420

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Scope of the Equal Protection Clause

ANNOTATION
THE SCOPE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
By
Atty. FLORIMOND C. ROUS
1. Introduction, p. 450.
2. The Protected Entities, p. 451.
3. The Protected Rights, p. 451.
4. The Purpose of the Clause, p. 451.
5. The Characteristics of Proper Classification,
p. 452.
6. Discrimination in Favor of Certain Groups, p.
453.
7. Application of the Equal Protection Clause, p.
456.

1. Introduction
Equal protection of the law means that no person or class
of persons shall be denied the protective mantle of the law
which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances in their life, liberty, and their property, and
in the pursuit of happines. (Moore vs. Missouri, 159 U.S.
673).
Equal protection requires that all persons be treated
alike under like circumstances or conditions both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed (Barbier vs.
Connoly, 113 U.S. 27).
The 1973 Constitution states that no person shall be

deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of

law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws. (Article IV, Section 1 (1), 1973 Constitution).
421

VOL. 95, JANUARY 22, 1980

421

The Scope of the Equal Protection Clause

The equal protection clause does not imply the same

treatment to all, that it applies merely to persons, things or
transactions similarly or identically situated and that it,
consequently, permits a classification of the object or
subject of the law, provided the classification is reasonable
or based upon real or substantial distinctions germane to
the statutory object or purpose. (Central Bank vs. Cloribel,
44 SCRA 507).
What is required under the equal protection of law is the
uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons under
similar circumstances would be accorded the same
treatment both in privileges conferred and the liabilities
imposed. (Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420).
2. The Protected Entities
All persons whether citizen or alien without regard to any
difference of race, color or nationality, are protected under
the guaranty. Private corporations are persons within the
meaning of the guaranty and are entitled so far as the
property is concerned, to the equal protection of the laws.
(Smith, Bell & Company vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136).
3. The Protected Rights
The equal protection secured under the Constitution
extends only to civil rights as distinguished from those
which are political or such as arise from the form of
government and its mode of administration. (Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339).
4. The Purpose Of The Clause
The equal protection clause was designed as a safeguard
against acts of the state and not against the conduct of

private individuals or persons. It does not add anything to

the rights which one citizen has against another under the
Constitution. The right of equal protection is a restraint on
all three grand departments of government and on the
subordinate instrumentalities and subdivisions thereof.
(People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56).
422

422

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Scope of the Equal Protection Clause

5. The Characteristics Of Proper Classification

Problems on equal protection have to depend on the
reasonableness of the classification made by the law. A
classification made by the legislature to be reasonable must
have the following requisites:
(1) It must rest on substantial distinctions
(2) It must be germane to the purpose of the law
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only
and
(4) It must apply to all members of the same class.
(People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12).
The established and recognized principle is that
classification is not only unreasonable where it is based on
substantial distinctions that make real differences, is
germane to the aim and purpose of the law is not limited
to existing conditions, and it applies equally to all members
of the same class, under similar conditions. (Tan Ty vs.
Land Tenure Administration, 35 SCRA 250).
The equal protection clause is not violated by a
reasonable
classification
based
upon
substantial
distinctions that apply not only to present conditions, but
also to future conditions which are substantially identical
to those of the present and the classification which is
germane to the purpose of the law applies equally to all
those who belong to the same class. (Felwa vs. Salas, 18
SCRA 606).
The question of classification is primarily for the
legislature and it can never become a judicial question,

except for the purpose of determining in any given

situation whether legislative action is clearly unreasonable.
The courts cannot require the legislature to specify its
reasons for classification, but they will always presume
that the legislature acted on the legitimate ground of
distinction if any such ground exists. (6 R.C.L. 384).
In this regard, one case held that Act 1639 satisfies the
requirements of a valid classification, one of which is that
the classification under the law must rest on real or
substantial distinction. The classification here between the
members of the nonChristian tribes and the members of
the Christian tribes is
423

VOL. 95, JANUARY 22, 1980

423

The Scope of the Equal Protection Clause

not based upon accident or birth or parental but upon the

degree of civilization or culture. The term nonChristian
tribe refers to geographical area and more directly to
natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of
civilization usually living in tribal relationship apart from
settled communities. The purpose of the prohibition in this
case is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order
in and among nonChristian tribes. It has been the sad
experience of the past that the free use of highly
intoxicating liquors by the nonChristian tribes has often
resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the
efforts of the Government to raise their standards of life
and civilization. In this case, the second requirement that
the classification must be germane to the purpose of the
law has also been fully satisfied in that here the purpose of
the law is to insure peace and order in and among the non
Christian tribes. (People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12).
In another case, where it was alleged that a law
constituted class legislation because it was designed to
favor one private organization to the exclusion of others, it
was ruled that the argument is without merit. The
P.A.E.A.E. (Philippine Association of Embroidery and
Apparel Exporters) was not singled out by the law in order
to favor it above and over others, but rather because it is
the dominant organization in the field. Under the law no
privileges are accorded P.A.E.A.E. members which are not
similarly given to nonmembers. Both are within the

coverage of the Act. It is a rule that legislation which

affects with equal force all persons of the same class and
not those of another is not class legislation and does not
infringe the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of
the laws. (Rafael vs. Embroidery and Apparel Central
Board, 21 SCRA 336).
6. Discrimination In Favor Of Certain Groups
In one case wherein a law was passed limiting coastwise
shipping to Filipino citizens, it was decided that Act 2761
denying to owners of foreign vessels the right to register
them in the coastwise trade was not a deprivation of
property without due process of law, nor a denial of the
equal protection of the
424

424

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Scope of the Equal Protection Clause

law. The restriction has for its object the encouragement of

Philippine shipbuilding, the safeguarding of the country
from foreign elements, promotion of its prosperity and
limitation of the use of common property in the Philippine
Islands to its citizens. (Smith Bell and Company vs.
Natividad, 40 Phil. 136).
With regard to discrimination in employment, there was
a case which involved Republic Act 1180 excluding aliens
from the operation of the retail trade in the Philippines.
Petitioner sought to have said law declared as
unconstitutional because it denied equal protection to
aliens. It was held that the law is a legitimate exercise of
police power, the exercise by the state of the authority to
insure its existence and security and the supreme welfare
of its citizens. The equal protection clause of the
Constitution is not violated. There is a reasonable
distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the
regulation of the occupation. (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101
Phil. 1155). In this connection, it was likewise declared
that public markets are public services or utilities and
under the Constitution the operation of public services are
reserved to Filipino citizens or corporations or associations
60 per centum of the capital of which belongs to Filipino

citizens. The guaranty of equal protection of laws has to

give way to the specific provision of the Constitution which
reserves to Filipino citizens the operation of public services
or utilities. Operation of public markets is a part of the
functions of government. (Co Chiong vs. Cuaderno, 83 Phil.
242).
In another case, pursuant to the power vested in the
Rice and Corn Board by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 3018
(reproduction of Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended),
Resolution No. 10, series of 1960 was promulgated
providing that no person who is not a citizen of the
Philippines shall be employed in any capacity in any
Filipino owned establishment engaged in any of the lines
whose employment may be authorized by the President of
the Philippines upon recommendation of the Rice and Corn
Board. Petitioners, alien employees of the Universal Corn
Products, Inc., challenged the constitutionality of the
resolution on the ground that it violated the provisions on
due process and equal protection of laws. The Supreme
Court decided that it is hard to see how the
425

VOL. 95, JANUARY 22, 1980

425

The Scope of the Equal Protection Clause

nationalization of employment can run counter to any

provision of our Constitution considering that its aim is not
exactly to deprive a citizen of a right that he may exercise
under it but rather to promote, enhance and protect those
that are expressly accorded to a citizen. The nationalization
of an economic measure when founded on grounds of public
policy cannot be branded as unjust, arbitrary or oppressive
or contrary to the Constitution because its aim is merely to
further the material progress and welfare of the citizens of
the country. In nationalizing employment in the rice and
corn industry, the right of choice of an employer is not
impaired but its sphere is merely limited to the citizens to
the exclusion of those of other nationalities. (Universal
Corn Products, Inc. vs. Rice and Corn Board, 20 SCRA
1048). This was another example of discrimination in favor
of Filipino citizens.
With regard to discrimination for the promotion of
public interest, Section 4 of Act No. 44 forbade a person or
firm to compel an employee or laborer to work during

Sundays and legal holidays, unless he was paid an

additional sum of at least twenty five per centum of his
regular remuneration, but exempted public utilities
performing some public service such as supplying gas,
electricity, power, or water or providing means of
transportation or communication from such prohibition.
The law was attached on the ground of being
discriminatory since a public utility company can force its
employee or laborer to work without being required to pay
additional compensation. It was ruled that said section is
not a class legislation. The classification made between
ordinary firms and public utilities is based on differences
which are apparent and reasonable. To acquire public
utilities performing public service to pay additional or
extra compensation to employees whom they have to
compel to work during Sundays and legal holidays would
be tantamount to penalizing them for performing public
service during said days in compliance with the
requirement of the law and public interest. (Manila Electric
Company vs. Public Utilities Employers Association, 79
Phil. 409). In regard to public interest also, Section 19 of
the Peoples Court Act suspended Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code so as to allow government prosecutors to file
the corresponding information
426

426

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Scope of the Equal Protection Clause

against political prisoners within a period not exceeding six

months from the time said prisoners were delivered to the
Commonwealth authorities. This provision was attached as
a denial of equal protection since it applied only to political
prisoners. It was decided that there was no denial of equal
protection. The equal protection clause does not prevent
the legislature from establishing classes of individuals or
objects upon which different rules shall operate so long as
the classification was prompted by the desire of the
government to give the government prosecutors sufficient
time to investigate and file the proper charges or to
discharge those whom it may find innocent. In this
particular case, there were about 6,000 political prisoners
against whom the prosecutors had to file information.
(Laurel vs. Misa, 76 Phil. 372).

 7. Application Of The Equal Protection Clause

The equal protection clause was applied to various
situations. Among others, it was applied to penal statutes,
procedure, certain business, and the giving of certain
benefits. But the latest application of this clause is with
regard to election laws.
This case subject of annotation is the example of the
situation wherein equal protection was applied to election
laws. This case decided that the assertion that Section 4 of
BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection
is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If
the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated
differently from another class. For purposes of public
service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly
classified differently from younger employees. Employees
attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement,
while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily
retirable. In respect of election to provincial, city, or
municipal positions, to require that candidates should not
be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume
office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a
reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General
has intimated,
427

VOL. 95, JANUARY 22, 1980

427

The Scope of the Equal Protection Clause

a good policy of the law would be to promote the emergence

of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the
other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years
old may also be good elective local officials. Coming now to
the case of retirees. Retirement from government service
may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective
local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from
government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be
reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65year old
retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65,
who is not a retiree. But, in the case of a 65year old

elective local official, who has retired from a provincial,

city, or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him
from running for the same office from which he had retired,
as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for
new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree
for government work is present, and what is emphatically
significant is that the retired employee has already
declared himself tired and unavailable for the same
government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of
mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very
reason that inequality will neither result from the
application of the challenged provision. Just as that
provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it
permit of such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56
[1933]). Persons similarly situated are similarly treated.
(Dumlao et al. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. L52245,
January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 423.)
With regard to penal statutes, in one case, the accused
was found stealing coconuts in a plantation and was
prosecuted for qualified theft under Article 310 of the
Revised Penal Code. The counsel for the accused attached
the constitutionality of this article of the Revised Penal
Code on the ground that it punishes the stealing of
coconuts more heavily than the taking away of similar
produce such as rice and sugar. The Court declared that
here there is no denial of equal protection to the accused.
In the matter of theft of coconuts the purpose of the heavier
penalty is to encourage and protect the development of the
coconut industry as one of the sources of our national
ecocomy. (People vs. Isinain, 85 Phil. 684).
428

428

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Scope of the Equal Protection Clause

With regard to procedure, in a certain case, the accused

appellant attacked the validity of the Peoples Court Act on
the ground of equal protection in that the political
offenders accused in the Peoples Court have a limited right
to appeal while those who may be accused of the same
crime in the Court of First Instance have an absolute right
to appeal to the appellate courts, inasmuch as under Sec.
13 of the Peoples Court Act, Rules 42 and 43 of the Rules
of Court which deal with appeals from the Courts of First

Instance to the Supreme Court and appeals from the Court

of Appeals to the Supreme Court, respectively, are made
applicable to the latter. It was held that there is here no
denial of equal protection. There is a rational basis for the
distinction between the two classes of offenders. The
employment of two modes of appellate procedure in the two
classes of cases are suitably adopted to the differences in
the composition between the courts from which the appeals
are taken. The Peoples Court is a collegiate court, whereas
the Court of First Instance is presided over by a single
judge. Appeal is not a constitutional but a statutory right.
The admitted fact that there is no discrimination among
appeals from the same court or class of courts saves the
provision objected to from being declared unconstitutional.
(People vs. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535).
With regard to the application of the clause to certain
business, a case involving the transportation business was
brought to court. In said case, the Batangas Transportation
Company questioned the right of the Manila Railroad
Company to establish a line for motor vehicles for the
transportation of passengers between Manila and the town
of Batangas without previously obtaining a certificate of
public convenience for the purpose. It was alleged that the
establishment of such line will constitute an invasion of
territory over which there was a certificate of public
convenience and this would result in increased competition.
Batangas Transportation Company alleged that there was
a denial of equal protection. The Court held that here there
was no denial of equal protection since in the enactments of
a regulatory measure, the legislature may without
offending such constitutional provisions, make exceptions
in pursuance of a
429

VOL. 95, JANUARY 22, 1980

429

The Scope of the Equal Protection Clause

policy designed to promote the public interest. It is so

expressly provided in the law that the Public Service
Commission shall not exercise any control or supervision
over the Manila Railroad Company so long as the same
shall be controlled by the Government of the Philippine
Islands, except with regard to its rates. The Manila
Railroad Company can, therefore, establish and operate

lines of motor vehicles for the transportation of passengers

abovementioned without obtaining a certificate of public
convenience from the Public Service Commission.
(Batangas Transportation Company vs. Manila Railroad
Company, 64 Phil. 312).
With regard to the giving of government benefits, there
was a case involving Republic Act 3836, which granted
retirement benefits to Senators and Members of the House
of Representatives but not to other elective officials such as
governors of provinces and members of the provincial
boards, and the elective officials of municipalities and
chartered cities. This law was challenged as being contrary
to the equal protection clause. The Court ruled that the
classification here is not reasonable. One reason is that all
Members of Congress under Republic Act 3836 are given
retirement benefits after serving twelve years, not
necessarily continuous, whereas, most government officers
and employees are given retirement benefits after serving
for at least twenty years. This is discrimination.
Furthermore, all government officers and employees are
given only one retirement benefit irrespective of their
length of service in the government, whereas, under
Republic Act 3836, because of no age limitation, a Senator
or Member of the House of Representatives upon being
elected for 24 years will be entitled to two retirement
benefits or equivalent to six years salary. (Philconsa vs.
Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479). With regard again to government
benefits, in another case, the petitioner, widow of a police
sergeant, filed a death compensation claim under the
provisions of Republic Act 784, which provided
compensation for members of municipal police forces and
fire departments who died or were disabled in line of duty.
The claim was dismissed. The issue was does the denial of
the application of Republic Act 784 to chartered cities
render said law discriminatory. The Court said
430

430

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Scope of the Equal Protection Clause

that the provisions of Republic Act 784 are extended to

municipalities which is not true of chartered cities.
Municipalities and chartered cities differ both with respect
to their resources and the scope of their taxing power and

cannot, therefore, be considered equally situated as to

demand their equal consideration at the hands of the
central government. The law is not discriminatory. (Tibon
vs. Auditor General, 96 Phil. 786).
o0o
431

Copyright2016CentralBookSupply,Inc.Allrightsreserved.