Calalang v Calalang-Garcia

Complaint4 for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of

Property filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan on June 10,

1991, the respondents Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora

Calalang-Sabile, and Carlito S. Calalang asserted their
ownership over a certain parcel of land against the petitioners
Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Elvira B. Calalang.
According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang
contracted two marriages during his lifetime. The first
marriage was with their mother Encarnacion Silverio. During
the subsistence of this marriage, their parents acquired the
above-mentioned parcel of land from their maternal
grandmother Francisca Silverio. Despite enjoying continuous
possession of the land, however, their parents failed to register
the same. On June 7, 1942, the first marriage was dissolved
with the death of Encarnacion Silverio.
Pedro Calalang entered into a second marriage with Elvira B.
Calalang who then gave birth to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and
Rolando Calalang. According to the respondents, it was only
during this time that Pedro Calalang filed an application for free
patent over the parcel of land with the Bureau of Lands. Pedro
Calalang committed fraud in such application by claiming sole
and exclusive ownership over the land since 1935 and
concealing the fact that he had three children with his first
spouse.
Pedro Calalang sold the said parcel of land to Nora B. CalalangParulan
respondents assailed the validity of TCT No. 283321 on two
grounds. First, the respondents argued that the sale of the land
was void because Pedro Calalang failed to obtain the consent
of the respondents who were co-owners of the same. As
compulsory heirs upon the death of Encarnacion Silverio, the
respondents claimed that they acquired successional rights
over the land. Thus, in alienating the land without their
consent, Pedro Calalang allegedly deprived them of their pro
indiviso share in the property. Second, the respondents
claimed that the sale was absolutely simulated as Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan did not have the capacity to pay for the
consideration stated in the Deed of Sale.
whether Pedro Calalang was the exclusive owner of the
disputed property prior to its transfer to his daughter Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan.

records are bereft of any concrete proof to show that the

subject property indeed belonged to respondents maternal
grandparents. The evidence respondents adduced merely
consisted of testimonial evidence such as the declaration of
Rosario Calalang-Garcia that they have been staying on the
property as far as she can remember and that the property was
acquired by her parents through purchase from her maternal
grandparents. However, she was unable to produce any
document to evidence the said sale, nor was she able to
present any documentary evidence such as the tax declaration
issued in the name of either of her parents. Moreover, we note
that the free patent was issued solely in the name of Pedro
Calalang and that it was issued more than 30 years after the
death of Encarnacion and the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains of the first marriage. Thus, we cannot
subscribe to respondents submission that the subject property
originally belonged to the parents of Encarnacion and was
acquired by Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion.
We likewise cannot sustain the argument of the petitioners that
the disputed property belongs to the conjugal partnership of
the second marriage of Pedro Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang
on the ground that the title was issued in the name of Pedro
Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]. merely describes
the civil status and identifies the spouse of the registered
owner Pedro Calalang. Evidently, this does not mean that the
property is conjugal.
in his application for free patent,16 applicant Pedro Calalang
averred that the land was first occupied and cultivated by him
since 1935 and that he had planted mango trees, coconut
plants, caimito trees, banana plants and seasonal crops and
built his house on the subject lot. But he applied for free
patent only in 1974 and was issued a free patent while already
married to Elvira B. Calalang. Thus, having possessed the
subject land in the manner and for the period required by law
after the dissolution of the first marriage and before the second
marriage, the subject property ipso jure became private
property and formed part of Pedro Calalangs exclusive
property.17 It was therefore excluded from the conjugal
partnership of gains of the second marriage.

only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December 27, 1989

that his heirs acquired their respective inheritances, entitling
them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the
time of the sale of the disputed property, the rights to the
succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of Pedro
Calalang. And absent clear and convincing evidence that the
sale was fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable
consideration (in effect an inofficious donation inter vivos), the
respondents have no right to question the sale

Art 886
Spouses Joaquin v CA

Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are

the parents of plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and
Natividad as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio,
Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed JOAQUIN. The
married Joaquin children are joined in this action by their
respective spouses.

Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds

of sale of real property executed by defendant parents
Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their codefendant children and the corresponding certificates of title
issued in their names

plaintiffs-appellants, like their defendant brothers and sisters,

are compulsory heirs of defendant spouses, Leonardo Joaquin
and Feliciana Landrito, who are their parents. However, their
right to the properties of their defendant parents, as
compulsory heirs, is merely inchoate and vests only upon the
latters death. While still alive, defendant parents are free to
dispose of their properties, provided that such dispositions are
not made in fraud of creditors.

Plaintiffs-appellants are definitely not parties to the deeds of

sale in question. Neither do they claim to be creditors of their
defendant parents. Consequently, they cannot be considered
as real parties in interest to assail the validity of said deeds
either for gross inadequacy or lack of consideration or for

failure to express the true intent of the parties. Hence not

parties to the alleged deed of sale and are not principally or
subsidiarily bound thereby; hence, they have no legal capacity
to challenge their validity.
Manonongsong v Estimo
Allegedly, AgatonaGuevarra (Guevarra) inherited a property from
Justina Navarro, which is now under possession of the heirs of
Guevarra. Guevarra had six children, one of them is Vicente Lopez,
the father of petitioner Milagros Lopez Manongsong
(Manongsong). The respondents, the Jumaquio sisters and
Leoncia Lopez claimed that the property was actually sold to them
by Justina Navarro prior to her death. The respondents presented
deed of sale dated October 11, 1957. Milagros and
CarlitoManongsong (petitioners) filed a Complaint on June 19,
1992 praying for the partition and award to them of an area
equivalent to one-fifth (1/5), by right of representation. The RTC
ruled that the conveyance made by Justina Navarro is subject to
nullity because the property conveyed had a conjugal character
and that AgatonaGuevarra as her compulsory heir should have the
legal right to participate with the distribution of the estate under
question to the exclusion of others. The Deed of Sale did not at all
provide for the reserved legitime or the heirs, and, therefore it has
no force and effect against AgatonaGuevarra and should be
declared a nullity ab initio.

partnership; unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the

husband or to the wife. The presumption under Article 160 of the
Civil Code applies only when there is proof that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. There was no
evidence presented to establish that Navarro acquired the Property
during her marriage.
Bartolome v SSS
John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime
Services, Inc. He was enrolled under the governments Employees
Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to an accident while on
board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless and
unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, Johns
biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a
claim for death benefits.
SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was
no longer considered as the parent of John since the latter was
legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who
qualifies as Johns primary beneficiary, not petitioner.
According to the records, Cornelio died during Johns
minority.

Whether or not the rights of the compulsory heirs were impaired by

the alleged sale of the property by Justina. - NO
As opposed to a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous
title, a valid sale for valuable consideration does not diminish the
estate of the seller. When the disposition is for valuable
consideration, there is no diminution of the estate but merely a
substitution of values, that is, the property sold is replaced by the
equivalent monetary consideration. The Property was sold in 1957
for P250.00.
trial courts conclusion that the Property was conjugal, hence the
sale is void ab initio was not based on evidence, but rather on a
misapprehension of Article 160 of the Civil Code, which provides:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal

Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of

John. Yes
The Court held that Cornelios adoption of John, without more, does
not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming
from Johns death as a dependent parent given Cornelios untimely
demise during Johns minority. Since the parent by adoption
already died, then the death benefits under the Employees
Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner,
Johns sole remaining beneficiary.
Art 854
Reyes v. Barretto-Datu

Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. When Bibiano

Barretto died he left his share in a will to Salud Barretto and Lucia
Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters
Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew and nieces. The
usufruct of a fishpond was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo.
Maria Gerardo, as administratrix prepared a project of partition. It
was approved and the estate was distributed and the shares
delivered.
Later on, Maria Gerardo died. Upon her death, it was discovered
that she executed two wills, in the first, she instituted Salud and
Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the second,
she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of
Milagros Barretto alone. The later will was allowed and the first
rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as
guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the LC held that Salud
was not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her
husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was appealed to the SC,
which affirmed the same.
Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria
Gerardo, as a legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls
back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased Bibiano
Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo.
Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof.
This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her
right of ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of
all the other properties willed and delivered to Salud Barretto, for
being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of
Bibiano Barretto, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of
the project of partition, but of the decision of the court based
thereon as well.
W/N the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab
initio and Salud did not acquire valid title to it.
NO. Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late
Bibiano Barrettos last will and testament together with defendant
Milagros; hence, the partition had between them could not be one
such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really
being one, and was not null and void. The legal precept (Article
1081) does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs

(without distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones),

and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the
testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly
named in his testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to
assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose.
While the share () assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of
Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary
heir of Bibiano Barretto.
Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her fathers will a
share smaller than her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud
as heir, since there was here no preterition, or total ommission of a
forced heir.
Aznar v Duncan
Christensen died testate. The will was admitted to probate. The
court declared that Helen Garcia was a natural child of the
deceased. The Court of First Instance equally divided the properties
of the estate of Christensen between Lucy Duncan (whom testator
expressly recognized in his will as his daughter) and Helen Garcia.
In the order, the CFI held that Helen Garcia was preterited in the
will thus, the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled and
the properties passed to both of them as if the deceased died
intestate.
Whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be equally
divided or whether the inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir should
be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover the legitime of
Helen Garcia, equivalent to of the entire estate.
The inheritance of Lucy should be merely reduced to cover the
legitime of Helen Garcia.
Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural
daughter and limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00. When a
testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less than the
legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as
a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons, the
heir could not ask that the institution of the heirs be annulled
entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.
Nuguid v Nuguid

Acain v CA

JLT Agro v Balasang