Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
178610
17, 2010
November
DECISION
RTC- petitioner
CA respondents
CARPIO, J.:
MTC petitioner
The Facts
The appellate court narrated the facts as
follows:
Petitioners Gerong and [Editha] Broqueza
(defendants below) are employees of
Hongkong
and
Shanghai
Banking
Corporation (HSBC). They are also
members of respondent Retirement Plan.
[Editha] Broqueza obtained a car loan and
appliance loan.
Geriong was granted an emergency loan.
Both were paid through automatic salary
deduction.
On the other hand, petitioner Gerong
applied and was granted an emergency
loan in the amount of Php35,780.00 on
June 2, 1993. These loans are paid through
automatic salary deduction.
PROMISSORY NOTE
x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
PAY VS PALANCA
issue is whether a creditor is barred by
prescription in his attempt to collect on a
promissory note executed more than
fifteen years earlier with the debtor sued
promising to pay either upon receipt by
him of his share from a certain estate or
upon demand, the basis for the action
being the latter alternative.
The lower court held that the ten-year
period of limitation of actions did apply,
the note being immediately due and
demandable,
the
creditor
admitting
expressly that he was relying on the
wording "upon demand.".
George pay creditor of palanca who died
many years ago by virtue of a promissory
note. He ask for letters of admin in favor
of palancas wife to settle the estate and
be paid. Wife refused alleging that the
action of George already prescribed.
Court ruled
prescribed.
that
the
action
has
already
HELD:
it would appear that petitioner was
hopeful that the satisfaction of his credit
could he realized either through the
debtor sued receiving cash payment from
the estate of the late Carlos Palanca
presumptively as one of the heirs, or, as
expressed therein, "upon demand." There
is nothing in the record that would indicate
whether or not the first alternative was
fulfilled. What is undeniable is that on
August 26, 1967, more than fifteen years
after the execution of the promissory note
on January 30, 1952, this petition was
filed. The defense interposed was
prescription. Its merit is rather obvious.
Article 1179 of the Civil Code provides:
"Every obligation whose performance does
March 9,
The
promise
or
indication of shipment carries with
it absolutely no obligation on our
part Government regulations,
railroad embargoes, lack of vessel
space, the exigencies of the
requirement of the United States
Government, or a number of
causes may act to entirely vitiate
the indication of shipment as
stated. In other words, the order is
accepted on the basis of shipment
at Mill's convenience, time of
shipment
being
merely
an
indication of what we hope to
accomplish.
In the contract Exhibit C (page 63 of the
record), with reference to the expellers,
the following stipulation appears:
The following articles, hereinbelow
more particularly described, to be
shipped at San Francisco within the
month of September /18, or as
soon as possible. Two Anderson
oil expellers . . . .
And in the contract relative to the motors
(Exhibit D, page 64, rec.) the following
appears:
CHAVEZ VS GONZALES
1. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; BREACH OF CONTRACT
FOR NON-PERFORMANCE; FIXING OF PERIOD BEFORE
FILING OF COMPLAINT FOR NON-PERFORMANCE,
ACADEMIC. Where the time for compliance had
expired and there was breach of contract by nonperformance, it was academic for the plaintiff to have
first petitioned the court to fix a period for the
performance of the contract before filing his
complaint.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENDANT CANNOT INVOKE ARTICLE
1197 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Where the defendant virtually admitted nonperformance of the contract by returning the
typewriter that he was obliged to repair in a nonworking condition, with essential parts missing,
Article 1197 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
cannot be invoked. The fixing of a period would thus
be a mere formality and would serve no purpose than
to
delay.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DAMAGES RECOVERABLE; CASE AT
BAR. Where the defendant-appellee contravened
the tenor of his obligation because he not only did
not repair the typewriter but returned it "in
shambles, he is liable for the cost of the labor or
service expended in the repair of the typewriter,
which is in the amount of P58.75, because the
obligation or contract was to repair it. In addition, he
is likewise liable under Art. 1170 of the Code, for the
cost of the missing parts, in the amount of P31.10,
for in his obligation to repair the typewriter he was
bound, but failed or neglected, to return it in the
same condition it was when he received it.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES OR
ATTORNEYS FEES NOT RECOVERABLE; NOT ALLEGED
OR PROVED IN INSTANT CASE. Claims for damages
and attorneys fees must be pleaded, and the
existence of the actual basis thereof must be proved.
As no findings of fact were made on the claims for
damages and attorneys fees, there is no factual
basis upon which to make an award therefor.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEALS; APPEAL FROM COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE TO SUPREME COURT; ONLY
QUESTIONS OF LAW REVIEWABLE. Where the
DECISION
HELD:
chavez argues that : "ART. 1167. If a person obliged
to do something fails to do it, the same shall be
executed
at
his
cost.
This same rule shall be observed if he does it in
contravention of the tenor of the obligation.
Furthermore it may be decreed that what has been
poorly
done
he
undone."
cralaw
virtua1aw
library
On the other hand, the position of the defendantappellee, Fructuoso Gonzales, is that he is not liable
at all, not even for the sum of P31.10, because his
contract with plaintiff-appellant did not contain a
period, so that plaintiff-appellant should have first
filed a petition for the court to fix the period, under
Article 1197 of the Civil Code, within which the
defendant appellee was to comply with the contract
before said defendant-appellee could be held liable
for
breach
of
contract.
SC: The time for compliance having evidently
expired, and there being a breach of contract by nonperformance, it was academic for the plaintiff to have
first petitioned the court to fix a period for the
performance of the contract before filing his
complaint in this case. Defendant cannot invoke
Article 1197 of the Civil Code for he virtually
admitted
non-performance
by
returning
the
typewriter that he was obliged to repair in a nonworking condition, with essential parts missing. The
fixing of a period would thus be a mere formality and
would serve no purpose than to delay (cf. Tiglao. Et.
Al. V. Manila Railroad Co. 98 Phil. 18l).
It is clear that the defendant-appellee contravened
the tenor of his obligation because he not only did
not repair the typewriter but returned it "in
shambles", according to the appealed decision. For
such contravention, as appellant contends, he is
liable under Article 1167 of the Civil Code. jam quot,
October 4,
VICENTE
SINGSON
ENCARNACION, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JACINTA
BALDOMAR,
ET
AL., defendants-appellants.
HILADO, J.:
Vicente Singson Encarnacion, as lessor of
a house in favor of baldomar to ba paid
monthly.
Furthermore,
carried
to
its
logical
conclusion, the defense thus set up by
defendant Lefrado Fernando would leave
to the sole and exclusive will of one of the
contracting parties (defendants in this
case) the validity and fulfillment of the
contract of lease, within the meaning of
article 1256 of the Civil Code, since the
continuance and fulfillment of the contract
01 July 2013
Eleizegui v. The Manila Lawn Tennis Club
Digest G.R. No. 967
Eleizegui v. The Manila Lawn Tennis Club
Facts:
RULING:
a)
YES, the parties have agreed upon a
term hence Art. 1581 is inapplicable.
September
CASTRO, J.:
Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her
sister Lorenzo were the owners in common
of a piece of land in Manila. Wong had
been a long-time lessee of a portion of the
property, paying a monthly rental of
P2,620.
Justina Santos became the owner of the
entire property as her sister died with no
other heir. Then already well advanced in
years. Her only companions in the house
were her 17 dogs and 8 maids. Wong took
care of all expenses of justina.
"In grateful acknowledgment of the
personal services of the lessee to her,"
Justina Santos executed on November 15,
1957 a contract of lease (Plff Exh. 3) in
favor of Wong, the entire property with an
option to buy the property. The lease was
for 50 years and can be terminated at the
option of WONG.
The option was conditioned on his
obtaining Philippine citizenship, a petition
for which was then pending in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal. It appears, however,
LOURDES
VALERIO
LIM, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
to
the
house
of
the
appellant several times, but
the appellant often eluded
her; and that the "camarin"
the appellant was empty.
RELOVA, J.:
Petitioner Lourdes Valerio Lim was found
guilty of the crime of estafa
From this judgment, appeal was taken to
the then Court of Appeals which affirmed
the decision of the lower court but
modified the penalty imposed
ISSUE: is whether the receipt, Exhibit "A",
is a contract of agency to sell or a contract
of sale of the subject tobacco between
petitioner and the complainant, Maria de
Guzman
Vda.
de
Ayroso,
thereby
precluding criminal liability of petitioner
for the crime charged.
The findings of facts of the appellate court
are as follows:
... The appellant is a
businesswoman. On January
10, 1966, the appellant
went to the house of Maria
Ayroso and proposed to sell
Ayroso's tobacco. Ayroso
agreed to the proposition of
the appellant to sell her
tobacco consisting of 615
kilos at P1.30 a kilo. The
appellant was to receive the
overprice for which she
could sell the tobacco.
Demands for the payment
of the balance of the value
of the tobacco were made
upon the appellant by
Ayroso, and particularly by
her sister, Salud Bantug.
Salud
Bantug
further
testified that she had gone
was
Ayroso
who
had
requested her to sell her
tobacco, it would not have
been the appellant who
would have gone to the
house of Ayroso, but it
would have been Ayroso
who would have gone to the
house of the appellant and
deliver the tobacco to the
appellant. (p. 19, Rollo)
The fact that appellant received the
tobacco to be sold at P1.30 per kilo and
the proceeds to be given to complainant
as soon as it was sold, strongly negates
transfer of ownership of the goods to the
petitioner. The agreement (Exhibit "A')
constituted her as an agent with the
obligation to return the tobacco if the
same was not sold.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for review on
certiorari is dismissed for lack of merit.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.
1wph1.t
PACIFICA
MILLARE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. HAROLD M. HERNANDO, In his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Court of
Instance of Abra, Second Judicial District,
Branch I, ANTONIO CO and ELSA
CO, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
5 year lease contract by pacifica in favor of
respondent elsa co.
Expiry date May 31 1980.
"fly-by
night
unjust
enrichment" at the expense of
said lessees; but, no Man
should unjustly enrich himself
at the expense of another;
under
these
facts
and
circumstances
surrounding
this case, the action therefore
to renew the lease contract! is
"tenable" because it falls
squarely within the coverage
and command of Articles 1197
and 1670 of the New Civil
Code, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
The term "to be renewed" as
expressly stipulated by the
herein parties in the original
contract of lease means that
the lease may be renewed for
another term of five (5) years;
its equivalent to a promise
made by the lessor to the
lessee, and as a unilateral
stipulation, obliges the lessor
to fulfill her promise; of course
the lessor is free to comply
and honor her commitment or
back-out from her promise to
renew the lease contract; but,
once expressly stipulated, the
lessor shall not be allowed to
evade or violate the obligation
to renew the lease because,
certainly, the lessor may be
held hable for damages
caused to the lessee as a
consequence
of
the
unjustifiable termination of the
lease or renewal of the same;
In other words, the lessor is
guilty of breach of contract:
Since the original lease was
fixed for five (5) years, it
follows, therefore, that the
lease contract is renewable for
another five (5) years and the
lessee is not required before
hand to give express notice of
this fact to the lessor because
it was expressly stipulated in