'Substance' and 'Simple Objects' in Tractatus 2.

02 ff
Author(s): Jan Ludwig
Source: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic
Tradition, Vol. 29, No. 5 (May, 1976), pp. 307-318
Published by: Springer
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JAN LUDWIG

'SUBSTANCE' AND 'SIMPLE OBJECTS'

IN TRA CTA TUS 2.02ff.

(Received 17 April, 1975)

Tractatus 2.02 states: "Objects are simple". Together with T2.021a:

"Objects make up the substance of the world," this claim lies at the heart
of Wittgenstein's logical atomism, and indeed at the heart of the Tractatus
itself. Not only the ontology of the Tractatus, but practically the whole of
the theory of language which Wittgenstein develops later in the work

depends upon the doctrine that there are ultimate simples. Without
absolutely simple objects to serve as the meanings of names, such principal
theses as the account of elementary propositions as pictures, the distinction between the sense of a proposition and its truth-value, and the
radical difference between what can be said and what can only show itself
could not be established. To put this point another way: unless there can
be such a thing as the final analysis of a proposition, Wittgenstein's view
of language in the Tractatus is untenable. It is the existence of simple
objects which guarantees that the analysis of a proposition cannot be infinitely complex.

It is therefore important to understand the basis for Wittgenstein's

metaphysical claim that the substance of the world consists of absolutely
simple objects. The natural place to look for the justification of this view
is the passage T 2.021 to 2.0212, for these remarks comment on T 2.02.
Most commentators on the Tractatus have noted the importance of this
passage, but I shall argue that there has been a general failure to appreciate the complexity of the argument presented in it. This passage is
often referred to as Wittgenstein's "argument for simple objects," and
particular attention has been paid to the structure of the argument
presented in remarks T 2.0211 and 2.0212. However, the latter two
remarks do not explicitly mention objects at all. Rather, the key concept
invoked there is one of "the substance of the world."

Philosophical Studies 29 (1976) 307-318. All Rights Reserved

Copyright c 1976 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland

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LUDWIG

On the other hand, remark T 2.021, which has been left largely unexplicated by the commentators, does explicitly relate the substance of
the world to the concept of a 'simple object'. I wish to argue that T 2.021
contains the skeleton of a second argument which is crucial to any clear
understanding of the so-called 'argument for simple objects'. For it is

this second argument which connects substance with simple objects, and

without an appreciation of the relationship between these two key concepts

a satisfactory account of the grounds of Wittgenstein's logical atomism
cannot be produced.
II

I shall begin by examining briefly several of the existing accounts of

Tractatus 2.021-2.0212. The English text of these remarks is as follows:'
2.021 Objects make up the substance of the world.
That is why they cannot be composite.

2.0211 If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition

had sense would depend on whether another proposition was
true.

2.0212 In that case we could not sketch out any picture of the world

(true or false).
James Griffin has provided one of the most detailed accounts of this
passage. According to him: 2
Wittgenstein's proof [that objects are simple] is as follows. Objects form the substance
of the world, therefore they cannot be compound, i.e. they must be simple. [T2.021]
And the world must have substance because: (i) if the world had no substance, then
whether a proposition had sense would depend upon whether another proposition
were true [T2.0211], and (ii) if whether a proposition had sense depended upon another
proposition's being true, then we could not sketch out a picture of the world, true or
false [T2.0212]. The argument moves from the obvious falsity of the consequent in
(ii): of course, we can make pictures of the world. The argument is in forn a two-staged

modus tollens; (i) p> vq, (ii) qD r, but - r, thus - q, thus p. And its conclusion, -p, is:
the world does have substance, i.e., objects which are simple.

Griffin's view of the passage in question, and especially his analysis of

the logical structure of the argument at T 2.0211-2.0212, is shared by

Julius Weinberg in his early article on logical simples,3 and by E. D.
Klemke in his recent paper on Wittgenstein's ontology. Klemke's statement is worth noting:4

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'SUBSTANCE' AND 'SIMPLE OBJECTS' 309

I agree with those who take this [T2.021-2.012] to be an incomplete argument, the
rest of which runs as follows: Since we can produce pictures of the world (2.1ff.), then
wbether a proposition has sense does not depend on whether some other proposition
is true; and since the latter is the case, the world must have a substance. That is, the
entities which make up atomic facts must be noncomposites.

Other authorities on the Tractatus agree that the remarks T 2.021-2.0212

contain a proof of the existence of simple objects, although they generally
do not explicitly claim that T 2.0211-2.0212 has the modus tollens form

which Griffin, Weinberg, and Klemke ascribe to these remarks. For

example, G. E. M. Anscombe says that5 "the simple objects are presented

as something demanded by the nature of language at 2.021, 2.0211," and

she then goes on to explicate T 2.0211-2.0212 as an argument from the
possibility of our devising a proposition to the conclusion that there must

be simple objects. Max Black also focuses his analysis upon remarks
T 2.0211-2.0212, arguing that they show that the denial of simple objects
would lead to a vicious infinite regress: 6
If the world had no substance - i.e., if there were no objects - the resolution of the
apparent complexity of a given proposition could have no terminus. The sense of Si
would depend upon the truth of some other sentence S2 (affiirming the existence of a
complex apparently mentioned in Si) and the sense of S2 would depend upon the truth
of some other S8, and so on without end. This would be a vicious regress: we could
never know what the sense of a given Si was without first, per impossibile, knowing an
infinity of other propositions to be true.

George Pitcher agrees that the remarks in question present some of

Wittgenstein's grounds for asserting the existence of simple objects.

However, he claims that Wittgenstein "states these grounds without

actually producing an argument" 7 at remark T 2.0211. Pitcher goes on

to say that: 8
Since the preceding section (T2.021) tells us that "objects make up the substance of the

world," the present section [T 2.0211] clearly deals witb the existence of objects.
Wittgenstein thought it plainly false to say that the question of whether or not a

proposition has sense (meaning) depends on whether or not some other proposition is
true. (One allegedly absurd consequence of such a statement is given in the succeeding
section, T 2.0212.) Therefore, if it can be shown that this unacceptable statement
follows from the hypothesis that there are no simple objects, this will prove that there
must be such objects.

There are two critical comments which ought to be made in regard to

the accounts cited above. The first is that these commentators all tend
to overlook the important remark T 2.021. When they mention it at all,

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LUDWIG

they make little or no attempt to explicate its content, or to discuss its

role in relation to T 2.0211-2.0212 and, ultimately, to T 2.02. This seems

to be a serious omission from their accounts, for I shall argue later that
this remark (T 2.021) is crucial to an adequate understanding of Wittgenstein's argument for logical atomism.

My second objection to these accounts of the 'argument for simple

objects' is that they fail to observe an important distinction between:

(1) Proving that the world must have a substance; and (2) proving that
the substance of the world must consist of simple objects. That there is
such a distinction to be made seems undeniable; many philosophers who

would agree to the conclusion (1) above would not, and need not, assent
to conclusion (2). Certainly there have been a number of views regarding
the nature of substance expressed in the history of philosophy, many of
them radically at odds with the metaphysical pluralism which Wittgenstein defends in the Tractatus.

Moreover, it appears that the distinction at issue is in fact implicit

in the Tractatus passage under examination here. Remarks T2.0211-2.0212
explicitly deal with the issue of why the world must have a substance,

whereas remark T 2.021 speaks explicitly about why the objects which
make up the substance of the world must be simple. Nonetheless, the
above accounts all tend to miss this critical point and to conflate the

two distinct proofs, (1) and (2).

That the above commentators do conflate the two issues becomes ob-

vious when their accounts are carefully examined, for one finds them
treating 'substance' and 'simple objects' as synonymous terms, especially
in their respective expositions of the argument at T 2.0211-2.0212. This
is clearly revealed in such passages as the following:
Griffin: ... the world does have substance, i.e., objects which are simple;
Weinberg: In the indirect form given in the Tractutus the argument is: if the world
has no simples,... [etc.];9

Klemke: ... the world must have a substance. That is, the entities which make up
atomic facts must be noncomposites;

Black: 'If the world had no substance' - i.e., if there were no objects -... [etc.]10

Pitcher: Therefore, if it can be shown that this unacceptable statement [T2.0212]

follows from the hypothesis that there are no simple objects, this will
prove that there must be such objects.

It is possible that the identification of substance and simple objects

reflected in the above quotations is justified in regard to the explication

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'SUBSTANCE' AND 'SIMPLE OBJECTS' 311

of T 2.0211-2.0212. But this could only be the case if there were an

additional argument to prove that, if the world has a substance, substance

must consist of simple objects. However, the commentators discussed

in this paper do not present any account of this required second argument.
In fact, they offer little more than a passing reference to remark T 2.021,
without discussing its import. Therefore, these accounts of the argument
at T 2.02ff. are at best incomplete.
On the other hand, it may be that the identification of substance and

simple objects in explicating T 2.0211-2.0212 is not justified. On this

view, these two remarks, suitably amplified, prove only that the world

must have a substance, and prove nothing in regard to the nature of that
substance. If this could be established, then the accounts discussed earlier
would have to be considered incorrect.

III

We have seen that the argument at T 2.0211-2.0212 can be interpreted

in either of two ways: (1) As an argument that the world must have a
substance (leaving the nature of that substance an open question); or
(2) as an argument that there must exist simple objects (which constitute

the substance of the world). The accounts of the argument for logical
atomism referred to earlier all tend to support the latter interpretation.

However, on that interpretation an additional argument must be found

to justify the identification of substance with simple objects, and such an

argument is not presented in those accounts. On the other hand, if (as

in (1) above) the argument at T 2.0211-2.0212 is construed as leading

only to the conclusion that the world must have a substance, then what
is required to complete the proof of logical atomism is a second argument
to show that the substance of the world must consist of simple objects.
There are, then, two possible logical structures which might be ascribed
to T2.02ff.:

I. (A) 2.0211+2.0212+ [2.1's, 3, 4] entail 'The world must have a

substance'.

(B) 2.021a ('Substance consists of objects')+ [suppressed pre-

mises] entail 2.021 b ('Objects cannot be composite'.), which

conclusion is equivalent to 2.02 ('Objects are simple').

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LUDWIG

II. (A) 2.021a+ [suppressed premises] entail 2.021b (=2.02).

(B) Substance consists of simple objects (2.021ab).

(C) 2.0211+2.0212 + [2.1's, 3, 4] entail 'There must be simple
objects' (i.e., 'the world must have a substance').

The important point to notice is that, on either of these interpretations

of the argument for logical atomism at T 2.02ff., there must be a separate

argument [I. (B); II. (A)] for the identification of substance and simple
objects. Thus Wittgenstein's proof of logical atomism consists of two
distinct arguments, and is considerably more complex than the usual
accounts suggest.

As the two schemata above indicate, I contend that the crucial second

argument is implicit in T 2.021, the passage which is frequently passed

over in existing accounts of the "argument for simple objects." Tractatus

2.021 states: "Objects make up [constitute] 11 the substance of the world.

That is why [Therefore]'2 they cannot be composite" (my emphasis).
The second sentence of this remark must be regarded as a conclusion

which follows logically from the first sentence [+suppressed premises,

of course]; otherwise one cannot account for the occurrence of 'Therefore'

[Darum] in it. What is needed, then, is a textually plausible way of

supplying the additional premises to complete the argument. In other
words, we need to explore Wittgenstein's grounds for holding that the
substance of the world must consist of absolutely simple objects.

IV

In the first place, Wittgenstein appears to share a bias which has historically characterized metaphysicians, namely, the belief that the ultimate

ontological structure of the world cannot be merely contingent. This finds

expression at T 2.024: "Substance is what subsists independently of what

is the case"; i.e., what necessarily exists.'3 Earlier, in the Notebooks, we

can see Wittgenstein struggling with this metaphysical assumption:14
And it keeps on forcing itself upon us that there is some simple indivisible, an element
of being, in brief a thing.
It does not go against our feeling that we cannot analyse PROPOSITIONS so far as
to mention the elements by name; no, we feel that the WORLD must consist of elements. And it appears as if that were identical with the proposition that the world must
be what it is, it must be definite. Or in other words, what vacillates is our determina-

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'SUBSTANCE' AND 'SIMPLE OBJECTS' 313

tions, not the world. It looks as if to deny things were as much as to say that the world

can, as it were, be indefinite in some such sense as that in which our knowledge is uncertain and indefinite.

The world has a fixed structure.

While the Notebooks are not always a reliable guide to the interpretation

of the Tractatus, in this case it seems clear that the idea of a necessary
and fixed ontological structure of the world did find expression in the
later work. Thus we find the notion that "the world has a fixed structure"
embodied in the following remarks:

T2.022 It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it

may be from the real one, must have something - a form - in
common with it.

2.023 Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form.

2.026 There must be objects, if the world is to have an unalterable

form.

2.027 Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the
same.

The thrust of these and related remarks in the 2.0's of the Tractatus is to

articulate and defend the metaphysical principle that substance is what

is necessary and unalterable, the firm base upon which all description
of the 'real' world rests.

The next step in the argument is the further claim that what is fixed

and necessary cannot be composite. The notion that anything which is

composite is subject to alteration is also a long-standing metaphysical

principle, and it is clear that Wittgenstein accepts it. What is composite

can be taken apart; it can be analyzed into its components, and thus it
cannot be the ultimate ontological ground of the world.15 Nor can what

is composite exist necessarily, since its existence is dependent upon the

existence of its parts, and what is dependent upon something else for its
existence cannot be said to exist necessarily. Wittgenstein indicates some-

thing of this attitude toward the composite in the following remarks:

T2.0271 Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing and unstable.
2.0272 The configuration of objects produces states of affairs.
If the objects which are concatenated to form states of affairs were them-

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LUDWIG

selves composite, then they would be subject to the same vicissitudes of

re-configuration as are the states of affairs which contingently exist at
any one time. Wittgenstein clearly finds this unacceptable, for there
would then be no fixed structure onto which we could fasten our descriptions of the contingent.

It is interesting that Wittgenstein confirms these views in the Philosophical Investigations (para. 46), where he refers to Socrates' discussion

of the primary elements of reality in the Theaetetus. Socrates is quoted

as saying: 6
If I make no mistake, I have heard some people say this: there is no definition of the
primary elements - so to speak - out of which we and everything else are composed;
for everything that exists in its own right can only be named, no other determination is
possible, neither that it is nor that it is not.... But what exists in its own right has to
be... named without any other determination. In consequence it is impossible to give
an account of any primary element; for it, nothing is possible but the bare name; its
name is all it has. But just as what consists of these primary elements is itself complex,
so the names of the elements become descriptive language by being compounded
together. For the essence of speech is the composition of names.

To which Wittgenstein responds: "Both Russell's 'individuals' and my

'objects' (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) were such primary elements."

The considerations thus far adduced are of a general metaphysical

nature and, while there can be little doubt that Wittgenstein accepted
them, they do not provide his only grounds for the conclusion that substance must consist of simple objects. The passage from the Theaetetus
suggests a second type of argument which is central to Wittgenstein's
view, namely, an argument from the nature of language to the nature of
substance.
The first step in this argument is to prove that a complex cannot be

named. This conclusion follows from Wittgenstein's view that "a com-

plex can be given only by its description..." (T 3.24), together with the
claim that whatever can be described cannot be named (cf. T3.144).
Given this conclusion, one can then construct the following argument to
demonstrate that objects must be simple:
Every proposition can be completely analyzed (see especially
T2.0201;17 3.2 and 3.201);
A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions

(T 5ff.);

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'SUBSTANCE' AND 'SIMPLE OBJECTS' 315

An elementary proposition consists of a concatenation of

names (T4.22);

A name means an object. The object is its meaning.

(T 3.203);
Objects can only be named (T 3.221);

The meaning of a name cannot be a complex (a complex

cannot be named);

Therefore, objects cannot be composite (T2.021b). It is by this

'transcendental argument' from the structure of language to the ontological structure which must underlie such a language that Wittgenstein
completes his proof that the substance of the world must consist of ab-

solutely simple objects.18 This argument from language substantiates his

metaphysical prejudices, and also provides the required connection between the proof that the world must have a substance and the claim that
substance consists of simple objects.
Moreover, the argument for the simplicity of objects formulated above

seems to be the sort of thing Wittgenstein is alluding to when he says in

the Notebooks [60 (8)]:

The question [whether there are simples] might however also be presented like this:
It seems that the idea of the SIMPLE is already to be found contained in that of the
complex and in the idea of analysis, and in such a way that we come to this idea quite
apart from any examples of simple objects, or of propositions which mention them,
and we realize the existence of the simple object - a priori - as a logical necessity.

A bit later in the Notebooks [63 (8)] this point of view is expressed quite
succinctly: "The demand for simple things is the demand for definiteness

of sense." (This statement should be compared with T 3.23, where the

same claim is made from the point of view of language.) If the ultimate
components of language are names (simple signs) and these names are to
have meaning, then there must exist simple objects which are their
meanings, and which together constitute the substance of the world.

In Section III above, I outlined two possible interpretations of the structure of the proof of logical atomism in remarks T 2.02-2.0212. Each
requires the separate argument for the simplicity of objects which I

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LUDWIG

formulated in the last section, but its logical relationship to the other
argument at T2.0211-2.0212 differs in the two cases. The accounts of

T 2.02ff. cited earlier all appear to follow Interpretation (II), since they
construe T2.0211-2.0212 as proving the existence of simple objects

(which constitute the substance of the world). While I have shown that
these accounts are incomplete, I can see no way to prove that they are
incorrect. That is, I cannot show conclusively that Interpretation (II)

is the wrong interpretation of the passage. It has the advantage of

presenting the two arguments in the order in which they appear to the
reader of the work. Second, Interpretation (II) allows for an easier and

more detailed explication of the argument at T2.0211-2.0212, since

arguments from language to prove that objects, if they exist, must be

simple (T 2.021) can be appealed to in defense of these remarks.19 There
are, then, some strong reasons for accepting Interpretation (II).
However, there are also strong grounds in support of Interpretation (I).
First, if we take the numbering system of the Tractatus seriously,20 then
the entire passage T2.0201-2.0212 is a comment upon T2.02. But

T 2.02 is the claim, "Objects are simple", which is the conclusion of the
entire argument of the passage as characterized in Interpretation (I).
This is not true of the other interpretation. Furthermore, the numbering

system requires that T2.021 be understood as the most important com-

ment on T2.02. Under Interpretation (I) it is so understood, since it

embodies the argument for the claim that objects cannot be composite,
based upon the presupposition that the world has a substance and that

objects make up that substance (i.e., T2.021a). On this interpretation,

remarks T2.0211-2.0212 constitute a proof of that presupposition of

T 2.02 1, that is, a proof that the world must have a substance. They lead
to, are a comment upon, T2.021, and this again is demanded by the

numbering system. All of this makes sense if we construe the remarks

T2.021-2.0212 as being presented to the reader in the inverse logical

order of the argument to the conclusion that "Objects are simple." In

light of Wittgenstein's own description of the numbering system, this is
the most plausible construction to place upon the passage.

In the second place, Interpretation (I) is more faithful to what the

text explicitly says. As I pointed out earlier, there is no mention of

'objects' in the remarks T2.0211-2.0212, only of 'substance'; whereas

'objects' are explicitly mentioned at T2.021. Interpretation (I) is fully

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'SUBSTANCE' AND 'SIMPLE OBJECTS' 317

consistent with such a strict reading of the text, while Interpretation (II)
clearly is not. Related to this textual consideration is the further point

that Interpretation (I) provides some justification for T 2.021a: "Objects

make up the substance of the world," since it presupposes the proof
(at T2.0211-2.0212) that the world must have a substance. On Inter-

pretation (II) this statement stands unjustified by any prior argument,

yet it is the connection between 'substance' and 'simple objects'.

These last considerations lead me to accept Interpretation (I), but I

recognize that they are not conclusive and that there is clearly room for

disagreement. In any case, the crucial point is not to decide upon one
interpretation or the other, but to acknowledge that, on either interpretation, remarks T 2.0211-2.0212 do not prove that objects must be
simple. Rather, this is proven through an enthymematic argument which

underlies T2.021, the passage which has been largely overlooked by

commentators on the Tractatus. The important thing is to recognize the

conceptual difference between proving that the world must have a substance and proving that the substance of the world must consist of
simple objects, and to realize that paying attention to this distinction
improves our understanding of the grounds for Wittgenstein's logical
atomism.*

Union College
NOTES

1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [Translated by D. F. Pears

and B. F. McGuinness], (London, 1961). All references to the Tractatus are this
translation.

2 James Griffin, Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism (Oxford, 1964), p. 65. (The interpolations are mine.)

8 Julius Weinberg, 'Are There Ultimate Simples?', Philosophy of Science 2 (1935), pp.
387-399.

4 E. D. Klemke, 'The Ontology of Wittgenstein's Tractatus', in E. D. Klemke (ed.),

Essays on Wittgenstein (Urbana, Illinois, 1971), p. 113. (My interpolation.)
5 G. E. M. Anscombe, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus (London, 1959),
p. 29.

6 Max Black, A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus (Ithaca, 1964), p. 60.

7 George Pitcher, The Philosophy of Wittgenzstein (Englewood Cliffs, 1964), p. 38.
8 Pitcher, p. 38. (My interpolation.) It is difficult to see why Pitcher would claim that
Wittgenstein does not 'produce an argument' at T2.0211-2.0212, since Pitcher himself
analyzes that passage as 'proving' that there must be simple objects.
9 Weinberg, p. 393.

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10 It is clear from the context that Black is here using the term 'objects' to mean 'simple
objects'. See Companion, pp. 58-61.

1 Black's alternative translation; see his gloss on T2.021a, Companion, p. 61.

12 The Ogden edition of the Tractatus (London, 1922) translates 'darum' as 'therefore'.
This translation may be preferable to that by Pears and McGuinness, especially since
it is now clear that Wittgenstein did in fact read and revise the translation in the Ogden

edition. See the foreword to: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Letters to C. K. Ogden [edited by
G. H. von Wright], (Oxford and London, 1973), viii-ix.
13 Again following Black, p. 61.

14 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914-1916 [Edited by G. H. von Wright and

G. E. M. Anscombe, Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe], (Oxford, 1961), 62 (9-11).
References to the Notebooks follow Black's convention of citing page, paragraph, and
sentence, in that order.

15 In his Companion, Black points out the possibility of irreducible (contingent)

complexes in order to stress that Wittgenstein's belief that only simples cannot be
analyzed is in fact a metaphysical bias. See pp. 58-60.

16 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations [Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe], Third Edition (New York, 1958), para. 46.

17 I believe that it is here, in the argument for T 2.021b (=2.02), that this remark,
which is akin to a brief statement of Russell's theory of descriptions, enters into
Wittgenstein's proof of logical atomism. It says in effect, that every non-elementary
proposition (statement about a complex) must be completely analyzable into a set of
elementary propositions referring only to simple objects. This assessment of its role in
the argument accounts for its standing as a comment on T 2.02, and for its being a less
important comment on T 2.02 than is T 2.021. [On the relationship of zero-remarks
such as these, see my "Zero-Remarks and the Numbering System of the Tractatus"
(forthcoming in The Journal of Critical Analysis, VI).]
18 Stenius has suggested a generally similar interpretation of T 2.021 ff., but he does
not supply the details of the argument, as I have tried to do. See: Erik Stenius, Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' (Oxford, 1964), pp. 64-66. On Wittgenstein's arguments in the
Tractatus as "transcendental deductions" see Chapter XI of this book.
19 That is, if one has already shown that objects, as substance, must be simple, then
'transcendental arguments' from the nature of language can be used to prove that the
world must have a substance. This is in fact the sort of interpretation whicb the argument at T 2.0211-2.0212 usually receives at the hands of commentators. However, it
should be pointed out that the same general argument could be made out even if
substance were identified with irreducible complexes. In this case one would of course
have to argue from a view of language very different from that actually held by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus.

20 That is, if one accepts the view that the principles of the numbering system as stated

by Wittgenstein are adhered to in the Tractatus without violation or inconsistency.

Some reasons for taking the numbering system this seriously are given in my paper on
the zero-remarks, referred to in footnote 17, above.

* Early versions of this paper were written while I enjoyed a leave of absence for
research under a grant from the Union College Humanities Faculty Development Fund.
I am gratelul for that support.

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