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From Problem Solvers to Solution Seekers: The Permeation

of Knowledge Boundaries at NASA



Hila Lifshitz-Assaf
New York University
Leonard N. Stern School of Business
New York, NY 10012
Tel: 212-998-0810
h@nyu.edu

January 4, 2015

-Draft, Please do not distribute-

Acknowledgments: I thank the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
especially NASAs space life science directorate (SLSD) and its organizational members who shared their
daily work life, experiences and thoughts with me and welcomed me to their workshops, meetings and
labs. I thank my main adviser and mentor, Michael Lee Tushman and devoted committee members,
Michel Anteby and Karim R. Lakhani; as well as Leslie Perlow, Carliss Baldwin and Elizabeth Hansen
for extensive feedback on several versions of this paper, and participants in the inductive qualitative craft
group and WOM Seminar, for their enthusiastic support. I am also grateful for feedback from participants
at the organization science winter conference, the structure and structuring of work in organizations
workshop, the national science foundation knowledge conference, Wharton people and organization
conference, as well as seminars at Harvard University. This research was funded by Harvard Business
Schools Division of Research and Faculty Development.

Abstract
Innovation scholars have long been modeling and arguing about the optimal way to organize for
the production of scientific and technological innovation. Until recently, the prevailing
consensus among various streams of theoretical and empirical literature has been that innovation
does and should take place within the boundaries of the firm. However, recently a new model,
usually named open or peer production innovation, is challenging the permeability itself of
these boundaries. According to this model, knowledge work should transcend the traditional
professional and knowledge boundaries, and instead be conducted in the open, by anyone who
chooses to contribute. This study is a longitudinal in depth field study of how R&D professionals
permeate their boundaries. In an open innovation experiment at NASA, R&D professionals
experimented with posting their strategic R&D challenges on open innovation online platforms
and communities. This experiment resulted in an important scientific breakthrough in
unprecedented speed. However, challenging the permeability of professionals knowledge
boundaries, posed a challenge on their professional identity. This paper describes the reactions of
these professionals and finds that professional identity refocusing work- the ability to change,
reconstruct and re-narrate ones professional identity-is critical for permeating professionals
knowledge boundaries and shifting the locus of innovation. I discuss the contributions and
implications of these findings on organizing for scientific and technological innovation,
knowledge boundaries and professional identity.

Keywords: innovation; knowledge boundaries; boundary work; professional identity; open


innovation; identity work; knowledge boundary work; technology, work and organizations

It is a deep philosophy change, from being a problem solver to a solution seeker...


it is not only about the organizations [we work in], this is how we have been trained
ever since we are kids- to solve problems! To be the experts of a field and solve!
-Marie, an engineer, NASA, June 2012
Since Schumpeter (1934), social scientists have been modeling and arguing about the optimal
way to organize the production of scientific and technological innovation (see Baldwin and Von
Hippel, 2011). Until recently, the prevailing consensus among various streams of theoretical and
empirical literature has been that innovation does and should take place within the boundaries of
the firm. There is a well-established literature examining the organizational knowledge creation
processes related to innovation (Bechky, 2003a, 2003b; Carlile, 2002, 2004; Hargadon, 2003;
Kogut and Zander 1992, Dougherty, 1992; Nonaka, 1994; Nickerson and Zenger, 2004; OwenSmith and Powell, 2004; Orlikowsky, 2002; Tushman, 1977). However, recently, scholars are
arguing for a shift in the locus of knowledge creation and innovation outside the boundaries of
the traditional processes due to recent changes introduced by digital technologies (Baldwin and
von Hippel, 2011; Benkler, 2006). This approach is usually named open, peer production or
distributed innovation (Benkler, 2006; Chesbrough, 2003; Von Hippel, 1988, 2005) and is
inspired by the open source methods of organizing for innovation which have demonstrated
the possibility of innovating successfully outside of the traditional economic and organizational
boundaries (Benkler, 2006; Lerner & Schankerman, 2010; OMahoney and Ferraro, 2012;
OMaoney and Lakhani, 2011; Raymond, 1991).
A growing number of professions and organizations are experimenting with such open
innovation models to various degrees, however we sorely lack related empirical research
(Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke and West 2014; Helfat, 2006; Gann, 2005; Lakhani, Lifshitz-Assaf
and Tushman, 2013; Dahlander and Wallin, 2006; Henkel, 2006; West and OMahony 2005).
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Most of the research on such models focuses on the online platforms and communities
(Dushnitsky and Klueter, 2010; Fleming et al., 2007; Lerner and Tirole, 2002; West, 2003;
Boudreau et al., 2009; Jeppesen and Lakhani, 2009; Terwiesch and Xu, 2008) and not of the
organizations and professionals using them. As innovation and organizational theory scholars our
interest is peaked by the promise of this approach to produce knowledge and innovation, yet we
expect insurmountable obstacles. As social scholars we expect that such an opening of the
organizational innovation process would threaten several fundamental social structures in the
organization and meet with implacable resistance. As the phenomenon begins to spread, the
questions remain unanswered: What is the ensuing impact inside organizations? How does using
open innovation influence R&D professionals and their work? How do R&D organizational
members permeate these boundaries and shift the locus of innovation?
Prior literature on knowledge and innovation in organizations suggests that R&D
organizational members would fiercely reject opening their problems to be solved by external
members of online platforms and communities. The boundaries of knowledge and innovation
processes have been demonstrated to be an important and contested area for R&D organizational
members (Bechky, 2003a, 2003b; Brown and Duguid, 2000; Carlile, 2002, 2004; Dougherty,
1992; Orlikowsky, 2002; Szulanski, 1996). Knowledge is an embedded and invested practice
and therefore is at stake for those actors who have developed it (Carlile, 2002). Beyond the
notorious not-invented-here syndrome (Allen, 1977; Katz and Allen, 1982), there are unique
reasons to reject knowledge from open innovation platforms and communities since they attract
individuals on the margins of the knowledge boundaries (Jeppesen and Lakhani, 2010) and
therefore can pose a threat to the specialized knowledge developed within the organization.

The sociological Boundary work and professionalism literature also predicts such a
rejection. The literature on professions has ample studies of professions collectively determining
criteria to keep "unqualified" members out of the profession, lay claim to a specific knowledge
base (Sarfatti-Larson, 1979) and establish boundaries to help distinguish laymen from experts
(Lamont and Molnar, 2002). Gieryn, who coined the boundary work construct (1983), stresses
that expansion, monopolization and protection of boundaries are at the heart of
professionalization. Solving challenging scientific and technological problems is often the main
motivator for entering the profession and surely its most prestigious activity. Therefore unlike
common hiving off practices (Hughes, 1958; Smith, 1987) in which professions allocate their
more routine duties to others, the open innovation model threatens to deprive the profession of its
most prestigious task. As Van Maanen and Barely explained Technological innovations which
are interpreted as potentially deskilling or which might disrupt the social structure and prestige of
the community as it is currently organized will be resisted and, if possible, sabotaged (1984:90).
In the same vein, according to Abbotts theory of professionalism (1988), the main focus
of professions is to gain legitimacy over tasks and problems through protecting and expanding
their professional jurisdiction. As Abbott explains; The history of professions is a biography of
the relationship between problems and the tasks that seek to resolve them (1988: 285).
Professions build themselves through legitimizing the type of problems they can solve and
therefore are within the boundaries of their jurisdiction and therefore having other professionals
solve their problems is a clear threat. Opening these tasks and problems to essentially anyone
would put both professional jurisdiction and legitimacy at risk, contradicting the very
foundations of reigning theories. The new paradigm of the web however, is changing knowledge
work and the permeability of multiple boundaries, challenging professional jurisdictions and

organizational boundaries in theoretically unexplored ways. Recently, there has been a call to reexamine the literature and our theories regarding knowledge production and scientific work
(Janasoff, 2004; Leonardi and Bailey, 2008). In particular, scholars have been calling for an
exploration of the use of open innovation by organizations in greater detail (Gann, 2005; Helfat,
2006; Lakhani, Lifshitz-Assaf and Tushman, 2013; Murray and OMahoney, 2007), yet to date
there are few papers that have systematically undertaken this endeavor (Dahlander and Wallin,
2006; Henkel, 2006; Laursen and Salter, 2006, 2014; West and OMahony, 2005). This study is a
first step in filling this gap.
In order to investigate the shifting locus of knowledge and innovation production, I use
the concept of knowledge boundary work, capturing the actions behind the change to
knowledge boundaries. This concept is inspired by and borrowed from the studies of boundary
work in sociology of science and knowledge; leveraging it as an immensely useful concept to
illuminate the social organization of scientific knowledge (Gieryn, 1983, 1999; Lamont and
Molnar, 2002; Nelson and Lawrence, 2012). Investigating knowledge boundary work requires an
in depth investigation of the work itself of the R&D professionals (Anteby, 2008a; Barley and
Kunda, 2001;1994; Bechky, 2003b; Huising, 2015; Owen-Smith, 2001). Such a close
investigation enables examining the change in integration of external knowledge flows inside the
R&D process and openness and sharing of internal knowledge work following the use of open
innovation methods.
Most research about boundaries (organizational, professional, knowledge or symbolic)
and boundary work investigates the existence of boundaries and the challenges fraught with
working across such boundaries (e.g., Carlile, 2004; Dougherty, 1992; Lamont and Molnar,
2002; Levina and Orlikowski, 2009). The boundary spanning literature, for instance, assumes the

permeability of these boundaries as a given and a constant construct (Levina and Vaast, 2005;
Obstfeld, 2005; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Tushman, 1977). In contrast, this study sheds light
on a new type of boundary work that changes the actual formation and permeability of the
boundaries themselves, namely boundary permeation work. This advances our understanding of
the significant and underexplored changes in the nature of knowledge work within organizations
that the Internet has brought about (Argote, McEvily and Reagans, 2003; Levina and Vaast,
2008; Laursen and Foss, 2012; Murray and OMahoney, 2007). Moreover, the concept of
knowledge boundary work suggests a resolution to the fiercely debated novelty of the open
innovation phenomenon (Cassiman and Valentini, 2013; Trott and Hartman, 2009). The term
open innovation has become exceedingly unclear as it is used to describe such a wide range of
knowledge creation and innovation processes at organizations (Dahlander and Gann, 2010). It is
unclear which innovation processes qualify as open and, more critically, how this approach
differs from the traditional cross boundary innovation collaborations that have been extensively
studied (Gann, 2005; Helfat, 2006; Murray and OMahoney, 2007). The types of knowledge
boundary work explored by this study, and the resulting set of possible boundary types
contribute clarity to the topic and its fuzzy terms. It elucidates the multiple meanings of open
innovation as reported by organizations and their members in the popular literature by focusing
not only on the rhetoric but also on the knowledge activities of R&D organizational member as
they react to and enact open innovation.
Most studies of knowledge and innovation processes do not investigate the identity of the
members involved and its impact. The notable exceptions are studies that illustrate the effect of
pre-hoc organizational identity and technological framework on resistance to technological
change (Benner and Tripsas, 2012; Kaplan, Murray and Henderson, 2003; Kaplan and Tripsas,

2008; Tripsas, 2009). This study builds on their work and expands it to the individual level in the
case of change. Challenging professional boundaries and jurisdictions creates tensions and
threatens professionals identity (Hornsey and Hogg, 2000; Mitchell et al., 2011). Prior studies
on identity threats (Elsbach, 2003; Huy, 2011) would clearly predict that R&D organizational
members reject opening their boundaries through online platforms and communities.
Contemporary identity literature is shifting from viewing identity as relatively enduring and
resilient to a more dynamic and nuanced view focused on the processes related to identity
construction and reconstruction (Gioia et al., 2000; Lepisto, Crosina and Pratt, 2013; Pratt,
2012). Identity scholars have developed the concept of Identity work to explain the range of
activities that individuals engage in to create, present, and sustain personal identities that are
congruent with and supportive of the self-concept (Snow and Anderson, 1987: 1348).
Investigating both knowledge boundary work and identity work of R&D organizational
members deepens our understanding of the overall relationship between "doing" and "being" of
professionals (Anteby, 2008b; Elsbach, 2009; Glynn, 2000; Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008; Pratt et
al., 2006; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). Identity work is often observed in narratives and other
symbolic and rhetorical strategies of organizational members (Alvesson, 1994; Corley and Gioia,
2004; Gioia, 1986; Ibarra and Barabulescu, 2010; Rafaeli and Pratt, 2006). Alternatively, other
scholars emphasize the role of "working and doing" in the creation of self (Anteby, 2008b;
Glynn, 2000; Van Maanen, 1997; Wrzesniewski and Dutton, 2001). This study investigates both
the change in organizational members innovation narratives (Bartel and Garud, 2009) and also
what they did in their R&D work. This is particularly important since open innovation can be
viewed as a managerial fad, an analysis of mere rhetoric can be misleading (Zbaracki, 1998).
Research Setting

To study the influence of open innovation on R&D professionals and their work, I conducted an
in-depth longitudinal study at the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA,
more specifically at NASAs space life science directorate (SLSD) and related units. The study
started in 2009 and ended in 2011, designed as an inductive study in one organization, enabling
in-depth analysis, similar to most studies of technology in organizations that follow one
organization throughout the process of introducing a new technology (Barley, 1986, 1990;
Orlikowsky, 2007, 2008; Zuboff, 1988). NASA was an appropriate fit as a field site since they
conducted a significant experiment with open innovation; they opened strategic R&D challenges
and therefore their R&D organizational members were heavily involved in the experimentation.
Furthermore, NASA has fewer intellectual property concerns which enabled focusing on the
organizational issues raised by open innovation. Focusing on the population of NASAs R&D
organizational members as the unit of analysis and not the organizational level makes this field
study more representative since their population is similar to equivalents life science R&D
organizations. Lastly, investigating the experience of R&D organizational members within the
same organization enabled controlling the field and organizational environment and focusing
on the variation of the experience of open innovation.
Data Collection
This study ran for three years between 2009 - 2012, throughout this period I collected data and
conducted iterative cycles of analysis and collection, pre and post open innovation experiment. I
collected data on 98 organizational members across 28 organizational units relying on three main
sources: observations, interviews and internal surveys, documents and communication (see Table
1). My data collection was aimed at gaining a deep understanding of the day-to-day work
experience of organizational members at NASA as a necessary basis to understand their open

innovation experience in context (Kunda, 1992; Van Mannen, 1988). Therefore in each of the
data sources detailed below, I started with collecting data on the day-to-day work and only over
time focused on the open innovation experiment and its impact.
Observation: In order to have a longitudinal view I collected data in the field for an average of 1
week every other month for 2 years and complemented the collection with remote participation
in workshops and meetings (NASA SLSD is physically located at Johnson Space center (JSC), in
Houston, Texas). First, to gain an in depth understanding of the day-to-day experience of
members in the organization, I observed and participated in various workshops, meetings and
training sessions. Then, to explore the influence of the open innovation experiment on their
work, I observed R&D meetings, demos of innovative projects and joined off- site meetings with
potential collaborators (such as General Electrics) and contractors (such as Wyle Laboratories). I
observed and recorded all the open innovation workshops and meetings and participated at the
first NASA workshop for collaborative innovation with the White House Office of Science and
Technology. Lastly, since the entire space industry was going through momentous change I
joined the organizational members to the annual humans in space conference and to the
astronauts debrief for family and friend (of the last shuttle flights). I asked permission to record
all my observations in meetings and workshops, and each day of observation yielded audio
recording of the meetings that were later transcribed and handwritten field notes that I wrote up
within 24 hours of leaving the field (resulting in approximately 1,000 pages of field notes).
Interviews: I conducted semi-structured interviews with R&D organizational members who
varied in their level of participation in the open innovation processes and in their professional
background (see Table 1). Overall, I conducted 104 interviews, 87 formal interviews with 70
individuals and 17 informal interviews with 12 individuals. The interviews were an average of an

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hour and a half long, producing about 25-60 pages of an interview transcript and notes (resulting
in approximately 500 pages of interviews transcripts and notes).
Project Work documents, Internal Surveys and Emails: Throughout the study, I received
access to related project work documents written and presented by organizational members. I
collected 94 project documents and 25 presentations (resulting in approximately 1,100 pages). In
addition, I collected the public publications and patents produced by these R&D professionals.
These work documents had a crucial role in understanding the change in the R&D work that took
place as a reaction to the open innovation experiment. It enabled me to analyze both the way the
external knowledge found through open innovation was integrated or not, and the degree to
which the internal knowledge production process was shared (see Table 2). I was provided
access to internal surveys regarding the experiment, as well as interview transcripts and
summaries with key organizational members. These internal sources of data enabled me to
triangulate and enrich my interview and observation data. Lastly, I subscribed to and collected
data from the internal email list pertaining to the open innovation initiatives (overall
approximately 110 internal emails).
Secondary Data Sources: The focus of this study is the organization and its members, however,
in order to have more comprehensive understanding of the open innovation experiment, I
collected not only data from NASA, but also data from the open innovation platforms:
Innocentive, Top Coder and Yet2.com. This data is both quantitative and qualitative in nature.
For instance, type and number of external solvers who tried solving it, professional background
and geographical location, proposed solutions, amount of awards, and more.
Data Analysis

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I conducted an iterative process of data collection and analysis according to the insights and
theoretical categories I induced from the field data, thus creating a theory that is grounded in
the data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Miles and Huberman, 1984). For the first two years of this
study, I conducted a multi-level analysis on the R&D unit, the R&D project and the professionals
as nested units of analysis. Mid-way through the second exploratory analysis, it became clear
that the focus of inquiry and action is the R&D professionals. Due to the breadth and depth of the
data, the analysis was conducted in three steps, two exploratory and one confirmatory (Charmaz,
2006; Feldman, 1995). The first exploratory analysis was conducted on the data collected in the
period before and throughout the open innovation experiment (2009 - 2010). During this period,
organizational members were sensemaking the new open innovation model; they kept repeating
that open innovation is a completely different approach to solving their R&D challenges. I,
therefore, conducted a comparative analysis of the open innovation model with their standard
R&D model. Right after I completed this phase of the analysis, going back to the field site, I was
struck by the shift from sensemaking to clear attitudes and responses. I therefore decided to
conduct the second wave of data collection with interviews more focused on the reactions,
attitudes and opinions regarding the open innovation experiment.
The second exploratory analysis was conducted during the period after the open
innovation experiment (2011- 2012). This period was characterized by tensions and
organizational drama between NASAs organizational members surrounding the open innovation
model. I began mapping the tensions and coding every expression of emotion, opinion or
behavior regarding open innovation. Using ATALS/ti (a qualitative data-analysis program), I
coded the amount and intensity of tension around each of dimensions of comparisons between
the two models. A new in-vivo dimension code emerged around identity. This led me to conduct

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a comparative narrative analysis of the standard R&D model, and the one introduced by the open
innovation experts (Bartel and Garud, 2009; Czarniawska-Joerges, 1998). As new reaction
patterns emerged, I conducted a thematic analysis (Charmaz, 2006) of the reactions by coding
and tracking patterned expressions and behaviors using ATLAS/ti. I focused on activities of the
individuals, I analyzed what the organizational members did beyond what they said. I
categorized their activities as four different types of knowledge boundary work. At this stage I
tested various possibilities suggested in prior literature to explain the variation of the reactions to
open innovation such as demographic characteristics (age, gender), professional characteristics
(type of profession, professional education, level of education), organizational characteristic
(tenure, role in the organization, hierarchy), R&D unit, patents and publications, and the level of
success in finding solutions through the open innovation model. None of these factors explained
the variation in knowledge boundary work responses. With time, it became clear that the change
in the knowledge boundary work co-evolved with the change in professional identity and that
they are mutually reinforcing. These activities became the focus of the study. The last step of
analysis conducted was confirmatory across the previous periods of the study.
Findings
The Backdrop: Innovation Produced with Clearly Pre-defined & Selectively Permeable
Knowledge Boundaries
On July 20 1969, the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA] did the
impossible. Putting a man on the moon pushed the frontiers of science and engineering;
innovative by any standard. Ever since, top engineers and scientists from around the world have
been attracted to work for NASA and to be in the center of new knowledge creation and
innovation in space exploration. It has been the locus of new knowledge and innovation in space

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exploration for several decades which has led to breakthroughs in our understanding of ourselves
and our universe. In the few years prior to this study, following a period of traumatic shuttle
accidents, NASA embarked on a new and exciting scientific and technological journey, a human
spaceflight to Mars (Constellation space program). The production of innovation at NASA was
led by its R&D professionals. Work in the field of space exploration requires a high level of
expertise and specialization in ones professional and educational background, leading to the
creation of knowledge experts in their fields. This environment created multiple knowledge
boundaries, which were reinforced by the organization structure and were the most common
topic for tension and humor in the daily life at NASA. However, R&D work was not contained
within the walls of the organization. Instead, it had a long tradition of collaboration and
contracting relationships with a network of public and private organizations. The relationship
between the participants in the R&D processes were clearly predefined through agreements and
sometimes contracts (in the case of contractors and collaborators). Therefore, there was a clear
demarcation of who is working on each portion of the project. The work was produced within
pre-defined and selectively permeable boundaries.
In 2009, organizational members across NASA worked on reinvigorating and
demonstrating their innovative capabilities. This followed the Augustine Committee report and
later President Obamas administration to change NASAs human spaceflight mission. As the
head scientist of Johnson Space Center kicked off a cross organizational meeting on a Monday
morning in that period; For those of you who have been sleeping in the last six months,
headquarters are telling us we are not innovative enough, we need to show them theyre wrong.
Various innovation initiatives sprouted up to demonstrate existing R&D capabilities.
Management encouraged bottom-up innovation, creating innovation days and fairs, and

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internal innovation contests for seed funding. The head of the engineering directorate, initiated
an ambitious project named after Morpheus, the Greek god of dreams, to land a humanoid robot
on the lunar surface in 1,000 days. This project rejuvenated the R&D organizational members
and brought back excitement and pride Look outside the window, this is innovation! I was told
at the day of testing Morpheus. This was the environment and driving force behind the open
innovation experiment and this study. The open innovation experiment was initiated by the head
of the Space Life Science Directorate (SLSD) at NASA. The model was introduced to the
leading scientists and engineers of their R&D groups, and together decided to experiment with
three leading open innovation platforms, Innocentive, Yet2.com and TopCoder (hereby: the
platforms) on their strategic R&D problems.
The Open Innovation Experiment: Challenging Knowledge Boundaries, and Yielding a
Scientific Breakthrough in an Unprecedented Speed
The open innovation model was introduced to NASAs space life science directorate
organizational members through expert led workshops from each of the three platforms. By the
end of these workshops, they decided to conduct an experiment through open innovation
platforms and communities with the major R&D challenges of their strategy plan for that year.
The experiment was carried as in parallel to usual activities, they would work on solving these
problems through the standard R&D model processes of internal work, contracting work and
collaborating with external public and private organizations. They assumed this experiment
would take a year. In total, 14 R&D problems from 11 R&D units were posted on the various
open innovation platforms, from a variety of scientific and technological fields (ranging from
microbiology, heliophysics, mechanical engineering, radiation, material science to medical
devices and more). The process was very fast; the R&D organizational members formulated their

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problems into short challenge statements with solution criteria, and posted them for the world to
solve on the platforms for 2-3 months. The nature of these two processes was fundamentally
different. The standard R&D process is an organizational process based on negotiations between
various professional and organizational groups that spans across years (3-5 average R&D life
cycle). The open innovation model was a distributed process with participants that mostly work
virtually in short and fast pace R&D cycles (3-6 months average), following rapid prototyping
and agile programing principles. The costs of standard R&D projects are very high and induce
risk adverse approaches, whereas the open innovation model assumes multiple tasks with low
costs in an experimental mode.
After 3 months from the beginning of the experiment, while NASAs organizational
members (about 100 individuals) were working on these 14 strategic challenging, on the open
innovation platforms, over 3,000 individuals from 80 countries tried to solve these same
problems (see appendix A). More than 300 solutions were submitted overall for evaluation of
NASAs R&D members in the various units of the challenges. Each of these challenges had clear
solution evaluation criteria that were set before hand, scientific and technological requirements
that a proposed solution needs to meet. The proposed solution surprised the R&D by their
quality, they were successful beyond their set expectations. Some solutions even exceeded their
solution criteria and all within astonishingly short time turnaround, as a lead scientist expressed:
In general it is known that to receive a solution for the cost (award and success fee) would not
be possible otherwise. Turnaround time for a solution like this could take years. In particular,
there was one solution that became known as the home run of the open innovation experiment.
This was a solution to a well-known and researched problem in heliophysics: prediction of solar
particle events (SPEs), popularly known as solar storms. One of the most significant health risks

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to current and future human exploration of the solar system is exposure to ionizing radiation.
Therefore since the start of the space program, NASA and its collaborators in academia and
government have invested significant financial and intellectual resources towards the
development of better solar events forecasts (24 hour forecast window). After years of research,
the best algorithms in heliophysics could only predict a flare 1 to 2 hours in advance with 50%
accuracy and a two-sigma confidence interval; this challenge sought an algorithm that could
predict an event up to 4 to 24 hours in advance. This problem was posted in December 2009,
suggesting a reward amount of $30,000.
In a three-month time period, over 500 individuals expressed interest in trying to solve
this problem, 11 submitted solutions and the winning solution came from a semi-retired
telecommunications engineer from rural New Hampshire. Using only ground-based equipment
instead of the traditional use of orbiting spacecraft, he created an algorithm able to forecast solar
flare 8 hours in advance with to 75% accuracy and three-sigma confidence level, well beyond the
expected result in an order of magnitude. When the R&D organizational members at NASA
tested his solution on their operational systems they even achieved better results: 80%-85%. The
head of the R&D unit that worked on this problem was stunned: This has spun up so fast here
and thats what has caught everyone off guard. The successful results of the open innovation
experiment triggered a wave of excitement and positive responses all the way from members
across the organization, the innovation team, SLSD management, NASAs headquarters, to the
White House Office of Science and Technology. Management and the innovation team were
excited about the internal results and positive external responses and moved forward to prepare
the ground for turning open innovation from an experiment into a day-to-day reality, integrating
it with their standard R&D model.

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Challenging Knowledge Boundaries, in turn, Challenges Professional Identity: A few


months after the successful results of the open innovation initiative, the management and
innovation team assembled a larger next steps workshop intended to discuss the next strategic
R&D challenges for 2010-2011 and how open innovation can be used to solve them. The day
started with grandiose statement; This puts you on the edge of many organizations in many
ways of all organizations in the world trying to figure out this open innovation perspective
and ended with a plea of the head of space life science to simply think of this open innovation
model as just another tool in your toolkit . The tensions, debates and forces unleashed on that
day, led to a very different trajectory than that planned. The intensity of fears and resistance
expressed in the room throughout the day was out of the out of the ordinary and juxtaposing
camps of organizational members started coalescing. The management and innovation team were
utterly surprised, confused, and frustrated by the rising tensions and fragmentation. The reactions
were so strong that the strategy and innovation team decided to stop the efforts on the directorate
level and instead to conduct one on one meetings with the leading scientists and engineers of
their various units to understand these reactions.
In conversation with managers the issues that were initially raised by the R&D
professional were budget or technical issues, but these were quickly and easily solved did not
change the strength of the reactions and in some cases, resistance. In the months following this
workshop, these tensions and fears did not subside, instead clear camps were forming. On one
hand, some scientists and engineers not only continued to use the open innovation platforms and
the knowledge found through them, but were also changing their old processes to match open
innovation models. On the other hand, other scientists and engineers refused to discuss any R&D
challenge fearing it would become an open innovation challenge. The open model was posing a

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significant challenge to the R&D professionals identity; it triggered a wave of discussion about
who they are, why they are where they are, and whether this needs to change. During this period,
when discussing the open innovation experiment amongst themselves or when interviewed about
it, many organizational members suddenly talked about why they joined NASA, who they are
and how they were trained. Analyzing their innovation narratives, work artifacts and
organizational ceremonies, a clear common identity of the R&D professionals was evident;
namely being the problem solver.
This problem solver role identity was rooted in the education and professional training
of both scientists and engineers. The conflict with open innovation was described by Marvin, a
leading scientist and bio medical engineer: Its [the resistance to open innovation] really
intrinsic, the history of the scientific method goes against itIn our training, trying to solve
problems in the scientific method was: I take in all this information, I synthesis it, I do analysis
and I come to some conclusion and so to reach out to other people to solve it, its like cheating!.
R&D organizational members saw themselves as problem solvers, even if the project was done
in collaboration or through contractors. In the open innovation model, they lose control and
choice of what is exposed and what solutions are pursued. This study was conducted at Johnson
Space Center (JSC), a legendary place that solved the technical problems for Apollo 13, in April
1970, when they reported Houston, we have a problem and was able to bring the astronauts
back to earth safely. A sense of importance was palpable in the workplace, even sometimes
ridiculed; There is a joke about why we dont launch the shuttle from here, because gravity is
too strong in the center of the universe I think they are up for a real awakeningthe mentality
is we are the only ones who can do it. Culturally speaking, to shift from Houston, we have a

19

problem to asking the world for solutions and receiving Houston, we have a solution was
jarring.
Emergent Professional Identity Refocusing Work: From Problem Solvers to Solution
Seekers: The open innovation model, as presented by the external experts and explained by the
managers, did not have a clear implication on the role of the scientists and engineers at NASA.
Neither the experts nor the managers really discussed these issues; their focus and attention was
on the efficiency of the model, its speed, its low costs and its impressive performance in solving
challenging R&D problems. The external experts narratives hardly ever mentioned the R&D
organizational members or any individuals. A narrative analysis of these open innovation texts
(from experts and internal presentations and the open innovation online platforms) finds no
individual hero, but rather glorification and credit to the web, the magical technology that
makes these connections and innovations possible. This lack of clarity left room for
interpretation regarding the role of the R&D professionals by those who were actually using it;
some R&D professionals perceived this challenge to their identity as a direct threat and
responded with identity protection work, while others perceived it as an opportunity to change
and enhance their identity, role and capabilities
Some professionals, such as Mike, a leading researcher expressed the perceived conflict
very clearly: I've been attracted to places that allow you to access a problem, come up with a
plan, and execute the solution to be able to think and solve greater problems. If I cant do it at
NASA, what is keeping me from going somewhere else?. Chris, a bio-medical engineer,
explained the significant shift adopting the open innovation model requires; Its going to take
them a change in their heads on how they do their jobs They truly look at themselves as the
brains behind the vehicles and they are the ones, I mean, there isnt anyone thats going to know

20

better what they need to go do, they are the ones, thats what they do... and they make the best
ones. Identity work emerged in internal meetings as the approaches clashed. One camp argued
for a protecting their current identity and solidifying their capabilities. The other argued for a
change as a highly appreciated lead scientist declared: Your main responsibility is to seek for
solutions and they may come from the lab, from open innovation, or from collaboration, you
should not care! You are the solution seeker!. From that meeting on, this new identity of a
solution seeker defined the move the camp put forward: at the end of the day its about the
big agenda vs. the personal oneScience is about finding the truth!.
Unveiling The Relationship between Professional Identity Work and Knowledge Boundary
Work: Challenging the existing model of work for R&D professionals sheds light on the
unexplored relationship between knowledge boundaries and professional identity and how
changing one leads to changing the other. The emergent professional refocusing identity work
enabled a significant change in the knowledge work and boundaries. Organizational members
who discussed the need to change their professional identity in the following months also made
an explicit effort to change their knowledge boundaries and work processes. In the traditional
R&D model, the professional identity of problem solvers created very clear group boundaries
of us and them in which only a bounded group of experts generated solutions. Expanding
their role to that of solution seekers opened these boundaries and invited everyone to generate
solutions, to be problem solvers. One of the engineers explicitly expressed this change in a
blog post: The Next Rocket Scientist: YOU... Solving those mysteries has long been the domain
of lab-coat wearing scientists in government agencies and universities. However, with the advent
of the Internet, social web, and open source data, it has become possible for anyone to make
scientific discoveries about our universe. Find out how you can actively contribute to space

21

exploration and how the collective power of the Internet is enabling the future of scientific
research.
The R&D professionals who did not go through any significant change in their identity,
did not go through any change in their knowledge boundaries and work. The rejection of the
Open Innovation model was founded in identity protection. Alex, a leading scientist expressed:
They want the opportunity to contribute to something that nobody's ever done before. And so
this (open innovation) becomes quite a slap in the face!. When asked whether there is any
change that needs to take place in their current work, they called for increasing resources and
focus on strengthening and solidifying their current problem solving identity capabilities. After
this period of emergent professional identity work, organizational members transitioned from
discussing the need to change to acting upon it. The reactions ranged from fierce rejection to
enthusiastic embrace with clear patterns and groups (29% of the R&D professionals were
protecting boundaries while 42% were permeating, and the rest did not manifest any significant
boundary work). There were strong and important scientists and engineers at each end of the
spectrum; no side was stronger or more influential. Rather, these groups decreased the level of
discussion and arguments amongst themselves and simply started initiating changes in their own
labs and organizational units. The new solution seekers adopted many open innovation model
principles significantly changing their R&D work. The identity protectors either rejected the
open innovation model or allowed for it without actually adopting the resulted knowledge.
A Shift From Thinking That The Lab Is My World to The World Is My Lab: In order
to capture the change in their work as it co-evolved and becoming mutually reinforcing, I
focused on analyzing the change in their knowledge boundary permeability before and after the
open innovation experiment. I investigated the knowledge flows going in and out of the

22

members R&D projects processes and found four distinctly different types of knowledge
boundary work. The change in the permeability of the knowledge boundaries was meaningful, as
was captured by one of the R&D professionals; It is a shift from thinking about the lab is my
world to the lab is my world. Table 2 summarizes and compares the knowledge boundary work
types:
--------------------------------------------------Insert Table 2 Here
--------------------------------------------------Knowledge Boundary Permeation: New solution seekers, permeated their knowledge
boundaries in the subsequent months. There were two major types of boundary work taking
place on this side of the spectrum: boundary dismantling, when professionals made an effort to
completely destroy the boundaries of the R&D process, and boundary perforating, when
professionals dismantled selective important parts of these boundaries.
Knowledge Boundary Dismantling: Knowledge boundary dismantling entailed an attempt to
destroy all the knowledge boundaries of the standard R&D process. Some of these members
worked to change their current R&D units, while others left their original units to create a new
unit named open NASA, and completely devoted their time and resources to making this
change a reality. All these members believed that the R&D model should change into an open
one. To begin with, these members worked on opening more of their internal knowledge
workflows and strategic R&D problems to the external world. They took their existing and
emerging R&D challenges and opened them to essentially anyone to consume or contribute to.
When a new strategic and urgent R&D challenge emerged and the immediate automatic
approach was to treat it as a top secret, experts-led R&D project; the lead scientist (who coined
the need to shift from problem solvers to solution seekers) and the professionals in her
23

group, worked hard to dismantle its boundaries. The change in the knowledge flows was
significant, in the definition, data collection, and evaluation phases. These professionals did not
simply embrace the open innovation model as presented by the external experts to the
organizations, focused on posting well-defined problems. Instead, they adopted the principles of
the original open source model, seeking for openness and transparency throughout the full
process, as one scientist expressed: if we only open one end of the process, we will still have
our bias on the other end. These R&D professionals fully utilized and integrated the knowledge
found through open innovation platforms. They dedicated special attention to thinking about
what will they do with the solution found. Several engineers even decided to found the first
international space apps hackathon (a popular format in open source communities) which went
on to become the largest international hackathon event in 2012 (and is taking place ever since
annually). The boundary dismantling work of these R&D professionals shifted the locus of
knowledge and innovation produced outside the previously pre-defined boundaries. Knowledge
production was conducted within undefined and permeable boundaries and was regularly
flowing both inside out and inside in. A prime example of the shift was building a publicly open
wiki as both the internal knowledge management tool and the way to bring external knowledge
in. The wiki included every new and relevant knowledge work, and as an open wiki was
automatically shared with other members from three different space centers across the country,
and with the whole world.
Knowledge Boundary Perforating: In this boundary permeation work, R&D professionals only
dismantled selective parts of their R&D process knowledge boundaries. They perforated
multiple holes in the boundaries of the R&D process for knowledge flows in and out, mostly at
its outset or before important milestones. Not seeing the need to make a discrete choice between

24

either the standard or the open R&D models, they concluded that the debate over the best
model of their colleagues is misguided: So then one barrier [to adopting open innovation] or
one problem might be assuming that one size fits all!. They decided that the outset of every
project should be open. Tom, a discipline scientist explained: It's [using open innovation] going
to get you out of your bubble a little bit. These R&D professionals fully integrated the
knowledge found through open innovation platforms in their R&D process. For instance, the
food packaging material that was found through the open innovation experiment, was shipped
from the solver in Europe and tested in the food lab. In response to criticism they argued that
they fully integrating the knowledge from outside, treating it with the same diligence in the
quality testing process they use for internally developed solutions.
Knowledge Boundaries Protection: Organizational members who protected their professional
identity as problem solvers also protected their knowledge boundaries during this period.
There were two major types of boundary work taking place on this side of the spectrum: false
boundary permeating and boundary fencing.
False boundary Permeation: This boundary work was illusive; initially these R&D
professionals seemed to be permeating their boundaries as they allowed for opening some
challenges. However, a closer investigation of these professionals work revealed that there was
no significant change in their identity or knowledge work. Ultimately the fruit of the open
challenges was simply discarded and not integrated. They were actually adding an additional
boundary. Internal knowledge was very sparingly shared, only the knowledge needed to write the
challenge description on open innovation platforms and only such knowledge on non-strategic
projects. The participation was an illusion performed for management as Mike, a discipline lead
scientist, explicitly explained: We quickly pick something we thought that would give some

25

results so that we could, you know, keep that person happy for a while and go and address the
twelve other things we're working on. They intentionally blocked the gained external
knowledge from any use even though some of the solutions had substantial scientific and
technological potential for their work and the space mission. The solutions found, the ostensible
goal of the members work, were discarded. In one lab, it went as far as withholding the fact that
the lab was actually participating in open innovation.
Boundary Fencing: Some R&D organizational members vehemently protected their identity as
problem solvers and their knowledge production process. They interpreted the open innovation
model as a clear threat to their professional identity; as expressed by Matt, a senior scientist;
when we see opportunities like Innocentive, It's extremely frustratingof what value am I?.
These professionals protected their knowledge boundaries by fencing off the knowledge gained
through the open innovation experiment as did those who falsely permeated, but went further.
They actively rejected any attempt to allow knowledge flows in or out of the predefined
boundaries, and where their falsely permeating colleagues pretended to embrace open
innovation, they made no such theatre. Many went as far as to dissuade colleagues from
participating. When asked about the successful results of the open innovation experiment, these
organizational members dismissed it as unrelated to their field; thats a heliophysics specific
thing.
Epilogue: Innovation Produced With Permeated Boundaries
These different types of boundary work took place over the following two years, with strong and
influential scientists and engineers were on both sides of the spectrum. The change in the R&D
work after boundary dismantling became increasingly evident with time and the gap between the
traditional model and the open one grew deeper. One of the organizational members explained

26

The open source mindset transfers us from the innovation-resistant Not Invented Here attitude
to Proudly Found Elsewhere. while a colleague, when asked, what do you think about open
innovation? he answered: You see this? [pointing to a pile of scientific articles written by his
group], read this, this is innovation, this is research, and not gimmicks.
--------------------------------------------------Insert Table 5 Here
--------------------------------------------------The longitudinal design of this study enables analyzing the relationship between the
knowledge boundary change and professional identity change over time. This analysis brings
forth a mutually reinforcing relationship between the two processes; they feed and strengthen
each other. The more boundary permeation took place, and new work practices emerged, the
more meaning and legitimacy the refocused identity received. Boundary permeation required
building capabilities focused on problem formulation, distant search, evaluation and integration
(see discussion section below). The identity shift was evident in the emerging new innovation
narrative, namely, the solution seeker as the hero. In these emergent innovation stories, the
organizational member was praised for finding a solution in a creative way. One new and
popular innovation story was about an R&D professional (engineer) who found a needed medical
device, which was found suitable for the international space station, through Google and
YouTube. In this innovation story, the creativity and resourcefulness of the R&D professional
was highly valued, rather than the raw creative prowess. Innovation was re-narrated.
Discussion
Organizing for Innovation and The Changing Role of R&D Professionals
This study sheds a timely light on the broader and long-studied question of how to organize for
innovation. Since Schumpeter (1934), social scientists have been modeling and arguing about the
27

optimal way to organize innovation (see Baldwin and Von Hippel, 2011). The open innovation
model holds a potential to increase innovation performance on one hand, (Benkler, 2006;
Jeppesen and Lakhani, 2010; Lerner and Schankerman, 2010) but it goes against major
assumptions of the existing models for innovation in organizations (see Lakhani et al., 2013).
The results of this study suggest that, indeed, the web-enabled open innovation model introduce
a real option for advancing scientific and technological knowledge, it can lead to the production
of scientific and technological breakthroughs under unprecedented time and resource constraints.
However, at the same time, it poses a significant challenge to the professional identity and
knowledge work and capabilities of R&D professionals in organizations today. Adopting such a
model requires a major shift in the knowledge work and professional identity of the R&D
professionals.
The shift from problem solvers to solution seekers has major implications on the role of
scientists and engineers in the production of knowledge and scientific and technological
innovation. History has witnessed several shifts in the role of scientists and engineers in
organizations (Bailyn, 1980; Merton, 1973; Mokyr, 2002; Shapin, 2008) and this study illustrates
the potential paths the roles can follow in the future. This shift has important implications for
innovation policy (Evans, 2009; Janasoff, 2004; Murray et al., 2012) all current resource
allocation, incentive and award systems, and education and professional training are devoted to
problem solving and the related capabilities and skillset and not to solution seeking (Azoulay et
al., 2011; Jones, 2009; Stern, 2004).
New skills would stresses the capabilities and practices of formulating problems,
searching for solutions, evaluating solutions, and integrating knowledge. Each of these
capabilities and practices warrants future work: Problem formulation has been studied to be a

28

highly political and challenging process within organizations (Baer, Dirks and Nickerson, 2013;
Lyles and Mitroff, 1980). The integration of external knowledge is expected to run into
challenges of absorptive capacity and combinative capabilities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990;
Kogut and Zander, 1992; Zahra and George, 2002). Therefore, this shift offers fertile ground to
test, challenge and contribute to many of our existing theories regarding knowledge work
processes and capabilities (Afuja and Tucci, 2011; Bailey, Leonardi and Chong, 2010; Felin and
Zenger, 2014; Levina and Fayard, 2012; Lifshitz-Assaf, 2015).
Permeation of Knowledge Boundaries
Investigating the different types of knowledge boundary work advances our understanding of
the changes in the nature of knowledge work within organizations that the Internet has brought
about (Argote etal., 2003; Levina and Vaast, 2008; Laursen and Foss, 2012; Murray and
OMahoney, 2007). The R&D professionals no longer function merely as knowledge gate
keepers; they can also perforate and dismantle existing knowledge boundaries in order to let
internal knowledge flow out and external and for distant knowledge to flow in via online
platforms and communities. An in depth investigation of the work of professionals; analyzing
their changing work flows, tasks documents, observing project meetings and practices enabled
the inquiry of the actual knowledge work shift. This type of findings suggests a resolution to the
fiercely debated novelty of the open innovation phenomenon (Cassiman and Valentini, 2013;
Chesbrough et al., 2014; Trott and Hartman, 2009). The term open innovation is currently used
to describe such a wide range of knowledge creation and innovation processes at organizations
(Dahlander and Gann, 2010) that it has become unclear which innovation processes qualify as
open and, more critically, how this approach differs from the traditional one (Helfat, 2006;
Gann, 2005; Murray and OMahoney, 2007). Focusing on the knowledge boundary work and the

29

change of knowledge boundaries of the R&D process contributes clarity to the topic and its
fuzzy terms.
Furthermore, this studys findings raise broader questions regarding the knowledge
theory and boundaries of the firm (see Eisenhardt and Santos, 2005). Until recently, the
prevailing consensus among various streams of theoretical and empirical literature in strategy,
economics and organizational theory has been that innovation does and should take place within
the boundaries of the firm. However, there is a call in the literature to re-examine our theoretical
assumptions regarding the boundaries of the firm due to the change in costs and structure of
knowledge (Baldwin and Von Hippel, 2011; Felin and Zenger, 2014; Leonardi and Bailey, 2008;
Lakhani at al., 2003; Laursen and Salter, 2014). Our current theoretical frameworks fall behind
the change in the field (Felin and Zenger, 2014; Murray et al., 2012). It is a prime time to
advance both our theoretical and empiric understanding of the mechanisms and boundary
conditions of open models across various domains of problem solving, professions and
organizations.
Unveiling the Relationship Between Knowledge Boundary Work and Identity Work
This study sheds light on the identity refocusing process through which professionals are able to
change their boundaries instead of protection or spanning across them. They can perforate and
dismantle their boundaries in such a way that enables other, external social actors to bring in
knowledge and build upon the internally produced knowledge. They are able to do so by
reconstructing their professional identity, role and capabilities. For instance the professions of
education and journalism that are currently challenged to open their boundaries via the webbased models. As professors profession is being challenged by open education (Friedman,
2013), based on this study, we can predict that professors that will go through a refocusing and

30

reconstruction of their identity and capabilities will permeate their boundaries and let external
knowledge (other professors) go into their knowledge work with their students and open their
internal knowledge work (their teaching classes and notes) to others. Future work should analyze
multiple professions to investigate the boundary conditions of the mechanism found in this study.
Most studies of knowledge and innovation processes do not investigate the identity of the
members involved and its impact. This study builds on the notable exceptions that examine the
effect of pre-hoc organizational identity and technological framework on resistance to
technological change (Benner and Tripsas, 2012; Kaplan et al., 2003; Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008;
Tripsas, 2009). It expands our understanding by investigating the individual level and the case of
change. The findings strengthen that dynamic view of identity (Pratt et al., 2006; Kreiner et al.,
2006) by finding that professional identity work enables dealing with a tension and a contentious
change in work. It also emphasizes that active and important role of professional and their
meaning making (Weick, 1995) processes and re-narrating capabilities (Ibarra and Barabulescu,
2010). This study suggests an independent contribution to the identity literature since there is
little research on identity processes, let alone to their relationship with other processes in the
organization (Gioia et al., 2010; Glynn, 2000; Pratt, 2012; Pratt, 2006; Ravasi and Schults, 2006;
Tripsas, 2009; Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). Having a longitudinal study design enabled
investigating the shift of the professional identity of the R&D professionals at NASA over time.
The relationship between knowledge boundaries and identity in a case of change suggests
that there is a less observable relationship between the two constructs when they are in a stable
state (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Kane, 2010). Future work should investigate this relationship; for
instance do we see more boundary spanning or cross-disciplinary work of professionals who
have a more expanded defined professional identity? This has major implications on increasing

31

cross-disciplinary collaboration in developing science and technology (Fleming et al., 2007;


Hargadon and Bechky, 2006; Wutchy et al., 2007). In times where specialization is rising (Jones,
2009) and the fruits of scientific are becoming harder to produce within the disciplinary fields,
such focus on developing a more expanded professional identity could provide an answer to the
production of innovation. Finally, these findings illuminate the equivocal nature of technology
(Weick, 1990). Scientific and technological knowledge always walked the fine line between
being democratic or elitist, belonging to a privileged few, or empowering the masses (Gieryn,
1983). Technology has dramatically altered this tension and currently enables the
democratization of knowledge in unprecedented breadth (Dyson, 1999). It now remains for the
professional, sociological and organizational forces to determine the nature of this change.
Tables and Graphs
Table 1: Demographics of Organizational Members at NASA
Total n = 98
Educational Background
Science (percentage)
Bio-Medical Engineering (percentage)
Engineering (percentage)
Medicine (percentage)
Other (percentage)
Male (percentage)
Female (percentage)
Average age in years (standard deviation)
Average tenure in years (standard deviation)

37 (37.8)
8 (8.2)
30 (30.6)
9 (9.2)
14 (14.3)
62 (63.3)
36 (36.7)
41 (8)
13 (8)

Table 2: Knowledge Boundary Work Types and Implications


The type of knowledge
boundary work

Boundary
permeation

Internal
External
knowledge knowledge

Dismantling Mostly open Fully


integrated

32

Resulting
knowledge
boundaries
Undefined &
Permeable
boundaries

Boundaries
illustration

Resulting
locus of
knowledge &
innovation
production
Outside the
pre-defined
boundaries

Boundary
protection

Perforating

Significant Fully
part is open integrated

Semi
permeable
boundaries

FalsePermeating

Significant Isolated
part kept
inside

False semipermeable

Fencing

Kept inside Kept outside Clearly


predefined &
selectively
permeable

Either inside
or outside
pre-defined
boundaries

Inside
predefined
boundaries

Table 3: Shift in Knowledge and Innovation Production Locus


Knowledge and
Within pre-defined boundaries
With permeable boundaries
innovation
production locus
R&D professional
Problem solvers
Solution seekers
identity and role
Process Participants Experts (from inside and outside Anyone (can be anonymous)
the organization)
Type of process
Organizational process,
Distributed process, virtual and
negotiation based
light communication and
interaction
Level of control
High (knowledge production
Low (knowledge produced by
process with ongoing control
the external solvers, tested only
and testing milestones)
after production)
Spatial dimension
Geographically concentrated in
Widely geographically
one or few countries
distributed
Temporal dimension Long R&D cycles (3-5 years)
Short R&D cycles (3-6 months)
APPENDIX A: The geographic spread of solvers that tried solving NASAS R&D problems at
the open innovation experiment: 3,000 solvers from 80 countries

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