Contents

Introduction
What is discipline by Michel Foucault
Provision of article 27
Practice of veto power
Common users of veto power
Security Council on Iraq issue
United nation resolutions
Criticism on Iraq war by passing veto power
Reforms
Conclusion
References

Introduction

The veto power is exercised when any permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States), cast a
"negative" vote in any draft resolution. It enables them to prevent the adoption of
any "substantive" resolution, as well as to decide which issues fall under
"substantive" title. Since 1946 up to now a hundred of veto has been attempted
although few put long lasting consequences but most of them were attempted for
self-interest or for client members. Even though ,security council veto power had
been challenged from its inception, however it becomes crucial debate on resent
decade .newly emerging states demanded to become a part of security council , as
they shared huge contribution in world affairs but on the other hand they also faced
tense opposition .
The control over the UN Security Council by the five governments are
seen by critics, since its creation in 1945, as the most undemocratic character of
the UN. Critics also note the veto power as a main cause for most international
inaction war crimes and crimes against humanity. The veto does not apply to
procedural votes, which is significant in the Security Council's permanent
membership can vote against a "procedural" draft resolution, without necessarily
blocking its adoption by the Council.
In order to avoid lengthy detail and discussion, I have decided to work on
highlighted content. First part of my assignment focuses on veto power, its origin
and provision. the second part refers to the frequent uses of veto power by five
permanent members on different occasions and also enlighten a last-decade span
of Security Council resolution, action and impasses on Iraq, investigating closely the
period of diplomatic confrontation in 2002-2003, culminating in unilateral military
action to remove Saddam Hussein from power by the US, the UK and a very few
others without a mandate from the Council to do so. The UN Security Council veto
was mostly side-lined in Iraq war.
Last part of my research is a brief sketch on critics and reforms of Security Council
veto power, and recently spokesman views over five permanent members
monopoly over world government.

Source of the veto power

The idea of states having a veto over the actions of international organizations was
not new in 1945. From the foundation of the League of Nations in 1920, each
member of the League Council, whether permanent or non-permanent, had a veto
on any non-procedural issue. From 1920 there were 4 permanent and 4 nonpermanent members, but by 1936 the number of non-permanent members had
increased to 11. Thus, there were in effect 15 vetoes. This was one of several
defects of the League that made action on many issues impossible.

The UN Charter provision for unanimity among the Permanent Members of the
Security Council (the veto) was the result of extensive discussion, including at
Dumbarton Oaks (AugustOctober 1944) and Yalta (February 1945).The evidence is
that the UK, US, USSR, and France all favored the principle of unanimity, and that
they were motivated in this not only by a belief in the desirability of the major
powers acting together, but also by a hard-headed concern to protect their own
sovereign rights and national interest. Truman, who became President of the US in
April 1945, went so far as to write in his memoirs: "All our experts, civil and military,
favored it, and without such a veto no arrangement would have passed the Senate."
The veto was forced on all other governments by the five veto holders. In the
negotiations building up to the creation of the UN, the veto power was resented by
many small countries, and in fact was forced on them by the veto nations , US, UK,
China, France and the Soviet Union - through a threat that without the veto there
will be no UN.
Here is a description by Francis O. Wilcox, an adviser to US delegation to the
1945 conference: "At San Francisco, the issue was made crystal clear by the leaders
of the Big Five: it was either the Charter with the veto or no Charter at all. Senator
Connally (from the US delegation) dramatically tore up a copy of the Charter during
one of his speeches and reminded the small states that they would be guilty of that
same act if they opposed the unanimity principle. "You may, if you wish," he said,
"go home from this Conference and say that you have defeated the veto. But what
will be your answer when you are asked: 'Where is the Charter'?
The UNSC veto system was established in order to prohibit the UN from taking
any future action directly against its principal founding members. One of the lessons
of the League of Nations (191946) had been that an international organization
cannot work if all the major powers are not members. The expulsion of the Soviet
Union from the League of Nations in December 1939, following its November 1939
attack on Finland soon after the outbreak of World War II, was just one of many
events in the League's long history of incomplete membership.
It had already been decided at the UN's founding conference in 1944,
that Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the United States and, "in due course" France,
should be the permanent members of any newly formed Council. France had been
defeated and occupied by Germany (194044), but its role as a permanent member
of the League of Nations, its status as a colonial power and the activities of the Free
French forces on the allied side allowed it a place at the table with the other four.

Provision of Article 27
Article 27 of the United Nations Charter states:
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an

affirmative vote of nine members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the
permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under
paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.
Although the "power of veto" is not explicitly mentioned in the UN Charter, the fact
that "substantive" decisions by the UNSC require "the concurring votes of the
permanent members means that any of those permanent members can prevent the
adoption, by the Council, of any draft resolutions on "substantive" matters. For this
reason, the "power of veto" is also referred to as the principle of "great
power unanimity and the veto itself are sometimes referred to as the "great power
veto".

The practice of the veto power

The real use of the veto and the constant possibility of its use have been central
features of the functioning of the Security Council throughout the UN's history. From
1946 to 2015, vetoes were issued on 236 occasions. In the period from 1945 to the
end of 2009, 215 resolutions on substantive issues were vetoed, sometimes by
more than one of the P5. These figures reflect the fact that a Permanent Member of
the Security Council can avoid casting a veto if the proposal in question does not in
any event obtain the requisite majority. In the first two decades of the UN, the
Western states were frequently able to defeat resolutions without actually using the
veto; and the Soviet Union was in this position in the 1970s and 1980s. Use of the
veto has reflected a degree of diplomatic isolation of the vetoing state(s) on the
particular issue. Because of the use or threat of the veto, the Security Council could
at best have a limited role in certain wars and interventions in which its Permanent
Members were involved , for example in Algeria (195462); Suez (1956), Hungary
(1956), Vietnam (194675), the Sino-Vietnamese war (1979), Afghanistan (1979
88), Panama (1989), Iraq (2003), and Georgia (2008)
Not all cases of UN inaction in crises have been due to actual use of the veto.
For example, Iran and Iraq war of 198088 there was no use of the veto, but the UN
role was minimal except in its concluding phase. Likewise the limited involvement of
the UN in the crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan from 2003 onwards was not due to
any actual use of the veto. A general lack of willingness to act was the main
problem.
Since 1990 the veto has been used sparingly. The period from 31 May 1990
to 11 May 1993 was the longest without use of the veto in the history of the UN. Up
until the end of 1989 the number of resolutions passed by the Security Council had
been 646 an average of about 15 per annum.

In 1950 the Soviet Union missed one important opportunity to exercise its
veto power. The Soviet government had adopted an "empty chair" policy at the
Security Council from January 1950, owing to its discontent over the UN's refusal to
recognize the People's Republic of China's representatives as the legitimate
representatives of China, and with the hope of preventing any future decisions by
the Council on substantive matters. The result of the Soviet Union's absence from
the Security Council was that it was not in a position to veto the UN Security Council
resolutions 83 (27 June 1950) and 84 (7 July 1950) authorizing the US-led military
coalition in Korea which assisted South Korea in repelling the North Korean attack.

Most common users of veto power

In the history of the Security Council, almost half the vetoes were cast by the Soviet
Union, with the vast majority of those being before 1965.
Since 1966, out of the total 153 vetoes cast, 119 were issued by one of the council's
three NATO members: the US, the UK and France.
From 1946 to 2015, vetoes were issued on 236 occasions. For that period, usage is;

The United States has used the veto on 79 occasions between 1946 and
2015; and since 1972, it has used its veto power more than any other
permanent member.

Soviet Union used the veto on 103 occasions, more than any other of the five
permanent members of the Security Council.

December 23, 1989: France, the United Kingdom and the United States
vetoed a draft resolution condemning the United States invasion of Panama.

Most recent veto power country

While China, Russia and the United States have exercised their veto power in the
twenty-first century, neither France nor the United Kingdom has. The following list
contains the most recent event any of the five permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council exercised their veto power:

July 29, 2015: Russia vetoed a draft resolution seeking to set up an

international criminal tribunal into the MH17 air disaster in Ukraine.

May 22, 2014: China and Russia vetoed a resolution condemning the state of
Syria.

February 18, 2011: The United States vetoed a draft resolution

condemning Israeli settlements in the West Bank.

Russia/Soviet Union
At the inception of the United Nations, the Soviet Union commissar and later
minister for foreign affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, vetoed resolutions so many times
that he was known as "Mr. Veto". In fact, the Soviet Union was responsible for nearly
half of all vetoes ever cast (79) vetoes were used in the first 10 years. Molotov
regularly rejected bids for new membership because of the US's refusal to admit all
of the Soviet republics. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has used its
veto power sparingly.
United States
Ambassador of united state Charles W. Yost cast the first U.S. veto in
1970, regarding a crisis in Rhodesia, and the U.S. cast a lone veto in 1972, to
prevent a resolution relating to Israel. Since that time, it has become by far the
most frequent user of the veto, mainly on resolutions criticizing Israel; since 2002,
the Negroponte doctrine has been applied for the use of a veto on resolutions
relating to the ongoing Israel-Palestinian conflict. This has been a constant cause of
friction between the General Assembly and the Security Council. On 18 February
2011, the Obama administration vetoed resolutions condemning Israeli settlements.
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has used its Security Council veto power on 32
occasions. The first occurrence was in October 1956 when the United Kingdom and
France vetoed a letter from the USA to the President of the Security Council
concerning Palestine. The most recent was in December 1989 when the United
Kingdom, France and the United States vetoed a draft resolution condemning
the United States invasion of Panama.

The United Kingdom used its veto power, along with France, to veto a draft
resolution aimed at resolving the Suez Canal crisis in 1956. The UK and France
eventually withdrew after the U.S. instigated an 'emergency special session' of the
General Assembly, under the terms of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, which led
to the establishment of the United I (UNEF I), by the adoption of Assembly resolution
1001.The UK also used its veto seven times in relation to Rhodesia from 1963 to
1973, five of these occasions were unilateral which are the only occasions on which
the UK has used its veto power unilaterally.
France
France uses its veto power sparingly. The last time it unilaterally vetoed a
draft was in 1976 to block a Resolution on the question of
the Comoros independence, which was done to keep the island of Mayotte as a
French overseas territory. It also vetoed, along with U.K, a resolution calling on the
immediate cessation of military action by the Israeli army against Egypt in 1956
during the Crisis. The last time France used its veto power was in December 1989
concerning the situation in Panama. In 2003, the threat of a French veto
of resolution on the impending invasion of Iraq caused friction between France and
the United States.

China
In between 1946 and 1971, the Chinese seat on the Security Council was the
government of the Republic of China (which retreated to Taiwan in 1949) during
which its representative used the veto only once to block Mongolia's application for
membership in 1955 because the ROC considered the country to be a part of China.
This postponed the admission of Mongolia until 1960, when the Soviet Union
announced that unless Mongolia was admitted, it would block the admission of all of
the newly independent African states. Faced with this pressure, the ROC relented
under protest.
After the Republic of China's expulsion from the United Nations in 1971, the
first veto cast by the present occupant, the People's Republic of China, was issued
in 25 August 1972 over Bangladesh's admission to the United Nations. As of May
2014, the People's Republic of China has used its veto nine times. Observers have
noted a preference for China to abstain rather than veto on resolutions not directly
related to Chinese interests.

Security Council on Iraq issue

The legality of the invasion and occupation of Iraq has been widely
debated since the United States, United Kingdom, and a coalition of
other countries launched the 2003 invasion of Iraq.. Many of the political leaders of
the US and UK have argued the war was legal ], while many legal experts and other
international leaders have argued that it was illegal. US and UK officials have argued
that existing UN Security Council resolutions related to the (1991) Gulf War and the
subsequent ceasefire (660, 678), and to later inspections of Iraqi weapons programs
(1441), had already authorized the invasion. Critics of the invasion have challenged
both of these assertions, arguing that an additional Security Council resolution,
which the US and UK failed to obtain, would have been necessary to specifically
authorize the invasion.

Principal of legal rationalities

The United Nations Charter is the foundation of modern international
law. The UN Charter is a treaty ratified by the US and its principal coalition allies in
the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which are therefore legally bound by its terms. Article 2(4)
of the UN Charter generally bans the use of force by states except when carefully
circumscribed conditions are met, stating:
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
This rule was "enshrined in the United Nations Charter in 1945 for a good
reason: to prevent states from using force as they felt so inclined", said Louise
Doswald-Beck, Secretary-General International Commission of Jurists. Therefore, in
the absence of an armed attack against the US or the coalition members, any legal
use of force, or any legal threat of the use of force, had to be supported by a UN
Security Council resolution authorizing member states to use force against
Iraq. However, the US government stated that an armed attack by Iraq did occur
against the US and its coalition partners as demonstrated by
the assassination attempt on former US President George H. W. Bush in 1993 and
firing on coalition aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones over Northern and Southern
Iraq since the 1991 Gulf War ceasefire agreement. Under Article 51 of the UN
Charter, the US reserved the right to self-defense, even without a UN mandate, as
were the cases in the bombing of Iraq in June 1993 in retaliation for Hussein's
attempt on former President Bush's life and again in 1996 in retaliation for Hussein's
targeting of American aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones over Northern and
Southern Iraq and the launching of a major offensive against the city of Irbil in Iraqi
Kurdistan in violation of UNSC Resolution 688 prohibiting repression of Iraq's ethnic
minorities.
The U.S. and UK governments, along with others, also stated (as is detailed in
the first four paragraphs of the joint resolution) that the invasion was entirely legal

because it was already authorized by existing United Nations Security

Council resolutions and a resumption of previously temporarily suspended
hostilities, and not a war of aggression as the United States and UK were acting as
agents for the defense of Kuwait in response to Iraq's 1990 invasion. Some
International legal experts, including the International Commission of Jurists, the
U.S.-based National Lawyers' Guild, a group of 31 Canadian law professors, and the
U.S.-based Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy have found this legal rationale to
be untenable, and are of the view that the invasion was not supported by UN
resolution and was therefore illegal.

UN resolutions
Resolution 1441
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 is a United Nations Security
Council resolution adopted unanimously by the United Nations Security Council on 8
November 2002, offering Iraq under Saddam Hussein "a final opportunity to comply
with its disarmament obligations" that had been set out in several previous
resolutions (Resolution 660, Resolution 661, Resolution 678, Resolution
686, Resolution 687, Resolution 688, Resolution 707, Resolution 715, Resolution
986, and Resolution 1284).
Resolution 1441 stated that Iraq was in material breach of the ceasefire terms
presented under the terms of Resolution 687. Iraq's breaches related not only
to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but also the known construction of
prohibited types of missiles, the purchase and import of prohibited armaments and
the continuing refusal of Iraq to compensate Kuwait for the widespread
looting conducted by its troops during the 19901991 invasion and occupation.
It also stated that "...false statements or omissions in the declarations
submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to
comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall
constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations."

The resolution strengthened the mandate of the UN Monitoring and Verification

Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), giving
them authority to go anywhere, at any time and talk to anyone in order to verify
Iraqs disarmament."
The most important text of Resolution 1441 was to require that Iraq "shall provide
UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted
access to any and all, including underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment,
records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect" However, on January
27, 2003, Hans Blix, the lead member of the UNMOVIC, said that, "Iraq appears not

to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament that
was demanded of it". Blix noted that Iraq had failed cooperation in a number of
areas, including the failure to provide safety to U-2 spy planes that inspectors hoped
to use for aerial surveillance, refusal to let UN inspectors into several chemical,
biological, and missile sites on the belief that they were engaging
in espionage rather than disarmament, submitting 12,000-page arms declaration
that it handed over in December 2002 which contained little more than old material
previously submitted to inspectors, and failure to produce convincing evidence to
the UN inspectors that it had unilaterally destroyed its anthrax stockpiles as
required by resolution 687 a decade before 1441 was passed in 2002. On March 7,
2003, Blix said that Iraq had made significant progress toward resolving open issues
of disarmament but the cooperation was still not "immediate" and "unconditional"
as called for by UN Security Council Resolution 1441. He concluded that it would
take but months to resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks. The US
government observed this as a breach of resolution 1441 because Iraq did not meet
the requirement of an "immediate" and "unconditional" compliance.
On the day Resolution 1441 was passed, the US ambassador to the UN, John
Negroponte, assured the Security Council that there were no "hidden triggers" with
respect to the use of force, and that in the event of a "further breach" by Iraq,
resolution 1441 would require that "the matter will return to the Council for
discussions as required in paragraph 12." However, he then added: "If the Security
Council fails to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi violations, this resolution
does not constrain any Member State from acting to defend itself against the threat
posed by Iraq or to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world
peace and security."
At the same meeting, UK Permanent Representative Sir Jeremy Green
stock KCMG used many of the same words. "If there is a further Iraqi breach of its
disarmament obligations, the matter will return to the Council for discussion as
required in Operational Paragraph 12."
Resolutions related to Persian Gulf War and 2003 Invasion
As part of the 1991 Gulf War ceasefire agreement, the Iraqi government
agreed to UN Security Council Resolution 687, which called for weapons inspectors
to search locations in Iraq for chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, as well as
weapons that exceed an effective distance of 150 kilometers. After the passing of
resolution 687, thirteen additional resolutions
(699, 707, 715, 949, 1051, 1060, 1115, 1134, 1137, 1154, 1194, 1205,) were
passed by the Security Council reaffirming the continuation of inspections, or citing
Iraq's failure to comply fully with them. On September 9, 1998, the Security Council
passed Resolution 1194, which unanimously condemns Iraq's suspension of
cooperation with UNSCOM. One month later, on October 31, Iraq officially declares it
will cease all forms of interaction with UNSCOM.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) authorizes the use of
all necessary means to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 660
(1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions and to compel Iraq to cease certain
activities that threaten international peace and security, including the development
of weapons of mass destruction and refusal or obstruction of United Nations
weapons inspections in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687
(1991), repression of its civilian population in violation of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 688 (1991), and threatening its neighbors or United Nations
operations in Iraq in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 949
(1994).
The commission of inquiry of the government of the Netherlands found that the UN
resolution of the 1990s provided no authority for the invasion.
Criticisms on Iraq war
The legal right to determine how to enforce its own resolutions lies with the
Security Council alone (UN Charter Articles 39-42) not with individual nations. On 8
November 2002, immediately after the adoption of Security Council resolution 1441,
Russia, the People's Republic of China, and France issued a joint statement declaring
that Council Resolution 1441 did not authorize any "automaticity" in the use of force
against Iraq, and that a further Council resolution was needed were forced to be
used. Critics have also pointed out that the statements of US officials leading up to
the war indicated their belief that a new Security Council resolution was required to
make an invasion legal, but the UN Security Council has not made such a
determination, despite serious debate over this issue. To secure Syria's vote in favor
of Council Resolution 1441, Secretary of State Powell reportedly advised Syrian
officials that "there is nothing in the resolution to allow it to be used as a pretext to
launch a war on Iraq."
The United States structured its reports to the United Nations Security Council
around intelligence from the Central Intelligence Agency and Secret Intelligence
Service (MI6) stating that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. The US
claimed that justification for the war rested upon Iraq's violation of several UN
resolutions, most recently UN Security Council Resolution 1441.
Commission of Inquiry of Dutch Government
According to a detailed legal investigation conducted by an independent
commission of inquiry set up by the government of the Netherlands headed by
former Netherlands Supreme Court president Willibrord Davids, the 2003 invasion
violated international law. Also, the commission concluded that the notion of
"regime change" as practiced by the powers that invaded Iraq had "no basis in
international law." Also, the commission found that UN resolution 1441 "cannot
reasonably be interpreted as authorizing individual member states to use military
force to compel Iraq to comply with the Security Council's resolutions..

United Kingdom
Then UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw sent a secret letter to Prime
Minister Tony Blair in April 2002 warning Blair that the case for military action
against Iraq was of "dubious legality." The letter goes on to state that regime
change per se is no justification for military action and that the weight of legal
advice here is that a fresh [UN] mandate may well be required. Such a new UN
mandate was never given. The letter also expresses doubts regarding the outcome
of military action.
Downing Street memo
On 1 May 2005, a related UK document known as the Downing Street memo,
detailing the minutes of a meeting on 26 July 2002, was apparently leaked to The
Sunday Times. The memo recorded the head of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6)
as expressing the view following his recent visit to Washington that "Bush wanted to
remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism
and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy." It also
quoted Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Foreign
Secretary) Jack Straw as saying that it was clear that Bush had "made up his mind"
to take military action but that "the case was thin", and the Attorney-General
Goldsmith as warning that justifying the invasion on legal grounds would be difficult.
British officials did not dispute the document's authenticity but did dispute that it
accurately stated the situation. The Downing Street memo is relevant to the
question of the legality of the 2003 invasion of Iraq because it discusses some legal
theories that were considered prior to the invasion.
War of aggression
As Professor Ferencz quoted the British deputy legal adviser to the Foreign Ministry
who resigned suddenly before the Iraq war started, stating in her resignation letter:
I regret that I cannot agree that it is lawful to use force against Iraq without a
second Security Council resolution. An unlawful use of force on such a scale does
not amount to the crime of aggression; nor can I agree with such action in
circumstances that are so detrimental to the international order and the rule of law.
United States
George W. Bush addressed the General Assembly on 12 September 2002 to outline
the complaints of the United States against the Iraqi government.

On 12 September 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush addressed the General

Assembly and outlined a catalogue of complaints against the Iraqi government.
These included:

"In violation of Security Council Resolution 1373, Iraq supports terrorist

organizations that direct violence against Iran, Israel, and Western
governments....And al-Qaida terrorists escaped from Afghanistan are known
to be in Iraq."

The United Nations Commission on Human Rights in 2001 found "extremely

grave" human rights violations

Iraqi production and use of weapons of mass destruction (biological weapons,

chemical weapons, and long-range missiles), all in violation of U.N.
resolutions.

Iraq used proceeds from the "oil for food" U.N. program to purchase weapons
rather than food for its people.

Iraq flagrantly violated the terms of the weapons inspection program before
discontinuing it altogether.

Thus, with the support of large bipartisan majorities, the U.S. Congress passed the
Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002. The
resolution asserts the authorization by the Constitution of the United States and the
United States Congress for the President to fight anti-United States terrorism. Citing
the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, the resolution reiterated that it should be the policy
of the United States to remove the Saddam Hussein regime and promote a
democratic replacement.
Supporter of Iraq war
Support for the invasion and occupation of Iraq included 49 nations, a group that
was frequently referred to as the "coalition of the willing". These nations provided
combat troops, support troops, and logistical support for the invasion. The nations
contributing combat forces during the initial invasion were, roughly: The United
States (250,000 84%), the United Kingdom (45,000 15%), Australia (2,000
0.6%), Denmark (200 0.06%), and Poland (184 0.06%), these totals do not include
the 50,000+ Iraqi Kurdish soldiers that assisted the coalition
Opposition on Iraq war
Global protests expressed opposition to the invasion. In many Middle Eastern
and Islamic countries there were mass protests, as well as in Europe. On the
government level, the war was criticized by Canada, Belgium, Chile, Russia, France,
the People's Republic of China, Germany, Switzerland,
the Vatican, India, Iraq, Indonesia, Malaysia, Zealand, Brazil, Mexico, the Arab

League, the African Union and many others. Though many nations opposed the war,
no foreign government openly supported Saddam Hussein, and none volunteered
any assistance to the Iraqi side. Leading traditional allies of the U.S. who had
supported Security Council Resolution 1441, France, Germany and Russia, emerged
as a united front opposed to the U.S.-led invasion, urging that the UN weapons
inspectors be given time to complete their work.
Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud said the U.S. military could not use Saudi
Arabia's soil in any way to attack Iraq. After ten years of U.S. presence in Saudi
Arabia, cited among reasons by Saudi-born Osama bin Laden for his alQaeda attacks on America on September 11, 2001, most of U.S. forces were
withdrawn in 2003. According to the New York Times, the invasion secretly received
support from Saudi Arabia.

New emerging states

The current challenge to the Security Councils authority goes deeper than the
veto issue. Seventy years passed, the settlement is less representative than ever of
the global distribution of population and economic strength. Emerging powers are
knocking ever more assertively on the clubhouse door. India, Brazil, Germany and
Japan have collectively been pushing their claims for more than a decade. They also
support permanent membership status for Africa, where the leading and most vocal
current claimant is South Africa.
Asoke Kumar Mukerji, Indias UN ambassador, said,
In terms of its effectiveness, I think the United Nations security council in 2015 is
much less effective than when it was set up in 1945,. Because it does not really
take on board the views of countries from the areas where disputes occur and the
Security Council takes action.
Antonio Patriota, the Brazilian ambassador, said,
There are entire regions of the world that are absent from the permanent
member category,
The world is bigger than five, Turkish President
Kingsley Mamabolo said, the South African permanent representative at the UN.
How can we have a situation in which other people are discussing what is
happening on our continent without our participation?
The barriers to expansion are formidable, however. France and the UK have voiced
their support for a new intake of permanent members.

Its time to see some changes to the way that the worlds reality is 2015 are
reflected inside the Security Council, said Rycroft, the British ambassador.
Frances foreign minister first floated the idea of a code of conduct for the veto in
2001.France is proposing that the five permanent council members voluntarily
suspend their veto rights in situations where genocide or other mass atrocities are
being committed.
The French ambassador, Franois Delattre, said. Our initiative is based on the key
and core convictions that veto power is not a privilege. Its a responsibility,
The proposal has widespread support in the UN general assembly, but Russia
adamantly opposes it.
However, Non-member countries are themselves so divided as to make that a
long shot. Jealous neighbors and regional rivalries of the leading candidate
members have grouped together to block progress. The group started informally in
1995 as the Coffee Club, so named because the Italians did the hosting and
provided the beverages, but it has since crystallized into a 13-nation lobby calling
itself uniting for Consensus.
There have been proposals suggesting the introduction of new permanent
members. The candidates usually mentioned are Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan.
They comprise the group of G4 nations, mutually supporting one another's bids for
permanent seats. Britain, France and Russia support G4 membership in the UN
Security Council. This sort of reform has traditionally been opposed by the "Uniting
for Consensus" group, which is composed primarily of nations who are regional
rivals and economic competitors of the G4. The group is led
by Italy and Spain (opposing Germany), Mexico, Colombia, and Argentina (opposing
Brazil), Pakistan and china (opposing India), and South Korea and china (opposing
Japan), in addition to Turkey, Indonesia and others. Since 1992, Italy and other
members of the group have instead proposed semi-permanent seats or the
expansion of the number of temporary seats.
Most of the leading candidates for permanent membership are regularly elected
onto the Security Council by their respective groups: Japan was elected for eleven
two-year terms, Brazil for ten terms, and Germany for three terms. India has been
elected to the council seven times in total, with the most recent successful bid
being in 2010 after a gap of almost twenty years since 199192.

Criticism on veto power

Various discussions have taken place in recent years over the suitability of the
Security Council veto power in today's world. Key arguments include that the five
permanent members no longer represent the most stable and responsible member
states in the United Nations and that their veto power slows down and even

prevents important decisions being made on matters of international peace and

security. Due to the global changes that have taken place politically and
economically since the formation of the UN in 1945, widespread debate has been
apparent over whether the five permanent members of the UN Security Council
remain the best member states to hold veto power. While the permanent members
are still typically regarded as great powers, there is debate over their suitability to
retain exclusive veto power.
A second argument against retaining the UNSC veto power is that it is
detrimental to balanced political decisions, as any draft text needs to be approved
of by each permanent member before any draft resolution can possibly be adopted.
Indeed, several proposed draft resolutions are never formally presented to the
Council for a vote owing to the knowledge that a permanent member would vote
against their adoption (the so-called "pocket veto"). Debate also exists over the
potential use of the veto power to provide "diplomatic cover" to a permanent
member's allies. The United States has used its veto power more than any other
permanent member since 1972, particularly on resolutions condemning the actions
or policies of Israel.
As Without the veto power, the Security Council would be open to making
democratic "majority rules" decisions on matters that have implications at a global
level decisions that may well go directly against the interests of a permanent
member.

Veto power reforms

To improving the UN's effectiveness and responsiveness to international
security threats often include reform of the UNSC veto. Proposals include: limiting
the use of the veto to vital national security issues; requiring agreement from
multiple states before exercising the veto; and abolishing the veto entirely.
However, any reform of the veto will be very difficult, if not impossible. In fact,
Articles 108 and 109 of the United Nations Charter grant the P5 veto over any
amendments to the Charter, requiring them to approve of any modifications to the
UNSC veto power that they themselves hold: it is highly unlikely that any of the P5
would accept a reform of the UN Charter that would be detrimental to their own
national interests.
Nonetheless, it has been argued that with the adoption of the "Uniting for
Peace" resolution by the General Assembly, and given the interpretations of the
Assembly's powers that became customary international law as a result, that the
Security Council "power of veto" problem could be surmounted. By adopting
A/RES/377 A, on 3 November 1950, over two-thirds of UN Member states declared

that, according to the UN Charter, the permanent members of the UNSC cannot and
should not prevent the UNGA from taking any and all action necessary to restore
international peace and security, in cases where the UNSC has failed to exercise its
"primary responsibility" for maintaining peace. Such an interpretation sees the
UNGA as being awarded "final responsibility" rather than "secondary responsibility
for matters of international peace and security, by the UN Charter. Various official
and semi-official UN reports make explicit reference to the Uniting for Peace
resolution as providing a mechanism for the UNGA to overrule any UNSC
vetoes; thus rendering them little more than delays in UN action, should two-thirds
of the Assembly subsequently agree that action is necessary.
The threat of the use of the veto by the P5 has led the UN Security Council to
adopt what some commentators have described as unlawful resolutions that
violated the UN Charter. For example, UNSC resolution 1422 of 2002, renewed once
through resolution 1487 of 2003, aimed at exempting peace-keepers and other
military personnel conducting operations authorized by the Security Council from
the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) for a period of 12 months.
Resolution 1422 was adopted as a consequence to the US veto on 30 June 2002 to
the renewal of the Peace-keeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a State
Party to the Rome Statute of the ICC.
There has been discussion of increasing the number of permanent members.
The countries who have made the strongest demands for permanent seats are
Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan. Japan and Germany are the UN's second and third
largest funders respectively, while Brazil, the largest Latin American nation, and
India, the world's largest democracy and second most populous country, are two of
the largest contributors of troops to UN-mandated peace-keeping missions. This
proposal has found opposition in a group of countries called Uniting for Consensus.
On 21 September 2004, the G4 nations issued a joint statement mutually backing
each other's claim to permanent status, together with two African countries. Any
such proposal would involve amendment of the UN Charter, and as such would need
to be accepted by two-thirds of the General Assembly (128 votes), and also by all
the permanent members of the Security Council.

Conclusion
The Iraq experience demonstrates that the Security Council is tremendously
vulnerable to the ebb and flow of international politics, especially the relationship
among the five permanent members at any given time. P-5 members alienate each
other at considerable risk, as happened during the 1990s and again in the first three
years of the new century on Iraq.
A failure to secure the united nation Security Council approval for invasion of
Iraq in 2003 might productively have prompted second thoughts. And although the
united states and United kingdom largely lost the 2003 Iraq War (after briefly

winning it), in public opinion the united nation security council lost a great deal of
legitimacy for failing to prevent it. There were thus no winners from this fiasco.
Although several Gulf countries did provide quiet support. Washington and London
overestimated their own capacity to govern a country of which they knew all too
little, and failed in all but the narrow objective of overthrowing Saddam Hussein at
huge cost to Iraq, the region and themselves.

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Bush, George H. W. and Brent Scowcroft (1998) A World Transformed, New
York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf. Mofid, Kamran (1990) Economic Consequences of
the Gulf War, London and New York: Rutledge.
Traub, James (2002) Who Needs the UN Security Council?, The New York
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The Yalta Voting Formula, Author(s): Francis O. Wilcox, Source: The American
Political Science Review, Vol. 39, No. 5 (Oct., 1945), pp. 943-956, Stable
Adam; Welsh, Jennifer; et al. The United Nations Security Council and War:
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Stuck, William (2008). "The United Nations, the Security Council, and the
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United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and
Practice since 1945. Oxford University Press. pp. 2667, 2778.
Global Policy Forum (2008): "Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the
Security Council". Retrieved 30 December 2008.
Veto database and information at Global Policy Forum
Truman, Year of Decisions: 1945, p. 207. See also US Department of
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2005. Retrieved 1 March 2012.