The United Kingdom had suffered a disastrous defeat atSingapore in 1942 against the Japanese military, which then

proceeded to conquer Burma from the British in the same year. Burma was the world's largest exporter of rice in the
inter-war period, the British having encouraged production by Burmese smallholders, which resulted in a virtual
monoculture in the Irrawady delta and Arakan [1]. By 1940 15% of India's rice overall came from Burma, whilst in
Bengal the proportion was slightly higher given the province's proximity to Burma [2].
It seems unlikely, however, that these imports can have amounted to more than 20% of Bengal's consumption, and
this alone is insufficient to account for the famine, although it ensured that there were fewer reserves to fall back on.
British authorities feared a subsequent Japanese invasion of British India proper by way of Bengal (see British Raj),
and emergency measures were introduced to stockpile food for British soldiers and prevent access to supplies by the
Japanese in case of an invasion.
A 'scorched earth' policy was implemented in the Chittagongregion, nearest the Burmese border, while large amounts
of rice were exported to the Middle East to feed British and Indian troops there, and to Ceylon, which had been
heavily dependent on Burmese rice before the war, and where large military establishments were being created as it
was feared that the Japanese might invade the island.
On the 16th October 1942 the whole east coast of Bengal and Orissa was hit by a cyclone. A huge area of rice
cultivation up to forty miles inland was flooded, causing the autumn crop in these areas to fail. This meant that the
peasantry had to eat their surplus, and the seed that should have been planted in the winter of 1942-3 had been
consumed by the time the hot weather began in May 1943. [3].
This was exacerbated by exports of food and appropriation of arable land.
However, Amartya Sen holds the view that there was no overall shortage of rice in Bengal in 1943: availability was
actually slightly higher than in 1941, when there was no famine [4]. It was partly this which conditioned the sluggish
official response to the disaster, as there had been no serious crop failures and hence the famine was unexpected. Its
root causes, Sen argues, lay in rumours of shortage which caused hoarding, and rapid price inflation caused by wartime demands which made rice stocks an excellent investment (prices had already doubled over the previous year).
In Sen's interpretation, while landowning peasants who actually grew rice and those employed in defence-related
industries in urban areas and at the docks saw their wages rise, this led to a disastrous shift in the exchange
entitlements of groups such as landless labourers, fishermen, barbers, paddy huskers and other groups who found
the real value of their wages had been slashed by two-thirds since 1940. Quite simply, although Bengal had enough
rice and other grains to feed itself, millions of people were suddenly too poor to buy it.[5]

[edit] The Response

The Bengal government, reacted to the crisis lazily and incompetently, refusing to stop the export of food from
Bengal.
In contrast to the incompetence of the civil service the British military commanders and the British military in general,
performed as best as it could to combat the famine[6], providing food to the suffering and organising relief. During the
course of the famine the government organised roughly 110,000,000 free meals [7] which proved pathetically too small
to cope with the disaster.
Winston Churchill was Prime Minister of the time and, although the famine occurred under his own watch his
involvement in the disaster and indeed his knowledge of it remain a mystery. When in response to an urgent request
by the Secretary of State for India, Leo Amery, and Wavell to release food stocks for India, Churchill responded with a
telegram to Wavell asking, if food was so scarce, "why Gandhi hadnt died yet."[8] Initially during the famine he was
more concerned with the civilians of Greece (who were also suffering from a famine) compared with the Bengalis [9].
In the end Churchill did ask for US assistance, writing to Roosevelt that he was "no longer justified in not asking for
aid" but the American response was negative[1]

The Bengal Government failed to prevent rice exports, and made little attempt to import surpluses from elsewhere in
India, or to buy up stocks from speculators to redistribute to the starving. Overall, as Sen shows, the authorities failed
to understand that the famine was not caused by an overall food shortage, and that the distribution of food was not
just a matter of railway capacity, but of providing free famine relief on a massive scale: "The Raj was, in fact, fairly
right in its estimation of overall food availability, but disastrously wrong in its theory of Famines".[10] The famine ended
when the government in London agreed to import 1,000,000 tons of grain to Bengal, reducing food prices.[11]

[edit] Famines and democracies

Citing the Bengal Famine and other examples from the world, Amartya Sen argues that famines do not occur in
functioning democracies. Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow provides a discussion of this argument [2] It should be noted
that between 1950 and 1984, as the Green Revolution transformed agriculture around the globe, world grain
production increased by 250%.[12][13]
The Bengal Famine may be placed in the context of previous famines in Mughal and British India. Deccan Famine of
1630-32killed 2,000,000 (there was a corresponding famine in northwestern China, eventually causing the Ming
dynasty to collapse in 1644). During the British rule in India there were approximately 25 major famines spread
through states such as Tamil Nadu inSouth India, Bihar in the north, and Bengal in the east; altogether, between 30
and 40 million Indians were the victims of famines in the latter half of the 19th century (Bhatia 1985).
Though malnutrition and hunger remain widespread in India, there have been no famines since the end of the British
rule in 1947 and the establishment of a democratic government. There has been a recurrent threat of famine in
Bangladesh[3][4], which unlike India has spent a considerable period of its existence under military rule.

[edit] "Food Availability Decline" or "Man Made"

Rice production
Year
(in million of tons)

1938

8.474

1939

7.922

1940

8.223

1941

6.768

1942

9.296

1943

7.628

Severe food shortages were worsened by the Second World War, with the British administration of India exporting
foods to Allied soldiers. The shortage of rice forced rice prices up, and wartime inflationcompounded the problem.
The civil administration did not intervene to control the price of rice, and so the price of rice exceeded the means of
ordinary people. People migrated to the cities to find food and employment; finding neither, they starved.
Amartya Sen has cast doubt on the idea that the rice shortage was due to a fall in production. He quotes official
records for rice production in Bengal in the years leading up to 1943 as reported in the table to the right.
The 1943 yield, while low, was not in itself outside the normal spectrum of recorded variation, and other factors
beyond simple crop failure may thus be invoked as a causal mechanism.

[edit] Diseased rice vs. Total Rice Yield

It has been argued that the famine was primarily due to an epidemic of brown spot disease Cochliobolus
miyabeanus (formerlyHelminthosporium oryzae), affecting the crop. This argument, based on data collected by S. Y.
Padmanabhan, has been developed by the historian Mark Tauger.
In the rice growing season of 1942, weather conditions were exactly right to encourage an epidemic of the rice
disease brown spot following a cyclone and flooding. The outbreak of the disease caused a variation in the 1942 crop
ranging from a 236.6% gain to a 90% crop loss in Bankura and Chinsurah according to Padmanabhan.
Tauger argues that Sen's analysis based economic entitlement overlooks the role of food shortage. Tauger argues
that the yield in 1942 was low (based on Padmanabhan's data) causing a serious food shortage in Bengal and was
the most important cause of the famine. Others dispute this argument, primarily based on the fact that
Padmanabhan's data is yield per acre for different varieties, and from this data it is impossible to estimate total
production without knowing the total area of the different varieties.
The official famine inquiry commission reporting on the Bengal Famine of 1943 put its death toll at about 1.5 million
Indians. Source : Famine Inquiry Commission, India (1945a),pp. 109-10.
Years later in 1974, W.R. Aykroyd, who was a member of the Famine inquiry commission and was primarily
responsible for the estimation, conceded that the figures were an underestimate. Quote by W.R. Aykroyd "I now think
it (the death toll) was an under-estimate, especially in that it took little account of roadside deaths". [14]
Amartya Sen has recently estimated that three million may be slightly too high an estimate and that two to two and a
half million fatalities may be more accurate[15]

[edit] The Famine in Bengali culture

Artists, novelists and film-makers have tried to capture the enormity of the famine in their works. The renowned
Bengali painterZainul Abedin was one of the early documentarians of the famine, with his sketches of the dead and
dying.
The novelist Bibhuti Bhusan Bandyopadhhay penned his novel Ashani Sanket with the famine serving as both
backdrop and protagonist. The novel was adapted in 1973 by Satyajit Ray into an award-winning film, also
titled Ashani Sanket, which focussed on the role of hoarding as a cause for the famine. Mrinal Sen also made
a National Award winning film in 1980 about the famine, called Akaler Sandhane (In Search of Famine'). Sen's other
films that relate to the theme of the 1943 famine areBaishey Sravan and Calcutta 71.

It is 1943, the peak of the Second World War. The place is London. The British War
Cabinet is holding meetings on a famine sweeping its troubled colony, India. Millions of
natives mainly in eastern Bengal, are starving. Leopold Amery,secretary of state for India,
and Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell, soon to be appointed the new viceroy of India, are
deliberating how to ship more food to the colony. But the irascible Prime Minister Winston
Churchill is coming in their way.
"Apparently it is more important to save the Greeks and liberated countries than the Indians
and there is reluctance either to provide shipping or to reduce stocks in this country," writes
Sir Wavell in his account of the meetings. Mr Amery is more direct. "Winston may be right in
saying that the starvation of anyhow under-fed Bengalis is less serious than sturdy Greeks,
but he makes no sufficient allowance for the sense of Empire responsibility in this country,"
he writes.

Some three million Indians died in the famine of 1943. The majority of the deaths were in
Bengal. The scarcity, was caused by large-scale exports of food from India for use in the war
theatres and consumption in Britain - India exported more than 70,000 tonnes of rice
between January and July 1943, even as the famine set in. This would have kept nearly
400,000 people alive for a full year. Mr Churchill turned down fervent pleas to export food to
India citing a shortage of ships - this when shiploads of Australian wheat, for example,
would pass by India to be stored for future consumption in Europe. As imports dropped,
prices shot up and hoarders made a killing. Mr Churchill also pushed a scorched earth policy
- which went by the sinister name of Denial Policy - in coastal Bengal where the colonisers
feared the Japanese would land. So authorities removed boats (the lifeline of the region)
and the police destroyed and seized rice stocks.
What resulted was a chilling tale of the effects of hunger and deprivation. Parents dumped
their starving children into rivers and wells. Many took their lives by throwing themselves in
front of trains. Starving people begged for the starchy water in which rice had been boiled.
Children ate leaves and vines, yam stems and grass. People were too weak even to cremate
their loved ones. No one had the strength to perform rites. Dogs and jackals feasted on
piles of dead bodies in Bengal's villages. The ones who got away were men who migrated to
Calcutta for jobs and women who turned to prostitution to feed their families. Mothers had
turned into murderers, village belles into whores, fathers into traffickers of daughters.

The famine ended at the end of the year when survivors harvested their rice crop. The first
shipments of barley and wheat reached those in need only in November, by which time tens
of thousands had already perished. Throughout the autumn of 1943, the United Kingdom's
food and raw materials stockpile for its 47 million people - 14 million fewer than that of
Bengal - swelled to 18.5m tonnes.

The proximate cause of the famine was a reduction in supply with some increase in demand. The
winter 1942 aman rice crop, which was already expected to be poor or indifferent, [11] was hit by a
cyclone and three tidal waves in October.[B] This killed 14,500 people and 190,000 cattle.[13] The
homes, livelihood and property of nearly 2.5 million Bengalis were ruined or damaged. [14] The
fungus Cochliobolus miyabeanus destroyed 50% to 90% of some rice varieties,[15] causing even
greater damage to yield than the cyclone.[C]
Bengal had been a food importer for the last decade. Calcutta was normally supplied by Burma.
The British Empire had suffered a disastrous defeat at Singapore in 1942 against the Japanese
military, which then proceeded to invade Burma in the same year. There were poor crops and famine
situations in Cochin, Trivandrum and Bombay on the West coast and Madras, Orissa and Bengal in
the East. It fell on the few surplus Provinces, mainly the Punjab, to supply the rest of India and
Ceylon.[20][21][D]
Bengal's food needs rose at the same time from the influx of refugees from Burma. The enormous
expansion of the Indian Army probably did not increase total food demand in India, but it did mean
significantly more local demand in Bengal
Whatever the cause of the famine, deaths could only be prevented by supplies of food from
elsewhere in India. This was not forthcoming.
In normal regional famines the Indian Government had provided the starving with money, and let the
trade bring in grain which worked for regional famines, though this had been disastrous in Orissa in
1888 when, as in 1943, the shortage was not regional but national. In 1942, with the permission of
the central government, trade barriers were introduced by the democratically elected Provincial
governments. The politicians and civil servants of surplus provinces like the Punjab introduced
regulations to prevent grain leaving their provinces for the famine areas of Bengal, Madras and
Cochin. There was the desire to see that, first, local populations and, second, the populations of
neighbouring provinces were well fed, partly to prevent civil unrest. Politicians and officials got power
and patronage, and the ability to extract bribes for shipping permits. Marketing and transaction costs
rose sharply. The market could not get grain to Bengal, however profitable it might be. The main
trading route, established for hundreds of years was up the river system and this ceased to operate,
leaving the railway as the only way of getting food into Bengal. Grain arrivals stopped and in March
1943, Calcutta, the second biggest city in the world, had only two weeks food supply in stock.

[38]

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1943

The Government of India realized a mistake had been made and decreed a return to free trade. The
Provinces refused. In this, again, the Government of India misjudged both its own influence and the
temper of its constituents, which had by this time gone too far to pay much heed to the
Centre.[39] The Government of India Act 1935 had removed most of the Government of India's
authority over the Provinces, so they had to rely on negotiation.
Thus, even when the Government of India decreed that there should be free trade in grain,
politicians, civil servants, local government officers and police obstructed the movement of grain to
famine areas.[40] In some cases Provinces seized grain in transit from other Provinces to Bengal.
[K]

As Mahesh Chandra stated in 1943, But men like Bhai Permanand say that though many traders

want to export food [to Bengal] the Punjab Government would not give them permits. He testified to
large quantities of undisposed-of rice being in the Punjab. [41]
Eventually there was a clear threat by the Government of India to force the elected governments to
provide grain, when the new Viceroy, Archibald Wavell, who was a successful general, was about to
take office. For the first time substantial quantities of grain started to move to Bengal. [42]
The Government of Bengal was slow in starting relief measures and at one stage in 1943 it limited
relief to save money, though the money could have been obtained.[43] The supporters of the two
Bengal Governments involved, that of A. K. Fazlul Huq (December 1941 to March 1943) and
of Khawaja Nazimuddin's Muslim League (April 1943 to March 1945) each held the other
government responsible for the catastrophe, because of its inaction and corruption. [44] Bengal's chief
minister, A. K. Fazlul Huq, had warned of the risk of famine but he was ignored and replaced. [45] The
government had done almost nothing to prepare for famine, and critics noted "the feebleness of its
moral and administrative standards".[46]
Contemporary commentators believed that there was substantial hoarding by those consumers who
could afford it, by firms and by those farmers who produced surpluses. This started in July 1941

when war with Japan was inevitable, increased when Burma was attacked in December 1941 and
when Ceylon, then Calcutta were bombed in 1942. India would have entered the famine year with
substantial surplus private stocks. These stocks do not appear to have been released and there was
no political drive to get people to give or sell the surpluses. An official Food Drive in Bengal did not
result in release of hoarded stocks.[47] It was believed that fear of the famine actually increased
hoarding.
The elected Provincial governments, their public servants and some key people in the Indian civil
service believed, or said they believed, that Bengal had plenty of food, which could be made
available with good administration. There were no meaningful production statistics which could
support this, and those hopelessly defective production statistics that did exist indicated a serious
shortage.
There were claims that hoarding was the cause of the famine, and this should be dealt with
administratively, not by providing starving people in Bengal with food. And at the Third Food
Conference in Delhi on the 5 to 8 July, the suggestion that "the only reason why people are
starving in Bengal is that there is hoarding" was greeted at the Conference by the other Provinces
with applause.[48] Similarly, some officials in the Government of India refused to accept the evidence
on the ground, preferring their own idiosyncratic interpretations of the market: as late as November
1943, The Government of India would admit no intrinsic shortage in Bengal in the Spring of 1943
and, even in November, at the height of the famine, the Director-General of Food in the Council of
State said that "the major trouble in Bengal has been not so much an intrinsic shortage of essential
food grains as a breakdown of public confidence.[48]On 19 October 1943, when the famine was at its
peak, Wavell noted in his journal "On the food situation Linlithgow [The outgoing Viceroy] says chief
factor morale.[i.e. panic hoarding]"[49] For hoarding to have created the amount of hunger and death
recorded if there had, indeed, been adequate supplies, it would have been necessary that the richest
10% of Bengal's population, the only ones who could afford it, to lay in two years' rice supply for
themselves, in addition to the stocks accumulated in the previous two years, and to keep it in stock
until the end of the war, while their neighbours starved. There was never any suggestion that
anything of the sort happened, which is strong evidence against the hoarding explanation.
There was a widespread claim,[citation needed] unevidenced,[citation needed] that there was no shortage really, that
there was plenty of rice available but traders were stockpiling it to make speculative profits. In fact,
there was strong evidence that this was not so: extensive investigations by police, special branch
and officials, backed up by rewards for information, found no examples; raids on traders found that
they had significantly smaller trading stocks than they had in normal years. [38] This was confirmed
when there was no release of surplus stocks when the famine ended. Only if speculators had stored
more than usual, and not released it during the famine year, would they have increased the number

of deaths: there is ample evidence that they did not. [50] Such claims of speculation causing famine
have been ridiculed by economists since Adam Smith.
Similarly, it was claimed, without evidence or calculation, that the 1% to 2% of the Bengal population
whose purchasing power increased because of the wartime inflation and war expenditure [51] ate so
much more than usual that two-thirds of the population went hungry 10% very hungry indeed, [52]
[53]

with half of this 10% dying of starvation and disease. A quick calculation would have shown that

this explanation requires that on 1 November 1942 the small group with increased purchasing power
started eating 12 to 46 times more than usual per head and that they reverted to normal
consumption in December 1943.[50] The Working Class Cost of Living Index rose by 15% to 20% per
annum from 193946 with a sharp rise in cities in famine districts in 1942/3 because of famine-level
rice prices, returning to the average level afterwards.[54]
Most contemporary commentators thought the Hindu-Muslim conflict a serious factor.[55] It was even
claimed by a leading politician that Bengal had been deliberately starved out by other provinces
which refused to permit the export of grain.
Any imports would have had to come from Australia, North America or South America. Some
supplies from Australia entered the region.[57] The main constraint was shipping. The Battle of the
Atlantic was at its peak from mid-1942 to mid-1943, with submarine wolf packs sinking so many
ships that the Allies were on the verge of defeat, so shipping could not be spared for India. [L]
By August 1943 Churchill refused to release shipping to send food to India. [60] Initially during the
famine he was more concerned with the civilians of Nazi-occupied Greece (who were also suffering
from a famine) compared with the Bengalis,[61] noting that the "starvation of anyhow underfed
Bengalis is less serious than that of sturdy Greeks". [62]
The Famine Inquiry Commission (1945) documents a large number of administrative, civil policy and
military policy failures. Significantly, no other famine-struck country has published such criticisms of
its own government's actions. The failure to set up a food administration in 1939 and prepare for
rationing was the key failure. The failure to enforce an India-wide food policy with an equality of
sacrifice was another. Without this, the administrative controls must prevent any meaningful
intervention. Political and administrative failures to set up a system for seizing surplus food in
surplus areas also contributed (it was acceptable in deficit areas). There were many others which
added to local shortages or otherwise increased the death rate, (e.g. Boat Denial Policy, Rice Denial
Policy, various purchasing policies) but were not causes of the famine. During the Famine Inquiry
Commission's investigation, one official stated that 'We felt difficulty about one thing. That was lack
of one co-ordinating authority at the time of famine' [63]

In the middle of 1942, British authorities feared that the Japanese would follow up their conquest of
Burma with an invasion of British India proper by way of Bengal. A scorched earth policy was hastily
implemented in the Chittagong region, nearest the Burmese border, to prevent access to supplies by
the Japanese in case of an invasion. In particular, the Army confiscated many boats (and motor
vehicles, carts and even elephants), fearing that the Japanese would commandeer them to speed an
advance into India. The inhabitants used the boats for fishing and to take goods to market, and the
Army failed to distribute rations to replace the fish and the food lost through the stoppage of
commerce.[64] The dislocation in the area forced many of the male inhabitants into the Military Labour
Corps, where at least they received rations, but the break-up of families left many children and
dependents to beg or to starve.[65]
In December 1942 there was a shortage in Calcutta itself. Therefore, government focused on getting
supplies to Calcutta by trying to buy surplus stocks in the region. The quantities that District Officers
were able to locate and purchase were considered too small to end the famine, so the Government
introduced free trade in rice in Eastern India, hoping that traders would sell their stocks to Bengal;
however this measure also failed to move large stocks to Bengal.[66] In April and May there was a
propaganda drive to convince the population that the high prices were not justified by the supply of
food, the goal being that the propaganda would induce hoarders to sell their stocks. [67] When these
propaganda drives failed, there was a drive to locate hoarded stocks. H. S. Suhrawardy, Bengal's
Minister of Civil Supplies from April 24, 1943, announced that there was no shortage of rice in
Bengal and introduced a policy of intimidating hoarders: this caused looting, extortion and
corruption but did not increase the amount of food on the market. [68] When these drives continually
failed to locate large stocks, the government realized that the scale of the loss in supply was larger
than they had initially believed.[66]
The Indian Army and Allied troops acted only after Wavell became Viceroy and got permission from
the Bengal Government. They had vehicles, fuel, men and administrators, which the civil authority
did not, so they were much more effective than the civil authority in getting food to the starving
outside Calcutta. The distribution was difficult and continued for five months after the
November/December 1943 crop was harvested. However, they did not have much food to distribute.
During the course of the famine, 264 thousand tons of rice, 258 thousand tons of wheat and wheat
products, and 55 thousand tons of millet were sent to Bengal from the rest of India and overseas in
order to relieve the famine.[69] One ton feeds 5.75 people for a year at normal consumption, perhaps
8.2 at emergency survival rates.[50] Various guesses were that the rice production in Bengal was 1.2
2.5 million tons below the ten-year average.

Teenagers

Nope nope nope nope nope

I'm 15 years old and a freshman in high school. All my classmates are constantly on
Snapchat, whether we are in class or not. It's so annoying because they're insolent and
insubordinate. Half of them don't even do their homework. When I get home from school, I
do homework, watch some YouTube videos, and read novels (granted, I'm a die-hard reader).
I don't bother casting my line in the addictive cesspools of SJWs and idiots. Social media is
just another fake popularity contest. You think you're famous because you have a hundred
followers or subscribers, but you're not. We need to stop being lazy and irresponsible
because I fear for my generation.
This is a pathetic excuse to explain their behaviours and attitude. Are rude, loud,
annoying, obnoxious and disrespectful people. Lack compassion & empathy for others.

They are wonderful people with so much potential. They are the salt of the earth. Many of
them want to make a difference in the world. They like to serve others. They want to live,
learn and to survive in this scary world. They can be generous and giving people.
Teenagers are not misunderstood, quit the whinging

It hasn't been long since I was a teenager... And as a teenager I remember thinking how
misunderstood most of us were. But now I realise the truth. Adults WERE teenagers at one
stage. Many of them DO remember what it is like to be a teenager. Maybe they had a
different lifestyle and expectations, but they still went through the same stage in life. People
know what teenagers go through, so you are not misunderstood. A few of you may be
misunderstood, but sadly most of you are just immature or irresponsible. I know because I
was a silly teenager once too. I realise now that my parents understood exactly who I was,
even when they were strict with me and I though they were being unsupportive. The fact is
that no matter how mature you think you are, you still have a lot of development to go
through as a teenager. Brain development does not stop until your mid 20s... Even my brain
hasn't stopped developing yet. This means that young people don't think about
consequences as much and are more vulnerable, reckless and irresponsible. Teenagers need
to stop with this whiny angst about how "nobody understands us..." YES THEY DO.
No they are not.

Teenagers are not misunderstood, they are irresponsible. They have a right to be, there are
still kids, but are growing up and wanting to spread their wings and have more fun and not
get tied down with even more responsibility. It makes sense that they act the way they do,
but they are still irresponsible.
Frontal Lobe Development

Thats what makes them irresponsible AND missunderstood. Most people dont get it, because
they have either forgotten what they felt, or consider their own actions as teenagers
outrageous and become hypocritical. Teenagers ARE irresponsible, but should not be treated
like adults, because most of the time they have no idea why they feel how they feel, and are
only now learning to control it. They are misunderstood because adults forgot how they felt,
and never learned how to help them.
I grew up real fast. I taught myself most of the stuff I did. And did the stuff 16 year olds
pulled, when I was 12. By 15 I was mentally 20, stopped drinking and partying.
Even now at 23 my coworkers usually think I am 30. I dont look old, I just grew up fast.
Yes, they are irresponsible

Lumping teenagers into one group is absurd. I am 16, and I generally perceive myself to be
more responsible than my peers. However, generally speaking, teenagers tend to be
irresponsible. How exactly are they "misunderstood"? Going out to parties and binge
drinking is irresponsible. Bullying your peers is irresponsible. And failing to do minor things,
such as cleaning your room, is irresponsible.
They are, by the majority

Teenagers are usually much more irresponsible than adults; they are trained to be in public
schools, yet expected to behave like adults. I think that they are taught to ignore wisdom
and instruction, and to do whatever they want to. It's almost completely the fault of our
government. Two words
Teenagers are irresponsible.

I, myself, am a teenager. I am turning 15 in the upcoming months. However, I think

teenagers are all irresponsible, people all irresponsible at different degrees. I also do agree
adults have a certain degree of irresponsibility, again, depending on the person and the
topic. In a summary, irresponsibility is defined as not having or showing maturity or good
judgment : not responsible, according to the Merriam Webster Dictionary. Based on
standards of today's society, everyone has some type of irresponsibility to a degree,
however big or small that may be.

Cloud Coputing

There was a time when, to use files (word processing files, spreadsheets, etc.) on different
computers, you needed to save your files on a thumb drive or CD-ROM disk. The drive or
disk then traveled around with you so that you could load your information onto other
computers while holding your breath until the document or PowerPoint slide was actually
retrieved! Not any longer. The safety, stability, and ease-of-use of cloud computing in
education is resulting in widespread adoption in educational institutions of all sizes and
types.
Why Store in the Cloud?
Are there really any true advantages in education for storing information off-site on a server
that could be located anywhere? The answer is yes! A recent conversation about cloud
computing with several colleagues in the education field, including a high school chemistry
teacher, revealed significant advantages:

No more carrying around devices, such as thumb drives or CDs. You dont need to worry
about losing the device, breaking the CD, or not having your information load properly.

Easy access! Lesson plans, labs, grades, notes, PowerPoint slides just about anything
digital that you use in teaching is easily uploaded and accessed anytime.

Stability: cloud computing is now to the point of being a very stable technology that you can
rely on.

Security: Your data, content, information, images anything you store in the cloud usually
requires authentication (ID and password, for example) so it is not easily accessible by
anyone. In addition, should something happen to the technology at school, your content will
still be available to you and your students if it is stored elsewhere.

Shareability: Working on an instructional assignment with other teachers? You can share
some or all of your files that you have stored in the cloud. No more obtaining an extra thumb
drive or burning another CD or DVD. You just need to send a link to the file(s) destination.

Trackability: Make changes to a lesson and want to change it back? No problem. Cloud
computing will save multiple revisions and versions of a document so that you can
chronologically trace back the evolution of an item.

Collaboration: You can set-up various student groups to work on projects and assignments
in the cloud.

Good-bye copier! Thats right! With cloud computing, the amount of photocopying is
reduced significantly even more so if each student has their own smart device (computer,
laptop, tablet, etc.). Quizzes, tests, assignments all can be taken, scored, shared with
student and parents, and stored.

Good-bye file cabinets! With cloud computing redundancy, there is no longer the need to
both save files digitally as well as in paper format. Cloud computing systems are regularly
backed-up, so the chances of losing content are quite small. And, no more file cabinets
means more classroom space for you and your students!

Going Paperless
In the early 1980s, F.W. Lancaster predicted a paperless society. We are not quite there yet
and many not be for many years to come. There are some instances where paper is still the
preferred format for education. Even though we have e-books, people still prefer to hold an
actual paper book in their hand. There are situations, however, that going digital makes
sense. Classroom and school administrative management is a perfect example. If your
school has information technology infrastructure (wired and/or wireless), it is easy to
implement cloud computing. And, the advantages of cloud computing far outweigh any
disadvantages. From the administrative perspective:

Staff and teacher time spent printing, filing, and distributing can be better used on more
educationally-directed activities that impact student learning.

Cost savings in terms of buying, leasing, and maintaining photocopiers and printers, ink
cartridges, and paper.

Return-on-investment by not needing to invest in purchasing, housing, and maintaining

servers, software, and related IT items, such as thumb drives, and CD-ROMs.

Greater efficiencies as teachers and staff can easily access documentation anytime,
anywhere without needing to rely on someone being at their desk to sign-out a paper file.

Streamlined workflow: Workflow can be tracked using various analytical tools to see how
often files are accessed, busiest times of the day and days of the week, etc.

Short learning curve: It does not take long a few hours (if that) to learn how to manage
digital documents in the cloud.

The Big Leap

Going from paper to digital requires a big leap of faith. We want to hold onto that paper item
because we can feel, see, and touch it something not available with a digital object.
However, think of it this way. Lets say you store your documents in the cloud and back it up
in paper format. Along comes a major hurricane and wipes out the paper, yet the digital
items are safe and sound and easily accessible because they are stored in a secure
environment. No need to worry about having to try and replicate all those paper documents
a task that would literally be impossible to accomplish.
I share these insights with you not to promulgate a 100% digital environment. Like
thousands of others, I still enjoy reading hard and soft cover books. During another part of
my career I was able to let go of that venerable library card catalog but not until the
technology proved to be stable and reliable. We are at the time, now, where cloud
computing is stable and reliable providing us with opportunities to implement new ways of
collaboration and learning while letting go of our educational paper archives.

Waste Segregation

What is Waste Segregation?

There are certain things are not required around the house are kept aside to be sold
to Kabadiwala or the Person who Buy old items. These can newspaper, used bottles,
magazines, carry bags, old books, Oil cans, Glass, Paper Etc. This is one form of
Segregation of waste, which is done at almost all households. Segregation our
waste is essential as the amount of waste being generated today caused immense
problem. There are certain items are not Bio Degradable but can be reused or
recycled in fact it is believed that a larger portion of the waste can be recycled, a
part of can be converted to compost, and only a smaller portion of it is real waste
that has no use and has to be discarded.
Household waste should be separated daily into different dustbins for the different
categories of waste such as Wet & Dry Waste which should be disposed of
separately. One should also keep a dustbin for toxic wastes such as medicines,
batteries, dried paints, old bulbs and dried shoe polish. Wet wastes, which consist of
leftover foodstuff, vegetables, peels etc. should be put in a compost pit and
compost can be used as manure in the garden. Dry waste consisting of cans,
aluminum foils, plastics, metal, glass and paper could be recycled. If we do not
dispose of the waste in a systematic manner than more than 1400 sq. km of land
which the size of the city of Delhi would be required in the country by the year 2047
to dispose of it.

Segregation of Waste:Waste Can be segregated as :1.

2.

Bio Degradable Waste:- Bio Degradable waste includes organic waste, e.g.
kitchen waste, vegetables, fruits, flowers, leaves from the garden and paper.
Non Bio Degradable Waste:Non Biodegradables can be further segregated into:A - Recyclable Waste- Plastics, Paper, Glass, Metal Etc.
B- Toxic Waste:- - Old Medicine, paints, Chemicals, bulbs, Spray Cans, fertilizer
and pesticide containers, batteries, shoe polish.
C- Soiled:- Hospital waste such as cloth soiled with blood and other body fluids.
Toxic & soiled waste must be disposed of with utmost care.

THE COLOR CODING OF WASTE BINS

Organic is Green, Glass is Yellow, Paper is White,
Metal is Grey, Plastic is Blue, Hazard is Red!

Zoogyroscope
Zoopraxiscope

The Zoopraxiscope (earlier known as the Zoogyroscope) was essentially a projecting

version of the old Phenakisticsope or 'spinning picture disk'. The device projected
sequences of images from glass discs and was devised in order to prove the
authenticity of Muybridge's galloping horse pictures. The earlier Zoogyroscope took the
16 inch discs while the latter Zoopraxiscope took the 12 inch discs.
Zoopraxiscope discs
All of the zoopraxiscope glass discs in Muybridge's possession at the time of his death
in 1904 were bequeathed to Kingston Museum (together with the surviving
zoopraxiscope and many other items). These were probably the only zoopraxiscope
discs in existence. A large number of discs were stored by the Science Museum
(London) from about 1947 to 1996, when they were returned to Kingston.
One of the discs was incorporated into the Will Day collection. This disc is now in the
collection of the Cinmatheque Francaise. One other disc was given to the National
Technical Museum in Prague. Of the 71 known surviving discs, 67 are still in the
Kingston collection. A number of early glass photographic negative plates from which 12
inch discs could be printed are in the Smithsonian collection.
The images on the discs represent animals, birds and humans in motion. The images
on the painted (16 inch) and drawn (12 inch) discs have been informed by Muybridge's
original photographic sequences. The zoopraxiscope produced a distortion on
projection (compressing the images). This was compensated for by painting the images
in an elongated form.
Many of the discs contain imaginary scenes produced by combining sequences and by
adding imaginary details, eg 'matchstick' figures around a racetrack etc. Most of the
discs are in quite good condition. Some have cracks and some of the silhouettes are
lifting, whilst other discs have had damp damage in the past. Most discs have numbers
on the labels, relating to the original numbers given to the discs and to the quantity of
images.