence of
the constitution.
The Zimbabwe Report (2014) sees the inclusion of members of Parliament in provincial and
metropolitan councils as a way to improve consistency in the formulation and implementation
of national and provincial policies. Members of Parliament (even ministers) are now
obligated not only to interrelate productively with local people but also to deliberate on local
issues. Consequently, provincial councils have the capacity to become a more accessible
governance and decision-making platform than was the situation hitherto, providing a forum
driven by evidence based accountability connecting dogmatic manifestos with local
execution.
The report cautions though that the provincial council is, by design, a choked structure with
too many players. At this time, the country is undergoing serious economic challenges and
cannot afford to adequately resource such a huge administrative structure. In fact, some
proponents of devolution had envisioned a two-tier system rather than a three-tier one.
Additionally, power and political dynamics stemming from the configuration of provincial
councils could compromise local policymaking. The dilemma develops regarding whose
voice will be loudest in provincial council deliberations. Can the provincial council chair
manage to control the ministers who sit in the council? This is exacerbated by the fact that the
executive appointed Ministers of State for Provincial Affairs. Also, given that most members
of provincial councils have national responsibilities that call for their devotion will they have

enough time for local issues? These questions are difficult to answer and perhaps the
Constitutional Court would deal with them. But then again, can it?
Role of the Constitutional Court
There is opacity when it comes to the capacity of the Constitutional Court to arbitrate if and
when parliament has laid down laws that undermine devolution. Can it strike them down?
The Constitution is unclear whether devolution is a constitutional matter. What are
constitutional matters anyway? This is another debate where scholars will not find common
ground easily. Regardless that the status, powers and functions of provincial and local
government are circumscribed by the Constitution and Acts of Parliament- s 276(1), it is quite
apparent that the Constitution promotes parliamentary sovereignty over devolution. This
brings in uncertainty over the respect for devolution.

Comparison of current Constitution to the previous one

Section 111A of the Zimbabwe Constitution (as amended 2009) provided that: Provincial,
district or regional governors
(1) For the better administration of Zimbabwe, an Act of Parliament may provide for the
appointment by the President of governors for any areas within Zimbabwe.
(2) Governors appointed in terms of an Act of Parliament referred to in subsection (1) shall
have such functions and powers in relation to the areas for which they have been appointed as
may be prescribed by or under the Act of Parliament.
(3) The offices of governors appointed in terms of an Act of Parliament referred to in
subsection (1) shall be public offices but shall not form part of the Public Service.
From the above, it is observed that the local government system did not enjoy any
constitutional protection. Resultantly, local government existed as a creature of statute and
subject to the whims of the Minister responsible for local government. Amongst the
significant of these enormous powers was the enactment of section 4A of the urban Councils
Act (2008) which provided for the appointment of special interest councillors in all urban
areas.

The current Constitution stipulates that whenever appropriate, governmental powers and
responsibilities must be devolved to provincial and metropolitan councils and local
authorities which are competent to carry out those responsibilities efficiently and effectively.
This implies that the Constitution guarantees the executive discretionary power to decide
whether a particular province has the appropriate competence to efficiently and effectively
administer local affairs and introduce locally relevant socio-economic development
interventions for the benefit of the majority of the local citizens. Knowing the views of the
ruling party, this will bring all opposition-led councils into clashes with the Minister of Local
Government. In fact, it has been reported that the incumbent minister defied a court order that
revoked his suspension of a mayor and councillors. As stated above, the appointment of
Ministers of State for Provincial Affairs has sunk any optimisms of decentralising power.
These provincial ministers report directly to the President, hence their interaction with

provincial councils or mayors of respective areas will be posturing. They can supersede every
programme set to be taken in their respective provinces as discussed by Bhebhe (2013).
It remains to be clarified on which government institution is principally responsible for the
execution of the devolution programme and who, in the event of resistance between
provincial and metropolitan councils and respective sector ministries, has the final arbitral
powers. Mitchinson (2003) postulates that dispersal of the powers of oversight and
adjudication to several key players may have the benefit of warranting that no super ministry
or agency takes absolute control of the proposed lower tiers of government. This is why
Bogdanor (1999) advocates for a court to police the division between various tiers of a
devolved government.
Jacobs and Chavunduka, (2003) have observed that most of the developing countries are
peppered with totalitarianism, the preservation of traditional leadership and strong hints of
colonial tendencies. Furthermore, and broadly, public structures in the emerging world, as
debated by Chirenje et al., (2013) orbit about small clusters of communities that are
characterised by geo-political, economic and cultural bonds, characteristic of rural areas.
These scenarios denote top-down decision-making regimes. As a consequence, Morgan
(2001) argues that each region should receive an allocation based on their needs rather than
population in order for devolution to achieve territorial impartiality. Poverty eradication is at
the centre of devolution. To accomplish this goal redistributive strategies have to be certain
and expressive on the concept of social justice. Furthermore, the policies must plainly deal
with the problem of elite capture. This requires robust support structures to expedite the
transformation. Capacity building, dispute resolution approaches and fiscal empowerment are
therefore critical to ensuring that devolution achieves its aims by promoting citizen
participation.

Conclusion
Centralised systems rely on disciplinary specialisation using tools to examine the rural status.
As contrasted by Chambers (1983), decentralized systems advance from an examination of
the condition of underprivileged people, their resources, aspirations and challenges involving
emphasis from within in that way lending a superior conceptualisation and a fertile
environment for democratic development. Chirisa et al. (2013) mourn that devolution is
engaging to contrive on a fundamental scale since the elites in power should be the ones to
relinquish functions and resources. Moreover, the triumph of devolution is grounded on its
centrality to the constitution, reinforced by robust legal institutional frameworks. Thirdly, the
decentralisation initiative demands a sturdy transparency framework supported by robust
involvement in the process to create an inclusive devolution process.
Leonardi, Nanetti & Putnam (1981) delineate the limitations of realising devolution in
Zimbabwe into two categories, viz., formal resources (laws, rules and money) and informal
resources (technical proficiency, civic opinion and partisan politics. Brand (1991) bemoaned
the failure of early attempts at decentralisation, which efforts he likened to centrally created
decentralization. It has been argued that central government was not dedicated to the letter
and spirit of making local government a distinct sphere. In support, Gasper (1991:41)
stresses that decentralization should not be believe to be a mere set of legal or administrative

decrees. It requires concerted efforts in information dissemination, demonstration, incentives,

training, discussion, mobilization, and on-going informal coordination.
The 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe recognises and protects provincial and local
governments. This seeks to advance democracy. Disappointingly, there have been no
substantial changes in the powers and functions of provincial and local governments. It is
noteworthy though that the debate on devolution of power is not yet closed. In addition, the
ruling party officially publicised its economic blueprint: Zimbabwe Agenda for
Sustainable Social Economic Transformation (marketed as ZimAsset). This strategy covers
the period 2013 to 2018 but it never refers to devolution as embraced in the Constitution. The
Public Administration, Governance and Performance Management sub-cluster of ZimAsset,
does not mention devolution nor does it include the establishment of provincial structures. In
its place, the cluster focuses on building the capacity of the civil service and on performance
management as the catalyst for refining public administration and service delivery.

In theory, the small size of wards from which councillors (who make up the council) are
drawn permits councillors to be in constant close contact with their constituents. This
possibly delivers an avenue for local citizens to access their political representatives thus
enabling their voice to be heard in decision making that affects their local service delivery
and local development. In addition, cooperation between the three tiers is possible, its
accomplishment or miscarriage will be contingent on how an Act of Parliament (yet to be
promulgated) will delimit the instruments and procedures to facilitate co-ordination among
central government, provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities.
According to Morgan (2001), devolution delivers cost-effective dividends when it permits
provincial governments to architect and deliver developmental policies that answer to needs
and interests of provincial citizens; when it endows local people to organise indigenous
knowledge to address local challenges; and through enhancing locally centred accountability
and effective service delivery.

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