Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 188106

November 25, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO DALISAY y DESTRESA, Appellant.

Prior to this assault, appellant had already been repeatedly molesting the girl
since she was 13 years old by inserting his finger into her genitalia. 5 However,
paralyzed by the terror that he would make real his threats of annihilating her
family, she was compelled to suffer in silence. Her trepidation was further
fueled by her knowledge that appellant always carried a knife with him. 6
In the morning of July 11, 2003, the day after the unfortunate incident, the
victim and her sister had a quarrela blessing in disguise, so to speak, as it
resulted in the latter running away from their home and disclosing to their aunt,
who lived nearby, the sexual abuse. It appeared that the victims sister
witnessed an incident when appellant thought that everyone in the rented room
was sleeping and pulled off his dastardly act.7

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
For final review by the Court is the trial courts conviction of appellant Antonio
Dalisay for rape. In the October 23, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02836, the appellate court, on intermediate
review, affirmed with modification the April 11, 2007 Decision 2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 88 of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-03119026.
The victim in this case was, at the time of the incident, a 16-year-old lass, who,
together with her siblings, stayed with her mothers live-in partner, appellant
Dalisay, in a rented second-floor room in Fairview, Quezon City. Their mother
worked as a baby-sitter and helper in Makati City and only came home at the
end of every month.3
On that fateful evening of July 10, 2003, the victim was alone playing cards in
the aforesaid rented room, while her siblings were watching television in the
common area on the ground floor. Appellant entered the room to change his
clothes. He then laid himself down on the floor near the young lady, pulled her
shirt up, and touched her breasts and thighs. Bent on satisfying his lust, he
forced the girl down on the floor, took off her shorts and underwear, and placed
himself on top of her. The defenseless lass resisted by kicking his legs and by
pleading for him to stop. He, however, remained deaf to the girls earnest
entreaty, warned her that he would kill her entire family, and proceeded to
bombard the gate to her chastity with his bestial toughness. 4

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Alarmed by her nieces information, their aunt rushed to their home to verify
from the victim the truth of the molestation. They then reported the matter to
the authorities, who lost no time in apprehending appellant. 8 The ano-genital
examination of the victim revealed the presence of abrasion and congestion in
the perihymenal area/vestibule and in the posterior fourchette area. Revealed
further were deep healed lacerations at 5 and 7 oclock positions in the hymen.
The examining physician opined that the findings were definitive evidence of
previous and recent blunt penetrating trauma to the genitals of the victim. 9
Consequently, an Information for rape in relation to Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7610 was filed, pertinently reading:
That on or about the 10th day of July 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, with lewd design[,] with force and intimidation[,] did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
one [name withheld], his stepdaughter[,] 16 years old, a minor[,] against her
will and without her consent, to the damage and prejudice of said offended
party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
Appellant, on arraignment, pleaded not guilty, and, for his defense, mainly
denied the accusation. He further claimed that the filing of the charge was only
upon the instigation by the victims aunt who harbored a grudge against him. 11
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered the April 11, 2007
Decision12 convicting appellant of qualified rape but imposing the penalty of

reclusion perpetua in light of the passage of R.A. No. 9346. 13 The RTC further
ordered appellant to pay the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00
as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.14
On intermediate review, the appellate court affirmed with modification the
ruling of the trial court. The CA convicted the accused not of qualified rape but
of simple rape, and disposed of the case in the following tenor:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed decision finding
accused-appellant guilty of qualified rape is MODIFIED in that accusedappellant Dalisay is instead found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of SIMPLE
RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The award
of damages by the court a quo is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.15
The case having been elevated to this Court, we now finally review the trial
and the appellate courts uniform findings.
We affirm the conviction of appellant Dalisay for simple rape.
Three principles guide the courts in resolving rape cases: (1) an accusation for
rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the
crime of rape in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of
the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.16
In a determination of guilt for the crime of rape, primordial is the credibility of
the complainants testimony, because, in rape cases, the accused may be
convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided it is credible, natural,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things.17 Here, the victim, in the painstaking and well-nigh degrading public
trial, related her painful ordeal that she was raped by appellant. Her testimony
was found by the trial court, which had the undisputed vantage in the
evaluation and appreciation of testimonial evidence, to have been made in "a
simple, straightforward and spontaneous manner." 18

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This eloquent testimony of the victim, coupled with the medical findings
attesting to her non-virgin state, should be enough to confirm the truth of her
charges.19 Further, deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the
highest respect and are not to be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any
clear showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would have affected the
result of the case.20
The Court discredits appellants defense of denial for it is a negative and selfserving evidence,21 which pales in comparison to the victims clear and
convincing narration and positive identification of her assailant. The Court,
likewise, does not find merit in appellants rather belated assertion that the
prosecution failed to establish force or intimidation and the resistance of the
victim to the intrusion. The presence of intimidation, which is purely subjective,
cannot be tested by any hard and fast rule, but should be viewed in the light of
the victims perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the
rape.22 Not all victims react in the same waysome people may cry out, some
may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may appear to
yield to the intrusion.23 Here, the records show that the victim was coerced into
submission by her fear that appellant would harm her family. In any event,
established during the trial were that appellant was the live-in partner of the
victims mother, and that he was the one taking care of the children while the
mother worked in Makati City.24 The moral ascendancy and influence of
appellant, a father figure to the victim, can take the place of threat or
intimidation.25
The Court, therefore, finds appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of simple rape. While it has been proven that appellant was the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim and the child was a minor at
the time of the incident, the Court cannot convict appellant of qualified
rape26 because the special qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship were not sufficiently alleged in the information. To recall, the
information here erroneously alleged that appellant was the stepfather of the
victim. Proven during the trial, however, was that appellant was not married to
the victims mother, but was only the common-law spouse of the latter.
Following settled jurisprudence,27 appellant is liable only of simple rape
punishable by reclusion perpetua.

As to the amount of damages, the Court finds as correct the award

of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages in line with
prevailing jurisprudence.28
As to the award of exemplary damages, the Court deems it opportune to clarify
the basis for and the amount of the same. Article 2229 of the Civil Code
provides that
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example
or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated
or compensatory damages.
Article 2230 of the same Code further states that
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil
liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from
fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, 29 courts
generally awarded exemplary damages in criminal cases when an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, had been proven to have
attended the commission of the crime, even if the same was not alleged in the
information. This is in accordance with the aforesaid Article 2230. However,
with the promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts no longer consider the
aggravating circumstances not alleged and proven in the determination of the
penalty and in the award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating
circumstance has been proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award
exemplary damages.30 Pertinent are the following sections of Rule 110:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense.The complaint or information shall state
the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of accusation.The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its

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qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce

judgment.
Nevertheless, People v. Catubig31 laid down the principle that courts may still
award exemplary damages based on the aforementioned Article 2230, even if
the aggravating circumstance has not been alleged, so long as it has been
proven, in criminal cases instituted before the effectivity of the Revised Rules
which remained pending thereafter. Catubig reasoned that the retroactive
application of the Revised Rules should not adversely affect the vested rights
of the private offended party.32
Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases, especially those
involving rape, dichotomized: one awarding exemplary damages, even if an
aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime had not been
sufficiently alleged but was consequently proven in the light of Catubig; and
another awarding exemplary damages only if an aggravating circumstance has
both been alleged and proven following the Revised Rules. Among those in the
first set are People v. Laciste,33 People v. Victor,34 People v. Orilla,35 People v.
Calongui,36People v. Magbanua,37 People of the Philippines v. Heracleo Abello
y Fortada,38 People of the Philippines v. Jaime Cadag Jimenez,39 and People
of the Philippines v. Julio Manalili.40 And in the second set are People v.
Llave,41People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par,42 and People of the
Philippines v. Edwin Mejia.43 Again, the difference between the two sets rests
on when the criminal case was instituted, either before or after the effectivity of
the Revised Rules.1avvphi1
In the instant case, the information for rape was filed in 2003 or after the
effectivity of the Revised Rules. Following the doctrine in the second set of
cases, the Court can very well deny the award of exemplary damages based
on Article 2230 because the special qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship, as mentioned above, were not sufficiently alleged.
Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for the grant
of exemplary damagestaking into account simply the attendance of an
aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime, courts have lost sight
of the very reason why exemplary damages are awarded. Catubig is
enlightening on this point, thus
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective
damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as
a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an

injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms

are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is
preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to account for
injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a
person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted,
the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the
highly reprehensible conduct of the defendantassociated with such
circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or
recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraudthat intensifies the
injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to
those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish
him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in
good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct
in the future.44
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded,
not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the
circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous
conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an
instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main
provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v.
Matrimonio,45 the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers
with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing
their own daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal,46 the Court awarded
exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and
wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman.
Recently, in People of the Philippines v. Cristino Caada, 47 People of the
Philippines v. Pepito Neverio48 and The People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo
Layco, Sr.,49 the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example,
to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect
the latter from sexual abuse.
It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article 2229,
rather than Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary damages. Indeed, to
borrow Justice Carpio Morales words in her separate opinion in People of the
Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par,50 "[t]he application of Article 2230 of the
Civil Code strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the present one, defeats the
underlying public policy behind the award of exemplary damagesto set a
public example or correction for the public good."

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In this case, finding that appellant, the father figure of the victim, has shown
such an outrageous conduct in sexually abusing his ward, a minor at that, the
Court sustains the award of exemplary damages to discourage and deter such
aberrant behavior. However, the same is increased to P30,000.00 in line with
prevailing jurisprudence.51
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the October 23, 2008 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02836 is AFFIRMED WITH THE
MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages is increased
toP30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 146569. October 6, 2003]
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs. JOHN
NEQUIA, appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review of the Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 23, convicting the appellant of qualified rape,
sentencing him to death by lethal injection and directing him to pay the victim
Mary Ghel P. Guanco, civil indemnity and moral damages.
The Antecedents
On May 10, 1999, an information was filed with the RTC, charging John
Nequia with rape. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about January 23, 1999, in the Municipality of Oton, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with grave abuse of confidence, he, being the stepfather of the victim, with
lewd design and by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having carnal knowledge of one
MARY GHEL P. GUANCO, a 13 year-old minor, against her will and/or consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
The accused, assisted by counsel, was arraigned on June 21, 1999 and
entered a plea of not guilty.
The Case for the Prosecution
During their coverture, Helena Planta and her live-in partner German
Guanco had three children, Mary Ghel, Gerlyn and John Gil. Mary Ghel, the
eldest, was born on February 2, 1986. Helena eked out a living as a franchise
dealer of Avon products.
Helena and German eventually separated. In March 1995, Helena and
the accused lived as husband and wife in Pakiad, Oton, Iloilo. The children
stayed with them. Helena and the accused were later married on December 5,
1997.
On December 31, 1995, Helena was in their house cooking. The accused
insinuated that he wanted to have sex with her. Helena told her husband not to
bother her because she was busy cooking. The accused went up to the
second floor of their house. When the accused came down, he kissed
Helena. She upbraided her husband and told him: Ga, your mouth is smelling
vagina. He told her that he would just wash his mouth. After doing so, the
accused went to the camalig. For her part, Helena went up to the second floor
of their house and saw her daughter Gerlyn, who was then about eight years
old, lying on the floor covered with a blanket. When Helena pulled the blanket
away, she noticed that her daughters panties were inverted. Suspecting that
the accused had sexually abused her daughter, Helena proceeded to
the camalig and confronted him. She demanded to know what he did to
Gerlyn. The accused kept silent. Helena then told the accused that she would
send her daughter to live with her parents and sisters in Barangay Pulo,
Maestra Vita in Oton. The accused got angry. Helena then pleaded to him: If
you will not admit [it], please dont repeat it again [sic]. Helena told Gerlyn to be
on guard henceforth. Helena did not report the incident to the police authorities

5 | Page

hoping that the accused would not abuse her daughter again. As a
precautionary measure, Helena brought her daughters Mary Ghel and Gerlyn
to her parents house at the end of the school year, and asked them if her
daughters could stay there for a while.Her parents agreed. However, John Gil,
who was then about five years old, stayed with his mother and the accused in
Pakiad.
At 7:00 a.m. of January 23, 1999, a Saturday, Helena left their house to
collect her customers accounts. The accused, his mother Linda and John Gil
were left in the house. At about 9:00 a.m., Mary Ghel, who by then was twelve
years old, arrived at the house and asked the accused to make a flower vase
for her as a school project. The accused agreed. By noontime, he had not yet
finished his stepdaughters project. After lunch, he ordered Mary Ghel and John
Gil to go up to the second floor to sleep.The two children did as they were
told. Mary Ghel and John Gil lay down on the floor face up beside each
other. Mary Ghel could not sleep and merely closed her eyes, while her brother
slept soundly.
Momentarily, the accused went up to the second floor, forcibly held Mary
Ghels hands and placed them behind her back. The accused hit her buttocks
with his hand and placed a pillow on her face to prevent her from shouting or
making any noise. Mary Ghel found it hard to breathe. She wanted to shout,
but she could not. The accused then removed her clothes and panties, licked
her vagina with his tongue and inserted his fourth finger. He then mounted
Mary Ghel and inserted his penis into her vagina. Mary Ghel felt excruciating
pain. After the accused was satiated, he dismounted from Mary Ghel and
removed the pillow from her face.The pain Mary Ghel felt in her vagina made
her cry out loud. Alarmed, the accused hastily put his clothes on and dressed
up Mary Ghel as well. In his hurry, he forgot to put on Mary Ghels panties. The
accused then hurriedly went down to the ground floor. Lola Linda went up and
inquired what the accused had done to her, but Mary Ghel could only cry.
M`ary Ghel then put on her panties and woke up her brother. The two left the
house and went to their maternal grandparents house at Pulo Maestra Vita.
Mary Ghel did not tell her grandparents Lola Etring and Lolo Emil, and her
aunties Aya and Bingbing what the accused had done to her. She was afraid
that if she did, the accused might harm her and her family.
At about 6:00 p.m. of the same day, the accused fetched Helena at
Barangay Cagbang and brought her home. In the days that followed, Helena
noticed that the accused was not his usual self. He seemed absentminded. She asked her sister-in-law Milagrosa Senarlo, what caused the
unusual behavior of her husband. Milagrosa replied that she did not know, but
suggested that Helena talk to her daughter Mary Ghel.
On January 26, 1999, Helena went to the Pakiad Elementary School
where Mary Ghel was studying. She wanted to talk to her daughter. She was
unable to do so, however, because Mary Ghel was taking her tests at the time.
January 27, 1999 was Helenas birthday. She returned to the school and
talked with Mary Ghel in the school canteen. When Helena asked her daughter
what happened to her on January 23, 1999, Mary Ghel replied that nothing
happened. However, Helena noticed that Mary Ghel was kicking her feet on
the ground and that she had started crying. Mary Ghel then admitted that

something indeed happened to her. Helena urged her daughter to reveal the
incident and to consider the information as Mary Ghels birthday gift to
her. Touched by her mothers request, Mary Ghel finally told her mother that
she was raped by the accused shortly after lunch on January 23, 1999. She
told her mother how the accused sexually abused her. Helena was shocked by
her daughters revelation. Helena did not confront the accused because she
was sure that he would not admit to any wrongdoing.
Nevertheless, Helena accompanied Mary Ghel to the Western Visayas
Medical Center in Iloilo City on February 12, 1999. Dr. Encarnacion A. Rubinos
examined Mary Ghel and later signed a medico-legal certificate containing the
following findings:
INTERNAL EXAMINATION FINDINGS:
COMPLETE HYMENAL TEAR, OLD, HEALED AT
5:00 and 7:00 oclock POSITIONS.
LABORATORY FINDINGS: NO SPERMATOZOA SEEN
IMPRESSION: COMPLETE HYMENAL TEAR, OLD, HEALED AT 5:00 & 7:00
OCLOCK POSITIONS.[3]
On February 4, 1999, Helena and Municipal Social Worker Raquel
Baldovese accompanied Mary Ghel to the Oton Police Station where they
reported the incident, as well as the December 31, 1995 occurrence when the
accused had also apparently sexually abused the younger Gerlyn. [4]On
February 15, 1999, Chief of Police Antonio B. Bersamin filed a criminal
complaint for rape against the accused with the Municipal Trial Judge of
Oton. Appended to the complaint was the affidavit executed by Mary Ghel.
The Evidence of the Accused
The accused denied the charge. He claimed that Helena instigated the
charge against him because she wanted to leave him but he prevented her
from doing so. He testified that he was heavily indebted and that in 1998,
Helena was asked to pay his debts. At 6:30 a.m. on January 23, 1999, he
accompanied his wife Helena to Barangay Cagbang, Oton. He returned to the
house and saw Mary Ghel who asked him to apply shellac on her bamboo
project. He told Mary Ghel that he had no shellac but that his brother-in-law
Roger Planta, Helenas brother, had some. After a short time, the accused left
to pass by Rogers house and to fetch Helena. On the way, he also passed by
the house of a friend, Nestor Espada, at Barangay Abilang Sur. Fifteen
minutes later, he arrived at Rogers place. The accused asked Roger if he
had shellac and the latter replied that he had already used them up. Roger
then invited the accused to a drinking spree. The accused agreed. They were
joined by Torpo, and later by Joseph. The drinking spree ended at around 2:30
p.m. Thereafter, the accused proceeded to Barangay Cagbang where he
fetched Helena. The couple arrived home at 6:30 p.m. By then, Mary Ghel had
already left the house with her brother.
Milagrosa Senarlo, the sister of the accused, testified that she lived about
ten meters away from her brothers house. Helenas relationship with her
brother turned sour when Helena started arriving home late. The accused
became absent-minded because he and Helena were heavily
indebted. Helena had been to Hongkong in 1998 and spent so much money
for her trip. They also gambled at Pakiad.

6 | Page

The witness also testified that in the early morning of January 23, 1999,
the accused and Helena left their house and went to Barangay Cagbang. The
accused returned at 9:00 a.m. Mary Ghel, who was wearing pants and a
blouse, arrived at the house with her school project.The accused then left. His
mother Linda told Mary Ghel to leave her project in the house. As it was
getting late, Linda accompanied Mary Ghel and John Gil to the nearby
store. From there, Mary Ghel and John Gil left for Pulo Maestra Vita by
themselves. According to the witness, Mary Ghel and John Gil were even
playing together on their way to the store.
The next day, January 24, 1999, the accused and Helena went to the city
to see a movie. Mary Ghel brought her brother John Gil back to the house of
the accused at 4:30 p.m. in a tricycle.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the
accused of qualified rape and sentencing him to death. The decretal portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape defined and penalized under Arts. 266-A and
266-B of Republic Act 8353 hereby sentencing the accused John P. Nequia to the
supreme penalty of DEATH by lethal injection, further condemning the said accused to
pay the victim Mary GheI Guanco the sum of P75,000.00 by way of civil liability and
the amount of P75,000.00 moral damages.
The Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center, Iloilo City where the accused is detained is
ordered to immediately remit said accused to the National Penitentiary. Let the entire
records of this case be elevated to the Honorable Supreme Court, Manila for automatic
review.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The appellant assails the decision of the trial court, raising the lone
assignment of error that THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF CONSUMMATED RAPE
DESPITE UNCERTAINTY OF ITS COMMISSION.[6]
The appellant asserts that, as can be gleaned from Mary Ghels affidavit
and the complaint filed with the MTC, the appellant did not insert his penis into
Mary Ghel s vagina. Mary Ghel admitted when she testified that she did not
see the penis of the appellant. She admitted that she was lying beside her
brother John Gil when the appellant raped her, and was forced to close her
eyes when the appellant had sex with her.
The appellant contends that although the prosecution proved that he
inserted his fourth finger into the private complainants vagina, such act does
not constitute rape (sexual assault) under the Anti-Rape Law. [7] He argues that
the insertion of a human finger into the victims vagina has been excluded in
Senate Bill No. 950 and House Bill No. 6265. He also cited Memorandum
Circular No. 22, dated September 28, 2000 of the then Secretary of Justice
Artemio Tuquero. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the appellant
threatened the victim with physical harm. The prosecution thus failed to prove
with certainty that the appellant raped Mary Ghel.
According to the appellant, the victim and her mother Helena were even
smiling and were in a happy mood during the trial. Despite Helenas knowledge

that the appellant had abused her daughter, she never confronted him. Helena
even admitted that despite her knowledge that the appellant had raped her
daughter, she still agreed to have sex with the appellant, and prodded the
latter to have more sex although he had already ejaculated.
The contention of the appellant does not hold water. Mary Ghel testified
that the appellant licked her vagina with his tongue, inserted his fourth finger,
then his penis into her vagina, although she did not know how deep the
penetration was. She felt pain in her vagina as the appellant penetrated her:
Q At around 12:30 oclock [sic] at noon, can you tell this Honorable
Court what were you doing at that time inside the house of your
stepfather?
A He told us to go to sleep.
Q You said us, who was your companion at that time?
A My younger brother.
Q Your younger brother John Gil?
A Yes, sir.
Q When your stepfather told you to sleep, did you sleep?
A I slept on the upper portion.
Q You mean the house of your stepfather and mother has a [sic] 2
storey?
A Yes, sir.
Q That place, the upper part of the house where you were told by
your stepfather to sleep, how many rooms are there?
A One.
Q And where did you and your brother sleep that noon of January
23, 1999 because you were told to sleep?
A At the upper portion.
Q On the bed?
A No, sir.
Q Where?
A On the floor.
Q There is no bed on the upper part of the house of your stepfather?
A No, sir.
Q By the way, were you able to sleep that afternoon of January 23,
1999?
A I was not able to sleep, I only closed my eyes.
Q When you said you only closed your eyes, and [were] not able to
sleep, can you tell this Honorable Court what happened?
A My stepfather went upstairs and held my [sic] both hands and
placed it [sic] on my back.
COURT:
Q About what time is this, more or less?
A I can not recall.
Q Have you already taken your lunch when you went to sleep?
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Proceed.
FISCAL:

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Q When you said your stepfather came and held your 2 hands and
put them at your back, what was your position at that time?
A I was facing upwards.
Q Can you demonstrate what was your position at that time?
A Yes, sir. (Witness demonstrating by sitting and placing both hands
on the back).
Q After your stepfather held your both hands and put [them]
on [sic]your back, what did he do after that?
A He covered my eyes and mouth with a pillow.
Q After he covered your eyes and mouth with a pillow, what did he
do?
A He slapped my buttocks so that I will not shout.
Q And after that?
A Then he took off my pants and panty.
Q What were you wearing at that time?
A Pants.
Q What kind of pants was that?
A Maong.
COURT:
Q Is that a long or short pants?
A Long.
Q And after he took off your long pants and panty, what did he do?
A He placed a pillow under my buttocks.
Q And what did he do after that?
A He lipped [sic] my vagina and fingered my vagina.
Q What did you do at that time when your stepfather lipped and
fingered your vagina?
A I can not move at that time.
Q And after he lipped and fingered your vagina, what did he do?
A He laid on top of me and inserted his penis [in]to my vagina.
Q And after he inserted his penis into your vagina what happened?
A Because of pain I shouted.
Q And when you shouted because of pain, what happened?
A He removed his penis in my vagina.
Q And what happened next?
A And my grandmother inquired from him what happened to Candy
and he replied, Nothing, he just quarreled with her brother.
Q Where was your grandmother?
A Downstairs.
Q What was she doing at that time?
A She finished already [sic] weeding.
COURT:
Q You said that when you shouted because of pain, the accused
withdrew or removed his penis from your vagina, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why, was his penis able to enter the opening of your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
Q Was it able to penetrate your vagina?

A It was not fully inserted.

Q Was the tip of his penis able to touch the opening of your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
Q Was it able to penetrate the portion of your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
Q About how many inches was the penetration, if any?
A I do not know.[8]
...
COURT
Q You are sure that John Nequia, the accused inserted his penis into
your vagina?
A Yes, Your Honor, because I felt pain when he inserted his penis.
Q Was his penis able to penetrate into your vagina?
A I cannot ascertain but I only felt pain.
Q You cannot determine how deep was the penetration of his penis
into your vagina?
A No, Your Honor.
Q Did you experience whether your vagina bled?
A No, Your Honor.
Q Did it bleed or it did not bleed?
A I do not know because I was not able to see.[9]
Although Mary Ghel testified that she did not see the penis of the
appellant because of the pillow on her face, she was sure that the appellant
inserted his penis because it was bigger than his finger:
ATTY. DEGUMA
Q Madam Witness, since you said your eyes were covered, how do
you know that it was the penis of John Nequia that [was]
inserted into your vagina?
A Because of that fact that I felt as if it is his finger because his finger
is smaller than his penis.
COURT
Q Which is bigger, his penis or his finger?
A His penis, Your Honor.[10]
The trial court correctly convicted the appellant of consummated rape
under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law.
In People v. Salinas,[11] we held that in rape cases, there are no half
measures or even quarter measures, nor is their gravity graduated by the
inches of entry. Partial penile penetration is as serious as full penetration. In
either case, rape is deemed consummated. We further said that in a manner of
speaking, bombardment of the drawbridge is invasion enough even if the
troops do not succeed in entering the castle.[12]
In People v. Campuhan,[13] we held that rape is consummated by the
slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia ofthe
pudendum by the penis:
As the labias, which are required to he touched by the penis, are by their
naturalsitus or location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them
with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the

8 | Page

conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of

thepudendurn constitutes consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are
visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora,the hymen,
the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that
becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer
is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex
surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair
follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have
any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia
minora. ...
Mere contact by the males sex organ of the females sex organ
consummates rape.[14]
Threats of physical harm on the victim is not an indispensable element in
the crime of rape. For rape to be consummated, it is enough that the victim is
intimidated or forced into submitting to the bestial lust of the
accused. In People v. Sagun,[15] we held that intimidation is addressed to the
mind of the victim. It is subjective and its presence cannot be tested by any
hard-and-fast rule but must be viewed in the light of the perception and
judgment of the victim during the commission of the crime. [16] The age, size
and strength of the parties should be taken into account in evaluating the
existence of the element of force or intimidation in the crime of rape. [17] Though
the accused lays no hand on the victim, yet if by any way of physical forces, he
so overpowers her mind that she does not resist, or ceases resistance through
fear of greater harm, rape is deemed consummated. Physical resistance need
not be proven in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the
latter is impelled to submit herself to the bestial desire of the accused. [18]
In this case, the appellant was 28 years old and heavy in built. He
overpowered the victim by holding both her hands and placing them at her
back. The appellant even slapped her buttocks and put a pillow over her face
to prevent her from shouting for help. The victim could hardly breathe as the
appellant ravished her. She felt pain in her vagina when the appellant
penetrated her.
The Court, however, does not agree with the appellants submission that
he did not commit rape (sexual assault), as defined and penalized in Article
266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
8353, when he inserted his fourth finger into Mary GheIs vagina. The aforesaid
law reads:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed:
...
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph I
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person.
In People v. Perez,[19] the word instrument or object was construed to
include a human finger. The Court reiterated its ruling in People v.
Soriano[20] and People v. Bun.[21] The Anti-Rape Law transformed and
reclassified rape as a felony against persons, under Title Eight, Chapter Two,

Book II of the same Code. [22] The criminalization of the penetration of a

persons sex organ or anal orifice and the insertion of a persons penis into the
mouth or anal orifice of another, whether man or woman, and the classification
thereof as rape (sexual assault) were designed to prevent not only the physical
injuries inflicted on the victim but also his subjection to personal indignity and
degradation and affront to the psychological integrity associated with an
unwanted violation.[23] An unconsented intrusion by whatever object or
instrumentality chosen by the perpetrator, whether animate or inanimate, is
prohibited by the law.[24] The fact that only digital penetration occurred did not
lessen the victims fear and humiliation or the violation of her bodily integrity.
[25]
The public prosecutor should thus have filed two separate Informations
against the appellant, one for rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 for the
insertion by him of his penis into the vagina of the victim, and rape (sexual
assault) under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the law for inserting his finger into
the victims vagina. However, only one information was filed against the
appellant, for rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Code. The appellant
cannot thus be convicted of rape (sexual assault) under Article 266-A,
paragraph 2, since he was not charged with the said crime.
There is no discordance between Mary Ghels affidavit, which was
appended to the criminal complaint for rape, and her testimony. In her affidavit,
Mary Ghel stated that the appellant had intercourse with her:
That after a few minutes, my stepfather John Nequia came and he hold [sic] my hands,
covered my mouth with a pillow and slapped my hip in order not to shout and he
immediately took off my underwear, he put pillow my [sic] hips, kissed, sucked and
finger [sic] my vagina and have intercourse with me but did not consum[m]ate
because [sic] I shouted for [sic] the pain of my vagina.[26]
The credibility of Mary Ghel and the probative weight of her testimony are
not impaired by the deficiency in the accusatory portion of the criminal
complaint filed by Oton Chief of Police Bersamin, nor the latters failure to
testify for the prosecution, or the fact that Mary Ghel did not sign the criminal
complaint. Besides, the criminal complaint was never adduced in evidence by
the prosecution.
There is no evidence on record that Mary Ghel and Helena were always
smiling and in a happy mood during the trial. On the contrary, the records show
that when Mary Ghel testified, she cried:
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY PROSECUTOR CABALUM
Q. Madam Witness, how were you able to shout when you said
before that the pillow was covering your mouth and your eyes?
A. I was able to shout when he was no longer lying on top of me.
Q. And you were able to remove the pillow covering your eyes and
mouth?
A. Yes, Ma[a]m.
Q. Madam Witness, why did you not tell your Lola Linda whom you
first met after the incident?
A. I have not told anybody about it. I just continued to lie and I was
afraid at the time.
COURT:

9 | Page

Q. Why are you afraid?

A. I was just afraid, Your Honor.
Q. You are afraid of whom?
A. John Nequia.
Q. Why are you afraid of John Nequia?
A. Because if I will reveal he might kill us.
ATTY. DEGUMA
Your Honor, I move to strike out the statement basi pamatyon ko sila.
It is a presumption, Your Honor.
COURT
Q. Why, are you afraid that John Nequia will kill your parents if you
will report the incident to them?
A. Because I love them, Your Honor.
Q. But John Nequia warned you not to report to your parents?
A. No, Your Honor, because my grandmother immediately went up.
Q. What I mean, John Nequia did not tell you not to report what he
did to you to your parents?
A. No, Your Honor.
COURT
Proceed.
PROSECUTOR:
I would like to put on record that the victim is crying.
COURT
Noted already.
PROSECUTOR
That will be enough.[27]
The testimony of Mary Ghel is not impaired by the evidence that
theappellant raped her while John Gil was sleeping beside her. Rape can be
committed in the same room where other members of the family are also
sleeping.[28]
The appellants attack on Helenas credibility as a witness and the veracity
of her testimony is futile. Helenas account of the events is merely corroborative
of Mary Ghels testimony. Case law has it that it is perfectly acceptable to
anchor a judgment of conviction for rape based solely on the uncorroborated
testimony of the victim when the testimony per se is credible, natural,
convincing and free from serious contradiction, and her sincerity and candor,
free from suspicion.[29] In this case, the trial court found the testimony of Mary
Ghel spontaneous, sincere and entitled to full probative weight:
Whereas, complainant Mary Ghel Guanco declared that she was raped by her
stepfather and herein accused John Nequia, the said accused, relying on simple denial
and alibi and further attributing ill-motive on the part of Helena P. Nequia, strongly
denies having raped complainant Mary Ghel Guanco. That complainant Mary Ghel
was only 13 years old then and a 6th grade student of Pakiad Elem. School in Brgy.
Pakiad, Oton, Iloilo is given. She was not shown to have the shrewdness and
callousness of a woman who would concoct such a story and endure physical
examination and public trial if her story were untrue. In People vs. Victor, the Court
held that when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed (People vs.

Alejandro Devilleres, G.R. No. 114138, Mach 14, 1997).That the herein accused John
Nequia was married to her natural mother Helena C. Planta on December 5, 1997
(Exh. B, p. 134, rec.) hence, said accused John Nequia is her stepfather, is also given.
If we go by the testimony of complainant Mary Ghel vis a vis the denial by the
accused John Nequia, it would not be difficult for the Court to readily give credence to
the testimony of Mary Ghel which the Court finds replete with spontaneity and so
overwhelming as to be impervious as to the mere denial of the accused. It is a wellsettled rule that an affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony
especially so when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. (People vs.
Ramirez, G.R. No. 97020, Jan. 20, 1997).[30]
After an incisive consideration of the evidence on record, we find no
reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court and its calibration of the
testimony of Mary Ghel. In People v. Castillo,[31] we held that in rape cases
where the offended parties are young and immature girls from the ages of
twelve to sixteen, there is considerable receptivity on the part of this Court to
lend credence to their testimonies, considering not only their relative
vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which such a grueling
experience as a court trial, where they are called upon to lay bare what
perhaps should be shrouded in secrecy, did expose them to. [32] There is no
showing that Mary Ghel was impelled by any ill-motive in charging her
stepfather with a heinous crime. Hence, her testimony is entitled to full faith
and credence. No woman, much less a child, would willingly submit herself to
the rigors, the humiliation and the stigma attendant upon the prosecution of
rape, if she were not motivated by an earnest desire to put the culprit behind
bars.[33] All told then, this Court is convinced of the guilt of the appellant for
qualified rape, and that the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of death in
this case.
The Proper Penalty for the Crime
The trial court correctly sentenced the appellant to suffer the death
penalty. As alleged in the Information, the victim was under 18 years old when
she was raped by her stepfather, the appellant. The victims minority and her
relationship with the appellant are circumstances which require the imposition
of the death penalty under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, which reads:
...
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
The Civil Liabilities of the Appellant
The trial court awarded P75,000 to the victim Mary Ghel Guanco as civil
indemnity, and P75,000 as moral damages. It did not award exemplary
damages. Conformably to case law, the victim in rape cases is entitled to
P75,000 as civil indemnity, and P75,000 as moral damages when the death
penalty is imposed by the Court. She is also entitled to exemplary damages in
the amount of P25,000 as a vindication of the undue sufferings and wanton

10 | P a g e

invasion of her rights, and to punish the appellant for his outrageous conduct.
[34]

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial

Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that
appellant John Nequia is ordered to pay the victim Mary Ghel Guanco P75,000
as civil indemnity, P75,000 as moral damages, and P25,000 as exemplary
damages.
Three Justices of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No.
7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty;
nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is
constitutional, and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case
at bar.
In accordance with Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659, amending Section
83 of the Revised Penal Code, let the records of this case be forthwith
forwarded, upon finality of this Decision, to the Office of the President for
possible exercise of the pardoning power. Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 133815-17. March 22, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.EDGARDO
LIAD y BEIGAR and JUN VALDERAMA y CASPE, accusedappellants.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
On the night of February 28, 1996, at around 7:00 in the
evening, Lydia Cuenca was driving her Tamaraw FX along
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. Immediately behind the FX in
his own vehicle was Lydias husband Manuel.Seated beside Manuel in
the car was the latters employee, Larry Buseron. Manuel and Larry
had just come from the store and were on a convoy with Lydia on
their way home.
Upon reaching the corner of Don Enrique Subdivision and
Commonwealth Avenue, Lydia made a full stop to make a Uturn. Three (3) men then approached her vehicle, banging on the
door to force it to open. Unsuccessful, the man on the left of the
vehicle pulled out a gun and pulled the trigger, hitting one of the
windows as well as Lydias left shoulder. One of the men also shot the
other side of the vehicle but it hit Manuels car instead. Still unable to
open the FXs door, one of the men broke the window of the right
door using the butt of a gun.
Finally succeeding, the men boarded the vehicle. Manuel heard
another shot which hit his wifes nape. Manuel bumped the rear of
the FX, hoping to startle the culprits. The bump did not startle them
as Manuel hoped. The men sped off aboard the FX, heading north
with Lydia. The whole incident took around five (5) to ten (10)
minutes.
Manuel got out of the car and tried to pursue the FX. Larry
Buseron also wanted to help but could not get out of the car, which
was locked. Manuel went back to his car to follow the FX. Alas, his

11 | P a g e

car broke down. Manuel ordered Larry to go back to their store,

presumably owned by Manuel, and get help. Manuel for his part
rushed to another store around a hundred meters away also to ask
for help. The people in the store went to the police station to report
the hold-up.Manuel went home to get another car and catch up with
the FX.
In the meantime, Larry did not find anyone in their store so he
went to the police station by himself. A police officer told him that
they would have to talk to Mr. Cuenca. Larry said he would look for
him.
Larry returned to the scene of the crime but did not find Manuel
there. Larry waited and looked after the car. After several minutes,
Manuel arrived and instructed Larry to watch over the vehicle. He
informed Larry that Mrs. Cuenca was at Ilang-Ilang Street.
Meanwhile at Police Station 6, Commonwealth Avenue, the desk
officer, SPO Bernarte, received a telephone call from a concerned
citizen informing them that a robbery-hold-up was in progress along
Commonwealth Avenue. The desk officer immediately dispatched
SPO4 Raul Espejon, SPO1 Ricardo Inamac, SPO2 Faustino and SPO1
Diaz. Before they could leave the police station, however, their office
received another report from Batasan Hills Barangay Captain Arturo
Ison regarding the same incident.
The police thus proceeded to Commonwealth Avenue and IlangIlang Street where they saw the victim, Lydia Cuenca, lying on the
front door of the Tamaraw FX. SPO4 Diaz and SPO1 Faustino brought
the victim to the hospital while the rest of the force proceeded to the
Trans-World Compound along Filinvest Road, about 400 yards from
Ilang-Ilang Street. A security guard as well as members of the
barangay commando informed them that the three suspects were in
the compound.
Upon approaching the suspects, the police were met with a
barrage of gunfire. The police returned fire. The exchange lasted a
few minutes until one of the suspects, a certain Baeng, was
hit. Baeng sprawled to the ground, still holding his .38

calibre paltik. Accused-appellants, who were

banana plants, then surrendered to the police.

hiding

behind

the

SPO4 Espejon immediately apprehended accused-appellant Jun

Valderama and disarmed him of his .38 calibre paltik revolver. He
also recovered Baengs gun.

wounds, one located at the posterior chest at the back of the victim
and the second on the victims left arm. The second gunshot wound
exhibited an area of tattooing, leading Dr. David to deduce that the
muzzle of the gun must have been less than 36 inches from the
victim. Both wounds were fatal. Dr. Davids findings are embodied in
Autopsy Report No. N-96-42.[1]

SPO1 Inamac arrested the other accused-appellant, Edgardo

Liad, and confiscated the latters firearm, likewise a .
38 paltik revolver. SPO1 Inamac also recovered the victims jewelry
and wallet, which was pointed to by Liad. The victims bag was
wedged in the trunk of a banana plant. The police brought the
accused-appellants to the police station while Baeng, who was
gasping for breath, was rushed to the Fairview Hospital.

Elmer Nelson Piedad, also of the NBI, conducted a ballistic

examination on the two (2) bullets recovered by Dr. David on the
victims body. His findings and conclusions are contained in Report
No. FID-123-92-29-96 (N-96-458) dated March 6, 1996:

Back at Commonwealth Avenue, Manuel came upon his wifes FX

at the corner of Commonwealth Avenue and Ilang-Ilang Street,
abandoned and bloody.A horde of people milled around the
vehicle. Manuel asked them where the victim was and a police officer
informed him that she was rushed to the Fairview Hospital. Manuel
proceeded to the hospital and arrived there only to find his wife of 30
years already dead. She was 53.

xxx

Suddenly, a wounded person accompanied by a police officer

arrived at the hospital. Manuel recognized him as one of the holduppers. He asked one of the police officers what the mans name
was. The police officers told him that, per reference to the mans ID,
the mans name was Baeng. Five (5) to ten (10) minutes later, Baeng,
too, breathed his last.
Manuel headed to the police station where he recognized the
two other persons who accosted his wife in police custody. A police
officer showed Manuel the articles they recovered from the
perpetrators, including Lydias blue shoulder bag, cash amounting to
more than P15,000.00, pieces of jewelry, bank books, calling cards,
ATM cards and other personal items.
Dr. Alvin David, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), conducted an autopsy on the victims
remains. From the examination, Dr. David concluded that a gunshot
wound was the victims cause of death. He found two gunshot

12 | P a g e

1. To determine the caliber and type of firearm from which

the evidence bullets marked LD-1 and LD-2 were fired.

a. Evidence marked LD-1 is a deformed caliber .38 lead

bullet and was fired through the barrel of a caliber .38
firearm with riflings twisting to the right.
b. Evidence marked LD-2 is deformed caliber .38 copper
coated lead bullet and was fired from a caliber .38
firearm. No determination could be made as to the
type of firearm from which it was fired due to its
deformed and scratched conditions.
2. Comparative examinations made between the evidence
bullets marked LD-1 and LD-2 revealed that evidence
bullet marked LD-2 does not possess sufficient individual
characteristics markings that could be used as basis for a
definite identification due to its deformed and scratched
conditions.[2]
Accused-appellants Edgar Liad and Jun Valderama were
subsequently charged before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
with Robbery with Homicide, defined and punished by Article 293 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in relation to Article 294
thereof. The information in Criminal Case No. Q-96-65118 reads:

That on or about the 28th day of February, 1996, in Quezon City,

Philippines, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack and
employ personal violence upon the person of LYDIA DY-CUENCA in
the following manner, to wit: on the date and in the place
aforementioned while herein victim was driving her Tamaraw FX
bearing plate No. TPD-522, cruising Commonwealth Avenue near cor.
Don Enrique Heights, Brgy. Holy Spirit, this City, accused pursuant to
their conspiracy, flagged down the victims vehicle but when the
latter refused to open her car, accused armed with handguns fired
two successive shots at the windshield, hitting the said victim,
causing her to sustain serious and mortal wounds which was the
immediate cause of her untimely death; that immediately thereafter,
accused boarded the said vehicle and upon reaching Ilang-Ilang St.,
Brgy. Batasan Hills, this City, abandoned the said car afterwhich they
took, robbed and carried away cash money in the amount of
P15,090.00 and valuable items all valued in the amount of
P170,000.00 Philippine Currency, belonging to LYDIA DY-CUENCA, all
in the total amount of P185,090.00 to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of said LYDIA DY-CUENCA.[3]
Accused-appellants were also charged in the same court with
one count each of Illegal Possession of Firearm, defined and punished
by Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, [4] as amended. In
Criminal Case No. Q-96-65119 against accused appellant Edgardo
Liad, the information alleged:
That on or about the 28th day of February 1996 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused without any authority of law, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her
possession and under his/her custody and control one (1) caliber .38
paltik snob nose revolver, without serial number, loaded with two (2)
spent shell and three (3) live ammunitions without first having
secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper
authorities.[5]

and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her

possession and under his/her custody and control one (1) caliber .38
paltik Revolver without serial number, loaded with two (2) spent
shells and three (3) live ammunitions, without first having secured
the necessary license/permit issued by the proper authorities.[6]
Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to all
the above charges.
The prosecution presented, among other evidence, the
testimonies of Manuel Cuenca,[7] SPO4 Raul Espejon,[8] PO3 Rudy
Peralta,[9] Larry Buseron,[10] SPO1 Ricardo Inamac,[11] Dr. Alvin
David[12] and Elmer Nelson Piedad,[13] from which the foregoing
narration of facts was culled. The deceaseds son Manuel, Jr. was also
presented to prove the civil liability of accused-appellants. [14]
Accused-appellants offered denial as their defense.
Accused-appellant Jun Valderama, 23, married, a vendor of garlic
and other spices, and a resident of Diliman, Quezon City, claimed
that on February 28, 1996, he was in Batasan Hills selling his
wares. At around 5:00 p.m., Valderama was passing by a compound,
the name of which he could not recall. He noticed many people in
front of the compound. Suddenly, a police officer accosted him.The
police officer frisked him and asked him where he lived. Valderama
said that he lived in Diliman. The police officer also asked Valderama
where he came from. Valderama replied that he had just finished
vending his goods.

In Criminal Case No. Q-96-65120, the information charged

accused-appellant Jun Valderama as follows:

From the search conducted on Valderama, the police officer

recovered a fanknife from Valderamas pocket. Valderama explained
in court that he carried the knife for self-defense since he usually
passes by the squatters area. He said that he did not intend to use
the knife for anything that is not good. The police officer then
handcuffed Valderama to the tricycle parked nearby, and told him to
wait there. According to the police officer, they were waiting for a
person inside the compound. From the police officers uniform,
Valderama was able to identify the officer as Espejon.

That on or about the 28th day of February 1996 in Quezon City,

Philippines, the said accused without any authority of law, did then

About (30) thirty minutes later, Valderama heard two (2) loud
gunshots and another one not so loud coming from the compound,

13 | P a g e

which was about thirty (30) meters away. After a while, the police
came out the compound dragging Edgardo Liad. The police brought
Liad to the tricycle where Valderama was handcuffed.They unlocked
the handcuffs from the tricycle and placed it on Liad such that
Valderama and Liad were cuffed together. The accused-appellants
were then brought to the police station in Precinct 6.
Valderama was placed in a detention cell while Liad was brought
to another room. Twenty minutes later, the police took Valderama
out of the cell and brought to the same room where Liad was
taken. The latter was placed in the detention cell.
Valderama claimed that while in the room the police tried to
force him to admit that he was a participant in the hold-up in
Commonwealth Avenue.Valderama denied the accusation, angering
the four (4) police officers, all of who were not in uniform. They
mauled and tortured him. When Valderama could no longer endure
the beating, he finally admitted the crime. It was only then that the
officers stopped torturing him.
In court, Valderama averred that he was not provided the
services of counsel at the time he was forced to admit the police
officers accusations. He denied having anything to do with the killing
of Lydia Cuenca. It was not true that he carried a paltik revolver.[15]
Accused-appellant Edgardo Liad, 26, a laborer and a resident of
194 Saint Andrew Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City,
admitted his presence at the crime scene but denied any
participation therein.
He claimed that at around 2:00 in the afternoon of February 28,
1996, he was watching TV at home when he saw his brother-in-law
Felix Forteza together with the latters friend, Liberato
Quintoa. Quintoa was Liads neighbor from the province, whom he
had not seen since 1992.
Liad asked the two to bring him to a movie since they had just
received their salaries. Forteza and Quintoa agreed to Liads request
but Forteza said that they had to pass by the office to get his
pay. Forteza worked as a security guard in Capital Auto Supply, a
business owned and managed by Manuel Cuenca.

14 | P a g e

The three left the house, took a tricycle then a bus. Forteza left
the two in acarinderia along Commonwealth Avenue and proceeded
to his employers office.When he came back, he told them that they
would have to wait a little longer since his employer was not yet
there. Less than an hour later, Liads companions suddenly blocked a
white car in the middle of the street. Liad remained in
thecarinderia. Forteza and Quintoa, who both carried firearms, shot
at the vehicle.Quintoa entered the vehicle and took the drivers seat
while Forteza sat beside him. Once inside, the two called Liad and
told him to board the vehicle. Shocked and confused, Liad did as he
was told and sat himself at the right side behind the front seat. Liad
did not flee, thinking that people in the carenderia would point to
him because they knew that he was Quintoa and Fertozas
companion.
The three then drove away and left the car at the corner of IlangIlang Street and Commonwealth Avenue.
Forteza and Quintoa then alighted the vehicle and told Liad to do
the same.Liad refused, however, so Quintoa poked a gun at him. He
threatened, If you will not alight I am going to shoot you. Liad did not
know what to do or where to go so he just followed Quintoa. He did
not know where Forteza went.
Along Ilang-Ilang Street was a squatters area. Quintoa climbed
into the compound followed by Liad. People were chasing Quintoa
and Liad, and Quintoa fired once at them. Liad asked Quintoa why
they did it. Quintoa told him not to ask too many questions. Marines
in civilian clothes then arrived and asked Quintoa and Liad, who were
crouching, to surrender. Quintoa finally stood up but, afraid, Liad did
not. Liad heard shots and tried to lie low.
Upon hearing calls for him to surrender, Liad slowly showed that
he was unarmed. He told them not to fire and that he did not have a
gun. The Marines arrested Liad and the police arrived. They took Liad
from the Marines while Quintoa, also known as Baeng, was brought
to the hospital. As for Forteza, Liad said he did not see him again.
Liad corroborated his co-accuseds denial. He claimed that the
first time he met his fellow accused was while he (Liad) was at the
compound. By then, Valderama was already handcuffed. Valderama

purportedly had no part in the incident that transpired on

Commonwealth Avenue.[16]
On rebuttal, Manuel Cuenca refuted Jun Valderamas allegation
that he(Valderama) was not at the scene of the crime. Manuel
categorically declared that he saw him and Liad there. He further
stated that Felix Forteza was not at the crime scene when the
tragedy took place.
On March 2, 1998, the RTC rendered a decision convicting
accused-appellants of robbery with homicide and illegal possession
of firearm, thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused Jun Valderama and Edgardo Liad guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals by direct participation of the crime of
robbery with homicide defined and penalized under Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and
hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of Lydia
Cuenca the amount of P50,000.00 for her death, funeral expenses in
the amount of P615,415.00 and moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, plus costs.
Accused Valderama and Liad, are likewise found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of firearms as defined and
penalized under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8294, and hereby sentences each of
them to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and
eleven (11) days to five (5) years, four (4) months and twenty (20)
days of prision correctional [sic].
SO ORDERED.[17]
Accused-appellants thus turn to this Court, contending that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT BOTH
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE CO-CONSPIRATORS OF DECEASED
BAENG AND FELIX FORTEZA.

15 | P a g e

II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING BOTH
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR VIOLATION OF P.D. 1866, AS
AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8294.[18]
The Court finds merit in the second assigned error but not in the
first.
Accused-appellants submit that they were not part of the
conspiracy in thecrime perpetrated against the deceased. They urge
the Court to give credence to their respective accounts negating any
participation in the robbery and death of Lydia Cuenca.
The Court finds that the prosecution established beyond
reasonable doubt the existence of a conspiracy between accusedappellants and the deceased Liberato Quintoa, also known as
Baeng. In conspiracy, direct proof of a previous agreement to commit
a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and
manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the
acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose
and design, concerted action and community of interest.
[19]
Conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during or after the commission of the crime.[20]
The following circumstances immediately before, during and
after the robbery indubitably show that the perpetrators were one in
their purpose to rob Lydia Cuenca: (1) Three (3) men blocked the
Tamaraw FX and banged on the door; [21] (2) One of the men shot the
door of the vehicle, hitting Lydia Cuenca; [22] (3) Another also fired his
gun but hit Manuel Cuencas car instead; [23] (4) One man smashed the
FXs window to gain entry to the FX; [24] (5) The three men then rode
the vehicle to Ilang-Ilang Street;[25] and (6) Thereafter, all of them
alighted the FX and fled in the same direction to the Trans-World
Compound.[26]
Manuel Cuenca positively identified both accused-appellants as
among the participants to the crime. He recognized them at the
police station[27] and pointed at them in open court. [28] On rebuttal, he
stated without any hint of hesitation:

Q. Mr. Witness, accused Jun Valderama testified that on the date

when the crime was committed, he was never present at the
scene of the crime, what can you say to that?
A. It is not true, sir.

Q. Kindly look around if the accused are here.

A. Yes, sir. (Witness pointing to a person sitting on the second row
who identified himself as Jun Valderama and witness pointed
to another person sitting on the first row who identified
himself as Edgardo Liad.)[29]

Q. Why?
xxx
A. Because I saw them.
Q. Where did you see them?

Q. Felix Forteza was not at the scene of the crime at the time of
the incident?

A. They held up my wife and even killed my wife.

A. I saw only three.

Q. Where did this happen?

Q. You saw only three, Jun Valderama, Edgardo Liad and Baeng?

A. Along Commonwealth Avenue corner Don Enrique Heights.

A. Yes, sir.[30]

Q. How far were you when the crime was being committed?
A. I was following them.
Q. Your wife was in the car ahead of you and you were at the
back?
A. Yes, sir, I was at the back.
Q. Mr. Cuenca, Mr. Liad also testified that he never participated in
the commission of the offense on that unfaithful night. What
can you say to that?
A. It is not true, sir.
Q. Why?
A. Because I saw them, they were three.
Q. Can you still remember their faces if you can see them again?
A. Yes, sir.

16 | P a g e

The testimony of Manuel Cuenca identifying accused-appellants

as among the perpetrators of the robbery deserves great weight. The
absence of evidence to show any improper motive why he should
testify falsely against accused-appellants and implicate them in such
a grave crime indicates that there is no such motive and that his
testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. [31] Accused-appellants
self-serving denials cannot prevail over Manuel Cuencas positive
identification. In
weighing
contradictory
declarations
and
statements, greater weight must generally be given to the positive
testimony of the prosecution witnesses than to the denials of the
defendants.[32]
The testimonies of SPO4 Espejon[33] and SPO1 Inamac[34] that the
police engaged in a gunfight in the Trans-World Brokers Compound
where accused-appellants were holed up and thereafter
confiscated paltiks from accused-appellants bolsters the testimony of
Manuel Cuenca that they indeed participated in the robbery of Lydia
Cuenca. According to SPO1 Inamac, Liad even pointed to him where
the victims bag was.[35]
Incidentally, we cannot give much credence to accusedappellant Valderamas claim that the police merely picked him out
from the crowd, handcuffed him to a tricycle, tortured him so he

would admit to the crime, in short, frame him for robbery with
homicide. When police officers have no motive for testifying falsely
against the accused, courts are inclined to uphold the presumption
of regularity in the performance of their duties.[36]

Funeral expenses (Exhibit G) P290,000.00

Interment and gravestone 6,215.00
Cemetery lot 9,050.00

It is true that neither Manuel Cuenca nor Larry Buseron specified

each individual perpetrators location in reference to the vehicle or
their particular acts.Nevertheless, where conspiracy is shown, the
precise extent of participation of each accused in the crime is
secondary and the act of one may be imputed to all the conspirators.

---------------Total funeral and burial expenses P305,265.00

[37]

The decision of the trial court is thus modified accordingly.

The trial court, therefore, did not err in convicting accusedappellants of robbery with homicide. Whenever homicide has been
committed as a consequence or on the occasion of the robbery, all
those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held
guilty as principals for the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, although they did not actually take part in the homicide. [38]

Accused-appellants also contend that the trial court erred in

holding them liable for illegal possession of firearm, a position shared
by the Solicitor General.

With respect to accused-appellants civil liability, the trial court

correctly awarded the heirs of Lydia Cuenca the amount of
P50,000.00 as indemnity for the victims death [39] and P50,000.00 as
moral damages.[40]
The trial court also adjudicated P615,415.00 for funeral
expenses. The trial court did not present in its decision its
computation to justify such amount, although it did refer to Exhibits
G, H and I. Exhibit G is a receipt from La Funeraria Paz for funeral
expenses amounting to P290,000.00. Exhibit H is a receipt from
Heavens Gate Memorial Gardens, Inc. for P5,665.00 as interment fee
and P550.00 for the gravestone.
Exhibit I, on the other hand, is a Deed of Sale dated 10 July 1996
showing that Heavens Gate Memorial Gardens sold to Manuel
Cuenca a Junior Family Estate consisting of 24 lots for the sum of
P217,200.00. The price of one lot, therefore, would cost only
P9,050.00 (P217,200.00 divided by 24 lots).
Adding up the expenses evidenced by Exhibits G, H and I, we
arrive at the following amount:

17 | P a g e

In cases involving illegal possession of firearm, the requisite

elements are: (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the
fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not
have the corresponding license or permit to possess. The latter is a
negative fact that constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense
of illegal possession, and it is the duty of the prosecution not only to
allege it but also to prove it beyond reasonable doubt. [41]The Court
agrees with accused-appellants and the Solicitor General that the
prosecution in this case failed to prove the second element.
The trial court nevertheless justified accused-appellants
conviction for illegal possession of firearm, thus:
As regards the charges of illegal possession of firearms, the Court
finds the accused Valderama and Liad guilty hereof. The prosecution
did not have to prove that they did not have license or authority to
possess firearm because the firearms were Paltik or homemade. In
the case of People vs. Ramos, 222 SCRA 557, the Supreme Court
ruled:
Since a paltik is a homemade gun, it is illegally manufactured and
cannot be issued a license or permit, and hence it is no longer
necessary to prove that it is unlicensed. [42]

The trial court clearly misread People vs. Ramos. The trial courts
rationale was precisely the contention that the Court rejected
in Ramos:
We do not agree with the contention of the Solicitor General that
since a paltik is a homemade gun, is illegally manufactured as
recognized in People vs. Fajardo, and cannot be issued a license or
permit, it is no longer necessary to prove that it is unlicensed. This
appears to be, at first blush, a very logical proposition. We cannot,
however, yield to it because Fajardo did not say that paltiks can in
no case be issued a license or a permit, and that proof that a firearm
is a paltikdispenses with proof that it is unlicensed.

[43]
[45]

The above ruling was reiterated in People vs. Evangelista,

Mallari vs. Court of Appeals,[44] People vs. De Vera, Sr.,
and People vs. Dorimon,[46]and People vs. P02 Rodel Samonte.[47]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon

City is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
In Criminal Case No. Q-96-65118, accused-appellants Edgardo
Liad yBeigar and Jun Valderama y Caspe are hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide and are
sentenced to each suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accusedappellants are ordered to pay in solidumthe heirs of the deceased
Lydia Cuenca the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death,
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P305,265.00 as funeral and burial
expenses.
In Criminal Case Nos. Q-96-65119 and Q-96-65120 for illegal
possession of firearm, accused-appellants are ACQUITTED for
insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.

18 | P a g e

SECOND DIVISION

In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59471, also for estafa, the information charged:

[G.R. Nos. 138535-38. April 19, 2001]

That on or about the month of August, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused conspiring together, confederating with several persons whose true names and
true identities have not as yet been ascertained and helping one another did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud RONALD F[R]EDERI[Z]O Y
HUSENIA in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made to said complainant to
the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and employ complainant
abroad as [a] seaman and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given
the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar
deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said RONALD F[R]EDERI[Z]O Y
HUSENIA to give and deliver, as in fact gave and delivered to said accused the
amount ofP45,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said
accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely to
obtain, as in fact they did obtain the amount of P45,000.00 which amount once in
possession, with intent to defraud complainant wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own personal use and benefit, to
the damage and prejudice of said RONALD F[RE]DERI[Z]O Y HUSENIA in the
aforesaid amount of P45,000.00, Philippine Currency.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUZ GONZALESFLORES, accused-appellant.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77,
Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Luz Gonzalez-Flores guilty of illegal
recruitment in large scale and of three counts of estafa against Felixberto Leongson,
Jr., Ronald Frederizo,[2] and Larry Tibor and sentencing her to suffer four prison terms
and to pay indemnity and damages to complainants.
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59470, the information for estafa against accusedappellant alleged:
That on or about the month of August, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring together, confederating with several persons whose true names and
true identities have not as yet been ascertained, and helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud FELIXBERTO LEONGSON, JR. y
CASTAEDA in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representation which she made to said complainant to
the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and employ complainant
abroad as [a] seaman and could facilitate the processing of the requirements thereof,
and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said
complainant to give and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to said accused the
amount ofP45,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said
accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely to
obtain, as in fact they did obtain the amount of P45,000.00, which amount once in
possession, with intent to defraud FELIXBERTO LEONGSON, JR. wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said complainant in the
aforesaid amount of P45,000.00, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

19 | P a g e

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59472, another case for estafa, the information
averred:
That on or about the month of August, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring together, confederating with several persons whose true names and
whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained and helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud LARRY TIBOR Y MABILANGAN
in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and
fraudulent representations which they made to said complainant to the effect that they
had the power and capacity to recruit and employ complainant abroad as [a] seaman
and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary
amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits,
induced and succeeded in inducing said complainant to give and deliver, as in fact
gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P38,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were
false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as in fact they did obtain the
amount of P38,000.00 which amount once in possession, with intent to defraud

LARRY TIBOR Y MABILANGAN wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of said complainant in the amount of P38,000.00, Philippine
Currency.

replied that he was interested to work abroad but he had doubts regarding his
qualification for the job. Accused-appellant assured him that this was not a problem
because she could fix his application. All he had to do was pay P45,000.00 as
processing fee. Accused-appellant told him that Jojo and Cloyd were departing
soon. Complainant told accused-appellant that he would consider the offer.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. Q-94-59473, the information for illegal
recruitment in large scale charged:
That on or about the month of August, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring together, confederating with several persons whose true names and
whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained and helping one another, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously canvass, enlist, contract and promise
employment to the following persons, to wit:
1. RONALD F[R]EDERI[Z]O Y HUSENIA
2. LARRY TIBOR Y MABILANGAN
3. FELIXBERTO LEONGSON, JR. Y CASTAEDA
after requiring them to submit certain documentary requirements and exacting from
them the total amount of P128,000.00, Philippine Currency, as recruitment fees, such
recruitment activities being done without the required license or authority from the
Department of Labor.
That the crime described above is committed in large scale as the same was perpetrated
against three (3) or more persons individually or as group as penalized under Articles
38 and 39, as amended by P.D. 2018, of the Labor Code.[6]
When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the criminal charges,
whereupon the cases were jointly tried.
The evidence for the prosecution is as follows:
On August 6, 1994, at around 1:00 p.m., complainant Felixberto Leongson, Jr.
chanced upon his neighbors, Cloyd Malgapo, Jojo Bumatay, and accused-appellant,
who were talking in front of his house at 68-C East Riverside, Bgy. Paltok, San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. Complainant was asked by accused-appellant if he
was interested to work as a seaman in Miami, Florida, United States of America. He

20 | P a g e

That night, accused-appellant came to see Felixberto and reiterated her

proposal. Felixberto said he wanted the job but he only had P10,000.00.Accusedappellant told him the amount would be sufficient as an initial payment.
Accused-appellant came back with Joseph Mendoza, whose brother-in-law, Engr.
Leonardo Domingo, according to accused-appellant, was recruiting seamen.
Thereafter, accused-appellant and Mendoza took complainant, Cloyd, and Jojos wife,
Clarita, to a house on Second Street, near Camp Crame in Quezon City, where the
latter were introduced to Andy Baloran.[7] Complainant and his companions were told
that Baloran was an employee of the National Bureau of Investigation and he would
take care of processing the applications for employment. Baloran told complainant and
the other job applicants that those who would be employed would be paid a monthly
salary of US$1,000.00, plus tips, and given vacation leaves of 45 days with
pay. Baloran asked complainant to submit his picture, bio-data, and birth certificate,
which complainant later did.Accused-appellant then asked complainant to give her
the P10,000.00 as initial payment. Complainant handed her the money and asked for a
receipt, but accused-appellant told him not to worry and assured him that she would be
responsible if anything untoward happened. Complainant, therefore, did not insist on
asking accused-appellant for a receipt. Accused-appellant said she gave the money to
Baloran.
Two days later, Baloran and Domingo went to the compound where Felixberto
and accused-appellant were residing and called Felixberto, Cloyd, and Jojo to a
meeting. Domingo told the applicants that he was the chief engineer of the luxury
ocean liner where they would embark and repeated to them the salaries and other
benefits which they would receive. He told them not to get impatient.
Accused-appellant later saw complainant to collect the balance
ofP35,000.00. Complainant was told to give the money to accused-appellant at
Wendys in Cubao, Quezon City on August 12, 1994.
At the appointed date and place, complainant and his wife delivered the amount
to accused-appellant who, in turn, handed it to Baloran. No receipt was, however,
issued to Felixberto.

Another meeting was held on August 16, 1994 at the Mandarin Hotel in Makati
City by accused-appellant, Domingo, Baloran, Mendoza, the Leongson spouses, the
Malgapo spouses, and Jojo Bumatay. The applicants were told by Domingo that they
would be employed as waiters and attendants in the luxury liner and asked them again
to wait a while.
On August 18, 1994, accused-appellant saw complainant again to collect
theP25,000.00 balance. Felixberto paid the amount to accused-appellant four days
later. As in the case of the first two payments, no receipt was given for
theP25,000.00. Accused-appellant told him that she would turn over the amount to
Baloran. Although complainant regularly followed up his application with accusedappellant, he was told each time to have patience and to just wait for the call from
Domingo or from Baloran. But Felixberto never heard from either one of these two.[8]
Felixbertos testimony was corroborated by his wife, Maria Luz, who said that
accused-appellant claimed she could help her husband get a job as a seamen despite
the latters lack of formal training. She knew of the three payments made to accusedappellant, totalling P45,000.00, and witnessed the last two payments of P10,000.00 at
Wendys, Cubao, and P25,000.00 at accused-appellants residence. Maria Luz said she
met Baloran, Mendoza, and Domingo and discussed with them the job offered to her
husband and the salaries and benefits appurtenant thereto.[9]
Complainant Ronald Frederizo, a resident of 68-A East Riverside, San Francisco
del Monte, Quezon City, also testified. According to him, in the morning of August 10,
1994, he received a call from his sister, Elsa Cas, at Far East Bank, Binondo Branch,
Manila, asking him to go home because accused-appellant, their neighbor, was in his
house recruiting seaman for employment abroad. Ronald said that when he arrived
home, he was told by accused-appellant that he had to pay P10,000.00 as initial
payment for the processing of his application. Ronald withdrew the amount from Elsas
account. Then, Ronald went with accused-appellant to a house on Second Street near
Camp Crame in Quezon City. On the way to that place, accused-appellant assured him
that he would receive a salary of US$1,000.00. At an apartment on Second Street,
Ronald saw his neighbors, complainant Felixberto, Jojo, and Cloyd. Baloran and
Mendoza were also there. Accused-appellant introduced Baloran to Ronald, Cloyd,
and Jojo. She told them that Baloran was going to take care of their applications and
that he could pull strings at the NBI. Ronald paid accused-appellant P10,000.00 for
which no receipt was issued. He was assured by accused-appellant that he would be
able to leave for his job abroad in one or two weeks. He was told to be ready with the
balance of P35,000.00 for the plane ticket on August 12, 1994.

21 | P a g e

Hence, on August 15, 1994, Ronald mortgaged his land in Batangas just so he
could pay the P35,000.00 remaining balance. Accused-appellant went to Ronalds
house to meet him. Thereafter, Ronald, Elsa, and accused-appellant took a cab to
Mandarin Hotel in Makati City. Accused-appellant told Ronald to have no fear because
the persons whom he was dealing with were her relatives. Elsa gave the P35,000.00 to
accused-appellant. Ronald no longer asked for a receipt because he trusted accusedappellant. At the hotel were Felixberto and his wife, Baloran, and Domingo. Domingo
showed Ronald and Felixberto his identification card and said that he was the captain
of a ship. He told them that they would receive a salary of US$1,000.00 plus other
benefits. He also assured them that he would inform them of developments in their
applications through accused-appellant. After the meeting, Ronald went to his office
and tendered his resignation. Ronald followed up his application almost every week
but every time he was told by accused-appellant to be patient [10] because Domingo had
not yet called.
Complainant Larry Tibor said that on August 10, 1994, he went to the house of
his cousin, Elsa Cas, at 68-A East Riverside, Bgy. Paltok, San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City, because accused-appellant was there recruiting seamen to work
abroad. Larry was then looking for a job. Accused-appellant introduced herself and
told him that she could get him a job abroad if he had the necessary documents
and P45,000.00. Larry said he had only P3,000.00. He was told by accused-appellant
to bring the amount the next day for his fare and certification.As instructed, Larry
paid the amount in the presence of his sister, Junet. He asked for a receipt, but
accused-appellant told him to trust her. Accused-appellant instructed Larry to prepare
extra money as his initial payment was insufficient.Larry left for the province to get a
loan. He went to accused-appellants house on August 15, 1994 and paid her an
additional amount of P35,000.00. Again, no receipt was issued to him. Thereafter,
accused-appellant took him to Mandarin Hotel where he was introduced to Baloran
and Domingo. Larry kept waiting for a call, but none came. He was later told by
accused-appellant that he could not leave yet because Baloran was sick and he had to
postpone his trip.[11]
Junet T. Lim, Larrys sister, testified that she was present her when brother
paid P3,000.00 to accused-appellant, although no receipt was issued. She stated that
she asked accused-appellant questions to make sure she could help Larry get a job
abroad as a seaman. Janet said accused-appellant was able to convince her that she
could do so. Junet also testified that she accompanied her brother in following up his
job application for about three months until November 1994, when they realized they
had been defrauded by accused-appellant, Domingo, and Baloran.[12]

Realizing that they had been deceived, complainants went to the Baler Police
Station 2 in Quezon City on November 11, 1994 to file their complaints for illegal
recruitment and estafa against accused-appellant, Baloran, Domingo, and Mendoza.
Felixberto executed his sworn statement[13] on the same day, while Ronald and Larry
gave their respective statements[14] on November 12, 1994.

Accused-appellant said that because Domingo, Baloran, and Mendoza did not
make good their promises, accused-appellant filed a complaint for illegal recruitment
and estafa against them on November 7, 1994 in the NBI, including as her cocomplainants Felixberto Leongson, Jr., Ronald Frederizo, Larry Tibor, Eduardo
Sibbalucas, Har Taccad, Romeo Gallardo, Joseph Mendoza, and her son, Noli Flores.
[16]

On November 14, 1994, complainants went to the Philippine Overseas

Employment Administration (POEA) and discovered that accused-appellant and her
companions did not have any license or authority to engage in any recruitment activity.
Felixberto and Ronald asked the court to order accused-appellant to pay them
back the placement fees of P45,000.00 which each of them had paid and moral
damages of P200,000.00 for each of them for the shame, anxiety, and loss of jobs they
suffered. They also sought the reimbursement for litigation expenses they each
incurred, amounting to P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and P500.00 per court
appearance. Larry, on the other hand, sought the recovery of the total amount
of P150,000.00 for placement fee, travelling expenses from the province to Manila to
follow up his application, and the anguish and shame he suffered.[15]
In her defense, accused-appellant Luz Gonzales-Flores, a resident of 68-B East
Riverside, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, testified that she knew Felixberto
Leongson, Jr., who was her neighbor and a nephew of the owner of the house in which
they were staying. She came to know Ronald Frederizo and Larry Tibor through Elsa
Cas. Accused-appellant denied having promised complainants overseas employment
and having collected money from them.According to her, she came to know Andy
Baloran and Engr. Leonardo Domingo through Joseph Mendoza, who referred her and
her son, Noli, to them in connection with their own applications for overseas
employment. She came to know Joseph Mendoza through Elsa Cas and Felixberto
Leongson, Jr.
Accused-appellant claimed that she and Noli agreed to pay Baloran, Domingo,
and Mendoza the total sum of P90,000.00 for their application fees.Since she did not
have enough money to cover the amount, she asked her neighbors and friends to help
her get a loan. Felixberto and his wife offered help and introduced her to Jenny
Tolentino, from whom she got a loan of P15,000.00 guaranteed by Felixbertos
wife. Accused-appellant said she used the amount to pay for her and her sons
recruitment fees. Accused-appellant claimed that she paid the total amount
of P46,500.00 for her recruitment fee in three installments,i.e., P10,000.00 to Mendoza
at her house, P10,000.00, and P16,500.00 to Baloran at the Mandarin Hotel. She
alleged that she also gave them several pieces of jewelry worth P10,000.00. According
to her, no receipts were issued for the money and jewelry she gave.

22 | P a g e

Accused-appellant was investigated by the Baler Police Station 2 on November

11, 1994 as a result of the complaints filed against her by Felixberto, Ronald, and
Larry. Thereafter, she was detained.[17]
On November 24, 1994, she appeared before the NBI accompanied by a
policewoman to comply with the subpoena[18] issued regarding her
complaint.According to NBI Agent Jesus Manapat, accused-appellants complaint was
dismissed for lack of merit.[19]
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court rendered its assailed decision on
November 23, 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused for illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa
in three (3) counts having been proved beyond reasonable doubt, she is hereby
convicted of said crimes and is sentenced:
(1) To suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and pay a fine of P100,000 in Criminal
Case No. Q-94-59473;
(2) To suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS AND
THREE (3) MONTHS of prision correccional, as minimum, and up to TEN (10)
YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs in Criminal Case No. Q94-59470;
(3) To suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS AND
THREE (3) MONTHS of prision correccional, as minimum, and up to TEN (10)
YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs in Criminal Case No. Q94-59471; and
(4) To suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging FOUR (4) YEARS AND THREE
(3) MONTHS of prision correccional, as minimum, and up to NINE (9) YEARS
of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs in Criminal Case No. Q-9459472.

The accused is also directed to pay: (a) Ronald Federi[z]o, the amount ofP45,000.00 as
and by way of actual damages; (b) Felixberto Leongson, Jr.P45,000.00 as and by way
of actual damages; and (c) Larry Tibor, P38,000.00 as and by way of actual damages.
The accused is further directed to pay to the said private complainants moral damages
in the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) each.

The allegation is untenable. Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and
placement as referring to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or
not. The same article further states that any person or entity which, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement.[25]

SO ORDERED.[20]
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant contends thatI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RELYING UPON THE
JURISPRUDENCE AND AUTHORITIES CITED, I.E., PEOPLE VS.
COMIA, PEOPLE VS. MANOZCA, PEOPLE VS. HONRADA,
PEOPLE VS. TAN TIONG MENG, PEOPLE VS. VILLAS AND
PEOPLE VS. SENDON BECAUSE, WITH DUE RESPECT, THE
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES AVAILING IN SAID CASES ARE
DIFFERENT AS IN THE PRESENT CASE; AND
II. [THE LOWER COURT] ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE BASIS OF
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION TAKEN IN
THE LIGHT OF THE UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE OF THE
ACCUSED ON VERY MATERIAL POINTS.[21]
The contentions are without merit.
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59473, accused-appellant was charged with illegal
recruitment in large scale, the essential elements of which are: (1) that the accused
engages in acts of recruitment and placement of workers defined under Art. 13 (b) or
in any of the prohibited activities under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) that the accused
has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to
recruit and deploy workers, either locally or overseas; and (3) that the accused
commits the unlawful acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group.[22]
In these cases, according to the certification of the POEA, accused-appellant had
no license or authority to engage in any recruitment activities. [23] In fact, this was
stipulated at the trial.[24] Accused-appellant claims, however, that she herself was a
victim of illegal recruitment and that she simply told complainants about job
opportunities abroad.

23 | P a g e

The evidence for the prosecution shows that accused-appellant sought out
complainants and promised them overseas employment. Despite their initial reluctance
because they lacked the technical skills required of seamen, complainants were led to
believe by accused-appellant that she could do something so that their applications
would be approved. Thus, because of accused-appellants misrepresentations,
complainants gave her their moneys.Accused-appellants companions, Domingo,
Baloran, and Mendoza, made her ploy even more plausible.
Accused-appellant contends that all she did was to refer complainants to
Domingo, Baloran, and Mendoza. However, under Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code,
recruitment includes referral, which is defined as the act of passing along or
forwarding an applicant for employment after initial interview of a selected applicant
for employment to a selected employer, placement officer, or bureau. [26] In these cases,
accused-appellant did more than just make referrals. She actively and directly enlisted
complainants for supposed employment abroad, even promising them jobs as seamen,
and collected moneys from them.
The failure of complainants to present receipts to evidence payments made to
accused-appellant is not fatal to the prosecution case. The presentation of the receipts
of payments is not necessary for the conviction of accused-appellant. As long as the
prosecution is able to establish through credible testimonies and affidavits that the
accused-appellant was involved in the prohibited recruitment, a conviction for the
offense can very well be justified.[27] In these cases, complainants could not present
receipts for their payment because accused-appellant assured them she would take care
of their money.
It must be remembered that the trial courts appreciation of complainants
testimonies deserves the highest respect since it was in a better position to assess their
credibility.[28] In these cases, complainants testimonies, to the effect that they paid
money to accused-appellant and her companions, Domingo and Baloran, because the
latter promised them overseas employment, were positive, straightforward, and
categorical. They maintained their testimonies despite the lengthy and gruelling crossexamination by the defense counsel. They have not been shown to have any ill motive

to falsely testify against accused-appellant. Naive, simple-minded, and even gullible as

they may have been, it is precisely for people like complainants that the law was made.
Accordingly, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.[29]
In contrast, accused-appellants defense is merely denial. Time and again, this
Court has ruled that denial, being negative evidence which is self-serving in nature,
cannot prevail over the positive identification of prosecution witnesses. [30] Here,
complainants positively identified accused-appellant as one of those who represented
that they could be deployed for overseas work upon payment of the fees.
Accused-appellant claims that she herself had to borrow P15,000.00 from Jenny
Tolentino, guaranteed by Maria Luz Leongson, to defray her own and her sons
application expenses. The claim has no merit. Maria Luz Leongson, who is Felixbertos
wife, testified that accused-appellant sought her help to guarantee a loan to pay the
tuition fees of her daughter and the rent of the apartment in which she and her family
were staying,[31] and not to finance her and her sons overseas job applications.
Accused-appellant likewise testified that she paid in cash a total ofP36,500.00 in
three installments, i.e., P10,000.00 to Mendoza at her house, andP10,000.00
and P16,500.00 to Baloran, at the Mandarin Hotel. This testimony cannot be deemed
worthy of belief. When cross-examined, accused-appellant could not remember the
dates when she allegedly made these payments. For someone who was jobless[32] and
looking for employment, it is very doubtful that she would pay considerable sums of
money to strangers without even remembering at least the month or the year when the
same were supposed to have been paid.
Accused-appellant further contends that if she was indeed a conspirator in the
illegal recruitment transactions with complainants, she would not have filed a
complaint[33] in the NBI against Domingo and Baloran. The complaint was, as already
stated, dismissed and it is apparent that accused-appellant filed the complaint only to
make it appear that she herself had been the victim of swindling and illegal
recruitment. First, the complaint shows that it was filed on November 7, 1994, even
before she was detained at the Baler Police Station 2 upon the sworn statements of
complainants. Complainants were included as complainants in a complaint filed by
accused-appellant. Yet, the complainants were never told, nor did they ever knew, of
the complaint until the trial of these cases. Second, accused-appellant could have
easily told them at least of the complaint because Felixberto Leongson, Jr., Ronald
Frederizo and Elsa Cas, a relative of complainant Larry Tibor, were her immediate
neighbors. Third, it is also noteworthy that despite her claim that she paid P10,000.00
to Mendoza, accused-appellant made the latter a co-complainant in the complaint she
filed with the NBI.

24 | P a g e

More importantly, accused-appellants defense is uncorroborated. Not one of the

persons she included in her complaint to the NBI was ever presented in her defense in
these cases. Nor did she present Domingo, Baloran, or Mendoza to corroborate her
statements. It is probable that had she presented any of these persons, their testimonies
would have been adverse to accused-appellant.[34]
Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary as it may
be deduced from the mode in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the
acts of the accused which point to a joint purpose and design. [35] In these cases, the fact
is that there was conspiracy among accused-appellant, Domingo, and Baloran in
recruiting complainants for employment overseas. The evidence shows that each had a
role in that conspiracy. Domingo posed as a representative of the luxury liner in
recruiting crew for the vessel. Baloran represented himself as the person who would
actually process complainants travel documents, while accused-appellant acted as a
scout for job applicants and a collector of their payments. It was only Mendoza who
did not misrepresent himself as someone capable of helping complainants go abroad
nor collect money from them.[36]
In sum, we are of the opinion that the trial court correctly found accusedappellant guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale. The imposition on accusedappellant of the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00 is thus
justified.
Accused-appellant was likewise found guilty of estafa under Art. 315 (2) (a) of
the Revised Penal Code committed By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by
means of other similar deceits.
Both elements of the crime were established in these cases, namely, (a) accusedappellant defrauded complainant by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit and (b)
complainant suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation as a result.
[37]
Complainants parted with their money upon the prodding and enticement of
accused-appellant on the false pretense that she had the capacity to deploy them for
employment abroad. In the end, complainants were neither able to leave for work
overseas nor did they get their money back, thus causing them damage and prejudice.
[38]

The issues that misappropriation on the part of accused-appellant of the money

paid by complainants and their demand for the same were not sufficiently established
are immaterial and irrelevant, conversion and demand not being elements of estafa
under Art. 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code.
In Criminal Case Nos. Q-94-59470 and Q-94-59471, the amounts involved are
both P45,000.00, as testified to by complainants Felixberto Leongson, Jr. and Ronald
Frederizo. Pursuant to Art. 315, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, and the ruling in People v. Gabres,[39] the trial court correctly meted
accused-appellant the maximum penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor in each
case. This is so considering that the maximum penalty prescribed by law for the felony
is six (6) years, eight (8) months, and 21 days to eight (8) years of prision mayor. The
amounts involved in these cases exceedP22,000.00 by at least P20,000.00,
necessitating an increase of one (1) year for every P10,000.00. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the sentence is thus from six (6) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional. The trial
court can exercise its discretion only within this period. Thus, the minimum penalty
imposed by the trial court should be reduced to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional.
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59472, where the amount involved isP38,000.00, the
indeterminate sentence which should be imposed on accused-appellant should range
from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine
(9) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
In accordance with the ruling in People v. Mercado,[40] the fact that no receipts
were presented to prove the amounts paid by complainants to accused-appellant does
not prevent an award of actual damages in view of the fact that complainants were able
to prove by their respective testimonies and affidavits that accused-appellant was
involved in the recruitment process and succeeded in inveigling them to give their
money to her. The award of moral damages should likewise be upheld as it was shown
to have factual basis.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon
City, finding accused-appellant guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa
against complainants Felixberto Leongson, Jr., Ronald Frederizo, and Larry Tibor is
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATIONS that, in the cases for estafa, accusedappellant is sentenced:

25 | P a g e

(1) In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59470, to suffer a prison term ranging from four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years
of prision mayor, as maximum;
(2) In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59471, to suffer a prison term ranging from four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years
of prision mayor, as maximum; and
(3) In Criminal Case No. Q-94-59472, to suffer a prison term ranging from four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years
of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

mercy, Elijorde stabbed him with a knife on the chest and then fled. Visbal and
his wife brought Hierro to the hospital where he died soon after.

[G.R. No. 126531. April 21, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GILBERT ELIJORDE
y DE LA CRUZ and REYNALDO PUNZALAN y ZACARIAS alias
KIRAT, accused-appellants.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
GILBERT ELIJORDE Y DE LA CRUZ and REYNALDO PUNZALAN Y
ZACARIAS alias Kirat were convicted of murder by the Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan for the killing of Eric Hierro. Both accused were sentenced to death
and ordered jointly and severally to indemnify the heirs of Eric
Hierro P50,000.00 plus P35,000.00 for actual damages,P100,000.00 for moral
damages and P25,000.00 for exemplary damages.The case is now with us on
automatic review.
The records show that at around 6:00 oclock in the evening of 21 May
1995 Eric Hierro, Benjamin Visbal and Rodel Contemplado were drinking in
the house of the latter. Sometime later, Hierro and Visbal went out to buy
mango at a nearby sari-sari store. Accused Gilbert Elijorde, Reynaldo
Punzalan and a certain Edwin Menes were at the time in front of the store. As
Menes approached Hierro the latter warned Menes, Dont touch me, my
clothes will get dirty. Suddenly Menes punched Hierro on the face, followed by
Elijorde who also boxed Hierro on the face, and Punzalan who kicked Hierro at
the back. Hierro and Visbal ran for their lives. They sought shelter at
Contemplados house. After some three (3) minutes, Hierro went out of the
house to go home together with Visbal and the latters wife.
As they walked home, Visbal noticed the accused Elijorde, Punzalan and
Menes waiting for them. As Hierro and company drew near, Punzalan kicked
Hierro at the back for the second time. Visbal tried to retaliate by punching
Punzalan on the face but was held back by his wife.Hierro ran away pursued
by Elijorde. They were followed by Visbal.Elijorde stabbed Hierro at the
back. When Hierro fell down, Elijorde placed himself on top of Hierro who was
now raising his arms defensively and pleading, Maawa na kayo, huwag ninyo
akong patayin, wala akong kasalanan sa inyo. Despite the pleas of Hierro for

26 | P a g e

Dr. Benito Caballero, Medico-Legal Officer of Bocaue, Bulacan,

conducted a post-mortem examination of Eric Hierro, and reported that the
cause of his death was shock resulting from multiple stab wounds in the thorax
penetrating the aorta and vena cava.[1]
Gilbert
Elijorde,
Reynaldo
Punzalan
and
Edwin
Menes
[2]
aliasNonong were accordingly charged in an Information for murder of Eric
Hierro qualified by treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength. But only Elijorde and Punzalan were arrested and tried. Menes has
since remained at large.
Both accused contend that the court a quo erred in finding that treachery
qualified the killing of Hierro to murder, and in finding Punzalan guilty of murder
by reason of conspiracy with Elijorde. The defense argues that Punzalan did
not conspire with Elijorde because the only participation of Punzalan in the
commission of the offense was his kicking of Hierro twice: first, after Hierro
was boxed by Elijorde and Menes in front of the nearby sari sari store, and the
second time, when Hierro was on his way home; that Punzalan remained in
the place where he kicked Hierro and did nothing more; that he did not join or
cooperate with Elijorde in pursuing and stabbing the deceased; and, that the
acts of kicking Hierro were neither in pursuance of the same criminal design of
Elijorde nor done in concert aimed at the attainment of the same objective
of killing Hierro.
Indeed, with respect to accused Reynaldo Punzalan, the Court cannot
assert with moral certainty that he is guilty of murder. To convict him as a
principal by direct participation in the instant case, it is necessary that
conspiracy between him and his co-accused Elijorde be proved. That,
precisely, is wanting in the present case. Conspiracy must be proved as
indubitably as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not
merely by conjecture.[3] To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of
conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity.[4] Hence, conspiracy exists in a situation where at
the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly
showed unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the
death of the victim.[5] In a great majority of cases, complicity was established by
proof of acts done in concert, i.e., acts which yield the reasonable inference

that the doers thereof were acting with a common intent or design. Therefore,
the task in every case is determining whether the particular acts established by
the requisite quantum of proof do reasonably yield that inference. [6]

Q: Now, after that Eric Hierro went home?

Clearly, the testimony of eyewitness Benjamin Visbal narrated the

circumstances surrounding the killing of Hierro, to wit:

Q: How long did Eric Hierro stayed (sic) at that place?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

A: For about three (3) minutes, Your Honor.

Q: Now, you said that Eric Hierro went to the store to buy mango, do you
know the reason why there was a boxing incident?

Q: When Eric Hierro went out you went with him together with Eric Hierro?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: What was the reason?

Q: Together with your wife?

A: When Nongnong approached Eric, Eric stated, "Dont touch me, my

clothes will become dirty."

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: When the three of you went out what happened?

Q: Who is this Nongnong?

A: Edwin Meneses,[7] Your Honor.
Q: When Eric Hierro said that what did Edwin Menes(es ) do?

A: While we were walking home this Kirat (Reynaldo Punzalan) suddenly

kicked Eric Hierro at the back.
Q: Do you mean to say aside from the first incident Kirat kicked Eric Hierro,
(during) the second incident Kirat kicked Eric Hierro?

A: He suddenly punched Eric Hierro.

A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: When Eric Hierro (was) punched what did this Gilbert Elijorde do?
A: Gilbert Elijorde also punched Eric Hierro.
Q: How about Reynaldo Punzalan?

Q: When you were approaching, how many of them were there waiting for
Eric Hierro?
A: The three of them were waiting for Eric Hierro but during the chasing it
was only Gilbert Elijorde who chased us.

A: Reynaldo Punzalan kicked Hierro at the back, Your Honor.

Q; What did Edwin do during the second incident?
Q: That was during the first incident?
A: He did nothing.
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: How about Kirat?
Q: You mean to say they were three at that time?
A: He kicked Eric Hierro at the back.
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: After that what did you do?

27 | P a g e

A: I cant (sic) do anything, Your Honor, because I was being held by my

wife.

Q: And you saw Gilbert stab Eric Hierro?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: How about Eric Hierro what did he do?

Q: How many times?
A: He ran away x x x x
A: Only once, Your Honor.
Q: While Eric Hierro was running did you see that Gilbert stab Eric at the
back?
A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: During those incidents where was Kirat?

A: He did not run after Eric Hierro. He remained in front of the house of my
cousin Rodel.

Q: That was the first stab that was made by Gilbert is that correct?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: What happened to Eric when he was stabbed at the back?
A: He continued running, Your Honor.
Q: And how about Gilbert what did Gilbert do?
A: He continued chasing, Your Honor.
Q: How about your wife where was your wife?
A: At my back, Your Honor.
Q: When you met Eric Hierro at a certain point what did you actually see?
A: That was when I saw Gilbert stab Eric Hierro right on the chest.
Q: And when Eric Hierro was already lying (facing?) up?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: And Gilbert was on top of Eric Hierro?
A: Yes, Your Honor.

28 | P a g e

On the basis of the above testimony, the only involvement of Punzalan

was kicking Hierro at the back before the latter was pursued and stabbed by
accused Elijorde. After kicking the victim, Punzalan remained where he was
and did not cooperate with Elijorde in pursuing Hierro to ensure that the latter
would be killed. There is no other evidence to show unity of purpose and
design between Punzalan and Elijorde in the execution of the killing, which is
essential to establish conspiracy. His act of kicking Hierro prior to the actual
stabbing by Elijorde does not of itself demonstrate concurrence of wills or unity
of purpose and action. For it is possible that the accused Punzalan had no
knowledge of the common design, if there was any, nor of the intended assault
which was committed in a place far from where he was. The mere kicking does
not necessarily prove intention to kill. The evidence does not show that
Punzalan knew that Elijorde had a knife and that he intended to use it to stab
the victim.[8] Neither can Punzalan be considered an accomplice in the crime of
murder. In order that a person may be considered an accomplice in the
commission of the offense, the following requisites must concur: (a) community
of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and, (c) there must
be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the
person charged as accomplice. The cooperation that the law punishes is the
assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered which cannot exist without
previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore
required in order to be liable either as a principal by indispensable cooperation
or as an accomplice that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the
principal by direct participation. There is nothing on record to show that
accused Punzalan knew that Elijorde was going to stab Hierro, thus creating
serious doubt on Punzalans criminal intent.[9]

In the absence of a previous plan or agreement to commit a crime, the

criminal responsibility arising from different acts directed against one and the
same person is individual and not collective, and that each of the participants
is liable only for his own acts.[10] Consequently, accused Punzalan must be
absolved from all responsibility for the killing of Hierro.It may be emphasized
that at the time accused Elijorde intervened in the assault, Punzalan had
already desisted from his own acts of aggression.He did nothing in fact to
assist Elijorde in the immediate commission of the murder. Moreover, the act of
kicking by Punzalan prior to the actual stabbing by Elijorde was evidently done
without knowledge of the criminal design on the part of the latter as that design
had not yet been revealed prior to the killing of Hierro.
As regards the kicking of the victim by Punzalan, which the latter admits,
there is nothing on record to show that the kicking resulted in any injury on any
part of the body of Hierro. Neither is there any evidence that the victim was hit
at all when Punzalan kicked him. Of what then can Punzalan be held liable?
With regard to the principal accused Gilbert Elijorde, the trial court
correctly ruled that treachery attended the killing of Hierro thus qualifying the
crime to murder. Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the
crimes against person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. The
fact that a verbal confrontation accompanied by physical assault by the group
of Elijorde preceded the actual killing did not negate the treacherous character
of the stabbing which resulted in the death of Hierro. After the first physical
assault which sent Hierro retreating and seeking shelter in the house of a
friend, the victim did not expect that the accused would persist in inflicting
harm upon him who, unaware of the impending danger, proceeded home with
his friends. Unfortunately, however, Elijorde was waiting for the deceased and
pursued him to his end. After stabbing Hierro at the back, and if only to ensure
the success of his criminal design, accused Elijorde persistently chased his
unarmed quarry until he finally overpowered his victim and delivered the fatal
stab on his chest. In one case, treachery was present where the accused
stabbed the victim with a bladed weapon even as his hands were raised
and he was pleading for mercy.[11] In another case where the accused who was
armed with a revolver had an altercation with the victim, fired at him, pursued
him, and when cornered he (victim) threw himself on thefloor, raised his hands
and begged the defendant not to shoot him as he was already wounded, but
the malefactor just the same shot him thrice, we held that there was treachery
in the killing.[12]

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We likewise agree with the trial court when it disregarded the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength alleged
in the Information. No sufficient evidence exists to show that the requisites of
evident premeditation were present, to wit: (a) the time when the offender
decided to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that he had clung
to his determination to commit it; and, (c) a sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and the execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences
of his act and for his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he
desired to hearken to its warnings. [13] Where there is no showing that the
accused Elijorde prior to the night of the commission of the crime resolved to
kill the victim nor proof that such killing was the result of meditation, calculation
or resolution on his part, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated against
him.[14] Moreover, the time interval of three (3) minutes between the first and
the second assault on Hierro is too brief to have enabled Elijorde to ponder
over what he intended to do with Hierro.The circumstance of abuse of superior
strength is absorbed in treachery; hence, it cannot be appreciated as an
independent aggravating circumstance when treachery is already present. [15]
The penalty for murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by RA 7659 is reclusion perpetua to death. As regards the accused
Gilbert Elijorde, the killing although qualified by treachery was not attended by
any generic modifying circumstance; consequently, the penalty to be imposed
upon him must be the indivisible penalty ofreclusion perpetua.[16] With respect
to the accused Reynaldo Punzalan, he should be acquitted of the crime
charged for insufficiency of evidence.
Although not objected to by the accused, we modify the award of
damages adjudged by the court a quo in favor of the heirs of the victim,
particularly with regard to the moral and exemplary damages. The award
of P100,000.00 for moral damages may seem excessive considering the
purpose of the award which is not to enrich the heirs but to compensate them
for injuries to their feelings.[17] For this reason, an award ofP50,000.00 may be
adequate and reasonable.[18] The exemplary damages awarded by the trial
court may be deleted since they are granted only when the crime is committed
with one (1) or more aggravating circumstances. In the instant case, treachery
may no longer be considered as an aggravating circumstance since it was
already taken as a qualifying circumstance in the murder, and abuse of
superior strength which would otherwise warrant the award of exemplary
damages was already absorbed in the treachery.[19] But the indemnity for death
fixed at P50,000.00 and the actual damages representing uncontested funeral
expenses of P35,000.00 should be affirmed.

On the part of accused Reynaldo Punzalan as there is no finding of

criminal responsibility against him, only accused Gilbert Elijorde should bear
the liability for such civil indemnity as well as the actual and moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED.Accused
GILBERT ELIJORDE y DE LA CRUZ is found GUILTY of MURDER and is
accordingly
sentenced
to reclusion
perpetua. Accused
REYNALDO
PUNZALAN y ZACARIAS is ACQUITTED of the crime charged and is ordered
RELEASED FROM CUSTODY IMMEDIATELY unless legally held for another
cause. In this regard, the Director of Prisons is directed to report to the Court
his compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof. Accused
ELIJORDE is solely held responsible for the payment to the heirs of the victim
Eric Hierro the amounts of P50,000.00 for civil indemnity, P35,000.00 for
actual damages and P50,000.00 for moral damages.
SO ORDERED.

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FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121039-45. January 25, 1999]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.MAYOR ANTONIO
L. SANCHEZ, GEORGE MEDIALDEA, ZIOLO AMA, BALDWIN
BRION, LUIS CORCOLON, ROGELIO CORCOLON, and PEPITO
KAWIT, accused-appellants.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
. . . a plot seemingly hatched in hell . . .
This was how Judge Harriet O. Demetriou [1] of the Pasig City Regional Trial
Court, Branch 70, in her 132-page Decision dated March 11, 1995 now before us on
review, emphatically described the Allan Gomez-Eileen Sarmenta rape-slay that drew
strong condemnation from an outraged populace in the middle of 1993.After a
protracted and grueling 16-month trial, she found all those charged therewith, namely:
Calauan Mayor Antonio Sanchez (hereafter the Mayor), George Medialdea, Luis and
Rogelio Corcolon, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit (appellants herein),
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide on seven counts
and sentenced each one of them:
. . . to suffer the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the seven offenses
or a total of seven reclusion perpetua for each accused. In addition, the Court hereby
orders all the accused to jointly and severally pay the victims respective families the
following sums by way of civil indemnity:
1. the sum of P3,432,650.00 representing the actual damages sustained
by the Sarmenta family;
2. the sum of P3,484,000.00 representing the actual damages sustained
by the Gomez family;
3. the sum of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages sustained by the
Sarmenta family;
4. the sum of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages sustained by the Gomez
family;
5. the sum of P191,000.00 as attorneys fees and litigation expenses
incurred by the Gomez family; and
6. the sum of P164,250.00 for litigation expenses incurred by the
Sarmenta family.
As to the antecedents, appellants all appear to agree that the trial court, in the
very words of counsel[2] who prepared the consolidated brief for the Mayor and
Medialdea, made a very detailed summary of both the prosecution and defense
evidence.[3] This Court can thus conveniently provide a briefer but fairly accurate
account of the respective versions of the State and the defense on the basis of the trial
courts summary, rather than combing the heap of evidence presented by both sides.
The prosecutions version of the events on that horrible night of June 28, 1993
was based mainly on the recollections of its star witnesses Aurelio Centeno and
Vicencio Malabanan (a member of appellant Sanchez security team) co-conspirators
turned state witnesses. Both admitted having taken part in the abduction of Eileen and
Allan, but denied any personal involvement in the rape of Eileen and the twin killings
that followed. Heres their story.
Medialdea (then the Deputy Chief of the PNP Calauan), together with Centeno
who was driving an ambulance, fetched witness Malabanan at his residence in the

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early morning of June 28, 1993 on the pretext that they will apprehend one Rodolfo
Calva alias Tisoy a notorious gun runner and drug pusher in the locality. Next to be
picked up was Ama in Barangay Masiit, then Luis Corcolon (hereafter, Luis) in
Barangay Mabacan. On board the ambulance, the five (5) men made stopovers in
Barangays Imok and Wawa until they headed back for Calauan at past 7:00 oclock in
the evening, upon orders of Luis.
At the Shell gas station in the poblacion of Calauan, the five (5) men met and
picked up Rogelio Corcolon (hereafter, Boy), Kawit and Brion, then they proceeded to
Los Baos. Along the way, Luis announced to the group that the real purpose behind the
Los Baos trip is to take a pretty young lass long desired by the Mayor and offer her to
him as a gift. Luis, to satisfy his companions curiosity, even guaranteed that her beauty
will make their saliva drip.
Not for long, the ambulance arrived at the U.P. Los Baos grounds. Witness
Centeno drove the ambulance around the campus at a snails pace while Luis scoured
the area with watchful eyes. As the search inside the campus proved fruitless, Luis
then ordered Centeno to slowly drive out of the university compound and to stop upon
reaching the vicinity of the Agrix complex. Luis, Boy, Ama, Brion and Kawit alighted
from the ambulance and went inside the Agrix complex. Witness Centeno overheard
Medialdea informing the Boss, via the radio, that they were already in the area. The
Boss was the Mayor.
Inside the Agrix complex is a restaurant called Caf Amalia. Parked in front of that
establishment was a Tamaraw van. Eileen and Allan were its passengers, both
occupying the front seats. She was wearing a T-shirt, white shorts and rubber
shoes. Armed with guns, Luis and Boy approached Eileen and Allan, forcibly took the
two and loaded them at the back of the van. All the appellants boarded the van while
Centeno and Malabanan stayed in the ambulance. Both vehicles then headed for Erais
Farm situated in Barangay Curba, owned by the Mayor.
As soon as the group arrived at the farm, the two (2) captives were brought down
the van. Eileen was gagged by a handkerchief and her hands, like Allan, were tied. A
white towel was wound around Allans mouth. The Mayor, then wearing a jogging
attire, emerged from the resthouse and asked the group: My children, whats the
problem? To this Luis respondent: Mayor, this is our gift to you, the girl youve been
longing for. Shes really beautiful. But whos that man? asked the Mayor. Eileens
companion, boss. Medialdea replied. We brought him along to avoid complications, he
continued.
The two youngsters were then brought inside the resthouse where Eileen was
taken to the Mayors room. Allan was badly beaten up by Luis, Boy, Ama and
Medialdea and thereafter thrown out of the resthouse. Kawit followed-up by striking
Allans diaphragm with the butt of an armalite, causing Allan to fall against a cement
box. Brion thought Allan was already dead, but Kawit said: :His death will come later.
Meanwhile, Centeno, while waiting for further orders, joined the Mayors
personal aides Edwin Cosico and Raul Alorico watch television at the adjacent
resthouse. Alorico told Centeno that the Mayor had been eagerly waiting for the group
and worried that they will not arrive.
At around 1:00 a.m. of the next day, a crying Eileen was dragged out of the
resthouse by Luis and Medialdea her hair disheveled, mouth covered by a
handkerchief, hands still tied and stripped of her shorts. The Mayor, clad merely in
white polo, appeared and thanked Luis and Medialdea for the gift. I am through with

her. Shes all yours, the Mayor uttered in contentment. When asked what will happen to
Allan, Medialdea assured the Mayor that they will also kill him for full
measure. Eileen and Allan were then loaded in the Tamaraw van by the appellants and
headed for Calauan, followed closely by the ambulance.
En route to Calauan, Centeno, who was driving the ambulance, noticed the van
swaying from side to side. Then he heard gunfire coming therefrom. The van pulled
over whereupon Kawit dragged Allan, whose head was already drenched in blood, out
of the vehicle onto the road and finished him off with a single gunshot from his
armalite. The ambulance and van then sped away.
The next destination was a sugarcane field in Sitio Paputok, Kilometro 74 of
Barangay Mabacan. It was here that Luis announced that its tiime for the group to feast
on Eileen (the exact words of Luis were Turbohin na rin natin ang tinurbo ni
Boss). She was laid at the back of the van, with her hands and legs being held by the
appellants while waiting for their turn. Then the gang-rape began. The first to ravish
Eileen was Luis, then Medialdea, Boy, Ama, Brion and finally, Kawit. Bewailing the
helplessness of her situation, Eileen pleaded, in between sobs and whimpers, for the
torture to stop. However, her tears for compassion fell, weak and ineffective, upon the
insensitive brutes. Kawit invited Centeno to join the sexual fiasco but the latter refused
as he cannot, in conscience, bear the bestiality being committed on Eileen who
appeared to be dead. After Kawits turn, Eileen knelt on the seat of the van and begged
for her life. Unmoved, Luis muted Eileens cried by forcing an object into her mouth
and then fired his baby armalite at her. Centeno was thereafter ordered to get rid of
Eileens dead body. Moments later, all eight (8) men boarded the ambulance and
proceeded to Calauan, leaving the Tamaraw van with Eileens remains behind.Along
the way, Centeno and Malabanan watched in dismay as Luis, Boy, Medialdea, Ama,
Brion and Kawit savored the nights escapade, to their sickening delight. Appellants
and Malabanan were then brought to their respective homes by Centeno.
June 29, 1993 and the day following were tense moments for the group. In the
morning of June 29, Medialdea and Centeno fetched Malabanan, Luis and Ama. They
were going to Barangay Imok to make it appear that they were conducting some police
operations in that area. Upon reaching Barangay Imok, the group saw Allans body
which they dumped a few hours earlier. Luis, Medialdea and Malabanan alighted from
the ambulance, whereupon Luis ordered Centeno to drive back to the municipal hall.
Boy Corcolon, who was at the municipal hall, informed Ama that a dead female
loaded inside a Tamaraw van was found in Barangay Mabacan. Ama then radioed the
PNP Chief of Calauan, Major Cao, who at that time was summoned by the
Mayor. Major Cano thereafter arrived and ordered one SPO2 Melencio Nuez to
investigate the matter. Meanwhile, Centeno received word that he was to fetch
Malabanan, Luis and Medialdea in Barangay Imok. After picking up the three (3),
Centeno drove the ambulance to Barangay Mabacan where the dead Eileen was found.
Eileens body lying inside the Tamaraw van was a pitiful sight. Her face bore a
gunshot wound; a handkerchief was stuffed in her mouth; her T-shirt was rolled up
revealing her breasts; and her panty was rolled down on one of her feet still with
rubber shoes on. Medialdea covered Eileens exposed private parts by fixing her T-shirt
and underwear and by placing a sackcloth over her lower body. The group then
escorted the van with Eileens body in it, to the UP Los Baos police station where
student milled around and identified the cadaver to be Eileen indeed. Later on, the van

32 | P a g e

carrying Eileen, as well as Allans body, was brought to the Calauan municipal
hall. There, Centeno saw a prisoner named Arnold cleaning the van.
Meanwhile, Malabanan, Ama and Medialdea, on June 29, went to the site (Bgy.
Imok) where Allans body was found, started asking residents about the incident and
were able to retrieve an empty armalite shell. Malabanan thereafter handed the empty
shell to Major Cao at the police station. The three (3) men and one SPO3 Rizaldy
Belen, sometime in the afternoon of the same day, visited the Mayor at his house in
Bay, Laguna. Medialdea informed the Mayor of the presence of people from the CIS,
NBI and press in the locality. The Mayor flared up and blamed them for not using their
heads. But he later on assured them that he could fix the problem in less the amount of
a brand new car.
The following day, June 30, Medialdea, upon the Mayors directive, handed a pair
of white walking shorts to Major Cao. When Malabanan asked Medialdea whose pair
of shorts was that, the latter replied that it was the short of Eileen which the Mayor
wanted to be delivered to Major Cao.
That same day of June 30, Centeno went to see the Mayor at his house in Calauan
about his worries over reports that the driver of the ambulance involved in the rapeslay was being hunted down. The Mayor gave Centeno P2,000.00 and advised him to
keep silent or better yet, to go into hiding. Centeno did hide himself until CIS agents
accosted him at the Divisoria market on August 10, 1993. As to Malabanan, he,
Medialdea and Ama were brought to the PNP Sta. Cruz Command to shed light on the
cleaning of the Tamaraw van.
Coming now to the defense, each of the appellants had an alibi to tell and sought
to put the blame on Kit Alqueza, the son of a feared general (Dictador Alqueza) who
earned the monicker Barako from the local residents.
The Mayor claimed that he was at the residence of his mistress Elvira in Bay,
Laguna in the morning of June 28, 1993. They left for Makati City at about 1:00
oclock in the afternoon thereafter proceeded to San Pablo City at around 4:00 p.m., left
that city at 7:30 p.m. and then returned to Elviras house in Bay at around 10:00
p.m. He and Elvira retired at around 12:30 in the morning. He woke up at 5:00 a.m.
Jogging was his favorite form of exercise, but foul whether prevented him from
running that morning. His three (3) children with Elvira greeted him at around 6:30
a.m. before heading for school. He took his breakfast and lunch at Elviras house.
Medialdea, Ama and Malabanan arrived between 1:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m. and
informed the Mayor of the rape-slay in which Kit Alqueza was the prime suspect. This
made the Mayor very angry, for which he ordered a thorough investigation of the
incident to avoid any whitewash. "I will not hesitate to have the perpetrators of this
crime killed (by electric chair), whether a generals son in involved or not, son of a
bitch!, he blurted. The Mayor then advised appellants not to worry if they were really
innocent and that the primordial concern is that a full investigation be conducted.
The Mayor then went to his residence in Calauan. At around 4:00 p.m. of that
same day (June 29), he sent his driver Mario Puyales to Barangays Masiit and
Balayhangin to inquire from the residents about the crime. Puyales returned at around
7:00 p.m. and informed the Mayor that a card gambler was able to retrieve a pair of
white shorts lying near the national highway in Barangay Balayhangin. Puyales was
sent back to that barangay to advise the residents thereof to keep the shorts at their
fence near the highway as it may later on aid the on-going investigation.

In the morning of June 30, 1993, the Mayor, with some companions, jogged
towards the direction of Barangay Mabacan and at the same time inquired from
residents whether they noticed anything unusual on the night of June 28, 1993. A
certain Mang Torio told the Mayor that he found a pair of maong pants lying at the
side of the road but left if there. After inspecting the dirty maong pants, the Mayor
instructed Mang Torio to keep the pants as the former will send someone back to pick
it up.
Eventually, the Mayor got hold of the pairs of white shorts and maong pants.The
shorts was clean, with complete beltloops and without any tear. He then ordered his
driver Puyales to send the articles to Medialdea for safekeeping. But during the trial,
the Mayor, when shown the shorts and pants, claimed that they are quite different from
the articles he got hold of previously. The maong pants shown to him by Mang Torio
was of a darker shade of blue. As to the white shorts, it was the same pair he gave to
Medialdea, but now it is torn and has some missing beltloops.
Based on his own investigation, the Mayor came to know that Kit Alqueza is a
feared and dangerous student of the university, being a member of an elite fraternity in
the campus and a generals son at that. The Mayor later informed Congressman
Tingzon of Kits probable involvement in the crime. Congressman Tingzon, in turn,
disclosed that Kit, his nephew-in-law (the congressmans wife is the sister of Gen.
Alquezas wife), was hiding in his house and that the legislator will call Gen. Alqueza
in Davao City to discuss the matter.
The Mayor also testified that he closely coordinated with Major Cao in
investigating the case. This included frequent evening conferences with Malabanan,
medialdea and Ama who were members of Major Caos investigation team.
Subsequently, the Mayor was requested to facilitate the surrender of Luis and
Boy Corcolon to Camp Crame since the CIS suspected them of being involved in the
crime together with Kit. The Corcolon brothers, accompanied by the Mayor,
peacefully surrendered to CIS operatives in the afternoon of July 12, 1993.
On August 10, 1993, the Mayor received an anonymous phone call advising him
that he would better leave the country because he was to be arrested in three (3) days
time. He refused to heed the advice because he had nothing to do with the crime. And
so he was apprehended on August 13, 1993 at his Calauanresidence and brought to
Camp Vicente Lim where he was presented to the media. There he saw Centeno and
Malabanan who did not greet him. General Salimbangon ordered the two (2) witnesses
to implicate the Mayor. The general then ordered that the Mayor be handcuffed as he is
the rapist. You son of a bitch, Salibangon. You framed me up, the Mayor cursed.
The Mayor denied having given Centeno advice and P2,000.00 pocket money on
June 30, 1993. It was only in the courtroom that he saw Centeno, although he knows
the latter. The Mayor also denied Malabanans testimony implicating him in the
crime. In fact, Malabanan wrote him letters asking for his help. The trial court noted,
however, that the letter adverted to by the Mayor were all addressed to Judge Baldo.
Appellant Medialdea was Calauan policeman until his summary dismissal on
September 10, 1993. He claimed that he, being a member of a crack team formed by
Major Cao and composed of Malabanan, Luis and Ama, was preoccupied the whole
day of June 28, 1993 conducting police operations on board an ambulance in different
barangays of the town in search of Tisoy. The fruitless operations ended at about 9:00
p.m. of June 28. Driving the ambulance, he got home at around 10:30 p.m. where he

33 | P a g e

saw his wife playing mahjong with some friends. Medialdea joined the players for
about an hour, then he slept until 5:00 a.m. of the next day (June 29).
The crack team met again in the morning of June 29, 1993 to continue the
manhunt for Tisoy. At around 7:15 a.m. in Barangay Imok, they saw Tisoy speed by in
a motorcycle. Medialdea and Luis fired shots in the air but Tisoy managed to
escape. Centeno was not present when this event transpired because he was instructed
to go to the municipal hall with the ambulance.
Upon hearing news over the radio that a dead body was found at Sitio Paputok,
Km. 74, Barangay Mabacan, Medialdea radioed Centeno to fetch the group at the
fishpond of one Gani. As soon as Centeno arrived at around 8:00 a.m., they proceeded
to Km. 74 where they saw Eileens body inside the van parked in the sugarcane
field. Major Cao and several policemen were already there. Medialdea had to pull
down Eileens T-shirt and roll up her underwear to spare her from numerous kibitzers
staring at her naked body. He recovered several scattered items inside the van like
cigarette packs, a paddle, spike shoes, and 5 bottles of beer. The van was then driven
by a certain Gener to the UP Los Baos escorted by the ambulance and Major Caos
police car.
Thereafter, at around 9:30 a.m., Medialdea, on Major Caos directive, went to the
Gomez residence and asked for Allan. The maid told him that Allan has not come
home since the night before and that she last saw him at around 6:30 p.m. with one Jet
Tejada. As there was no other person inside the house except the maid, Medialdea,
with her permission, searched for Allan inside but to no avail.Before leaving, he
instructed the maid to tell Allan that he better make good his hiding because Allan is a
suspect in the crime. At the Tejada residence, Jet was neither there. So Medialdea
proceeded to the boarding house of Eileen and instructed the landlady to inform calmly
Eileens parents on what had happened to their daughter.
Medialdea then returned to the UP Los Baos security force where he told Major
Cao that Allan had escaped. Before leaving UP campus to bring Eileens body to
Calauan, Major Cao ordered Medialdea to still look for Allan. When his efforts to find
Allan inside the campus proved futile, Medialdea sought the aid of Barangay Captain
Cesar Ruiz who brought him to the barangay hall where Jet Tejada was. Tejada
strongly objected to Medialdeas insinuation of his and Allans participation in the
crime, saying that they can never do anything as dastardly as that.
Afterwards, a certain Allan, a barangay tanod, volunteered that he knew
Allan. This Allan opines that if Allan was dead then Kit had a hand on it since Allan
had earned Kits ire when the former began dating the latters girlfriend named
Rose. Medialdea informed Major Cao that Allan perhaps has gone to Manila with his
father. The Major replied that Allan is here, but is likewise dead.
Ama then informed Major Cao that they have a suspect named Kit who had an
axe to grind against Allan. Then someone in the crowd uttered Ako iyon. Kit
approached and told Ama that he and Allan had patched up their differences three (3)
months ago. Medialdea noticed a drop of blood on the middle of Kits right thigh. Kit
explained that the blood oozed after punching a wall with his right knuckle.
At the municipal hall, Ama handed an empty armalite shell recovered from the
site where Allans body was found. Thereafter, Arnold (the prisoner who was cleaning
the van) was seen carrying the rubber matting of the Tamaraw van to hang it over the
municipal fence to dry. Ama could not help but curse Arnold and ordered the latter to
bring it back. Ama explained to Major Cao that they could be dragged to the case just

like what happened to the policeman in the Paraaque massacre who burned a mosquito
net and was thereafter sacked.
Medialdea also testified that it was Major Cao who ordered the cleaning of the
van to diffuse the stench caused by the blood stains therein.
Then on July 6, 1993, Medialdea, together with Ama and Malabanan, went to the
PNP Sta. Cruz Command to answer queries about the cleaning of the van.They were
then brought to Canlubang where they executed their respective sworn
statements. Medialdea also recalled that Major Cao instructed them not to say anything
about the cleaning of the van. Afterwards, they were brought back to the PNP Sta.
Cruz and detained therein pending the filing of formal charges against them.
Major Cao visited Medialdea the next day, July 7. The major advised him that
they should just point to Malabanan as the one who cleaned the van.Medialdea did not
heed his advice for he pitied Malabanan and besides, it was Major Cao who really
ordered its cleaning. The major then reiterated the reason why he caused its cleaning
(the unbearable stench of blood).
Days later, on July 16, 1993, Medialdea and Ama, together with Malabanan, were
brought to the Department of Justice where Fiscal Abesamis asked them to sign a
waiver of their detention. On July 24, 1993, the three (3) men were led back to PNP
Canlubang where Colonels Gualberto and Tiangco began investigating then on July
27, 1993. During the investigation, Medialdea was being enticed by Col. Gualberto to
cooperate with the government by testifying against the Mayor, as there is an order
from the higher echelon to bring the Mayor down. He refused, saying that the Mayor is
completely innocent because he is pro-poor and the Mayor even walks the church aisle
on his knees. Col. Gualberto threatened that he will be dragged all the more to the case
if he will not cooperate. Medialdea begged for mercy and suggested that they should
investigate Kit instead. The colonel said that messing up with Kit is like ramming into
a wall. Medialdea was then asked to sign a statement that contained inaccurate
answers. The inaccuracies were supplied by Col. Gualberto.
Medialdea also professed his ignorance before Col. Tiangco. This colonel was
less diplomatic. He splashed coffee on Medialdeas face, cursed him and whipped his
face. So was Malabanan. The investigators would hit then when they try to
reason. Back to his cell, Medialdea heard Col. Tiangco order somebody to have him
killed in the evening.
On August 13, 1993, one Colonel Versoza advised Medialdea to follow
Malabanan in testifying against the Mayor. They will be placed under the Witness
Protection Program where they would be entitled to allowances, free housing facilities
and the chance to go abroad with their families where they can live peacefully, Col.
Versoza assured them. Medialdea refused once again.Malabanan therafter informed
him that he and Centeno had already given false statements for they can no longer
stand the torture inflicted on them. But Medialdea stood pat with his refusal, for he
cannot testify falsely against his companions just to free himself. It is still better to live
than to die a martyr, Malabanan answered.
We now to go appellant Luis Corcolons story which painted the Kit Alqueza
angle in greater detail. In the morning of June 25, 1993, three (3) men went to Luis
residence in Barangay Mabacan. They told Luis that their boss, Edgardo Lavadia alias
Uod, wanted to see him the next day. Lavadia is a very generous friend of Luis for so
many years who, as a professional forger of checks, is being protected by General
Alqueza.

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Luis arrived at Lavadias house at around 2:00 p.m. of June 26. There he saw Kit
and Lavadias men. Lavadia requested him to abduct and kill Allan because the latter
has done something wrong to Kit. Luis asked what Allans fault was and then suggested
that if its just a small squabble, they better forgive Allan. Lavadia insisted, but Luis
appeared hesitant since it might put him in big trouble. Lavadia tempered his request
by asking Luis to merely help in getting rid of the body.Luis agreed. He and Lavadia
were to meet again on June 28, 1993 in the Bay cockpit. After this, Luis left.
Luis was also a member of the team formed by Major Cao to hunt down
Tisoy. At around 8:30 in the morning of June 28, 1993, he was fetched by Medialdea,
Ama, Malabanan and proceeded to Barangay Imok on board the ambulance driven by
Centeno to apprehend Tisoy. At around 1:00 p.m., Luis left the group and went to Bay
cockpit to meet Lavadia, as agreed upon the previous day. When he arrived at the
cockpit, only Lavadias men were there. Luis then asked one of the men to tell Lavadia
that he is backing out of the agreement. He first attended the derby being held at the
cockpit before returning to Barangay Imok at around 5:00 p.m. and re-joined the
team. They left Barangay Imok at around 7:30 p.m. and proceeded to Barangay Wawa,
San Pablo City where they stayed for about two (2) hours waiting for Tisoy. Sensing
that Tisoy would not be passing by, the team headed back for Calauan. Luis was driven
home first and reached his house at around 9:30 p.m. A certain Ernesto Bustillo was
waiting for him to borrow his passenger jeepney. Thereafter, Luis slept at around 10:30
p.m.
At around 4:45 a.m. of the next day (June 29) while Luis was preparing the
breakfast of his children, a Tamaraw van, driven by Kit, stopped in front of his house
honking its horn continuously. Four (4) motorcycle-riding men, each wearing bonnet
masks and maong jackets, escorted the van. Kit sought his help in burying at once the
dead female body inside the van. Luis inspected the van and saw a naked corpse of a
woman. He refused Kits summons after which Luis immediately returned to his house,
turned off the lights and closed door for fear that Kits escorts would shoot him. The
convoy then headed towards the direction of Sitio Paputok, Km. 74.
At about 6:30 a.m., Luis, Centeno, Medialdea and Malabanan met and continued
their surveillance of Tisoy at Barangay Imok. They saw Tisoy pass by at around 7:10
a.m. but were not able to apprehend him. The group thereafter went to Ganis fishpond
at about 8:30 a.m. then proceeded to Km. 74 to verify reports of a females death. There
they saw the Tamaraw van with a dead woman inside. Luis recognized the vehicle as
that driven by Kit hours earlier, but he kept silent. The group then brought the van to
the UP Los Baos campus.
In the morning if June 30, 1993, Luis met the Mayor. The latter instructed him to
investigate on who dumped Eileens body at Km. 74. Luis obliged and said that he will
make a report within a week. He, however, did not tell the Mayor about Kits
involvement in the crime.
On July 7, 1993, CIS agents of Canlubang raided his house during his absence
thereat. The agents, his wife said, planted a gun inside. The next day, Luis read in the
papers that a P100,000.00 reward has been offered for his and brother Boys capture.
He rushed to the Mayor who advised him to remain quiet.
In the afternoon of July 12, 1993, Luis went to Boys house upon being
summoned by the Mayor who was with General Quizon and Colonel Hilario. He and
Boy were brought to Camp Crame for interview. After the interview, the CIS took their
sworn statements. The answers therein, Luis said, were furnished by the agents. He

signed the statement out to fear without the assistance of a lawyer of his own
choice. For several days, he was investigated by PACC agents. Then on or July 20,
1993, he and Boy were transferred to CIS Canlubang and were interrogated by Col.
Tiangco who repeatedly manhandled and cursed him. Luis insisted on his innocence
and suggested that it is Kit who they should investigate.After the interview, Luis was
tortured by way of water treatment, denied of food and was not allowed to receive
visitors. In the afternoon of June 28, 1993, Luis was brought before the PACC where
he was again manhandled during the 2-hour interrogation. He answered yes to all the
questions hurled at him because he was already dizzy. He was also informed that
Lavadia had already executed a statement saying that the latter paid him.
On August 1, 1993 at the PACC-TFH office, General Quizon was forcing him to
testify against the Mayor. He was also interviewed by media afterwhich, he was
brought back to his cell where he met Lavadia. He cursed and strangled Lavadia. Luis
suggested that they should now tell the truth about Kits involvement, but Lavadia
advised him to remain silent because reprisal from General Alqueza would be far
worse. Luis was detained at the PACC until the start of the trial. He also filed a
complaint for torture before the Commission on Human Rights.
Boy Corcolon testified that he never left house on the night of June 28, 1993. He
woke up at around 7:00 a.m. of the next day and proceeded to the Calauan police
station on his motorcycle upon being informed of the discovery of a dead female in
sitio Paputok, Km. 74. After going to the municipal building where he saw Ama,
Major Cao and Judge Baldo, Boy followed Major Cao and his men in going to Km.
74. There he saw the naked body of the dead woman inside the van. Boy thereafter
followed the van to the UP compound. Moments later, the van was brought to Calauan
municipal hall compound. He did not stay in the municipal hall, but went straight
home instead.
The CIS agents raided his house on July 7, 1993. The next day, Boy read in the
papers that he and his brother Luis were being haunted down by the authorities and
a P100,000.00 bounty is at stake for their capture. He rushed to the house of the Mayor
to inform the latter of the raid. The Mayor advised him to remain calm and to avoid
being visible.
In the afternoon of July 12, 1993, he and Luis were fetched by General Quizon
and Colonel Hilario at Luis residence and thereafter brought to Camp Crame. At the
camp, press people interviewed them after which they were led to a room for taking of
their respective sworn statements. Boy claimed that he was forced to give his
statement after being kicked, slapped and cursed by the investigators. He tried to
correct portions of his statement but the investigating officer did not allow him. Boy
and Luis were detained at the camp until charges have been filed against them, for
their refusal to cooperate with the CIS.
On July 20, 1993, the two (2) brother were brought to an uninhabited place near a
hill in Barangay Paliparan where they were made to stand in front of the military group
consisting of Generals Quizon and Salimbangon, Colonel Gualberto and his men. Boy
and Luis were each asked to hold an armalite rifle, and then pictures were taken of
them handing the rifles over to the generals.
The next day (June 21), they were brought to CIS Canlubang and stayed there
until the start of the trial in September, 1993. Boy claimed he was subjected to electric
shock and water treatment to make him confess his guilt.

35 | P a g e

Ama, also a member of the team involved in the Tisoy manhunt, related a similar
story on the groups sorties in different barangays on June 28, 1993. After the failed
mission, Centeno dropped him off at his residence in Barangay Masiit at about 10:00
p.m. of the same day and did not leave the house until the next morning.
At around 6:15 a.m. of the next day (June 29), he was at Barangay Balayhangin
to wait for Tisoy per Medialdeas instruction. Minutes later, he saw Tisoy pass by on a
motorcycle and thereafter reported the matter to Medialdea.Ama learned of Eileens
death at around 8:00 a.m. when he was at the Calauan police station. Centeno
thereafter picked him up and they, together with Medialdea, Malabanan and Luis
proceeded to Sitio Paputok where Eileens body was found.
From the university compound, he, Medialdea, Malabanan and a UP student
named Butch went to Allans house but the latter was not there. They also went to Jet
Tejadas and Eileens boarding houses.
At Barangay Batong Malaki, Los Baos, barangay tanod Allan revealed to
Medialdea that the dead Allans enemy was Kit. Allan was fond of girls and there was a
time when Kit got angry at and threatened Allan when the latter dated Kits girlfriend
Rose, the tanod narrated.
Ama and the rest of the group were able to talk to Jet Tejada who denied any
involvement in the crime. After Major Cao informed him that Allan is already dead,
Ama told the major about the friction between Allan and Kit. Then someone tapped
Major Caos shoulder and identified himself as Kit who clarified that he had patched up
with Allan about three (3) months ago. Kit angrily pointed his finger at Ama, then
Major Cao pacified them. Ama asked Kit about the drops of blood on his right
thigh. Kit explained that the blood came from his right knuckle. He is our suspect Ama
blurted. Major Cao, however, reprimanded him for making such a loud comment.
*(On the cleaning of the van, Amas story is similar to Medialdeas account
heretofore discussed).
Thereafter, Ama, Medialdea and Malabanan found their way to the Mayors
residence in bay. Ama revealed to the Mayor that Kit is the suspect. The Mayor said
that Kit comes from a very powerful and influential family, and that his father, General
Alqueza, is a tough man. The Mayor nonetheless assured them of his support.
On July 1, 1993, Ama accompanied some CIS personnel at the site where Allans
body was found. They found drops of blood, cigarette butts and wrappers in the
area. Later in the afternoon, Ama went to Canlubang as he was asked by Colonel
Roxas to make a written report on the Kit Alqueza angle. He completed his statement
in about five (5) hours. The officer before whom he was sworn, Ama noticed, was
drunk.
On July 3, 1993, he received word that he was to undergo counter-insurgency
training effective that same day. Two (2) days after (July 5), he asked a certain Colonel
Toco why he was being required to undergo training again. The colonel promised to
look into the matter. On that same day, Malabanan informed him that Luis appeared
panicky and was acting suspiciously, as the latter seemed to go back and forth to the
municipal hall and kept asking Malabanan for the names of people investigating the
case. Also on that day, Ama gave the NBI Regional Director some information about
Kit and Luis which started the NBI investigation.
On July 6, 1993, Ama, together with Medialdea and Malabanan, executed his
statement in CIS Canlubang assisted by one Atty. Exconde who asked him to sign the
same even before Ama can read it. At PHQ Sta. Cruz, the Deputy Provincial

Commander for Operations fumed when he declared in his statement that he was
absent during the cleaning of the van. He declared so because Major Cao instructed
him to keep silent on that matter. Subsequently (July 7), he learned of Malabanans
escape.
On July 24, 1993, Ama, Malabanan and Medialdea were brought to CIS
Canlubang. They ate drugged food which gave him chest pain and made him very
weak and talkative. He saw Medialdea being whipped on the head with a newspaper
by one official.
Five days later (July 29), they were brought to the PACC where Luis pointed to
them before the media. The next day (July 30), he and General Alqueza met at the
Department of Justice. The general cursed him for dragging Kit in the case and even
challenged him to a fistfight outside the building.
On August 7, 1993, at General Salimbangons office, the general informed him
that his summary dismissal is on hand unless he testifies against the Mayor.When he
refused, the general cursed him. Colonel Gualberto also tried to convince him by
offering promotion, house and lot, monthly allowance, or a chance to leave the country
with his family. But Ama insisted on his innocence.
On August 13, 1993, a sobbing Malabanan embraced Ama and asked for his
forgiveness because the former has already implicated him falsely in the
crime.Malabanan said he could no longer bear the torture being inflicted on him and
the threats on his life and family. He was also advised by Malabanan to follow suit, but
he refused once again.
Brion is the Mayors nephew. He denied being in the company of any of the
appellants on the evening of June 28, 1993 as he stayed at their house on J. del Valle
St., Calauan the whole night. In the morning of July 29, 1993, he was arrested at his
father-in-laws house without any warrant. The arresting officer told him that Colonel
Navarro (PNP Director of Laguna) wanted to interview him. Brion was brought to the
Calamba police station from where he was taken to Canlubang. There, Col. Navarro
cursed him for being so elusive. Brion answered that he never went into hiding. Col.
Navarro informed him that Luis Corcolon has revealed that he was the third man to
rape Eileen. Brion then heard Malabanan shouting that he is taking all the blame for
the crime if they would just spare the two students (Brion and Kawit) who are totally
innocent.
Brion, together with Malabanan, Ama and Luis, was brought to the office of the
then Vice-President Estrada who asked Ama and Malabanan whether they raped
Eileen. Ama belied the accusation. Malabanan, too, professed innocence and said that
in the nine (9) years he stayed in Mindanao, it is his first time to cry this way. This
convinced the vice-president of Malabanans innocence. Kawit also cried at this
point. Brion saw Luis being held up by two men towards the room as Luis appeared to
be on the brink of collapse. One of the escorts then raised Luis hand so as to point at
Brion.
On July 30, 1993, Brion, Ama, Malabanan, Kawit, Luis and Boy were brought to
the Department of Justice where Fiscal Zuo asked them to sign some papers. Luis was
instructed to re-affirm his sworn statement before the PACC while Brion and Kawit
were asked to sign a waiver of detention. The three (3), however, refused. Fiscal Zuo
offered them a lawyer from the Public Assistance Office (PAO) to assist them but
Brion rejected the offer.

36 | P a g e

On August 6, 1993, General Quizon asked Brion to sign a confession but he

refused. When a second statement was prepared, he cried because he was allowed to
read only that portion relating to his personal circumstances before being forced to
sign it without the assistance of a lawyer. Thereafter, he was brought back to PHQ Sta.
Cruz at around 5:00 p.m.
Brion related having executed a sworn statement detailing the methods of torture
he underwent to force him into implicating the Mayor, Ama, Medialdea and
Malabanan, viz:
1) he would be placed in a doghouse-like cell fitted with loudspeakers;
2) his hands would be tied behind his back and he would be tied to a
bench. A towel would be placed over his mouth and nostrils, then 7-up is poured
on his face;
3) his body would be whipped with guns.
No medical examination was ever conducted on him. More, his captors would padlock
his cell whenever Atty. Arias paid him a visit.
Kawit was a houseboy of the Mayor in his Calauan residence. He claimed he
slept at around 9:00 p.m. of June 28, 1993 and woke up at 6:00 a.m. the following day
to water the plants.
On July 16, 1993, he was interrogated in connection with the deaths of Eileen
and Allan. Later in the day, Medialdea and some policemen fetched him at his house in
Barangay Bagong Pook and brought him to PHQ Sta. Cruz. Kawit was led into a room
where Medialdea, in the presence of Centeno and Malabanan, asked him the name of
the girl who was reportedly shouting while Kawit was dragging her at
CPAMMS. Kawit answered that there were two (2) bar girls, whose names are Carla
and Ninja Joyce, who were shouting at Barangay Bagong Pook. Ama then entered the
room and requested Malabanan and Medialdea not to hurt Kawit. When Malabanan
and Medialdea left the room, Kawit explained to Ama that the two (2) bar girls
complained of one Melvin Pajadan not paying them for their services.
Thereafter, Kawit was asked by one Major Uyami to make a statement. After
signing the statement, Kawit was told by investigator Cansanay that the major wanted
him to include in his statement the Mayors involvement in the Gomez-Sarmenta
slaying, but Kawit refused. He was thus detained for the night. A policeman in civilian
clothes thereafter asked him to sign a paper bearing his name and the handwritten
words: Pauuwiin ka na bukas ng umaga. Kawit signed the paper, but he was not
released the next day.
Before this Court, Mayor Sanchez and Medialdea filed their consolidated
Appellants Brief, and so did Ama, Brion and Kawit. Brothers Luis and Boy Corcolon,
on the other hand, filed separate appeal briefs. Briefly, the pith of the assigned errors
and the focus of the appellants arguments is the issue of witnesses Centeno and
Malabanans credibility, whose open-court narrations served as principal basis for the
trial courts rendition of a guilty verdict.
So oftenly repeated by this Court is that the matter of assigning values to
declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial
judge[4] who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess
their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected in the record. The
demeanor of the person on the stand can draw the line between fact and
fancy. The forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering voice or the angry

tone, the flustered look or the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the guilty blanch these
can reveal if the witness is telling the truth or lying in his teeth. [5]
Judge Demetriou who presided over the entire trial until its very conclusion
expressed her satisfaction with the way witnesses Centeno and Malabanan survived the
hot seat with flying colors, so to speak. With respect to Centeno, the honorable Judge
had this to say:
In thus passing upon the credibility of Centeno, this Court kept his alleged dubious
reputation for veracity in mind. But, after carefully reviewing the testimony of
Centeno in his direct examination and gruelling (sic) cross-examination for almost 3
months, this Court, even with a jaundiced eye, could not help but be impressed about
the myriad of details in his testimony and his frank, spontaneous and straightforward
manner of testifying. The lengthy and punishing cross-examination by seven lawyers
to which he was subjected failed to bring out any serious flaw or infirmity in his
perception or recollection of events or destroy the coherence of his narration. That
Centeno merely wove such a yarn from his fertile imagination, conflict with a
multitude of details, is highly improbable considering that his highest educational
attainment was sixth grade in the elementary school.[6]
Similarly, Malabanan displayed a frank, straightforward manner of answering
questions and a desire to state all the facts within his knowledge, and his credibility
was never shaken on cross-examination; there was no indication of prevarication or
evasiveness. Consequently, (his) testimony is entitled to full faith and credit, the
honorable Judge observed.[7] Her impressions of these star witnesses for the State bind
this Court, for we accord great respect if not finality, to the findings of the trial court
on the credibility of witnesses.[8] They, therefore, ought not to be disturbed.[9] And once
the prosecution witnesses are afforded full faith and credit, the defenses version
necessarily stands discredited.[10]
To recall, all the appellants relied on the defense of denial/alibi, i.e., they were at
their respective homes on the night of the rape-slay. But Centeno and Malabanan
confirmed the presence of all the appellants on the night of June 28, 1993 till the early
morning of the following day and detailed the exact participation of each in the
crime. Positive identification by credible witnesses of the accused as the perpetrators
of the crime, as we have consistently held, demolishes the alibi [11] - the much abused
sanctuary of felons.[12] Moreover, except for the Mayor who presented Ave Marie
Tonee Jimenez Sanchez (his daughter with his mistress Elvira) and Medialdea who
presented his neighbor Anastacia Gulay, the other appellants failed to present
corroborating testimonial evidence to butress their respective alibis. The defense of
alibi is inherently weak especially when wanting in material corroboration. Categorical
declarations of witnesses for the prosecution of the details of the crime are more
credible than the uncorroborated alibi interposed by the accused. [13] Ave Maries
testimony is of no help to the Mayor, since alibi becomes less plausible as a defense
when it is invoked and sought to be crafted mainly by the accused himself and his
immediate relatives.[14] Anastacia Gulays testimony is likewise worthless since the trial
court found her testimony rehearsed. We will not disturb this finding because it
touches on credibility.
In fine, the defense of alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on the credibility of
witnesses, and the assessment of the trial court, unless patently and clearly
inconsistent, must be accepted.[15]

37 | P a g e

In an attempt to discredit Centeno, appellants principally harp on the

contradictions in four (4) Sworn Statements executed by Centeno on August 13, 1993,
August 15, 1993, August 17, 1993 and August 30, 1993. The Solicitor Generals Office
summarizes appellants asseverations on this point, viz:
Appellants point out that while in his Sworn Statement dated August 13, 1993,
Centeno stated that after the victims were seized, they were brought to CPAMMS, in
his Sworn Statement dated August 15, 1993, he claimed that the two were brought to
Erais Farm (p. 86-96, Sanchez and Medialdea; p. 11-12, Luis Corcolon; p. 38, Ama,
Brion and Kawit; p. 10, Rogelio Corcolon).Appellant also point out that in the August
13, 1993 Sworn Statement, Centeno merely referred to a person named Edwin
(without stating his family name) and another person he did not know who was in the
place where the victims were brought. In his Sworn Statement dated August 17, 1993,
Centeno supplied the family name of Edwin as Cosico and the name of the other
person whom he did not know as Lito Angeles (pp. 96-97, Sanchez and Medialdea).
Another major contradiction pointed out is that in his August 13, 1993 Sworn
Statement, Centeno mentioned that he drove the Corcolon brothers to the house of
Edgardo Uod Lavadia in Bangkal Street, Los Baos, Laguna. Upon arriving at the
house of Lavadia, Centeno saw Lavadia and Teofilo Kit Alqueza talking.Later Lavadia
handed an envelop to Luis Corcolon. In the latest Sworn Statement dated August 30,
1993, Centeno stated that they did not go to the house of Lavadia and that during the
whole day of June 26, 1993, Centeno was with Malabanan (pp. 99-102, Sanchez and
Medialdea; pp. 37-40, Ama, Brion and Kawit; p. 8, Rogelio Corcolon).[16]
The trial judge found Centenos explanation on these inconsistencies satisfactory,
justifying such finding with pertinent jurisprudence. The Court, therefore, affirms and
adopts her disquisition on the matter, viz:
With respect to the portion of his sworn statement dated August 13, 1993 which
implicated Kit Alqueza, Centeno explained that it was dictated by a CIS agent named
Rommel. He feared Rommel because the latter threatened him that he would be hurt if
he did not cooperate. Even when his family was already under the custody of the CIS
on August 15, 1993, he did not ask for the deletion of the said portion because he was
still under the CIS custody. It was only on August 30, 1993 when he was placed under
the Witness Protection Program that he found the courage to execute another sworn
statement for the specific purpose of deleting the reference to Kit Alqueza. Although
he was placed under the Witness Protection Program on August 17, 1993, there was a
delay in his retraction of Kit Alquezas involvement due to his inability to reach Fiscal
Arellano.
Centenos explanation is quite believable because he had already implicated the
accused Sanchez in his sworn statement of August 13, 1993. Thus, the portion
implicating Kit Alqueza does not jibe with the main story of Centeno that Eileen
Sarmenta was abducted by Medialdea, Ama, the Corcolon brothers, Brion and Kawit
to be given as a gift to their boss, Mayor Sanchez.
As to his sworn statement of August 15, 1993 where he stated that the victims were
taken to Erais Farm instead of CPAMMS as originally indicated in his August 13, 1993
sworn statement, Centeno explained that when he gave his first statement he was still
hoping that Mayor Sanchez would help him. Furthermore, he feared the power and
influence of the Mayor. Thus, according to him, he gave the wrong place to mislead
his investigators. It was only on August 15, 1993 when the accused Sanchez was
already in prison that Centeno decided to correct his previous statements.

This Court is inclined to accept the explanation of Centeno that his earlier attempt to
mislead the investigators by saying that the victims were taken to CPAMMS was out
of fear of the Mayor. Our Supreme Court has recognized that the inherent fear of
reprisal by witnesses who refuse initially to disclose what they know about a crime is
quite understandable, especially when the accused is a man of power and influence in
the community (People v. Catao, 107 Phil. 861 [1960]).
In a recent case, People v. Pascua (206 SCRA 628 [1992]), the Supreme Court
observed that Fear for ones life explains the failure on the part of a witness to
immediately notify the authorities of what exactly transpired. And, [o]nce such fear is
overcome by a more compelling need to narrate the truth, the Supreme Court went on
to say, then the witness must be welcomed by the courts to help dispense justice.
Consequently, this Court will not reject the testimony of Centeno on the basis of
inconsistencies in his sworn statements taken by police authorities which have been
sufficiently explained. What is more important is that Centeno testified on the witness
stand in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remained
consistent on cross-examination. This Court, therefore, finds Centeno a credible
witness.[17]
To further fortify this observation, we advert to that all-too familiar rule that
discrepancies between sworn statements and testimonies made at the witness stand do
not necessarily discredit the witnesses. [18] Sworn statements/affidavits are generally
subordinated in importance to open court declarations because the former are often
executed when an affiants mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a fair
opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has transpired. [19] Testimonies given
during trials are mush more exact and elaborate. [20] Thus, testimonial evidence carries
more weight than sworn statements/affidavits.
Appellants would also quibble on the following portions of Centenos testimony,
to wit:
1) he could not give exactly where the appellants went after sexually
abusing Eileen;]
2) he was unsure whether it was Eileens left or right foot that hit the chair of
the van when she was struggling;
3) he was unsure of their speed while on their way to the UP compound;
4) he could not give the exact distance between the ambulance he was
driving and the van;
5) he said he could see the protruding end of the roof of a kubo when he
parked the ambulance in front of the Big J restaurant. Appellants claim that from
where Centeno was allegedly standing, there was no way he could see the roof of
that kubo;
6) he was able to recall what appellants were wearing on that night of June
28, 1993;
7) he saw Kawit hit Allan at his diaphragm with the butt of an armalite, but
the medico-legal finding of Dr. Escueta revealed no injury in the abdominal
region of Allan;
8) his testimony that the appellants raped Eileen inside the van which was
very limited space, while appellants could have chosen a far more comfortable or
remote place to do the crime. With respect to the Mayor, it was very unbelievable
for him to commit rape inside his room filled with religious adornments and in

38 | P a g e

the process risk his reputation as mayor and an established man in the
community;
9) his testimony to the effect that appellants rolled their pants down to their
knees and then climbed the van to rape Eileen. Appellants would consider such
testimony impossible, claiming that the narrow circumference of the waistline
will impede and obstruct the upward movement of the legs.
10) his admission that he can lie for money, or out fear.
It may be conceded that these inconsistencies marred Centenos testimony, but
they refer to trivial details which do not, in actuality, touch upon the whys and
wherefores of the crime committed.[21] Equally settled is the rule that inconsistencies in
the testimony of witnesses when referring only to minor details and collateral matters
do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of
their testimony. Although there may be inconsistencies on minor details, the same do
not impair the credibility of the witnesses where there is consistency in relating the
principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants, [22] as in this
case. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the sincerity of a witness
and prove that his testimony is not rehearsed. [23] They are fail-safes against memorized
perjury.[24] Besides, errorless testimonies cannot be expected especially when a witness
is recounting details of a harrowing experience. [25] Even the most truthful witnesses
can make mistakes but such innocent lapses do not necessarily affect their credibility.
[26]
Consequently, Centenos and Malabanans credibility still remains intact
notwithstanding these inconsistencies.
Other pieces of evidence further enhance the damaging testimonies of Centeno
and Malabanan. For one, a missing belt loop from the pair of white shorts worn by
Eileen on the night of the crime was recovered from Erais Farm by prosecution
witness Major Lulita Chambers who, together with Col. Gualberto and other officers,
went there on August 19, 1993 to effect service of the search warrant issued by RTC
Judge Geraldez. Major Chambers, a forensic chemist, conducted a series of laboratory
examinations and later concluded that the retrieved beltloop matched in color, size and
fiber composition with a beltloop she detached from the white shorts of Eileen which
she (Major Chambers) used as a standard.
Another corroborating evidence is the M16 empty bullet shell recovered at the
site where Allans body was found. The ballistic examination on the empty shell
conducted by FID-PNP Chief Ballistician Vicente de Vera revealed that the striations
of the empty shell were the same as those registered by the cartridges from M16 rifle
bearing Serial No. 773159 surrendered by Luis Corcolon. Mr. De Vera also found the
metallic fragments recovered from Eileens body, after conducting microscopic
examinations thereof, to bear the same characteristics as those from a bullet fired from
an M16 rifle.
The autopsy and vaginal examination conducted by prosecution witness Dr.
Vladimir V. Villaseor, medico-legal officer of the PNP-CIS, on Eileens cadaver
buttresses all the more the gang-rape story of the prosecution. Dr. Villaseors findings,
in a nutshell, disclosed the presence of multiple contusions on Eileens body, fresh
shallow lacerations on her hymen, a congested cervix, a gaping labia majora and
oozing whitish fluid (tested positive for spermatozoa) from the vaginal
opening. Oozing spermatozoa, Dr. Villaseor explained, means that the amount of
semen was much more than the vaginal canal could contain and that there were several
seminal ejaculations that occurred therein. He also noted that a great quantity of

whitish fluid continued to ooze from Eileens vaginal opening despite her death for
several hours. Taking into account all these findings, Dr. Villaseor ruled out the
possibility of any consented sexual intercourse. In this connection, appellants would
belittle Dr. Villaseors findings by insisting as the more convincing opinion the
defenses medical expert witness, Dr. Ernesto Brion who testified to the effect that there
can be no multiple rape if there is only one laceration on Eileens hymen as testified to
by Dr. Villaseor. We dismiss appellants argument by reiterating anew that the absence
of extensive abrasions or contusions on the vaginal wall does not rule out rape because
the slightest penetrations enough.[27] It is not an indispensable element for the
successful prosecution of said crime.[28] Moreover, Dr. Brion is an uncle by
consanguinity and erstwhile counsel of record of the Mayor, thus making his
objectivity highly questionable.
Appellants Ama, Kawit and Brion would assail the trial courts finding that they
were part of the conspiracy to commit the rape-slay. Their concurrency of sentiment
with the other appellants, however, was evident from the time they abducted Eileen
and Allan, brought the two to Erais Farm where Eileen was raped by the Mayor and
Allan beaten up black and blue, headed for a sugarcane field killing Allan along the
way, sexually abused Eileen in rapid succession and finally killed her. In not an
instance did any of the three appellants (Ama, Kawit and Brion) desist from that
common design.[29] Likewise, the complicity of the Mayor in the crime can be deduced
from the following conversations he had with some of the appellants at the Erais Farm
(per Centenos testimony), viz.:
LUIS CORCOLON: Mayor, ito po yung regalo namin sa inyo. Ito po yung babae
na matagal na po ninyong kursunada.
MAYOR: Aba, and ganda talaga ng babaeng yan. Pero sino yung kasama ninyong
lalake?
MEDIALDEA: Boss, kasama ho yan ng babae yung lalake. Isinama na rin ho
namin para wala pong bulilyaso.
After raping Eileen, the Mayor had this short exchange with Medialdea:
MAYOR: O sige mga anak, salamat sa regalo ninyo. Salamat sa regalo ninyo sa
akin.Tapos na ako, sa inyo na iyan. Bahala na kayo
diyan.Ano naman ang gagawin ninyo diyan sa
lalake?
MEDIALDEA: Boss, papatayin na rin po namin ito para wala pong bulilyaso.
Finally, on appellants claim that the publicity given to this case impaired their
right to a fair trial, we need only to revisit this Courts pronouncements inPeople v.
Teehankee, Jr. (249 SCRA 54), viz:
We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to
prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar
pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and
now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free
press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial for, as
well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of
effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x x. The press does
not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of
justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public
scrutiny and criticism.

39 | P a g e

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial.The
mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverages
does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and
impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the
bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The
state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to out
breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday
menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge
is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the
jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their
impartiality.Criticisms against the jury system are mounting and Mark Twains wit and
wisdom put them all in better perspective when he observed: When a gentleman of
high social standing, intelligence, and probity swears that testimony given under the
same oath will outweigh with him, street talk and newspaper reports based upon mere
hearsay, he is worth a hundred jurymen who will swear to their own ignorance and
stupidity x x x. Why could not the jury law be so altered as to give men of brains and
honesty an equal chance with fools and miscreants? Our judges are learned in the law
and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a
litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per
se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility or prejudice on the part of the trial judge
due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the
case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejsndro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of
prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding
of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been
unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the
case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against
appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of
his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge
acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of
change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove
this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
And so we come to hear another tale of woe, of an infamous public figure and his
minions indicted for having raped and killed a young lady and a budding lad, of these
victims who had led short obscure lives that earned an equally ignominous end, and of
a criminal enterprise so despicable only the unthinking beasts can orchestrate. It was,
indeed, a plot seemingly hatched in hell. And let it not be said that the full protection
of the law had been deprived appellants. Even a beast cannot deny this.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.In
addition, each of the appellants having been found guilty of seven (7) counts of rape
with homicide and considering that existing jurisprudence pegs the amount of
indemnity for the death of the victim at Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, this Court
hereby orders each of the appellants to pay the respective heirs of Eileen Sarmenta and
Allan Gomez the amount of Seven Hundred Thousand (P700,000.00) Pesos as
additional indemnity.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 140393-94. February 4, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARCOS ASUELA,
JUANITO ASUELA, ALBERTO ASUELA, ROGER ASUELA,
TEOFILO BOYET CAPACILLO, JUN-JUN ASUELA (at large)
and MIGUEL ASUELA (at large), accused.
MARCOS ASUELA, JUANITO ASUELA, ALBERTO ASUELA,
ROGER
ASUELA
and
TEOFILO
BOYET
CAPACILLO, appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Where the evidence fails to show conclusively that the wounds
inflicted on the offended party were fatal or serious and where the
medical treatment -- which lasted less than nine days in the present
case -- were merely first aid in nature, appellants may be convicted
only of slight physical injuries, not frustrated murder.
The Case
Before us is an appeal from the July 20, 1999 Decision [1] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal (Branch 76) in Criminal
Cases Nos. 3365 and 3366. The assailed Decision disposed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered in
these cases as follows:
1) In Crim. Case No. 3366, finding accused Juanito Asuela,
Marcos Asuela, Alberto Asuela, Roger Asuela,
and Teofilo Boyet Capacillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder, as defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, and sentencing each of them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs
of Wilfredo Villanueva in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the
costs.
2) In Crim. Case No. 3365, finding accused Juanito Asuela,
Marcos Asuela, Alberto Asuela, and Teofilo Boyet Capacillo GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder as
defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
sentencing each of them to suffer imprisonment of fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal and to
pay the costs.
As against accused Jun-jun Asuela and Miguel Asuela, who have, to
date, remained at-large, let a warrant of arrest be issued against
them and let these cases be, in the meantime, sent to the archives
without prejudice to their reinstatement upon apprehension of the
said accused.[2]
This case originated from the September 24, 1997
Information[3]signed by Third Assistant Prosecutor Nestor V. Gapuzan,
charging Appellants Marcos Asuela, Juanito Asuela, Alberto Asuela,

40 | P a g e

Rogelio RogerAsuela and Teofilo Boyet Capacillo[4] with frustrated

murder, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of September 1997 in the Municipality
of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, armed with a lead [pipe] and pieces
of wood, with intent to kill and with abuse of superior strength, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack assault and
stab one ANTHONY A. VILLANUEVA on his body, thus performing all
the acts of execution which could have produced the crime of murder
as a consequence but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of
cause independent of his will, that is, due to the timely and able
medical attendance rendered to said ANTHONY A. VILLANUEVA which
prevented his death.[5]
That same day, the same prosecutor filed against appellants
another Information,[6] this time for murder, as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of September 1997 in the Municipality
of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, armed with a lead [pipe] and pieces
of wood, with intent to kill employing means to weaken the defense
of the victim, one WILFREDO VILLANUEVA, by spraying him with [tear
gas] in the eyes and taking advantage of their superior strength did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab one WILFREDO VILLANUEVA, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal wounds which directly caused his death.[7]
When arraigned on separate dates, appellants pleaded not
guilty.[8]After trial in due course, the RTC convicted them.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief,[9] the Office of the Solicitor General summarized the
prosecutions version of the facts in this wise:
In the early evening of September 7, 1997, prosecution eyewitnessvictim Anthony Villanueva was in their house
at Valleyview Subdivision, GulodMalaya, San Mateo, Rizal, with his
brother Mark, his sister Hayen, and their mother Magdalena
Villanueva. They were at that time celebrating the birthday of their
father, Wilfredo Villanueva. While his father Wilfredo was cooking
food, Anthony saw appellants and the accused Jun-jun Asuela and
Miguel Asuela in a drinking spree in front of the house of
appellant Juanito Asuela, situated at about five (5) meters away from
the house of the Villanuevas. Appellants and their co-accused were
later joined by their neighbors.
At about 6:30 oclock in the evening of the same day, Anthony heard
and saw appellant Juanito call up his father. Thereafter, Anthony saw

his father being pulled near the gate of their house and
x x x appellants Marcos Asuela, AlbertoAsuela,
Roger Asuela, Teofilo Boyet Capacillo, Juanito Asuela and co-accused
Jun-jun Asuela and Miguel Asuela stabbed and/or struck with a knife
and a blunt
instrument Wilfredo Villanueva. Appellant Boyet Capacillo sprayed
[tear gas] on the eyes of Wilfredo;
appellant Juanito stabbed Wilfredos eyes and cheek him eight (8)
times with a knife; Roger hit three (3) times Wilfredos back with a
lead pipe; co-accused Jun[-]jun stabbed Wilfredos chest four (4)
times with a knife; appellant Alberto stabbed Wilfredo with a pointed
bamboo while the latter lay on the ground; appellant Marcos also hit
him at the back with a lead pipe; and co-accused Miguel
stabbed Wilfredo four (4) times with a knife.
In further details, Anthony stated that when
appellant Juanito stabbed Wilfredo, appellant Boyet was at the back
of Juanito. Then, appellant Boyet sprayed [tear gas] on the eyes
of Wilfredo and thereafter, appellant Roger went
[behind]Wilfredo and hit the latter with a lead pipe. At that precise
moment, co-accused Jun-jun went in front of Wilfredo and
immediately hit him on the chest with the knife. Then, appellant
Marcos, instead of going to the barangay office for assistance, picked
up a lead pipe and hit Wilfredo. Co-accused Miguel who positioned
himself as the lookout, also stabbed Wilfredo in reaction to the
inquiry of appellant Roger if Wilfredo was still alive; and when
appellants and the two (2) co-accused left the scene of the crime,
appellant Alberto went back and stabbed Wilfredo with a pointed
bamboo pole. Anthony knew that appellantAlberta is the father of
accused Miguel, and Albertos brothers are appellantsJuanito, Marcos,
Roger, and co-accused Jun-jun. Appellant Boyet Capacillo is their
brother-in-law, Boyets wife being the sister of
the Asuela brothers. When his father Wilfredo was being ganged
up[on] by appellants and their co-accused, Anthony tried to help his
father but Anthony fell down from the sudden blow on his back.
While on the ground, Anthony was hit on the head with a lead pipe
by appellants Roger and Marcos and then appellant Juanita hit
Anthony three (3) times at his left eyebrow, right side of his neck,
and at the left side of his body in between his left armpit and left
nipple. Before Anthony could run for his safety, accused Jun-jun and
Miguel stabbed him with a knife. Roger chased him, while
appellantAlberta was looking for him with a pointed
bamboo. Anthony was treated of his injuries at
the Amang Rodriguez Hospital by Dr. Aladdin Bongco who issued a
medico-legal certificate. He was also medically attended to at the
Health Center of Gulod Malaya. Anthony Villanueva further stated
that from a distance of five (5) meters, he saw appellant Alberto
arrive at the scene of the crime and stabWilfredo with a pointed

41 | P a g e

bamboo while the latter was still lying prostrate on the gutter of the
street. Appellant Alberta also spat on the body of Wilfredo.
Prosecution eyewitness Hayen Villanueva, daughter
of Wilfredo Villanueva, testified that at about 7:30 oclock in the
evening of September 7, 1997, she was with her father in the kitchen
of their house. Her mother, brothers, sisters, and her sister-in-law
were also in their house. It was her fathers birthday and the latter
was cooking food for the occasion. Then, Hayen heard and saw
appellant Juanitocall up her father. While her father was at the gate
of their yard, Hayen saw from the distance of seven (7) meters,
appellant Juanito stab her father. [From] the same
distance, Hayen also saw appellant Boyet Capacillo spray [tear gas]
on the eyes of [her] father. Hayen fully corroborated the testimony of
her brother Anthony on how appellants and their co-accused fatally
ganged up on their father. She said that appellant
Alberta Asuela tried to stab her with a pointed bamboo; however,
she was able to run away. Then, Hayen saw appellants Alberto and
Marcos thr[o]w stones at their house until the police authorities
arrived. Hayen also saw Anthony trying to help their father but was
chased by appellants Marcos, Roger, and co-accused Jun-jun. She
clearly saw the incident because the scene of the crime was
illuminated by fluorescent bulbs from the well owned by
the Asuelas (situated at a distance of about six (6) arms-length from
the crime scene), from the Santos residence (situated at about seven
(7) arms-length away) and from the residence of the [Evangelios],
(situated at about nine (9) arms-lengths away).
Prosecution eyewitness Magdalena Villanueva, widow of
victim WilfredoVillanueva, corroborated her childrens
testimonies. According to her, while she peeped through the window
of their house and saw the criminal incident, as it transpired from a
distance of four (4) arms-length.
Dr. Ma. Cristina B. Freyra, medico legal officer of PNP Crime
Laboratory, CampCrame, Quezon City, conducted an autopsy
examination on the cadaver ofWilfredo Villanueva. Dr. Freyra issued
Medico-legal Report No. M-1291-97 on the results of the
examination. In the course of her examination, Dr. Freyra found
that Wilfredo sustained twelve (12) wounds, seven (7) of which were
fatal; that the stab wounds could have been caused by four (4)
bladed instruments considering the difference in the measurements
of the wounds; the lacerated wound at the right leg of the victim
could have been caused by a pointed sharp bamboo; that the
fractured bones at the head could have been caused by a lead pipe
or a piece of wood. She opened the victims skull and found fractures
and bleeding below and above the brain. She also found that the
victims right eyeball was destroyed and have been caused by
stabbing with the use of [a] pointed instrument. Dr. Freyra issued a

death certificate stating therein, among others, that the cause of

death was hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds, x x x.
Prosecution witness Dr. Jose Aladin Bongco, resident physician of
the AmangRodriguez Medical Center, examined and treated Anthony
Villanueva of his injuries on September 7, 1997. Dr. Bongco reduced
his findings in a medico-legal certificate. He found that Anthony
Villanueva sustained a wound on the left frontal parietal and
lacerated wound at the right frontal. Dr. Bongco also found a stab
wound at the nipple area. He closed the wounds to stop the
bleeding. He stated that the lacerated wounds could have been
caused by a blunt or any sharp object or by a lead pipe, and the stab
wound by a sharp blunt object. The three (3) wounds could have
been fatal if not for the medical treatment given.[10] (Citations
omitted)
Version of the Defense
In their Brief,[11] appellants submit their version of the events in
these words:
All herein accused-appellants except
accused Juanito Asuela interposed self-defense[.]
MARCOS ASUELA testified that on 07 September 1997 at around 6:00
pm, a commotion occurred in Barangay Gulod, Malaya, San
Mateo, Rizal between theAsuelas and Villanuevas; that he saw Mark
Villanueva and Juanita Asuelatalking in front of the store
of Aling Betty Santos, [a] distance of around 10 meters from the
place; that he did not hear what they were talking about but
certainly, they conversed for a while when Anthony Villanueva
arrived and instructed Mark to leave the place but the latter refused;
[a] few moments later,Wilfredo Villanueva arrived with a 'karet and
suddenly brushed/pushed his two Sons aside, and
hacked Juanito Asuela with a karet inflicting in[j]uries on the latters
head which prompted him to immediately call the attention
of barangayofficial[s] for assistance, but when he returned together
with Alberta Asuela,Kagawad Doromal, Police
Officer Rabina and Barangay Tanod Eddie SantosWilfredo Asuela was
already dead; that he personally knows Julius Villanueva, son of the
victim, who was involved in a carnapping incident, and it was
accused Juanita Asuela who tipped Atty. Pozon, owner of the vehicle,
of Julius[] participation, hence, the latter was put behind bars; that
when he came back [to] the scene of the incident he
saw Juanito Asuela a[l]so injured; that he helped/assisted the
policemen in carrying [to] or placing the cadaver
of WilfredoVillanueva in the van; that he also helped Magdalena
Villanueva and HayenVillanueva [in] boarding the vehicle; that he
denied having hit Anthony Villanueva with a lead pipe; that he went
[to the] barangay hall on the following day, 08 September 1997[;]
however SPO4 Armando Santiago told him to stay in that place and
when he (Santiago) returned accompanied by Magdalena Villanueva

42 | P a g e

and her daughter Hayen, they pointed to him as the one who
hitWilfredo Villanueva at the latters back for there were no other
persons inside the hall except him so he was immediately placed
under arrest under the pretext of custodial investigation[.]
Accused ALBERTO ASUELA, SR. testified that on 07 September 1997
at around 7:00 pm, he was in the house
of Purok Leader Mang Dodong which [was] 500 meters away from
the house of [the] Villanuevas, attending to the birthday celebration
of the latters son Raffy together with
[K]agawad Doromal, MangDodong and Policeman Rabina; that he
vehemently denied the accusations leveled against him; that the
incident happened on Sunday where Boyet and the latters wife were
regularly selling religious articles at the St. Joseph Church; that at
noon of 07 September 1997, he met Anthony Villanueva and they
even played tong-its, after which he proceeded to Dodongs place to
have a drinking spree; that he denied having
struck Wilfredo Villanueva with a bamboo [pole] nor did he chase
Anthony Villanueva for he was at Dodongs place when the incident
happened.
"Accused TEOFILO CAPACILLO alias Boyet testified that on 07
September 1997 x x x [h]e was at St. Joseph Church, Quezon City,
helping his wife [sell] religious articles and cigarettes; that there
were persons who saw him in that very evening selling said articles
and named them as Sps. Elizabeth and Richard Martin. As a security
guard, he was issued a .38 caliber and was not issued any [tear gas];
that the accusations levelled against him by Anthony, Magdalena
andHayen Villanueva were [a] bunch of lies; that he only
met Juanito Asuela with several companions at the St. Joseph Church
at around 9:00 pm on 07 September 1997 with blood oozing from his
head; that his wife even gave Juanito money for treatment.
Accused ALBERTO ASUELA, JR. testified that on 07 September 1997
he was at Vicky Santos place when the incident happened; that he
heard and noticedJuanito Asuela and Mark Villanueva conversing
about the apprehension of JuliusVilanueva in [a] carnapping case,
and he heard Anthony Villanueva [confront] Juanita Asuela uttering
the words:
[M]ay sama ako ng loob sa iyo at itoymatatapos lamang kung mailal
abas mo si Julius sa kulungan, and [a] few moments
later, Wilfredo Vil[l]anueva arrived and brushed aside his t[wo] sons
(Mark and Anthony), and thereafter hit Juanito Asuela with a karet;
that he sawJuanito r[u]n towards his house already bloodied on the
head closely followed byWilfredo Villanueva then [a] scuffle ensued
between the duo; that at the time [of] the incident, he did not see
Marcos Asuela, Jun-jun Asuela [or] Boyet Capacilloexcept his father.
Accused ROGELIO ASUELA alias Roger testified that on 07 September
1997 at around 7:30 pm., while he together with his family were
inside his house watching a championship game in basketball

between Alaska and Gordon Gins somebody knocked at the door,

and when his son Domingo opened the door, he saw one of his
nieces crying and informed him that her father, Juanito Asuelawas
full of blood, so he immediately proceeded to Juanitos house and saw
him full of blood sitting on the sofa; that when he asked Juanito what
really happened, Juanito did not answer instead he pointed to him a
certain direction which prompted him to go to the place pointed by
Juanita and there he sawWilfredo Villanueva lying on the ground
already dead and his kumadreMagdalena Villanueva crying; and that
when he approached his kumareMagdalena, the latter uttered:
'[M]ga hayop kayo, pagbabayaran ninyong lahatito.
Accused JUANITO ASUELA alias Fernando Bonifacio, averred that on
07 September 1997 at about 7:00 pm., he was buying cigarette at
the store of Mrs. Santos when Mark Villanueva approached and
talked to him regarding thecarnapping case of the latters brother
Julius Villanueva whom he reported to Atty. Pozon to be the one
responsible for the carnapping of his car. Minutes later, Anthony
Villanueva arrived and shouted to Mark not to talk to him and
uttered: [M]asyado kang mapapel. Kung
gusto mong magkaareglohan tayo, ilabas mo angkapatid ko sa kulun
gan. Suddenly and without any warning, Wilfredo Villanueva who was
drunk attacked him but was pacified by [the] latters son Mark who
requested his father and Anthony to go home; that Anthony boxed
him on the head, and when Wilfredo arrived, he suddenly pushed
aside his two Sons and hacked him on the head with a karet; that
when he ran towards his house, he accidentally slipped and fell to
the ground, and when he saw Wilfredo about to attack him again, he
picked a stone and threw it [at] the face of Wilfredo; that he
wrest[l]ed the 'karet from Wilfredo to avoid further injury, and in the
process, he felt a knife on the waist of Wilfredo, and he took it and
used [it] in stabbingWilfredo several times; at this juncture, he saw
Anthony coming out of their house with a lead pipe about to hit him
so he embraced Anthony and also stabbed the latter; that at the
time of the incident, his co-accused were not present, and he was
alone defending himself; that at the time he left the scene he
noticed thekaret still in the hand of Wilfredo; that because of his
bloodied head, he went home and thereafter, with his sisters went
to Boyet Capacillo at the St. Joseph Church. The following day, he
went to the Antipolo General Hospital where his wounds were treated
by Dr. Edwin Borja who issued a medical certificate marked as Annex
'10'."[12]
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court gave full faith and credence to the prosecution
witnesses because they were at the crime scene, and their
declarations were consistent in describing the participation of
appellants in the crimes charged. Despite their relationship to the
victims, these witnesses were not disbelieved, because no improper

43 | P a g e

motive for testifying falsely against appellants was proven. Also

established was appellants conspiracy in killing Wilfredo Villanueva
and in fatally injuring his son Anthony.
The RTC also rejected the contention of Juanito that he had acted
in self-defense -- he had stabbed the victim even after being able to
subdue
the
latter;
therefore, unlawful
aggression had
ceased. Neither was there any reasonable necessity for Juanito to
stab Anthony, who was allegedly moving towards the former.
Moreover, the court a quo debunked the alibi of the other
appellants, because they had failed to show that it was physically
impossible for them to be at the crime scene. Finally, the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength in killing Wilfredo and
seriously injuring Anthony was appreciated because of the gross
physical disparity between the versions of appellants and the victims
in terms of their number, the weapons used and the force employed.
Hence, this appeal.[13]
Issues
Appellants submit the following assignment of errors for our
consideration:
I
The trial court erred in concluding that there was conspiracy on the
part of all the accused-appellants, and in disregarding the justifying
circumstance of self defense of accused Juanito Asuela;
II
The trial court erred in totally disregarding the evidence of the
defense and finding all the accused guilty of the offenses charged
beyond reasonable doubt;
III
The lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of murder by
appreciating abuse of superior strength as a qualifying
circumstances.[14]
For purposes of clarity, we deem it wise to restate the assigned
errors as follows: (1) sufficiency of the prosecution evidence; (2)
efficacy of self-defense, denial, alibi and conspiracy; and (3) abuse of
superior strength as a qualifying circumstance. We will discuss them
in that order.
This Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in according full
faith and credence to the testimonies of Prosecution Witnesses
Anthony, Hayenand Magdalena - all surnamed Villanueva -- because
they
had
allegedly
contradicted
one
another. Hayen said
that Boyet Capacillo had sprayed tear gas on the eyes of her
father, Wilfredo, before Juanito Asuela and his cohorts ganged up on
the old man. On the other hand, Magdalenamaintained that the

accused had first surrounded the deceased before his eyes were
sprayed by Capacillo with tear gas.
We are not convinced. Appellants attack on the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses is misplaced. Nothing is more well-settled in
law than the principle that the trial courts evaluation of the
testimony of witnesses is accorded the highest respect, even finality,
because it had the direct opportunity to observe them on the stand
and to determine if they were telling the truth. [15] In the present case,
the discrepancy between the two versions on the sequence of the
attack on the deceased does not disprove the material fact that
appellants did attack, maul and kill him. Inconsistencies in the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details
and collateral matters do not affect the substance, the veracity or
the weight of the testimony.[16]
Preposterous
is
the
contention
of
appellants
that
the Villanuevas filed
the
charges
against
them
because Juanito Asuela had implicated Julius Villanueva, one
of Wilfredos sons, in a carnapping incident. It is highly unlikely that
the Villanuevas would place the members of their family at risk in
order to get Julius out of prison. In the absence of proof that an
improper motive impelled the witnesses to wrongly implicate the
accused in the commission of the crime, a court cannot refuse to
give due weight and probative value to their testimonies.[17]
Second Issue:
Self-Defense, Denial, Alibi and Conspiracy
Self-Defense
Appellant Juanito Asuela claims self-defense.[18] Together with the
other appellants, he further alleges that Anthony confirmed his story:
that the deceased had followed him to Mrs. Santos store, which was
10 to 11 meters away from the gate of the Villanuevas home; that
Anthony had confronted him at the store regarding the case of
the formers brother; and that it was Wilfredo who had attacked him
with a sickle.
Juanito also alleges that he was boxed on the head by
Anthony. The former further alleges that his two sons -- Anthony and
Mark - were pushed aside and his head hacked with a sickle
by Wilfredo. Injured by the attack, Juanito ran towards his house, but
slipped and fell to the ground. Wilfredo caught up and wrestled with
him for the sickle. In the process, Juanito felt, on the waist
of Wilfredo, a knife which the former used to stab the latter several
times and also to stab Anthony, thereby getting an opportunity to
flee. Juanito then went home and got his sisters to accompany him
to St. Joseph Church to find Boyet Capacillo.
We are not persuaded. Juanitos testimony is self-serving and is
not corroborated by the evidence on hand. His allegations are easy
to concoct, but difficult to verify.

44 | P a g e

Besides, for the resort to self-defense to succeed, the following

elements must be proven: (1) unlawful aggression, (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression,
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the one
defending oneself.[19] Self-defense must be proven by sufficient,
satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of
criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it. [20] Such
evidence is sorely lacking in this particular case. Without adequate
proof of unlawful aggression, self-defense cannot stand.
Denial
The other appellants deny their involvement in the crimes,
because
the
altercation
was
between Juanito and
the
deceased. Appellant MarcosAsuela insists that he immediately called
for the assistance of barangayofficials when the deceased
hacked Juanitos head with a sickle. The rest contend that they were
somewhere else when the commotion occurred:Alberto was
supposedly in the house of a certain Mang Dodong, thepurok leader,
together
with Kagawad Doromal and
Policeman Rabina;Teofilo Boyet Capacillo, at St. Joseph Church
in Quezon City where, together with his wife, he was selling religious
items; and Rogelio Asuela, at home watching a championship
basketball game on television.
We are not convinced. Appellants denials cannot overcome the
positive identification by the three prosecution witnesses. [21] The
latters testimonies clearly show the formers participation in the
mauling and the killing of Wilfredo. Besides, unsubstantiated denials
are negative,selfserving and have no weight in law. They cannot be
given greater evidentiary value than that given to testimonies of
credible witnesses on affirmative matters.[22]
Alibi
Alberto and Roger Asuela proffer the defense of alibi which is not
tenable, either, because they have failed to show by clear and
convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to
have been at the scene of the crimes.[23]
Clearly, appellants alibis are tenuous. Mang Dodongs house,
where Alberto Asuela was allegedly engaged in a drinking spree, was
only 500 meters from the crime scene; [24] Roger Asuelas house, only
30-40 meters away.[25] Because they were not able to show that the
crime scene was inaccessible from St. Joseph Church, they therefore
failed to establish that they were somewhere else when the crimes
took place, and that it was impossible for them to have been present
at the situs of the crimes at the time they were committed.[26]
We affirm the RTCs ruling that appellants alibi and denial cannot
prevail over the affirmative testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
[27]

Conspiracy

We also hold that the trial court did not err in finding that
conspiracy had attended the crimes.
Surrounding and, in a concerted fashion, assaulting the unarmed
victim proved that appellants had intentionally and voluntarily acted
together for the realization of a common criminal intent to kill the
victim.[28]Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually
demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is
evident.[29]
Criminal Case No. 3366-97
The
conviction
of
appellants
for
the
murder
of Wilfredo Villanueva is sufficiently supported by the evidence. On
direct examination, Hayennarrated how appellants collectively and
individually mauled and killed her father, as follows:
Q Now, you said [a while] ago that you remember there was
an unusual or untoward incident that transpired[;]
kindly inform this Honorable Court what was that
unusual incident that transpired[.]
A Juanito Asuela called
my
father,
stabbed
and
tear[-] gased my father and they helped each other, sir.
Q Where was Juanita Asuela when he called your father?
A He was outside our yard, in the street, sir.
Q And when your father was called by Juanito Asuela, did
your father approach Juanito Asuela?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in what place did Juanita Asuela stab your father, was
it in the street or somewhere else?
A He stabbed my father in the gate of our yard, sir.
Q You stated [a while] ago that he was tear[-]gas[s]ed, do
you still remember?
xxx xxx xxx
Q By the way, x x x what part of your fathers body was
tear[-]gased byBoyet Capacillo?
A His eyes, sir.
Q And how many times did Juanito Asuela stab your father,
if you saw it?
A As I remember, there were many stab blows, sir.
Q And was your father hit with those several stab blows
by JuanitoAsuela?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where was your father hit?
A He was hit on his chest, sir.
Q Were you able to see that instrument used
by Juanito Asuela in stabbing your father?
A Yes, sir.
Q What kind of instrument did he use?
A A knife, sir.

45 | P a g e

Q What kind of knife was it, a kitchen knife, a balisong or

what?
A A kitchen knife, sir.
Q And
you
also
stated
awhile
ago
in Tagalog,
At siya po aypinagtulungan,[] do you still affirm that?
A Yes, sir.
Q Kindly inform this Honorable Court who were those other
persons who ganged up [on] your father?
A Marcos Asuela,
Jun-Jun Asuela,
Roger Asuela, Boyet Capacillo,
Miguel Asuela and
Alberto Asuela, sir.
Q What did this Marcos Asuela do to your father?
A He hit my father with a lead pipe, sir.
PROS. RAMOLETE:
May I make it of record that my witness is crying.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Was your father hit with those blows delivered by
Marcos Asuela with the use of a lead pipe?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where was your father hit?
A In his head, sir.
Q Kindly point to your head where your father was hit with
those blows delivered by Marcos Asuela?
A Here on his forehead, sir.
Q How many times did this Marcos Asuela club your father
with that lead pipe?
A Many times, sir.
Q What part of his body was hit with those [that were]
several times delivered by Marcos Asuela [with the use
of] that lead pipe?
A On his body, on his chest, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about this Roger Asuela, what did Roger Asuela do
to your father?
A He hit my father with a lead pipe, sir.
Q How many times did this Roger Asuela hit your father with
a pipe?
A Many times, sir.
Q And was your father hit with those blows delivered by
Roger Asuelawith that lead pipe?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where was your father hit?
A On the different parts of his body, sir.
Q Where in particular?
A He was hit on the upper part of his hip and left eyebrow,
sir.

Q And where was this Roger Asuela positioned in relation to

the position of your father when he clubbed your father
with that pipe?
A He was also in front of my father, sir.
Q Were you able to see this Roger Asuela[? W]here did he
get that pipe which he used in clubbing your father?
A No, sir, because when they approached my father they
were already carrying with them those instruments, sir.
Q What about Marcos Asuela, were you able to see
x x x where he got that lead pipe which he used in
clubbing your father?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where did he get that lead pipe?
A He got the lead pipe from the artesian well because the
pipe there is detachable, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about this Alberto Asuela, what did he do to your
father?
A My father was already dead then when Alberto Asuela got
a pointed bamboo and stabbed the right foot of my
father and he even uttered bad words, sir.
Q Were you able to hear those bad words which
Alberto Asuelauttered?
A Yes,
sir,
and
he
said, Wala iyan, mahina iyan, sisiw pala iyan, and he
even spit on my father, sir.
Q And how far were you when these Marcos Asuela,
Juanita Asuela,Boyet Capacillo,
Jun-Jun Asuela,
Roger Asuela, Miguel Asuela and Alberto Asuela were
doing this to your father?
A I was inside our house, sir.
Q How far?
A About six (6) arms[-]length, sir.
xxx xxx xxx.[30]
Criminal Case No. 3365-97
The Court is also convinced that appellants collectively and
individually attacked and injured Anthony, who testified as follows:
Q Now, upon seeing your father being ganged up [on] by
these seven (7) accused, what did you do?
A When I saw my father being ganged up [on] by them, I
went
near
them
to
help
my
father
but Boyet said: Hayan pa ang isa.
Q And what else transpired, Mr. witness?
A When Boyet said hayan pa ang isa, suddenly, I felt that
somebody hit me at my back, sir.
Q And what else transpired, Mr. witness?
A When I was hit, I fell down, sir.

46 | P a g e

Q And then?
A When I fell down, Roger hit me with a lead pipe on my
head, sir.
Q And then, what else?
A Marcos also hit me with a lead pipe on my head, sir.
Q And what else transpired?
A I fell down and Juanito stabbed me on my neck, and also
on the left side of my body, sir.
FISCAL:
In between his left armpit and left nipple with visible scars,
your Honor please.
Q How many times did Juanito Asuela stab you?
A Three (3) times, sir.
Q Where were you hit, in what part of your body were you
hit by that stabbing blow delivered by Mr.
Juanita Asuela[? A]gain, will you point to this Court the
exact position where you were hit by that stabbing
blow?
FISCAL:
Witness, you[r] Honor please, is pointing to his left eyebrow,
right side of his neck with a scar visible, and the other
one at the left side of his body in between his left armpit
and left nipple with visible scars.
Q And after that, Mr. Witness, after Marcos Asuela hit you
with that lead pipe hitting you on your head and Roger
also hitting you with that lead pipe on your head
and Juanito Asuela stabbing you 3 times, what else
transpired, Mr. Witness?
A When I fell down and they were being pacified by my
brother Mark Villanueva, that was the time that I was
able to run and Jonjon, Miguel and Roger chased me, sir.
[31]

However, we are not convinced that appellants should be held

liable for frustrated murder. The evidence presented by the
prosecution failed to show conclusively that the wounds inflicted on
Anthony were fatal or serious. Dr. Jose Aladin Bongco, the doctor who
had attended to Anthony at the Amang Rodriguez Medical Center,
opined that all of the latters wounds can be fatal, [32] implying that the
former was not sure of their gravity. The extent of the medical
treatment Dr. Bongco gave the victim was limited to first aid -stopping the flow of blood from the wounds -- as the latter had
refused further medical examination and treatment. On crossexamination, the doctor declared:
Q You stated that any of the three (3) wounds, you
considered fatal, is that correct?
A It could be fatal, sir.

Q And you attest also below that the duration is less than
nine (9) days, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Doctor, [a while] ago, you stated among others that the
patient refuses to [have] further treatment, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q We noticed that below the medico-legal findings,
Dr. Bongco, that [to] the patient Anthony Villanueva,
you recommended that the condition of his wounds may
last x x x nine (9) days [or less] unless [a] complication
arises. Do you agree with me that the wounds were
slight injuries only?
A Externally, the wounds look like non-penetrate [sic]
because of the limitation of further work out[.] I cant tell
[if] the patient is having penetrating injuries but based
on the external signs of the injuries, sir. [33] [Italics
supplied]
He even reported his findings in the Medico-Legal Certificate as
follows:
Lacerated wound 4 cms left fronto parietal
Stab wound 3 cm 4th ICS AAL left
Lacerated wound 3 cms right frontal
Positive alcoholic breath
xxx xxx xxx
The above mentioned conditions may last [for] x x x nine days [or
less] unless complications [arise].[34]
In the absence of more convincing evidence, we hold that the
prosecution failed to prove that appellants had fatally wounded
Anthony Villanueva. Thus, they should be held liable only for slight
physical injuries under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code. [35] This
is because his injuries lasted less than nine days.
Third Issue:
Abuse of Superior Strength
From the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, it is clear that
appellants abused their superior strength. They used excessive force
out of proportion to the means for self-defense available to the
person they attacked.[36] Aside from being numerically superior to the
unarmedWilfredo and his son Anthony, the assailants were also
armed with knives, pointed bamboo poles, tear gas and lead
pipes. And, equally important, they used their superior number and
weapons to their great advantage in methodically attacking their
prey.
Proper Penalty

47 | P a g e

The solicitor general contends that the trial court erred in

refusing to impose on appellants an indeterminate sentence for the
murder ofWilfredo Villanueva.
We disagree. Section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act
No. 4103, as amended) provides that it shall not apply to persons
convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life
imprisonment; x x x. It must be noted that appellants were convicted
of murder which is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death
under the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in the absence of any proven
aggravating circumstance, they were correctly sentenced by the trial
court to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision in
Criminal Case No. 3366-97 is AFFIRMED, while that in Criminal Case
No. 3365-97 is MODIFIED; appellants are found GUILTY of SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES and are hereby SENTENCED to twenty days of
ARRESTO MENOR.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 134823-25. January 14, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ANTONIO HAMTON a.k.a.
BOY NEGRO, ANTONIO RAMIREZ alias TONG or CHITO, accused.
ARTHUR PANGILINAN y DE GUZMAN a.k.a. TORING, ARNOLD LOPEZ y
SERRANO a.k.a. ADAN MANALO, REYNALDO YAMBOT y
MASAGAYA, and JUN NOTARTE (at large), accused.
ARTHUR PANGILINAN y DEGUZMAN a.k.a. TORING, ARNOLD LOPEZ y
SERRANO a.k.a. ADAN MANALO and REYNALDO YAMBOT y
MASAGAYA, appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court for automatic review is the Joint Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 70, penned by Judge Pablito M.
Rojas in Criminal Cases Nos. 105326, 106115 and 106116, finding Arthur
Pangilinan, Arnold Lopez and Reynaldo Yambot guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of kidnapping for ransom and illegal possession of firearms
and imposing upon each of them the supreme penalty of death and a prison
term of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years.
Antonio Hamton, who was found guilty of robbery and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from four (4) years of prision correccional to eight (8)
years of prision mayor in Criminal Case No. 105326, filed an appeal with this
Court, but later withdrew the same.[1]
The Solicitor General narrates the antecedent facts of the case as follows:
Teofilo Garcia, and his wife, Leonida, were the sole distributors of the Singer Sewing
Machines under the business name Gamier Industrial Sewing Machines. On March 8,
1994, around eleven oclock in the morning, two armed men, later identified as Jun
Notarte and Reynaldo Yambot, entered the Garcias office and showroom at 322 Shaw
Boulevard, Mandaluyong City and announced a hold-up. After emptying Teofilos
drawer of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) in cash, they took him with them outside
to a waiting light gray Mitsubishi Lancer. Inside the car were two other men, later
identified as herein appellant Arnold Lopez and Arthur Pangilinan. Teofilo was shoved
into the backseat of the car and blindfolded with black sunglasses covered with
adhesive tapes. One of the men told him, Pera lang ang kailangan namin sa iyo. His
abductors then divested him of his gold ring worth Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00), his gold bracelet worth Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), his gold
necklace worth Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), and his wallet containing, among
others, Two Thousand Three Hundred Pesos (P2,300.00) in cash.
About the time Teofilo was being led out of the office, Leonida arrived. Seeing her
husbands plight, she immediately approached the Mitsubishi Lander and asked the
men inside why they were taking her husband. In response, appellant hit her on the
nose with a gun and pushed her away. The Mitsubishi Lancer then sped away.
After traveling for about two hours, the Mitsubishi Lancer stopped. TeofIlos abductors
transferred him to a trimobile where, accompanied by appellant, he traveled for thirty
minutes more before finally stopping. Teofilo was brought to a house where he was
confined in a room with no windows. To prevent him from escaping, his left wrist was
chained to an iron grill. Three or four persons guarded him.

48 | P a g e

On March 10, 1994, around eleven oclock in the morning, appellant, who identified
himself as Adan Manalo, called up Leonida, telling her to prepare the amount of Ten
Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as ransom money for her husbands release. When
Leonida pleaded for the amount to be lowered since she could not afford it, appellant
put the phone down.
On March 12, 1994, appellant called up Leonida to inquire if she had already raised
the ransom amount. Leonida replied that she had raised only Six Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P600,000.00) and would be needing more time to raise the rest of the amount.
Appellant called again around twelve noon of March 14, 1994. Asked how much
money she had already raised, Leonida answered that she was still trying to raise the
needed amount. She also requested appellant to get for her the key to their office vault
from her husband, so that she could get the money inside and add it to the money to be
paid as ransom.
Accordingly, appellant, on March 15, 1994, told Teofilo to give him the key to their
office vault and to write a note for his family so that they would know that he was still
alive. Teofilo did as he was instructed.
Around eight oclock in the morning of March 16, 1994, appellant called up Leonida to
inform her that the key to their office vault as well as a note from her husband was
ready for her pick-up at Andoks Litson located at EDSA corner Estrella Street. By ten
oclock of the same morning, Leonida was in possession of the key and the note. She
was able to confirm that the note was in her husbands handwriting. When appellant
called her again later that day, Leonida informed him that she had gotten the key and
the note, and that she had raised One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) already.
Unimpressed, appellant told her that this was not enough and that he would call her
again the next day.
True to his word, appellant called around noontime the following day. Informed by
Leonida that she now had One Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000.00),
appellant seemed finally satisfied. He then gave Leonida instructions for the pay-off.
At a little before four oclock that afternoon, she should be at the Magallanes flyover
and open the hood of her car to make it appear that it developed engine trouble.
Appellant would then drive by and stop his car beside hers. After he identifies himself
as Adan, Leonida should immediately hand over the ransom money to him.
All this time, Leonida had been coordinating with the Task Force Habagat of the
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC). Alerted of these latest developments,
Col. Michael Ray Aquino, Chief of Special Operations, PACC, planned for the
delivery of the ransom money and Teofilos rescue. Eight teams were formed to
monitor the pay-off and conduct rescue operations. The ransom money was placed in a
light blue Dunlop bag (Exhibit G) and Leonida was instructed to wear a green dress for
easy identification at the pay-off site.
About 3:45 in the afternoon of the same day, Leonida, accompanied by her driver,
arrived at the pay-off site on board her Pajero. Pursuant to appellants instructions,
Leonidas driver opened the hood of the Pajero. A red Toyota Corolla with Plate No.
PFW 688 then approached and stopped just beside the Pajero. Leonida saw her
husband seated between two men at the back of the red car. Meanwhile, appellant, who
was seated in front at the passenger side, got down from the car. After identifying
himself as Adan, Leonida gave the Dunlop bag containing the ransom money to him.
The Toyota Corolla then sped away.

Inside the Toyota Corolla, appellant gave Teofilo Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) for
taxi, assuring him that they would drop him off a short distance away. Before they
could do so, however, they noticed a speeding white Nissan Sentra behind them.
Appellant warned his companions, Puwesto kayo, delikado tayo mga kasama, alert
kayo, puwesto kayo. Without stopping to release Teofilo anymore, the Toyota Corolla
raced along EDSA towards Cubao, with the Nissan Sentra in hot pursuit. The chase
continued until the Toyota Corolla stopped near the intersection of Guadix Drive and
ADB Avenue: Using an armalite, Jun Notarte, the driver of the Toyota Corolla, opened
fire at the Nissan Sentra, shattering its windshield. Col. Raymundo Padua and his team
members, the occupants of the Nissan Sentra, returned fire. During, the exchange of
gunfire, Jun Notarte managed to escape. However, his companions, namely appellant,
Arthur Pangilinan, and Reynaldo Yambot, were not as lucky. After about ten minutes
of intermittent firing, they were finally subdued and taken into custody. Teofilo was
successfully rescued, shaken but unharmed.
Among the items recovered from Teofilos kidnappers were the following: the Dunlop
bag containing the ransom money in the amount of One Million Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000.00); additional cash in the amount of Thirty Two
Thousand Six Hundred Forty Seven Pesos (P32,647.00); an M-16 armalite rifle with
Serial No. 164881 (Exhibit CC); and a .45-caliber pistol with Serial No. 1163568
(Exhibit A). Subsequent verification revealed that the M-16 armalite rifle and the .45caliber pistol were not registered with the Firearms and Explosives Office, Camp
Crame, Quezon City, and that no license to possess these firearms had ever been issued
in the names of any of Teofilos kidnappers.
Separately apprehended in connection with his kidnapping incident was Antonio
Hamton. Having somehow learned about Teofilos abduction, Antonio, at the same time
that appellant was negotiating with [Leonida] for the ransom money, was also calling
up Leonida, pretending to be her husbands kidnapper. Antonios ruse was eventually
discovered, but not before he was already able to extort Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) from Leonida.[2]
An Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1061. 14, was filed on
April 1 4, 1994. It charged appellants in this manner:
That [on] or about March 8, 1994 at about 11:00 oclock in the morning at Shaw
Boulevard, corner Aquino Lane in Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being all
private persons conspiring, confederating and mutually helping/aiding each other and
by means of force, threats or intimidation and with the use of arms and vehicles, for
the purpose of demanding money or ransom, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously abduct and kidnap TEOFILO M. GARCIA while at his office; and that
once in their physical custody and control detain and deprive him of his liberty against
his will, and demand TEN (P10,000,000) Million from his wife Leonida Garcia, in
exchange for her husbands life, safety and freedom, but which amount through sheer
patient appeals/negotiation was later reduced to P1 .2 Million, which accused finally
agreed and accepted which said Mrs. Leonida Garcia, did in fact give, pay and deliver
the said amount or ransom money to accused to her loss, damage and prejudice. [3]
A second Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 106116, was filed
against appellants thus:
That, on or about March 8 & 17, 1994 in the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named

49 | P a g e

accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their
possession, custody and control, a Caliber 45 Pistol, bearing Serial No. SN-1 163568,
and one (1) M-16 Rifle with Serial No. RP 164881, without first having secured the
necessary license and/or permit, from the corresponding office/agency of government.
[4]

During their arraignment on May 2, 1994, appellants, assisted by their

respective counsels, pleaded not guilty to the twin charges of kidnapping for
ransom and illegal possession of firearms.[5] After a joint trial, they were found
guilty via the automatically appealed Decision, which reads in part:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Arthur Pangilinan y de Guzman, a.k.a
Toring; Arnold Lopez y Serrano, a.k.a. Adan Manalo; and Reynaldo Yambot y
Masagaya, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses of Kidnapping for
ransom and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as
charged in Criminal Case No. 106115 and of the offense of Illegal Possession of
Firearms as charged in Criminal Case No. 106116. For the offense of kidnapping for
ransom and serious illegal detention, said accused are hereby meted out the death
penalty. For the offense of Illegal Possession of Firearms, said accused are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of six years and one day to eight years and to pay a fine
of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 30,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
Accused Pangilinan, Lopez and Yambot are further ordered to return to the private
complainant, Teofilo Garcia, the sum of FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
PESOS (PHP 4,300.00) representing the total amount of cash taken from the latters
office and his person during the abduction, as well as to return or restore to said private
complainant the gold bracelet and the gold necklace or if the same is no longer
possible, to pay the value of the same which is PHP 50,000.00 each. In addition, said
accused are hereby ordered to indemnify, in solidum, the private complainant, Teofilo
Garcia, the amount of TWO MILLION PESOS (PHP 2,000,000.00) and to the wife of
the complainant, Leonida Garcia, the amount of ONE MILLION PESOS (PHP
1,000,000.00), by way of moral damages.[6]
Appellants submitted individual appeal briefs assailing the RTC Decision.
They aver that the trial court failed to establish clearly that they had all
committed conspiracy to commit kidnapping for ransom. The lower court
should have imposed individual penalties upon them depending on their
degree of participation in the crime.
Appellants also question their conviction for illegal possession of firearms,
arguing that the prosecution failed to produce sufficient evidence showing their
physical or constructive possession of the subject firearms. Further, they
contend that their conviction for the said offense cannot be made on the basis
of the testimony of a prosecution witness of questionable credibility and
competence.
Specifically, appellant Reynaldo Yambot assigns the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT REYNALDO YAMBOT AS CO-CONSPIRATOR IN
COMMITTING THE OFFENSE OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM
II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED

REYNALDO YAMBOT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION WAS
NOT CREDIBLE ENOUGH TO TESTIFY.[7]
This assignment of errors has been adopted by appellant Arnold Lopez
with the following addition:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED ARNOLD LOPEZ
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED
DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY REPRESENTED
DURING THE PRESENTATION OF CO-ACCUSED ARTHUR PANGILINAN AS
HOSTILE WITNESS.[8]
On the other hand, appellant Arthur Pangilinan ascribes the following
errors to the trial court:
3.1 THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT
AS A CONSPIRATOR IN THE OFFENSE OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM AND
SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION.
3.2 THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THAT HE WAS IN
PHYSICAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF ANY OF THE SUBJECT
FIREARMS AND THAT HE HAD ANIMUS POSSIDENDI AS REGARDS THESE
FIREARMS.[9]
After a careful review of the records and the arguments of both the
prosecution and the defense, this Court agrees with the trial court that all three
appellants are guilty of kidnapping for ransom, but not of illegal possession of
firearm.
Appellants all rely on the defense of denial and alibi. They point to Jun
Notarte, who is still at large, as. the mastermind of the kidnapping. They
maintain that they merely accepted his offer of jobs with higher pay, and that
they were not privy to his plans to kidnap Garcia. Plainly, they want this Court
to believe that they were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time with the
wrong companion and for the wrong reason.
Appellant Arnold Lopez claims that Notarte offered him a job to train as a
soldier, with better pay.[10] He says that because of his meager earnings as a
construction worker, he was easily enticed by Notartes promise. [11] He alleges,
however, that he was not present during the abduction of the victim, because
he was working in Paraaque, installing doors and windows from March 8 to 15,
1994.[12] It was only because of the job offer that he was present during the
pay-off. He argues further that his participation in the kidnapping incident was
very minimal, if any, so he could not have been a co-conspirator in the crime. [13]
On the other hand, Reynaldo Yambot alleges that Notarte promised to
help him apply as a driver of the latters superior officer.[14] Yambot maintains
that, because he was driving his jeepney in Caloocan from March 8 to 16,
1994,[15] he was not present during the abduction of the victim. The only reason
he was present during the pay-off was that Notarte had actually engaged him
as a driver, but without his knowing anything about the abduction that had
already taken place.[16]

50 | P a g e

Finally, Arthur Pangilinan claims that he was offered a job to watch

Notartes car at five hundred pesos a day.[17] He maintains that there were no
overt acts that would link him to the kidnapping other than his being merely an
ill-fated passenger of the car used by his co-accused in two occasions, i.e., in
kidnapping Mr. Garcia and in receiving the ransom from the victims wife.
[18]
Further, his wife was presented in court to corroborate his claim that he had
not taken part in the plan to commit the kidnapping.
At the outset, we emphasize that the identities of all the accused were
adequately established by the clear and convincing testimonies of the victim
and his wife. Particularly persuasive was the narration by Garcia of the events
that led to his abduction, his captivity, the ransom payment and his eventual
release and rescue. He never wavered in his story, even when he was
subjected to an exhausting cross-examination by the defense counsels. He
testified thus:
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q On March 8, 1994 at about 11:00 in the morning do you remember
where were you?
A Yes, sir. I was in my office at about 11:00 in the morning at Shaw
Blvd.
Q Were you alone in your office?
A I was with my three employees, sir.
Q What are their names?
A They are Grace Munda, Aurora Mckinley and Dado Mercado, sir.
COURT:
Q How is he related to your wife?
A He is the cousin of my wife, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q On that occa[s]ion, do you recall having received a visitor in your
office?
A Yes, sir. Two men arrived.
Q What questions, if any, did they ask you upon entering your
showroom?
ATTY. LEONARDO:
No basis, Your Honor.
COURT:
He said he had two visitors. Witness may answer.
WITNESS:
A When the two men entered in our office, one pretended to be a
customer and the other one approach[ed] my three employees,
sir.
xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Why do you say that one of them pretended to be a customer?
A Because he was the one who asked me about the price of the
sewing machine, sir.
Q Was there anything unusual that happened afterwards?
ATTY. LEONARDO:
We will object, Your Honor. The question is leading.

COURT:
How can it be leading? Objection overruled. Witness may answer.
WITNESS:
A Yes, there was, sir.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q What is it?
A The one who pretended as a customer pulled out the gun and
pointed it at me and said, hold-up, sir.
Q What kind of firearm did you see?
A Its a 45 caliber, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
All right. You said that, there were two male visitors who entered your
showroom that day, what was the other one doing?
A The other one poked a gun on my three employees, sir.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Can you identify the man who pointed the gun at your three
employees if you see him again?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please look around the courtroom and point to the man
who pointed a gun at your three employees?
COURT:
Why dont you ask him the guy who poked the gun at him.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
He was the one who got away, Your Honor. There were four
kidnappers, one of them escape. He is at large.
COURT:
All right. Let him identify.
Q Yung nagtutok sa iyo [ng] baril nandito ba?
A Wala po.
Q Yung nagtutok ng baril sa tatlo nandito ba?
A Opo. He is here, your Honor.
Q Yung nagtutok ng baril sa tatlong empleyado mo, ituro mo,
bumababa ka at ituro mo.
INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to a man whom when asked identify himself
as Reynaldo Yambot.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q You stated that the man [who] pretended to be a customer poked a
gun at you, what did he want?
COURT:
He already said, hold-up.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q What did he do afterwards, if he did anything?
A After he said, hold-up, he opened the drawer of my table and g[o]t
some P2,000.00 cash, sir.
Q Having taken the money, what did he do afterwards?

51 | P a g e

A Then he told me, you go with us, sir. After taking the money he
said,sama ka sa amin.
Q What was your reaction?
A I went along with him, sir.
Q Why did you go with him?
A I went with him because it was a hold-up and I was afraid so I went
with him, sir.
Q At the time he made those statements, what was he doing to the
gun?
A He tucked it in his waist, sir.
Q Did you go with him willing?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why?
A Baka patayin po ako kaya sumama ako. Perhaps they would kill
me so I went along with him, sir.
Q Where did he take you?
A They b[r]ought me outside the door and outside was a car waiting,
sir.
[A] I am showing you pictures of a car ... (discontinued)
COURT:
Excuse me. Why dont you ask him first to describe the car.
Q Anong itsura ng kotse?
A It was a lancer with a color which looks like a silver green with
tinted windows and partially tinted front glass, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q How did you enter the vehicle that was waiting for you?
A The car was opened by accused Jun Notarte and I was pushed
inside, sir.
FISCAL VILLA-IGNACIO:
Your Honor please, actually the witness said tinuhod meaning a
person used his knee to shove him inside the vehicle. Its more
of a kick, Your Honor.
WITNESS:
A The car was opened by accused Ju[n] Notarte and he used his
knee to shove me inside, sir.
ATTY. DE LEON:
We adopt the tagalog translation also, Your Honor.
WITNESS:
A Tinuhod niya ako papasok sa kotse.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Did you enter the front seat or the back seat?
A The back seat, sir.
Q Once you were inside the vehicle, will you tell the Court what
happened?
A I was sand[w]iched by two men, sir.
COURT:
Q Who was the one to your right?

A Arthur Pangilinan was on my right, Your Honor.

Q And who was on your left?
A Yambot was on my left, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Is the man whom you mentioned, Arthur Pangilinan, can you
identify him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is he in the courtroom?
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Bumaba ka at ituro nyo po.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a man inside the courtroom whom when
asked identify himself as Arthur Pangilinan.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q After you were seated sandwiched between two men, do you
recall if there were any persons seated on the front of the
vehicle?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the drivers seat who was seated?
A Ju[n] Notarte was in the drivers seat, sir.
Q And on the seat beside the driver?
A Beside the driver was Arnold Lopez, sir.
Q Can you identify the man whom you said as Arnold Lopez? A Yes,
sir.
Q Please point to him.
FISCAL VILLA-IGNACIO:
For the record, Your Honor, witness is stepping down from the
witness stand and appearing to [point] to a man whom when
asked answered by the name of Arnold Lopez.
ATTY. MACATANGAY:
For the record, Your Honor, Arnold Lopez is [the] man who is walking
with c[r]utches.
COURT:
Make it of record that the man is using c[r]utches.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q After you were seated in the car, will you please state what
transpired, if any?
A Yung sunglass na sinasabing piring, piniringan po ako rito.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Did you not ask these men what they wanted from you? A I a[sk]ed
them what they want from me, sir.
ATTY. MACATANGAY:
Very leading, Your Honor.
COURT:
I will allow that.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q And what is the answer, if any?

52 | P a g e

A Pera lang ang kailangan namin sa iyo, that was what they told me,
sir.
Q After you were already in the car, what did you try to do in the car?
A None, sir. We were on the road.[19]
Thereafter, Garcia further recounted his ordeal, replete with details that he
could not have simply concocted. He narrated how he had been brought to a
house where he was chained to an iron grill [20] and detained for ten days.[21] His
testimony included details of how he had been fed, how he had relieved
himself during his detention, and how he had been asked by appellant Lopez
to write a letter to his family to assure them that he was still alive. [22] The
testimony of the victim regarding the ransom payment was likewise credible
and convincing. He detailed the events leading to the pay-off, from the time he
was awakened to the time of the actual shoot-out that eventually led to the
arrest of appellants.[23]
His wife, who was also present during the abduction, corroborated his
testimony as follows:
FISCAL DAOSOS:
Q Will you tell this Honorable Court, Mrs. Garcia, if on March 8, 1994
you reported for work in your office?
A Yes, I reported for work about 11 oclock.
Q Were you able to reach your office that morning of March 8, 1994?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you recall of any unusual incident that took place that morning?
A I saw my husband being led by the arm by a man and another man
was just behind my husband and closely following.
COURT:
Q Where were they going?
A I saw them going to board a blue grey vehicle.
FISCAL DAOSOS:
Q Would you know the model or make of the car?
A I did not notice but I know it was colored blue grey.
Q What else happened when you saw that your husband was being
led inside the car?
A I saw that my husband as if he was shoved inside (tinuhod).
Q Who of the two, if you saw, tumuhod sa asawa mo? A Hes a tall
man with fair complexion.
Q The one who shoved, would you kindly look around if he is in the
courtroom?
A He is not around.
Q What about the other one who closely followed your husband?
A He is here.
Q Will you kindly go down and identify him by lightly tapping his
shoulder?
INTERPRETER:
The witness pointed to a man inside the courtroom who when asked
identified himself as Reynaldo Yambot.
[FISCAL DAOSOS:]

Q After your husband was shoved inside that grey car, what else
happened, if you know?
A I alighted from my car and opened the front door of the blue grey
vehicle. I saw my husband with a blindfold and a gun pointed to
him.
Q You said when you opened the car, you saw your husband already
wearing a black blindfold sunglass. If you are shown that
sunglass or black blindfold would you be able to recognize it?
A Yes, sir.
Q Im showing to you a plastic sunglass which was previously
marked, Your Honor, as exh. C. Will you kindly go over and tell
this Honorable Court what is the relation of that black sunglass
to the blindfold you were referring to [a] while ago?
A Parang ganito po.
Q You also said that someone pointed a gun at your husband. What
particular part of the head or the face was the gun pointed?
A The gun was pointed to my husbands neck.
Q Would you be able to recognize the person who was pointing a
gun at your husband?
A I would not know who was the person who pointed a gun to my
husband.
Q What kind of gun was pointed, was it a long firearm or a short
firearm?
ATTY. LEONARDO:
We object to that question, Your Honor. He is suggesting to the
witness her answer
FISCAL DAOSOS:
If she knows.
COURT:
Q What kind of gun was that?
A It was a short gun.
FISCAL DAOSOS:
Q If you are shown a gun of that description, as you said short[,
w]ould you be able to recall whether the gun that we are going
to show you will be similar to that pointed to your husbands
neck?
COURT:
Excuse me. Before you show that particular gun to the witness,
[d]o you know what sort of hand gun was pointed to your
husband?
A No, Your Honor. Basta baril. Para pong pagalingan lang yung baril
na yan, eh. Ngunit kung pakikitaan ako puwede k[o]ng ituro
pero hind ko alam kung anung klaseng baril yon.
FISCAL DAOSOS:
Q Im showing to you a [hand]gun. Will you be able to tell this
Honorable Court if the gun pointed to the neck of your husband
would be similar to this?
A Para pong kamukha.

53 | P a g e

FISCAL DAOSOS:
This was already marked as Exh. A, Your Honor.
Q Now, where was your husband seated, madam witness?
A Nasa gitna po siya ng dalawang lalake.
Q Where? [In f]ront or at the rear?
A He was seated at the rear of the car sandwiched by two persons.
Q Now, you said that your husband was seated between two
persons. Would you be able to tell this Honorable Court which of
the two pointed a gun at your husband. Was it the person sitting
at the left of your husband or the right side of your husband?
A I did not see clearly which of the two men was pointing a gun at my
husband.
Q You said, Mrs. Garcia, that your husband was seated between two
persons at the rear seat of the car, [is] that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Would you be able to recognize any of the two that sandwiched
your husband?
ATTY. LEONARDO:
Your Honor, the witness is incompetent to answer that.
COURT:
Let her answer if she knows.
A Yung pong isa sa kaliwa ng mister ko.
FISCAL DAOSOS:
Q Will you kindly look around this courtroom and point to the person
Identified, the person sitting at the left of your husband?
A At my husbands left was Reynaldo Yambut.
Q We go back to that portion where you said you immediately
opened the door of the front seat of the car
COURT:
You would not know or you would not recall the face of the man
who was seated to your husbands right?
A I cannot recall, Your Honor.
FISCAL DAOSOS:
Q You said that you opened the front seat of the car. Which side of
the door of the car that you opened?
A I opened the right side door of the vehicle.
Q Were you able to open the car?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you do, if any, when you opened the car?
A I asked them why they are taking my husband. What wrong has he
done.
Q What was their reply, if any?
A I did not hear any answer...
COURT:
Q Bakit wala kang narinig na sagot. Ano ang sinabi mo sa kanila?
A Ang sinabi ko po, ano ang kasalanan ng mister ko, bakit ninyo siya
kinuha. I did not hear any answer but instead I was whipped
with a gun.

Q Were you hit by this gun? Where were you hit?

A The gun hit my nose and my nose even bled on that day.
Q Will you tell this Honorable Court briefly what kind of gun was used
to whip you?
ATTY. LEONARDO:
The witness already answered she does not know what kind of
a gun was that.
[FISCAL DAOSOS:]
Q All right. The next question is, is it a long gun or a short gun?
A It was also a short gun.
Q Would you be able to say if the gun looks similar to the one that
was pointed to the neck of your husband?
ATTY. LEONARDO:
We interpose objection to that question, Your Honor. For the
reason that it is not only leading but the witness is incompetent
to testify on what kind of gun was she able to see.
FISCAL ASDALA:
The testimony refers to the husband not to the gun used in
whipping her.
FISCAL DAOSOS:
Q Would it be similar?
ATTY. LEONARDO:
Shes not in a position to testify...
COURT:
Just ask her to describe it.
A Parang pareho duon sa ipinakita sa akin. (It looks like the one I
was shown earlier).
COURT:
Witness referring to a caliber 45 marked as exhibit A.
FISCAL DAOSOS:
Q You said you asked them, why are you taking my husband, what
wrong has he done. Now, did you notice if there were people in
the front seat of the car?
A Yes, sir.
Q Would [you] be able to recognize the person who whipped you
with the gun?
A Nakilala ko po.
Q If he is in this courtroom would [you] be able to identify him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please step down and identify this person by lightly
tapping his shoulder?
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to a man inside the courtroom who identified
himself as Arnold Lopez.
[FISCAL DAOSOS:]
Q Where was this Arnold Lopez seated?
A He was seated in [f]ront beside the driver.
COURT:

54 | P a g e

Q Where was he at the time when he whipped you with the gun?
A He was seated beside the drivers seat.
FISCAL DAOSOS:
Q How about the drivers seat[,] was somebody there?
A Meron po.
Q Would you tell this Honorable Court if that man occupying the
drivers seat is inside this courtroom?
A He is not present.
Q Now, after you were whipped and you received no reply, what
happened, if any?
A Tinulak niya po ako palabas.
Q Who?
A Arnold Lopez pushed me out.
Q Now, after you were pushed out, what else happened?
A They sped away.
Q Were you able to observe to what direction they sped away?
A They were going towards the direction of Acacia Lane. [24]
These testimonies constitute persuasive and unassailable proof that all
the appellants committed the crime of kidnapping. Certainly, the positive
identification of them by the victim and his wife, who had ample opportunity to
see and remember their faces, more than satisfies the judicial mind and
conscience. It is natural for victims of crimes to strive to remember the faces of
their assailants and the manner in which they committed the crime. [25] Hence,
there is usually no reason for us to doubt their testimonies or to suspect their
motives. The present witnesses had close contact with the kidnappers when
the victim was abducted and his wife was hit with a gun. Further, the victim
was held for ten (10) days, which was more than ample time for him to be
familiar with them. His wife, on the other hand, was in constant communication
with one of the appellants during the ransom payment negotiations. She again
saw them during the actual ransom payment.
Moreover, the appellants did not even deny their presence during the
abduction or the ransom payment. This fact bolsters the credibility of the
spouses and confirms that they did not simply make up their narration of the
kidnapping.
As to the demand for and the actual payment of the ransom money, the
victims wife testified thus:
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q On March 17, 1994 you recall having received a telephone call?
A Opo.
Q At about what time did you receive the call?
A Banda pong mag-aalas dose ng umaga po.
Q And who was the one who called you?
A Si Adan po.
Q Was there any conversation?
A Mga sabi niya po sa akin nadagdagan na ba yong
pera? Opo,nadagdagan na ng dalawang daan.
COURT:

Dalawang daang piso? Dalawang daan? O two hundred

thousand?
A Two hundred thousand (P200,000.00).
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q And what did Adan say?
A x x x sabi niya Ito na dahil ang sabi mo gusto mong makausap ang
mister ma, ito na ang mister ma, kausapin mo na siya.
Q Were you able to talk to your husband?
A Opo, kinausap niya ako. Ang sabi niya po sa akin lumipat ka ng
bahay.
Q What else?
A Yon po ang sabi niya lumipat ako ng bahay. Pa[g]katapos ko daw
pong makipagusap.
COURT:
Just quote what he said. You quote what he actually said to you.
PROS. DAOSOS:
Ano ang sinabi?
A Opo. Ang sabi niya lumipat ako ng bahay.
COURT:
Hindi lumipat. Yong mismong sinabi niya. I-quote mo yang sinabi
niya mismo.
A Yon nga lumipat daw ako ng bahay.
COURT:
Hindi. Kung ano ang sinabi niya mismo.
A Lumipat ka ng bahay.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q To what house?
A Lumipat ka ng bahay. Pumunta ka doon kila nanay.
COURT:
Yon lang ba ang sinabi sa iyo sa telepono?
A. Oho. Tapos ang sagot ko bakit?
Q And what was the answer?
A Wala na po. Ang sumagot si Adan na po.
Q And what did Adan say?
A Ang sabi niya O, iready mo ang pera tatawag uli ako bago magala una.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q What else did he say? Is that all?
A Opo. Binaba na niya ang telepono.
Q Do you recall if on that day Adan Manalo called you up?
A Opo, tumawag po siya mga ala-una.
Q What was your conversation?
A Tinanong niya po sa akin kung magkano na ang pera. Ang sabi ko
po1.2 na.
Q 1.2 what?
A One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000.00) lang
ang naiipon ko. Nagalit po siya sa akin. Ang sabi niya
bakit 1.2 lang? Di ba sabi mo 2 million na. Akala ko two

55 | P a g e

million na. Hindi sabi ko. 1.2. lang ang naipon ko sa ngayon.
Baka puwede na iyon kapalit ng mister ko.
Q And what did Adan say?
A Na cut na naman[. [T]atawag uli ako[,] sabi niya.
Q Did he in fact call up again?
A Opo.
Q At about what time.
A Mag-aalas dos na po iyon.
Q Ng hapon?
A Ng hapon po.
Q And what was your conversation with him?
A Pumayag na po siya sa 1.2 na ibibigay ko sa kanya kapalit ng
mister ko.
Q When you said 1.2, what do you mean?
A Ransom money.
Q 1.2 what is that?
A One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000.00).
Q So you said he agreed already to the amount of one million two
hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000.00)?
A Opo.
Q In exchange [for] your husband?
A Opo.
Q And what else did you talk about?
A Binigyan niya po ako ng instruction kung saan ko ibibigay yang 1 .
2 million.
Q Could you tell us what is the instruction?
A Ang sabi niya po sa akin magkikita kami ng bago mag-alas
kuwatro ng hapon sa fly-over.
Q Fly-over where?
A Doon po sa Magallanes papuntang Alabang doon po sa ibabaw
tapat po daw ng Mercedes Benz Service. Doon po daw ako
tatapat at buksan ko daw iyong hood para po daw sira ... sira
yang sasakyan ko at saka buksan ko po daw lahat ang bintana
ng sasakyan ka.
Q Was there any other instructions?
A Ang sabi po niya ipaparada po daw niya sa tabi ng sasakyan ko at
saka bubuksan niya sasabihin niya ako si Adan. Doon ka po
daw ibibigay ang pera. Pag sinabi niyang siya si Adan doon
ka po daw ibibigay ang pera. At saka tinanong din po niya sa
akin kung anong sasakyan ang gagamitin ko.
Q Did you tell him?
A Opo, sinabi ko po Pajero ang gagamitin kong sasakyan. Ibinigay
ko po lahat yung plate number.
Q What plate number did you give?
A T as in Task, F as in Force and H as in Habagat. Number 808.
Q What else did you talk about?
A [Y]on pa. Sabi niya bago mag-alas kuwatro nandon na ako.
Binaba na po niya.

Q Now what happened after your phone conversation?

A I called up PACC.
Q Whom did you call?
A Si Major Aquino po at saka si Tinyente Mendoza. Nagpunta po sila
sa bahay.
Q Were you able to talk with them?
A Opo.
Q What was your conversation with them?
A Sinabi ko po sa kanila magbabayaran na kami dito sa lugar na ito
bago mag-alas kuwatro magkikita kami sa ibabaw ng fly-over.
Q Did you tell them what fly-over?
A Opo. Yan pang sa Magallanes papuntang Alabang doon po ako
pupuwesto.
Q What time you should go there?
A Bago mag-alas kuwatro nandoon na ako sa ibabaw.
Q What did Major Aquino and his companion tell you?
A Wala na pa. Umalis na po sila. Ako naman po papunta na sa
luga(r) na ibibigay ko yang pera.
COURT:
Q Are you saying that Major Aquino did not give you any instruction?
A Wala na po. Basta ang sabi niya O sige pumunta ka na doon.
Hindi ko na po alam kung ano ang gagawin nila.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Did you in fact go to the fly-over on the corner of Magallanes?
A Opo, pumunta po ako.
Q In what vehi[cl]e were you riding?
A Yon pang Pajero.
Q Who was driving?
COURT:
Q At what time did you leave your house?
A Siguro po mga alas 3:15 po.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Who was the driver?
A May driver po ako.
Q And where were you seated?
A Sa tabi po ng driver.
Q When you went to the place [w]here you bringing anything with
you?
A Opo, meron po.
Q What were you bringing?
A Yon pong pera na nakalagay sa bag.
COURT:
Q How much?
A One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000.00).
Q Place in?
A Nakalagay po sa bag na Dunlop na kulay asul.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Did you arrive at the fly-over in Magallanes?

56 | P a g e

COURT:
Were you not going to ask her to identify the bag?
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Later on Your Honor because the money were xeroxed. We will
ask her. Nakarating na ba kayo sa Magallanes?
A Opo, nakarating po kami.
Q And what happened upon your arrival in Magallanes?
A 3:45 ng makarating po kami doon.
Q Did your driver comply with the instruction to open the hood?
A Opo. Bumaba po siya at saka binuksan yong hood na kunwari
nasiraan yong sasakyan. Eh, matagal po kami doon. May
lumapit pa pong traffic aide. Ang sabi ko sandali na lang,
inaayos pa yong sasakyan eh. Ang sabi ko aalis na rin kami
dahil ho tumagal kami doon ng mga ten minutes eh. Tinataboy
na kami ng traffic aid. Ngayon ho sinara namin yong hood.
Lumakad ho kami unti-unti eh kasi nga hindi po ho siIa
dumarating. Eh ngayon siguro mga alas-kuwatro na ho sila
dumating biglang meron pumaradang red toyotasa tabi namin.
COURT:
Q Where did they park their car?
A They parked their car parallel to my car.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q You mentioned a red toyota. I am showing you Exhibit I on which
attached Exhibits I-1 and I-2, can you identify them?
A Para pang kahawig na ganito. Ganitong kulay.
Q Ang ano?
A Ang sasakyan.
Q Kahawig na paano?
A Para pong ganyan.
Q After this toyota car stoppped beside the Pajero, what transpired
next?
A Bumukas po yong dalawang bintana. Bandang kanan nila.
Dalawang bintana.
Q Nang ano? Nang anong kotse?
A Yong red toyota po.
Q And where were you at that time?
A Nandoon po ako sa tabi ng driver.
Q Nang?
A Nang sasakyan ko po, yong Pajero.
Q When those two (2) windows on the right side of the car, the toyota
car open did you see anything?
A Nakipag-usap po sa akin ... Nakita ko po ang mister ko at saka
yong katabi niya.
COURT:
Q Where was he seated? Right or left?
A Parang nasa gitna po. Parang nandito po siya sa tagiliran.
Q When you saw your husband where was he seated?
A Dito po sa tabi ng bintana.

Q Kaya nga, where was he seated?

A Sa likod po.
Q Yes, where was he seated, right, middle or left?
A Right.
Q Extreme right?
A Yes.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Was he alone in the back seat?
A Hindi ho. Nakita ko ho yong sa kaliwa niya.
Q Can you identify the man who was seated on his left?
A Opo. (Witness pointing to a man inside the court room, who, when
asked, answered by the name of Arthur Pangilinan.
Q Do I understand from you that there were only two (2) persons
seated at the back seat of the toyota?
A Apat po sila. Pang lima ang mister ko. Kaya lang hindi ko nakita
yong isa doon sa bandang hulihan.
Q Yong upuan lang sa likod yong katabi ng asawa mo? Ilang tao ang
nakita mong naroroon? Isang tao lang o...?
A Dalawa lang sila. Kaya lang hindi ko mamukhaan yong isa po
dahil yong bintana eh, hindi ko na siya makita.
Q What about in the front seat, was there anybody in the front seat?
A Meron po. Yon po si Adan.
Q Can you identify them?
A Opo, si Arnold Lopez.
COURT:
Q Saan nakaupo Si Arnold Lopez?
A Doon po sa harapan na tabi ng driver.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Can you identify him?
A Opo. (Witness pointing to a man inside the court room, who, when
asked, identified himself as Arnold Lopez as the man seated
beside the driver.)
Q Was there anyone seated at the drivers seat of the red toyota?
A Meron po yong driver. Kaya lang hindi ko po siya nakita. May tao
doon dahil dalawang bukas na bintana.
COURT:
Q Nakita mo yong driver?
A Hindi ko po nakita. Yong paa lang ang nakita ko.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Have you seen your husband in the car? What transpired next?
What happened after you saw your husband?
A After ho? Nakipag-usap po siya sa akin.
Q What did he say?
A Ang sabi niya uuwi na daw po ako magtataksi na lang siya.
Magtataksi na lang po daw siya pauwi sa amin. Tapos po
sinarado na po yong bintana.
COURT:
Will you please quote it.

57 | P a g e

A Umuwi ka na, uuwi na lang ako. Magtataksi na lang ako.

JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q You said ... You mentioned that you have with you on that day one
million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000.00)?
A Opo.
Q Now, what did you do with that money?
A Bumaba po si Adan.
COURT:
Q Who is Adan?
A Si Arnold Lopez. Sabi niya ako si Adan, amin na ang pera.
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q Where was Adan Manalo at the time he uttered that words?
ATTY. LEONARDO:
We object to the question of distinguished Justice Your Honor.
COURT:
Why?
ATTY. LEONARDO.
Because he already stated that Adan went out.
COURT:
He went out of the car.
ATTY. LEONARDO:
Yes, [he] went out Your Honor. The question is where was he
seated?
COURT:
Q Where was he if you know in relation to where he was
seated? Saan si Adan, ah, si Arnold Lopez?
A Doon po sa unahan ng sasakyan. Binuksan niya bumaba siya
pagkatapos kinuha niya ang pera sa akin.
Q Katabi siya ng driver mo?
A Opo. Ito po yong driver ka dito niya pinadaan ang pera.
Q Kaya nga saan nakatayo si Adan?
A Doon po sa labas sa tabi ng driver ko. (He was standing beside my
driver when I gave the money to him).
JUSTICE CONCEPCION:
Q I am showing you this kind of bag which bag has a word Dunlop
on it and previously marked as Exhibit G, can you identify this
bag?
A Opo, yan po ang pinaglagyan ko ng pera.
Q After you deliver the bag containing one million two hundred
thousand pesos (P1,200,000.00), what happened next?
A Umalis na po kami. Bumalik na po ako sa bahay namin.
Q When you say kami, to whom do you refer? Umalis na kami.
A Yong driver ko.
Q Yong driver mo at ikaw?
A Opo.
Q And what about the car what happened to it?
A UmaIis na rin po siya. Magkaiba kami ng daan. (They left and we
went Into different directions).

Q You said you went in different directions, the Pajero and the toyota
car. To what directions did you go?
A Going to Manila.
Q And what about the toyota car, where was it [heading]?.
A Hindi ko na po sila alam kung saan sila lumiko.[26]
Clearly, the appellants denial cannot overcome the positive identification
by the complaining witness and his wife.
As a defense, denial is indeed insipid and weak, being easy to fabricate
and difficult to disprove.[27] Mere denial of involvement in a crime cannot take
precedence over the positive testimony of the offended party.[28]
Strangely, considering their proven participation in the crime, appellants
Lopez and Yambot also proffer the defense of alibi. For it to prosper, however,
it is not enough for them to prove that they were somewhere else when the
crime was committed; they must likewise demonstrate that it was physically
impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the time. [29] This,
appellants miserably failed to show.
Moreover, other than giving self-serving testimonies, they did not present
any evidence to corroborate their denial and alibi. It cannot be gainsaid that
self-serving declarations are inadmissible as evidence of the facts asserted.
[30]
As a general rule, the reason for the exclusion of such evidence is not that it
might never contribute to the ascertainment of the truth. Rather, the reason is
that, if received, it would most likely consist of falsehoods fabricated for the
occasion and mislead more than enlighten.[31]
Time and time again, this Court has ruled that denial and alibi are the
weakest of all defenses, because they are easy to concoct and difficult to
disprove.[32] Furthermore, they cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal
identification of appellant by the offended party.[33] Absent any showing of ill
motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, a categorical,
consistent and positive identification of the accused prevails over denial and
alibi.[34] Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, denial and alibi are
negative, self-serving and undeserving of any weight in law.[35]
In the instant case, there is no showing of any improper motive on the
part of the victim or his wife to testify falsely against the accused or to implicate
them falsely in the commission of so heinous a crime. The logical conclusion,
then, is that no such improper motive exists and that the testimonies are
worthy of full faith and credence.[36]
Likewise, the fact that the judge who penned the decision was not the
same one who had heard the testimonies of all the witnesses is not a
compelling reason to jettison the findings of the court a quo. This circumstance
does not ipso facto render the judgment erroneous, more so when it appears
to be fully supported by the evidence on record. [37]While a judge in such a
situation has no way to test the credibility of all the witnesses, since he did not
have the unique opportunity of observing their demeanor and behavior under
oath, the trial courts factual findings are nonetheless binding on this Court
when these are ably supported by the evidence on record. [38] Unless there is a
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the validity of a decision is not
necessarily impaired by the fact that its ponente only took over from a
colleague who had earlier presided at the trial.[39]

58 | P a g e

Appellants also question the RTC decision finding all of them in

conspiracy to commit kidnapping for ransom. They submit that conspiracy was
not established with positive and conclusive evidence. According to them, to
be guilty of conspiracy, they must be shown to have participated in the criminal
design and, at the same time, to have committed overt acts necessary or
essential to the perpetration of the offense.
Such postulations are merely feeble attempts to escape liability. We do
not subscribe to the tale of appellants that they associated with Jun Notarte,
the alleged mastermind, simply because he had offered them high-paying jobs.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. [40] The
agreement need not be proven by direct evidence; [41] it may be inferred from
the conduct of the parties before, during and after the commission of the
offense, [42] pointing to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and
community of interest.[43] Indeed, jurisprudence consistently tells us that
conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense
was perpetrated.[44]
In the case at bar, as the trial court correctly held, conspiracy may be
deduced from the appellants acts that show concerted action and community
of interest. If it can be proven that two (2) or more persons aimed their acts
toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful object -- so that their acts,
though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating closeness of personal association and concurrence of sentiment -then conspiracy may be inferred, even though no actual meeting among them
to concert means can be shown.[45] Consequently, the conspirators shall be
held equally liable for the crime, because in a conspiracy the act of one is the
act of all.[46]
Undoubtedly, in perpetrating the kidnapping for ransom, conspiracy
existed among herein accused-appellants. Viewed in its totality, the individual
participation of each of them pointed to a joint purpose and criminal design.
Notarte and Yambot snatched the victim from his office in Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila.
Pangilinan and Yambot sandwiched him in the car and transported him,
together with the others, to a house where he was detained for ten days.
Lopez negotiated with the victims wife for the ransom payment. Further, all
three appellants set out to the designated place of ransom payment. These
acts were complementary to one another and were geared toward the
attainment of a common ultimate objective. That objective was to extort a
ransom of P10 million (which was later reduced to P1.2 million through
bargaining by the victims wife) in exchange for the victims freedom.
Moreover, it is difficult to accept the excuse of appellants that they had
nothing to do with the kidnapping. We agree with the following observation of
the trial court:
Pangilinans pretenses do not jibe well with reality. From his own version of the
incident, there was no need for Notarte to have hired him merely to watch the
former[]s car on the day of the abduction. For, it must be emphasized that when
Notarte and Yambot left the car and entered the building for the purpose of abducting
Garcia, one of Notartes companions, Arnold Lopez, was left in the car. Evidently,

Lopez could very well have assumed the role of watching the car without the need of
having to hire an extra hand for the purpose.
Moreover, it is significant to note that as early as March 08, 1994 when Garcia was
forcibly taken from his office whom Pangilinan thought, as he was made to
understand, was a drug-pusher, he already entertained some suspicion that it was not
so and that Notarte and his group were into something illegal when instead of going to
Camp Crame to detain the drug-pushing suspect, they bypassed Camp Crame and
proceeded to Baliuag, Bulacan. He was even prompted, by reason of said unexpected
turn of events, to tell his wife right after he was given PHP 500.00 as his compensation
for the day and after he was sent home by Notarte that what he saw was not an arrest
of a suspect but a hold-up. Yet, when Notarte again passed by his house on March 17,
1994, Pangilinan again went with Notarte, although Pangilinan claims that he was only
forced to do so because of alleged threat by Notarte that something would happen to
him and his family if he refuses to go with him. Such threat, assuming it was made,
pales into significance in the light of the fact that Pangilinan accepted from Notarte an
additional amount of PHP 1,000.00 which, if anything, clearly demonstrates, coupled
with his earlier participation, his complicity or connivance with Notarte in the
abduction of Teofilo Garcia.
xxx xxx xxx
The accused Pangilinan, Lopez and Yambot uniformly declared that their involvement
with Notarte was only on account of the latters offer to them of better-paying jobs and
not because of his plan to kidnap a person of which they were not privy to. Only the
naive would fall for such a ruse. If their testimonies are to be believed, the jobs being
offered to them were no better than their jobs at the time the offers were made.
Besides, all of them profess to barely know Notarte when he approached them about
the jobs and yet they appear to have readily accepted the offers. On the part of Notarte,
he could not have been stupid enough to have recruited men of dubious loyalty and
commitment to a risky and dangerous undertaking.[47]
Verily, it is inconceivable that members of a kidnapping syndicate would
entrust the performance of an essential and sensitive phase of their wellplanned criminal scheme to people not in cahoots with them, and who had no
knowledge whatsoever of the details of their nefarious plan. [48]
Appellant Lopez also argues that he cannot be convicted, because he
was not sufficiently represented during the presentation of co-appellant
Pangilinan as hostile witness.
Such an argument would hold if Lopezs conviction were based on
Pangilinans testimony. But as we have held above, Lopez was convicted
because of the positive identification made not only by the victim, but also by
the victims wife who also pointed to him as the person who had whipped her
with a gun on the day her husband was abducted.[49]
When Arthur Pangilinan testified in the absence of Lopezs counsel, the
court appointed Atty. Leonardo to represent Lopez for that day.[50]However, we
find that such an appointment did not provide the appellant with adequate
representation to safeguard his rights fully. It was irregular because Pangilinan,
whom the lawyer was also representing, gave incriminating statements against
Lopez. As the counsel of Pangilinan, Atty. Leonardo could not have objected
either to his questions or to his answers to safeguard the rights of his other
client, Lopez. However, this notwithstanding, the incriminating evidence

59 | P a g e

provided by the victim and his wife are more than sufficient to convict Lopez
even without Pangilinans testimony.
Appellants were charged with and convicted of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom and serious illegal detention. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
reads:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. -- Any private
individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner
deprive him of liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death.
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days;
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority;
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made;
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the
accused is any of the parents, female, or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are
the following: (a) the accused is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnaps or
detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of
detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any
of the four circumstances mentioned above is present. [51] Moreover, the
imposition of the death penalty is mandatory if the kidnapping was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom. [52] In the instant case, appellants cannot
escape the penalty of death, inasmuch as it was sufficiently alleged and
indubitably proven that the kidnapping had been committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom.
As to the conviction of the appellants for illegal possession of firearms, we
are constrained to dismiss and set aside this portion of the judgment. They
cannot be held liable for such offense, since there was another crime -kidnapping for ransom -- which they were committing at the same time.
The law governing illegal possession of firearms provides:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
Firearms or Ammunition Instruments Used or intended to be Used in the Manufacture
of Firearms or Ammunition. -- The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed
upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or
possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other
firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or
instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm
which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter
such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered

powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms
with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or
three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person
arrested.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of
an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with
the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat, such violation
shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or
attempted coup detat.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or
other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity,
who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm,
company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of
violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow
any of them to use, unlicensed firearms or firearms without any legal authority to be
carried outside of their residence in the course of their employment.
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any
licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor.[53](Emphasis
supplied)
Interpreting this law, this Court has consistently ruled that if an unlicensed
firearm is used in the commission of any other crime, there can be no separate
offense of simple illegal possession of firearms.[54]Explained the Court:
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the
plain meaning of RA 8294s simple language is most favorable to herein appellant.
Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law
demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. Accordingly, appellant cannot
be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct
assault with attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed was direct
assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed
an aggravating circumstance x x x x The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of
simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that no other crime was committed by
the person arrested. If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer
only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third
paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.[55]
In sum, we affirm the conviction of the appellants as principals in the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention. However, we set
aside the judgment convicting them of illegal possession of firearms.
As regards the articles allegedly taken from the victim during the
kidnapping, we find that the prosecution failed to prove with certainty the
amount of money or the value of the jewelry taken from him. These cannot be
presumed. Moreover, we reduce the award of moral damages to three hundred
thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to be paid by the appellants solidarily. The fact
that the victim suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological
ordeal constitutes sufficient basis for an award of moral damages.
[56]
Meanwhile, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,
entitles the offended party to exemplary damages within the meaning of Article
2230 of the Civil Code.[57] There being a demand for ransom in this case, and

60 | P a g e

by way of example or correction, the offended party shall receive exemplary

damages in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00). [58]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the RTC of Pasig City (Branch 70) in
Criminal Case No. 106115 sentencing appellants to death for kidnapping for
ransom is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that they shall pay the victim in
solidum the amount of three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) as moral
damages and an additional amount of one hundred thousand pesos (P
100,000.00) as exemplary damages. Costs against appellants.
However, the Decision of the court a quo convicting them of illegal
possession of firearms in Criminal Case No. 106116 is REVERSED andSET
ASIDE.
Three Justices of the Court maintain their position that R.A. No. 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they
submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional, and that the
death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659 amending Section 83 of
the Revised Penal Code, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded,
upon finality of this decision, to the Office of the President for possible exercise
of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 128106-07. January 24, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
BALDOGO, accused-appellant.

vs.

GONZALO

DECISION

That on Thursday, February 22, 1996 at more or less 8:15 in the evening at the Victims
residence, Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused while serving sentence at the
Central Sub-Colony both for the offense of Homicide, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, commits (sic) another offense, kidnapping
one JULIE E. CAMACHO, a girl 12 years of age, and brought her to the mountains,
where said Julie E. Camacho was detained and deprived of her liberty fro [sic] more
than five days.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

CONTRARY TO LAW and attended by the aggravating circumstance of recidivism.[2]

This is an automatic review of the Joint Judgment, [i] dated October 18,
1996, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City, finding
accused-appellant Gonzalo Baldogo alias Baguio guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder in Criminal Case No. 12900 and Kidnapping in
Criminal Case No. 12903. The trial court imposed on accused-appellant the
supreme penalty of death in Criminal Case No. 12900 and reclusion
perpetua in Criminal Case No. 12903.

Accused-appellant was arraigned on June 28, 1996 and entered a plea of

not guilty to both charges. [3] Edgardo Bermas died before he could be
arraigned.[4] The two cases were ordered consolidated and a joint trial
thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, Julie Camacho, Dr.
Edilberto Joaquin, Esteban Mamites and Julio Camacho, Sr., and offered
documentary and object evidence on its evidence-in-chief.

I. The Indictments
II. The Antecedent Facts
Two Informations were filed against accused-appellant and Edgar Bermas
alias Bunso which read:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1996 in the evening at the residence of Mr.
Julio Camacho of Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused who were both
convicted by final judgment of the offense of Homicide and while already serving
sentence, committed the above name offense by conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation and while armed with a bolo, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and hack one JORGE CAMACHO, hitting him and
inflicting upon him mortal wounds at the different parts of his body, which was the
direct and immediate cause of his death shortly thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident[,]
premeditation and recidivism. Puerto Princesa City, Philippines, March 5, 1996.[1]
xxx

61 | P a g e

Julio Camacho, Sr. and his wife, Heather Esteban, had four children,
namely: Julio, Jr., a student of the Palawan State University in Puerto Princesa
City and who stayed in Guaygo, Puerto Princesa City; Jorge, who was
fourteen years old;[5] Julie, who was 12 years old and a grade six elementary
pupil at the Iwahig Elementary School and Jasper, who was eight years
old. Julio Sr. was employed as a security guard in the Iwahig Prison and Penal
Colony. He and his family lived in a compound inside the sub-colony. Edgardo
Bermas alias Bunso, an inmate of the penal colony, was assigned as a
domestic
helper
of
the
Camacho
spouses. Accused-appellant
alias Baguio, also an inmate of the colony, was assigned in January 1996 as a
domestic helper of the Camacho family. Both helpers resided in a hut located
about ten meters away from the house of the Camacho family.
In the evening of February 22, 1996, accused-appellant and Bermas
served dinner to Julio Sr., Jorge and Julie in the house of the Camachos.At
about 7:30 p.m., Julio Sr. left the house to attend a bible study at the dormitory
in the Agronomy Section of the Penal Farm. Heather and her son, Jasper,
were in Aborlan town. Only Jorge and his sister Julie were left in the house.

After Julio Sr. had left the house, Julie went to the sala to study her
assignment. Momentarily, Bermas called Julie from the kitchen saying:Jul,
tawag ka ng kuya mo. Julie ignored him. After five minutes, Bermas called her
again but Julie again ignored him. Julie was perturbed when she heard a loud
sound, akin to a yell, Aahh! Ahh! coming from the kitchen located ten meters
from the house. This prompted Julie to stand up and run to the kitchen. She
was appalled to see Jorge sprawled on the ground near the kitchen, face down
and bloodied. The vicinity was lighted by a fluorescent lamp. Standing over
Jorge were accused-appellant and Bermas, each armed with a bolo. [6] The
shirt of Bermas was bloodied.[7]Julie was horrified and so petrified that
although she wanted to shout, she could not. She ran back to the sala with
accused-appellant and Bermas in pursuit. Accused-appellant overtook Julie,
tied her hands at her back with a torn t-shirt and placed a piece of cloth in her
mouth to prevent her from shouting for help from their neighbors. Bermas went
to the room of Julies brothers. Accused-appellant dragged Julie outside the
house and towards the mountain. Bermas tarried in the house.
With the aid of a flashlight, accused-appellant, with Julie in tow, walked for
hours towards the direction of the mountain. About a kilometer away from the
house of the Camachos, accused-appellant and Julie stopped under a big
tamarind tree at the foot of the mountain. After about thirty minutes, Bermas
arrived with a kettle and raw rice. Accused-appellant and Bermas retrieved a
bag containing their clothing and belongings from the trunk of the tamarind
tree. They untied Julie and removed the gag from her mouth. The three then
proceeded to climb the mountain and after walking for six hours or so, stopped
under a big tree where they spent the night. When the three woke up in the
morning of the following day, February 23, 1996, they continued their ascent of
the mountain. Seven hours thereafter, they started to follow a descending
route. Accused-appellant and Bermas told Julie that they would later release
her. At about 3:00 p.m., Bermas left accused-appellant and Julie.However,
accused-appellant did not let go of Julie. The two survived on sugar and rice
cooked by accused-appellant. Once, they saw uniformed men looking for
Julie. However, accused-appellant hid Julie behind the tree. She wanted to
shout but he covered her mouth.
In the early morning of February 28, 1996, accused-appellant told Julie
that he was leaving her as he was going to Puerto Princesa City. He told her to
fend for herself and return to the lowland the next day. After their breakfast,
accused-appellant left Julie alone to fend for herself. A few hours after
accused-appellant had left, Julie decided to return to the lowlands. She found
a river and followed its course toward Balsaham until she saw a hut. She
called upon its occupant who introduced himself as Nicodemus. Julie sought

62 | P a g e

help from him. When asked by Nicodemus if she was the girl whom the police
authorities were looking for, she replied in the affirmative. Nicodemus brought
Julie to Balsaham where they met some personnel of the penal colony and
police officers, and Nicodemus turned Julie over for custody to them.
Meanwhile, Julio, Sr. arrived home after his bible study at about 9:00 p.m.
on February 22, 1996. He noticed that the television set was switched on but
no one was watching it. He looked for his children but they were nowhere to be
found. He then proceeded to the hut occupied by accused-appellant and
Bermas but he also failed to find them. Julio Sr. then rushed to the house of his
older brother, Augusto Camacho, to look for his children, but Augusto told him
that Jorge and Julie were not there.Julio Sr. then sought the help of Romualdo
Esparagoza, a trustee of the penal farm. The two rushed back to the Camacho
residence and proceeded to the kitchen where they noticed blood on the
floor. The two proceeded to the dirty kitchen and saw the bloodied body of
Jorge dumped about three meters away from the dirty kitchen. Julio Sr. and
Esparagoza then brought Jorge to the Iwahig Hospital where he was
pronounced dead on arrival at 12:40 a.m. of February 23, 1996. Dr. Edilberto
Joaquin examined the cadaver and found that the victim was stabbed on the
breast once and at the back seven times. He sustained a lacerated wound on
the neck. The layers of the neck, trachea and esophagus of Jorge had been
cut. Jorge did not sustain any defensive wound. Dr. Joaquin performed an
autopsy of the cadaver and signed a medical certificate with his findings, thus:
MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
GENERAL DATA:
JORGE CAMACHO y ESTEBAN, 14 years old, student, resident of Iwahig Prison
and Penal Farm, approximately 53 inches in-height, was brought to the hospital,
(DOA) dead on arrival at 12:40 AM, 23 February 1996, approximate time of death
8:00 P.M. February 22, 1996.
FINDINGS
1. Stab wound, deep, penetrating, approximately 1 inch in length, at
the level of the xyphoid process, anteriorly.
2. Stab wound, chest, back, approximately 1 inch length, right
midclavicular line, level of the 3rd rib.

3. Stab wound, back, right midclavicular line, level of the 5 th rib.

4. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch length level of the 5 th rib,
left midclavicular line.
5. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch length, right midclavicular
line, 6th rib.
6. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch length, right midclavicular
line, level of the 4th lumbar region.
7. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch in length, right third
lumbar region, deep, penetrating involving the liver.
8. Stab wound, back, approximately 3/4 inch, at the level of the
2ndlumbar region.
9. Lacerated wound, neck, anteriorly, deep, penetrating, cutting the
layers of the neck and the trachea and esophagus.
CAUSE OF DEATH
Hypovolemia due to severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds and
laceration of the neck.[8]
Wounds numbers 7 and 9 were fatal. It was possible that two sharpedged and sharp pointed weapons were used in stabbing Jorge and that two
assailants stabbed the victim.[9]
On February 29, 1996, Julie gave her sworn statement and a
supplemental sworn statement to the police investigators. [10] Julio Sr. suffered
mental anguish and sleepless nights because of the death of Jorge.
The prosecution adduced in evidence excerpts of the personal file of
accused-appellant kept in the penal colony showing that he had been
convicted of homicide by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and that he
commenced serving sentence on November 19, 1992 and that the minimum
term of his penalty was to expire on August 16, 1997. [11]
III. The Defenses and Evidence of Accused-Appellant

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Accused-appellant denied killing Jorge and kidnapping Julie.Accusedappellant asserted that Julie implicated him because she was coached and
rehearsed. He testified that he was assigned as a helper in the house of
Augusto Camacho, the Chief of the Industrial Section of the colony and the
older brother of Julio Sr. Augusto told accused-appellant that his brother, Julio
Sr., wanted to have accused-appellant transferred as his domestic
helper. However, accused-appellant balked because he had heard from
Edgardo Bermas, the helper of Julio Sr., that the latter was cruel and had been
maltreating Bermas. Nonetheless, in December 1995, accused-appellant was
transferred as a domestic helper of Julio Sr.Accused-appellant confirmed that
indeed Julio Sr. was cruel because whenever the latter was angry, he
maltreated accused-appellant by spanking and boxing him. These would occur
about two times a week.
On February 22, 1996, at about 6:30 p.m., accused-appellant took his
dinner in the kitchen. At about 7:00 p.m., while he was already in his quarters
and preparing to sleep, Bermas arrived, armed with a bloodied bolo measuring
about 1 feet long and told accused-appellant that he (Bermas) had just killed
Jorge to avenge the maltreatment he received from Julio Sr. Bermas warned
accused-appellant not to shout, otherwise he will also kill him. Petrified,
accused-appellant kept silent. Bermas then brought accused-appellant to the
kitchen in the house of the Camachos where accused-appellant saw the
bloodied body of Jorge sprawled near the kitchen. Bermas called Julie three
times, telling her that her brother was calling for her but Julie at first ignored
Bermas. Julie later relented and went to the kitchen where Bermas grabbed
her and threatened to kill her if she shouted. Bermas tied the hands of Julie
with a piece of cloth and placed a piece of cloth around her face to prevent her
from shouting.
Bermas, still armed with his bolo tucked on his waist and a knife on his
hand, brought accused-appellant and Julie outside the house. The three then
trekked towards the mountain. On the way, Bermas picked a bag containing
food provisions and his and accused-appellants clothings.Accused-appellant
thought of escaping but could not because Bermas was watching him. With the
help of a flashlight brought by Bermas, the three walked towards the mountain,
with Julie walking ahead of accused-appellant and Bermas. After walking for
hours, they stopped by a tree to which Bermas tied Julie. At one time, while
Bermas and accused-appellant were scouring for water, Bermas kicked
accused-appellant and pushed him into a ten feet deep ravine. The right hand
and foot of accused-appellant sustained bruises. He likewise sustained a
sprain on his foot. Bermas left accused-appellant and Julie after 1 days.

In the meantime, accused-appellant managed to climb out of the ravine

and heard Julie calling his name. Julie later told accused-appellant that before
Bermas left, the latter told her that he was going to kill accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant and Julie remained in the mountain after Bermas had
left. At one time, accused-appellant and Julie saw soldiers who were looking
for her. Accused-appellant did not reveal his and Julies location to the soldiers
because he was afraid that he might be killed. On February 25, 1996,
accused-appellant untied Julie. He told her that he will set her free as soon as
his foot shall have healed.

paragraph, No. 1, of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to

death in the manner prescribed by law; to pay the heirs of the deceased Jorge
Camacho;
1. Actual and compensatory damages:
For expenses incurred for funeral and
other expenses incident to his death ---P45,000.00
2. Moral damages ----------------------------- 100,000.00

On February 27, 1996, accused-appellant told Julie that she can go home
already. He ordered her to go down the mountain and proceed to Balsaham on
her way back home. Although his foot was still aching, accused-appellant went
down from the mountain ahead of Julie and proceeded to Balsaham. He then
walked to Irawan where he took a tricycle to the public market in the poblacion
in Puerto Princesa City. He then took a passenger jeepney and alighted at
Brookes Point where he was arrested after one week for the killing of Jorge
and the kidnapping of Julie.
Accused-appellant maintained that he did not intend to hurt Julie or
deprive her of her liberty. He averred that during the entire period that he and
Julie were in the mountain before Bermas left him, he tried to protect her from
Bermas. Accused-appellant asserted that he wanted to bring Julie back to her
parents after Bermas had left them and to surrender but accused-appellant
was afraid that Julio Sr. might kill him.
IV. The Verdict of the Trial Court
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered its decision, the decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, a Joint Judgment is hereby rendered
in:
A. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 12900 finding the accused Gonzalo Baldogo, alias Baguio,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of murder as defined and
penalized in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 7659, and appreciating against him the specific aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage and use of superior strength, without any mitigating
circumstance to offset the same, and pursuant to the provisions of the second

64 | P a g e

3. Civil indemnity for the death of the

victim, Jorge Camacho ------------------- 50,000.00
or the aggregate amount of ------------- 195,000.00
B. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 12903 finding the accused GONZALO BALDOGO, alias,
Baguio, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659, and there being no
modifying circumstance appreciated and pursuant to the provisions of the second
paragraph, No. 2, of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, and not being entitled to the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, with the accessory penalties of civil interdiction for life, and of perpetual
absolute disqualification; to pay the offended party, Julie Camacho for physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and moral shock, moral damages of
P100,000; and to pay the costs.
The case as against co-accused Edgar Bermas is ordered dismissed by reason of
extinction of criminal liability occasioned by his death pending conclusion of the
proceedings as against him.
SO ORDERED.[12]
V. Assignment of Error
In his appeal brief, accused-appellant avers that:
I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER AND KIDNAPPING.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF DENIAL.

REJECTING

ACCUSED-

III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
AND GENERIC AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TAKING
ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH DESPITE THE FAILURE
OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE SAME.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY
UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN THE (SIC) CRIMINAL
CASE #12900.[13]
VI. Resolution of this Court
The first two assignments of errors being interrelated, the Court will delve
into and resolve the same simultaneously.
Accused-appellant avers that he had nothing to do with, and hence
should not be claimed for, the death of Jorge and the kidnapping and detention
of Julie. Accused-appellant claims that he was acting under duress because
he was threatened by Bermas with death unless he did what Bermas ordered
him to do. Accused-appellant was even protective of Julie. He insists that the
latter was not a credible witness and her testimony is not entitled to probative
weight because she was merely coached into implicating him for the death of
Jorge and her kidnapping and detention by Bermas.
We find the contention of accused-appellant farcical. At the heart of the
submission of accused-appellant is the credibility of Julie, the 12-year old
principal witness of the prosecution and the probative weight of her testimony.

65 | P a g e

This Court has held in a catena of cases that the findings of facts of the
trial court, its calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties, its
assessment of the probative weight of the collective evidence of the parties
and its conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded by the appellate
court great respect, if not conclusive effect. The raison detre of this principle is
that this Court has to contend itself with the mute pages of the original records
in resolving the issues posed by the parties:
x x x The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose
the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a
discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a
ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked
down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or
conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in
remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all
these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict.
[14]

In contrast, the trial court has the unique advantage of monitoring and
observing at close range the attitude, conduct and deportment of witnesses as
they narrate their respective testimonies before said court.Echoing a foreign
courts observation, this Court declared:
Truth does not always stalk boldly forth naked, but modest withal, in a printed abstract
in a court of last resort. She oft hides in nooks and crannies visible only to the minds
eye of the judge who tries the case. To him appears the furtive glance, the blush of
conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat,
the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of
the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.The brazen face of the liar, the glibness
of the schooled witness in reciting a lesson, or the itching overeagerness of the swift
witness, as well as the honest face of the truthful one, are alone seen by him.[15]
The rule, however, is not iron clad. This Court has enumerated exceptions
thereto, namely: (a) when patent inconsistencies in the statements of
witnesses are ignored by the trial court; (b) when the conclusions arrived at are
clearly unsupported by the evidence; (c) when the trial court ignored,
misunderstood, misinterpreted and/or misconstrued facts and circumstances of
substance which, if considered, will alter the outcome of the case. [16] In this
case, the trial court found the youthful Julie credible and her testimony entitled
to full probative weight.Accused-appellant has not sufficiently demonstrated to
this Court the application of any of the aforestated exceptions.

The Court agrees with accused-appellant that the prosecution was

burdened to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the felonies for which
he is charged. This Court has held that accusation is not synonymous with
guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove thecorpus delicti, more
specifically, that the crimes charged had been committed and that accusedappellant precisely committed the same. The prosecution must rely on the
strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the
accused.[17] The reasonable standard rule which was adopted by the United
States way back in 1978 is a requirement and a safeguard, in the words of Mr.
Justice Felix Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court, of due process
of law in the historic, procedural content of due process. The United States
Supreme Court emphasized in Re: Winship[18] that in a criminal prosecution,
the accused has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of
the possibility that he may lose his liberty or even his life upon conviction and
because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.
In the cases at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence to
prove that accused-appellant killed Jorge. However, the prosecution adduced
indubitable proof that accused-appellant conspired with Bermas not only in
killing Jorge but also in kidnapping and detaining Julie.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy if
two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit
it.Conspiracy may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial
evidence.Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused, before,
during and after the commission of a felony pointing to a joint purpose and
design and community of intent.[19] It is not required that there be an agreement
for an appreciable period prior to the commission of a felony; rather, it is
sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, all the conspira`tors
had the same purpose and were united in its execution. [20] In a conspiracy, the
act of one is the act of all.[21] All the accused are criminally liable as coprincipals regardless of the degree of their participation. [22] For a conspirator to
be criminally liable of murder or homicide, it is not necessary that he actually
attacks or kills the victim. As long as all the conspirators performed specific
acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a
common purpose or design in bringing about the death of the victim, all the
conspirators are criminally liable for the death of said victim. [23]
In these cases, the prosecution adduced conclusive proof that accusedappellant indeed conspired with Bermas to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie as
shown by the following cogent facts and circumstances:

66 | P a g e

1. When Julie responded to the repeated calls of Bermas for her to go to

the kitchen on his pretext that Jorge wanted to talk to her, Julie saw accusedappellant and Bermas, each armed with a bolo, about half a meter from Jorge
who was sprawled on the ground, bloodied all over.[24]
2. Even as Julie fled from the kitchen for dear life to the sala of their
house, accused-appellant and Bermas ran after her. Accused-appellant tied
the hands of Julie with a piece of cloth and inserted a piece of cloth into her
mouth to prevent her from shouting for help from their neighbors. [25]
3. With a flashlight on hand, accused-appellant then exited from the
house, dragged Julie towards the direction of the mountain while Bermas
remained in the house to rummage through the things in the bedroom of her
brothers. Accused-appellant stopped for a while for Bermas to join him. [26]
4. Before the killing of Jorge, accused-appellant and Bermas placed their
clothing and personal belongings in a bag and buried the bag under a tree,
and when accused-appellant and Bermas were on their way to the mountain
after killing Jorge, they excavated and retrieved the bag from under the tree. [27]
5. Accused-appellant and Bermas brought with them to the mountain a
kettle filled with raw rice which they cooked in the forest. [28]
6. When Julie saw uniformed men who were looking for her and wanted
to shout for help, accused-appellant covered her mouth to prevent her from
shouting for help.[29]
7. Even after Bermas had left accused-appellant and Julie in the forest in
the afternoon of February 23, 1991, accused-appellant continued detaining
Julie in the forest until February 27, 1996, when he abandoned Julie in the
forest to fend for herself.
The evidence of the prosecution was even buttressed by the judicial
admissions of accused-appellant, thus:
1. After releasing Julie on February 27, 1996, accused-appellant
proceeded to Puerto Princesa City and on to Brookes Point where he was
arrested a week after said date.[30]

2. Both accused-appellant and Bermas had a motive to kill Jorge and

kidnap Julie, that is, to avenge the repeated maltreatment and physical abuse
on them by Julio Sr., the father of Jorge and Julie. [31]

Q You heard the testimony of Julie Camacho that she is pointing to

you to have kidnapped her and participated in the killing of her
brother Jorge, what can you say to that?

The flight of both accused-appellant and Bermas from the house of Julio
Sr. to the mountain where they found refuge after killing Jorge, and their
motive to kill Jorge Jr. and kidnap and detain Julie in conjuntoconstitute potent
evidence of their confabulation and of their guilt for the death of Jorge and
kidnapping and detention of Julie.[32]

A That is not true.

Q You donot (sic) know the reason why? In fact you treated her well,
why she pointed you as one of the authors of the crime?
A Maybe somebody coached her.

The bare denial by accused-appellant of criminal liability for the crimes

charged is inherently weak. Accused-appellants claims that he even protected
Julie from harm and that he was forced by Bermas to kidnap Julie are of the
same genre.[33] The bare denial by accused-appellant of the crimes charged
constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot prevail over the
categorical and positive testimony of Julie and her unequivocal identification of
accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crimes charged. [34]
Accused-appellants insistence that he was forced by Bermas, under pain
of death, to cooperate with him in killing Jorge and kidnapping and detaining
Julie is merely an afterthought. For duress to exempt accused-appellant of the
crimes charged, the fear must be well-founded, and immediate and actual
damages of death or great bodily harm must be present and the compulsion
must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to accused for escape
or interpose self-defense in equal combat. [35] Accused-appellant is burdened to
prove by clear and convincing evidence his defense of duress. He should not
be shielded from prosecution for crime by merely setting up a fear from, or
because of, a threat of a third person. [36] As Lord Dennan declared in Reg. Vs.
Tyler,[37] No man from fear of circumstances to himself has the right to make
himself a party to committing mischief on mankind. In these cases, in light of
the testimony of Julie and the inculpatory acts of accused-appellant no less,
there is no doubt that the latter acted in concert with Bermas and is himself a
principal by direct participation. That accused-appellant abandoned Julie after
six days of captivity does not lessen his criminal culpability much less exempt
him from criminal liability for the killing of Jorge and the kidnapping and
detention of Julie.
Accused-appellant failed to prove his claim that Julie was coached on
how and what to testify on. Indeed, when asked to identify the person or
persons who coached Julie, accused-appellant failed to mention any person:

Q Who do you think coached her?

A I cannot mention the name but I am sure that somebody coached
her.[38]
It bears stressing that when she testified, Julie was merely 12 years
old. The Court has repeatedly held that the testimony of a minor of tender age
and of sound mind is likewise to be more correct and truthful than that of an
older person so that once it is established that they have fully understood the
character and nature of an oath, their testimony should be given full credence
and probative weight.[39] Julie had no ill motive to tergiversate the truth and
falsely testify against accused-appellant.Hence, her testimony must be
accorded full probative weight.[40]
VII. Crimes Committed by Accused-Appellant
The Court shall now delve into and resolve the issue of what crime or
crimes accused-appellant is guilty of. The trial court convicted accusedappellant of two separate crimes and not the special complex crime of
kidnapping with murder or homicide under the last paragraph of Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659. [41]The trial court is
correct. There is no evidence that Jorge was kidnapped or detained first by
accused-appellant and Bermas before he was killed.The last paragraph of
Article 267 of the Code is applicable only if kidnapping or serious illegal
detention is committed and the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
kidnapping or serious illegal detention.
Re: Criminal Case No. 12900
(For Murder)

67 | P a g e

The trial court convicted accused-appellant of murder with the qualifying

aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, based on the following
findings and ratiocination:
The slaying of Jorge Camacho took place about 8:30 oclock in the evening of February
22, 1996. It was carried out after the accused have been through tidying-up the kitchen,
the dining room and the kitchen wares the family of the Camachos used in their early
dinner before 7:00 oclock that evening. But even before dinner, the accused have
already made preparations for their flight, shown by the fact that they already had their
clothes, other personal belongings and food provisions stacked in their respective
travelling bags then placed in a spot where they can just pick them up as they take to
flight.[42]
The trial court also appreciated against accused-appellant the qualifying
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength with the following
disquisition:
The victim, Jorge Camacho, is a lad only 14 years of age and unarmed when brutally
slain. On the contrary, both accused are of age and confirmed convicted felons. Any
one of them would already be superior in strength and disposition to their hapless and
innocent victim. How much more with the combined strength and force of the two of
them.
Their choice of the object of their brutality is indicative of their unmistakable intent of
taking advantage of their superior strength. The likely object of their resentment, for
purported cruelty to them, is Prison Guard Julio Camacho, father of the victim. They
could have directed their criminal intent on Julio Camacho himself. But Julio Camacho
could be a match in strength and agility to any of them or even to the combined force
of both of them. So, to insure execution of their criminal intent without risk to them for
the defense which the offended party might put up, they directed their criminal acts
against the deceased who is very much inferior in physical combat even only to any
one of them.[43]
While the Court agrees that accused-appellant is guilty of murder, it does
not agree with the rulings of the trial court that the crime was qualified by
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. To warrant a finding of
evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish the confluence of the
following requisites:
x x x (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act
manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient

68 | P a g e

interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him
to reflect upon the consequences of his act. x x x[44]
The qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, like
any other qualifying circumstance, must be proved with certainty as the crime
itself. A finding of evident premeditation cannot be based solely on mere lapse
of time from the time the malefactor has decided to commit a felony up to the
time that he actually commits it. [45] The prosecution must adduce clear and
convincing evidence as to when and how the felony was planned and prepared
before it was effected.[46] The prosecution is burdened to prove overt acts that
after deciding to commit the felony, the felon clung to his determination to
commit the crime. The law does not prescribe a time frame that must elapse
from the time the felon has decided to commit a felony up to the time that he
commits it. Each case must be resolved on the basis of the extant factual
milieu.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation.The
barefaced fact that accused-appellant and Bermas hid the bag containing their
clothing under a tree located about a kilometer or so from the house of Julio
Sr. does not constitute clear evidence that they decided to kill Jorge and
kidnap Julie. It is possible that they hid their clothing therein preparatory to
escaping from the colony. There is no evidence establishing when accusedappellant and Bermas hid the bag under the tree. The prosecution even failed
to adduce any evidence of overt acts on the part of accused-appellant, nor did
it present evidence as to when and how he and Bermas planned and prepared
to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie and to prove that the two felons since then clung
to their determination to commit the said crimes. Although accused-appellant
and Bermas were armed with bolos, there is no evidence that they took
advantage of their numerical superiority and weapons to kill Jorge. Hence,
abuse of superior strength cannot be deemed to have attended the killing of
Jorge.[47]Nighttime cannot likewise be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance because there is no evidence that accused-appellant and
Bermas purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the killing or to insure its
execution or accomplishment or to evade their arrest. [48] Neither is dwelling
aggravating because there is no evidence that Jorge was killed in their house
or taken from their house and killed outside the said house.
In light of the evidence on record, it is clear that the killing of Jorge was
qualified by treachery. When Jorge was killed by accused-appellant and
Bermas, he was barely 14 years old. The Court has previously held that the
killing of minor children who by reason of their tender years could not be

expected to put up a defense is attended by treachery. [49] Since treachery

attended the killing, abuse of superior strength is absorbed by said
circumstance.[50]
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Republic Act 7659 is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances in the commission of the crime,
accused-appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
[51]
Conformably with current jurisprudence, accused-appellant is hereby
ordered to pay to the heirs of the victim civil indemnity in the amount
of P50,000.00 and the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral
damages. Although Julio Sr. testified that he spent P45,000.00 during the
wake and burial of the victim, the prosecution failed to adduce any receipts to
prove the same. Hence, the award of P45,000.00 by way of actual damages
has no factual basis and should thus be deleted.
Re: Criminal Case No. 12903

law preve dos modalidades de privacion de libertad, el encierro y la

detencion. Encerrar significa recluir a una persona en un lugar de donde no
puede salir, detener a una persona equivale a impedirle o restringirle la
libertad de movimiento. Para que el sujeto pasivo no quiera permanecer en el
sitio donde esta recluido, pues no es posible llamar encierro ni detencion a la
estancia de un a persona en lugar del que no quiere salir.[56]
In this case, Julie, a minor, was not locked up. However, she was seized
and taken from her house through force and dragged to the mountain. Since
then, she was restrained of her liberty by and kept under the control of
accused-appellant and Bermas. She was prevented from going back home for
a period of about six days. Patently then, accused-appellant is guilty of
kidnapping and illegally detaining Julie. The crime was aggravated by dwelling
because Julie was taken from their house by accused-appellant and
Bermas. However, dwelling was not alleged in the Information as an
aggravating circumstance as required by Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure which reads:

The trial court convicted accused-appellant of kidnapping under Article

267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishable byreclusion
perpetua to death. The trial court is correct.

SEC. 9. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting
the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no
designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.[57]

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code was taken from Article 267 of the
Spanish Penal Code, which reads:

Even if dwelling is proven but is not alleged in the Information as an

aggravating circumstance, the same will not serve to aggravate the penalty.[58]

Art. 267Detencin ilegal grave.Ser castigado con la pena de reclusin temporal el

particular que secuestrare o encerrare a otro o en cualquier forma le privare de libertad.

Quasi-recidivism as defined in Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code [59] is

alleged in both Informations. Accused-appellant is alleged to have committed
murder and kidnapping while serving sentence in the penal colony by final
judgment for the crime of homicide. Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating
circumstance.[60] The prosecution is burdened to prove the said circumstance
by the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself. In the present case, to
prove quasi-recidivism, the prosecution was burdened to adduce in evidence a
certified copy of the judgment convicting accused-appellant of homicide and to
prove that the said judgment had become final and executory.[61] The raison
detre is that:

(For Kidnapping)

Secuestrare means sequestration.[52] To sequester is to separate for a

special purpose, remove or set apart, withdraw from circulation. [53] It also
means to lock-up or imprison. Encerrare is a broader concept thansecuestrare.
[54]
Encerrare includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the
deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. As
explained by Groizard, encerrar es meter una persona cosa en parte de donde
no pueda salir; detener o arrestar, poner en prisin, privar de la libertad
alguno. He continued that la detencin, la prisin, la privacin de la libertad de
una persona, en cualquier forma y por cualquier medio por cualquier tiempo
en virtud de la cual resulte interrumpido el libre ejercicio de su actividad.[55] On
his commentary on the Spanish Penal Code, Cuello Calon says that the

69 | P a g e

x x x Since the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to such information,

there was a joinder of issues not only as to his guilt or innocence, but also as to the
presence or absence of the modifying circumstances so alleged. The prosecution was

thus burdened to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and the
existence of the modifying circumstances. It was then grave error for the trial court to
appreciate against the accused-appellant the aggravating circumstance of recidivism
simply because of his failure to object to the prosecutions omission as mentioned
earlier.[62]
In this case, the prosecution adduced in evidence merely the excerpt of
the prison record of accused-appellant showing that he was convicted of
homicide in Criminal Case No. 10357-R by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
(Branch 6) with a penalty of from six years and one day as minimum to
fourteen years, eight months and one day as maximum and that the sentence
of accused-appellant commenced on November 19, 1992 and that the
minimum term of the penalty was to expire on August 16, 1997. [63] The excerpt
of the prison record of accused-appellant is not the best evidence under
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court [64] to prove the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and to prove that said judgment had
become final and executory. Said excerpt is merely secondary or
substitutionary evidence which is inadmissible absent proof that the original of
the judgment had been lost or destroyed or that the same cannot be produced
without the fault of the prosecution. The barefaced fact that accused-appellant
was detained in the penal colony does prove the fact that final judgment for
homicide has been rendered against him. [65] There being no modifying
circumstances in the commission of the crime, accused-appellant should be
meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the
Revised penal Code.[66]
VIII. Civil Liability of Accused-Appellant for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention
The trial court awarded the amount of P100,000.00 to Julie by way of
moral damages for the felony of kidnapping with serious illegal detention,
predicated on her having suffered serious anxiety and fright when she was
kidnapped and dragged to the mountain where she was detained for several
days. The trial court is correct. Julie is entitled to moral damages.[67] In light of
the factual milieu in this case, the amount is reasonable.Julie is also entitled to
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.[68]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION:

70 | P a g e

1. In Criminal Case No. 12900, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of murder defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended and is hereby meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua, there
being no modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the
felony. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay to the heirs of the victim
the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and the amount of P50,000.00 as
of moral damages. The award of P45,000.00 as of actual damages is deleted.
2. In Criminal Case No. 12903, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of kidnapping with serious illegal detention defined in Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, and there
being no modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the felony is
hereby meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is hereby
ordered to pay moral damages to the victim, Julie Camacho, in the amount
of P100,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.

EN BANC

The Case for the Prosecution

[G.R. No. 137601. April 24, 2003]

In the evening of September 19, 1997, Winchester, Ritchie and Gregmar were
in the store of Rudy Galarpe at Bubutan, Tubigan, Initao,Misamis Oriental. [3] The
three ordered a case of red horse beer and had a drinking spree. They sang with
the accompaniment of a video karaoke. Also in the store were Rudys employee,
Maricar Perez, a widow, who was vending chicken barbecue; and the victim, Edgar
Galarpe, Maricars boyfriend; Rosie Pabela and her boyfriend, Al Cailing.
[4]
Winchester and Al were contemporaries in the Initao National Comprehensive
High School. Rosie had been the girlfriend of Winchester before she became the
girlfriend of Al. Maricar had been employed for one month in the store of Ritchies
mother before she was employed by Rudy.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. WINCHESTER ABUT,

RITCHIE WASLO and GREGMAR BALIGA, accused.
WINCHESTER ABUT and GREGMAR BALIGA, appellants.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court for automatic review is the decision [1] of the Regional Trial
Court, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. 97-1504, finding
appellants Winchester Abut and Gregmar Baliga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder. The trial court sentenced appellant Winchester Abut to death, and
appellant Gregmar Baliga only to an indeterminate penalty because of the privilege
mitigating circumstance of minority, the trial court appreciated in his favor.
The Charge
On October 27, 1997, an Information was filed charging Winchester Abut,
Gregmar Baliga and Ritchie Waslo with murder which reads:
On September 20, 1997, at about 2:00 oclock early dawn, at the National Park, Bubutan,
Tubigan, Initao, Misamis Oriental, which is within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent to kill and taking advantage of superior strength,
conspiring, confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, box, hit, and wound one Edgar
Galarpe with the use of their fists, broken bottles, and other deadly weapons, thus,
inflicting multiple stab wounds upon the person of the latter which caused his death not
long thereafter.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. [2]
Winchester and Gregmar were arrested. Ritchie remained at- large.Upon
arraignment on January 5, 1998, assisted by their counsel, Winchester and
Gregmar pleaded not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued with the prosecution presenting
Maricar Perez, Rosie Pabila, Al Cailing and Dr. Tammy Uy as witnesses.
Winchester and Gregmar testified in their behalf.

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At around 2:00 a.m. the following day, Maricar and Edgar and Rosie and Al
agreed to take a stroll at the National Forest Park, which was about one half
kilometer away from the store. Upon reaching the park, the two couples sat on the
concrete benches facing each other, with a concrete table in between them. [5] Al
and Rosie sat on one of the cemented benches facing the national highway [6] while
Edgar and Maricar sat on the other bench. [7] Behind Al and Rosie was a pole on
which a flourescent lamp was installed. [8] About fifty meters away from the table
was another flourescent lamp installed near the office of the park administrator.
The couples placed the two bottles of red horse beer which they brought along with
them on the table. After a few minutes, Winchester, Gregmar and Ritchie arrived.
Winchester told Maricar that he wanted to get acquainted with Edgar, and
asked her permission. Maricar agreed. Edgar introduced himself to Winchester, at
the same time, extending his hand towards Winchester for a handshake and said: I
am Edgar. Winchester shook hands with Edgar. When Edgar asked for his name,
Winchester curtly responded: King-king ko, Bay. Edgar was dumbfounded when
Winchester yanked his hand and immediately boxed him. Edgar fell to the ground.
He tried to stand up but Winchester, Gregmar and Ritchie ganged up on him,
kicked and mauled him. Ritchie struck the two bottles of red horse beer against the
table and hit Edgar with the broken bottles. Winchester astraddled the victim while
Ritchie and Gregmar positioned themselves on each side of the victim. The three
continued their assault on the victim and stabbed him. Maricar and Rosie saw
Edgar being stabbed by Winchester, Gregmar and Ritchie and tried in vain to stop
the assault. Edgar pleaded to his attackers to stop assaulting him telling them that
he had sustained so many stab wounds already. Frantic, Rosie shouted at Ritchie,
Gregmar and Winchester: What have we done to you? Why did you do that to us?
Although mortally wounded, Edgar stood up and staggered towards the direction of
the national highway only to fall down near one of the cemented benches in the
park about 10 meters from the table. [9]Winchester wanted to run after Edgar but

was prevailed upon by Rosie not to. Gregmar and Ritchie ran after Edgar but
returned to the park when Edgar fell down. Afraid that he would be the next victim,
Al fled from the park towards the national highway with Ritchie and Gregmar in hot
pursuit. Al was able to elude his pursuers. Ritchie and Gregmar rejoined
Winchester at the park. Gregmar, Ritchie and Winchester then left the park
together. Maricar tried to help Edgar up but he was too heavy for her. She then
shouted for help. When Al heard the shouts for help of Maricar, he returned to the
park and together with the girls, flagged down a truck. They then boarded Edgar in
the truck and had him transported to the Initao District Hospital. However, Edgar
was already dead on arrival at the hospital.
Dr. Tammy Uy, the Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation conducted an autopsy of the victims body. His post mortem findings
are as follows:
Embalmed, fairly well-preserved. Areas of post-mortem greyish-yellowish discolorations
are noted.
ABRASIONS, roughly linear: 7X0.3 cms., left side of the chest, infero-medial aspect;
10X0.2 cms., left lower thoracic region between left posterior and mid-axillary lines.
ABRASIONS, confluent, 2X1.5 cms., right elbow; 4X0.7 cms., left forearm, middle third,
posterior aspect; 5X6 cms., right knee region; 6X3 cms., left knee region.
STAB WOUNDS, non-penetrating; two (2) in number; elliptical in shapes; measuring 1.7
cms. long and 2.1 cms. long; located at the left scapular region of the back and middle third
of right forearm, posterior aspect, respectively; edges, clean-cut; extremities are modified
by embalming; both directed forward, downward, medially; involving only the skin and
underlying soft tissues and muscles; with approximate depths of 2.2 cms. and 2.5 cms.,
respectively.
STAB WOUNDS, non-penetrating; twelve (12) in number; triangular in shapes; with
average sizes of 0.4X0.4X0.4 cm.; two (2) are located at the chest, six (6) at the back, two
(2) at the left upper arm, one (1) at the dorsum of right hand, and one (1) at the middle third
of right thigh, posterior aspect; with contused edges; involving only the skin and
underlying soft tissues and muscles; with approximate depths ranging between 0.6 cm. and
3.7 cms.
STAB WOUNDS, penetrating; four (4) in number; triangular in shapes; with average sizes
of 0.4X0.4X0.4 cm.; one (1) is located at the left side of the chest, medial aspect, and three
(3) at the left lower thoracic region of the back; with contused edges; involving among
others, the skin and underlying soft tissues and muscles, the pericardium and right ventricle
of the heart, the lower lobe of the left lung, the lower lobe of the left lung and the lower

72 | P a g e

lobe of the left lung, (sic) respectively, with approximate depths of 6.5 cms, 6 cms, 5.5 cms,
and 7.5 cms, respectively.
HEMOPERICARDIUM, about 30 cc. embalmed blood.
HEMOTHORAX, left, about 400 cc. embalmed blood; left lung, atelectatic.
Stomach, empty. Heart chambers, empty of blood. Brain and other visceral organs,
embalmed and fairly well-preserved.
VVVVVVVVVVV
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage, severe, secondary to multiple stab wounds.[10]
The Defenses and Evidence of the Accused
Gregmar and Winchester denied assaulting and stabbing Edgar. They
claimed that it was Ritchie alone who stabbed and killed the victim.
Winchester testified that before he left Sitio Bubutan for Manila, he and
Rosie had been sweethearts. However, they broke up before Winchester left for
Manila. Winchester was employed for seven months in a printing press in Manila.
He had to return on September 14, 1997 to Bubutan when his father died.
However, Winchester was peeved when his father was buried even before his
arrival. In the meantime, Winchester and Rosie reconciled.
On September 19, 1997, late in the evening, Winchester, Gregmar and
Ritchie were in the store of Rudy Galarpe at Bubutan, Tubigan, Initao, Misamis
Oriental. They sang with the accompaniment of a video karaoke. With them were
Maricar Perez, the girlfriend of Ritchie and Rosie Pabilan who were listening to the
singing and the karaoke. At about 2:00 a.m. the following day, Rosie and Maricar
left the store telling Ritchie that they were going to the park in the forest and for
him and Winchester to follow them. The two women left the store first, followed by
Ritchie and Winchester and Gregmar. When they reached the park, Winchester,
Ritchie and Gregmar saw that the two women were with Edgar Galarpe and Al
Cailing seated on the benches made of cement. Winchester then asked Maricar if
he, Winchester, could get acquainted with Edgar, and Maricar agreed. Winchester
then extended his hand towards Edgar and introduced himself, thus: Kiking ako,
parts (I am Kiking, parts). However, Edgar abruptly pulled the hand of Winchester
and boxed Winchester on the neck. Winchester and Edgar then fought each other.
Ritchie and Al likewise fought with each other. Maricar intervened and pacified
Ritchieand Al. Edgar and Winchester continued boxing each other. Winchester fell
down when Edgar hit him. When he saw his friend Winchester down on the

ground, Ritchie struck the bottles of red horse beer against the table and hit Edgar
with the broken bottles. Edgar fled from the park towards the national highway.
Ritchie, armed with a knife, ran after Edgar. Al also fled from the park. On the other
hand, Winchester and Gregmar remained in the park with Maricar and Rosie.
Ritchie later rejoined Winchester and Gregmar in the park. They then left the park
together. On September 22, 1997, Winchester was arrested by policemen for the
death of Edgar.
Winchester adduced evidence that on September 23, 1997, he was examined
and treated by Dr. Jaima Roa, the Municipal Health Officer, for the following
injuries:
1. Old contussion right middle arm lateral portion about 1 inch in a semi
circular.[11]
Gregmar testified that he was born on January 15, 1980. To buttress his
testimony, he adduced in evidence his Certificate of Live Birth [12] and his
Elementary School Permanent Record[13] showing that he was born on January 15,
1980. He also testified that on his way to the park with Winchester and Ritchie, he
tarried because he had to defecate. After he had defecated, he heard a woman
shouting for help from the direction of the park. He rushed to the park and saw
Edgar mauling Winchester. Winchester fell to the ground. Edgar then knelt on the
back of Winchester and mauled him anew. Ritchie stabbed Edgar several times
and fled from the park.
The Verdict of the Trial Court
On October 9, 1998, the trial court rendered its Judgment [14] with the following
dispositive portion:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this Court hereby finds both
accused, WINCHESTER ABUT and GREGMAR BALIGA, GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of MURDER, in conspiracy with each other as
principals by direct participation.
Considering that the crime was committed by both accused Winchester Abut and Gregmar
Baliga when the penalty for Murder was amended by R.A. 7659, effective January 1, 1994,
the said penalties found in said law is applicable and hereby sentences the accused,
WINCHESTER ABUT to DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION.
Accused Gregmar Baliga, who is still below 18 years when the crime was committed, is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of Ten (10) years of Prision Mayor as minimum to
Seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of Reclusion Temporal as the maximum term.

73 | P a g e

The two accused, WINCHESTER ABUT and GREGMAR BALIGA are ordered to pay
Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) to the herein offended party as indemnity and
another Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Winchester and Gregmar, now appellants, assail the decision of the trial court
contending that:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR THE CRIME CHARGED WERE PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
GRANTING THAT HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY IN KILLING
THE VICTIM, THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THEM OF
THE CRIME CHARGED INSTEAD OF THE LESSER OFFENSE OF HOMICIDE.
III
GRANTING FURTHER THAT HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY OF
THE CRIME CHARGED, THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH UPON ACCUSED-APPELLANT WINCHESTER
ABUT.[16]
On the first assignment of errors, the appellants assert that Ritchie alone
assaulted and killed the victim. The prosecution failed to prove that the appellants
conspired with Ritchie to assault and kill the victim. They did not intend to assault
and kill the victim. They and Ritchie proceeded to the park from the store of Rudy
Galarpe merely to get acquainted with the victim and Al and not to assault or kill
him. The appellants could not have conspired with Ritchie to assault and kill the
victim because (a) appellant Winchester was shaking hands with the victim when
Ritchie broke two bottles of red horse beer prompting the victim to violently pull the
hand of the appellant; (b) Rosie was able to pull away appellant Winchester from
Edgar; (c) it was Ritchie alone who pursued the victim as the latter staggered from
the park towards the national highway; (d) appellant Gregmar was still defecating
while the victim was being mauled, assaulted and stabbed by Ritchie; (e) even as
Maricar, Rosie and Al were carrying the victim to the truck, Rosie and Maricar were
talking with the appellants and Ritchie, hence, the women were aware that the
assault and killing of the victim were the result of an uncontrolled outburst of

emotions. Maricar, Rosie and Al could not have identified and pin-pointed who
among the appellants and Ritchie assaulted and stabbed Edgar considering that
the moon was dimly lit and that the flourescent lamp installed near the office of the
park administrator was about fifty meters away from the situs criminis.
The Court is not persuaded by the contentions of the appellants.
By challenging their identification by the witnesses of the prosecution, as the
assailants of the victim, the appellants thereby attacked the credibility of said
witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies. But the legal aphorism is
that when the issue of credibility of witnesses is involved, the findings of facts of
the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of
the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings
are accorded by the appellate court high respect if not conclusive effect precisely
because of the unique advantage of the trial court in observing and monitoring at
close range the demeanor, deportment and conduct of the witnesses as they testify
unless the trial court has overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts
of substance which if considered might affect the result of the case. [17]
In this case, there is no showing that the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood, misapplied or misconstrued any facts of substance that would
have materially affected the outcome of the case. The trial court found the
collective testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution straightforward, positive
and credible, in contrast to the testimonies of the appellants. The trial court
correctly concluded that the appellants conspired with Ritchie in assaulting and
stabbing the victim to death and that all of them are criminally liable for the death of
the victim. The appellants cannot thus argue that Maricar, Rosie and Al could not
have seen the appellants stab and kill the victim.
A conspiracy exist when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To establish
conspiracy, direct evidence is not required. It is not even essential that there be
proof of the agreement to commit the felony. Proof of concerted action of the
accused before, during and after the crime which demonstrates their unity of
design and objective is sufficient. This Court had consistently ruled that conspiracy
may be inferred when by their acts, two or more persons proceed towards the
accomplishment of the same felonious objective, with each doing his act, so that
their acts though seemingly independent were in fact connected, showing a
closeness of former association and concurrence of sentiment. To hold one as a
co-principal by reason of conspiracy it must be shown that he performed an overt
act in pursuance of or furtherance of the conspiracy, although the acts performed
might have been distinct and separate. This overt act may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral

74 | P a g e

assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the time of the commission of

the crime, or by exerting a moral ascendance over the other co-conspirators by
moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. Once conspiracy is
established, all the conspirators are answerable as co-principals regardless of their
degree of participation, for in the contemplation of the law, the act of one becomes
the act of all.[18] It matters not who among the accused inflicted the fatal blow to the
victim.[19]
In this case, the evidence on record indubitably shows that after introducing
himself to the victim, appellant Winchester pulled the hand of the victim and boxed
him. Ritchie broke two bottles of beer and hit the victim with the broken bottles.
The appellants and Ritchie ganged up and assaulted the victim. Not content, they
stabbed the victim repeatedly. Maricar narrated how the appellants and Ritchie by
their collective acts killed the victim, thus:
Q And after Edgar Galarpe said his name to Winchester Abut, what did
Winchester Abut say?
A Winchester Abut did not answer when Edgar Galarpe said How about
you, Partner? What is your name?
Q And what happened after that?
A Then Richie (sic) Waslo got the two Red Horse bottle which were still
cold.
Q And what happened to these bottles?
A The two Red Horse bottles were broken.
Q Then, what happened?
A They immediately attacked Edgar.
Q Who are these who attacked Edgar Galarpe?
A Winchester Abut, Richie Waslo and Gregmar Balega.
Q How did they suddenly attack Edgar Galarpe? How about Winchester
Abut?
A Winchester Abut boxed Edgar Galarpe.

Q Where was he hit?

A I was not able to notice where Edgar Galarpe was hit because there
was already a rumble. He was ganged up by the three.

Q Now, what was Winchester Abut doing to Edgar Galarpe when he was
riding on top of Edgar Galarpe?

Q How about Al Cailing? Where was he during the rumble?

A They kept on stabbing, but I did not see what was the instrument used
by them in stabbing Edgar Galarpe because the moonlight was not
quite bright.

A Al Cailing was near us.

Q How was Edgar Galarpe positioned while lying on the ground?

Q What about Waslo? What specifically did he do when you said he

ganged up on Edgar Galarpe? On the part of Waslo, what
specifically did he do by way of attacking Edgar Galarpe?

A At first Edgar Galarpe was lying on his back, but after awhile, he was
able to lie on his face to the ground because he struggled so that
he can stand up.

A Richie Waslo kept on boxing Edgar Galarpe.

Q Was he able to stand up?

Q Do you recall where was Edgar Galarpe hit by Richie Waslo?

A After awhile, when Richie Waslo left, he was able to stand up because
when I pulled up, Winchester Abut, Edgar Galarpe shouted enough
because I have many stab wounds already.

A I cannot recall.
Q What happened to Edgar Galarpe when he was boxed by Richie
Waslo?
A When Edgar Galarpe was continuously boxed, he fell down.
Q How about Gregmar Balega? What specifically did he do by way of
attacking Edgar Galarpe?
A Still the same. Gregmar Balega kept on boxing Edgar Galarpe. The
three of them took turns in attacking Edgar Galarpe.

Q How about Rosie Pabela? What was she doing all the while?
A Rosie Pabela pulled out Winchester Abut and kept on shouting, What
have we done to you?, and why did you do this to us? [20]
Al Cailing corroborated the testimony of Maricar when he testified on direct
and cross examinations, thus:
Q And who was this one who introduced himself?
A Winchester Abut introduced himself.

Q How about the bottle in which the group brought?

Q How did he do that?
A The bottle that was broken was left in the table.
Q You mentioned after awhile that Edgar Galarpe fell down. What did
accused do when Edgar Galarpe fell down?
A That was the time when Winchester Abut rode on top of Edgar
Galarpe, while Gregmar Balega was on one side, while Richie
Waslo was on the other side.

A When they arrived they met Maricar Perez and Maricar said, you are
here King, introduce yourself and so he said, King-King ko, Bay,
meaning, I am King-King, Bay.
Q When he said King-King ko Bay, to whom did he say those words?
A Winchester Abut addressed those words to Edgar Galarpe.
Q And what was the answer of Edgar Galarpe?

75 | P a g e

A Edgar Galarpe answered, I am Edgar, Bay.

Q After that, what happened next?
A When King-King released the hand of Edgar Galarpe, he immediately
boxed Edgar Galarpe and so Edgar Galarpe stood up, but he was
ganged up.

...
Q So, immediately thereafter, Winchester Abut introduced himself to
you?
A Yes, Mam.
Q And he suddenly boxed Edgar Galarpe?

Q Who ganged up Edgar Galarpe?

A Winchester Abut, Gregmar Baliga and Ritchie Walso ganged up Edgar
Galarpe.

A Immediately after releasing the hands of Edgar Galarpe because they

were shaking hands.
Q Without any reason, he immediately boxed Edgar Galarpe?

Q When they ganged up Edgar Galarpe, what happened to Edgar

Galarpe?

A Yes, Mam.

COURT:

Q How about Ritchie Waslo, what was he doing then?

Slowly. Before that, ask how?

A Then, the three accused helped one another in mauling Edgar

Galarpe.

Q How did they gang up Edgar Galarpe?

A The three accused helped one another in stabbing Edgar Galarpe.

Q Is it not a fact, Mr. Cailing, that this Winchester Abut fell down before
there (there) was a commotion among this group and the group of
Winchester Abut.

COURT:
A Winchester Abut did not fall down.
What did they use?
A I cannot exactly determine what were the instruments used by them in
stabbing Edgar Galarpe because there were insufficient illumination
of light.
Q While they were ganging up Edgar Galarpe, what happened to Edgar
Galarpe?
A (What happened to) Edgar Galarpe fell down.
Q And when Edgar Galarpe fell down, what did Wichester (sic) Abut do?
A Wichester (sic) Abut was brought by Rosie Pabila towards the
seashore.[21]

76 | P a g e

Q But, you are ascertain (sic), Mr. Cailing, that when there was a
commotion, you left the place instead of helping Edgar Galarpe?
A Edgar Galarpe and attempted to run away and Edgar Galarpe was
chased by the two accused, Wichester (sic) Abut and Gregmar
Baliga and I was chased by Ritchie Waslo.
Q So, it is not true that the three accused ganged up Edgar Galarpe?
There was first a chasing of Edgar Galarpe by the two accused,
Winchester Abut and Gregmar Baliga and against you by Ritchie
Waslo?
A At first, Edgar Galarpe was ganged up by the three accused and when
Edgar Galarpe and myself attempted to run away, I was chased by
Ritchie Waslo while Edgar Galarpe was chased by Winchester Abut

and Gregmar Baliga, but Edgar Galarpe did not run because he
was already wounded.

A Yes.
Q How deep are these stab wounds?

Q But, you did not see who stabbed Edgar Galarpe?

A I saw that Edgar Galarpe was stabbed by the three accused.
Q Despite the fact, the three accused ganged up Edgar Galarpe, you did
not do anything?

A Well, the size are 1.7 cm long and 2.1 cm long and they have an
approximate depth of 2.2 cm and 2.5 cm, respectively.
Q Do you consider those stab wounds as fatal?
A No.

A I attempted to help Edgar Galarpe, but I was also afraid and so, I ran
away.

Q Could you estimate how deep is that with your finger?

Q You are telling now the court that only the girls or the females who
helped Edgar Galarpe when there was a commotion?

A 2.5 cm is rough which is equivalent of one inc. 2.2 cm is almost one

inch.

A It did not take long and I came back because Maricar Perez was
shouting for me to come back.[22]

Q Could you tell if the size or sharp-pointed instrument used was single
or double-bladed?

Rosie Pabila likewise testified that the appellants and Ritchie stabbed the
victim several times.[23]

A I could not tell that. It could be single or double-bladed.

Q The next entry is twelve stab wounds. Could you point?

As shown in the autopsy report of Dr. Tammy Uy, the victim sustained
eighteen stab wounds on the chest, arms, thighs and at the back, as well as
abrasions.[24] The finding of the trial court that the appellants stabbed the victim is
buttressed by the testimony of the doctor that the assailants used two kinds of
weapons, a single or double-bladed instrument or object and a sharp-pointed
instrument with three sides (tres cantos):
Q The next entry are stab wounds.Where are these located?
A These two stab wounds are located at the left scapular region of the
back or left shoulder blade region, and the other is located at the
posterior aspect of the forearm.
Q What could have caused these two stab wounds?
A Considering that these stab wounds are eliptical (sic) in shape they
could have been caused by any sharp-bladed object or instrument.
Q Such as a knife?

77 | P a g e

A These twelve non-penetrating stab wounds are described in my report.

As to shape, they are triangular in shape.
Q What could have caused these stab wounds?
A These could have been caused by a sharp-pointed instrument with
three sides.
Q Such as a file?
A A file (limbas or tres cantos).
Q These stab wounds are fatal?
A Considering that all of them are non-penetrating, if they are taken
individually they are non-fatal. As to location, two are located at the
chest; six at the back; two at the left upper arm; one at the back of
the right hand; and one in the middle third of the right thigh
posterior aspect, back of the right thing.

Q Would you say that the wound found on the dorsal portion of the hand
could be called as a defensive wound?
A Yes, it is possible.
Q How about the other wounds at the forearm which you mentioned in
Entry No. 3?
A The one at the posterior aspect of the left forearm is highly indicative
of a defensive wound.
Q The last entry is also stab wounds, four in number and penetrating.
Where are these located?
A These are located on the following: One is found on the left side of the
chest medial aspect or near the center of the body; the other three
are located at the left lower thoracic region of the back, more or
less below the left shoulder blade region (witness demonstrating).
Q What kind of weapon was used in the infliction of these four stab
wounds?
A Well, these could have been caused by a sharp-pointed object or
instrument with three sides or three corner or tres kantos.
Q All the four stab wounds?
A Yes.
Q Could you determine which of the penetrating stab wound was caused
first?
A I cannot determine that, sir. I can only say that all these stab wounds
sustained by the victim were inflicted on the fact while he was still
alive.
Q Could you hazard an educated guess of what position was the victim
at the time he was stabbed with these penetrating wounds?
A Well, with respect to the left side of the chest, most probably they
were, more or less, facing each other while the three at the back is

78 | P a g e

that most probably the assailant was, more or less, at the back of
the victim.
Q Would you say that the victim was lying at that time when the wounds
were inflicted on him?
A That is possible.
Q Which of these stab wounds was fatal?
A Each of them could be fatal because the one at the chest involved the
heart, while the three at the back involved the lungs.
Q Are you trying to say that the one found on the left chest caused injury
of the heart?
A Yes.[25]
Although Ritchie alone pursued the victim as he staggered from thesitus
criminis, however, by then the victim had already been assaulted and repeatedly
stabbed by the appellants and Ritchie. The appellants cannot thus argue that
Ritchie alone is criminally liable for the death of the victim. As against the collective
positive testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution coupled with the physical
evidence on record pointing to the appellants and Ritchie as the perpetrators of the
crime, the bare denial of the appellants which are merely negative self-serving
evidence cannot prevail.[26] Besides, there is no evidence on record that the three
witnesses of the prosecution had any ill motives to testify against the appellants
and ascribe to them the commission of a heinous crime for which the appellants
could be meted reclusion perpetua or even the death penalty. It would run counter
to the natural order of events and of human nature and contrary to the presumption
of good faith for the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against the appellants
if, indeed, they are innocent.[27]
In sum, the appellants are criminally liable for the death of the victim.
The Crime Committed by the Appellants
On the second and third assignment of errors, the appellants aver that they
are guilty only of homicide as defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code,
and not of murder. Even if it is assumed that the appellants are guilty of murder,
the proper penalty for the crime isreclusion perpetua and not the death penalty.
Although the crime is qualified by abuse of superior strength, however, treachery

was not alleged in the information; and hence, treachery should not be considered
as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime.
The trial court correctly convicted the appellants of murder with the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. However, the trial court erred in
appreciating treachery against the appellants. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. In order that treachery may be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance, it must be shown that: a.) the malefactor employed means, method
or manner of execution affording the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate; and b.) the means, method or manner of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. The second is the subjective
element of treachery.[28] Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. In the absence of any convincing
proof that the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the means by which
they committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, the Court must resolve
the doubt in favor of the accused.[29] In this case, the prosecution failed to prove
that the mode or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by
the appellants when they stabbed the victim. Appellant Winchester first boxed the
victim. The appellants and Ritchie then mauled and kicked the victim.There is no
evidence that at the outset, they had decided to stab and kill the victim. It was only
at the late stage of the assault that the appellants and Ritchie stabbed the
victim. The Court believes that after ganging up on and mauling the victim, the
appellants, at the spur-of-the moment, decided to stab the victim. Thus, the
subjective element of treachery was not present. [30] However, the appellants and
Ritchie abused their superior strength. They boxed and kicked the victim without let
up. They mauled and kicked the victim even as he was already sprawled on the
ground.The victim was outnumbered. As against the combined strength of the
appellants and Ritchie, the victim was helpless. There was indubitably inequality of
strength between the victim and the appellants and Ritchie. [31]
The Proper Penalties
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder
is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no modifying circumstances in the
commission of the crime other than the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, appellant Winchester Abut should be sentenced to reclusion
perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
The penalty imposed by the trial court on appellant Gregmar Baliga which is
from ten years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion

79 | P a g e

temporal, as maximum is correct. The appellant was seventeen and eight months
old when the crime was committed and under Article 68 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty for the crime should be reduced by one degree.
Civil Liabilities of the Appellants
The trial court awarded to the heirs of the victim Edgar GalarpeP75,000 as
civil indemnity and P75,000 as moral damages. The decision of the trial court must
be modified. Conformably with the current jurisprudence, the appellants are
obliged to pay in solidum the heirs of the victim, Edgar Galarpe, the amount
of P50,000 as civil indemnity.[32]However, they are not liable for moral damages
because the prosecution failed to present the heirs of the victim to prove said
damages.[33]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. 97-1504 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellants Winchester Abut and Gregmar
Baliga are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code qualified by abuse of superior strength. There being no other
modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime, appellant Winchester
Abut is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant Gregmar
Baliga is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years
ofprision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. Said
appellants are hereby ordered to pay in solidum the heirs of the victim, Edgar
Galarpe, the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity.The award for moral damages is
deleted.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 131926 & 138991. June 18, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MICHAEL U. PAGALASAN alias
Mike, RONNIE CABALO alias Romy, ALADIN CABALO, FERDINAND
CORTEZ, a JOHN DOE identified only as FERNANDO, and a PETER DOE
identified only as Bong, accused.
MICHAEL U. PAGALASAN alias Mike, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an automatic review of the Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court of
General Santos City, Branch 35, convicting appellant Michael U. Pagalasan of two
counts of kidnapping for ransom of George Lim and his 10-year-old son Christopher
Neal Lim and sentencing him to double death.
The Antecedents
The Spouses George and Desiree Lim and their three young children, one of
whom was 10-year-old Christopher Neal Lim, resided at Villa Consuelo Subdivision,
General Santos City. The spouses hired a security guard, Ferdinand Cortez, from the
Valiant Security Agency to provide security services to the family. On September 4,
1994, at 11:00 p.m., the spouses and their children were in the masters bedroom
watching television. The couples housemaid, Julita Sarno, was in the kitchen. She
heard knocks on the kitchen door. Thinking that it was Ferdinand, she opened the
door. Four men, about 55 to 56 tall, each armed with handguns, two of whom were
holding hand grenades, barged into the kitchen. The four intruders wore bonnets over
their faces. With them was Ferdinand, whose hands were tied behind his back. When
asked by the masked men where her employers were, Julita responded that they were
in their bedroom. On orders of the intruders, she knocked on the bedroom door. When
Georges daughter opened the door, three of the masked men barged into the room,
while the fourth masked man remained in the sala of the house. [2] The three masked
men shouted to George and Desiree:Walang mangyayari sa inyo basta ibigay ninyo
ang kailangan namin.(Nothing will happen to you provided you give us what we want.)
[3]
They ransacked the house, getting cash and valuables. The masked men gave
Desiree a handwritten note,[4] and dragged George and Christopher Neal Lim out of the
bedroom through the sala to the garage, where Georges Nissan car was parked for the
night. George saw Ferdinand in the sala with his hands tied behind his back. One of the
masked men ordered George to hand over the key to his vehicle, to board the car and
occupy the back seat along with Christopher. Father and son did as they were told. Two
of the masked men positioned themselves on either side of George and
Christopher. The third man drove the car, while the fourth sat on the passengers seat
beside the driver. The car cruised along the national highway. When the car was
nearing the Gambalan Kitchenette, George and Christopher were blindfolded. The
masked men told them that they would be brought to Polomolok. After about fifteen
minutes, the car stopped at Sitio Tupi. The two men who were seated at the back and
the masked man seated beside the driver alighted from the car, bringing Christopher
with them. George was transferred to the front seat beside the driver. George was told
that he would be transported to Maasim.
In the meantime, SPO2 Federico Pao, the duty officer of Police Precinct No. 2,
received a radio report that George Lim and his son Christopher had been
kidnapped. Police investigators were dispatched to the Lim residence to conduct an onthe-spot investigation. They brought Ferdinand and Julita to the police station for
investigation. SPO2 Renato Daga-as, SPO2 Datur Villanueva and SPO1 Alimuddin
Timbao were directed to establish a mobile checkpoint at the intersection of the national
highway and a dirt road (Espina Road). The three policemen boarded a Tamaraw
mobile car and parked it at the said intersection. At about thirty meters from the

80 | P a g e

checkpoint, the masked driver of the Nissan vehicle saw the police car. Instead of
running the car through the checkpoint, the driver stopped and switched off its
headlights. He removed his bonnet and Georges blindfold, warning the latter not to
make any false move. George looked at the driver, who turned out to be the appellant
Michael Pagalasan.
The three police officers approached the car. Daga-as went to the right side of the
car beside the passenger seat, while Villanueva went to the left side, near the drivers
seat. For his part, Timbao proceeded to the cars rear end. Daga-as and Villanueva
identified themselves to George and Michael as police officers on the lookout for a
certain George Lim and his son who had been kidnapped in General Santos
City. Daga-as inquired from George what his name was, and George replied that he
was Albert Lim. The driver identified himself as Michael Pagalasan.George gave a false
first name because he was afraid Michael might shoot him. Daga-as noticed that
Georges fingers were trembling.Villanueva knocked at the door on the drivers side, and
tried to open the same, but it was locked. When Michael himself opened the door,
Villanueva pulled him out of the vehicle and brought him to the mobile car. Michael was
suddenly in the custody of the policemen. George then identified himself as one of the
kidnapped victims. He also told the policemen that his son was still with the other
kidnappers. The policemen thereafter searched the Nissan car and found a .38
caliber[5] handgun with six live bullets in its chamber[6] and a grenade under the drivers
seat.[7] The policemen brought Michael and George to the police station where
Ferdinand was being interrogated by police investigators. Ferdinand told George that
he had nothing to do with the kidnapping, but before he could explain further, he was
whisked into the investigation room. After giving a sworn statement to the police
investigator, George was allowed to go home. Desiree gave George the handwritten
letter earlier given to her by the kidnappers before they left the house that evening. In
the letter, the spouses were warned not to coordinate with the military, nor to take any
action in connection with the kidnapping without their knowledge or consent. They were
also informed that the malefactors would communicate with the couple, whether by
letter or through the telephone only through MUBARAK II or 2. [8] Julita executed an
affidavit in connection with the kidnapping.[9]
Police Inspector Antonio Evangelista ordered SPO4 Recio Aniversario to conduct
a custodial investigation on Michael. Recio asked Michael if he wanted to execute an
affidavit, and Michael replied that he was going to execute one. The police investigator
inquired if he knew of any lawyer, to which Michael replied in the negative. The police
investigator then suggested Atty. Tomas C. Falgui, a private practitioner, as his
counsel. When Michael agreed, the police investigator phoned the lawyer, requesting
the latter to assist Michael while undergoing custodial investigation. The lawyer agreed
and forthwith proceeded to the police station. Michael gave his confession under
custodial investigation with the assistance of Atty. Falgui.[10]
In his confession, Michael admitted that upon orders of Ronnie Cabalo, he and
three other men, Aladin (Ronnies brother), a Muslim known as Ferdinand, and Bong (a
resident of Purok Islam), had kidnapped George and his son Christopher. Ronnie
Cabalo instructed Michael to use Georges vehicle to transport father and son to the
banana plantation where Aladin, Ferdinand and Boy would alight with Christopher, and
to thereafter return George to his house. Aladin had given him a handgun for his
use. Ferdinand Cortez was in cahoots with them. He was at first reluctant to obey
Ronnie, but relented when he was told not to be afraid and to use the grenade in case
of trouble. George told him that he had already given money to Aladin, and that
Michaels companions had taken some pieces of jewelry from him and his wife before
they left the Lim residence.
In the light of Michaels confession, farmer Hadji Aladin Malang Cabalo, Ronie
Puntuan and Fernando Quizon were arrested and detained at Camp Fermin Lira

Barracks, General Santos City. In the meantime, on September 6, 1994, George

received another handwritten letter, ordering the release of Michael and Ronie Puntuan
because they were innocent, and demanding P3,000,000 for Christophers release.[11]
On September 9, 1994, George received another handwritten letter dated
September 9, 1994, this time from MUBARAK II or 2 informing him and his wife that the
kidnappers did not want the military to be involved nor innocent people to be
prejudiced. The spouses were also warned that their son would not be released alive
unless Ronie Puntuan was freed in three days. [12] On the same day at 3:25 p.m., Ronie
Puntuan, through counsel, filed a motion with the MTC praying that he be transferred
from the Camp Fermin Lira Barracks to the General Santos City Jail.[13]
In the morning of the following day, September 10, 1994, Christopher was
rescued by policemen without any ransom being paid. On September 13, 1994, George
executed a sworn statement relating to the incidents that happened from September 4,
1994 to September 10, 1994.[14]
Michael was charged with kidnapping for ransom and violation of PD 1866 before
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of General Santos City.[15]
During the initial stage of the preliminary investigation by the MTC on September
6, 1994, Atty. Falgui appeared as Michaels counsel and testified on what transpired
immediately before, during and after the custodial investigation, including Michaels
execution of his extrajudicial confession.[16] Michael was also placed on the witness
stand and, with the assistance of counsel, testified on his extrajudicial confession. He
affirmed the veracity of the contents of the said confession.[17]Subsequently, Michael,
through his mother, secured the services of Atty. Emmanuel V. Fontanilla. On
September 12, 1994, Michael executed an affidavit withdrawing his September 5, 1994
extrajudicial confession, in which he stated that: (a) he was not assisted by counsel of
his own choice when he executed the extrajudicial confession; and (b) Ronie Puntuan,
who was arrested and detained, was not Ronnie Cabalo.[18]Michael also executed a
counter-affidavit where he denied the accusations against him, and clarified that he was
forced and intimidated into making his September 5, 1994 confession, and he was not
provided with counsel of his own choice during custodial investigation. His
constitutional rights under custodial investigation were allegedly not sufficiently
explained to him.[19] He filed the said affidavits with the MTC during the preliminary
investigation.
On September 23, 1994, the MTC issued a resolution finding probable cause for
charging the accused with kidnapping for ransom. The Office of the City Prosecutor
conducted a reinvestigation of the case. On October 4, 1994, the Office of the City
Prosecutor issued a resolution ordering the release of Hadji Aladin Malang Cabalo on
the ground that he was not the Aladin Cabalo referred to by Michael in his confession.
[20]

An Information for violation of PD 1866 was filed against Michael on October 17,
1994 with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 22, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 11062. On November 3, 1994, Michael, Ronnie Cabalo, Aladin
Cabalo, Ferdinand Cortez, a certain John Doe identified as Fernando, and Peter Doe
were charged with kidnapping for ransom in an Information, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 11098, which reads:
That on or about September 4, 1994, in General Santos City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring, and confederating together and mutually
helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap George Lim,
and his ten-year-old son, Christopher Neal Lim, for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
said victims.[21]
The cases were raffled to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court.When arraigned in
Criminal Case No. 11062 for Violation of PD 1866, Michael pleaded not guilty. On
February 6, 1995, Michael, Ferdinand and Fernando Quizon were arraigned in Criminal

81 | P a g e

Case No. 11098 and pleaded not guilty.[22] Ronnie Cabalo and Aladin Cabalo remained
at-large. On August 24, 1995, the judge hearing the cases inhibited himself.Both cases
were re-raffled, assigned to, and were tried jointly by Branch 35 of the Regional Trial
Court.
During the trial, Michael, through counsel, admitted the truth of the contents of the
affidavit executed by Julita Sarno.[23] Michael also executed an affidavit on December 5,
1995 alleging inter alia that he was forced at gunpoint by Boy and Aladin to barge into
the Lim residence and drive the latters car, and that he did not know Fernando Quizon.
[24]
After the prosecution had presented all its witnesses, it filed a formal offer of its
documentary evidence including Michaels December 15, 1995 Sworn Statement and
his confession.[25] Michael did not file any comment or opposition to the said offer. On
May 3, 1996, the trial court issued an order admitting the prosecutions documentary
evidence, including Michaels confession.[26] After the prosecution had rested its case,
Fernando Quizon filed a demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case No. 11098. On July 2,
1996, the court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence of the said accused
and acquitted him of the charge.[27]
The Defense and Evidence of the Accused
Ferdinand Cortez denied kidnapping George and Christopher. He testified that he
had been employed as a security guard by the Valiant Security Agency. He was
assigned by the agency to protect George Lim and his family. On the evening of
September 4, 1994, Ferdinand was washing Georges car in the garage. The house
was surrounded by a 10-foot wall, and the gate was locked. Ferdinand was shocked
when masked men, armed with handguns, suddenly arrived. They poked their guns at
him, maltreated him, and tied his hands behind his back. The masked men knocked at
the door of the house and when the housemaid Julita Sarno opened it, the men
dragged Ferdinand towards the entrance, to make it appear that he was the one
knocking. The masked men then barged into the sala and tied Julitas hands. Ferdinand
claimed he never met any of the kidnappers before September 4, 1994. He was
puzzled why he was being implicated in the case.
For his part, Michael testified that he was a Muslim, 19 years of age, and an
elementary school graduate. He made a living as a conductor of his uncles jeepney. At
night, the jeepney was parked in Tambler, and it was where he usually slept. On the
evening of September 4, 1994, at about 9:00 p.m., he was in their house at Purok Islam
public market, General Santos City. His friend Bong arrived, and invited him for a stroll
and to accompany the latter to get a motorcycle. Michael agreed. They took a tricycle
and arrived at the Villa Consuelo Subdivision. Michael was surprised when the tricycle
stopped near the gate of the Lim residence and masked men suddenly appeared,
poking their guns at him. Bong fled, leaving Michael alone to fend for himself. The
masked men ordered Michael to drive a car, and warned him that if he refused, he
would be killed. Momentarily, one of the men emerged from the house, with George Lim
in tow. George gave the key to his Nissan car to one of the kidnappers, who in turn
handed it over to Michael. The men forced George and his son Christopher to board
the car. Father and son were seated between two masked men. Afraid for his life,
Michael was forced to drive the car with one of the kidnappers pointing a gun at him,
seated to his right at the passengers side. The kidnappers ordered Michael to drive the
car towards the direction of Barangay Ligaya.
When the car reached a dark portion of the road in Barangay Ligaya, three of the
men alighted, bringing Christopher with them. Michael then pleaded to George to bring
him first to Tambler, where the jeepney of his uncle was parked. Michael wanted to
sleep there instead of going home.George agreed, and drove the car himself through
Barangay Makar.George told Michael that they had to travel along Espina road, a dirt
road, instead of the regular road because they might encounter policemen, and
Christopher might be killed by his kidnappers. However, the car had to stop at the

intersection of the national highway and Espina Road when George saw policemen and
the mobile police car parked at the intersection.
Michael was arrested by the police, blindfolded, and brought to the mobile car
where he was also mauled. His head was banged against the sides of the mobile
car. At the precinct, Michael was mauled anew by the policemen. It was only after he
had given his statement to a police investigator that Atty. Falgui arrived and told
Michael, I am your lawyer.[28]Atty. Falgui instructed Michael to tell the whole truth.
[29]
When his mother Camaria Opong visited him, he told her that he had been
blindfolded and mauled at the station, and that because of this, his body ached. She
saw a big hump in his head. On September 8, 1994, she secured the services of Atty.
Fontanilla as counsel of her son. The lawyer went to the City Jail and talked to
Michael. Michael showed the lawyer the contusions and bruises on his body, and the
scratches on his neck. Michael told the lawyer that he had been maltreated by an
inmate at the detention cell. He also narrated that he knew nothing about the
kidnapping and that he was only hired by somebody to drive a car. Michael assured the
lawyer that he was not aware of the purpose of the culprits in kidnapping George and
Christopher. On September 9, 1994, Atty. Fontanilla executed an affidavit reiterating the
information Michael conveyed to him.[30] On September 16, 1994, Michael filed an
urgent motion for medical check-up, which the court granted.[31]
Dra. Virginia Ramirez, Officer-In-Charge of the City Integrated Health Services,
examined Michael on September 22, 1994 and found him suffering from myalgia
residual or muscle pains due to mauling, which she surmised took place about one
week to ten days before the examination. She issued a medical certificate of the said
examination.[32]
On September 24, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting Ferdinand
Cortez and convicting Michael of kidnapping for ransom, the decretal portion of which
reads:
JUDGMENT
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused is hereby sentenced as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 11062 for failure of the prosecution to prove the accusation against the
accused Michael Pagalasan beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.
In Criminal Case No. 11098, the accused Michael Pagalasan is hereby found guilty of the crime
of kidnapping for ransom as defined and penalized under Article 267 as amended by Section 8
of Republic Act 7659, and there being no modifying circumstance to consider, he is sentenced to
suffer the EXTREME PENALTY OF DEATH insofar as the case of George Lim is concerned.
The same penalty of death shall also be imposed against Michael Pagalasan in the case of
Christopher Neal Lim who was kidnapped on the same occasion and was released only on the
sixth day after his captivity.
The case of Ferdinand Cortez, for lack of sufficient evidence to convict him, he is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.[33]
The trial court ruled in Criminal Case No. 11098 that with or without the confession
of Michael, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that he, in
conspiracy with three others, kidnapped George and Christopher. It found the testimony
of George straightforward and positive, credible and entitled to full probative
weight. The trial court sentenced Michael to double death on its finding that he and his
cohorts kidnapped George and Christopher for the purpose of extorting ransom. It
disbelieved Michaels confession implicating Ferdinand Cortez, and acquitted the latter
for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court
likewise acquitted Michael in Criminal Case No. 11062.
Michael, now the appellant, asserts that:
I

82 | P a g e

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE

CRIME OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM OF CHRISTOPHER NEAL LIM DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE
CRIME OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM OF ONE GEORGE LIM WITHOUT ANY BASIS
IN FACT AND IN LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT
TESTIMONY OF GEORGE LIM.[34]
The appellant is guilty of
kidnapping Christopher
under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code.
On the first assignment of error, the appellant avers that the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt beyond cavil of doubt for the crime of kidnapping Christopher. Georges
testimony that the gun and hand grenade [35] were found in the car, under the seat
beside the driver is inconsistent with his own statement before the police investigator
that the said gun and grenade were found in the appellants possession; hence, the
testimony of George is incredible and barren of probative weight. The case for the
prosecution was enfeebled by its failure to present Christopher to testify on his
kidnapping and to corroborate the testimony of his father. The failure of the prosecution
to present Christopher as a witness raised the presumption that if he had been so
presented, he would have testified on matters adverse to the prosecution. For its part,
the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the testimony of George, its principal
witness, as well as those of its other witnesses, is sufficient to prove, beyond
reasonable doubt, that the appellant conspired with three others in kidnapping
Christopher for ransom. There was no need for the prosecution to present Christopher
to testify on his kidnapping, as his testimony would be merely corroborative of his
fathers account of events.
The contention of the appellant is barren of merit.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659
reads:
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female, or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances abovementioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (As amended by RA No.
7659).
For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping, the prosecution is burdened to
prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (a) the offender
is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the

latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the
commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed by simulating
public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.[36] If the victim of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the
victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the
duration of his detention is immaterial.
The essential elements for this crime is the deprivation of liberty of the victim
under any of the above-mentioned circumstances coupled with indubitable proof of
intent of the accused to effect the same. [37] There must be a purposeful or knowing
action by the accused to forcibly restrain the victim coupled with intent.[38]
Judge Learned Hand once called conspiracy the darling of the modern
prosecutors nursery.[39] There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit
a felony and decide to commit it.[40] Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability
must be proven separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime
itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. After all, secrecy and
concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. Conspiracies are
clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during
and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common
purpose and design.[41] Paraphrasing the decision of the English Court in Regina v.
Murphy,[42] conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by
their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part
so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact,
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment.[43] To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of
conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity.[44] There must be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[45]
The United States Supreme Court in Braverman v. United States, [46]held that the
precise nature and extent of the conspiracy must be determined by reference to the
agreement which embraces and defines its objects. For one thing, the temporal
dimension of the conspiracy is of particular importance. Settled as a rule of law is that
the conspiracy continues until the object is attained, unless in the meantime the
conspirator abandons the conspiracy or is arrested. There is authority to the effect that
the conspiracy ends at the moment of any conspirators arrest, on the presumption,
albeit rebuttable, that at the moment the conspiracy has been thwarted, no other overt
act contributing to the conspiracy can possibly take place, at least as far as the arrested
conspirator is concerned.[47] The longer a conspiracy is deemed to continue, the greater
the chances that additional persons will be found to have joined it. There is also the
possibility that as the conspiracy continues, there may occur new overt acts. If the
conspiracy has not yet ended, then the hearsay acts and declarations of one
conspirator will be admissible against the other conspirators and one conspirator may
be held liable for substantive crimes committed by the others.[48]
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which
follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and
natural consequences even though it was not intended as part of the original design.
[49]
Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular
purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and
growing out of the purpose intended.[50] Conspirators are held to have intended the
consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily
and directly produces a prohibited result that they are in contemplation of law, charged

83 | P a g e

with intending the result.[51]Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another
conspirator even though such act differs radically and substantively from that which
they intended to commit.[52] The Court agrees with the ruling of the Circuit Court of
Appeals (Second District) per Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Peoni[53] that
nobody is liable in conspiracy except for the fair import of the concerted purpose or
agreement as he understood it; if later comers change that, he is not liable for the
change; his liability is limited to the common purpose while he remains in it. Earlier, the
Appellate Court of Kentucky in Gabbard v. Commonwealth[54] held that:
The act must be the ordinary and probable effect of the wrongful acts specifically agreed on, so
that the connection between them may be reasonably apparent, and not a fresh and independent
project of the mind of one of the confederates, outside of or foreign to the common design, and
growing out of the individual malice of the perpetrator.
Equally persuasive is the pronouncement of the Circuit Court of Appeals (Second
District) in United States v. Crimms,[55] that it is never permissible to enlarge the scope
of the conspiracy itself by proving that some of the conspirators, unknown to the rest,
have done what was beyond the reasonable intendment of the common
understanding. This is equally true when the crime which the conspirators agreed upon
is one of which they severally might be guilty though they were ignorant of the
existence of some of its constitutive facts. Also, while conspirators are responsible for
consequent acts growing out of the common design they are not for independent acts
growing out of the particular acts of individuals.[56]
In this case, the evidence on record inscrutably shows that the appellant and his
three cohorts were armed with handguns; two of them had hand grenades, and all of
them had masks over their faces. They gained entry into the Lim residence after
overpowering the security guard Ferdinand and the housemaid Julita, and tying their
hands behind their backs. One of the masked men remained in the sala, while the three
others barged into the bedroom of George and Desiree, and kidnapped George and his
ten-year-old son Christopher. The appellant and his cohorts forced father and son to
board Georges car. The appellant drove the car, dropped off Christopher and his
cohorts at Sitio Tupi, and drove on with George in the car towards the direction of
Maasim.
The collective, concerted and synchronized acts of the appellant and his cohorts
before, during and after the kidnapping constitute indubitable proof that the appellant
and his three companions conspired with each other to attain a common objective: to
kidnap George and Christopher and detain them illegally. The appellant was a principal
by direct participation in the kidnapping of the two victims.
The trial court found the testimony of George straightforward and positive, and
entitled to credit and full probative weight. [57] The legal aphorism is that the findings of
facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of witnesses and of their
probative weight, its conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded high respect by
the appellate court, if not conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of the trial
court of observing at close range the demeanor, conduct and deportment of witnesses
as they regale the trial court with their testimonies. [58] It is true that the appellate court is
not bound by the findings and conclusions of the trial court if the latter ignored,
misunderstood, misapplied or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances, which, if
considered, would change the outcome of the case. [59] This ruling, however, is
inapplicable in the case at bar, since the appellant failed to establish that the trial court
erred in this wise.
George testified that when the policemen found the gun and grenade [60] inside his
car, the appellant was already at the police station.[61] However, in his September 13,
1994 Affidavit,[62] George stated that the policemen found the gun when the appellant
was frisked, while the grenade was spotted under the passengers seat, beside the
driver. This seeming inconsistency between the two statements does not discredit his

testimony nor his credibility for the following reasons: (a) it is of judicial knowledge that
affidavits being taken ex parte are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate and
are generally inferior to the testimony of a witness in open court; [63] (b) the credibility of
Georges testimony cannot be impeached by the inconsistent statements contained in
his sworn statement because the said statement was not admitted in evidence; and
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides that the Court shall not
consider evidence which has not been formally offered; besides, George was not
confronted with his sworn statement and accorded an opportunity to explain the
inconsistency;[64] (c) the inconsistency refers to trivial, minor and collateral matters and
not to the substance of his testimony. Such minor inconsistency even enhances its
veracity as the variances erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.[65] A truth-telling
witness is not always expected to give an error-free testimony, considering the lapse of
time and the treachery of human memory.[66]
Neither is the case for the prosecution impaired by the failure of the prosecution to
present Christopher as its witness. It bears stressing that Georges testimony is
corroborated by Julita and the three arresting officers. Besides, case law has it that the
testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a judgment
of conviction.[67]The law does not require the testimonies of at least two witnesses for
the conviction of an accused for kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The
prosecution has the discretion to decide on who to call as witness during the trial, and
its failure to present a particular witness does not give rise to the presumption that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if withheld, where the evidence is at the
disposal of the appellant and is merely cumulative or corroborative. [68] In this case, the
testimony of George is, by itself, independently of Christophers testimony, sufficient
proof of the guilt of the appellant. George had personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances of the kidnapping, as he himself had been kidnapped along with his
young son. His failure to testify on where Christopher was detained after the three
cohorts of the appellant had alighted from the car with Christopher, and the
circumstances surrounding the rescue do not weaken the case of the prosecution, as
the said facts and circumstances had occurred after the crime of kidnapping had
already been a fait accompli.
The prosecution failed to prove
that in kidnapping George and
Christopher, the appellant and
his cohorts intended to extort
ransom.
The trial court convicted the appellant of kidnapping George and Christopher for
ransom and sentenced him to double death on its finding that the appellant and his coaccused conspired to extort ransom for the release of the victims. For his part, the
appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove the element of extorting
ransom. The appellant argues that he cannot be held liable for kidnapping for ransom,
even if after his arrest on September 4, 1994 his co-conspirators actually demanded
ransom for Christophers release. The prosecution failed to prove that he had
knowledge of and concurred with the said demand.
The Court agrees with the appellant. The second paragraph of Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code reads:
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances abovementioned were present in the commission of the offense.
The provision is pursuant to Rep. Act No. 1084 approved on June 15, 1984 derived
from the so-called Lindbergh Law in the United States, approved on June 22, 1932, as
amended on May 13, 1934.

84 | P a g e

To warrant the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention for ransom, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable
doubt the following: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his
liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; (c) motive of the accused, which
is extortion of ransom from the victim or any other person. In kidnapping or serious
illegal detention for ransom, the purpose of extorting ransom is a qualifying
circumstance which must be alleged in the Information and proved by the prosecution
as the crime itself by words and overt acts of the accused before, during and after the
kidnapping and detention of the victim. Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of
ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed. [69] Although kidnapping for a certain
purpose is a qualifying circumstance, the law does not require that the purpose be
accomplished.[70] Ransom employed in the law is so used in its common or ordinary
sense: a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or consideration paid or
demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment that releases
from captivity.[71] It may include benefits not necessarily pecuniary which may accrue to
the kidnapper or a third person as a condition for the release of the victim.[72]
In this case, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
appellant conspired with three others to kidnap the victims.However, it failed to prove
that they intended to extort ransom from the victims themselves or from some other
person, with a view to obtaining the latters release. The kidnapping by itself does not
give rise to the presumption that the appellant and his co-conspirators purpose is to
extort ransom from the victims or any other person.
The only evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the element of extorting
ransom are the three handwritten letters: the first was received by Desiree on
September 4, 1994, while the second and third letters were received by George on
September 6 and 9, 1994, respectively.
The handwritten letter received by Desiree on September 4, 1994,first letter for
brevity, reads:
Para Sa Inyo Mr. & Mrs. Lim,
Una wag na wag kayong gumawa ng hakbang na hindi namin alam o gusto, lalong-lalo na sa
pakikipag-usap sa militar o magkoordinate sa militar ay hindi namin gustong mangyari ang
ganon mga sistem. Ang pangalawa, wag na wag kayong tumanggap ng negotiator na walang
palatandaan na galing sa amin, pakiusap lang yon na dapat ninyong sundin, madidisgrasya ang
aming dala kung kayoy magkakamali ng hakbang.
Maliwanag sana sa inyo ang aming mga salaysay.
Note
Palatandaan na galing sa aming hakbang ay ito
MR. MUBARAK II or 2
Sulat man o telephone[73]
The letter received by George on September 6, 1994, second letterfor brevity,
reads:
Ronie Puntuan
Michael Pagalasan
Mr. G. Lim palayain ninyo ang suspek ninyo. Wala silang kasalanan bago natin tapusin ang
usapan tatlong milyong piso (3,000,000) katumbas ng kalayaan ng mahal ninyong anak. Paalisin
ang mga sundalo. Kailangan ang Black Out News.Huwag kang magkakamali Mr.
Lim. Kunting sipyot mo patay ang anak mo.Isang araw lamang ang tagal namin sa inyo.
(Sgd.)[74]
The handwritten letter received by George on September 9, 1994,third letter for
brevity, reads:
Para sayo Mr. & Mrs. Lim,
Mr. Lim, gusto ko lang ipaabot sayo ang maikli kong kataga. Unang-una, ayaw namin na mga
asong militar na makialam. Pangalawa, ayaw namin sa grupo na idamay ang tao na walang-

alam. Alalahanin mo mabuti lahat ng mga kataga na iniwan ko sayo, Mr. Lim. Ang taong
dinampot ng militar sa purok islam na si Ronie, ang taong yan walang conection ( sic) sa grupo,
sa madaling usapan, Mr. Lim, alalahanin mo ang anak mo sa oras na tatlong araw na taong yan
hindi makalabas. Ang isipin mo ang anak mo hindi rin makalabas hanggat sa mabulok sa lupa
(maliwanag).
(Sign)
Palatandaan
MUBARAK II - 2[75]
As gleaned from the three letters, there was no demand for ransom in exchange
for George and Christophers liberty. While there is a demand for ransom of P3,000,000
in the second letter, and a demand for the release of Ronie Puntuan within three days
in the third letter, the said demands are in consideration of Christophers release from
custody, and not that of George.
Even then, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that the second
letter demanding ransom in the amount of P3,000,000 for the release of Christopher
actually came from the appellant and his co-conspirators. It bears stressing that in
the first letter, the kidnappers made it clear to the couple that only those
communications, whether by letter or by telephone, bearing the name MR. MUBARAK
II or 2 came from them:
Note
Palatandaan na galing sa aming hakbang ay ito
MR. MUBARAK II or 2
Sulat man o telephone[76]
The second letter received by George was signed by an unidentified person. It
was not stated that the letter came from MUBARAK II-2. That the second letter could
not have come from the appellant and his cohorts is buttressed by the fact that
the third letter, which came from MUBARAK II-2, does not even mention any demand
for ransom in the amount of P3,000,000 for Christophers release.
The Court can only surmise, but it is possible that the signatory and sender of
the second letter could have been acting independently of the appellant and his coconspirators in order to profit from the kidnapping. It bears stressing that the kidnapping
of Christopher and George was already known when the appellant was arrested on
September 4, 1994, and the crime had already been reported to the police
authorities.Persons other than the co-conspirators of the appellant could have written
the letter.
Since there is no evidence that the signatory and sender of thesecond letter is a
co-conspirator of the appellant, the latter is not bound by the said letter, conformably to
Section 28, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which reads:
Sec. 28. Admission by third party. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.
Even if it is assumed for the nonce that the second letter came from a coconspirator, the same is not binding on the appellant, absent evidence aliunde that he
knew of and concurred with the said ransom demand. It bears stressing that when
George received the second letter on September 6, 1994, the appellant had already
been arrested and detained. The conspiracy forged by the appellant and his cohorts on
or before September 4, 1994 had already ceased, when on the said date, the appellant
was arrested by the policemen and detained.[77]
Neither is the third letter admissible in evidence against the appellant to prove
that he conspired with others to demand the release of Ronie Puntuan in consideration
for Christophers freedom. The appellant and his cohorts could not have planned to
demand ransom for the release of Ronie Puntuan as early as September 4, 1994, the
date of the kidnapping: Ronie had not yet been arrested on this date. The appellant
was arrested first, and Ronies detention was only to follow. Furthermore, the third

85 | P a g e

letter was sent to George on September 9, 1994. At that point, the appellant had
already been arrested by the policemen, and was already in jail. There is no evidence
that while in jail, the appellant had knowledge of and concurred with the said ransom
demand. It may be reasonably inferred that the appellants co-conspirators could have
decided to demand Ronie Puntuans release as a consideration for Christophers liberty,
while the appellant was already languishing in jail.The said demand for ransom was a
new and independent project of the appellants co-conspirators, growing out of their own
malice, without any a priori knowledge on the part of the appellant or his post
facto concurrence therewith. Indeed, the records show that on September 9, 1994, the
very day the co-conspirators sent the third letter to George, Ronie Puntuan through
counsel Atty. Jose Jerry L. Fulgar, also the counsel for the appellant, filed a motion with
the MTC, praying that he be detained at the General Santos City Jail:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that an order be please
issued directing that accused Ronie Puntuan be please detained at General Santos City Jail with
the instruction that the said accused be separated from his co-accused as desired by the Police
Officers.[78]
That the appellant plotted with his co-conspirators to demand the release of Ronie
Puntuan as a condition for Christophers liberty is too far-fetched, considering that Ronie
and the appellant had the same lawyer.Ronie Puntuan himself, through his and the
appellants counsel, prayed to the court that he be transferred from Camp Fermin Lira
Barracks to the General Santos City Jail.
The appellant is also guilty
of slight illegal detention of
George under Article 268
of the Revised Penal Code.
Aside from convicting the appellant of kidnapping Christopher, the trial court also
convicted him of kidnapping George under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. But
the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the appellant is guilty of another felony:
slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code, because none of
the circumstances enumerated in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is present in
the kidnapping and detention of George. The prosecution may have failed to prove that
the appellant and his co-conspirators intended to extort ransom for Georges release;
however, as a matter of substantive law, the appellant may be held guilty of two
separate crimes, although he and his co-conspirators kidnapped George and
Christopher on the same occasion and from the same situs. As a matter of procedural
law, the appellant may be convicted of slight illegal detention under the Information for
kidnapping for ransom as the former is necessarily included in the latter crime.
The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General. The appellant is guilty of
slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code which reads:
Art. 268. Slight illegal detention. The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed upon any
private individual who shall commit the crimes described in the next preceding article without
the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated therein.
The same penalty shall be incurred by anyone who shall furnish the place for the perpetration of
the crime.
If the offender shall voluntarily release the person so kidnapped or detained within three days
from the commencement of the detention, without having attained the purpose intended, and
before the institution of criminal proceedings against him, the penalty shall be prision mayor in
its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding seven hundred pesos. (As amended
by Republic Act No. 18).
While the epigraph or title of the article mentions only slight illegal detention,
kidnapping committed in connection with the lower offense of slight illegal detention is
also covered by the article.[79]
The felony has the following essential elements:

1. That the offender is a private individual.

2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner depriveshim of
his liberty.
3. That the act of kidnapping or detention is illegal.
4. That the crime is committed without the attendance of any of the
circumstances enumerated in Art. 267.[80]
The crime of slight illegal detention is consummated upon the occurrence of all
the elements thereof. A day, in the last paragraph of Article 268 of the Revised Penal
Code, should be understood as twenty-four hours, to be counted from the deprivation of
the liberty of the victim until the cessation thereof. As Cuello Calon put it: El plazo de
los tres dias de veinte cuatro horas y desde el momento de la privacion de libertad si
en que esta cesare.[81] The rescue or escape of the victim within three days from his
kidnapping and detention is not an exempting circumstance. The voluntary release by
the offender of the victim within three days from his detention, without the offender
having attained his purpose and before the institution of criminal proceedings against
him for slight illegal detention, is not an exempting circumstance; it merely serves to
reduce the penalty to prision mayor in its maximum and medium periods and a fine not
exceeding P700.
In this case, the appellant is a private individual. George had been kidnapped and
detained illegally by the appellant and his cohorts, but only for less than a day. George
regained his freedom after the appellant had been arrested at the intersection of the
national highway and Espina Road. There is no evidence that the appellant and his
cohorts kidnapped George for the purpose of extorting ransom for his release. There is
likewise no evidence that they inflicted any serious physical injuries on George, or
simulated public authority, or threatened to kill him.Furthermore, there is no evidence
that the appellant and his cohorts intended to detain the victim for more than three
days.
Although the appellant and his co-conspirators kidnapped George and
Christopher on the same occasion and from the same situs, the appellant is guilty of
two separate crimes: kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, and
slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code. The appellant and
his co-conspirators were animated by two sets of separate criminal intents and criminal
resolutions in kidnapping and illegally detaining the two victims. The criminal intent in
kidnapping Christopher was separate from and independent of the criminal intent and
resolution in kidnapping and detaining George for less than three days. In the mind and
conscience of the appellant, he had committed two separate felonies; hence, should be
meted two separate penalties for the said crimes: one for kidnapping under Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code and another for slight illegal detention under Article 268 of
the same code.[82] The felony of slight illegal detention is necessarily included in the
crime of kidnapping for ransom; thus, the appellant may be convicted of the former
crime under an Information for kidnapping for ransom.[83]
PENALTIES FOR THE CRIMES
COMMITTED BY THE APPELLANT
The crimes committed by the appellant were aggravated by dwelling,[84] the victims
having been kidnapped in their house; by the use of motor vehicle, [85] the victims having
been transported by the appellant from their house with the use of Georges car; and by
a band, the crime having been committed by the appellant and three co-conspirators.
[86]
However, the Court cannot consider these aggravating circumstances in determining
the proper penalties for the said crimes, because the same were not alleged in the
Information as mandated by Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.[87] Although the said rules took effect after the commission of the
crimes by the appellant, the same is favorable to the appellant; hence, should be
applied retroactively.[88]

86 | P a g e

The appellant is not entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance under the
second paragraph of Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code [89]because he did not
voluntarily release George within three days from the kidnapping. George was
recovered by the policemen at the intersection of the national highway and Espina
Road.
The prescribed penalty for kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no
aggravating circumstance or modifying circumstance in the commission of the crime,
the proper penalty for the said crime is reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code. The prescribed penalty for slight illegal detention is reclusion
temporal in its full period, with a range of twelve years and one day to twenty years. To
determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, the penalty shall be reduced by
one degree, prision mayor, which has a range of six years and one day to twelve
years. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of
the penalty at the discretion of the Court. The maximum of the indeterminate penalty
shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, conformably to Article 64,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the appellant shall suffer an
indeterminate penalty of nine years and four months of prision mayor in its medium
period as minimum, to sixteen years and five months of reclusion temporal in its
medium period as maximum.
CIVIL LIABILITIES OF THE APPELLANT
Although the prosecution adduced testimonial evidence that the appellant and his
co-conspirators ransacked the bedroom of the victims and took cash and valuables, the
prosecution nevertheless failed to adduce any documentary evidence to prove the
amount of the said cash and the value of the jewelry. Hence, Spouses George and
Desiree Lim are not entitled to actual damages.
Under Article 2219, paragraph 5 of the New Civil Code, moral damages may be
recovered. In this case, the prosecution adduced testimonial evidence that for the
crimes committed by the appellant and his co-conspirators, Spouses George and
Desiree suffered mental anguish, fright and serious anxiety caused by the kidnapping of
George and their son Christopher. Considering the factual milieu in this case, the Court
believes that the said spouses are entitled to moral damages in the amount
of P100,000 for the kidnapping of Christopher, and the amount ofP50,000 for the illegal
detention of George. The appellant is also liable to the spouses for exemplary damages
in the total amount of P50,000 for the two crimes conformably with current
jurisprudence.[90]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision dated September 27, 1997 of
the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 35, is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Michael Pagalasan alias Mike is found guilty of kidnapping
under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code and there being no
modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty ofreclusion perpetua. Appellant Michael Pagalasan alias Mike is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight illegal detention under Article 268
of the Revised Penal Code and there being no modifying circumstances in the
commission of the crime is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from
nine years and four months of prision mayor in its medium period as minimum to
sixteen years and five months of reclusion temporal in its medium period as
maximum. The said appellant is ordered to pay to Spouses George and Desiree Lim
the total amount of P150,000 as moral damages; andP50,000 as exemplary damages
in the two cases.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136137. December 11, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.CALIXTO "ALEX"
BIONG (At Large), ANTONIO DIOLA, ENRIQUE "DODOY"
MORALES (At Large), ORLANDO "KOLOT" LEYSON (At
Large), JOHN DOE (At Large), RICHARD DOE (At Large) and
PETER DOE (At Large), accused.
ANTONIO DIOLA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
On 01 June 1996, fourteen-year old Carol Epis was in her grandparents house
in barrio Tuburan, Upper Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, when, about three
o'clock in the afternoon, Rowena Leyson and Gemma Jekjek Morales invited her
to go with them to barrio Sindangan, about five kilometers from Tuburan, to get
the pair of pants of Rowena from her father-in-law Emong Leyson. A benefit
dance, sponsored by the Kabataang Barangay, was scheduled at Sindangan that
same evening but Carol Epis had no intention of attending the affair. Carol
considered the two women as her friends as both frequently would pass time in the
place of her Tia Egia, although Rowena, at 20, and Gemma, at 19, were way older
than she was. After asking permission from her grandparents, Carol decided to
go. As the girl would soon learn, it was a decision that would change her young
life.
The three girls initially traversed the distance to Sindangan by foot but, after
reaching a particular juncture in Ilihan, they took a tricycle ride for the remaining
stretch of their journey. Arriving at Sindangan at five o'clock that afternoon, they
directly went to the store of Inday Lim, where they sat on the stores adjoining
wooden benches, staying there for the next two hours. Carol repeatedly told
Rowena that they should now go and get her pair of pants but Rowena prevailed
upon her to wait awhile. At eight oclock that evening, the benefit dance
started.Again, Carol tried to convince Rowena that they should now go but the
latter insisted that they dance first. Rowena and Gemma headed for the dance floor
while Carol, not being appropriately dressed for the occasion, remained seated at
the store with Inday Lim and the latters daughter, Elviza, for company.Meanwhile,
a man, who later introduced himself to be Mario Maraon, approached her and
asked her to dance but soon left when she begged off. Later, Antonio Diola also
asked her to dance and when she again declined, he went back to his companions
who were seated on a table. Moments later, Mario Maraon returned and quietly sat
beside her. Silence engulfed both Carol and Maraon who obviously had nothing to
say to each other. Momentarily, their silence was interrupted when Carol asked
Maraon the name of the person who had just asked her to dance. Maraon answered
that it was Antonio Diola, alias `Mocoy.' The persistent Diola convinced her to
dance three more times, but she repeatedly refused him. Carol, who at eleven
o'clock in the evening had still not eaten dinner, decided to look for her erstwhile
companions Rowena and Gemma but failing to find them at the dance hall or
anywhere else, she returned to her seat at the store. She would have wanted to

87 | P a g e

return to her grandparents house in Tuburan but for lack of fare money and her
fear of a dark and solitary journey home, the girl thought it best to just wait for her
friends. After a while, she decided to proceed to the house of Emong, which was
about 150 meters from Inday Lim's store, to look for them there. Not finding
anyone in the house, Carol went back to the store where she inquired whether
Rowena and Gemma had by then returned. She was told that they had not. She was
sitting on the stores wooden bench when she met Dominga Minggay
Cortina. After telling Cortina of her plight, the latter volunteered to accompany
Carol to Emong Leysons house.Finding nobody at the house of Emong Leyson,
the two girls decided to return to the store. It was approximately three o'clock in
the early morning of 02 June 1996 when they trudged back to Inday Lims store.
Along the way, at a point near a school, they noticed seven men. Among the
seven, Carol first recognized Antonio Diola, who was just wearing a "sando." She
also recognized Enrique Morales alias Dodoy, Calixto Alex Biong, and Orlando
Leyson alias Kolot. She did not know the names of the three others.After seeing
the seven men, Minggay Cortina ran away, leaving Carol behind.Desperate, she
yelled, "Minggay," but the latter did not respond. Left alone with their quarry, the
seven men surrounded Carol and dragged her towards a secluded area behind the
school building. Calixto Biong took hold of her, Orlando Leyson pulled her T-shirt
while Enrique Morales held her by the neck. Pointing his hunting knife at her,
Antonio Diola warned her not to make a sound. Orlando Leyson released her Tshirt and pulled down her short pants and her underwear.Calixto Biong began to
touch her all over. Morales then held her feet, Leyson her hands and Diola kept her
at bay with his knife. It was Calixto Biong who first ravaged her, followed by
Orlando Leyson, Enrique Morales and the three others whom she could not
identify. She tried to shout but they quelled her cries by covering her mouth with a
cloth.
It was a harsh initiation for Carol into the carnal world, and the pain was
unbearable. Antonio Diola, who continued to point the knife at her, himself did not
sexually molest her. After having sated their beastly appetites, the group left
her. Blood stained her pants. Not knowing what to do, the young girl went back to
the house of Emong to look for Gemma and Rowena but, failing to find them
there, she returned to the school, where, unable to sleep, she sat on a bench at an
inconspicuous corner of the building and stayed there up until morning. It was five
o'clock in the morning when she decided to take the one-hour hike homeward to
Tuburan.
Carol did not immediately tell her grandparents about the incident for fear of
their anger. It was only four days later when she found the courage to narrate her
ordeal to Lucing Neri, a paternal aunt, who promptly relayed her sad tale to her
grandfather. Her relatives accompanied her to the Macrohon police station and
thereafter to the municipal health office for medical examination. According to Dr.
Archimedes Demetrio, the vagina of private complainant proved negative of
spermatozoa. But, to the examining doctor, it was only to be expected because the
physical examination was made five days after the alleged rape. Medical findings
further revealed the hymen to be no longer intact, and without any recent

lacerations. Dr. Demetrio found old and healed lacerations, which, he opined,
could not have been made just within the last five days.
Preliminary investigation yielded the names of four of the malefactors, while
three remained unidentified. All but Antonio Diola had fled Sindangan, their
whereabouts still unknown. Antonio Diola was the only one arrested and, on 04
March 1997, an accusatory Information was filed against him. Thus "The undersigned Prosecutor, acting upon a sworn complaint originally signed and
filed by the offended party, hereby accuses CALIXTO BIONG alias `Alex',
ENRIQUE MORALES, alias `Dodoy', ORLANDO LEYSON alias `Kolot', JOHN
DOE, RICHARD DOE and PETER DOE, who are all at large, and ANTONIO
DIOLA, who is presently detained in the Provincial Jail, Maasin, Southern Leyte,
of the crime of Rape committed by them as follows "That on or about the second day of June 1996, at around 3:00 a.m., in barangay
Sindangan, municipality of Macrohon, province of Southern Leyte, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with lustful intent and
by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take turns in ravishing one Carol F. Epis, and successfully had
carnal intercourse with said offended party without her consent and against her
will, to the damage and prejudice of said Carol F. Epis and of social order."[1]
Antonio Diola advanced the defense of alibi and introduced a succession of
witnesses in an attempt to destroy the credibility of private complainant.
Witness Rowena Leyson denied having been a personal friend of Carol Epis
and disclaimed having gone to the latters house in Tuburan on 01 June 1996. She
testified that, on 31 May 1996, three days before the alleged rape she was on her
way to Sindangan with Gemma Morales to get a pair of trousers from her motherin-law "Toning" Leyson. It was then when she first met private complainant on the
road. She described the meeting as being brief and uneventful. Upon reaching
Sindangan, Toning Leyson told her and Gemma that the pair of trousers were not
yet finished. Since it was already late, she and Gemma decided to spend the night
at Ilihan in the house of Belen Leyson, a relative, and there stayed until the
afternoon of the next day. On cross-examination, the witness acknowledged as
being the sister-in-law of accused Orlando Kolot Leyson and admitted personally
knowing accused Antonio Diola and Calixto Biong and that it was the father of
Diola himself who convinced her to take the witness stand.
A repudiation of the account of private complainant was also echoed in the
testimony of defense witness Dominga Minggay Cortina. According to Cortina,
she first met private complainant Carol Epis on 01 June 1996. At between 6:30 to
7:00 p.m., she had gone to the store of Inday Lim to buy something to eat when
she saw Carol sitting on the bench. Obviously recognizing her as a newcomer in
the area, she introduced herself and asked the other girl her name to which the
latter replied, I am Carol. Cortina said that after that fleeting encounter, she
proceeded home to prepare herself for the benefit dance. The dance started at
10:30 p.m. When she returned later, she saw Carol still sitting on the bench. She
stayed at the dance hall for only thirty minutes and thereafter went home with her

88 | P a g e

cousin Sarah Jane Tenio. It was eleven o'clock in the evening when she arrived
home and never left the house after that. She denied having accompanied private
complainant to the house of Emong Leyson, let alone being with her when the
seven accused supposedly accosted them. Upon cross-examination, Cortina also
disowned any acquaintance with Gemma Morales and Rowena Leyson.
Luzviminda Tiempo Lim, also known in the Sindangan neighborhood as
Inday Lim admitted having personally known private complainant as the girlfriend
of her trusted errand boy, Jonathan Biong, alias Do." According to Lim, she first
met Carol Epis when she and her family were swimming at a beach in
Sindangan. There, she saw Jonathan Biong approach Epis and bring her
food.Sometime in March or April of 1996, Carol, in the company of an
unidentified girl, came to barangay Sumayod at Sitio Amparo in Macrohon. Again,
in May that year, Carol stayed at Sindangan for three days in the company of
Jonathan Biong. The witness was on board a motorcycle, driven by Jonathan
Biong, on her way home from Maasin and Lumbag when she saw Carol standing
by the roadside. Biong momentarily stopped and Carol hopped in. On 21 May
1996, Carol and Biong spent the night at the house of Aniceto Biong, the uncle of
Jonathan. The following day, Carol and Biong spent the night at the house of
Jonathans aunt. The witness did not bother to ask Jonathan Biong about it because
she knew he and private complainant were sweethearts and she respected their
privacy. The witness said that she was certain that on the evening of 01 June 1996,
Jonathan Biong was not in Sindangan because he was in Cebu. That night, Lim
saw Carol Epis sitting on a store bench together with Minggay Cortina.When
asked by the witness, the young girl replied that she was going to spend the night
at Rowenas place.
Aniceto Biong declared that when he entered his house in Sindangan on 01
June 1995, he saw Carol Epis lying on the bed. He asked who she was and she
remarked, "Do. Do and I are sweethearts," referring to Jonathan Biong, his nephew
and the son of his brother Arcadio. After changing his clothes, Aniceto left for his
farm. When he returned at five o'clock that afternoon, he saw Carol still there. She
told him she was going to take her supper at the house of Boy Lim. Aniceto Biong
took his dinner and spent the night at the residence of his sister, Maria Cortina, the
mother of "Minggay" Cortina. The next morning of 02 June 1995, when he
returned to his house to change into work clothes, he saw Carol inside but he
noticed that his nephew was not around. After advising her to go home, he gave
her some food to eat. He did not observe any change in her appearance nor any
indication that she might have been subjected to a violent rape the previous
night. It was the last time he ever saw her. When he later chided Jonathan about it,
his nephew simply smiled.
Accused Antonio Diola testified that on the evening of 01 June 1996, at seven
o'clock in the evening, he was preparing the sound system owned by his older
brother, Matranillo Diola, at the dance hall, which was just a few meters away
from his house. He admitted having seen Carol and Minggay at the store of Inday
Lim. It was the first time that he saw Carol and only came to know her name
during the preliminary investigation of the rape case. Diola said that the benefit

dance ended at about two o'clock in the early morning. He brought the sound
system, including the amplifier, home where he spent the night. He learned of the
alleged crime only when three police officers accosted him on 01 July
1996. Accused admitted having known his co-accused Enrique Morales, who was
a little older in years, as well as Calixto Biong, and Orlando Leyson who, at 14 to
15 years old, were relatively younger, than he was.
Witness Antonio Maturan corroborated the testimony of Antonio Diola. He
stated that on the night of 01 June 1996, he was at the dance hall of Barangay
Sindangan. When the affair came to an end at about two o'clock in the morning, he
helped Diola return the equipment to the latters house, which was about 15 meters
from the hall. His own residence being a distant away, and it was already late,
Diola invited him, and he acceded, to spend the night at Diola's house. The next
day, he and Diola woke up at six o'clock in the morning.
The succession of its witnesses notwithstanding, the defense failed to
convince the trial court of the innocence of accused Antonio Diola; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding accused ANTONIO DIOLA alias
`Mokoy' GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of six (6) counts of Rape and
sentencing him to six (6) determinate, indivisible penalties of RECLUSION
PERPETUA subject to Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, and to pay the costs.
"Accused Diola is also liable for civil indemnity for moral damages at P50,000.00
per rape or a total of 300,000.00 to the private complainant Carol Epis in line with
current jurisprudence.
"The accused is entitled to the full period of his preventive imprisonment to be
deducted from the period of his original sentence."
Accused Antonio Diola has appealed his conviction. Appellant has raised
nine assignments of error, which, in sum, assail the reliance made by the court a
quo solely on the account of private complainant in utter disregard of the
testimony of the defense witnesses. He argues that the dismissal of his defense
ofalibi by the trial court in the face of overwhelming corroborative testimony is
unjustified.
The Court is not prepared to accept appellant's plea and to disregard the
assessment made by the trial court. The test of credibility is not necessarily a
question of numbers nor a function of an appellate court more than that of the trial
court. Repeatedly, the Court has called attention to the fact that it is the trial court
which can be afforded the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses on the
stand. The manner witnesses testify the hesitant pause, the nervous voice, the
undertone, the befuddled look, the honest gaze, the modest blush, or the guilty
blanch is a significant indicum in aptly assigning value to testimonial
evidence.The evaluation made by the trial court on the credibility of witnesses is
rightly accorded respect and it is not interfered with except only, as so often held,
when any circumstance would indeed appear to have been patently overlooked or
misconstrued that the appellate court could be constrained to do otherwise.[2]
In the case at bar, the Court is not justified to ascribe to the trial court any
such error.

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The narrative of private complainant was clear and unwavering in placing

appellant at the scene of the crime. She convincingly detailed his exact
participation when she was waylaid and subjected to a most horrifying ordeal.She
testified thusly:
"Q. Since nobody responded from the house of Emong Leyson, where did you
go?
"A. We went back to the dancing hall, passing the school when I saw
somebody.
"Q. Who was this somebody?
"A. I could not identify the persons but they were many.
"Q. How many?
"A. Seven. The person whom I first saw was he (witness is pointing to accused
Antonio Diola to be the person whom she saw first) who was wearing an
undershirt (sando) at that time.
"Q. Now what happened when you saw them at the vicinity of the school at
Sindangan?
"A. Dominga Cortina ran away, leaving me behind.
"Q. Before Minggay ran away, did she tell you anything?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. After Minggay ran away, what happened?
"A. Alex held me.
"Q. What else happened?
"A. They surrounded me.
"Q. You mean that seven persons whom you saw surrounded you?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Aside from the seven persons surrounding you, were there any other
persons present?
"A. No more.
"Q. When one of them whom you identified as Alex held you, which hand of
yours did he hold?
"A. My two hands were held by Alex.
"Q. After the holding of your two hands by Alex, what happened next?
"A. Orlando Leyson alias `Kolot' pulled my t-shirt.
"Q. When Orlando Leyson pulled your t-shirt, what were the other persons
doing?
"A. Enrique Morales alias Dodoy held my neck.
"Q. What about accused Antonio Diola, what did he do if any?
"A. He pointed his hunting knife at me.
"Q. Can you still recall how long was the knife pointed at you?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. When you said he pointed his knife at you, what particular part of your
body was pointed to by his knife?
"A. At my chest. (witness pointing to her left chest).
"Q. While pointing his knife at you, did he utter anything?
"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. What did he say?

"A. If I would shout, he would kill me.
"Q. After you were held by some of the seven persons at the vicinity of the
Sindangan school, what happened next?
"A. Orlando Leyson released my t-shirt and pulled down my short pants.
"Q. While Orlando Leyson was pulling down your short pants, what did
accused Antonio Diola do?
"A. He was still pointing his knife at me.
"Q. Was Orlando Leyson successful in pulling your short pants?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Were you wearing your panty at that time?
"A. Yes. Sir.
"Q. When your short pants were pulled down by Orlando Leyson, you were
still wearing your panty?
"A. It was included when he pulled my short pants.
"Q. After your short pants and panty were pulled down, what happened next?
"A. Alex was the first one to touch me.
"Q. What part of your body was touched?
"A. My breast.
"Q. After that, what happened?
"A. He touched my vagina.
"Q. Who touched it?
"A. Alex.
"Q. While Alex Biong was touching your vagina, what did accused Antonio
Diola do?
"A. He was still pointing his knife at me.
"Q. What did the other persons do to you?
"A. They held my arms and legs.
"Q. Can you tell us who held your feet?
"A. Enrique Morales.
"Q. And who held your hands?
"A. Orlando Leyson.
"Q. Did you know the seven persons who held you?
"A. I could not identify the three (3) of them.
"Q. Who were the four of them whom you have known?
"A. Antonio Diola, Calixto Biong, Orlando Leyson and Enrique Morales.
"Q. And after Alex or Calixto Biong touched your vagina, what happened
next?
"A. He had sexual intercourse with me.
"Q. Who?
"A. Calixto Biong.
"COURT:
"Q. He was the first one?
"A. Yes, your honor.
"PROSECUTOR MAAMO:

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"Q. After Calixto Biong, who was the next?

"A. Orlando Leyson.
"Q. And who was the third one?
"A. Enrique Morales.
"Q. Was there a fourth one who had sexual intercourse with you?
"A. The other three of whom I could not identify.
"Q. What about Antonio Diola, did he have sexual intercourse with you?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. What was he doing when the other six (6) companions were having sexual
intercourse with you at that time?
"A. He was still pointing his knife at my chest.
"Q. Can you give us an estimate Carol, how long the sexual intercourse by the
six (6) men [lasted]?
"A. No, sir.
"COURT:
"Q. This happened where, in the school?
"A. Yes, your honor.
"Q. Inside one of the rooms?
"A. Outside the school.
"PROSECUTOR MAAMO:
"Q. What particular place in the school?
"A. Behind the school building.
"Q. How far is this from the road?
"A. Maybe from here to DILG.
"INTERPRETER: Witness is pointing from the witness stand towards DILG
which is approximately thirty (30) meters.
"Q While the six (6) men were having sexual intercourse with you, did you not
try to shout?
"A I shouted.
"Q How loud was it?
"A I shouted loudly twice and after that they covered my mouth with a cloth.
"Q Who covered your mouth?
"A I could not identify.
"Q After that what happened?
"A They left me in the school.
"COURT:
Alone?
"A Yes, Your Honor.
"PROSECUTOR MAAMO:
And where did you go?
"A I went back to Emong's place.
"Q What happened at Emong's place?
"A I asked whether Rowena Leyson and Gemma Morales went back but still
they did not come back.
"Q After that where did you go?

"A I went back to the school.

"Q What part of the school?
"A Just along the side of the school on a bench.
"Q. About what time was that Carol when the incident wherein you were
forcibly abused by the accused?
"A. About [three o'clock] early in the morning.
"Q. So it was already June 2, 1996?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Now when you went back to the school and seated on a bench, what
happened?
"A. Nothing, sir. I just stayed there until morning.
"Q. In the morning, what did you do?
"A. I went back to the house of my grandparents."[3]
A perusal of the accounts of defense witnesses Inday Lim, Dominga Cortina,
Rowena Leyson, Aniceto Biong and Antonio Maturan, would show that their
testimony merely touched on incidents prior to the rape. Nowhere in their narrative
did they successfully negate the presence of Antonio Diola during the commission
of the beastly crime. Antonio Maturan testified that after assisting Diola take the
sound equipment to the latters house, the two of them immediately slept together
in the sala of Diolas house. The witness could not have been expected to keep an
eye on his companion all night and be positively certain that the latter did not, at
anytime, leave to join his co-accused. The scene of the crime was not really distant
away from his residence. If at all, the account of Inday Lim and Aniceto Biong
only depicted private complainant as being one who could brazenly and wantonly
spend three nights with her lover, flouting the conservative moral sensibilities of
the people of Sindangan. Even if true, it certainly would not have necessarily
precluded private complainant from being raped.
The findings of Dr. Archimedes Demetrio, who conducted a medical
examination on private complainant (five days after the incident), that the victim's
private organ showed no recent lacerations but only old and healed vaginal tearing,
not likely made during the last five days, could not by itself be taken to necessarily
mean that she was not subjected to the crime charged.Neither virginity nor a
finding of fresh vaginal lacerations would be essential in proving rape.
In a long line of cases, this Court has continued to hold that subjecting the
victim to medical examination is not even a sine qua non to prove the charge.[4]Just
to the contrary, it has been a consistent ruling of the Court that an accused may be
convicted even solely on the testimony of the complainant if the same is not
improbable,[5] and it is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human
nature and the course of things.[6]
Appellant assails the findings of conspiracy by the court a quo, contending
that there has been lack of proof given of a prior agreement to commit the crime
by all the accused. The argument is without merit. Conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of the felony and
decide to commit it.[7] The agreement to commit the crime is, more frequently than
not, made by the malefactors, not within a considerable interval preceding the

91 | P a g e

commission of the act, but close to, or contemporaneous with, the actual
commission thereof,[8] when by their collective acts, it becomes implicit that they
have spontaneously agreed and decided to commit the felony. The existence of
conspiracy, in fact, is often inferred from the actuations of the accused during the
commission of the crime, which point to a joint purpose, concert of action and
community of interest.[9]
On the witness stand, the victim poignantly recounted the individual
participation of the seven malefactors. Calixto "Alex" Biong held her hands,
Orlando "Kolot" Leyson pulled her T-shirt, and Enrique "Dodoy" Morales held her
by the neck. Then, Leyson released her T-shirt and pulled down her short pants
and underwear. Alex forthwith touched her breasts and vagina while the others
continued to hold her hands and feet. During all the time that the six of his coaccused took turns in ravishing their hapless victim, appellant Antonio Diola kept
on poking his knife at her. It should be obvious that the malefactors acted in
concert and synchrony, with evident unity in their criminal intent, in
accomplishing their sinister design. The cooperative acts of each towards the
criminal purpose of taking on their victim should prove that they were all parties
to the dastardly deed.[10] While appellant Diola concededly did not actually
penetrate private complainant, his act of holding a knife against her to effectively
silence any protest, was an overt act in furtherance and facilitation of the
conspiracy.
The act of one conspirator being the act of all the conspirators, Diola is liable
for as many counts of rape as each of his six co-conspirators has committed
against private complainant.
Conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, appellant should be held liable to
pay the amounts of P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages,
the two kinds of damages having independent jural foundations, for each of the
acts of rape committed against private complainant or a grand total of
P600,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin,
Southern Leyte, in Criminal Case No. 1997, is AFFIRMED and ANTONIO
DIOLA is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, on six counts, against
Carol Epis and is sentenced to suffer, for each count, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Appellant is also ordered, conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, to
pay a total of P600,000.00 by way of damages, as hereinabove so explained, to
private complainant. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 148424-27. December 11, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DANILO CARAANG,
VIRGILIO CANLAS JR., MANNY BELAGOT (at large), ROLANDO
REBOTA (at large) and four JOHN DOES (at large), accused,
DANILO CARAANG, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Even if appellant is guilty of two counts of forcible abduction with rape, he
cannot be sentenced to death because the crimes happened in 1990, prior to
the effectivity of the Death Penalty Law. Nonetheless, thecivil liabilities to be
awarded should be equal to those prescribed for crimes committed under
circumstances that would have justified the imposition of death, had they been
committed after the effectivity of RA 7659. Indeed, the Civil Code, which
governs civil liabilities, has been in effect since 1950 and is thus applicable to
the herein factual environment.
The Case
Danilo Caraang appeals the November 24, 2000 Decision [1] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, (Branch 39), in
Criminal Case Nos. C-14(91), C-15(91), C-16(91) and C-17(91). The RTC
convicted him, together with Virgilio Canlas Jr., of the complex crime of
abduction with rape, two counts of rape and one count of acts of
lasciviousness. They were sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each of the first
three crimes; and imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months, one (1) day
to six (6) years of prision correccional for the last.
The decretal portion of the RTC Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Danilo Caraang and Virgilio Canlas, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
(1) In Criminal Case No. C-14(91), of the complex crime of Abduction with Rape, and
are hereby
(a) sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetua;
(b) ordered to pay jointly and severally Vanelyn
Flores,P50,000.00 as compensatory damages; P50,000.00
as moral damages; and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(2) In Criminal Case No. C-15(91), of the crime of Rape, and are hereby
(a) sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetua;
(b) ordered to pay jointly and severally Lorna Salazar,P50,000.00
as compensatory damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages;
and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(3) In Criminal Case No. C-16(91), of the crime of Rape, and are hereby
(a) sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetua;
(b) ordered to pay jointly and severally Vanelyn
Flores,P50,000.00 as compensatory damages; P50,000.00
as moral damages; and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
and
(4) In Criminal Case No. C-17(91), of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, and are
hereby

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(a) sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) years, Two (2)

months, One (1) day to Six (6) years of prision
correccional;
(b) ordered to pay jointly and severally Lorna Salazar,P20,000.00
as compensatory damages and P10,000.00 as moral
damages.[2]
Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ubaldino A. Lacurom
charged appellant and his co-accused in the following criminal Informations:
In Criminal Case No. C-14(91)
That on or about the 10th day of November, 1990, in the Municipality of Carranglan,
Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another
did then and there abduct, take and carry away with lewd design and by means of force
and intimidation, Vanelyn Flores to an uninhabited grassy upland five hundred (500)
meters away and there and then, conspiring and confederating together, and by means
of force and intimidation, said accused have sexual intercourse with her against her
will.
That as a consequence of the commission of the crime, Vanelyn Flores sustained
actual, moral and consequential damages in the amount of P100,000.00.[3]
In Criminal Case No. C-15(91)
That on or about the 10th day of November, 1990, in the Municipality of Carranglan,
Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and helping one another
did then and there abduct, take and carry away with lewd design and by means of force
and intimidation, LORNA SALAZAR to an uninhabited grassy upland five hundred
(500) meters away and there and then, conspiring and confederating together, and by
means of force and intimidation, said accused have sexual intercourse with her against
her will.
That as a consequence of the commission of the crime, Lorna Salazar sustained actual,
moral and consequential damages in the amount of P100,000.00.[4]
In Criminal Case No. C-16(91)
That on or about the 10th day of November, 1990, in the Municipality of Carranglan,
Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and helping one another
did then and there abduct, take and carry away with lewd design and by means of force
and intimidation, Vanelyn Flores to an uninhabited grassy upland five hundred (500)
meters away and there and then, conspiring and confederating together, and by means
of force and intimidation, said accused have sexual intercourse with her against her
will.
That as a consequence of the commission of the crime, Vanelyn Flores sustained
actual, moral and consequential damages in the amount of P100,000.00.[5]
In Criminal Case No. C-17(91)
That on or about the 10th day of November, 1990, in the Municipality of Carranglan,
Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and helping one another
did then and there abduct, take and carry away with lewd design and by means of force
and intimidation, LORNA SALAZAR to an uninhabited grassy upland five hundred
(500) meters away and there and then, conspiring and confederating together, and by

means of force and intimidation, said accused have sexual intercourse with her against
her will.
That as a consequence of the commission of the crime, Lorna Salazar sustained actual,
moral and consequential damages in the amount of P100,000.00.[6]
On April 1, 1991, the trial court issued a Warrant of Arrest [7] against all the
accused. Appellant and Canlas Jr. were arrested and detained at the Nueva
Ecija Philippine National Police (PNP) Company Headquarters, [8] but all the
others remained at large. When arraigned onJune 18, 1991, the two, assisted
by their counsel de parte,[9] pleaded not guilty after the Informations had been
read and explained to them in a language that they fully understood. [10] Trial on
the merits ensued. Since there were common witnesses and the acts
complained of arose from the same incident, the cases were consolidated and
tried jointly.[11]Thereafter, the lower court promulgated its assailed
Decision. Counsel for appellant then filed the Notice of Appeal [12] on January
22, 2001.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief,[13] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) narrates the factual
antecedents of the case as follows:
About 11 oclock on the night of November 10, 1990, the group of Vanelyn Flores,
Lorna Salazar, Angeline Flores, Jona Ampil, Gina Canzon, Froilan Galamay, Jimmy
Pascual and Tirso Ganzon were on their way home to Sitio Abibeg, Gen. Luna,
Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. The group had just attended a bangsal-bangsal or a prenuptial dance at Barangay Dipaan, Car[r]anglan, Nueva Ecija.
The moon [had] just begun to rise, and the road they were traversing was quite
dark. Reaching the boundary of Abibeg and Dipaan, the group was accosted by two (2)
armed men. Brandishing their guns, the men ordered the group to follow them. The
two (2) armed men wore bonnets. However, Vanelyn Flores recognized one of them as
appellant Danilo Caraang, having known him for a long time since they were
neighbors in the same barangay and because of the peculiar way he walked and
stood. Jimmy Pascual likewise recognized the two armed men as appellant Danilo
Caraang and Virgilio Canlas.
The group was forced to walk through rice paddies till they reached an uninhabited
and grassy place near a creek or parang, approximately 500 meters away from the
place where they were waylaid.
Upon reaching the parang, the armed men ordered the female members of the group to
sit down while the male members were ordered to lie on the ground face down.
Vanelyn Flores was the first female removed from the group by appellant. She knew
that it was appellant who grabbed her hand and who pulled her to a nearby creek about
50 meters away. There, Vanelyn saw another man waiting.
All of a sudden, appellant poked his gun on Vanelyns temple and ordered her to
remove her pants. Vanelyn became terrified and cried. Appellant forced her to lie down
on the ground. He repeated his order that she remove her pants. Vanelyn, however,
refused. This prompted appellants companion to grab both of Vanelyns hands. As
Vanelyn was immobilized, appellant succeeded in removing her pants and
underwear. Thereafter, appellant removed his pants, mounted Vanelyn and had sexual
intercourse with her. Vanelyn felt excruciating pain.

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By then, the place was well-illuminated by moonlight. The moment appellant removed
his bonnet, Vanelyn saw that her rapist was indeed appellant Danilo Caraang. Vanelyn
was sexually abused by appellant for more than 15 minutes, after which she was
returned to their group.
After an hour, Vanelyn was again forcibly brought by appellant to the nearby
creek. Vanelyn was made to lie down by appellant who poked his gun at her.Petrified
with fear, Vanelyn could not resist as appellants companion removed her underwear
and her pants. Then appellants companion mounted her and sexually abused
her. Vanelyn again cried because of terrible pain. After appellants companion had
satisfied his lust, appellant returned Vanelyn to the group. He approached Lorna
Salazar and forced her to go with him.
Lorna Salazar was first blindfolded and then brought to a place away from the
group. She was turned over to a man who removed the cover from her eyes.Lorna saw
[that] the man [was] wearing a bonnet.
The man ordered Lorna to remove her pants but she fought back. Thus, he kicked
Lorna hard in the abdomen which caused her to lose consciousness. When she
regained consciousness, Lorna felt weak and dizzy. She also saw that she was
naked. The man who raped her ordered her to put on her pants. Thereafter, she was
returned back to the group.
Subsequently, two other companions of appellant, who were also armed, took Lorna
Salazar away from the group. They also wanted to rape her. However, as the men were
starting to remove her clothes, Lorna cried and pleaded for mercy.The two men
relented. One of them asked Lorna to give him a kiss mark instead.As he prepared to
be kissed, the man removed his bonnet. Lorna was able to identify him as Manny
Belagot. Then she was returned to the group.
Around 4 oclock in the morning, the group was released at the place where they were
abducted. Before departing, the armed men threatened the group thus pag nagsumbong
kayo, papatayin naming kayo lahat.
Vanelyn Flores and her sister Angeline, together with Lorna Salazar, arrived at their
house crying. They narrated to Vanelyns parents all about the incident.Immediately,
Vanelyn was brought by her parents to San Jose City, where she was examined by Dr.
Rolando Valencia. Dr. Valencia reported the following findings:
First, Erymetamous vulva meaning the vulva was reddish. Vulva is the external part of
the female organ. Then, there was slight abrasion on the vaginal fourchette. Meaning,
there was an abrasion in the fourchette. If you will spread the vagina of a woman, the
portion that you will see is the fourchette and in the lower portion thereof was the
abrasion. My third findings is: Hymenal laceration with sharp edges at 3 oclock and 7
oclock. Meaning there was laceration in the hymen particularly at 3 oclock and 7
oclock position. The hymen is the rigid membrane. x x x [The] vagina admitted two
fingers with difficulty and the patient felt pain. Vaginal cervical [smear], meaning the
taking of the fluid from the vagina for examination and it proved of the presence of
sperm cell (tamod).
Meanwhile, on November 16, 1990, Lorna Salazar was medically examined by Dr.
Restituto Duran who reported the following findings:
Breast-no contusion, no abrasion, well formed and firm, nipple small, areola brownish
in color. Abdomen-no contusion, abrasion, hematoma, rest of the body show no sign of
contusion, abrasion and hematoma. Vagina-no signs of contusion, abrasion and
hematoma. Pubic hair moderate. Hymen-lacerated at12:00 oclock, seven

oclock and six oclock much lacerated. Vagina canal-admits 1 finger with resistance,
admits 2 fingers with much resistance. Cervix is somewhat soft and tender upon
touching.
The laceration suggests that there was a forceful entrance at the vaginal canal by a hard
object.[14] (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, appellant, in his Brief, [15] summarizes the facts of the
case as follows:
This is a case of 4 counts of rape with forcible abduction filed against CARAANG and
others. CARAANG was convicted based on the testimonies of the complainants
whereby they alleged that they were waylaid and raped by a group of men belonging to
the CAFGU. CARAANG [denies] the accusations against him. He maintains that he is
innocent and that he was not at the place of the incident and that he was sick at that
time. This defense was not believed by the trial court [which] x x x dismissed it as a
mere alibi. [Hence] this appeal.[16]
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC was convinced beyond reasonable doubt that appellant and his
cohorts had conspired in abducting the victims and eventually raping them. It
gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
especially those of the two victims -- Vanelyn Flores and Lorna
Salazar. Upholding the positive identification they had made, it rejected
appellants alibi.
The court a quo found that only one act of abduction had been committed
by all the accused. It added that the crafty way in which they made the victims
go with them revealed the lewd intention of the abduction. That the former had
intended to have carnal knowledge of the latter from the very beginning was
further held by the lower court. The rapes were thus complexed with the crime
of abduction. However, the RTC held that the subsequent instances of rape
committed were separate and distinct counts thereof. As to the fourth criminal
Complaint, it found appellant guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, since no
carnal knowledge had occurred.
Hence, this appeal.[17]
The Issues
In his appeal, appellant assigns the following alleged errors for our
consideration:
A. The trial court erred in finding that there was positive identification of
Caraang as the rapist.[18]
B. The trial court erred in not appreciating the existence of other facts and
circumstances which are of weight and substance in favor of the accusedappellant which shows that there is reasonable doubt.[19]
C. The evidence against the accused did not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and is not sufficient for conviction.[20]
D. The trial court erred in finding that there was conspiracy.[21]
Simply put, the issue to be resolved is whether the prosecution was able
to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In the main, appellant contests
the positive identification made by the victims and the trial courts finding of
conspiracy. He also cites questionable circumstances that allegedly create
reasonable doubt in his favor.

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The Courts Ruling

The appeal of the rape charges is unmeritorious; however, the alleged
acts of lasciviousness have not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Main Issue:
Proof of Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt
In support of his appeal, appellant assails the testimonies of the victims,
claiming that these do not pass the test of credibility. He avers that several
allegations therein -- especially those made by Flores -- create reasonable
doubt. He also enumerates several circumstances that allegedly make the
prosecutions case insufficient to rebut the constitutional presumption of
innocence.
First, he alleges that Flores could not have positively identified him as one
of the perpetrators of the crimes, because it was nighttime when the incident
occurred. He further argues that she did not directly testify to having seen him;
instead, she merely identified him by the way he spoke, stood and
moved. Second, he points to alleged inconsistencies between her court
testimony and her sworn affidavit before the police. Third, he cites
questionable circumstances that allegedly create reasonable doubt.He
specifically points to the fact that Flores, instead of immediately filing a
complaint with the police, went first to the CAFGU detachment with her group
-- supposedly a sign that she was unsure of the identities of the culprits.
Fourth, he faults the prosecution for failing to present any bloodied panty,
pants or dress belonging to the victim. Such failure was supposedly fatal for its
part, because it did not present any other physical evidence to prove the
rape. Finally, he claims that the RTC erred in finding conspiracy, since the
prosecution had likewise failed to prove that there was prior agreement among
the accused.
We will address the sub-issues raised by appellant seriatim.
Positive Identification
In discrediting the positive identification made by Flores, appellant argues
that she could not have seen the faces of the perpetrators, since the incident
happened at nighttime. Moreover, he avers that she did not directly testify that
she had seen him; rather, she based the identification purely on the way he
spoke, stood and moved.
We disagree. The testimony of Flores was categorical, convincing and
unequivocal. It was replete with details that were consistent with the
testimonies of all the other prosecution witnesses. Positively pointing to
appellant and his co-accused as the culprits, her straightforward testimony
proceeded thus:
Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court what was that untoward
incident that happened to you?
A We were waylaid/intercepted by Danilo Caraang, sir.
Q How many were they?
A There were two of them, sir.
Q Did you recognize the companion of Danilo Caraang?
A No, sir.
Q Now, please look around and tell the Honorable Court if you can
identify Danilo Caraang if he is inside the court room?

A That one, sir. (The witness pointed to a person inside the

courtroom who gave his name as Danilo Caraang).
Q Is he the same person whom you saw that evening of November
10, 1990 when you were intercepted on your way to Abibeg
from Dipaan?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, what did this Danilo Caraang tell you if ever he told you
anything at all?
A He told us: for a while, our leader wants to talk to you, sir.
Q After that?
A He told us to go with them, sir.
Q Where?
A There at Parang, sir.
Q And how far was that from the road where you were intercepted to
the place where you were brought, to that Parang?
A About 500 meters, more or less, sir.
Q When you reached that place where you were brought by the two,
what happened?
A We were ordered to sit down, sir.
Q By whom?
A Danilo Caraang, sir.
Q Did you notice his superior[,] if there was any superior at all or the
leader of the group?
A There was, sir.
Q Did you notice him there?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many were they or their companions awaiting in that place?
A Only one, sir.
Q Now, when you reached that place which is more or less 500
meters away from the place where you were intercepted and
you were told to sit down, did you ever sit down?
A Yes, sir.
Q How about the rest of your companions?
A Our three male companions were ordered to lay flat [on] their
bellies, sir.
Q And you are referring to Froilan Galamay, Jimmy Pascual and
Tirso Ganzon, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q When your three male companions were ordered to lay face down
what happened next?
A I was taken by Danilo Caraang, sir.
Q By the same person you have just identified a while ago?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said Danilo Caraang held you, in what particular part of your
body did he ever hold you?
Atty. Cruz:
We wil be constrained to object, there was no proper basis, they
were merely taken.

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Court:
Reform.
Atty. Borja:
Q What did this Danilo Caraang do to you when you were sitting
down?
A He held me, sir.
Q On what part of your body?
A My right hand, sir.
Q When he held you by your right arm what did you do next?
A He brought me to the creek, sir.
Q And how far is that creek from where you were seated and your
group?
A About 50 meters, sir.
Q When you were brought by Danilo Caraang in that particular place
near the creek, what did you see there?
A There [was] a person there, sir.
Q And what was that person doing there if you know?
A None, sir.
Q Were you able to recognize that person awaiting x x x you there?
A No, sir.
Q When Danilo Caraang was able to bring you to that place near the
creek what did he do if he ever did anything?
A His gun was pointed [at] me and ordered me to remove my pants,
sir.
Q Will you please describe that gun pointed [at] you if he pointed his
gun [at] you?
A It [was] small, sir, stainless.
Q A hand gun?
A Yes, sir.
Q On what particular part of your body did Danilo Caraang point that
gun to you?
A Here at my temple, sir.
Q And when he pointed his gun to you what did you feel then?
A I was crying, sir.
Q At that particular moment when you were already crying what did
he do if he did anything to you?
A He lay me down and he x x x [forcibly removed] my pants, sir.
Q How did he do it?
A His companion held my x x x hands above my head and Danilo
Caraang removed my pants, sir.
Q At that juncture, [when] the other man [was holding] your x x x
arms and Danilo Caraang was removing your pants, was he
able to remove the same?
A He was able to remove it, sir.
Q Besides your pants did you have any underwear also?
A There was, sir.

Your Honor, considering that this is a case [involving] decency and

public [morals], we will move and pray that the public be
excluded from the courtroom.
Court:
As the witness is about to testify [on a case involving] morality, the
public is hereby directed to leave the courtroom, except the
parents of the witness and the accused. Proceed.
Atty. Borja:
Q At the time your pants and panty were being removed by the
accused Danilo Caraang, did he ever tell you anything or utter
words to you?
A There was, sir.
Q Please tell the Court what was the utterance or expression made
by Danilo Caraang?
A That if I will not allow them I will be killed, sir.
Q On that circumstance what did you do if any?
A I cried, sir.
Q Was he able to push you down to the ground?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when you were pushed to the ground what about your pants
or trousers and panty[, were you still wearing them]?
A Yes, sir.
Q How was he able to remove it?
A He removed it because my arms were being held by the other
person, sir.
Q When you were lying down on the ground what happened next?
A That [was] the time when he removed my panty, sir, then later on
he kissed me and that [was] it.
Q And how were you able to recognize Danilo Caraang positively on
that particular occasion?
A Because of the way x x x he speak[s], the way x x x he stand[s],
and the way he move[s], I know him, sir.
Q May we know whether his face was covered at that time?
A He already removed his bonnet, sir.
Q And will you please tell the Honorable Court, during that time of
the night, was it dark or was it [dim] or with moon?
A It was very bright, sir.
Q Why did you say that it was bright then?
A The moon was big, sir.
Q And what was already the position of the moon then on the night
ofNovember 10, 1990?
A It was on this direction, sir. (The witness pointed 1:00 oclock during
day time.)
Q You said Danilo Caraang removed his bonnet covering his face at
the time he was kissing you and started to take or to deflower
you, please tell the Honorable Court what happened?
Atty. Cruz:
We will object to the question, you Honor, it has no basis.

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Court:
Sustained. Reform the question.
Atty. Borja:
Q When your trousers or panty was removed and you were laid
down by Danilo Caraang, what happened next?
A He placed his body on top of me, sir.
Q When he placed his body on top of you was he in his full dress at
the time?
A No more, sir.
Q What made you tell he [was] not in x x x normal clothes?
A Because being on top of me I felt it because I [had] no more pants,
sir.
Q What did you feel?
A There [was] pain, sir.
Q What part of your body was in pain?
A My private part, sir.
Q Why?
A Because I was being raped by Danilo Caraang, sir.
Q When you said you were being raped, are you telling the Court
that he penetrated your private part by his penis?
A Yes, sir.
Q Since you said you were in terrible pain, will you please tell the
Court whether previously there had been an experience, it at all,
by you in this kind of traumatic incident?
Atty. Tomas:
May we move to strike out the word terrible as a conclusion of the
counsel.
Court:
Strike that out.
Witness:
A Not yet, sir.
Atty. Borja:
Q You mean to tell the Court that at that time you [were] still a virgin?
A Yes, sir.
Q Because of that circumstance when Danilo Caraang was abusing
you physically, how did you feel?
A I felt too much pain on my private part, sir.
Q Were you able to recognize whether there was blood?
A Yes, sir.
Q How long did this Danilo Caraang [a]bused you?
A More than 15 minutes, sir.
Q After that 15-minute period what transpired next?
A He ordered me to wear my pants, sir.
Q And did you accede to his order?
A Yes, sir.
Q After putting on your dress or your pants and your panty what did
he do next to you if ever he did any?
A He took me and brought me back to my companions, sir.

Q And when you were taken back to the rest of your companions[,]
what did you see there?
A My companions, sir.
Q How about your three male companions?
A They were still lying face down [on] the ground, sir.
Q Since you were brought back to the place where you were held by
Danilo Caraang and his companion how long did you stay
there?
A More than an hour, sir.
Q After that one-hour period what transpired next?
A I was taken again, sir.
Q Who took you again?
A Danilo Caraang, sir.
Q How did he take you?
A He took me again and brought me down, sir.
Q Where?
A The same place where he brought me, sir.
Q Did you reach the place where he abused you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Upon reaching that place where you were formerly abused, what
happened next?
A Danilo Caraang again held me, sir.
Q Why?
A He laid me down, sir.
Q When you were lying down, were you still with your trousers and
panty?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you laid down, what happened next with your panty and
trousers?
A He was pointing me his gun while the other man was removing my
trousers and panty, sir.
Q Was that other man able to remove your trousers or pants?
A Yes, sir.
Q After removing your pants, what about your underwear?
A He also removed my panty, sir.
Q After both [were] removed, your pants and panty, by the other
person and that Danilo Caraang pointed to you a gun, what
happened next?
A That other person placed his body on top of me, sir.
Q Did he undress or remove his trousers before he placed his body
on top of you?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you feel when he placed his body on top of you while
lying down?
A I cried also, sir.
Q Besides crying what else?
A I felt too much pain on my private part, sir.

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Q Why [were] you in pain, in terrible pain, according to you, in your

private part?
A Because I was being sexually abused again, sir.
Q By that person, companion of Danilo Caraang?
A Yes, sir.
Q After having been abused by that other person-companion of
Danilo Caraang, what happened next?
A I was ordered to wear my pants, sir.
Q And after having worn your underwear and pants, what did this
other person do to you if any?
A I was taken by Danilo Caraang and [I was] brought x x x back to
my companions, sir.[22]
xxxxxxxxx
Court:
Q Where did you say [you, together with your companions,] were
intercepted by accused Caraang x x x?
A It [was] at the boundary of Sitio Abibeg and Sitio Dipaan, sir.
Q Prior to November 10, 1990, tell the Court if you know Caraang
already?
A Yes, sir, I have known him for a long time.
Q At that point and time when you were allegedly intercepted by
Danilo Caraang, tell the Court what was his physical
appearance?
A He was using x x x camouflage pants with a uniform and he was
wearing x x x rubber shoes, and he was wearing a white T-shirt,
sir.
Q He was with a mask?
A He was wearing a bonnet but his face was exposed, sir.
Q And when you were allegedly intercepted, is it the impression of
the court from you that you [had] a clear eyeview of Caraangs
face?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you made mention to the court likewise that you were brought
beside the creek, that is correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Were you asked to lie down or you were forced to lie down?
A I was forced to lie down, sir.
Q When you said you were forced, what do you mean by that?
A My shoulder was pushed back, sir, and that caused me to lie
down.
Q How many persons were there when you were asked to lie down.
A Two (2), sir.
Q But you could not recognize the other person?
A Yes, sir.
Q And per your testimony, Caraang succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with you, that is true?
A Yes, sir.
Q How did he do it to you?

A That [was] it, sir, he [laid] me down and he pointed his gun to my
temple.
Q Caraang himself did that to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q With what hand [was] he holding the gun?
A Right hand, sir.
Q What about his left hand?
A That [was] it, sir, he used it in removing my pants.
Q After he allegedly was able to remove your pants did he also
remove your panty?
A Yes, sir.
Q And by that, you mean the pants and the panty were totally
removed from you?
A Yes, sir.
Q And by that, you also mean that half of your body was exposed
naked?
A Yes, sir.
Q And after he was able to remove the pants and the panty, tell the
court what he did next?
A That [was] it, sir, he placed his body on top of me.
Q And what were you doing then when he placed his body on top of
you?
A I cried, sir.
Q You did not even give a sign of struggle?
A I was struggling, sir, but I could not do anything because his
companion was holding my hands.
Q But your legs were free?
A I was trying to keep my two legs intact but I could not do it, sir.
Q Why?
A I was afraid, sir.[23]
According to Flores, on the night the incident occurred, the place where
they were brought was brightly illuminated by the moon. Thus, she was able to
take a good look at and remember the face of appellant.These details make
her testimony and positive identification of him even more credible and
reliable.
Visibility is indeed a vital factor in determining whether an eyewitness
could have identified the perpetrator of a crime. [24] It is settled that when
conditions of visibility are favorable, and when the witnesses do not appear to
be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally
be accepted.[25] In proper situations, illumination produced by a kerosene or
wick lamp, a flashlight, even moonlight orstarlight may be considered sufficient
to allow identification of persons.[26]Under such circumstance, any attack on the
credibility of witnesses, based solely on the ground of insufficiency or absence
of illumination, becomes unmeritorious.[27]
To be sure, Flores had an unobstructed view of appellant because of their
proximity with each other. Given her familiarity with him, as well as the
illumination provided by the moonlight on that fateful evening -- reasonably

98 | P a g e

sufficient for the identification of persons -- we doubt if she could have erred in
identifying him.
Experience suggests that it is precisely because of the unusual acts of
violence committed right before their eyes that witnesses can remember the
identities of criminals with a high degree of reliability at any given time.
[28]
Indeed, although Flores was subjected to rigorous cross-examination, she
neither faltered in her positive identification of appellant nor gave any
statements materially inconsistent with her entire testimony.
Equally important is the fact that there was no showing of any improper
motive on her part that would make her testify falsely against him. Hence, the
logical conclusion is that no such motive exists, and that her testimony is
worthy of full faith and credence.[29]
Furthermore, the contention of appellant that Flores did not directly testify
that she had seen him is completely belied by her above-quoted
testimony. Although she did mention that she recognized him by the way he
spoke, stood and moved, those qualities were not her only bases for
identifying him; she was also able to see his face during the incident. She
positively testified thus:
Q At the point and time when you were allegedly intercepted by
Danilo Caraang, tell the Court what was his physical
appearance?
A He was using x x x camouflage pants with a uniform and he was
wearing x x x rubber shoes, and he was wearing a white T-shirt,
sir.
Q He was with a mask?
A He was wearing a bonnet but his face was exposed, sir.
Q And when you were allegedly intercepted, is it the impression of
the court from you that you [had] a clear eyeview of Caraangs
face?
A Yes, sir.[30]
During the rape, she was likewise able to see appellants face as
evidenced by the following excerpt from her testimony:
Q And how were you able to recognize Danilo Caraang positively on
that particular occasion?
A Because of the way x x x he speak[s], the way x x x he stand[s],
and the way he move[s], I know him, sir.
Q May we know whether his face was covered at that time?
A He already removed his bonnet, sir.
Q And will you please tell the Honorable Court, during that time of
the night, was it dark or was it [dim] or with moon?
A It was very bright, sir.
Q Why did you say that it was bright then?
A The moon was big, sir.
Q And what was already the position of the moon then on the night
ofNovember 10, 1990?
A It was on this direction, sir. (The witness pointed 1:00 oclock during
day time.)[31]

Given such direct and categorical statements, we cannot sustain

appellants arguments. Moreover, we do not doubt the veracity of the testimony
of Salazar, the other victim. She testified as follows:
Q In your case, as you said you were taken next after
Van[e]lyn Floreswas returned from the place where she was
brought, how were you taken?
A That person who returned back Van[e]lyn Flores where she was
ordered to sit in a different place [was] the same person who
took me, sir.
Q Why do you know that [she] was the same person when according
to you you were not able to identify [him]?
A I only remember his face, sir.
Q Was he not in mask?
A There was, sir.
Q Up to what portion of the face was the mask?
A The face was covered except the eyes, the nose, and the mouth,
sir.
Q If you would see that person again, would you be able to identify
that person again?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please look around and tell the Court if that person is
inside the courtroom?
A He is here, sir.
Q Point to him[.]
A He was the one recognized by my companions, sir. (The witness
pointed to a person inside the courtroom who, when asked of
his name, responded to the name of Danilo Caraang.)
Q You were taken according to you next after Angelina Flores, tell
the Court where you were brought?
A I was brought to another direction, sir, my eyes were covered and I
was turned-over to a person who was wearing a bonnet.
Q Are you telling the Court that the person who took you from the
group was the same person who brought you somewhere within
the vicinity?
A Yes, sir, because after taking me away from the group that person
handed me to another person.
Q And what did that person do to you?
A After that person who took me away from the group [had] already
entrusted me to another man and that person who took me had
already left, that man told me to remove my pants, sir.
Q Did you remove your pants as told?
A Not yet, sir.
Q What did that man do to you?
A I told him, I thought that you will not do me something wrong, and
that man answered that I talked [too] much, sir.
Q And then what happened to you next?
A I was fighting back but he kicked me and the kick landed on my
abdomen, sir.

99 | P a g e

Q What did you feel when you were kicked?

A The kick was so hard that I lost consciousness, sir.
Q Did you regain consciousness?
A When I regained consciousness I was ordered to put on my pants,
sir.
Q Are you telling the Court that when you were kicked and lost
consciousness something happened to you?
A There was, sir.
Q Tell the Court what happened to you?
A That person took advantage of my womanhood, sir.[32]
Q Were you able to recognize any of your captors who released
you?
A There was, sir.
Q And who is that person which you came to know?
A Manny Belagot and Rolando Rebota, sir.
Q Are they the only persons you recognized?
A Yes, sir.
Q How were you able to know them?
A The second time that they took me and brought me to another
direction he took off his mask and he asked me to give him a
kiss mark and that was the time I recognized him, sir.
Q And who was he?
A Manny Balagot, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Now, after the said incident[,] Madam Witness[,] was there a point
[in] time that you were able to identify other persons who
captured you during that fateful time?
A There was, sir.
Q [When] was it?
A When we were then about to go to school I saw them again, sir.
Q And who are these persons you are referring to?
A Manny Belagot, sir.
Q Only Manny Belagot?
A Danilo Caraang, a certain Canlas and Rolando Rebota, sir.
Q How many days after the incident did you [see] them?
A When we went to school, that was Wednesday, sir.[33]
That the testimonies of the two victims were nothing less than positive
and materially consistent with each other foreclosed the probability of any false
testimony on their part and served to bolster their credibility.Throughout the
time they were on the witness stand, they remained unwavering in their
declarations and thus evoked reliability and sincerity.
Time and time again, this Court has reiterated the principle that where the
culpability or the innocence of the accused hinges on the credibility of the
witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, the task of assigning values
thereto is best left to the trial court. [34] Indeed, it has the excellent opportunity of
obtaining firsthand impressions of their demeanor and conduct, an opportunity
that is not equally available to appellate courts. [35]

Needless to say, the straightforward, clear and positive testimony of the

victims -- coupled with the absence of any motive to fabricate evidence or to
falsely implicate appellant -- may be enough to convict him.[36] Neither can his
denial and alibi be sustained in the light of their positive identification of him as the
perpetrator of the crime.[37] When categorical and consistent and without any ill
motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, it prevails over such
defenses[38] which -- unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof -- are
deemed negative, self-serving and undeserving of any weight in law.[39]
Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and
difficult to disprove.[40] For it to prosper, proof that the appellant was
somewhere else when the crime was committed is insufficient; it must
likewise be demonstrated that it was physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time. [41] In the case before us,
appellant himself testified that he had been at the very same place where
the
victims
had
come
from. [42] Thus, it
would
not
have
beenphysically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime on the date
and time they testified to.
Besides, even the witnesses presented by appellant could not exculpate
him from criminal liability. He testified that on the night ofNovember 11,
1990 until the next morning, he stayed inside the house of Barangay Chair
Reynalda Baltazar.[43] When asked who his companions were, he pointed to
the barangay chairs daughter and grandchild. [44]Interestingly, he did not even
mention Conchita Baltazar -- his sister, who happened to be Reynaldas
daughter-in-law. She testified that she had been with him the whole night
of November 11, 1990 until the morning of the next day, November 12, when
they left the house of her mother-in-law.[45]
If indeed he had witnesses to prove that he did not leave the house, he
should have presented them, so that they could positively testify that he never
left their sight. Instead, he presented the barangay chair, who admitted that
she had been too busy during the dance party to have kept an eye on him
throughout the night; and his sister, whom he did not even mention, who
testified that she had been with him at the time.
Discrepancy Between the Sworn
Statement and the Court Testimony
In trying to discredit Flores, appellant claims that her sworn statement
before the police is materially inconsistent with her testimony. Again, we
cannot sustain this contention.
Appellants reliance on the affidavit of Flores in order to cast doubt on her
testimony is futile. The Court has consistently ruled that discrepancies
between the statements in an affidavit and those made on the witness stand
do not necessarily downgrade the latter.[46] Ex parte affidavits are usually
incomplete, frequently prepared by administering officers, and cast in their
language and understanding of what affiants have said. [47]Almost always, the
latter would simply sign such documents after being read to them. [48] Basic is
the rule that, taken ex parte, affidavits are considered incomplete and often
inaccurate. They are products sometimes of partial suggestions and at other
times of want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which witnesses

100 | P a g e

may be unable to recall the connected circumstances necessary for accurate

recollection.[49]
Affidavits are generally subordinate in importance to open-court
declarations, because the former are often executed when the mental faculties
of affiants are not in such state as to afford them a fair opportunity to narrate
more extensively the incidents that have transpired. [50] Normally, witnesses are
able to explain inconsistencies when they are examined thoroughly in court,
where they are given the chance to state as fully as they can the events that
transpired during the commission of the crime. Obviously, this kind of
opportunity is not available to them when their affidavits are taken.
By its very nature and the manner it is taken, an affidavit can hardly
compare with the weight of a testimony given in open court. Likewise, the
supposed failure of eyewitnesses to include some material facts in their
affidavits does not in any way diminish the veracity of their court
testimonies. In other words, whenever there is inconsistency between the two,
the latter commands greater weight.[51]
We have also repeatedly held that minor disparities do not detract from
the essential credibility of testimonies that are coherent and intrinsically
believable on the whole. This principle holds true particularly when, as in this
case, there is consistency in the narration of the principal occurrence and in
the positive identification of the accused. [52] What is clear is that the
responsibility of appellant for the crime charged was indubitably established by
both the sworn statement and the testimonies.If, indeed, there is any
inconsistency between the two, these are minor and incidental. Mere
inconsistencies on non-material points are not enough to deny weight to the
entire testimony; often, in fact, such discrepancies reassure against the
likelihood of a rehearsed testimony.[53]
Failure to Immediately File
a Complaint with the Police
Appellant questions why Flores and her group went to the CAFGU
detachment first, instead of immediately filing a complaint with the police, if
indeed they already knew that he was one of the culprits. This behavior
allegedly shows that the victims were unsure of the identities of the offenders.
On the contrary, we have extensively examined the testimonies of both
Flores and Salazar, but found no uncertainty in their positive identification of
appellant and his companions. Never was it shown that the victims had to go
to the CAFGU detachment to ascertain the identities of the culprits. It is clear
that the former already saw, recognized and identified appellant on the night of
the crime itself.
It was the father of Flores who testified that she and her group had first
gone to the CAFGU detachment before filing a complaint with the
police. However, such statement has absolutely no effect on the credibility of
the victims. It should be clear that after the crime had been committed against
them, they went home and reported the incident to their parents, then sought
medical doctors for physical examination.Going to the CAFGU detachment
was but a logical response of Flores and her group to the incident that
happened. They wanted the culprits to be arrested; because the latter were
members of the local CAFGU, naturally, the former proceeded to that

office. Certainly, there was no delay in the filing of a complaint with the
police. Flores father testified as follows:
Q Having known that and positively known that your daughters were
abused, what action did you do if any?
A I went to the Detachment Commander of the CAFGU, Gen. Luna,
sir.
Q And what did the Detachment Commander of the CAFGU do?
A The Detachment Commander, sir, ordered the members of the
CAFGU to assemble and in that instance, my daughter was
able to identify Caraang.
Q Who among your daughters identified Danilo Caraang?
A Vanelyn Flores, sir.
Q Were you present in that confrontation?
A Yes, sir, I was there.
Q And when you said you reported the incident to the Detachment
Commander of the Philippine Army, to whom were you referring
to, what were the names of those persons?
A Danilo Caraang, sir, and Amado Alcantara.
Q Who else?
A Sgt. Espadero, sir, and those others named, sir, are all Sgts.
Q Having been pointed to you by your daughter Vanelyn that it was
Danilo Caraang and Virgilio Canlas, Jr. who violated their
chastity, what else did the Detachment Commander do if they
did anything on that occasion?
A They were arrested, sir, and were brought to
the Municipality ofCarranglan, N.E. and later on, the authorities
of Carranglan endorsed them to the 182nd PC.
Q What about the local police of the PNP of Carranglan, what did
they do if any?
A We went to the PNP of Carranglan, sir, for several times but they
failed to take the statement of my daughters, so what we did
was to come here to the 182nd PC in order to execute our
respective affidavits and in our place, picture taking were made
at the scene of the incident.[54]
The above-quoted testimony definitely strengthens the case against
appellant. When Flores went to the CAFGU detachment, she was able to
identify him positively. To be sure, his assertion that the victims had to go to
the CAFGU detachment because they were unsure of the identities of the
culprits was not only unfounded, but also speculative.
Physical Evidence
Appellant then faults the prosecution for failing to present any bloodied
panty, pants or dress belonging to Flores. He argues that the trial court erred in
accepting the fact that no other physical evidence had been presented by the
prosecution to support and corroborate the testimonies of the victims. Though
he concedes that these objects are not essential in proving rape, he invokes
our ruling in People v. Godoy,[55]which is supposedly applicable to the present
controversy. In that case, the deliberate non-presentation of the bloodstained
skirt was ruled to have weakened the cause of the prosecution.

101 | P a g e

Again, this argument fails to convince us. In Godoy, the testimony of the
complainant was inherently weak, and no other physical evidence was
presented by the prosecution to bolster the charge of rape, except for the
medical report which had even negated one of the essential elements of the
crime.[56] Hence, the deliberate non-presentation of the complainants
bloodstained skirt was held to vigorously militate against the prosecutions
cause.[57]
In the case before us, the convincing and unwavering testimonies of not
only one victim, but two victims -- taken together with the similarly credible
corroborative testimonies of other witnesses -- leave no room to doubt
appellants guilt. Moreover, unlike in Godoy, the medical findings presented in
the present case are sufficient to sustain the charge of rape.
The testimony of Dr. Valencia, coupled with the corresponding Medical
Reports,[58] clearly establishes the rape. Thus, the non-presentation
of Flores bloodied underwear, skirt and pants is not indispensable to proving
the rape.
Neither was it important for the prosecution to prove that appellant was
afflicted with a sexually transmissible disease that he had passed on
to Flores. In the crime of rape, all that has to be proven is carnal knowledge of
a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1) when force, threat or
intimidation is used; 2) when the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious; 3) when fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority is employed; or 4) when the offended party is under twelve years of
age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above
be present.[59] At most, in rape, the transmission of a sexually transmissible
disease to the victim is not an element of the crime, but an
aggravating/qualifying circumstance[60] that has to be proven to sustain
conviction.
Not to be overlooked are the medical findings on the other victim,
Salazar. Although she testified that she had been knocked unconscious at the
time she claimed to have been raped, the overwhelming evidence proves that
she was indeed a victim of rape.
When the victim cannot testify on the actual commission of the rape
because she had been rendered unconscious before the act was committed,
the conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence.Such evidence is
admissible, provided that more than one circumstance is duly proven, and that
the totality or the unbroken chain of the circumstances proven lead to no other
logical conclusion than that of the guilt of the accused. [61]
According to the positive testimony of Flores, appellant took her from the
group, raped her, then returned her to where the others were. On the part of
Salazar, she also testified that the person who returned her to the group was
the same person who had taken her away.[62] She positively pointed to
appellant as the person who had done so.[63]
Thereafter, Salazar was handed over to another person, who ordered her
to remove her pants.[64] Although she resisted, she was kicked so hard on the
abdomen that she passed out. [65] After regaining consciousness, she was
already naked and feeling excruciating pain in her private part. [66] She was then

ordered to put on her pants. [67] The medical findings on her, as testified to by
her doctor, are as follows:
Q As regards to the third finding and you said no sign of contusion,
abrasion and hematoma and also as regards the hymen. Will
you please explain this in laymens term?
A In laymens term, sir, that shows that the vagina of the victim Lorna
B. Salazar, the vaginal canal was subjected to forceful entrance
of somewhat hard object.
Q Your findings as regards the hymen, will you please again
elaborate on this?
A The laceration that showed in the medical examination suggest
that there was a forceful entrance at the vaginal canal by a hard
object.
Q When you said there was this forceful laceration, was the wound
you found still fresh or an old wound?
A Still fresh, sir.
Q And what would have caused the forceful entrance to this?
A As I have said, sir, it could be due to forceful penetration of hard
object.
Q Could it be a penetration of a mans penis?
A Yes, sir.
Q Your last finding is as regards entrance to the vaginal canal shows
redness and tender to touch, what do you mean by this?
A In laymens terms, sir, the cervix is somewhat infected so it is
tender in touching the cervix.
Q And at the entrance of the hymen, it is infected by what?
A It could be infected by bacterial infection, sir.
Q You are referring to the wounds sustained by the vagina?
A I am referring to the tenderness and redness in the entrance of the
vagina, sir.
Q But this tenderness and redness on the private part of the patient
could have been due to infected wound sustained by the victim,
as a result of the forceful entrance on her private part?
A That could be, sir.[68]
The totality of the circumstances in this case warrants a finding that
Salazar, while unconscious, was also a victim of rape committed by the group
to which appellant belonged.
As to the charge of acts of lasciviousness, however, we cannot sustain
the trial courts conviction of appellant. Unlike the testimony of Salazar
concerning the rape -- which we find convincing, positive and categorical -- we
cannot say the same of her charge of acts of lasciviousness. All that she
mentions in her testimony is as follows:
Q How were you able to identify these persons who waylaid you on
the night of November 10, 1990?
A Because when I was taken for the second time he asked me to
kiss him, and that he removed his mask and I raised my
blindfold, that is why I was able to recognize him, sir.[69]

102 | P a g e

Other than this bare, passing statement, absolutely no other evidence

was presented to prove the charge of acts of lasciviousness. Salazar did not
even testify on the surrounding circumstances of this incident. Given the utter
lack of evidence, we have no other option but to dismiss that charge.
Proof of Conspiracy
In a final attempt to absolve himself of criminal liability, appellant
questions the trial courts finding of conspiracy. According to him, the
prosecution failed to present concrete evidence showing prior agreement
among him and his co-accused to commit the crime charged.
We disagree. There is no doubt that appellant and his co-accused acted
in conspiracy, as seen through their concerted actions in abducting the victims
with lewd design and later on raping them. Direct proof is not essential to
establish conspiracy; which may be inferred from the acts of the assailants
before, during and after the commission of the crime. [70] In a conspiracy, it is
not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually committed all the
elements of the crime charged; what is important is that all of them performed
specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate an
unmistakably common purpose or design to commit the crime. [71] Thus, the act
of one becomes the act of all, and each of them will thereby be deemed
equally guilty of all the crimes committed.[72]
It must be shown that each co-accused cooperated in the commission of
the offense -- either morally through advice, encouragement or agreement; or
materially through external acts indicating a manifest intent of supplying aid in
the efficacious perpetration of the crime. [73] In this case, the testimonies of the
victims and their witnesses, as well as all other pieces of evidence presented
indubitably established the concerted design of all the accused to abduct the
group forcibly and to rape its female members.
The common purpose of the accused was manifestly shown by the
deliberate and methodical manner in which the crimes were committed.The
victims were first tricked into going with appellant. When they arrived at a
secluded place, the women were ordered to line up, while their male
companions were told to lie on their stomachs. [74] According to the victims,
more men were already waiting at the place where the former were brought,
[75]
a fact that only shows that all the accused indeed knew what was going to
happen.
Thereafter the women were brought, one at a time, to the place where the
rapes were to occur. The manner in which the crimes were committed points to
no other conclusion than that all the accused had knowledge of the criminal
design. In fact, appellant himself committed the first act of rape on
Flores. Moreover, he was an indispensable participant in the second act
thereof. He was the one who brought her to his companions who took turns in
raping her,[76] while he pointed a gun at her.[77] Holding the victim and
threatening her with a gun while another was raping her was more than
sufficient to show indubitably a common criminal design.
After appellant had satisfied his own lust and later aided his companion in
raping Flores, the evidence indicates that he and his co-accused intended to
commit rape again -- which they actually accomplished -- this time on
Salazar. He was also involved in her forcible abduction with rape, as it was

again he who took her away from her group and handed her over to one of his
co-accused.[78] The pattern of the rapes committed and the indispensable role
of appellant therein is clear. Any intimation that he had nothing to do with them
would be nothing less than unbelievable. In view of the presence of
conspiracy, all the co-accused bear equal responsibility.[79]
The finding of conspiracy is significant, because it changes the criminal
liability of all the accused and makes them answerable as co-principals
regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime. [80]Their liability
becomes collective, with each participant deemed equally responsible for the
acts of the others.
To reiterate, conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. [81] It
comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to
commit the felony and forthwith to pursue it actually.[82] As in this case,
conspiracy is proved by concerted acts or other forms of evidence indicative of
actual cooperation -- a common purpose or design, as well as a concurrence
of sentiments to commit the felony and to pursue it actually.[83]
The two elements of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the
Revised Penal Code, are as follows: (1) taking a woman against her will and
(2) doing so with lewd designs. This complex crime occurs when there is
carnal knowledge of the abducted woman under any of the circumstances
mentioned earlier when force or intimidation is used; when the woman is
deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; and when the woman is under
twelve years of age or is demented.[84]
All told, the prosecution sufficiently proved the elements of forcible
abduction -- the taking of the victims against their will with lewd design.As to
the first element, although they voluntarily went with appellant, it was
indubitably shown that they did so upon being deceived. According to their
testimonies, he told them that his leader wanted to talk to them, and that no
harm would be done to them.[85] Upon this representation, they went with him.
The employment of deception suffices to constitute forcible abduction.
[86]
This Court has previously ruled that if the victims consent was obtained
through deceit and there was therefore no valid consent, the crime is forcible
abduction, as the deceit may be considered as constructive force. [87] The
second element, lewd design, was established by the actual rapes. [88]
Proceeding to the charges, aside from alleging the necessary elements of
the crimes, the prosecution convincingly established that appellant and his coaccused had conspired, confederated and mutually aided one another in
having carnal knowledge of the victims against the latters will by means of
force and intimidation.
The Proper Penalties
Preliminary Consideration:
No Double Jeopardy
Hence, appellant is guilty of two complex crimes of forcible abduction with
rape -- one against Flores and the other against Salazar. Since there were two
victims, the trial court erred in convicting him of only one count of the complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape. There can be no violation of the
constitutional right of appellant against double jeopardy, because the decisive

103 | P a g e

issue here is whether he was convicted of a crime charged in the

Information. A reading of the four separate Informations shows that in each
one, he was indeed charged with forcible abduction with rape. Having been
sufficiently informed of the accusations against him, he can thus be convicted
of two counts of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, as we have
done here based on the evidence presented.
Moreover, it is settled that when the accused appeals from the sentence
of the trial court, they waive their right to the constitutional safeguard against
double jeopardy and throw the whole case open to review by the appellate
court. The latter court is then called upon to render such judgment as law and
justice dictate -- whether favorable or unfavorable to them, and whether the
issues it resolves have been assigned as errors or not. [89] Such an appeal
confers upon it full jurisdiction over the case and renders it competent to
examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law.[90]
Conspiracy
In the present case, appellant should also be held liable for the other
count of rape he and his co-accused committed -- one after the other -against Flores. Clearly, there was conspiracy as shown by their obvious,
concerted efforts to perpetrate the crimes. It should be clear that appellant is
responsible not only for the rape he personally committed, but for the rape
committed by the others as well.
One Complex Crime
Against Each Victim
However, there can be only one complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape committed against each victim. The crime of forcible abduction was
necessary only for the first rape. [91] After the complex crime had already been
consummated, the subsequent rape can no longer be considered as a
separate instance thereof.[92] That is, it should be detached from, and
considered independently of, the forcible abduction. [93] Hence, any subsequent
rape of the same victim is simply rape and can no longer be considered as a
separate complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. [94]
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code governs complex crimes as follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied
in its maximum period.
Penalty for the More
Serious Crime
As earlier adverted to, the forcible abduction was necessary for the
succeeding rape of each victim. Consequently, for the complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape, the penalty for the rape -- which is the more
serious crime -- shall be imposed in its maximum period. At the time of the
commission of the crime, the applicable penalty for rape committed by two or
more persons was reclusion perpetua to death.[95] Since the rape was
committed by two or more persons -- a fact duly alleged in the Information and
proven in court -- it should have warranted the imposition of the death penalty.

However, appellant committed the crime of forcible abduction with rape

on November 10, 1990 -- before the passage of Republic Act 7659 or the
Death Penalty Law, which took effect on December 31, 1993.Thus, the trial
court correctly ruled that the penalty that could be imposed was reclusion
perpetua.
As regards the act of rape committed against Flores, appellant is likewise
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. This separate act of rape, directly and
successively committed against her by his co-accused, was the only one
remaining for which he may be further held liable. All told, three terms
of reclusion perpetua should be imposed upon him.
Damages
Regarding appellants pecuniary liabilities, we award P75,000 as civil
indemnity ex delicto for each of the two (2) counts of the complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape instead of the P50,000 compensatory damages
awarded by the trial court. First, considering that the rape was committed by
two or more persons, as alleged in the Information and proven in court, an
increase in civil indemnity is proper. Second, this Court has previously ordered
the accused to pay civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000, so long as the
crime was committed under circumstances that would justify the imposition of
the death penalty -- even if that penalty had not yet been imposed -- because
the crime was committed before the effectivity of the Death Penalty Law.[96]
Likewise, we affirm the award of P50,000[97] as moral damages for each of
the two counts of forcible abduction with rape. Moral damages are given
without need of further proof other than the fact of rape. The law recognizes
the victims injury, which is concomitant with and necessarily results from the
odiousness of the crime, thus warranting per se the award of moral damages.
[98]

As to exemplary damages, Article 2230 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may
be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to
the offended party.
Thus, we award the victims P25,000 each for exemplary damages in view
of the alleged and proven qualifying circumstance of the rape committed by
two or more persons. Relative to the civil aspect of a case, an aggravating
circumstance -- whether ordinary or qualifying -- should entitle the offended
party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of
Article 2230 of the Civil Code.[99]
For the single count of rape committed on Flores, for which the proper
penalty is reclusion perpetua, we affirm the P50,000 civil indemnity ex
delicto and the P50,000 moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED, insofar as the rape with abduction
and
the
rape
are
concerned. Appellant
Danilo
Caraang
is
foundGUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of the complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape -- one against Vanelyn Flores in Criminal Case No.
C-14(91) and the other against Lorna Salazar in Criminal Case No. C15(91). He is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each count. He is
further found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the separate crime of rape

104 | P a g e

committed against Vanelyn Flores in Criminal Case No. C-16(91), for which he
is sentenced to another term of reclusion perpetua.
To summarize, the pecuniary awards are as follows: (1) the amount
of P75,000 each for Criminal Case Nos. C-14(91) and C-15(91) as
indemnity ex delicto; (2) P50,000 each as moral damages; and (3)P25,000
each as exemplary damages. For the separate crime of rape committed
against Vanelyn Flores in Criminal Case No. C-16(91), the victim is entitled to
another P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral damages,
and P25,000 as exemplary damages, in addition to his conviction for rape and
his sentence to one more term of reclusion perpetua. Costs against appellant.
Finally, the conviction of Appellant Caraang for acts of lasciviousness in
Criminal Case No. C-17(91) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for
insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G. R. No. 149028-30. April 2, 2003]
THE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ARMANDO

CABALLERO, RICARDO CABALLERO, MARCIANO CABALLERO,
JR., and ROBITO CABALLERO, accused.

ARMANDO CABALLERO, RICARDO CABALLERO, and MARCIANO

CABALLERO, JR., appellants.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision [1] of the Regional
Trial Court of San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Branch 57, convicting
appellants Armando Caballero, Ricardo Caballero and Marciano Caballero, Jr.
of murder in Criminal Cases Nos. RTC-1217 and RTC-1218 and meting on
each of them the supreme penalty of death and ordering them to pay
damages; and of frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. RTC-1219 and
imposing on them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Antecedents
Teresito (Dodong) Mondragon and his family lived in a compound
surrounded by a barbed-wire fence at New Sumakwel, Broce Street, San
Carlos City, Negros Occidental. Living in the same compound were Ricardo
Caballero and his family; and Myrna Bawin, the sister of Eugene Tayactac, and
her family. Beside the compound was the house of Leonilo Broce, a nephew of
Wilma Broce.
In the afternoon of August 3, 1994, Armando (Baby), Robito (Bebot) and
Marciano, Jr. (Jun), all surnamed Caballero, were having a drinking spree in
the house of their brother Ricardo in the Mondragon Compound. At about 7:00
p.m. of said date, Eugene Tayactac and Arnold Barcuma arrived in the sari-sari
store of Wilma Broce which was across the Mondragon Compound. Eugene
had dinner in the store while Arnold proceeded to the house of Susana Broce,
Eugenes girlfriend, for a chat.Susanas house was about 15 meters away from
the store of Wilma. Momentarily, Armando arrived in the store and asked

105 | P a g e

Eugene in an angry tone: Gene mopalit ka? (Gene, will you buy?). Eugene
replied: What is this all about? We dont have any quarrel between
us. Armando left the store but stood by the gate of the barbed-wired fence of
the Mondragon Compound. His brothers Ricardo, Robito and Marciano, Jr.
joined him.Ricardo and Robito were armed with knives. When Wilma told
Eugene that she was closing the store already, he stood up and left the store
on his way to Susanas house. At that time, Myrna Bawin, who was standing by
the window of their house saw her brother Eugene going out of the store and
proceeding to the house of Susana. She called out to him and advised him to
go home. Myrna then left the window to pacify her crying baby.
As Eugene walked by the gate of the Mondragon Compound, Armando
suddenly
grabbed
Eugene
towards
the
compound. Eugene
resisted. Spontaneously, Ricardo, Marciano, Jr. and Robito joined Armando
and assaulted Eugene. Armando took the wooden pole supporting the
clothesline and hit Eugene with it. The latter tried to parry the blows of the
Caballero brothers, to no avail. In the process, Eugene was stabbed three
times. As Eugene was being assaulted, Myrna returned to the window of her
house and saw the Caballero brothers assaulting Eugene. She shouted for
help for her hapless brother. Wilma, who witnessed the whole incident, was
shocked to immobility at the sudden turn of events.
From the nearby house of Susana, Arnold saw the commotion and rushed
to the scene to pacify the protagonists. Arnold told the Caballero
brothers: Bay, what is the trouble between you and Eugene? However, Ricardo
accosted Arnold and stabbed the latter on the left side of his body. Forthwith,
Robito, Marciano, Jr. and Armando ganged up on Arnold. Two of them stabbed
Arnold on his forearm. Arnold fled for his life and hid under the house of a
neighbor.
For his part, Leonilo rushed from his house to where the commotion was.
He was, however, met by Robito who stabbed him on the chest. Wounded,
Leonilo retreated and pleaded to his uncle Lucio Broce for help: Tio, help me
because I am hit. The commotion stopped only upon the arrival of Teresito
Mondragon who was able to pacify the Caballero brothers. They all returned to
the compound.
In the meantime, Lucio Broce, the uncle of Leonilo brought the injured
Eugene, Leonilo and Arnold to the Planters Hospital for medical

treatment. Eugene and Leonilo eventually died from the stab wounds they
sustained.

POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION
Name: Leonilo Broce, 22 years old, male, married

Dr. Filped A. Maisog performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Eugene. He

signed a postmortem report containing the following findings:
POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION

Address: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg. Occ.

Place of Incident: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg. Occ.

Name: Eugenio Tayactac, 22 years old, male, single

Place of Examination: San Carlos City Hospital

Address: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg. Occ.

Date & Time of Incident: Aug. 3, 1994 @ 8:30 P.M.

Place of Incident: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg. Occ.

Date & Time Examined: Aug. 3, 1994 @ 8:45 P.M.

Place of Examination: San Carlos City Hospital

Post-mortem findings:

Date & Time of Incident: August 3, 1994 @ 8:30 P.M.

= Stab wound, (R) post chest, about the level of the 6th and 7th RICS, post.
axillary line.

Date & Time Examined: August 3, 1994 @ 10:40 P.M.

CAUSE OF DEATH: Hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple organ
injury.[4]

Post-Mortem Findings:
= Stab wound (L) anterior chest 2 cm. 5th ICS MCL directed postero
laterally, lacerating (L) auricle of the heart, and the (L) pulmonary
artery and the left middle lobe of the lungs;

Dr. Edgardo B. Quisumbing attended to and operated on Arnold

Barcuma. He signed a medical certificate stating that Arnold sustained the
following injuries:

= Stab wound (R) anterior chest 2 cm. long 5th ICS parasternal line directed
posteriorly;

= Lacerated wound 2 cm. (R) forearm middle 3rd

= Incised wound 2 inches (L) forearm middle 3rd

th

= Stab wound (R) posterior chest level 7 ICS 2 cm. long directed
anteriorly.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Severe Hemorrhage secondary to Multiple Stab
wounds with Massive Hemothorax (L) and Hemopneumothorax (R).[2]

= Stabbed wound, 2 inches in length (L) chest, anterior axillary line at the
level of the 7th intercostal space, penetrating thoracic cavity and
abdominal cavity.
... [5]

He testified that the stab wounds could have been caused by a sharpedged single-bladed or double-bladed instrument, or by three instruments. [3]
Dr. Jose Carlos L. Villarante performed an autopsy on the cadaver of
Leonilo. He signed a postmortem report containing the following findings:

106 | P a g e

On the witness stand, Dr. Quisumbing testified that the wounds sustained
by Arnold could have been caused by three different sharp-pointed
instruments.[6] He further testified that Arnold would have died because of the
stab wound on his chest, were it not for the timely medical intervention.

On August 5, 1994, Armando, Ricardo, Marciano, Jr. and Robito, were

charged with Murder for the death of Leonilo Broce. The Information, docketed
as Criminal Case No. RTC 1217 reads:
That on or about 8:00 oclock, P.M., August 3, 1994 at New Sumakwel, San Carlos
City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and helping one another, armed
with pieces of wood and hunting knives, and with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
the use of said weapons, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of
one LEONILO BROCE, by striking the latter with the use of pieces of wood and
stabbing him, thereby inflicting upon said Leonilo Broce physical injury described as
follows:

CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
Another Information was filed against the Caballero brothers for frustrated
murder for the injuries of Arnold Barcuma. Docketed as Criminal Case No.
RTC-1219, it reads:

and which injury caused massive hemorrhage which resulted to the death of Leonilo
Broce.

That on or about 8:00 oclock, P.M., August 3, 1994 at New Sumakwel, San Carlos
City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and helping one another, armed
with pieces of wood and hunting knives, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and use personal violence upon the person of oneARNOLD BARCUMA, by striking
him with the use of pieces of wood and stabbing him, thereby inflicting upon the latter
physical injuries which would have resulted to the death of said Arnold Barcuma, thus
performing all the acts of execution, which would have produced the crime of Murder,
as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it, by reason of causes independent
of the will of the accused that is, the timely medical assistance rendered to said Arnold
Barcuma.

That an aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is attendant in the

commission of the offense.

That an aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is attendant in the

commission of the offense.[9]

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]

Ricardo, Armando and Marciano, Jr., assisted by counsel, were arraigned

on September 15, 1994. They pleaded not guilty to all the charges. Robito
Caballero remained at-large.

= Stabbed wound (R) chest penetrating thoracic cavity.

They were also charged with the same crime for the death of Eugene
Tayactac in an Information docketed as Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, which
reads:
That on or about 8:00 oclock, P.M., August 3, 1994 at New Sumakwel, San Carlos
City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and helping one another, armed
with pieces of wood and hunting knives, and with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
the use of said weapons, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of
one EUGENE TAYACTAC, by striking the latter with use of pieces of wood and
stabbing him thereby inflicting upon said Eugene Tayactac physical injuries which
resulted to the death of the latter.
That an aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength is attendant in the
commission of the offense.

107 | P a g e

Ricardo, Armando and Marciano, Jr. invoked the defenses of denial and
alibi. They adduced evidence that Ricardo was employed as electrician in the
Office of the City Engineer of San Carlos City. Armando was a motor cab
driver. Robito resided in H.C. Rigor Street, San Carlos City while Marciano, Jr.
was a resident of Don Juan Subdivision, San Carlos City and was employed
with the Victorias Milling Corporation.
On August 3, 1994, at 8:00 a.m., Robito left San Carlos City and went to
Bacolod City. Armando went to the house of his brother Ricardo to help in the
construction of the latters house and to take care of Ricardos fighting cocks
while he was in his office. Ricardo arrived home at 8:00 p.m. and had dinner
with his family and Armando. Momentarily, their sister Mila and their younger
brother Marciano, Jr. arrived in the house of Ricardo. Marciano, Jr. allegedly
was mauled by a group of men and sustained an abrasion, a contusion and
swelling of the left side of his face. Ricardo and Armando brought their brother

Marciano, Jr. to the hospital for treatment. On August 4, 1994, Marciano, Jr.
was treated for:

years, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, with no
award as to damages, no evidence having been introduced to establish, the same; and

= Linear abrasion (L) scapula region;

4. To pay the costs in all three (3) cases.

= Contusion (R) lower lip lateral side;

SO ORDERED.[11]

= Swelling left face.

In convicting the accused, the trial court found that all of them conspired
to kill Eugene and Leonilo and cause injuries to Arnold. While the trial court
stated that it was only appellant Armando who stabbed Eugene, and only the
accused Robito who stabbed Leonilo, however, it concluded that all of them
were equally liable for the deaths of Leonilo and Eugene and for the injuries of
Arnold.

No. of days of healing: 5-7 days barring complication.[10]

Ricardo, Armando and Marciano, Jr. denied killing Eugene and assaulting
Arnold. They also denied having any altercation with the victims. They also
denied stabbing Leonilo. They had no idea why Wilma, Arnold and Myrna
would implicate them for the deaths of Leonilo and Eugene and for the injuries
of Arnold.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment on May 7, 2001
finding all the three accused, now appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as principals of the crimes charged, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused Armando Caballero, alias Baby, Ricardo Caballero, alias
Ricky and Marciano Caballero, Jr., alias Jun, having been found GUILTYbeyond
reasonable doubt of the offenses charged them as principals, are hereby sentenced to
suffer:
1. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1217 for the murder of Leonilo Broce, there being no
mitigating circumstance present, with the attendant aggravating circumstances of
treachery and abuse of superior strength, the maximum penalty of death and to pay the
heirs of Leonilo Broce the sum of P75,000.00 as indemnity;

In their Brief, the accused, now appellants assail the decision of the trial
court contending that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 1217-1219 DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEIR GUILT
WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND ABUSE OF
SUPERIOR STRENGTH ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS KILLED THE VICTIMS.
III

2. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, for the murder of Eugene or Eugenio Tayactac,
there being no mitigating circumstance present, with the attendant aggravating
circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength, the maximum penalty of
death; and to pay the heirs of Eugene Tayactac the sum of P75,000.00 as indemnity;
and

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY

UPON ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED THEY
KILLED THE VICTIMS.[12]
The Court will delve into and resolve the first two assignments of errors.

3. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, for Frustrated Murder, for having seriously
inflicted injuries upon the person of Arnold Barcuma which nearly resulted to his
death, there being no mitigating circumstance present, an imprisonment of twelve (12)

108 | P a g e

The appellants aver that the prosecution failed to prove beyond

reasonable doubt their respective guilt for the deaths of Eugene and Leonilo
and for the injuries sustained by Arnold. They assert that the trial court

committed reversible error in rejecting their defenses of denial and alibi. They
claim that at the time of the incident they were in the San Carlos Hospital for
the treatment of the injuries of appellant Marciano, Jr.
The appellants are partly correct.
The trial court correctly found that all the appellants conspired to kill
Eugene and assault Arnold; hence, they are criminally liable for the death of
Eugene and for the injuries sustained by Arnold. Article 8 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to
commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is always predominantly
mental in composition because it consists primarily of a meeting of minds and
intent.[13] Conspiracy must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as
the crime itself, that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt. [14] However, direct
proof is not required. Conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial
evidence. Conspiracy may be proved through the collective acts of the
accused, before, during and after the commission of a felony, all the accused
aiming at the same object, one performing one part and another performing
another for the attainment of the same objective, their acts though apparently
independent were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of
personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. [15] The
overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his coconspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.
[16]
Direct proof of a person in agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It
is enough that at the time of the commission of a crime, all the malefactors had
the same purpose and were united in their execution. [17] Once established, all
the conspirators are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the degree
of participation of each of them for in contemplation of the law, the act of one is
the act of all.[18]
Criminal conspiracy must always be founded on facts, not on mere
inferences, conjectures and presumptions. [19] Mere knowledge, acquiescence
to or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not
enough to constitute one party to a conspiracy absent the intentional
participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the common objective
and purpose.[20] Moreover, one is not criminally liable for his act done outside
the contemplation of the conspirators. Co-conspirators are criminally liable only
for acts done pursuant to the conspiring on how and what are the necessary
and logic consequence of the intended crime.[21]

109 | P a g e

In this case, when appellant Armando asked Eugene at the store of Wilma
whether the latter was going to buy something from the store, Eugene was
peeved and remonstrated that he and Armando had no quarrel between
them. Appellant Armando was likewise irked at the reaction of Eugene
because from the store, appellant Armando stationed himself by the gate of the
Mondragon Compound near the sari-sari store of Wilma. Appellants Ricardo,
Marciano, Jr. and Robito joined their brother, appellant Armando at the
gate. Appellant Ricardo and accused Robito were armed with knives. When
Eugene passed by the gate to the compound, appellant Armando pulled
Eugene to the gate but when the latter resisted, all the appellants ganged up
on Eugene. Appellant Armando took the wooden support of the clothesline and
hit Eugene with it. Eugene was stabbed three times on his chest even as he
tried to parry the thrusts. When Arnold rushed to the situs criminis to pacify the
appellants and accused Robito, appellant Ricardo stabbed him on the left side
of his body. The other appellants and accused Robito joined appellant Ricardo
and ganged up on Arnold. They stabbed Arnold anew twice on his
forearm. Teresito Mondragon, the father-in-law of appellant Ricardo intervened
and forthwith, all the appellants, including accused Robito returned to the
Mondragon Compound. Patently, all the appellants by their simultaneous
collective acts before and after the commission of the crimes were united in
one common objective, to kill Eugene, and cause injuries to Arnold for trying to
intervene and prevent bloodshed.Hence, all the appellants are criminally liable
for the death of Eugene and for the injuries of Arnold. It does not matter who
among the appellants stabbed Eugene or inflicted injuries on Arnold. The act of
one is the act of the others.
However, for the death of Leonilo, the Court believes that the appellants
are not criminally liable. The prosecution failed to adduce evidence that the
appellants and the accused Robito conspired to kill Leonilo. The appellants did
not actually see Leonilo rushing out from his house to the situs criminis. They
had no foreknowledge that the accused Robito would stab Leonilo. There was
no evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that all the appellants
assisted the accused Robito in killing Leonilo. It must be recalled that Leonilo
rushed out of his house when he saw the commotion, with the intention of
aiding the victim or pacifying the protagonists. He was, however, stopped by
accused Robito who suddenly stabbed him on the chest. Leonilo retreated and
asked for help. Wilma Broce testified that only the accused Robito stabbed
Leonilo:
Q After that, what happened next?

A Leonilo Broce came out of his house.

Q What happened to Leonilo Broce, where is he now?

Q Where is the house of Leonilo Broce?

A The two of them were (sic) already dead.

A Still located at Sumakwel.

Q Now, when did the trouble stop if it stopped?

Q In that case, the very house where Eugene Tayaktak leaned on

when he was ganged up by the four?

A It stopped when Dodong Mondragon arrived.

Q What did the accused do after the trouble was stopped?

A Yes.
A They went inside the compound of his (sic) father.
Q What happened after that?
Q What happened next?
A When he came out from the house and saw that it was Eugene
Tayaktak, he proceeded to approach them but he was not able
to approach them because he was met by Robit Bebot
Caballero and stabbed by Robito Caballero.
Q Was LeoniloBroce (sic) hit when he was stabbed by Robito
Caballero?
A Yes. He immediately ran back and said: Tio, help me because I am
hit.
INTERPRETERS (observation)
Witness demonstrating by holding her left armpit.
Q Was Eugene Tayaktak able to escape from the attach (sic) of the
Caballero brothers?
A Not (sic).
Q Now what happened to Eugene Tayaktak?
A He appeared very weak and he was staggering.
Q Do you know where Eugene Tayaktak now?
A Already dead.

110 | P a g e

A Nothing happened. Both of them were brought to the hospital.[22]

In sum, the trial court committed reversible error in convicting the
appellants of murder for the death of Leonilo. As this Court held in People v.
Flora:[23]
However, we cannot find Edwin Flora similarly responsible for the death of Emerita
Roma and the injury of Flor Espinas. The evidence only shows conspiracy to kill
Ireneo Gallarte and no one else. For acts done outside the contemplation of
the conspirators only the actual perpetrators are liable. InPeople v. De la Cerna, 21
SCRA 569, 570 (1967), we held:
... And the rule has always been that co-conspirators are liable only for acts done
pursuant to the conspiracy. For other acts done outside the contemplation of the coconspirators or which are not the necessary and logical consequence of the intended
crime, only the actual perpetrators are liable. Here, only Serapio killed (sic) Casiano
Cabizares. The latter was not even going to the aid of his father Rafael but was fleeing
away when shot.
To conclude, appellant Edwin Flora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt only of the
murder of Ireneo Gallarte. He has no liability for the death of Emerita Roma nor the
injuries of Flor Espinas caused by his co-accused Hermogenes Flora.
Crimes Committed by Appellants
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, the appellants are guilty as co-principals
by direct participation of murder, qualified by treachery. In order that treachery

may be considered as a qualifying circumstance, the prosecution is burdened

to prove that:
.... (1) the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted.[24]
Even a frontal attack is treacherous if it is sudden and the victim is
unarmed. The essence of treachery is a swift and unexpected attack on the
unarmed victim.[25]
In this case, Eugene was unarmed. He had no inkling that he would be
waylaid as he sauntered on his way to his girlfriend Susanas house. On the
other hand, appellant Armando was armed with a wooden pole while appellant
Ricardo and accused Robito were armed with knives. The attack on the
hapless Eugene was swift and unannounced. Undeniably, the appellants killed
Eugene with treachery.
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the appellants are guilty of frustrated
murder under Article 248 in relation to Article 6, first paragraph of the Revised
Penal Code which reads:
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts
of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.

In the leading case of United States v. Eduave,[27] Justice Moreland,

speaking for the Court, distinguished an attempted from frustrated felony.He
said that to be an attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be
thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him to
stop prior to the moment when he has performed all the acts which should
produce the crime as a consequence, which act it is his intention to perform.
The subjective phase in the commission of a crime is that portion of the
acts constituting the crime included between the act which begins the
commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with
prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. Thereafter, the phase is
objective.
In case of an attempted crime, the offender never passes the subjective
phase in the commission of the crime. The offender does not arrive at the point
of performing all of the acts of execution which should produce the crime. He is
stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance.
On the other hand, a crime is frustrated when the offender has performed
all the acts of execution which should result in the consummation of the
crime. The offender has passed the subjective phase in the commission of the
crime. Subjectively, the crime is complete.Nothing interrupted the offender
while passing through the subjective phase. He did all that is necessary to
consummate the crime. However, the crime is not consummated by reason of
the intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender. In homicide
cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the
wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim
barring medical intervention or attendance.[28]

The essential elements of a frustrated felony are as follows:

Elements:
1. The offender performs all the acts of execution;
2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a
consequence;
3. But the felony is not produced;
4. By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
[26]

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If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime
committed is either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no
intention to kill the victim or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated
murder or attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the victim. Intent to
kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of
weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of
wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and
(e) words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on
the victim.
In this case, appellant Armando was armed with a wooden pole.Appellant
Ricardo and accused Robito used knives. Dr. Quisumbing, who attended to

and operated on Arnold, testified that the stab wound sustained by Arnold on
the left side of his body was mortal and could have caused his death were it
not for the timely and effective medical intervention:
Q And how about the size and the depth of the wounds and how big
is each wound and how deep.
A The first wound is 2 cm. and the 2 nd is about 2 inches and the 3 rd is
2 inches in the left, penetrating the chest near the thorax along
the lateral line.
Q So, aside from the 3rd wound there are wounds which are not
really very serious?
A As I said before, the most serious is the 3rd wound.
Q So even without the other wounds the 3 rd wound - - it could be the
cause of the death of the victim?
A Yes, Sir.[29]
It cannot be denied that the appellants had the intention to kill Arnold. The
appellants performed all the acts of execution but the crime was not
consummated because of the timely medical intervention.
Treachery attended the stabbing of Arnold because he was unarmed and
the attack on him was swift and sudden. He had no means and there was no
time for him to defend himself. In sum, the appellants are guilty of frustrated
murder.
The appellants denial of the crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos. RTC1218 and RTC-1219 cannot prevail over Wilmas and Arnolds positive and
straightforward testimonies that the appellants killed Eugene and stabbed
Arnold. Moreover, Wilma and Arnold had no motive to falsely implicate the
appellants for the said crimes; hence, their testimony must be accorded full
probative weight.[30]
Equally barren of merit is appellants defense of alibi. Alibi as a defense is
inherently weak for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. To merit
approbation, the appellants were burdened to prove with clear and convincing
evidence that at the time the crimes were committed, they were in a place

112 | P a g e

other than the situs of the crimes such that it was physically impossible for
them to have committed said crimes. [31] The appellants dismally failed in this
respect. They testified that they were at the house of appellant Ricardo, which
was conveniently near the place where Eugene was killed and Arnold was
assaulted. Moreover, the records show that Marciano, Jr. was treated for his
superficial injuries on August 4, 1996, a day after the incident. This belies the
claim of appellants Ricardo and Armando that they were allegedly in the
hospital at the time of the incident.
Penalties Imposable on Appellants
The trial court imposed the death penalty on appellants in Criminal Case
No. RTC-1218 on its finding that treachery and abuse of superior strength
were attendant in the killing of Eugene. The Solicitor General does not agree
with the trial court and contends that abuse of superior strength was absorbed
by treachery; hence, should not be considered as a separate aggravating
circumstance in the imposition of the penalty on the appellants. The Court
agrees with the Solicitor General. Abuse of superior strength, concurring with
treachery is absorbed by treachery.[32]
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act 7659, is reclusion perpetua to death. Since aside
from the qualified circumstance of treachery, no other modifying circumstance
was attendant in the commission of the crime, the proper penalty for the crime
is reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, for frustrated murder, the Solicitor
General contends that the indeterminate penalty of from 12 years ofreclusion
temporal as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day ofreclusion
temporal as maximum, imposed on the appellants is not correct.The Court
agrees with the Solicitor General. The penalty for frustrated murder is one
degree lower than reclusion perpetua to death, which isreclusion temporal.
[33]
The latter penalty has a range of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years. The
maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from reclusion
temporal, the penalty for the crime taking into account any modifying
circumstances in the commission of the crime. The minimum of the
indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range ofprision mayor which
is one degree lower than reclusion temporal. Since there is no modifying
circumstance in the commission of frustrated murder, the appellants should be
meted an indeterminate penalty of from nine (9) years and four (4) months

of prision mayor in its medium period as minimum to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
Civil Liabilities of Appellants
The trial court ordered the appellants in Criminal Case No. RTC-1218 to
pay in solidum the heirs of the victim Eugene Tayactac, the amount ofP75,000
by way of indemnity. The trial court did not award moral damages to said
heirs. This is erroneous. Since the penalty imposed on the appellants
is reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity should be onlyP50,000. The heirs of
the victim should also be awarded the amount ofP50,000 as moral damages.

3. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the appellants are found guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder under Article 248
in relation to Article 6, first paragraph of the Revised Penal Code
and are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
from nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor in its
medium period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months ofreclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum. The appellants are hereby ordered to pay in solidum to
the victim Arnold Barcuma the amount of P25,000 as moral
damages and P10,000 as temperate or moderate damages.

[34]

Costs de oficio.

In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the trial court did not award moral
damages to the victim Arnold Barcuma on its finding that the prosecution failed
to adduce any evidence to prove said damages. The Court disagrees with the
trial court. The victim Arnold Barcuma himself testified on his injuries. [35] He is
entitled to moral damages in the amount of P25,000. [36] Having suffered injuries
and undergone medical treatment he is, as well entitled to actual damages,
which in the absence of evidence would, nevertheless, entitle him to an award
of temperate or moderate damages, herein fixed at P10,000.

SO ORDERED.

The Verdict of the Court

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of San Carlos City (Negros Occidental), Branch 57, in Criminal Cases
Nos. RTC-1217 up to RTC-1219 is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1217, the Court, finding the appellants
not guilty of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, REVERSES the
judgment of the trial court and ACQUITS them of the said charge.
2. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, the appellants are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, qualified by treachery, and are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay
in solidum the heirs of the victim Eugene Tayactac, the amounts
of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages.

113 | P a g e

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 135682. March 26, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.DANILO REYES y
BATAC, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon,
Metro Manila, Branch 72, in Criminal Case No. 18548-MN finding accused-appellant
Danilo Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessory
penalties and to pay the father of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P47,000.00 as actual damages.
The amended information charged accused-appellant and accused Arnel
Cergantes y Hadegero with Robbery with Homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of October 1997, in the Municipality of Navotas, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of
force, violence and intimidation employed upon the person of one DONALDO SALMORIN,
JR. Y SOLIS did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away
one (1) gold necklace, one (1) gold ring, one wristwatch, all of an undetermined value, and a
wallet containing unspecified amount of cash owned by and belonging to DONALDO
SALMORIN, JR. Y SOLIS to the damage and prejudice of the latter, and that on the occasion of
or by reason of the said robbery the said accused, conspiring with one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault, stab with a bladed weapon, the said
DONALDO SALMORIN, JR. inflicting upon him serious physical injuries which directly
caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Accused-appellant was the only one arrested and, when arraigned, he entered a
plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:
On October 12, 1997, at 2:00 a.m., PO1 Eduardo C. Molato of Station 4, Western
Police District, Sampaloc, Manila was on his way home on board a passenger
jeepney. When he alighted at the corner of Lapu-lapu Street and Northbay Boulevard
South he saw the victim being held up by two persons. The one in front of the victim
forcibly took his wristwatch while the other one stabbed him at the back. He fired one
warning shot which caused the three to run towards Phase I, Lapu-lapu Avenue. He
chased them but when he saw the victim, he hailed a tricycle and asked the driver to
bring the victim to the nearest hospital. He continued chasing the suspects up to Phase
II until he reached Agora, but the suspects were gone. The incident happened swiftly
but PO1 Molato had a good look at the face of the one who stabbed the victim as he
was about 8 to 10 meters away from them.
Accused-appellant denies the charge against him and insists that he was merely
mistaken for accused Arnel Cergontes who had the same protruding lips as he had and
with whom he shares a common alias as Buboy Nguso. He recalled that on October 12,
1997, he was sleeping in his house. He left only at 7:30 in the morning and went to the
house of his uncle Dabong to ask for money. On October 16, 1997 at around 7:30 in the
morning, police authorities came to Antorium St. looking for Buboy Nguso. To his
surprise, the policemen, without saying anything, handcuffed him and brought him to
the Lapu-lapu detachment. Thereafter he was brought to Navotas Police station for
further investigation. He claims that he was arrested for possession of a deadly weapon
in violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and not in connection with the robbery-homicide case.
After trial, the lower court rendered a judgment of conviction which reads:

114 | P a g e

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Danilo

Reyes y Batac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide defined
and penalized under Article 294, Paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA
7659. Considering that no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance attended the commission of
the crime nor alleged in the amended information, said accused is hereby sentenced to the prison
term of reclusion perpetua, together with all the accessory penalties thereof.
Accused Reyes is also condemned to pay the father of the victim the total amount of
P147,000.00 broken as follows: 1) P50,000.00 for the loss of the victims life, 2) P50,000.00 by
way of moral damages for the pain and sorrow suffered by the victims family, and 3) P47,000.00
by way of actual expenses incurred in connection with the death and burial of the victim. No
pronouncement on the claim for lost valuables and income can be made in view of the failure to
substantiate the same.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the PNP Director General and the Director of the WPD
so that the superiors of PO1 Eduardo Molato will know that in connection with this case, said
policeman while already off-duty responded to the commission of a crime, extended assistance
to the victim thereof, tried to arrest the malefactors and cooperated with the authorities
concerned in the prosecution of this case in a manner that can only be described as a laudable
display of civic duty brought about by his orientation as a policeman and for which PO1 Molato
is hereby commended.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Hence, this appeal based on the following assigned errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED NOTWITHSTANDING
THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT HAD NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY AND IDENTIFICATION MADE BY PO1 EDUARDO C. MOLATO.
Accused-appellant argued that his guilt was not established beyond reasonable
doubt for failure of the prosecution to prove the essential requisites of the crime
charged. According to him, the vital element ofanimus lucrandi was not sufficiently
established as the taking of the watch could have been a mere afterthought and the
real intent of the malefactors was to inflict injuries upon the victim. Moreover, there was
no evidence of ownership of the wristwatch, as it may have belonged to the two
persons who attacked the victim. Lastly, there was no evidence of conspiracy.
The arguments fail to persuade us.
A conviction for robbery with homicide requires proof of the following elements: (a)
the taking of personal property with violence or intimidation against persons or with
force upon things; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking be done
with animus lucrandi (intent to gain); and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by
reason thereof, homicide in its generic sense was committed. The offense becomes a
special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 (1) of Revised Penal
Code if the victim is killed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery.[4]
After reviewing the evidence on record of this case, we find that the facts
established a clear-cut case of robbery with homicide. Great respect is accorded to the
factual findings of the trial court. The trial judge had the best opportunity to observe the
behavior and demeanor of the witnesses.It formed first-hand judgment as to whether
particular witnesses were telling the truth or not. Thus, absent misapprehension or
misinterpretation of facts of weight and substance, and absent any arbitrariness or
irregularity, we will not overturn its findings.[5]
Accused-appellants contention that the animus lucrandi was not sufficiently
established by the prosecution is devoid of merit. Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an
internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender. Although

proof of motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of the robbery is
circumstantial, intent to gain or animus lucrandi may be presumed from the furtive
taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a
different intent on the part of the perpetrator. The intent to gain may be presumed from
the proven unlawful taking.[6] In the case at bar, the act of taking the victims wristwatch
by one of the accused Cergontes while accused-appellant Reyes poked a knife behind
him sufficiently gave rise to the presumption.
Accused-appellant also contends that the ownership of the wristwatch was not
proved by the prosecution. He argues that the attackers probably owned the wristwatch
and the reason they attacked the victim was to retrieve it.
Accused-appellants contention deserves no merit. The detailed narration of how
the victim was forcibly divested of the wristwatch by accused Cergontes and stabbed at
the back by accused-appellant cannot be taken lightly on the argument that the
attackers owned the wristwatch and they attacked the victim solely on their desire to
retrieve it. Clearly, this contention is a mere conjecture and has no basis on record. In
any event, in robbery by the taking of property through intimidation or violence, it is not
necessary that the person unlawfully divested of the personal property be the owner
thereof. Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code employs the phrase belonging to
another and this has been interpreted to merely require that the property taken does
not belong to the offender. Actual possession of the property by the person
dispossessed thereof suffices. In fact, it has been held that robbery may be committed
against a bailee or a person who himself has stolen it. So long as there
is apoderamiento of personal property from another against the latters will through
violence or intimidation, with animo de lucro,robbery is the offense imputable to the
offender. If the victim is killed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the offense is
converted into the composite crime of robbery with homicide.[7]
Likewise unavailing is the contention of accused-appellant that the prosecution
failed to prove conspiracy. In conspiracy, proof of an actual planning of the perpetration
of the crime is not a condition precedent. It may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was committed or inferred from the acts of the accused
evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interest.[8]
In the case at bar, conspiracy was clearly manifested in the concerted efforts of
the accused-appellant and his cohort. They were seen together by PO1 Molato at the
unholy hour of 2:50 a.m. forcibly taking the wristwatch of the victim and thereafter
stabbing him at the back. Their simultaneous acts indicate a joint purpose, concerted
action and concurrence of sentiments. Where the acts of the accused collectively and
individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and all the
perpetrators will be liable as principals.[9]
Accused-appellant faults the trial court for relying on the improbable testimony of
PO1 Molato who testified that the victim upon seeing him ran away towards the
direction where the two assailants also ran. It is well-settled that different people react
differently to a given situation or type of situation, and there is no standard form of
human behavioral response where one is confronted with a strange or startling or
frightful experience.[10] The firing of the warning shot may have frightened the victim and
made him act the way he did, especially since PO1 Molato did not identify himself as a
police officer before he fired the warning shot.
In a last ditch effort to obtain his acquittal, accused-appellant contends that PO1
Molatos testimony was inconsistent because while he initially testified that he boarded
the victim on a tricycle and proceeded to chase the two assailants, he later said that
upon reaching Agora he saw the victim lying down and sought help from the people
around and that no one aided him so he decided to wait for the police. Moreover,

115 | P a g e

despite the presence of bystanders no one was investigated and eventually presented
in court in order to corroborate his testimony.
We find the inconsistencies to be too trivial as to affect the credibility of PO1
Molato. Slight contradictions such as these even serve to strengthen the credibility of
the witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed nor perjured. What is
important is the fact that there is a sustained consistency in relating the principal
elements of the crime and the positive and categorical identification of accusedappellants as the perpetrators of the crime.[11]
Furthermore, the non-presentation of other witnesses to corroborate the testimony
of PO1 Molato is of no consequence. The matter of deciding whom to present as
witness for the prosecution is not for the accused or for the trial court to decide, as it is
the prerogative of the prosecutor. More importantly, the testimony of PO1 Molato is
sufficient to convict accused-appellant. Courts are not precluded from rendering
judgment based on the testimony even of a single witness. The weight and sufficiency
of evidence is determined not by the number of the witnesses presented but by the
credibility, nature, and quality of the testimony.[12]
As correctly held by the trial court, accused-appellants defense of alibi and denial
cannot prevail over the clear, positive and convincing testimony of PO1 Molato. In the
light of the positive identification of accused-appellant as one of the assailants, his
denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The positive identification of the accused, when
categorical and consistent and without any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial. Unless substantiated by clear
and convincing proof, such defenses are negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any
weight in law.[13]
As regards accused-appellants civil liability, the trial courts award of P50,000.00
as death indemnity to the father of the victim Donaldo Salmoren, Jr. and P50,000.00 as
moral damages are in accord with current jurisprudence. [14] The award of actual
damages in the amount of P47,000.00 should likewise be upheld, in view of the
defenses admission as to the claim for actual damages.[15]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 72, in Criminal Case No. 18548-MN, finding Danilo
Reyes y Batac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessory
penalties and to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P47,000.00 as actual damages, is
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 129306. March 14, 2003]
People of the Philippines, appellee, vs. James Patano y Marcaida, Ramil Madriaga
y Lagonoy and Rosendo Madriaga y Banaag, appellants.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
For automatic review is the decision dated April 30, 1997, rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 262 in Criminal Case No. 110089-H
convicting appellants James Patano, Ramil Madriaga and Rosendo Madriaga of the
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and imposing upon them the supreme penalty of
death.
The Amended Information, dated May 15, 1996, charged appellants James
Patano, Ramil Madriaga and Rosendo Madriaga as well as Oswaldo Banaag, Manolo
Babac, Allan Duarte and Jose Doe, with the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom,
committed as follows:
That on or about March 25, 1996, in Mandaluyong City, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused grouping themselves together,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously detain/kidnap and/otherwise deprived VICENTE
UY Y CHUA (NGO LIT POON) of his liberty for the purpose of extorting ransom, as
in fact demand therefore in the amount of TEN MILLION (P10,000,000.00) PESOS
had been made by the above-named accused, while detaining said victim in Antipolo,
Rizal, until his rescue on March 27, 1996.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
All three appellants together with Oswaldo Banaag pleaded not guilty to the
crime as charged. Their other co-accused Manolo Babac, Allan Duarte and Jose Doe
remain at large. Trial ensued.
The prosecution presented six witnesses.

116 | P a g e

Kidnap victim Vicente Uy testified as follows -- On March 25, 1996, at around

10:30 in the evening, he was along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, on his way
home driving his Nissan Sentra when a black Pajero bumped his car on the left door,
drivers side. Both he and the driver of the Pajero got off their respective
vehicles. When he told the driver that they have to call a police officer, he was told that
the passengers inside the Pajero were police officers. He was asked to look inside the
Pajero. When he did so, the driver suddenly pushed him inside the vehicle while the
four other passengers grabbed him. He was blindfolded and his feet and hands were
tied. After traveling for about 30 minutes, the vehicle stopped and he was transferred
to the baggage compartment of another vehicle.An object was placed on top of him
and he was told that it was an armalite. They traveled again for 30 minutes, after
which, he was moved, placed on a hard object and covered with something. He was
asked if he has ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) to which he replied in the
negative. They bargained for a while until the ransom money was pegged at five
million pesos (P5,000,000.00). They asked for his telephone number which he
gave. After some hours, Uy felt somebody lifting him up, telling him that he was
already safe, removing his blindfold and untying him. His daughter Lucy Ngo then
entered the room. He was asked if he wanted to go to the hospital but he declined.[2]
On cross-examination, Uy stated that when his blindfold was removed, he saw
two handcuffed men. He pointed to appellant Rosendo Madriaga who was in the
courtroom, but Uy declared that he is not certain that Rosendo was the one he had seen
handcuffed because the one he saw was wearing a moustache and Rosendo does not
have one.[3]
Chief Inspector Gilbert Cruz, in-charge of operations of the Presidential AntiCrime Commissions (PACC) Task Force Habagat, testified as follows -- On March 27,
1996, his superior, Supt. Calinisan instructed him to proceed to the residence of Uy as
the former received a call from Lucy telling him that there was someone in the house
of Virginia Avelita, Uys common-law wife, who claims to know the location of the
victim. He went to the house of Lucy and they agreed that he will pose as the familys
lawyer. They then went to the house of Virginia. There, he was introduced to appellant
Ramil Madriaga who told them that Uy was under the custody of the Antipolo police
because he was arrested for swimming without authority at the Villa Cristina Resort
(resort for brevity), Antipolo, Rizal, now Antipolo City. Upon his instructions,
verification was made by a certain Chief Insp. Quidato [4] who had gone to the resort
and learned that the information was false. Together with Lucy and appellant Ramil,
Maj. Cruz proceeded to the resort. Upon reaching the resort, Ramil dashed towards
cottage no. 2 but Maj. Cruz stopped Ramil. In front of the cottage was a certain
Richard Dimal to whom Cruz identified himself as a police officer. He found appellant

Rosendo and victim Uy inside the cottage. Dimal and appellant Rosendo were then
arrested, handcuffed and brought to the headquarters where they identified a certain
Oswaldo Banaag as the tipster of the group.[5]
Lucy Ngos testimony is as follows -- In the morning of March 26, 1996, she
received a call from Virginia Avelita telling her that a certain Ramil Madriaga was at
her place with information regarding the whereabouts of her father Vicente Uy, also
known as Ngo Lip Poon. She called Maj. Gilbert Cruz and together, they went to
Virginias house.There, they met appellant Ramil who informed them that he received a
beeper message from his cousin, appellant Rosendo, telling him that the Antipolo
police picked up their group and Uy was recovered. Maj. Cruz then instructed Maj.
Winnie Quidato to check with the Antipolo police if there was really an arrest made on
that day and it was learned that there was none. Maj. Cruz instructed Quidato to
proceed to the resort which they also did together with Lucys uncles and aunts. At the
resort, appellant Ramil got off the car and talked to Maj. Cruz who instructed
Ramil: (O)kay but slowly, do not run or make any move. Halfway towards his cousin,
appellant Ramil ran and met appellant Rosendo. Maj. Cruz then ran, followed by his
staff. Lucy and her companions were left waiting in the car until Quidato returned and
told her that her father is safe, and they proceeded to the cottage. Appellant Ramil
approached Lucy and asked her not to include his cousin Rosendo in the case because
of Ramils help in the rescue of her father.[6]
Richard Dimal who was arrested by Maj. Cruz on March 27, 1996, testified as
follows -- In the evening of March 25, 1996, he was renting some VHS tapes at the
Star Gazer video shop located at Pasig City where he saw his friend Nadel
Francisco. They chatted until 12 oclock midnight. Appellant Ramil passed by in his
white Toyota Corolla car between 12 oclock and 1 oclock in the morning of March 26,
1996 and invited Dimal to go around to which the latter acceded. They went to the
house of Dimal at Cainta, Rizal. Dimal saw a black Nissan Patrol parked in front of his
house. Appellant Ramil then called up a passenger of the Nissan Patrol on his mobile
phone and told the latter, we cant do it here, we must find a darker place. Then they
proceeded to Taytay, Rizal and stopped behind its new market. Appellant Ramil
alighted from the car and went to the Nissan Patrol. Thereafter, Dimal saw them put
something inside the trunk of the car of Ramil. They left Taytay, Rizal and roamed
around, with the Nissan Patrol tailing them. When they reached Bulacan, they stopped
and Ramil talked to the passengers of the Nissan Patrol.Ramil returned to his car and
told Dimal that they will go to Antipolo, Rizal. Upon reaching Antipolo, the
passengers of the Nissan Patrol transferred to the car of Ramil. They left the Nissan
Patrol
behind. Dimal
identified
Manolo
Babac
as
the
driver
of
the Nissan Patrol and both appellants Rosendo Madriaga and James Patano as well as
the two co-accused who are still at-large, Alan Duarte and Jose Doe, as its
passengers. When they reached the resort located in Antipolo, Rizal, between 5 oclock

117 | P a g e

and 6 oclock in the morning (March 26, 1996), appellant Ramil opened the trunk of his
car. Jose and appellant Patano lifted a person out of the trunk and brought him inside
cottage no. 2. Dimal asked appellant Ramil if he could go home but Ramil said that
they will all leave together. Ramil and Duarte then left the place. Dimal, appellants
Rosendo and Patano, and Jose were left inside the cottage. They all went to
sleep. When Dimal woke up, it was between 12 oclock and 1 oclock in the afternoon
(March 26, 1996). He went to the resorts restaurant and stayed there for about 30
minutes. When he went back to the cottage, the others were not there anymore. While
waiting for Ramil and the others to come back, he took his dinner between 7 oclock
and 8 oclock in the evening of March 26, 1996 and he laid down up to 1 oclock early
morning of March 27, 1996. When he went out of the cottage to call up somebody
because he was confused having been left alone, appellant Rosendo arrived together
with Jose. Jose left again at 6 oclock in the morning (March 27, 1996) leaving Dimal
and appellant Rosendo inside the cottage. They took their lunch in front of the cottage
and waited until around 3 oclock to 4 oclock in the afternoon when appellant Ramil
arrived with several companions who he later learned to be the kin of Uy and some
police officers. Dimal and appellant Rosendo were left inside the cottage together with
some police officers to wait for their (Dimals and Rosendos) other companions. At 7
oclock in the evening, appellant Patano arrived. They stayed in the resort until the
afternoon of the next day and they were brought by the policemen to Camp Crame.[7]
On cross-examination, Dimal admitted that he was arrested that afternoon of
March 27; that he was wearing a moustache at the time of the arrest and that he was
the one who fed victim Uy.[8]
Virginia Virgie Avelita, Uys common-law wife, corroborated the testimony of
Lucy and Maj. Cruz regarding appellant Ramils contact with her. Virginia further
testified that appellant Ramil related to her the whole kidnapping scenario; that Ramil
informed her that the kidnappers were demanding one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) ransom; that Oswaldo Banaag is the gangs tipster; and that Ramil
requested her not to involve his cousin Rosendo.[9]
The last witness for the prosecution, Chief Inspector Winnie Quidato, Chief of
the Intelligence and Operation Division of the Task Force Habagat, corroborated some
portions of the testimony of Maj. Cruz on the episode at the resort. He also testified
that appellant Patano arrived at the resort at around 9 oclock to 10 oclock in the
evening of March 27, 1996 bringing with him one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) as
payment for the cottage rental.[10]
The defense presented five witnesses.

First to be presented was accused Oswaldo Banaag, family driver of a certain

Beverly Tan. He denied any complicity in the crime. Banaag testified that: he was
arrested in White Plains, Quezon City, on March 29, 1996 by Maj. Cruz and was
brought to Camp Crame; it was only when he was transferred to a detention cell that
he met his co-accused; although he knew victim Uy, he thought that he was being
charged with the killing of his employer, Reynaldo Tan; he was surprised when he
learned that he was being implicated in the kidnapping of Uy.[11]
Nadel Francisco, a college student taking up Management course, testified that at
around 4 oclock to 5 oclock in the afternoon of March 25, 1996, Richard Dimal visited
him at his house at de Castro, Pasig City.They chatted for about one hour. Dimal
invited him to go swimming in Villa Cristina Resort but he declined because he has an
examination the following day. Francisco belied Dimals statement that they were
together until 12 oclock midnight as he was already asleep in his house at that time. He
further stated that he did not see appellant Ramil Madriaga on said day. [12] On crossexamination, Francisco admitted that appellant Ramils girlfriend asked him to testify
but he clarified that he was testifying not because of such request, but because of the
subpoena issued to him.[13]
Appellant Rosendo Madriaga testified thus -- At around 8 oclock in the evening
of March 25, 1996, Richard Dimal, together with a certain Nestor, went to his house
and invited him for a swim in Antipolo, Rizal, as it was Nestors birthday. They arrived
at Villa Cristina Resort at around 10 oclock in the evening and rented a cottage table
near the pool. While he and Nestor were swimming, he saw Dimal talk to some men
and then go upstairs. Later, he noticed that Nestor was no longer around. Afterwards,
Dimal came back and invited him to drink. They went to a veranda and there, he saw
Nestor drinking Fundador with the same men he previously saw talking to Dimal.
Appellant Rosendo recalls the names of two of the men as Allan and Bong. At around
4 oclock in the morning (March 26, 1996), Dimal confided to him that they were going
to actually stand guard over a person. Dimal pulled him towards a room where
Rosendo saw a person with bound feet and hands lying on his belly on the floor. When
Rosendo told Dimal that he wanted to leave, he was told that Bongs group had men
posted at the gate and he might be killed if he left.Scared, he stayed inside the
room. Per instructions of Dimal, Rosendo burned all the things belonging to the
captive but Rosendo kept a PLDT bill. When Dimal had gone asleep, Rosendo went to
the resorts canteen and called the number of Virginia Avelita reflected on the PLDT
bill but the person answering the phone hung up on him several times. He then called
up his cousin, appellant Ramil Madriaga, and asked for his help.Ramil initially didnt
want to intervene but eventually agreed to help him.He gave the number on the phone
bill and appellant Ramil assured him that he will contact such person. He then went
back to the veranda where he slept. The next day (March 27, 1996), between 3 oclock
and 4 oclock in the afternoon, he heard somebody calling his name, and saw appellant

118 | P a g e

Ramil who was with several armed men, running towards him. Dimal then ran and
threw a gun near the trees.[14]
Appellant Rosendo further testified that he saw appellant James Patano for the
first time in the afternoon of March 28 on board a van at the resort, [15] while he saw
Oswaldo Banaag for the first time at the PACC office. [16] Rosendo avers that Dimal
implicated him because the latter thinks he was the one who caused his arrest.
[17]
Further, Rosendo testified that in the room where he, Patano and Dimal were
brought by Maj. Cruz, victim Uy only pointed to Dimal as the one who kidnapped
him.[18]
Appellant James Patano recounted that: on March 28, 1996, after having gone for
a swim, Maj. Quidato arrested him while he was urinating in one of the corners in the
resort; he was brought inside a comfort room in one of the cottages where he was
asked if he knew Dimal or appellant Rosendo; when he was brought out of the room,
he was already unconscious as he was mauled and a plastic bag was placed on his
head; he regained consciousness inside a vehicle; from the resort, he was brought to
the PACC office; at the PACC office, Dimals kin, particularly Dimals sister Arlene and
her husband Willie Pangan, asked him to testify against the Madriagas, but he turned
them down; and he was also asked to sign an affidavit but he likewise refused. Patano
further denied knowing his co-accused in the case.[19]
Appellant Ramil Madriaga asserts his innocence of the crime charged. He
testified as follows -- In the early morning of March 26, 1996, his cousin Rosendo
called him up asking for his help. Rosendo told Ramil that he was in the resort and was
unexpectedly mixed up in a kidnapping; that he could not get out of the resort because
there were look-outs posted in the area. Rosendo gave Ramil a name and a number
written in a PLDT bill. Appellant Ramil was hesitant because the results of the Bar
examinations were coming out that day; but nevertheless, he went to see a certain Lt.
Capitulo in Camp Aguinaldo and told him about his cousins predicament. [20] The next
day, March 27, 1996, Ramil went to see Virginia Avelita, the name given by appellant
Rosendo written on the PLDT bill.He showed her his school I.D. and asked her if she
knows anybody who is missing, and the latter replied, si Vicente ko. He was then made
to talk over the phone to Vicente Uys daughter, who asked him to wait. Virginia,
meanwhile, told him that she was going out. After an hour, Virginia, Lucy, three old
women, their driver, PACC operatives and Maj. Cruz arrived.After a short
conversation, they left for the resort, leaving Virginia behind.He asked the latter to
look after his white Toyota Corolla car which he left in her residence. Upon reaching
the resort, they were approached by Maj. Quidato who asked him questions. He got off
the car when he saw his cousin Rosendo near the pool with Dimal. He pointed the two
to Maj. Cruz who instructed his men to scatter. He then started walking towards his

cousin, and when appellant Rosendo saw him, he told the latter, mga kasama natin ito,
huwag kang matakot. When he got to Rosendo, he pulled him and they leaned on the
wall for fear that they might get shot.Dimal ran upstairs while Rosendo pointed to the
place where Uy was being kept. They went inside the cottage and Ramil removed the
plaster bindings on Uy.[21]
The trial court convicted appellants James Patano, Ramil Madriaga and Rosendo
Madriaga of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, but acquitted their co-accused
Oswaldo Banaag.
The dispositive portion of the assailed decision, reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. With respect to the Criminal Case No. 110090, on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence, all the accused are ACQUITTED.
2. With respect to Criminal Case No. 110089-H, on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence, accused OSWALDO P. BANAAG is hereby ACQUITTED. The jail warden
of Mandaluyong City is hereby directed to immediately release his person unless there
are other legal grounds to justify his continued detention.However, with respect to
accused ROSENDO B. MADRIAGA, JAMES M. PATANO, and RAMIL L.
MADRIAGA, judgment is hereby rendered finding them GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention defined and penalized
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, said accused are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death, as provided for under said Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, to suffer the appropriate accessory penalties consequent thereto,
and to proportionally pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[22]
Appellants insist that they are innocent of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom,
arguing that:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED GROSSLY IN CONVICTING ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS WITHOUT BEING IDENTIFIED AS THE
ABDUCTORS/KIDNAPPERS OR CULPRITS OF THE ALLEGED
KIDNAPPING.
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE LONE AND

119 | P a g e

UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF THE CO-CONSPIRATOR.

[23]

Bearing in mind that it devolves upon the State to establish by proof all the
essential elements of the crime with which appellants are charged and to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that they are guilty of said crime, [24] the Court, after a
meticulous examination of the evidence of the prosecution, finds that appellants James
Patano, Ramil Madriaga and Rosendo Madriaga should have been acquitted by the
trial court. The prosecution failed to overthrow the constitutional presumption of
innocence in favor of appellants. It failed to adduce the quantum of proof necessary to
convict them.
In convicting appellants, the trial court gave great weight and evidentiary value to
the uncorroborated testimony of prosecution witness Richard Dimal on appellants
alleged participation in the crime. It stated that Dimals testimony is direct,
straightforward and spontaneous thus justifying the conclusion that appellants acted in
concert in carrying into effect the kidnapping of Vicente Uy. The trial court totally
disregarded appellants testimonies on the ground that they failed to support their
versions of the incident.
It is well settled that the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a
conviction so long as it is clear, straightforward and worthy of evidence by the trial
court.[25] It is likewise a settled doctrine that when it comes to credibility of witnesses,
the findings of a trial court on such matter will not be disturbed unless the lower court
overlooked, ignored, misapprehended, or misinterpreted certain facts or circumstances
which are so material such as to affect the outcome of the case.[26]
Although the trial court described the testimony of Dimal as direct,
straightforward and spontaneous, it should not automatically endow outright probative
weight to his testimony or its veracity, to the exclusion of the testimonies of other
witnesses. Many witnesses can give testimonies that are blatant lies, even if they
appeared poker-faced and did not bat their eyelashes.
After a careful scrutiny of the testimony of prosecution witness Dimal, the Court
finds that the trial court failed to consider some significant facts and circumstances
which affect his credibility. His version of the incident is so incredible that a complete
reversal of the findings of the trial court is warranted.
To begin with, Dimal testified that he was with Nadel Francisco on the night of
the kidnapping when appellant Ramil passed by and invited him to go around.
[27]
Dimal likewise declared in his Sworn Statement dated April 1, 1996 that he was

with Francisco when appellant Ramil Madriaga invited him at around 12 oclock
midnight, viz.:

Q Will you tell this Honorable Court what place he is going to have
swimming?

SAGOT - 13. Noong ganap na ika-pito ng gabi ng Marso 25, 1996, ako ay nagpunta sa
Star Gazer Video Shop sa Azucena Street, De Castro, Pasig upang mag-arkila ng VHS
tapes. Mayamaya ay nagkita kami doon ng kaibigan ko na si NADEL
FRANCISCO at nagkuwentuhan kami doon sa tapat ng nasabing video shop
hanggang bandang alas-dose ng hatinggabi. Habang nagkukuwentuhan kami ay
napadaan sa harapan namin si kuya Amel na lulan ng isang kotse at niyaya niya
akong sumama sa kanya at sinabing mayroon daw kaming happenings.
[28]
(Emphasis Ours)

A Villa Cristina, sir.

But defense witness Francisco categorically denied Dimals assertions.While he

admitted that he saw Dimal that day, he testified that they merely chatted for only
about one and a half (1 ) hours and parted ways at around 5:30 oclock in the
afternoon. Francisco testified thus:

A I have an examination on the following day, sir.

Q You said you talked with Richard Dimal for one hour, more or less, will
you tell this Honorable Court what time did Richard and you started to
talk?
A Approximately 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, sir.
Q It lasted around 5:30 oclock?
A Yes, sir.
Q What subject matter did you talk with Richard Dimal?
A I cannot remember anymore, we just chat about the lives of our friends,
sir.

Q Tell this Honorable Court what was your reaction to the invitation of
Ricahrd Dimal to go with him at Villa Cristina?
A I did not go with him, sir.
Q Why?

Q I am showing to you a statement of Mr. Ricard Dimal attached to the

records of this case found on page 64 consisting of 6 pages, on page
65 or the second page of the statement of Richard Dimal, question #13
and the answer thereto, Im reading it to you and please listen. Maaari
bang ikuwento mo dito kung paano ka nadamay sa nasabing
kaso? And the answer, Noong ganap na ika-pito ng gabi ng Marso 25,
1996, ako ay nagpunta sa Star GazarVideo Shop sa Azucena St., De
Castro, Pasig upang mag-arkila ng VHS tapes. Mayamaya ay nagkita
kami doon ng kaibigan ko na si Nedel Francisco at nagkuwentuhan
kami sa tapat ng nasabing video shop hanggang bandang alas-dose ng
hatinggabi.Habang nagkukuwentuhan kami ay napadaan sa harapan
namin si Kuya Amel na lulan ng isang kotse at niyaya niya akong
sumama sa kanya at sinabing mayroon day kaming happenings. Did
you hear what I read?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you understand what I read?

Q Who among your friends were talked about?

A Yes, sir.
A I cannot remember anymore, sir.
Q Before you and Ricard Dimal parted ways, what did Dimal tell you, if
any?

Q What can you say about what I have read which is the statement of
Richard Dimal?
A I do not know about that alleged happening, sir.

A He invited me to go with him for swimming, sir.

Q On that date, around 12:00 oclock midnight, where were you?

120 | P a g e

A I was already sleeping during that time, sir.

Q During your conversation with Richard Dimal from 4:00 to 5:30 oclock
in the afternoon of March 25, 1996, tell this Honorable Court whether
you saw Kuya Amel?
A I did not see him that day, sir.[29]
The trial court chose to ignore Franciscos testimony. It did not explain in its decision
why it opted not to consider his testimony, why it relied on the testimony of Dimal
despite Franciscos explicit testimony that he and Dimal talked only up to 5:30 oclock
in the afternoon and that it is not true that he saw Ramil with his car around midnight
or at any time of that day.The Court is confounded why the trial court entirely
overlooked or disregarded the testimony of Francisco who is a disinterested witness
and had nothing to gain from belying Dimals claim. Dimal regards Francisco as his
friend;[30] and Francisco considers Dimal as a closer friend of his than Ramils. [31] Thus,
when Francisco repudiated Dimals testimony, there was no reason for him to discredit
Dimal except to tell the truth. The credibility of Dimal is thereby eroded. There is no
reason for the trial court to discredit the testimony of Francisco. One may assert that
while it may be true that after Francisco and Dimal parted ways at 5:30 oclock in the
afternoon, it could have happened that Dimal and appellant Ramil had met at
midnight. But this posture could not be upheld because of the testimony of Dimal
himself that Francisco was present when Ramil invited him to roam around at about
midnight, which could not be believed because Francisco was, in fact, not present. In
effect, from the start, Dimal is shown to be concocting his version of the kidnapping
incident.
Furthermore, the trial court erred in accepting Dimals testimony as gospel truth
considering that his account of the events that transpired is replete with incredible
happenings that should not have been accepted by the trial court as part of ordinary
human experience and common sense.For example, Dimal testified that he went with
Ramil upon the invitation of the latter and they went to his (Dimals) house located at
No. 046 Blk. I, PFCI Brgy. San Andres, Cainta, Rizal; [32] that through a cellular phone,
Ramil told the passengers of the Nissan Patrol parked in front of Dimals house that
they could not do what they have to do in that place and that they have to find a darker
place.[33] Why then did Ramil have to meet the passengers of the Nissan Patrol in front
of Dimals house when the place is not suitable to his (Ramils) plans in the first
place? Why did Ramil have to go to Dimals house when he could have used the
cellular to tell them the place where he thought would be a better place to meet
them? There is nothing in Dimals testimony to explain said incongruities.

121 | P a g e

In addition, Dimal testified that they went to Taytay, Rizal and stopped behind the
new market place where Dimal saw something transferred from the Nissan Patrol to
the trunk of the Toyota Corolla of Ramil; [34] that thereafter, from Taytay, Rizal, they
roamed around and then went to Bulacan with the Nissan Patrol still tailing Ramils
car; that upon reaching Bulacan, Ramil alighted from his car and talked with the
passengers of the Nissan Patrol; that Ramil went back to his car and told Dimal that
they will go to Antipolo, Rizal; that upon reaching Antipolo, the passengers of the
Nissan Patrol transferred to Ramils car[35] and then they proceeded to Villa Cristina
Resort in Antipolo, Rizal. From Taytay, Rizal, why do they have to roam around, go to
Bulacan and then back to Rizal? From past midnight to 6 oclock in the morning, why
did Dimal, Ramil and the passengers of the Nissan Patrol have to go around killing
time when the final destination of all of them together is the resort in Antipolo, Rizal?
Why did the Nissan Patrol have to tail them all the while from Taytay, Rizal to
Bulacan after the victim was transferred to the car of Ramil only to go to Antipolo,
Rizal, a nearby town of Taytay, Rizal? Said acts are so preposterous that no amount of
stretching of imagination could bring the same within the realm of human
understanding.
The test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness is whether such is in
conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind; whatever
is repugnant to these standards becomes incredible and lies outside of judicial
cognizance.[36] Further, absent any other evidence to explain or corroborate such
implausible actuations, the trial court committed a reversible error in considering the
testimony of Dimal credible enough to sustain a conviction of all appellants. Evidence
to be believed must not only come from the mouth of a credible witness but must also
be credible in itself.[37]
It may be posited that in the commission of the crime of kidnapping with ransom,
the culprits usually adopt and pursue unfamiliar schemes or strategies not only to avoid
easy detection or monitoring of their movements, but to confuse the police authorities,
the victim and the family of the victims; that the incredible happenings narrated by
Dimal only highlight his knowledge of the details of the facts surrounding the
kidnapping for ransom. This may be so if the credibility of Dimal on the fact that he
and Ramil had met that night of the kidnapping is beyond question.
In any event, if a set of facts admits of two interpretations, then the one consistent
with the presumption of innocence and in favor of the accused should prevail.[38]
The trial court declared that there was never any positive identification made
on any of the accused, and that the prosecution presented evidence which are
circumstantial in nature to support the charge.[39]

It is a hornbook doctrine that conspiracy must be proved by positive and

convincing evidence. The prosecution miserably fell short of this requirement.
The trial court explicitly declared that the prosecution witness is not a coconspirator and therefore his testimony may be taken in evidence against all the
appellants without running counter to Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[40]
The court a quo seriously erred in this aspect. Based on Dimals sworn statement,
marked as Exhibit A,[41] and his testimony, Dimal admitted and confessed as to his
participation.[42]

SECTION 30. Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator

relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against
the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of
declaration.
Thus, conspiracy must be proven by evidence other than the testimony of Dimal.
Proof of conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence as the felonious covenant
itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties before, during, and after the
commission of the crime disclosing a common understanding between them relative to
its commission.[44]

In addition, the following manifestation of Atty. Marcelino Arias, to wit:

Atty. Arias Before the prosecution starts the direct examination, as per
record, I learned that his Richard Dimal is one of the
suspects and he was arrested in all these cases but he was
not included as one of the suspects, I want to put that on
record, as far as the record is concern, he is one of those
who allegedly took the victim, he confessed by means of an
affidavit, now he is a witness and not one of the accused,
your Honor.
Court Everything you have said will be put on record, and for your own
information defense counsel, that is the prerogative of the
prosecution and no longer of the defense.
Atty. Arias Considering that I noticed that the prosecution is in possession
of an Affidavit of this witness which was not included in the
records of this case, may I ask to be furnished of this
affidavit.
Fiscal Abesamis The purpose of the testimony of Richard Dimal is to show
the circumstances before, during and after the kidnapping
of Mr. Vicente Uy, to show the conspiracy acts of the
accused in this case of said kidnapping and to identify some
evidence and thereafter to identify the accused in this
case. With the permission of this Honorable Court.[43]

In its assessment, the trial court declared that the evidence for the prosecution is
purely circumstantial,[45] on which basis it ruled that appellants conspired in
perpetrating the crime of kidnapping with ransom.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the
circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at
the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other
rational hypothesis except that of guilt. [46] The following elements must concur: (1)
there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts on which the inference of guilt
is based must be proved; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[47]
In the present case, the totality of the pieces of circumstantial evidence presented
by the prosecution is not sufficient to establish the guilt of appellants. Not one of the
prosecution witnesses saw the actual abduction. Witness Dimal admitted during crossexamination that he did not see appellants actually kidnap or abduct Uy, viz.:
Q You know that you never saw Ramil kidnapped Vicente Uy?
A No, sir.
Q You never saw your Kuya Sendong kidnapped kidnapped (sic) Mr. Uy?
A Yes, sir.
Q You never saw Oswaldo Banaag kidnapped Mr. Uy?

was not refuted by the prosecution.

A No. sir.
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

122 | P a g e

Q You never saw James Patano kidnapped Mr. Uy?

A No, sir.
Q Never did you see Mr. Ramil Madriaga kidnapped Mr. Uy?
A Yes, sir.[48]
There could not be any misinterpretation in the meaning of the above testimonies. If
the testimony of Dimal is taken in its entirety, it mainly revolved around events that
allegedly occurred after the abduction was already consummated. As such, one would
readily conclude that Dimal did not really see the act of kidnapping and therefore, he
did not see any of the appellants perform the actual act of kidnapping. Besides, the trial
court itself declared that there was never any positive identification made on any of the
accused.[49]
Further, the prosecution evidence failed to sufficiently prove overt acts on the
part of appellants that will convincingly show their direct participation or complicity in
the kidnapping.
In the case of appellant James Patano, he was condemned to death for his
presence in the resort. The trial court held that since appellant Patano failed to
corroborate his excuse that he was just there for a swim with friends, then, the same
must be ignored.[50] The Court disagrees. If at all, what the prosecution was able to
establish is that appellant Patano knocked on the door of cottage no. 2, and Maj.
Quidato heard him say:(P)are kaibigan ninyo ito, dala ko ang pera.[51] Such alleged
statement by Patano, even if true, is equivocal and ambiguous. He did not state for
what purpose the money is to be used. No probative weight may be given to the
testimony of Maj. Quidato that the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) is for
the payment of the cottage because it is a mere conclusion on his part based on his bare
claim that the security guard and the official of the resort were preventing the victim
from leaving because the cottage has not been paid yet. Quidato did not testify that he
heard appellant Patano say that the alleged money he had with him was for the rental
of the cottage. In other words, even if appellant Patano really brought money to the
cottage, the prosecution failed to connect the participation of Patano in the commission
of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom. Absent any other proof of overt act necessary
or essential to the perpetration of the kidnapping, Patanos alleged presence and
utterance cannot be a valid basis for his conviction. The Court cannot accept the trial
courts sweeping conclusion against Patano. The mere presence of appellant Patano at
the resort after the commission of the crime does not imply conspiracy. Mere
knowledge, acquiescence to or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one

123 | P a g e

as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the

crime, with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
[52]
Conspiracy transcends companionship.[53] Neither can the Court rely on the
uncorroborated testimony of Dimal whose testimony at the outset had been found not
to be credible. The failure of appellant Patano to present the friends he was with is not
sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. An accused should be
found guilty on the basis of the strength of prosecution evidence and not on the
weakness of the defense.[54]
Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of the evidence of
the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. The identity of the offender,
like the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Even though appellant
Patano invokes the inherently weak defense of denial, such defense nonetheless
acquired commensurate strength in the instant case where no positive and proper
identification has been made by the prosecution witnesses of the offender, as the
prosecution still has the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused. The
weakness of the defense does not relieve the prosecution of this
responsibility. Besides, the Court has held that the testimony of witness Dimal is not
credible and not worthy of belief. There is reasonable doubt as to his guilt or
participation in the commission of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom. The doubt
should therefore be resolved in favor of appellant James Patano.[55]
As regards appellant Ramil Madriaga, the trial court refused to accept his
testimony and found his claim that he was responsible for the rescue of Uy to be
beyond ordinary human comprehension deserving of no evidentiary value. [56] Instead,
it banked on the suspicions entertained by the police operatives that appellant Ramils
actuations during the rescue were suspect, and that the latter failed to present Lts.
Capitulo and Lim, often referred to by him in his testimony.[57] The Court does not
agree.Mere suspicion, speculation, relationship, association and companionship do not
prove conspiracy.[58]
The Court scrutinized the testimony of appellant Ramil Madriaga and there is
nothing therein which is beyond ordinary understanding or which indicates any
suspicious behavior on his part that would create doubt on his account of what really
transpired. In fact, appellant Ramil exhibited candor and sincerity when he admitted
that he was initially ambivalent in helping out his cousin Rosendo because of fear and
of the fact that the results of the Bar examinations were coming out that day. [59] Also,
the victims daughter, Lucy Ngo, did not sense any suspicious behavior on the part of
appellant Ramil, and she testified that she even believed that the latter was trying to
help them, thus:

Q Will you tell us what do you mean by that?

A Nagmamagandang loob is parang tumutulong siya, sir.
xxx
Q The man who was nagmamagandang loob. Are you referring to Ramil
Madriaga as the one who was nagmamagandang loob?
A He is the one who was nagmamagandang loob. Yes, sir.
Q Even before, you knew Ramil Madriaga was incarcerated and one of the
accused in this case, were you surprised to know that Ramil Madriaga
who according to you nagmamagandang loob is now one of the
accused in this case?
A Yes, sir.[60]
It cannot be denied that appellant Ramil played a major part in the rescue of
Vicente Uy. The testimonies of Lucy Ngo, Virginia Avelita and Maj. Cruz all show that
it was through the information given by appellant Ramil that they were able to locate
Vicente Uy. If it were really true that appellant Ramil was one of the conspirators of
the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, it is absolutely incredible that Ramil would
openly go to the house of the victims common-law wife and place himself at the risk
of being identified as one of the conspirators when he could have accomplished the
same purpose by other means at the same time protect himself from being identified by
witnesses. Neither did Virginia Avelita nor Lucy Ngo testify that Ramil asked for
ransom. What then could be the motive of Ramil in going to the house of Avelita if not
to help his cousin out of his predicament? Whatever suspicions the police operatives
entertained were pure speculations, insufficient to warrant the conclusion that
appellant Ramil participated in the kidnapping. The required quantum of evidence is
proof beyond reasonable doubt.[61] The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that
embarks upon it is without rudder or compass.[62]
The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Maj. Cruz, Virginia Avelita and Chief
Inspector Quidato were all based on what appellant Ramil had purportedly told
them. The veracity of what they claimed was told them by Ramil is highly dubious in
view of the testimony of prosecution witness Lucy Ngo, daughter of the victim,
affirming that appellant Ramil was the one who was nagmamagandang-loob and who
told them about the kidnapping of her father and where he could be found.

124 | P a g e

The Court went over the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Cruz, Avelita and
Quidato and it found that certain portions thereof were tailored to suit the charges
against appellants.
Both Cruz and Quidato testified that appellant Ramil rushed to the cottage as
soon as they arrived at the resort and that they found appellant Rosendo inside the
cottage with victim Uy, giving the impression that appellant Ramil knew exactly where
the victim was and, therefore, appellants Ramil and Rosendo were two of the
kidnappers.[63] However, Lucy Ngo contradicted their testimonies. Lucy, instead,
confirmed the testimonies of appellants Ramil and Rosendo that the latter was outside
the cottage and that Ramil rushed to Rosendo only after getting instructions from Maj.
Cruz.[64]
The Court is likewise wary of the testimony of Virginia Avelita insinuating
appellant Ramils complicity for knowing the details of the crime. If it were true that
she suspected Ramil, then there was utterly no reason for her to tell Lucy Ngo when
she called up the latter that there was a certain person who was offering his assistance
(nagmamagandang-loob) in locating Uy.[65] Instead, she would have forewarned Ngo
about appellant Ramil.
Consequently, the Court cannot give much weight to the testimonies of these
prosecution witnesses as they suffer from infirmities.
Besides, it is a settled rule that the testimony of a witness who merely recites
what someone else has told him, whether orally or in writing is hearsay and has no
probative value[66] under Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Neither could the
same be validly regarded as an exception to the hearsay rule considering that the
details testified to by said witnesses were directly refuted by appellant Ramil when he
testified in court and asserted the fact that appellant Ramil merely went to Avelitas
house to tell her of the location of her common-law husband, Vicente Uy, and to help
his cousin, co-appellant Rosendo; which fact is confirmed by prosecution witness
Lucy Ngo.
The failure of appellant Ramil to present Lts. Capitulo and Lim does not
denigrate the credibility of his own testimony. As stated above, the prosecution must
rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the defense.
Thus, the Court finds that the prosecution evidence lacks that degree of
conclusiveness required to convict appellant Ramil Madriaga.

With regard to appellant Rosendo Madriaga, the Court also finds that there is no
sufficient evidence proving beyond reasonable doubt that he was involved in the
kidnapping of Vicente Uy. As with appellant Patano, there is lack of adequate evidence
of conspiracy insofar as appellant Rosendo is concerned. No proof was adduced by the
prosecution to show that Rosendo knew about the kidnapping and that he had actively
participated in its execution. When victim Uy identified Rosendo in the courtroom as
the person he saw handcuffed after his blindfold was removed, Uy admitted that he
was not sure of Rosendos identity as the latter is without a moustache. The testimony
of prosecution witness Dimal in this regard is quite revealing. Dimal admitted that he
was the one who fed the victim and that he was wearing a moustache at the time of his
arrest on March 27, 1996.[67]
Appellant Rosendo testified that he called up his cousin Ramil and asked for his
help as he got unintentionally mixed up in a kidnapping. [68]Appellant Rosendo
convincingly explained that he could not do anything because he was afraid. [69] Such is
not far-fetched or improbable. The Court is cognizant of the fact that fear is an
effective anesthetic that can paralyze one into inaction. Rosendos failure to report his
predicament with the police is not an indicium or positive proof that he actively took
part in the crime and, therefore, it could not be a valid basis for a finding of guilt for
the crime of kidnapping for ransom. What is clear is that appellant Rosendo called up
his cousin, appellant Ramil, for help because he was in a predicament over which he
had no control.
All told, while the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom has been proven, appellants
participation therein had not been adequately proven beyond reasonable doubt. Hence,
all three appellants must be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
262 in Criminal Case No. 110089-H convicting appellants JAMES PATANO y
MARCAIDA, RAMIL MADRIAGA y LAGONOY and ROSENDO MADRIAGA
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another is hereby rendered ACQUITTING them
of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom as charged for failure of the prosecution to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate
release of appellants, unless they are being lawfully held for another cause, and to
inform this Court of the date of their release or the ground for their continued
confinement, within five (5) days from notice of this decision.
The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation and the Director- General of
the Philippine National Police are directed to cause the arrest of accused Manolo

125 | P a g e

Babac and Allan Duarte who have remained-at-large as well as other persons who
appear criminally responsible for herein subject crime. The prosecution must exert
more diligent efforts next time.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR.,
CUSTODIO GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES and ROGELIO LANIDA, accused,
CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., accused-appellant.

SARMIENTO, J.:
In a decision 1 dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch
XXXVIII (38), in Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Fausta
Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio
Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida," found all the accused, except Rogelio Lanida who
eluded arrest and up to now has remain at large and not yet arrained, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. They were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in the amount of P40,000.00,
plus moral damages in the sum of P14,000.00 and to pay the costs." 2 The victim was
Lloyd Peacerrada, 44, landowner, and a resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.
Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course Rogelio Lanida, filed a notice
of appeal from the trial court's decision. During the pendency of their appeal and before
judgment thereon could be rendered by the Court of Appeals, however, all the accusedappellants, except Custodio Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their appeal and chose instead to
pursue their respective applications for parole before the then Ministry, now
Department, of Justice, Parole Division. 3
On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 4 on the appeal of
Custodio Gonzales, Sr. It modified the appealed decision in that the lone appellant was
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Lloyd Peacerrada in the
amount of P30,000.00. In all other respect, the decision of the trial court was affirmed.
Further, on the basis of our ruling in People vs. Ramos, 5 the appellate court certified
this case to us for review. 6

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The antecedent facts are as follows:

At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the
barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his sleep by the
spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just
killed their landlord, Lloyd Peacerrada, and thus would like to surrender to the
authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in the killing and
Fausta with her dress smeared with blood, Paja immediately ordered a nephew of his
to take the spouses to the police authorities at the Municipal Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy. As
instructed, Paja's nephew brought the Gonzales spouses, who "backrode" on his
motorcycle, to the municipal building. 7 Upon reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station, the
couple informed the police on duty of the incident. That same night, Patrolman
Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the Gonzales spouses went back to
Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay Tipacla the group went to Paja's residence
where Fausta was made to stay, while Paja, Patrolman Centeno, and Augusto
proceeded to the latter's residence at Sitio Nabitasan where the killing incident
allegedly occurred. 8 There they saw the lifeless body of Lloyd Peacerrada, clad only
in an underwear, sprawled face down inside the bedroom. 9 The group stayed for about
an hour during which time Patrolman Centeno inspected the scene and started to make
a rough sketch thereof and the immediate surroundings. 10 The next day, February 22,
1981, at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Patrolman Centeno, accompanied by a
photographer, went back to the scene of the killing to conduct further investigations.
Fausta Gonzales, on the other hand, was brought back that same day by Barangay
Captain Paja to the police substation in Ajuy. When Patrolman Centeno and his
companion arrived at Sitio Nabitasan, two members of the 321st P.C. Company
stationed in Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise been informed of the incident, were already
there conducting their own investigation. Patrolman Centeno continued with his sketch;
photographs of the scene were likewise taken. The body of the victim was then brought
to the Municipal Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.
The autopsy of Lloyd Peacerrada's cadaver was performed at about 11:20 a.m. on
February 22, 1981; after completed, a report was made with the following findings:
PHYSICAL FINDINGS
1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body moderately
built and on cadaveric rigidity.
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length, located at the
lower 3rd anterior aspect of the arm, right, directed upward to the
right axillary pit.

2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal 3rd, forearm
right, posterior aspect with an entrance of 5 cm. in width and 9 cm. in
length with an exit at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm,
right, with 1 cm. wound exit.
3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle 3rd, posterior
aspect of the forearm right, 1 cm. in width.
4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the right lateral border
of the sternum, 6th and 7th ribs, right located 1.5 inches below the
right nipple.
5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed inward to
the thoracic cavity right, located at the left midclavicular line at the
level of the 5th rib left.
6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth directed toward the
right thoracic cavity, located at the mid left scapular line at the level of
the 8th intercostal space.
7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the base of the left
armpit directed toward the left thoracic cavity.
8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in length, directed toward
the left deltoid muscle, located at the upper 3rd axilla left.
9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length, located at the
anterior aspect, proximal 3rd arm left, directed downward.
10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width, and 5 cm. in length,
medial aspect, palm right.
11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area, right, directed inward with
portion of large intestine and mysentery coming out.

16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with fissural fracture of

the skull.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left ventricle of
the heart.
2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the right
lower lobe of the lungs.
3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right middle lobe
of the lungs.
4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the descending
colon of the large intestine, thru and thru.
5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring the apex of
the right lungs (sic).
CAUSE OF DEATH:
MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE
DUE TO MULTIPLE
LACERATED, STABBED (sic),
INCISED AND PUNCTURED
WOUNDS.
JESUS D. ROJAS, M.D.
Rural Health Physician
Ajuy, Iloilo 11

12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the posterior portion of the
shoulder, right, directed downward to the aspex of the light thoracic
cavity.

The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16) wounds, five (5) of
which are fatal because they penetrated the internal organs, heart, lungs and intestines
of the deceased." 12

13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length, located at the

medial portion of the medial border of the right scapula.

On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared before the
police sub-station in the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily surrendered to Police
Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and protective custody for "having been involved" in
the killing of Lloyd Peacerrada. He requested that he be taken to the P.C.

14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in length, located at the
posterior aspect of the right elbow.

127 | P a g e

15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length, located at the

posterior portion, middle 3rd, forearm, right.

headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where his wife, Fausta, was already detained having been
indorsed thereat by the Ajuy police force. 13
Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy police force
and the 321st P.C. Company, an information for murder dated August 26, 1981, was
filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales. The information read as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA GONZALES and
AUGUSTO GONZALES of the crime of MURDER committed as
follows:
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981, in the Municipality of
Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the above-named accused with four other companions whose
identities are still unknown and are still at large, armed with sharppointed and deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating and helping
each other, with treachery and evident premeditation, with deliberate
intent and decided purpose to kill, and taking advantage of their
superior strength and number, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, stab, hack, hit and wound Lloyd D.
Peacerrada, with the weapons with which said accused were
provided at the time, thereby inflicting upon said Lloyd D.
Peacerrada multiple wounds on different parts of his body as shown
by autopsy report attached to the record of this case which
multifarious wounds caused the immediate death of said Lloyd D.
Peacerrada.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Iloilo City, August 26, 1981. 14
When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea of
not guilty. Before trial, however, Jose Huntoria 15 who claimed to have witnessed the
killing of Lloyd Peacerrada, presented himself to Nanie Peacerrada, the victim's
widow, on October 6, 1981, and volunteered to testify for the prosecution. A
reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on
the basis of which an Amended Information, 16 dated March 3, 1982, naming as
additional accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant), Custodio Gonzales,
Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Again, all the accused except as
earlier explained, Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the crime.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural Health physician of
Ajuy who conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim; Bartolome Paja, the
barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla; Patrolman Salvador Centeno and Corporal Ben

128 | P a g e

Sazon of the Ajuy Police Force; Sgt. (ret) Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo
of the 321st P.C. Company based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose Huntoria; and Nanie
Peacerrada, the widow.
Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of the deceased
Lloyd Penacerrada at around 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981 after it was taken to the
municipal hall of Ajuy. 17 His findings revealed that the victim suffered from 16 wounds
comprising of four (4) punctured wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four (4) incised
wounds, and one (1) lacerated wound. In his testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the
possibility that only one weapon might have caused all the wounds (except the
lacerated wound) inflicted on the victim, nevertheless opined that due to the number
and different characteristics of the wounds, the probability that at least two instruments
were used is high. 18 The police authorities and the P.C. operatives for their part testified
on the aspect of the investigation they respectively conducted in relation to the incident.
Nanie Peacerrada testified mainly on the expenses she incurred by reason of the
death of her husband while Barangay Captain Bartolome Paja related the events
surrounding the surrender of the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales to him, the
location of the houses of the accused, as well as on other matters.
By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged eyewitness account
of the incident. According to Huntoria, who gave his age as 30 when he testified on July
27, 1982, 19 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on February 21, 1981, he left his work at
Barangay Central, in Ajuy, Iloilo where he was employed as a tractor driver by one Mr.
Piccio, and walked home; 20 he took a short-cut route. 21 While passing at the vicinity of
the Gonzales spouses' house at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he heard cries for
help. 22 Curiosity prompted him to approach the place where the shouts were
emanating. When he was some 15 to 20 meters away, he hid himself behind a clump of
banana
trees. 23 From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused ganging upon and
takings turns in stabbing and hacking the victim Lloyd Peacerrada, near a "linasan" or
threshing platform. He said he clearly recognized all the accused as the place was then
awash in moonlight. 24 Huntoria further recounted that after the accused were through in
stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted his body and carried it into the house of
the Gonzales spouses which was situated some 20 to 25 meters away from the
"linasan". 25 Huntoria then proceeded on his way home. Upon reaching his house, he
related what he saw to his mother and to his wife 26 before he went to sleep. 27 Huntoria
explained that he did not immediately report to the police authorities what he witnessed
for fear of his life. 28 In October 1981 however, eight months after the extraordinary
incident he allegedly witnessed, bothered by his conscience plus the fact that his father
was formerly a tenant of the victim which, to his mind, made him likewise a tenant of
the latter, he thought of helping the victim's widow, Nanie Peacerrada. Hence, out of
his volition, he travelled from his place at Sitio Nabitasan, in Barangay Tipacla
Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara, Iloilo where Mrs. Peacerrada lived, and related to her
what he saw on February 21, 1981. 29

Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peacerrada in defense of her honor as the
deceased attempted to rape her, all the accused denied participation in the crime. The
herein accused-appellant, Custodio Gonzales, Sr., claimed that he was asleep 30 in his
house which was located some one kilometer away from the scene of the crime 31when
the incident happened. He asserted that he only came to know of it after his
grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales went to his house that night of
February 21, 1981 to inform him. 32
The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the testimony of
Huntoria.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales, Sr., the lone appellant,
contended that the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of the testimony of
Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged eyewitness, and in not appreciating his defense of alibi.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors. In upholding Huntoria's
testimony, the appellate court held that:
. . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused, including the herein
accused-appellant, as the assailants of Peacerrada. (TSN, p. 43,
July 27, 1982) The claim that Huntoria would have difficulty
recognizing the assailant at a distance of 15 to 20 meters is without
merit, considering that Huntoria knew all the accused. (Id., pp. 37-39)
If Huntoria could not say who was hacking and who was stabbing the
deceased, it was only because the assailant were moving around the
victim.
As for the delay in reporting the incident to the authorities, we think
that Huntoria's explanation is satisfactory. He said he feared for his
life. (Id., pp. 50-51, 65) As stated in People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA
442, 450 (1980): "The natural reticence of most people to get
involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. As held in People
v. Delfin, '. . . the initial reluctance of witnesses in this country to
volunteer information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to
be involved in or dragged into criminal investigations is common, and
has been judicially declared not to affect credibility.'"
It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant self admitted that he had
known Huntoria for about 10 years and that he and Huntoria were in
good terms and had no misunderstanding whatsoever. (TSN, p. 33,
July 18, 1984) He said that he could not think of any reason why
Huntoria should implicate him. (Id., p. 34) Thus, Huntoria's credibility.
is beyond question. 33

129 | P a g e

The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's defense of alibi. 34 The appellate
court, however, found the sentence imposed by the trial court on the accused-appellant
erroneous. Said the appellate court:
Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously sentenced the
accused-appellant to 12 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months
of reclusion temporal. The penalty for murder under Article 248
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. As there was no
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the imposible penalty should
be reclusion perpetua. Consequently, the appeal should have been
brought to the Supreme Court. With regard to the indemnity for
death, the award of P40,000.00 should be reduced to P30,000.00, in
accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court. (E.g., People v.
De la Fuente, 126 SCRA 518 (1983); People v. Atanacio, 128 SCRA
31 (1984); People v. Rado, 128 SCRA 43 (1984); People v. Bautista,
G.R. No. 68731, Feb. 27, 1987). 35
The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by the Court of
Appeals, the penalty imposed being reclusion perpetua.
After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find the same
insufficient to convict the appellant of the crime charged.
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much to be
desired. Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his sworn statements 36 even
gave the date of the commission of the crime as "March 21, 1981." Moreover, the
sketch 37 he made of the scene is of little help. While indicated thereon are the alleged
various blood stains and their locations relative to the scene of the crime, there was
however no indication as to their quantity. This is rather unfortunate for the prosecution
because, considering that there are two versions proferred on where the killing was
carried out, the extent of blood stains found would have provided a more definite clue
as to which version is more credible. If, as the version of the defense puts it, the killing
transpired inside the bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there would have been more
blood stains inside the couple's bedroom or even on the ground directly under it. And
this circumstance would provide an additional mooring to the claim of attempted rape
asseverated by Fausta. On the other hand, if the prosecution's version that the killing
was committed in the field near the linasan is the truth, then blood stains in that place
would have been more than in any other place.
The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the other
authorities. Police Corporal Ben Sazon who claimed that accused Augusto Gonzales
surrendered to him on February 23, 1981 failed to state clearly the reason for the
"surrender." It would even appear that Augusto "surrendered" just so he could be safe
from possible revenge by the victim's kins. Corporal Sazon likewise admitted that
Augusto never mentioned to him the participation of other persons in the killing of the

victim. Finally, without any evidence on that point, P.C. investigators of the 321st P.C.
Company who likewise conducted an investigation of the killing mentioned in their
criminal complaint 38 four other unnamed persons, aside from the spouses Augusto and
Fausta Gonzales, to have conspired in killing Lloyd Peacerrada.
Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that the sixteen
wounds described in the autopsy report were caused by two or more bladed
instruments. Nonetheless, he admitted the possibility that one bladed instrument might
have caused all. Thus, insofar as Dr. Rojas' testimony and the autopsy report are
concerned, Fausta Gonzales' admission that she alone was responsible for the killing
appears not at all too impossible. And then there is the positive testimony of Dr. Rojas
that there were only five wounds that could be fatal out of the sixteen described in the
autopsy report. We shall discuss more the significance of these wounds later.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by the lower
courts is to be sustained, it can only be on the basis of the testimony of Huntoria, the
self-proclaimed eyewitness. Hence, a meticulous scrutiny of Huntoria's testimony is
compelling.
To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including the
appellant, take turns in hacking and stabbing Lloyd Peacerrada, at about 8:00 o'clock
in the evening, on February 21, 1981, in the field near a "linasan" while he (Huntoria)
stood concealed behind a clump of banana trees some 15 to 20 meters away from
where the crime was being committed. According to him, he recognized the six accused
as the malefactors because the scene was then illuminated by the moon. He further
stated that the stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But on cross-examination,
Huntoria admitted that he could not determine who among the six accused did the
stabbing and/or hacking and what particular weapon was used by each of them.
ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on crossexamination):
Q And you said that the moon was bright, is it
correct?

Q If you saw the stabbing and the hacking, will you

please tell this Honorable Court who was hacking
the victim?
A Because they were surrounding Peacerrada
and were in constant movement, I could not
determine who did the hacking.
ATTY. GATON:
The interpretation is not clear.
COURT:
They were doing it rapidly.
A The moving around or the hacking or the "labu"
or "bunu" is rapid. I only saw the rapid movement
of their arms, Your Honor, and I cannot determine
who was hacking and who was stabbing. But I saw
the hacking and the stabbing blow.
ATTY. GATON:
Q You cannot positively identify before this Court
who really hacked Lloyd Peacerrada?
A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did the
hacking.
Q And likewise you cannot positively tell this
Honorable Court who did the stabbing?
A Yes sir, and because of the rapid movements.

A Yes, Sir.
Q And you would like us to understand that you
saw the hacking and the stabbing, at that distance
by the herein accused as identified by you?

Q I noticed in your direct testimony that you could

not even identify the weapons used because
according to you it was just flashing?
A Yes, sir. 39

A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly shining.

(Emphasis supplied)

130 | P a g e

From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific act committed,
or contributed, by the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peacerrada.
It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court and of the
Court of Appeals which would categorize the criminal liability of the appellant as a
principal by direct participation under Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code. Likewise, there is nothing in the evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him
by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the same Article 17, or by indispensable
cooperation under paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the direct part in the killing did
the appellant perform to support the ultimate punishment imposed by the Court of
Appeals on him?
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is incurred.
Art. 4. Criminal liability Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense
against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility
of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of
inadequate or ineffectual means.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through the commission
of a felony. Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, provides how
felonies are committed.
Art. 3. Definition Acts and omissions punishable by law are
felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also
by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and
there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
(Emphasis supplied.)

131 | P a g e

Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or omission; (2)
the act or omission must be punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act
is performed or the omission incurred by means of deceit or fault.
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both found, that the
appellant has committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd Peacerrada, forsooth there is
paucity of proof as to what act was performed by the appellant. It has been said that
"act," as used in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, must be understood as "any
bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the external world." 40 In this
instance, there must therefore be shown an "act" committed by the appellant which
would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that produced his death.
Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that he did not see
who "stabbed" or who "hacked" the victim. Thus this principal witness did not say,
because he could not whether the appellant "hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact,
Huntoria does not know what specific act was performed by the appellant. This lack of
specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid down by Article 3 of the
Revised Penal Code previously discussed. Furthermore, the fact that the victim
sustained only five fatal wounds out of the total of sixteen inflicted, as adverted to
above, while there are six accused charged as principals, it follows to reason that one
of the six accused could not have caused or dealt a fatal wound. And this one could as
well be the appellant, granted ex gratia argumenti that he took part in the hacking and
stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not him? Is he not after all the oldest (already
sexagenarian at that time) and practically the father of the five accused? And pursuing
this argument to the limits of its logic, it is possible, nay even probable, that only four, or
three, or two of the accused could have inflicted all the five fatal wounds to the
exclusion of two, three, or four of them. And stretching the logic further, it is possible,
nay probable, that all the fatal wounds, including even all the non-fatal wounds, could
have been dealt by Fausta in rage against the assault on her womanhood and honor.
But more importantly, there being not an iota of evidence that the appellant caused any
of the said five fatal wounds, coupled with the prosecution's failure to prove the
presence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant's conviction can not be
sustained.
Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the fact that he
only came out to testify in October 1981, or eight long months since he allegedly saw
the killing on February 21, 1981. While ordinarily the failure of a witness to report at
once to the police authorities the crime he
had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his
credibility, 41 here, the unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out engenders doubt on
his veracity. 42 If the silence of coming out an alleged eyewitness for several weeks
renders his credibility doubtful, 43 the more it should be for one who was mute for eight
months. Further, Huntoria's long delay in reveiling what he allegedly witnessed, has not
been satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse that he feared his life would be
endangered is too pat to be believed. There is no showing that he was threatened by
the accused or by anybody. And if it were true that he feared a possible retaliation from

the accused, 44 why did he finally volunteer to testify considering that except for the
spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales who were already under police custody, the rest
of the accused were then still free and around; they were not yet named in the original
information, 45 thus the supposed danger on Huntoria's life would still be clear and
present when he testified.
Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by the
prosecution. He admitted that he was a tenant of the deceased. In fact, he stated that
one of the principal reasons why he testified was because the victim was also his
landlord.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you so long
from the time you saw the stabbing and hacking of
Lloyd Peacerrada when you told Mrs.
Peacerrada about what happened to her
husband?

Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, 51 under appropriate circumstances, like in
the instant case in which the participation of the appellant is not beyond cavil it may be
considered as exculpatory. Courts should not at once look with disfavor at the defense
of alibi for if taken in the light of the other evidence on record, it may be sufficient to
acquit the accused. 52

A At first I was then afraid to tell anybody else but

because I was haunted by my conscience
and secondly the victim was also my landlord I
revealed what I saw to the wife of the victim. 46

In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis ours.)
At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under our socioeconomic set-up, a
tenant owes the very source of his livelihood, if not existence itself, from his landlord
who provides him with the land to till. In this milieu, tenants like Huntoria are naturally
beholden to their landlords and seek ways and means to ingratiate themselves with the
latter. In this instance, volunteering his services as a purported eyewitness and
providing that material testimony which would lead to the conviction of the entire family
of Augusto Gonzales whose wife, Fausta, has confessed to the killing of Lloyd
Peacerrada, would, in a perverted sense, be a way by which Huntoria sought to
ingratiate himself with the surviving family of his deceased landlord. This is especially
so because the need to get into the good graces of his landlord's family assumed a
greater urgency considering that he ceased to be employed as early as May
1981. 47 Volunteering his services would alleviate the financial distress he was in. And
Huntoria proved quite sagacious in his choice of action for shortly after he volunteered
and presented himself to the victim's widow, he was taken under the protective wings of
the victim's uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave him employment and provided lodging for
his family. 48 Given all the foregoing circumstances, we can not help but dismiss
Huntoria as an unreliable witness, to say the least.

132 | P a g e

At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged participation of the
appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peacerrada doubtful it is contrary to our customs
and traditions. Under the Filipino family tradition and culture, aging parents are
sheltered and insulated by their adult children from any possible physical and emotional
harm. It is therefore improbable for the other accused who are much younger and at the
prime of their manhood, to summon the aid or allow the participation of their 65-year
old 49 father, the appellant, in the killing of their lone adversary, granting that the victim
was indeed an adversary. And considering that the appellant's residence was about one
kilometer from the scene of the crime, 50 we seriously doubt that the appellant went
there just for the purpose of aiding his three robust male sons (Custodia Jr., Nerio, and
Augusta), not to mention the brother and sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in the killing of
Lloyd Peacerrada, even if the latter were a perceived enemy.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142932. May 29, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOEL GONZALES, JOSEPH
BERNALDEZ, and ROMEO BERNALDEZ, accused,
JOEL GONZALES and ROMEO BERNALDEZ, accused-appellants.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision, [1] dated February 10, 2000, of the Regional Trial
Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 6, Mati, Davao Oriental, insofar as it finds accusedappellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez guilty as principals of the complex crime of
robbery with homicide and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify jointly and severally
the heirs of the victim Nicanor Suralta in the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P2,425.00, plus the costs of the proceedings.
Accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez were charged with Joseph
Bernaldez with robbery with homicide under Art. 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code in an
information which alleged

133 | P a g e

That on or about July 5, 1992, in the Municipality of San Isidro, Province of Davao Oriental,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by
means of violence and intimidation, with intent to gain, in conspiracy with one another, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away Seiko divers watch
valued at P1,000.00, one Sanyo cassette valued at P600.00 and cash amounting to P2,725.00,
with a total value of FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE (P4,325.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency, belonging to Nicanor Suralta to the damage and prejudice of his
heirs, represented by his widow, Carolita U. Suralta in the aforestated sum; and on the occasion
thereof, the said accused, armed with an unlicensed handgun and a knife, with intent to kill, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said firearm
one NICANOR SURALTA, thereby inflicting upon the latter wounds which caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
When arraigned on December 1, 1992, the three entered a plea of not guilty, whereupon
they were tried.[3]

All persons in the house were ordered to go inside the bedroom, about two meters away from the
sala. There, the man with a gun demanded a gun and money from Nicanor. Nicanor answered
that he had no gun, but asked his wife to give money to the holduppers. Carolita gaveP2,100.00,
which was intended to be deposited in the bank, to the knife-wielder, who placed it in his
pocket. Then the knife-wielder ransacked the cabinet and took the remaining amount
of P325.00, which was intended for the school expenses of the Suralta children. In addition, he
took the familys Sanyo cassette recorder and some clothes. The holduppers also divested
Arsenio Abonales, one of the guests, of his Seiko divers wristwatch and then left. [5]
As the holduppers were leaving, two gunshots rang out. Carolita thought that the first one
was a mere warning shot, but later Nicanor was heard moaning.Carolita became hysterical after
seeing her husband lying in a pool of his own blood. Nicanor was immediately brought to the
Lupon Emergency Hospital where he was given first aid. Thereafter, he was transferred to the
Tagum Regional Hospital but he eventually died. [6] The death certificate (Exh. B) states the
cause of his death as
Immediate Cause: CARDIO-RESPIRATORY ARREST

On June 4, 1992, the accused filed a Joint Petition with Leave of Court for
Reinvestigation, which the court granted. As a result of the reinvestigation, a Motion to Dismiss
with respect to accused Joseph Bernaldez was filed. On September 9, 1993, the court issued an
order stating
On record is a motion to dismiss dated September 7, 1993 filed by OIC 1st Asst. Provl.
Prosecutor Pableo B. Baldoza. Finding the grounds stated therein to be well-taken and in order,
said motion is granted.
WHEREFORE, the case against accused Joseph Bernaldez only is hereby ordered
dismissed. The Provincial Warden is hereby directed to release immediately from custody the
person of Joseph Bernaldez, if there is no other case that will warrant his further confinement in
jail.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Thereafter, trial proceeded against accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez.
The facts are as follows:
At about 9:30 oclock in the evening of July 5, 1992, the spouses Nicanor and Carolita
Suralta had visitors at their house in Bagsac, Manikling, San Isidro, Davao Oriental. Nicanor
was having drinks with Arsenio Abonales, Bobong Lamanilao, and Nicasio Lamanilao when two
armed men, one carrying a gun and the other a knife, suddenly entered the house through the
kitchen door. The one carrying a gun had a bonnet over his face, with only his eyes exposed,
while the other one carrying a knife had the lower half of his face covered with a handkerchief.
The knife-wielder held Chona, the third child of the Suralta spouses, and announced a holdup.

134 | P a g e

Antecedent Cause: MULTIPLE [GUNSHOT WOUNDS] PENETRATING

ABDOMEN PERFORATING WITH MASSIVE CONTAMINATION,
PERFORATING CECUM, APPENDECIAL TRANSECTION MESENTERIC
VISSEL, ILEUM, JEJUNUM & SIGMOID
Other significant conditions contributing to death: HYPOVOLEMIA. [7]
The incident was reported to the San Isidro Police on the same night. Carolita Suralta and
Arsenio Abonales gave descriptions of the holduppers and told the responding police
investigators that they would be able to recognize the suspects if they saw them again. [8]
On July 12, 1992, there was another holdup inside the ACF passenger bus compound in
the neighboring municipality of Magdug, Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental. The police team
sent to investigate the incident was able to pick up suspects, [9] one of whom was accusedappellant Joel Gonzales. He was wearing a wristwatch (Exh. A) and had a handgun (Exh.
H). Other items, consisting of watches, a cassette recorder (Exh. D), a chain saw, and spare
parts, were recovered from his house, some of which were claimed by passengers of the ACF
bus line.[10]
Police Inspector Arnold Malintad of Governor Generoso, head of the team investigating
the robbery of the ACF bus compound, informed Capt. Adane Sakkam, Police Chief of San
Isidro, about the apprehension of accused-appellant Gonzales and the recovery of the items from
him. Accordingly, on July 14, 1992, Capt. Sakkam, Carolita Suralta, and Arsenio Abonales
proceeded to the Governor Generoso Police Station. Carolita and Arsenio identified accusedappellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez as the holduppers. Joel Gonzales was identified
as the man armed with a gun who wore a bonnet to cover his face, while Romeo Bernaldez was
identified as the knife-wielder who wore a handkerchief to cover the lower portion of his face. [11]

Carolita volunteered that accused-appellant Bernaldez is in fact her nephew.Carolita and

Arsenio said that they were able to recognize the suspects despite their disguises because they
were only one to two meters away from each other during the holdup, and the rooms of the
house were well-lighted.[12] In addition, Carolita was able to identify the Sanyo cassette recorder
(Exh. D) as the one taken from their house because of the broken antennae and the name Nick
Suralta written inside the battery compartment. On the other hand, Arsenio likewise identified
the Seiko divers watch (Exh. A) as his.[13]
Accused-appellants put up the defense of denial and alibi.
Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales testified that he was in Tandang Sora, Governor
Generoso, Davao Oriental the whole day of July 5, 1992 working in his mother-in-laws farm,
piling coconut palm leaves together with his brother-in-law. In the evening, he had supper in his
house and slept there together with his family.[14]
On July 13, 1992, Gonzales was suffering from a fever. While he was sleeping, he was
awakened by Policeman Danny Cabanilas, Inspector Arnold Malintad and Eddie Tano, who took
him to the Governor Generoso police station in connection with a robbery in the ACF bus
compound. At the police station, he was investigated by Inspector Malintad and thereafter put in
jail. While inside the jail, people came to see him. Malintad pointed at him and asked a woman
companion if he was one of the persons who committed the robbery in San Isidro. The woman
answered, I do not know them. For this reason, both Malintad and the woman left. However,
upon their return, the woman said that she recognized the men and pointed to him and accusedappellant Romeo Bernaldez as those who were involved in the robbery.[15]
On July 31, 1992, accused-appellant Gonzales was taken to Mati by Policemen Ernesto
Bahan and Alfredo Castro, but, before reaching Mati, somewhere in Baas, they alighted from the
jeep and he was made to kneel. He was beaten up by Bahan and Castro with the use of an
armalite and hit on the chest and the back. He was then brought to the Mati Cemetery and there
forced to confess. Thereafter, he was placed inside an open tomb for 12 minutes and then he was
taken to the Mati Municipal Jail. After three days, he was taken to Governor Generoso. He
denied participation in the crime and stated that the cassette recorder and other items were not
confiscated from him.[16]
For his part, accused-appellant Romeo Bernaldez claimed that at around 9:30 oclock in the
evening of July 5, 1992, he was sleeping in his house in Tibanban, Governor Generoso together
with his father, mother, and two sisters. On July 13, 1998, he went to the Municipal Jail of
Governor Generoso to answer accusations by the police that he was concealing a firearm. At the
police station, he was investigated by Inspector Malintad for the firearm he allegedly kept,
which he denied. He was later placed in jail. [17] Inspector Malintad, however, testified that
Bernaldez was actually arrested in his house in Tibanban. [18]
Romeo Bernaldez further testified that on July 14, 1992, Carolita Suralta, accompanied by
Policemen Sakkam and Malintad, went to the jail and made the prisoners stand up, after which

135 | P a g e

they went to Malintads office. Then, the two returned to the jail cell after a few minutes and
Carolita pointed to him as among those involved in the robbery.[19]
Romeo Bernaldez also said that his residence was approximately 25 kilometers from
Manikling, San Isidro, where the robbery with homicide took place, and could be reached by
several means of land transportation.[20]
Except for accused-appellants, no other witness was presented by the defense.
Thereafter, SPO4 Ernesto Bahan was presented to rebut accused-appellant Joel Gonzaless
testimony. According to Bahan, at around 5 oclock in the morning of July 21, 1992, he left for
Governor Generoso on official mission together with SPO3 Castro, SPO1 Lindo, PO3 Jaljis, and
PO3 Hassan, upon order of his superior to fetch Joel Gonzales, per letter-request of Assistant
Provincial Director Supt. Melchisedeck Barggio. Acting on said letter-request, Judge Rodolfo
Castro of Municipal Trial Court of Mati ordered Inspector Malintad, the Chief of Police of
Governor Generoso, to turn over Joel Gonzales.The party left Sigaboy, Governor Generoso at
past 11 oclock in the morning and arrived in Mati at around 1:30 oclock in the afternoon of July
21, 1992. To support his statement, SPO4 Bahan read to the court page 362 of the police blotter
for July 21, 1992, 1350H, to wit:
SPO3 Bahan, SPO3 Castro, SPO1 Lindo, PO3 Jaljis, PO3 Azan arrived [at the] Police Station
from Governor Generoso and brought in the person of Joel Gonzales regarding the request of
Chief Inspector Melchisedeck C Bargio PNP Davao Or Provincial Command, Mati Dvo Or to
Mun. Trial Court of Governor Generoso, Province of Davao Or duly signed by [Judge] Rodolfo
Castro to turn over the custody of accused to Mati Police Station for investigation, in relati[on]
to CC No. 7183 for Robbery with Homicide which is now pending in the Mun. Trial Court of
Mati, same the Chief of Police of Governor Generoso granted to be brought at Mati Police
Station provided that maximum security must be implemented and to be returned said to
Governor Generoso Police Station within three (3) days same said Joel Gonzales also
involved in Robbery with Homicide in CC No. 7183 as pinpointed by two witnesses subject is
hereby placed under police custody as per verbal order of OIC SPO1 Fortuna to the Jailer guard
BJMP SPO3 Cabillada.[21]
SPO4 Bahan denied having taken accused-appellant Joel Gonzales to the Mati
Cemetery. He said that when they arrived in Mati, he immediately turned over Joel Gonzales to
the Chief of Police, who then turned him over to the investigating section. [22]
He further testified that accused-appellant Joel Gonzales was taken to Mati in connection
with Criminal Case No. 7183. Although SPO4 Bahan admitted he had been administratively
charged with maltreating detention prisoners, he said the case was later dismissed and he was
exonerated.[23]
After trial, judgment was rendered by the trial court finding accused-appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide. The dispositive
portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as Principal[s] of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and hereby sentences
each of them to suffer RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties provided by law,
to indemnify jointly and severally, the Heirs of the victim, Nicanor Suralta, the sum
of P50,000.00, to indemnify also jointly and severally said heirs the sum of P2,425.00, plus the
costs of the proceedings.
The cassette [recorder] (Exhibit D) is ordered returned to the Suralta family, while the
wristwatch (Exhibit A) to Arsenio Abonales.

concedes that the prosecution was successful in proving the commission of the crime,
questioning only the identification made by the prosecution witnesses of accused-appellants as
the perpetrators of the crime.[27]
First. Accused-appellants contend that the trial court erred in giving credence to the
identification made by the two prosecution witnesses, Carolita Suralta and Arsenio Abonales.
They argue that the manner by which accused-appellants were identified was suggestive and
showed partiality. They argue further that, most often, the bereaved families of victims are not
concerned with the accuracy of identification because they are overwhelmed by passion for
vindication, regardless of whether or not the suspect is the real culprit.

SO ORDERED.[24]
Counsel for accused-appellant Joel Gonzales assigns the following errors allegedly
committed by the trial court:
I. THAT THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECIDING THAT THE
ACCUSED WERE POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY PROSECUTION
WITNESSES;
II. THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION DURING THE
TRIAL ARE INADMISSIBLE IN LAW.[25]
On the other hand, the Public Attorneys Office, on behalf of both accused-appellants, assigns the
following errors:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED
OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE IDENTITIES OF THE ASSAILANTS
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
[26]

We find accused-appellants contentions to be without merit.

After reviewing the records of this case, we find that the prosecution evidence establishes
the guilt of accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. A conviction for robbery with homicide
requires proof of the following elements: (a) the taking of personal property with violence or
intimidation against persons or with force upon things; (b) the property taken belongs to another;
(c) the taking be done with animus lucrandi (intent to gain); and (d) on the occasion of the
robbery or by reason thereof, homicide in its generic sense is committed. The offense becomes
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Art. 294 (1) of Revised Penal Code if
the victim is killed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. Even the Public Attorneys Office

136 | P a g e

This contention is without merit. We find no reason for setting aside the lower courts
conclusion on the accuracy and correctness of the witnesses identification of the accusedappellants as the persons who robbed the Suralta spouses and the couples guest Arsenio
Abonales and killed Nicanor Suralta. It is the most natural reaction of victims of criminal
violence to strive to ascertain the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner in which
the crime was committed. Most often, the face and body movements of the assailants create a
lasting impression on the victims minds which cannot be easily erased from their memory.
[28]
There is no evidence to show that the eyewitnesses were so paralyzed with fear that they
mistook accused-appellants for the men who robbed and killed the victims. On the contrary, fear
for ones life may even cause the witness to be more observant of his surroundings. [29] Experience
shows that precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their eyes,
eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, attain a high degree of reliability in identifying
criminals.[30] The desire to see that justice is done will not be served should the witness abandon
his conscience and prudence and blame one who is innocent of the crime. [31]
Indeed, prosecution witnesses positively and categorically identified accused-appellants as
the armed men who held them up on July 5, 1992 and killed the victim. There was no possibility
of mistaken identification because prosecution witnesses were able to observe their movements
and their body built and height despite the fact that accused-appellants covered their faces. [32] As
Carolita Suralta testified:
COURT TO THE WITNESS:
Q You stated that one of the robbers was wearing a bonnet, is that right?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And at that time when he was wearing a bonnet, you were not able to identify him?
A I cannot recognize him, but I can recognize his voice and his actions.
Q Why is it that you can recognize his voice and his actions?

A When they got inside, Your Honor.

....
Q How is it that you can recognize his voice and his movements that he is the accused Joel
Gonzales, considering that he was wearing a bonnet and he is not even your neighbor?

ATTY. LADERA:
Q Where did you pick up Joel Gonzales?
A At Barangay Tandang Sora, Governor Generoso.
....

A Because at the time he said, silence, I recognized his voice, Your Honor.[33]
Q In his residence?
Accused-appellants counsels attempted to confuse prosecution witnesses during the trial
by using the word recognize to simultaneously mean identification of face and knowledge of the
name. But the witnesses were able to stand their ground. We agree with private prosecutor that a
mistake is likely when one equates knowing the person by his movements and by his voice with
knowing a person by his name. Although the names of accused-appellants were supplied by the
police, the witnesses nevertheless recognized accused-appellants when they visited them in the
Governor Generoso jail.[34] What is important is not the ability of an eyewitness to give the true
and correct names of the accused, but rather his ability to identify the persons actually seen
committing the offense.[35]
Moreover, in the absence of proof that a witness is moved by improper motive, it is
presumed that he was not so moved and, therefore, his testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit.[36] That presumption has not been overcome in this case. Consequently, the identification
of accused-appellants as the killers of Nicanor Suralta stands. Nor is motive for the killing
important when there is no doubt as to the identity of the perpetrators of the crime. [37] But here
the motive is plain: the victim was killed to rob him of his possessions.

A In the vicinity of his residence.

Q Where?
A At the barangay road.
Q Was he sitting or standing?
A He was standing.
Q He was not bringing anything?
A A handgun and a wristwatch.
Q When did you recover the cassette [recorder]?

Furthermore, alibi is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the positive
identification of accused-appellants. The defense of denial and alibi, unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, is self-serving and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the
positive testimonies of credible witnesses.[38]
Second. Accused-appellant Gonzales contends that during the interrogation and
investigation, he and his co-appellant Romeo Bernaldez were not informed of their rights to
remain silent and to secure the services of counsel, in violation of 2 and 12, Art. III of the
Constitution. Hence, their admission of the commission of the crime is inadmissible in evidence
against them.
This contention lacks merit.
Inspector Arnold Malintad testified that on July 14, 1992, accused-appellant Joel Gonzales
was picked up at around 8:00 a.m. near his residence in Tandang Sora, Governor Generoso.
Accused-appellant Gonzales had a handgun tucked in his waistline and was wearing a
wristwatch. According to Inspector Malintad, accused-appellant Gonzales admitted participation
in the crime upon interrogation and voluntarily surrendered the stolen goods to him.

137 | P a g e

A I told him to turn over the loot of the ACF.

Q You told the accused to turn over the loot[?]
A Yes.
....
Q Where?
A He was apprehended with the gun and the wristwatch and I brought him to the police
station and interrogated him and after the interrogation, he accepted the commission of
the crime and he told me that he will voluntarily surrender the items in his house.
....

Q When you went to the house of Joel Gonzales, when was that that you said he voluntarily
turned over the loot?

ATTY. LOPEZ: (CROSS EXAMINATION)

For accused Romeo Bernaldez.

A On that date.
....
Q The time when you went to the house?
Q So, this Romeo Bernaldez was not a suspect in the Robbery?
A Yes.
A He was picked up later.
....
Q Where did you pick him up?
Q Did you have any search warrant?
A At Tibanban.
A I did not go inside the house.
Q Why did you pick him up?
Q How many of you went to the house?
A It was Joel Gonzales who told me.
A About ten (10).
Q You were armed?

Q You mean to tell us that Joel Gonzales told you that Romeo Bernaldez is one of his
companions?

A Yes.

A Yes and he told us that he is in Barangay Tibanban and we picked him up. [42]

Q You surrounded the house of Joel Gonzales?

A No, because it is only a matter of asking his wife to surrender the items. [39]
To be sure, accused-appellants were already under custodial investigation when they made
their admissions to the police. At that point, the investigation had ceased to be a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime and had began to focus on the guilt of a suspect and for this reason the
latter were taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom in a substantial way. [40] Hence,
the admissions made by accused-appellants are inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Art. III,
2(1) and (3) of the Constitution. However, the defense failed to raise its objections to the
admissibility of these statements immediately, as required by Rule 132, 36, when Inspector
Malintad was presented as a witness for the prosecution or when specific questions concerning
the confession were asked of him. Consequently, accused-appellants are deemed to have waived
their right to object to the admissibility of Inspector Malintads testimony. [41] Indeed, it was even
the defense counsel who provided the opportunity for Inspector Malintad to elaborate on the
circumstances of accused-appellant Gonzales admission in the course of his cross-examination
of the said witness.
Inspector Malintad also claimed that accused-appellant Joel Gonzales told him that one of
his companions was Romeo Bernaldez. He said:

138 | P a g e

On the other hand, Capt. Sakkam testified that when he was in the Municipal Jail at the
Police Station of Governor Generoso in order to identify the suspects, he asked them who killed
the victim and accused-appellant Romeo Bernaldez answered that it was accused-appellant Joel
Gonzales.
COURT:
....
Q Were you able to talk with all the accused?
A When I saw them, I asked one of them as to who killed the victim, and the other one
answered I was not responsible in the killing and he said, Joel Gonzales killed the
victim.
Q Who was the one who told you that the one who shot the victim was Joel Gonzales?
A It was Romeo Bernaldez, the short one.[43]

Such admission by accused-appellant Bernaldez may be taken as evidenceagainst his coappellant Joel Gonzales. For the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not
apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given
in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admitted having committed the crime. [44]

additional amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages should also be awarded in favor of the heirs
of the victim. Such damages require no further proof other than the death of the victim. [47] The
restitution of the cash and of the stolen items to their respective owners ordered by the trial court
is affirmed.

Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales also contends that Inspector Malintad had no warrant
when the latter conducted a search of his residence. He contends that the alleged items taken
during the robbery in the ACF bus compound and the cassette recorder and wristwatch are
inadmissible in evidence against him.

WHEREFORE, the decision, dated February 10, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, 11th
Judicial Region, Branch 6, Mati, Davao Oriental is AFFIRMED, with the modification that
accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Nicanor Suralta the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity,P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,425.00 as restitution for the stolen cash, plus
costs of the proceedings. The cassette recorder is ordered returned to the heirs of Nicanor
Suralta, and the wristwatch to Arsenio Abonales.

This contention deserves no merit. As explained by Inspector Malintad, accused-appellant

Joel Gonzales voluntarily surrendered the stolen goods to him.When he went to the house of
accused-appellant Joel Gonzales, the watches, cassette recorder, chainsaw, and spare parts were
given to him. What thus happened was a consented search, which constitutes a waiver of the
constitutional requirement for a search warrant. It has been held that the right to be secure from
an unreasonable search may be waived either expressly or impliedly. [45] And when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable search and seizure, as in this case, the
exclusionary rule (Art. III, 3(2)) in the Constitution does not apply.
Third. Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales denies that the stolen goods had been taken from
him. Inspector Malintad testified that he recovered watches, a cassette recorder, a chainsaw, and
spare parts from accused-appellant Joel Gonzales when he arrested the latter in his house. There
is no reason to doubt Inspector Malintads claim that the stolen items were indeed recovered from
accused-appellant Gonzales. These items were definitively identified by the owners as those
taken from them. Between the testimonies of the police officers, who enjoy the presumption of
regularity in their duties, and the bare denials of accused-appellants, we are more inclined to
believe the police officers. This is true especially considering that the police officers have not
been shown to have any motive to testify falsely against accused-appellants.
Rule 131, 3(j) of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that a person found in
possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the
whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over,
are owned by him. Since the subject items were found in the possession of accused-appellant
Joel Gonzales, he is then presumed to be the taker of the stolen items. Accused-appellant
Gonzales was unable to satisfactorily explain his possession of the stolen items.
All told, we hold the evidence in this case establishes the guilt of accused-appellants
beyond reasonable doubt. Under Art. 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, the penalty for robbery with homicide ranges from reclusion perpetua to death. In
view of the absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances attending the commission of
the crime, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed by the trial court on accusedappellants.
The Court likewise sustains the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of
the victim, Nicanor Suralta, the same being in line with prevailing jurisprudence. [46] An

139 | P a g e

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151072. September 23, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. FELIPE NATIVIDAD, CARMELITO
NATIVIDAD, ALFREDO QUIAMBAO (at large) and ALVIN BRUL (at
large),Accused,
FELIPE NATIVIDAD AND CARMELITO NATIVIDAD,appellants.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Conspiracy as a basis for conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral
certainty. The same degree of proof necessary in establishing the crime is required to
support the attendance thereof, i.e., it must be shown to exist as clearly and
convincingly as the commission of the offense itself.[1]
This is an appeal from the decision [2] dated June 8, 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court of San Pablo City, Branch 32, in Criminal Case No. 9615-SP, convicting
appellants Felipe Natividad and Carmelito Natividad of the crime of murder and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00.
Appellants, together with their co-accused, Alfredo Quiambao and Alvin Brul, were
charged with Murder in an information which reads:
That on or about January 27, 1995, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused above-named, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one ROLANDO
NAGUIT @ JOJO with a gun, with which accused Alvin Brul then conveniently provided,
thereby inflicting mortal wounds upon said Rolando Naguit which caused his immediate death
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
On May 17, 1995 a warrant was issued for the arrest of the four accused, [4] but
only appellants Carmelito Natividad and Felipe Natividad were apprehended. [5] Upon
arraignment, they both pleaded not guilty.[6]The two other accused remained at large.
The facts as established by the prosecution are as follows: On January 27, 1995,
at 4:00 p.m., prosecution witness Rolando Suratos attended a birthday party in the

140 | P a g e

house of Andy Alcantara at San Cornista Street, City Subdivision, San Pablo City. The
male guests, including Suratos and the deceased, Rolando Naguit, were having a
drinking spree. They were seated around a table in front of Andys house which was
enclosed by a fence of wood and galvanized iron sheets, with a height of approximately
four feet.[7]
At about 7:00 p.m., the four accused, namely, Felipe Natividad, Carmelito
Natividad, Alfredo Quiambao and Alvin Brul, together with a certain Francisco Luistro,
all acquaintances of Suratos, arrived at Andys house and joined the drinking
spree. Alvin Brul, however, left shortly thereafter.[8] At approximately 9:00 p.m. of the
same evening, Suratos heard 2 gunshots. After the first burst of gunfire, he heard the
deceased shout, may tama ako (Ive been hit.). Suratos looked at the direction where
the shot emanated and saw the gunman, Alvin Brul, standing just outside the fence,
about 2 arms length away from him. He easily recognized him because the area was
illuminated by an electric bulb. The second burst of fire came almost
instantaneously. The deceased tried to stand and staggered from his seat, but he
tripped and fell to the ground.[9]
Meanwhile, Suratos scampered for safety towards the comfort room while the
other guests hid at the side of the house. On the other hand, Alfredo Quiambao,
Francisco Luistro and appellants, Felipe and Carmelito Natividad, ran towards the area
where Alvin Brul was standing.Suratos, however, did not see what appellants and their
companions did because his back was turned away from them. As he was running
away, he heard 2 more shots but was not able to see who fired the gun. Inside the
comfort room, Suratos peeked through the gap between the roof and the wall and saw
Alfredo Quiambao, Francisco Luistro and the appellants standing behind Alvin
Brul. Immediately thereafter, all of them ran away towards the National Highway.[10]
The deceased was boarded on a tricycle but he died before he reached the
hospital.[11]
The Necropsy Report prepared by Medical Officer Azucena Bandoy revealed the
following findings
1) Gunshot wound thru and thru with the point of entrance measuring 0.9 x 0.9 cm.,
anterior surface middle-third forearm right directed inferior ward and
posterior ward with the point of exit measuring 1x1 cm. posterior surface
lower third forearm right.
2) Gunshot wound with the point of entrance measuring 0.9 x 0.9 cm. 0.5 cm.,
superior to the left nipple directed inferior ward and lateral ward to the right,
lacerating the lower lobe lung left, heart and right lobe of the liver with a
slug recovered beneath the tissue at the level between the 5 th and
6th intercostals space right.

CAUSE OF DEATH: SHOCK AND HEMORRHAGE DUE TO GUNSHOT WOUND

INVOLVING THE LUNG, HEART AND LIVER.[12]

The issue to be resolved is whether or not conspiracy, which was the basis of the
appellants conviction, was established beyond reasonable doubt.

Earlier that evening, while the celebration was going on, Leticia Naguit, mother of
the deceased, overheard Alvin Brul speaking to Felipe Natividad, Carmelito Natividad,
Alfredo Quiambao, and Francisco Luistro.Alvin said, Kaya mo ba pare? Para babarilin
lamang,[13] to which Carmelito Natividad replied, Sige, Pare, nang mawala na ang tinik
sa landas natin.[14] Leticia was bothered but she could not determine whom or what the
appellants group was referring to. She recalled a previous stabbing incident between
the deceased and the appellants, which was, however, amicably settled. Leticia did not
stay long in the house of Andy because she went to the house of a friend to join them in
singing on the videoke machine.[15]

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning

the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To establish conspiracy, direct
evidence is not required. It is not even essential that there be proof of the agreement to
commit the felony. Proof of concerted action of the accused before, during and after the
crime which demonstrates their unity of design and objective is sufficient. This Court
had consistently ruled that conspiracy may be inferred when by their acts, two or more
persons proceed towards the accomplishment of the same felonious objective, with
each doing his act, so that their acts though seemingly independent were in fact
connected, showing a closeness of former association and concurrence of sentiment.
To hold one as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be shown that he
performed an overt act in pursuance of or furtherance of the conspiracy, although the
acts performed might have been distinct and separate. This overt act may consist of
active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of
moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the time of the commission
of the crime, or by exerting a moral ascendance over the other co-conspirators by
moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. Once conspiracy is
established, all the conspirators are answerable as co-principals regardless of their
degree of participation, for in the contemplation of the law, the act of one becomes the
act of all. It matters not who among the accused inflicted the fatal blow to the victim.[22]

On January 28, 1995, Felipe, Carmelito and Alfredo were subjected to paraffin
testing to determine the presence of gun powder nitrates. The tests conducted on
Alfredo and appellant Felipe yielded positive results, while appellant Carmelito turned
out negative for powder nitrates.[16]
The version of the defense runs as follows: At around 5:30 p.m. of January 27,
1995, brothers Felipe and Carmelito Natividad, and their brother-in-law Alfredo
Quiambao, were invited by Andy Alcantara to join the drinking spree in his
house. Among the guests, was the deceased, Rolando Naguit, who sat beside
appellant Carmelito. Suddenly, the latter heard a gun burst and the deceased stood up
saying, may tama ako, may tama ako.[17] At this instance, all the visitors including the
appellants and Alfredo hurried out of the fence.[18] Carmelito said that he did not
recognize the gunman because his face was covered with a towel. [19]Felipe, on the
other hand, testified that he did not see the gunman because his back was turned.[20]
On June 8, 2001, the trial court found that appellants conspired with Alvin Brul, the
gunman, in killing the deceased, and rendered the assailed judgment, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of the accused Felipe Natividad and
Carmelito Natividad beyond reasonable doubt, each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay costs. Both of them are also ordered jointly and
severally to indemnify the heirs of Rolando Naguit in the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity.
Let alias warrant of arrest issue against Alfredo Quiambao and Alvin Brul for their immediate
apprehension.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Hence, the present appeal.

141 | P a g e

Conspiracy as a basis for conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral
certainty. Considering the far-reaching consequences of criminal conspiracy, the same
degree of proof necessary in establishing the crime is required to support the
attendance thereof, i.e., it must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the
commission of the offense itself.[23]
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to satisfy the required quantum of
evidence that would produce the conviction of the appellants on the basis of
conspiracy. The mere fact that Alvin Brul, the gunman, arrived and left the crime scene
together with appellants does not automatically mean that they shared a common
design and a unity of purpose in killing the deceased. There is no evidence that
appellants performed an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy. Neither was it
established that their act of fleeing towards Alvin was an act of giving moral assistance
to the criminal act of the latter. As testified by prosecution witness, Rolando Suratos, he
did not see what appellants did when they ran towards Alvin. Clearly, the finding of
conspiracy in this case was based merely on conjecture, and thus cannot pass the test
of moral certainty. Even if we consider the alleged previous disagreement between the
deceased and the appellants as a motive for killing the former, still, conspiracy would
not lie. This is so because mere presence, knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement
to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any
active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose.[24]

In the parallel case of People v. Agda,[25] the appellant was acquitted because of
lack of evidence that would prove conspiracy, thus:
The only incriminating evidence against appellant Romy Gelina are: He arrived and left the
drinking spree together with accused Noel Agda. Romy Gelina was standing nearby when
witness Almazan saw Noel Agda stab Quitorio. Both Agda and Gelina ran away after the
stabbing. It is not true, as nothing appears in the record, that when appellant Romy Gelina ran
away after the stabbing he was holding a thing that was black and looked like a horn.
There is no evidence of appellant Gelinas direct participation in the stabbing. [26]
Likewise in People v. Viernes,[27] it was held that the alleged co-conspirators act of
holding the victim while one of the accused was stabbing him does not itself
demonstrate conspiracy absent evidence tending to prove that the act of holding the
victim was intended to aid the killing of the victim. The Court held that
The evidence of the prosecution on the matter of conspiracy falls short of [the] requirement. The
evidence mainly point to the act of stabbing the deceased and what occurred
thereafter. Whatever the prosecution witnesses testified to before the stabbing would be of little
or no value as they themselves admitted that minutes before the commotion, they were watching
a betamax and their attention was focused on the screen. As the stabbing happened, by the
prosecutions own version, outside the fence, or on the road outside the house of Nanding Tomas,
it is possible that they only saw that part when Viernes stabbed the deceased while the three (3)
co-accused were holding him (the deceased). This picture does not of itself demonstrate a
concurrence of will or unity of purpose and action. The mere holding of the deceaseds hand does
not necessarily prove intention to kill, because it may be that they (co-accused) were trying to
prevent the stabbing of the deceased when the prosecution witnesses saw them. Absent any act
or circumstances from which may logically be inferred the existence of a common design among
the accused to commit the crime, the theory of conspiracy remains a speculation, not a fact. [28]
The testimony of the mother of the deceased that she overheard the group of
appellants talking about shooting somebody is of little probative value. The prosecution
failed to prove that the group was indeed planning the commission of the crime and that
they were intending the plan for the deceased. Under the equipoise rule, where the
evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the
evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule
finds application if, as in the present case, the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of
the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill
the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated,
the needed quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found
lacking.[29]
Moreover, the fact that appellant Felipe Natividad was positive for nitrates does
not conclusively show that he indeed fired the murder weapon. It must be stressed that

142 | P a g e

he was neither seen holding nor firing a gun. Besides, it is well settled in forensic
evidence that nitrates are also found in substances other than gunpowder. In People v.
Melchor,[30] the accused was acquitted despite the finding of gunpowder nitrates on his
right hand. It was noted that scientific experts concur in the view that the result of a
paraffin test is not conclusive. While it can establish the presence of nitrates or nitrites
on the hand, it does not always indubitably show that said nitrates or nitrites were
caused by the discharge of firearm.The person tested may have handled one or more
of a number of substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites,
such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such
as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite
deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the products of
combustion of tobacco. The presence of nitrates, therefore, should be taken only as an
indication of a possibility but not of infallibility that the person tested has fired a gun.
Finally, while flight has been said to be an indication of guilt, [31] this alone cannot
justify the conviction of appellants. The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own merit and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense. In this exacting standard, the prosecution failed. It follows
that the judgment of the lower court convicting appellants should be set aside for failure
to meet the quantum of evidence constitutionally required.[32]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision dated June 8, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch 32, in Criminal Case No. 9615-SP, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants Felipe Natividad and Carmelito Natividad are
ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt, and ordered released from prison
unless they are being held for some other lawful cause. The Director of Prisons is
DIRECTED to implement this Decision and to report to this Court immediately the
action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 134573-75. October 23, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. VICENTE BINARAO, RUDY CANATA
and JOSE COMBIS, JR.,appellants.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
On appeal is the decision[1] dated August 20, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 18 of Tabaco, Albay in Criminal Case Nos. T-2361, T-2362, T-2363, which
convicted herein appellants Vicente Binarao, Rudy Canata and Jose Combis, Jr. of

rape against then 14-year-old Emma Clapis and sentenced them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
Appellants were charged in three separate Informations for allegedly committing
three counts of rape, the accusatory portions of which similarly read:
That on or about the 16th day of November, 1991 at about 6:30 oclock in the evening,
more
or
less,
at
Barangay
Dapdap,
Municipality of Tiwi,Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with deliberate intent to violate the law by
means of force and intimidation by using a fan knife, without the consent and against
the will of EMMA CLAPIS, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
conspire, confederate and mutually helping one another, while Vicente Binarao was
sexually assaulting Emma Clapis the other co-accused helped in holding the offended
partys body to subdue resistance and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the
latter, to her damage and prejudice.[2]
Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges. The prosecution presented its
version of the facts through the testimonies of complainant Emma Clapis, Segundina
Clapis, Dr. Leonides Cruel and P/SI Benjamin B. Berdin.
According to Emma Clapis, at around 6:30 p.m. on November 16, 1991, she was
sent by her parents to buy ibangot (seasoning). After buying the ibangot from the store
of one Rosemia Base, Emma headed home. Along the way, she saw appellants Vicente
Binarao, Jose Combis, Jr. and Rudy Canata with Rodwin Langasa and Anthony Cope.
Appellants suddenly held her while Langasa and Cope left and went home.[3]
Appellants dragged Emma to an uninhabited house owned by one Aurora Colar.
Upon reaching the house, appellants forcibly undressed Emma and took turns raping
her. Binarao was the first who had carnal knowledge of Emma. While Binarao was
having sexual intercourse with her, Canata was covering her mouth with his hands and
Combis, Jr. was holding her legs. After Binarao satisfied his lecherous desires, Combis,
Jr. and Canata followed. Appellants also took turns in holding down Emma to frustrate
any resistance from the latter. Binarao raped the victim for a second time after Combis,
Jr. and Canata were done raping her.[4]
Afterwards, the appellants allowed Emma to leave but only after threatening her
not to reveal the incident to anybody, otherwise, they would kill her. They repeatedly
threatened her each time their paths crossed. Emma sealed her lips for some time
because of fear.[5]
In April 1992 or five months after the incident, however, Emma complained of pain
in the stomach.[6] Segundina Clapis, Emmas mother, brought her to Dr. Bernardo Corral
who discovered that she was pregnant. For the first time, she told her mother what
appellants did to her. Consequently, they went to the barangay captain and reported the

143 | P a g e

incident. The barangay captain referred Emmas case to the PNP of Tiwi, Albay.[7] The
incident was recorded in the police blotter and was later read by P/SI Benjamin B.
Berdin in open court.[8]
Dr. Leonides Cruel, Municipal Health Officer of Tiwi, Albay thereafter conducted a
physical examination on Emma on April 15, 1992. Dr. Cruel subsequently issued a
LIVING CASE REPORT which, in part, stated:
FINDINGS:
I External1. No signs of physical injuries noted.
2. Further physical examinations revealed that
the victim is on her fifth month of
pregnancy.
II Internal1. Hymen revealed healed shallow tear at 4:00 oclock, deep
healed lacerations at 6:00 oclock and 9:00
oclock respectively before the face of a watch.
2. Vaginal orifice admits one finger with ease.
III ConclusionPhysical virginity on the person of EMMA CLAPIS has
been lost.[9]
Emma gave birth on June 16, 1992 or seven months after the incident.
The defense offered its version of the incident through the testimonies of
appellants, Rudy Rangasa, Rustico Base, Dr. Bernardo Corral, Elena L. Celo, Lourdes
Dacoba and Amado Colina.
According to appellant Canata, on November 16, 1991 at about 6:30 p.m., he was
at Coro-Coro, Tiwi, Albay performing his duties as caretaker of the summer house of
one Pedro Raeses. He was required to stay at the summer house during the period of
his employment as caretaker. He only went home twice, in December 1991 and in
January 1992.[10]
Rudy Rangasa supported Canatas alibi. He narrated that, onNovember 16, 1991,
he saw Canata at Raeses house. Before he left past5:00 p.m., he saw Canata
preparing his supper.[11]
According to appellant Binarao, on November 16, 1991, he was on duty at
the Tiwi Agro-Industrial School feeding the chickens. He said that it was impossible for
him to be friends with Canata as the latter was still very young then.[12]

Appellant
Combis,
Jr.
testified
that
he
was
at
the Tiwi AgroIndustrialSchool on November 16, 1991, attending his classes. He narrated to the trial
court that he could not have had the courage to rape Emma as the latter was his
cousin. He suggested that she was impelled by an improper motive in filing the
complaint against him. According to him, his and Emmas parents were not in good
terms.[13]

Appellants came to this Court and appealed the trial court decision. However, they
subsequently filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal on the ground that they wanted to
apply for executive clemency, considering that they had already satisfied the required
minimum service in prison which would qualify them for a commutation of their
sentence.[19] We denied appellants motion in a resolution dated July 25, 2001.
Thus, the present appeal with appellants alleging that:

Rustico Base, a former barangay captain of Dapdap, Tiwi, Albay, testified that
Emma and her mother Segundina asked for his help to find out who fathered her
(Emmas) child. When Rustico questioned Emma about the identity of the father, the
latter retorted that there were several men who had sexual intercourse with her in
different places and on different dates. Appellants were among those who had sexual
intercourse with her.
Base also described to the trial court the everyday life of the locals in their area.
According to him, at 6:30 p.m., there were still a lot of people who frequented the place
where Emma was allegedly abducted. However, nobody ever mentioned, until after the
cases were filed against the appellants,[14] that Emma or anybody for that matter was
abducted and raped on November 16, 1991
Dr. Bernardo Corral, a physician in Tiwi, Albay, testified that on April 13, 1992,
Emma consulted him about the pain in her stomach. When he examined her, he
discovered that she was six to seven months pregnant.[15]
Elena L. Celo, the government midwife assigned at the Rural Health Unit
at Misibis, Tiwi, Albay, testified that she assisted in the delivery of Emmas child on June
16, 1992. According to her, she delivered a full-term baby boy.[16]
The defense also offered in evidence a document signed by 130 allegedly
disinterested inhabitants, which stated that no rape incident happened on November
16, 1991 in their barangay. Lourdes Dacoba and Amado Colina, two of the 130
signatories, testified in open court to substantiate their statement.[17]
The trial court convicted the appellants on August 20, 1997:
ACCORDINGLY, we find from the totality of the evidence, oral and documentary,
unfolded before us that the GUILT of the accused, VidenteBinarao in Criminal Case No.
T-2361, of accused, Rudy Canata in Criminal Case NO. T-2362 and that of accused,
Jose Combis, Jr. in Criminal Case No. T-2363, for the crime of Rape alleged and
recited in the three (3) Informations have been proved beyond reasonable doubt;
consequently, accused, Vicente Binarao, Rudy Canata and Jose Combis, Jr. are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to jointly and solidarily
indemnify EMMA CLAPIS the amount of P50,000.
Costs against accused.[18]

144 | P a g e

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE THREE (3) ACCUSED GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE.[20]
According to appellants, complainants long delay in reporting the incident cast
serious doubt on her credibility.
Likewise, the prosecution failed to present Langasa and Cope who were allegedly
with appellants before the latter raped the victim. They could have bolstered the theory
of the prosecution. Despite their availability, however, the prosecution did not call them
to testify to corroborate Emmas claim.
Appellants further argue that, if Emma really became pregnant because of that
rape incident, she could not have delivered a full-term baby in June 1992, given that
only seven months had lapsed after the alleged rape on November 16, 1991.
Appellants aver that the behavior of Emma, particularly her conduct after the
incident, negated her claim of rape. She did not exhibit any sign of trauma, quite
unnatural of a troubled woman who just went through the nerve-wracking experience of
being forcibly stripped of her honor.
On the other hand, appellants claim that their defense of alibi was perfectly
credible. It was not possible for appellants to be friends and thus act as a group
because of their age gap. Besides, they were in different places at the time of the
incident. And 130 disinterested inhabitants in their area attested that no rape took place
therein on the said date.
Appellants thus claim that the test of moral certainty or standard of proof beyond
reasonable doubt required for conviction in criminal cases was not satisfactorily
hurdled.
Appellants arguments fail to persuade this Court.
Considering the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape, usually no one can give a
first-hand account of what transpired, if truth be told, except the actual participants in
the sexual act.[21] The testimony of the offended party is therefore crucial in determining
the guilt of the accused. Indeed, it must be received with great caution, [22] since the

conviction or acquittal of the accused in rape indubitably depends on complainants

testimony.[23]However, if the lone testimony of the offended party is found credible, it has
been held sufficient to sustain a conviction.[24]

A After holding me, they brought me at the back of an uninhabited house.

After a careful review of the records, we find no reason to deviate from the settled
rule that the Court will not alter the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses,[25] unless there are circumstances which it overlooked that would change its
findings or modify its conclusions. As a rule, appellate courts generally rely on the
findings and observations of the trial judge who directly evaluated the demeanor of the
witnesses on the stand and who was in a better position to decide the question.[26]

A Vicente Binarao, Rudy Canata and Jose Combis, Jr.

The records bear out that the testimony of the offended party pertaining to the
sexual assaults on her was clear, positive and convincing. The fact of rape and the
identity of appellants as the malefactors were sufficiently established by the prosecution
through the straightforward narration of the offended party. Without doubt, Emmas
testimony revealed that she was forced and intimidated by appellants to have sexual
intercourse with them:
Q After buying that ibangot from the store of Base, was there any unusual
incident that happened to you?

Q Who are these men who held you?

Q How about the two, what were they doing?

A Rodwin told Anthony that they might as well go home because they were
suspecting some trouble.
Q After these three accused held you, what did they do, if any?
A They undressed me.
Q If these three people are here in Court, will you please point to them?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please point to Vicente Binarao?

A On my way home, I saw five men in a group.

Q Do you know these five men?

A (Witness pointing to a man dressed in striped pink T-shirt who

acknowledged to the identification as Vicente Binarao).

A Yes, sir.

Q How about Rudy Canata?

Q Will you please tell us the names of those five men whom you saw that
evening?

A (Witness pointing to a man dressed in Lavender T-shirt who acknowledged

to the identification as Rudy Canata).

A Vicente Binarao, Jose Combis, Jr., Rudy Canata, Rodwin Langasa and
Anthony Cope.

Q How about Jose Combis, Jr.?

Q After that, what happened next?

A (Witness pointing to a man dressed in white T-shirt and blue denim pants
who acknowledged to the identification as Jose Combis, Jr.)

A I did not expect these men to hold me.

Q Are the two companions of these three accused present in Court now?

COURT:

A They are not here.

Do not narrate.

Q What did these Vicente Binarao, Rudy Canata and Jose Combis, Jr. do to
you after being held by them in their arms?

ATTY. LELIS:
A Vicente raped me.
Q What happened after being held by these men?

145 | P a g e

Q When Vicente Binarao raped you, what was Rudy Canata doing?

Q When this Vicente Binarao raped you for the second time, what was Rudy
Canata doing?

A Rudy Canata was cupping his hands on my mouth.

A He was holding me.
Q How about Jose Combis, Jr.?
Q How about Jose Combis, Jr.?
A He was holding my legs.
A He was holding me.
Q After Vicente Binarao was through in raping you, what happened next?
xxx xxx xxx
A Jose Combis, Jr. also took turn (sic) in having carnal knowledge with me.
ATTY. LELIS:
Q When Jose Combis, Jr. was raping you, what was Vicente Binarao doing?
Q While these three accused were raping you, what were you doing?
A He was holding me.
A I could not free myself because they were holding me.
Q In what part of your body was he holding you?
Q Were you not able to call for any help?
A In my legs.
Q How about Rudy Canata?

A I could not, because they were covering my mouth and I was already
scared.

A In my mouth.

Q After that, what happened next?

Q After Jose Combis, Jr. was through in raping you, what happened next?

A After having carnal knowledge with me, the three accused, before leaving,
threatened me not to reveal it to anybody because they will kill me.

A It was the turn of Rudy Canata.

Q What was Vicente Binarao doing when Rudy Canata was raping you?
A He was holding me.
Q In what part of your body?
A In my legs.
Q How about Jose Combis, Jr.?
A In my mouth.

Q How many times have you been threatened by these accused?

A Almost everytime.
Q Did you reveal that to your parents after this incident?
A No, sir.
Q Why did you not reveal it to your parents immediately after the incident?
A Because of the threat they have made on me.

Q After you were raped by these three, what happened next?

Q Why is it that it took five (5) months till your parents were able to know that
you were pregnant, only when you were brought to the doctor?

A Vicente Binarao took another turn in raping me.

A Because I did not reveal anything yet to my parents.

146 | P a g e

Q Why did you not reveal anything yet for the past five months?
A Because every time these three accused would see me, they always
threatened me not to inform my folks about it, or they will kill me.[27]
Emma never vacillated in her assertion that appellants forced her to have sexual
intercourse with them. Indeed, we find that her testimony was consistent in all material
points. Her testimony must therefore be given full faith and credit.[28]
On the other hand, appellants failed to rebut the clear and positive testimony of
the offended party in all three criminal cases. It is doctrinal that when a woman testifies
that she has been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to show that rape has
been committed, as long as her testimony meets the test of credibility.[29]
Emmas credibility was not successfully assailed by appellants who cannot seek
exculpation simply because the victim did not report the rape at once or because there
was delay in the filing of the complaints. It is not uncommon for young girls to conceal
the assault against their virtue because of the threat on their lives. [30] Certainly, there is
no standard human reaction to a traumatic experience. Many times a victim would
rather suffer in silence than reveal her story.[31] Barely out of childhood, Emma could
easily be intimidated and cowed into silence even by the mildest threat against her.
[32]
Thus her delay in reporting the rape ought not to be taken against her, nor used to
weaken her credibility.[33]
Emmas credibility cannot also be impugned on the basis of appellants allegation
that she delivered a full-term baby despite the lapse of only seven months after the
rape. Appellants claim has no merit. It must be noted that when Dr. Corral, testifying for
the defense, examined Emma on April 13, 1992, he never issued any certificate
attesting to the fact that Emma was already six to seven months pregnant, as
maintained by appellants. Dr. Corrals testimony therefore could not prevail over the
evidence of the prosecution that Emma was only five months pregnant in April 1992.
The medical report issued by Dr. Cruel amply supported the claim of the prosecution.
Dr. Corrals testimony, on the other hand, remained an unsubstantiated allegation.
Although appellants presented a certificate issued by government midwife Elena Celo,
attesting to the alleged fact that Emma delivered a full-term child, the certificate
appeared dubious considering that the certificate was issued only on March 24, 1993 or
a year after the victim gave birth. Elena even revealed in her testimony that the
certificate was requested by no less than the mother of appellant Vicente Binarao.[34]

147 | P a g e

But assuming that Emma did not manifest any sign of trauma despite the rape,
such cannot justify the reversal of appellants conviction. How the victim comported
herself after the incident was not significant as it had nothing to do with the elements of
the crime of rape. Furthermore, different people react differently to a given situation.
There is no standard form of behavior when one is faced with a distressing incident.
The workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable.[35] In People vs. Luzorata, [36] this Court held:
This Court indeed has not laid down any rule on how a rape victim should behave
immediately after she has been abused. This experience is relative and may be dealt
with in any way by the victim depending on the circumstances, but her credibility should
not be tainted with any modicum of doubt.
The failure of the prosecution to present Langasa and Cope who were allegedly
with appellants before the rape did not matter at all.Langasas and Copes testimonies
would have served only to corroborate the testimony of Emma. It must be emphasized
that Emmas testimony, standing alone, was already very credible. The document
signed by 130 allegedly disinterested residents attesting that no rape took place on the
stated date was not sufficient to destroy the victims credibility. Furthermore, as defense
witness Colina testified, he was merely asked to sign the document by one of the
barangay officials. Obviously, the allegedly disinterested inhabitants were not aware of
the purpose and implications of affixing their signatures thereon. It must be noted that,
in fact, the barangay chairman at that time was the uncle of one of the appellants, Jose
Combis, Jr.[37]
Appellants likewise failed to establish that Emma had any ill motive to falsely
testify against them. It has been consistently held that the witness testimony deserves
full faith and credit where there exists no evidence to show any dubious reason or
improper motive why she should testify falsely against the accused or why she should
implicate the accused in a serious offense. [38] Moreover, if it were true that Emmas
complaint was merely spawned by ill will, why did not she implicate Langasa and Cope
who were with appellants just before the incident? Appellants failed to give any
plausible explanation why they were specifically singled out by Emma to answer for the
bestial acts done to her. She was clear and positive in imputing guilt to
appellants. Injustice was done against her person and her honor; thus her motives
could not be doubted.
Indeed, Emmas testimony could not be struck down by appellants bare defenses
of denial and alibi. The positive assertions of Emma could not be overcome by the
mere denial by appellants of their participation in the crime or by the mere alibi that they
were not in the crime scene during the rape incident. Alibi as basis for acquittal must be
established by clear and convincing evidence. Appellants failed to convincingly
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at
the time of its commission. On the other hand, the victim herself positively identified
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. Thus, the defense of alibi must fail. [39] Timetested is the rule that between the positive assertions of the prosecution witness and

the negative averments of the accused, the former undisputedly deserves more
credence and is entitled to greater evidentiary value. [40] Thus, the trial court was correct
in convicting appellants of the crimes charged.
The Revised Penal Code[41] defines and penalizes rape as follows:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua."
The essence of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman against her will. In all three
cases, appellants failed to show that Emma consented to have sexual intercourse with
them. On the contrary, the evidence showed that the carnal acts were against her will.
[42]

However, while this Court affirms the conviction of appellants, the trial court
decision must be modified.
For one, the trial court failed to note the existence of conspiracy among appellants
in raping Emma. They dragged her to an uninhabited house and thereafter perpetrated
their criminal acts one after the other. The evidence sufficiently demonstrated that,
while each of the appellants was raping Emma, the other two appellants assisted him
by cupping her mouth and holding her legs. Appellants also repeatedly threatened her
after the rape incidents. Certainly, the acts of appellants before, during and after the
commission of the crimes, taken together, were enough to show that they had a
commonality of criminal design.[43] From the circumstances narrated, it was evident that
there was a community of purpose on the part of appellants. Thus, the act of one was
the act of all.[44] Consequently, appellants should be meted the appropriate penalty for
each count of rape and therefore penalized for three counts of rape each.

148 | P a g e

We also note that the award of damages by the trial court appears to be improper.
While the trial court awarded the amount of P50,000 in favor of complainant, it was not
clear what it represented. Nonetheless, the amount of P50,000 is hereby awarded to
Emma as civil indemnity for each count of rape or a total of P150,000 for the three
counts of rape, from each appellant. Thus, appellants as conspirators should be jointly
and severally liable for the amount of P150,000 each, as civil indemnity. It must also be
noted that, in crimes of rape, moral damages should be awarded to the victim without
need for pleading or proof.
The fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical and
psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages are too obvious
to still require the recital thereof at the trial by the victim, since the Court itself even
assumes and acknowledges such agony on her part as a gauge of her credibility.[45]
Accordingly, for appellants conviction in the three criminal cases filed against
them by complainant, the latter is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P150,000
from each appellant.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(a) appellants are individually sentenced to suffer the penalty ofreclusion
perpetua for each of the three counts of rape;
(b) appellants are each hereby ordered to pay the complainant jointly and
solidarily the amount of P50,000 for each count of rape or a total ofP150,000 as civil
indemnity and P50,000 for each count of rape or a total of P150,000 as moral
damages.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 139474-75. December 11, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EDUARDO PABILLARE y
VARONA, ALFREDO CORPUZ y FLORES, SOTERO SANTOS y CRUZ
and CONRADO CAADA y VILLONGCO, accused.
EDUARDO PABILLARE y VARONA, and CONRADO CAADA y
VILLONGCO, appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For automatic review is the Decision [1] dated February 15, 1999 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 95, Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. 96-65215,
entitled
"People
of
the
Philippines
vs.
Eduardo Pabillare y Varona,
Alfredo Corpuz y Flores, Sotero Santos y Cruz, and Conrado Caada yVillongco"
for kidnapping for ransom.
The Information against the accused reads as follows:
"That on or about the 10th day of March, 1996 in Quezon City, Philippines, the abovenamed accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another
by means of force, violence and/or intimidation did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously armed with firearms kidnap one GURMAIL SINGH along NIA Road,
corner East Avenue, this city, and thereafter brought him to a warehouse somewhere
in Quezon City and finally to JOLLIBEE Food Plaza located along Del Monte cor.
Roosevelt Avenue, SFDM, this city, for the purpose of extorting money in the amount
of P20,000.00, Philippine Currency, thereby depriving and detaining him of his liberty for
more than five (5) hours to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party." [2]
The appellants here are Eduardo Pabillare and Conrado Caada who were
meted the supreme penalty of death.
Upon arraignment, both appellants and the other two accused, assisted by
their respective counsel, pleaded "not guilty." Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution established the following facts through the testimonies
of Gurmail Singh,
private
complainant,
SPO4 EpifanioDerequito,
SPO4
Eduardo Frias, SPO1 Ruben Reyes and Rajeet Singh.
Gurmail Singh is an Indian national engaged in the buy-and- sell business.
On March 10, 1996 at around 3:45 in the afternoon, while riding in his motorcycle
along NIA Road, Quezon City, a brown Ford Telstar car with Plate No. DED 714,
driven by appellant Conrado Caada, suddenly blocked his way causing him to fall.
Appellant Eduardo Pabillare and a certain Johnny "Kulot" (who has remained at
large) got off the car and told him, "You have raped a woman," referring to
Johnny's niece. They then forcibly took and dragged him to the back seat of the
car. Gurmailresisted but could do nothing because Pabillare had a gun tucked in
his waist. Once inside the car, Johnny and Pabillare beat him and took his
P1,500.00 and his driver's license. [3] Then Pabillare told him to produce
P100,000.00 for his release. He answered that he could only give them P5,000.00.
Disappointed with such response, they again beat him. He then agreed to pay
them P25,000.00. Pabillare coerced him to write a note to his wife to give
P25,000.00 for his release. Johnny took the letter and proceeded
to Gurmail's house.[4]
After an hour drive, Caada parked the car in front of an
apartment.Gurmail remained at the back seat guarded by Caada. Pabillare went
out and came back with a woman who was allegedly raped by Gurmail.
Meanwhile, Johnny arrived and punched Gurmail because contrary to his

149 | P a g e

assurance that no one was in his house, some Indian nationals were there.
Upon Pabillare's order, Gurmail gave
the
telephone
number
of
his
cousin Lakhbir Singh who would deliver the P25,000.00 ransom.[5]
Gurmail stayed in the car for 1 1/2 hours. Meantime, Caada and an
unidentified man brought him to a "bodega". Pabillare and Johnny were left at the
apartment. In the "bodega" were three persons. Two were later identified as
accused Alfredo Corpuz and Sotero Santos. They stayed there for an hour.
Thereafter, the group boarded the same car driven byCaada and proceeded
to Jollibee, at San Francisco Del Monte Avenue,Quezon City. The unidentified man
got off the car while they were on their way to Jollibee.[6]
At that instance, Lakhbir Singh, Gurmail's cousin, received a call at his house
informing him that his cousin Gurmail was kidnapped. The caller demanded
P25,000.00 for the release of Gurmail. Immediately,Lakhbir reported the matter to
Police Station No. 10 in Quezon City. SPO1 Eduardo Frias instructed him to keep
in touch with the abductors and wait for final instructions from the police. Upon
reaching home,Lakhbir was informed by his brother Harbir that according to the
caller, the pay-off (in the sum of P20,000.00) will be at the Jollibee, corner
ofRoosevelt and Del Monte Avenue, Quezon City. Lakhbir returned to the police
station
and
narrated
what
his
brother Harbir told
him.
Police
Inspector Edgardo Jovellano organized a team, composed of himself, SPO1 Frias,
SPO1 Rebancos, SPO1 Lozada, and SPO1 Ruben Reyes in order to entrap the
abductors.[7] Harbir was assigned to deliver the ransom money.[8]
The team, wearing civilian clothes, went to Jollibee and spread out in different
areas. SPO1 Frias and SPO1 Lozada entered the restaurant and the rest of the
team members waited outside. Thirty minutes thereafter,Harbir arrived
with Rajeet Singh, also a cousin of Gurmail. While seated inside the
restaurant, Pabillare approached them, introduced himself as a policeman and
asked for the ransom money. Harbir told him that he wanted to see Gurmail first
before handing the money. So Pabillare led them to Gurmail who was in the car
parked in front of the restaurant.Caada opened the front window and they
saw Gurmail. Rajeet then gavePabillare P20,000.00 placed in an envelope. The
latter opened the envelope then winked at Corpuz and made a thumb-up sign.
ForthwithCorpuz and Santos approached Pabillare. At this juncture, the policemen
apprehended appellants Pabillare and Caada and accused Corpuz andSantos.
SPO1 Ruben Reyes recovered from Pabillare the ransom money and a .38 caliber
revolver[9] with six live ammunitions.[10]
After the prosecution formally rested its case, accused Sotero Santos filed a
demurrer to evidence[11] which was granted by the trial court in its
Order[12] dated June 6, 1997.
Appellant Caada's testimony is as follows: On March 10, 1996, Napoleon de
Guzman, a mechanic, introduced to Silveriano Caada, appellant's father, a certain
Johnny who wanted to rent a vehicle.Silveriano was then engaged in a rent-a-car
business. Johnny rented a Ford Telstar car for P1,000.00 which he would use in
going
to Fairview,Quezon City in
order
to
check
a
car
for
sale. Silveriano instructed Caadato drive for Johnny. Caada acceded to his father's
instruction and told Johnny to come back after lunch. At around 2:30 p.m., Johnny,
together with appellant Pabillare, arrived. They then drove to Fairview. But
because the owner of the car, which Johnny was supposed to buy was not yet
around, they went to the house of Pabillare's mother-in-law at NIA
Road, Quezon City. Both Pabillare and Johnny alighted. After 20 minutes, they

boarded the car and returned to Fairview. On their way, they sawGurmail Singh on
board a motorcycle. Pabillare and Johnny orderedCaada to chase Gurmail.
When Gurmail stopped, Johnny and Pabillarebrought him inside the car and they
proceeded to San Francisco Del Monte. They stopped in front of an
apartment. Pabillare and
Johnny
entered
the
apartment,
while Gurmail and Caada remained in the car. Thereupon, Johnny returned to the
car with a woman. Caada took a snack. When the woman left, Johnny
and Pabillare went inside the car.Caada did not see what went on inside because
the glass windows of the car were heavily tinted. Afterwards, both Johnny
and Pabillare left. Later, a boy arrived and relayed to Caada Johnny's instruction to
proceed to a big compound within the area. After Caada parked the car, the boy
disappeared. Caada and Gurmail stayed in the place for about an hour. Then the
boy came back and told Caada to go to Jollibee. On their way, the boy alighted
near the market. When they reached Jollibee, Johnny was already there. He
ordered Caada to park in front of the restaurant. But when Caada opened the door
of the car, a policeman suddenly poked a gun at him, dragged him outside and told
him to lie on the pavement.Then he was brought to Police Precinct No. 10 and was
pinpointed as one of the kidnappers of Gurmail. Criminal cases for robbery, illegal
possession of firearms and kidnapping were filed against him. All the cases were
dismissed, except kidnapping.[13]
Appellant Pabillare testified that on March 10, 1996, he accompanied Johnny
to San Pedro Subdivision in Novaliches, Quezon City to look for a car for
sale. Caada drove for them. When they reached the subdivision, the owner of the
car was not there so they went to the house of his mother-in-law along NIA
Road, Quezon City to see his wife and children. But they were not around. So he
asked Caada to bring him home. While on their way to Frisco, Johnny
told Caada to chase Gurmail. WhenGurmail stopped, Johnny forcibly took him
inside the car. Pabillarealighted and went home. At past 6:00 p.m., he went
to Jollibee to buy snacks for his children. He saw Johnny there by chance. At
around 7:00 p.m., several policemen arrived and arrested them. Immediately they
were brought to a small room at the precinct and while there, many Indian
nationals came charging them with kidnapping.[14]
After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositiveportion of
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the following:
(1) In Criminal Case No. Q-96-65215, the Court finds the accused
EduardoPabillare y Varona and Conrado Caada y Villongco GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as principals of the crime of kidnapping or serious illegal detention for the purpose of
extorting ransom defined in and penalized by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH.
As to the other accused, Alfredo Corpuz y Flores, the Court finds the said
accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice of the crime of kidnapping or
serious illegal detention for the purpose of extorting ransom defined in and penalized by
Article 26 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The period within which the accused Alfredo Corpuz was
detained at the City Jail of QuezonCity shall be credited to him in full provided that he
agrees in writing to abide by and follow strictly the rules and regulations of the said
institution.
(2) In Criminal Case No. Q-96-65216, the Court finds the accused
EduardoPabillare y Varona GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of P.D. No.

150 | P a g e

1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of from two (2) years and four (4) months of prisioncorreccional minimum as the
minimum penalty to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium as
the maximum penalty and to pay aFINE of fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00).
All the three (3) accused shall pay the costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED."
The
capital
punishment
having
been
imposed
upon
appellants Caadaand Pabillare, the assailed Decision is now with this Court for
automatic review.
In his brief, Caada raises the following assignments of error:
"1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING CONSPIRACY BETWEEN APPELLANT
AND HIS CO- ACCUSED IN THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE; AND
"2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING APPELLANT OF THE
OFFENSE CHARGED ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT" [15]
For his part, Pabillare ascribes to the trial court the following errors:
"I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
EDUARDO PABILLARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIMES OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM AND ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARM
"II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE INCREDIBLE AND
INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES
"III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF A .38 PALTIK HAVING RENDERED
THE SAME WITHOUT JURISDICTION"[16]
Appellant Caada contends that he did not conspire with the other accused
who were strangers to him. He merely drove the car Johnny rented from his father.
If he were a conspirator, he would not have driven his father's Ford Telstar and
expose himself unnecessarily considering that its plate number was prominently
visible. Moreover, there is no evidence that he assisted appellant Pabillare and
Johnny in dragging the victim inside the car. He denies that he was guarding the
victim. In fact, the victim was not restrained of his movement. He could have gone
out of the car by simply unlocking the doors. Neither was there a threat to his life
since appellant Pabillare, who was in possession of a gun, stayed away for
sometime. Likewise, there is no proof that he had any motive to commit or consent
to the commission of the crime. At most, he was a victim of circumstances.
Appellant maintains that the ponente is not the trial judge. Consequently,
having no opportunity to observe the demeanor of the victim on the witness stand,
he should not have believed the latter's testimony.
For his part, appellant Pabillare contends that the prosecution witnesses have
inconsistent versions with regard to the amount and manner of payment of the
ransom money. While the Indian witness testified that he and Gurmail's cousin
handed the money to Pabillare, the police officer who headed the entrapment,
declared on the witness stand that only one person delivered the money.
Also, Gurmail testified that the ransom money was P25,000.00, however, his
cousin stated that it was P20,000.00. The prosecution witnesses also were
inconsistent regarding the color of the envelope containing the money.

The above contentions and arguments boil down to the issue of credibility of
the witnesses for the prosecution and for the defense.
It is a legal truism of long standing that we accord great respect to the factual
conclusions drawn by the trial court, particularly on the matter of credibility of
witnesses, unless some material facts have been overlooked or misconstrued as to
affect the result. In this case, we find no such material fact from the record that
would impair the correctness of the conclusions of the trial.
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of the victim who testified as
follows:
"Q Mr. Singh, please tell us how were you abducted by these three
persons along NIA Road in the afternoon of March 10, 1996?
A While I was driving my motor, a car suddenly blocked my way which
caused me to fall down, sir.
Q Incidentally can you describe to the Honorable Court the car that
blocked your way while you were driving your motor?
A It was a brown car with heavy tinted glasses with Plate Number DED
714 Telstar.
Q After you fell down from your bike, what happened next, if any?
A Two persons alighted from the car, sir.
Q Who among the accused alighted from the car, if you can still recall?
A That one, sir. (Witness pointing to accused Eduardo Pabillare)
Q You said there were three of them. Who was the other one?
A He was not yet apprehended.
Q Would you know the name of this other person whom you said had
not yet been apprehended?
A Johnny Kulot, sir.
Q What about accused Conrado Caada whom you pointed earlier, what
was he doing at that time?
A He was the driver, sir.
xxx
Q After these two men alighted from the car being then driven
byConrado Caada, what happened next, if any?
A They told me that, 'You have raped a woman so you have to come
with us.' And one of them had a gun tucked in his waist.
Q Who among them has a gun tucked in his waist?
A Eduardo Pabillare, sir.
Q After they told you that you have to go with them because you raped a
woman, what was your response, if any?
A Initially, I was resisting but they overpowered me and I noticed the gun
so I was forced to obey them, sir.
xxx
Q After they boarded you at the back seat of the vehicle, what happened
next, if any?
A They beat me and took my money and driver's license.
xxx
Q You stated earlier that you were beaten up by your abductors while
you were at the back seat of the vehicle. If you know, was the driver
of the vehicle, in the person of accused Caada, aware of what was
going on while you were being beaten up by your abductors?
A Yes, sir.[17]

151 | P a g e

xxx
Q Tell us, while you were parked in front of this apartment-type house,
where were you actually kept by your abductors?
A At the back seat of the car.
Q Was there any time where you were allowed to leave the said vehicle?
A No, sir.
Q If you know, what was accused Pabillare doing while you were in front
of this apartment-type house?
A Sometimes, he would come near me, sir, and sometimes he would go
back to the apartment.
Q What was Caada doing during that stopover?
A This Caada was the one who was guarding me and at one point, an
unidentified man came and brought something which looked
likeshabu. They sniffed it, sir.
Q What made you conclude that this Caada and his companion were
sniffing shabu at that time?
A The substance looked like crystal and when they burned it, it smelled
and they used plastic tooter.
Q Would you tell how far were Caada and the unidentified man from you
at the time when they were sniffing that substance which looked
like shabu?
A They were in front of the car and I was at the back seat." [18]
It is thus clear that appellant Pabillare and one Johnny forcibly dragged the
victim inside the car. They beat him and restrained his liberty. He could not escape
because Pabillare had a gun, while appellantCaada was guarding him.
The trial court was correct in convicting both appellants on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution.
By the same token, the trial court did not err in disregarding the denial of both
appellants.
It has been repeatedly held in a number of cases that denial, like alibi,is
inherently a weak defense, for it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. It
cannot stand vis-a-vis the unequivocal assertion to the contrary of the complainant.
It can safely be stated that the defense of denial assumes significance only when
the prosecution's evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.[19]
Appellant Pabillare claims that the prosecution witnesses gave conflicting
versions with respect to the amount of the ransom money; the color of the
envelope containing it; and the person who handed the same envelope to said
appellant. Suffice it to state that these are minor, trivial and inconsequential
matters which do not alter the fact that appellants committed the crime charged.
While appellant Caada presented witnesses to corroborate his testimony that
upon his father's instruction, he merely drove for Johnny and appellant Pabillare,
such fact does not prove that he is innocent. It is highly unthinkable that members
of a kidnapping syndicate would entrust the performance of a crucial and sensitive
phase of their criminal scheme to a person not trusted by them and who has no
knowledge of the details of their evil plan.
To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity.[20] There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view
to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. [21] Responsibility of a

conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of

conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out
of
the
purpose
intended.[22] The
following
acts
of
appellants Caada and Pabillare lead us to conclude that they conspired to commit
the crime: (a) Caada who was driving the car suddenly chased and overtook the
motorcycle driven by the victim causing him to fall; (b) at such unsuspecting
state, Pabillareand Johnny forcibly took and dragged him inside the car;
(c) Pabillare and Johnny beat the victim and compelled him to produce money for
his release; (d) Caada never showed any opposition to such acts, instead he
obeyed every instruction of Pabillare and Johnny; (e) while Johnny was negotiating
for the ransom money, Caada was left with the victim, closely guarding him;
(f) Caada brought the victim to the place where the pay-off would take place; and
(g) Pabillare took the ransom money.
Now, since appellants indeed conspired in kidnapping the victim for the
purpose of extorting ransom, they are both liable under Art. 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659,[23] which provides:
"Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days,
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of
the parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death penalty where the kidnapping or detention was committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if one of the
circumstances above- mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed."
The imposition of the death penalty upon both appellants is in order. [24] The
prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt their motive, which is ransom for
the victim. Ransom is money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the
redemption of a captured person or persons; a payment that releases from
captivity.[25] Since appellants demanded and received money as a requisite for
releasing complainant from captivity, whatever other motive may have impelled
them to do so, the money is still ransom under the law. [26] The purpose of the
offender in extorting ransom is a qualifying circumstance which may be proved
by their words and overt acts before, during, and after the kidnapping and
detention of the victim.[27] Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom
is necessary for the crime to be committed. [28] The fact that appellants sought to
extort ransom is clear from the following testimonies:
1. Testimony of Gurmail Singh:
"Q What happened while you were being held captive by your
abductors?
A They asked for P100,000.00 for my release, sir.
Q What was you response to that?
A I told them that I don't have that much and that I could only give them
P5,000.00, sir.
Q Who asked you to give P100,000.00?

152 | P a g e

A Pabillare, sir.
xxx
Q After you told Pabillare that you cannot afford the P100,000.00, and
that you could only afford P5,000.00, what happened next, if any?
A They beat me up again and then I agreed to pay them P25,000.00, sir.
Q When you said that you agreed to pay them, who are you referring to?
A Pabillare, Johnny Kulot and the driver, sir.
Q When you say the driver, who are you referring to in particular?
A I don't know his name but I know him by face, sir.
Q Could you please point him out again, this driver that you are referring
to?
xxx
A That man, sir. (Witness pointing to accused Conrado Caada)[29]
xxx
Q What was the reason why you gave your abductors the telephone
number of your cousin Harbir?
A So that he will give them P25,000.00 and these people will stop
beating me, sir.
Q If you know, did your kidnappers actually get in touch with your
cousin Harbir after you gave them his telephone number?
A Yes, sir.
Q How did you know this?
A Johnny Kulot came back after about 10 to 15 minutes and he told me
that they were able to talk to Harbir and that Harbir is willing to pay
them the P25,000.00, sir.[30]
2. Testimony of Rajeet Singh:
"Q And what did you do at Police Station 10 in the afternoon of March
10, 1996?
A We told the police officer what happened. We told them that our
relative Gurmail Singh was abducted and then they made a report
and after that, they told us to go home, sir.
Q And did you actually go home as instructed by the police authorities?
A Yes, sir. We went home, sir and then Harbir Singh told us that a while
ago, the kidnappers called him over the phone demanding for
ransom money, sir.
xxx
Q Tell us who was supposed to deliver the ransom money to the
kidnappers?
A Me and Harbir Singh were told to bring the money, sir.
Q After this meeting presided over by the police authorities and which
meeting was attended by you and your other relatives, what did you
do next, if any?
A We left in different groups, sir. Some of us were on motorbikes, others
on a jeep and went to Jollibee, sir.
xxx
Q After arriving at said Jollibee Restaurant in San Francisco Del Monte,
what happened next, if any?
A While at Jollibee Restaurant, me and Harbir Singh sat on a table and
waited for someone to contact us and after some time, a person

approached us and said 'hello and shook our hands and said Im a
policeman' and he showed us his ID, sir.
xxx
Q You said after going inside the particular restaurant, you were
approached by a person who introduced himself as a policeman.
My question is, who is this person who approached you and
introduced himself to you as policeman?
A Pabillare, sir.
Q And after Pabillare approached and introduced himself to you as
policeman, what did you do next, if any?
A He asked for the money they were demanding from my cousin and we
said okay we will give you the money but first of all we wanted to
see first Gurmail Singh if you might have killed him, something like
that.
xxx
Q Now, after you followed Pabillare to the car parked outside the
restaurant will you please tell us what happened next, if any?
A We went near the car and then Pabillare gave some sign and then
somebody opened the front window at the driver's seat and when I
peeped in, I saw Gurmail inside the car, sir.
xxx
Q Now, you said that there were two people inside that vehicle namely
the private complainant Gurmail and the driver of the said vehicle.
Tell us, were you able to recognize who was driving the vehicle at
that time?
A Yes, sir. I can.
xxx
Q If you would see the driver of that vehicle inside the courtroom today,
could you kindly point to him?
A That man, sir (Witness pointed to a man inside the courtroom who
when asked answered by the name of Conrado Caada)
Q Now, after you were actually able to determine for yourself, Mr.
Witness that Gurmail Singh was inside that vehicle, what did you
do next, if any?
A At that time I handed over to Pabillare the money which was placed in
an envelope, sir."[31]
Incidentally, while it may be true that the instant case was merely reraffled[32] to Judge Diosdado M. Peralta, the ponente, on July 9, 1998, hence, he
had no opportunity to personally hear the testimony of Gurmailon June 4, 1996 and
observed his demeanor, such fact would not alter the outcome of the present case.
The accuracy of a decision is not necessarily tarnished by the fact that
the ponente only took over from a colleague who had previously presided over the
trial. For it does not follow that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot
render a valid and just decision. In the present case, it appears that Judge Peralta
relied upon the transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis of
his decision. The full record was available to him. As the decision shows, he
thoroughly examined and analyzed the evidence and carefully weighed the
credibility of the witnesses with the seasoned perspective of a trial judge.
Going back to the penalty imposable, an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying, entitles the offended party to exemplary damages within the

153 | P a g e

meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. [33] There being a demand for ransom in
this case, an aggravating circumstance, an award of P25,000.00 as damages to
the victim is in order.[34]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of QuezonCity,
Branch
95
in
Criminal
Case
No.
Q-96-65215
sentencing
appellantsConrado Caada and Eduardo Pabillare to DEATH for kidnapping for
ransom is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in the sense that they shall
pay in solidum the amount of twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as
exemplary damages to the victim, Gurmail Singh.
Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that R.A. 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they
submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the death
penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
Let the records of this case, upon finality of this Decision, be forwarded to the
Office of the President for the possible exercise of her pardoning power pursuant
to Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of RA 7659.
Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 140895. July 17, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ALMA BISDA y GAUPO and
GENEROSA JENNY ROSE BASILAN y PAYAN, appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court on automatic review is the Decision [1] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City, Branch 272, convicting appellants Alma
Bisda and Generosa Jenny Rose Basilan, of kidnapping for ransom;
sentencing each of them to the extreme penalty of death by lethal injection,
and ordering them to indemnify the parents of the victim Angela Michelle
Soriano the amount of P100,000 as moral damages, and to pay the costs of
the suit.
The Case
In an Amended Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-2647-MK,
the appellants were charged with the felony of kidnapping for ransom
committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd of September 1998, in the City of Marikina, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, did there and then willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly kidnap, detain and deprive ANGELA MICHELLE
SORIANO y SAN JUAN of her liberty for six (6) days for the purpose of extorting
ransom from her/or her family.
Contrary to law.[2]
When arraigned, the appellants, assisted by counsel, entered separate
pleas of not guilty.[3]
The Evidence for the Prosecution[4]
William Soriano, a training consultant by profession, and his wife
Marymae Soriano, had two children: Kathleen Denise and Angela
Michelle. They rented a house at No. 5 Col. Divino St., Concepcion,
Marikina. Their landlady who lived nearby had a telephone with number 94249-18.[5] During the school year 1997-1998, then five-year-old Angela was in
Prep at the Mother of Divine Providence School in Marikina Heights, Marikina
City. The couple employed Lea and Wendy Salingatog as the yayas of their
children. Angela met appellant Jenny Rose Basilan when the latter visited her
niece Wendy in the Soriano residence. Jenny Rose was, thus, no stranger to
Angela.
About 11:00 a.m. on September 3, 1998, Angelas classes had just ended
and she was on her way to her school bus which was parked outside the
school campus near the exit gate. She was in her school uniform and wore
black shoes. Unknown to Angela, appellants Alma and Jenny Rose were
outside of the school gate waiting for her. When they saw Angela, Alma and
Jenny Rose proceeded to the gate and showed a visitors gate pass to the
security guard. They approached the young girl, and told her that her parents
were waiting for her at the Jollibee Restaurant. Angela initially refused to go
with the two women, but because Alma held on to her hand so tightly and
poked a knife at her, Angela had no choice but to go with them. They rode a
tricycle and went to the Jollibee Restaurant where Jenny Rose ordered

154 | P a g e

spaghetti for Angela. When Angela did not see her parents, she wondered why
she went with Jenny Rose and Alma in the first place. With Angela in tow, Alma
and Jenny Rose boarded a white taxi and went to a dirty house where they
changed Angelas clothes. The girl was made to wear blouse and shorts, yellow
t-shirt and a pair of panties.[6] Alma and Jenny Rose took her earrings. They
fed her with the spaghetti they earlier bought at the restaurant. Alma then left,
leaving Angela and Jenny Rose in the house.
Jenny Rose sent Angela to sleep, and after a while, Alma returned. When
Angela woke up, Alma and Jenny Rose served her merienda and allowed her
to watch television. Henceforth, Angela was kept in the house. At one time,
Alma and Jenny Rose tied up Angelas hands and feet, and placed scotch tape
on her mouth. Angela was sometimes left alone in the house but the door was
kept locked. To pass the time, Angela watched television and made
drawings. Jenny Rose and Alma did not fail to feed and bathe Angela. Angela
did not call her parents through the telephone number of their landlady.
In the meantime, when William arrived home shortly before noon on that
day, Lea and Wendy told him that Angela had not yet arrived home from
school. He rushed to the school to fetch Angela, but was informed by the
school security guard that his daughter had already been picked up by two
women, one of whom was registered in the visitors slip as Aileen Corpuz.
Because he did not know anyone by that name, William immediately
proceeded to the registrars office to verify the information, only to find out that
Aileen Corpuz had earlier inquired at the said office about the possibility of
transferring Angela to another school. The school staff panicked when William
demanded to know how unknown persons were able to get his daughter. He
then started calling his friends and relatives to help him locate Angela. He also
sought the help of Rizza Hontiveros, a TV personality who promised to relay
his plea to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). The
school staff also reported the incident to the Marikina Police Force which
dispatched a team of investigators to the Soriano residence. [7]
When apprised of the incident, the PAOCTF organized a team headed by
then Chief Inspector Ricardo Dandan with SPO4 Tito Tuanggang, SPO1
Charles Larroza and civilian agent George Torrente, as members, to conduct
surveillance operations and to recover the victim and arrest the culprits. The
team proceeded to the Soriano residence and to Angelas school to conduct an
initial investigation.
At about 6:00 a.m. on September 4, 1998, Williams landlady went to his
apartment to tell him that a lady had called up earlier and left a message for
him: Pakisabi na lang kay Mr. Soriano na kakausapin ko siya bukas ng
umaga. When the landlady asked who the caller was, the voice replied, Hindi
na importante iyon.[8] William thereafter convinced his landlady to have her
telephone set transferred to his residence to facilitate communication with his
daughters abductors.[9]
Shortly before midnight that same day, George arrived at the Soriano
residence and asked William if the kidnapper had already made contact.
William responded that a woman had earlier called, through his
landlady.George then instructed William to prolong the conversation should the

kidnapper call again, to enable the agents to establish the possible location of
the caller.[10]
On September 5, 1998 at around 9:25 p.m., William received a call from
an unidentified woman who told him, Kung gusto mo pang makita yong anak
mo, maghanda ka ng five million pesos. He replied, Saan naman ako kukuha
ng five million? Alam mo naman na nakatira lang ako sa apartment. The caller
said, Hindi ko masasagotyan. Tatanungin ko na lang sa aking mga
boss. William informed George of his conversation with the caller. George
relayed the information by means of a hand-held radio to the other PAOCTF
operatives standing by.[11]
On September 7, 1998, at about 11:25 a.m., Marymae received a
telephone call from a woman demanding for ransom money. The caller called
two more times, at 7:00 p.m. and at 9:26 p.m. Marymae pleaded with the caller
to reduce the ransom money to P25,000, or if that was not possible, to an
amount not exceeding P50,000. The caller said, Hindi ko masasagot iyan.
Dadaihin na lang namin ang bata sa boss namin.Marymae relayed the
conversation to William, their other daughter Kathleen and to George. [12]
At about noon that day, PAOCTF Chief of Operations Superintendent
Michael Ray Aquino received a call from an anonymous source informing him
that a woman who had talked about a ransom and had acted in a suspicious
manner was spotted at the MSC Freight Service office located at No. 1303 Paz
Street, Paco, Manila. Acting on the information, Ricardo, Charles, Tito and
other PAOCTF operatives swooped down on the place and saw a woman, who
turned out to be Alma Bisda, emerging from a small house at No. 1258 Paz
Street, some fifty meters or so away from the said office. She had just bought
food from an adjacent store at No. 1246 Paz Street, Paco, Manila. Surveillance
operations were thereafter conducted.
At about 3:40 p.m. on September 8, 1998, George and Charles were at
the Soriano residence. Ricardo and Tito were in the periphery of Almas house,
monitoring her whereabouts and movements. Alma again left her house and
after locking the door, went to the small store nearby. She lifted the telephone
and called someone. The telephone in the Soriano residence rang. When
William lifted the receiver, he heard a voice similar to that of the woman who
had called him the first time. The caller was asking where the money was.
William told her that the P25,000 was ready, to which she replied, Hindi ko
masasagot iyan, dadalhin na lang namin ang bata sa aking boss. William told
the caller that he was willing to give P50,000 but pleaded that he be given
ample time to produce the money. The woman reiterated: Hindi ko masasagot
iyan.[13]
Ricardo and Tito heard the sound of a car horn blowing while Alma was
using the telephone. Tito called up Charles and inquired whether he (Charles)
heard the same sound while William was talking to the caller. After William
hung up the telephone, he told George that he could hear the horn off a car
blowing in the background. George then called up Ricardo by phone and
relayed the information. When George inquired if Ricardo heard the sound of
the horn of a car while Alma was talking over the telephone, Ricardo replied in
the affirmative. The PAOCTF operatives concluded that Alma was the
kidnapper.

155 | P a g e

After making the call, Alma hung up the telephone and returned to her
house. The PAOCTF operatives followed. When Alma unlocked the door to the
house, the operatives accosted her. She tried to escape, to no avail. Tito heard
the cry of a child coming from inside the house, pleading for help: Tita ilabas
mo ako![14] He rushed to the house and saw the victim Angela. He then carried
her outside to safety. The agents searched the house for evidence and found a
pair of black shoes, a pair of panties, a yellow shirt, a set of blouse and shorts
with red, yellow and white stripes. The evidence was placed in a plastic bag.
[15]
The victim and the suspects were thereafter brought to the PAOCTF office
for proper documentation.
When informed that his daughter had already been rescued, William
rushed to the PAOCTF headquarters where he and Angela were reunited.
Angela identified Alma as her kidnapper. When William asked Alma why she
kidnapped Angela and what she would do with the one-million-peso ransom
she was demanding, she replied: Kuya, wag kang maghusga, pareho lang
tayong biktima. When William asked Alma: Biktima, saan?Alma replied: Ang
anak ko, kinidnap din nila.[16]
Chief Inspector Dandan turned over to Evidence Custodian P02 Joseph
Bagsao, the pieces of evidence contained in a blue Shoe Mart (SM), plastic
bag which the operatives found in Almas house: a pair of black shoes, a pair of
panties, a yellow shirt, a set of white blouse and shorts with red, yellow and
white stripes, all of which were sized to fit a child of 4 to 7 years of age.[17]
On October 19, 1998, an Information for kidnapping for ransom was filed
against Alma and Jane Doe.
On October 26, 1998, at around 11:00 a.m., Jenny Rose arrived at the
PAOCTF Headquarters in Camp Crame, and proceeded to P02 Joseph
Bagsaos office where she announced that she was one of Almas cohorts. P02
Bagsao took Jenny Roses fingerprints and entered the data in a fingerprint
index card.[18] Jenny Rose was thereafter placed in a police line-up. Angela,
who arrived at the PAOCTF office with her father, identified Jenny Rose as one
of her kidnappers. Police Chief Inspector Atty. Aurelio C. Trampe, Jr., the Legal
and Investigation Division Chief of the PAOCTF, later referred Jenny Rose to
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Marikina City, for preliminary investigation.
[19]

The prosecutor later amended the Information by deleting the name Jane
Doe and substituting the name Jenny Rose Basilan y Payan as the second
accused.
Almas Evidence
Alma denied having kidnapped Angela for ransom. She testified that she
was married, and a resident of Block 38, Lot 38, G. Maliputo Street, Phase II,
Area 4, Kaunlaran Village, Navotas, Metro Manila. She was a businesswoman
who ran a local employment agency for household help. She was also
engaged in the business of buying and selling palay grains.Her local
employment agency was located in Navotas. She had another office at No.
1258 Paz Street, Paco, Manila, which served as a bodegafor items she sent to
the province, as well as items she purchased. She had an adopted daughter
named Mary Rose, who, in September 1998, studied at Harris School in

Antipolo. She had employed Wendy Salingatog for a time as the yaya of her
adopted daughter. Alma was then residing in V. Luna Street, Quezon City.
Alma employed Jenny Rose as secretary in her employment agency. In
payment for services rendered, Jenny Rose was sent to school at the Lyceum
of the Philippines to study B.S. Business Administration. She wasalso given an
allowance.
In September 1998, Alma was looking for a school run by nuns that would
be willing to accept her adopted daughter in the middle of the school year.
Jenny Rose suggested the Divine Providence School in Marikina City. In the
morning of September 3, 1998, Jenny Rose brought her to the said school.
They proceeded to the administration office where Alma inquired if the school
would allow her adopted daughter to enroll. When Jenny Rose and Alma were
about to leave, a little girl, who turned out to be Angela, approached them and
asked what Jenny Rose was doing in her school. Jenny Rose introduced
Angela to Alma as her niece, and informed Alma that she would be bringing
Angela with her to her boarding house in Espaa Street.
At that point, Alma asked Jenny Rose and Angela if they wanted to eat.
When they agreed, the three of them proceeded to the Jollibee Restaurant
near the Meralco office in Marikina City. After eating, Alma bade them goodbye
and was about to leave for her office when Jenny Rose asked if she and
Angela could come along with her to Cubao. She acceded to the request, and
they rode a Tamaraw FX taxi. Because Angela was getting sleepy, Alma
offered to bring them to Jennys boarding house in Espaa, and dropped them
off there. Alma thereafter proceeded to her office at 1258 Paz St., Paco,
Manila, where she had been holding office since January 1997, and arrived
thereat at about 2:00 p.m.
At or about 8:00 p.m. of the same day, Alma passed by Jenny Roses
boarding house to give her instructions on what to do the following day. She
saw Angela crying profusely. She told Jenny Rose to bring Angela home, but
Jenny Rose told her that Angelas parents would be coming to fetch
her. Thinking that Angela was probably bored, Alma suggested that they stay
in her office in Paco so that they could watch television while waiting for
Angelas parents. Jenny Rose agreed. They arrived at the said office at around
8:40 p.m. Alma left at around 10:00 p.m. and went home to her rented house in
Palmera Homes, Antipolo, where she stayed until September 6, 1998.
On September 7, 1998, at around 12:00 noon, Alma arrived at her office
in Paco, Manila, and found that Jenny Rose and Angela were still there. Jenny
Rose assured Alma that Angela would be fetched by her parents. At around
4:00 p.m., Alma instructed Jenny Rose to go to the province to collect some
debts, Jenny Rose left for the province on the same day. Alma stayed in the
office because she was having her menstrual period at the time and was not
feeling well. She took care of Angela while Jenny Rose was away.
The next day, September 8, 1998, Alma was still in her office with Angela.
At about 3:00 p.m., while she was watching television with Angela, someone
knocked at the door. When she opened it, two male persons entered. One of
them was Inspector Ricardo Dandan who showed her a photograph of Angela
and asked if she knew the child. Alma answered in the affirmative. Ricardo
then asked her, Dont you know that this is kidnapping? to which Alma replied, I

156 | P a g e

do not know. She also told Dandan that she did not know what was happening
to her. Suddenly, Alma was handcuffed. Angela cried and asked Alma: What
are they doing to you, Tita? She was brought to Camp Crame where she was
interrogated and detained. Alma did not make any telephone calls that day.
William, Marymae and Angela arrived at Almas detention cell. When Angela
saw her, the girl tried to run to Alma but William held on to his daughter.
William asked Alma why she took Angela, Alma replied that it was Jenny Rose
who brought the girl along with them. She told William that they were both
victims.
Sometime on October 26, 1998, Jenny Rose visited Alma to ask for
forgiveness and to assume full responsibility for the incident. Jenny Rose also
informed her that she wanted to ask forgiveness from the Sorianos so that she
could finish her schooling. It was only then that she realized what Jenny Rose
had done to her. Nevertheless, she still believed that Jenny Rose was a good
person. She advised her to go home and continue with her studies.
When Angelas sworn statement was shown to her, Alma noticed that
Angela did not mention Jenny Rose as one of the two persons who had
kidnapped her. Alma executed a handwritten statement denying the truth of the
contents of Angelas affidavit.[20]
Jenny Roses Evidence
Jenny Rose did not testify in her defense. She presented Atty. Aurelio
Trampe, Jr. as her witness who testified [21] that he was the Legal and
Investigation Division Chief of the PAOCTF. On October 26, 1998, he
interviewed Jenny Rose when the latter surrendered to the task force. Jenny
Rose insisted that she wanted to help Alma and get all the blame for the
kidnapping. She wanted to admit her participation in the crime, and
volunteered the information that she and Alma kidnapped Angela. Atty.
Trampe, Jr. wrote a letter[22] to the Department of Justice requesting for her
inclusion in the ongoing preliminary investigation. He believed that it would be
more appropriate for the prosecutor handling the case to investigate and
determine whether Jenny Rose was the Jane Doe referred to in the complaint.
Atty. Trampe, Jr. admitted, however, that aside from the voluntary surrender of
Jenny Rose, he did not have any other evidence to include her as one of the
suspects in the case. Further, he did not provide a lawyer for Jenny Rose
because he did not intend to conduct an exhaustive interrogation, and he knew
that even if she admitted her participation, the statement would not be
admitted as evidence.[23]
Jenny Rose adduced in evidence the letter of Atty. Trampe, Jr. to prove
that she voluntarily surrendered and that there was lack of evidence against
her.
On September 16, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the accused ALMA BISDA y GAUPO
and GENEROSA BASILAN y PAYAN are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom penalized under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 and is sentenced to suffer the extreme
penalty of DOUBLE DEATH by lethal injection, the two accused having conspired in

the commission thereof. They are further ordered to pay solidarily the parents of the
victim the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages, and costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[24]
The assigned errors ascribed by the appellants to the trial court may be
synthesized, thus: (a) the trial court erred in convicting the appellants of
kidnapping; (b) the trial court erred in sentencing the appellants to double
death.[25] The Court will delve into and resolve the issues simultaneously.
The prosecution adduced
proof beyond reasonable
doubt that the appellants
kidnapped the victim.
The appellants aver that the prosecution failed to muster proof, beyond
reasonable doubt that, they kidnapped and illegally detained Angela. Angela in
fact voluntarily went with them, and she was free to roam around the house,
and to call her parents through the telephone of their landlady which Angela
knew by heart.
There is no proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants conspired
to kidnap Angela. Appellant Bisda avers that she is guilty only of slight illegal
detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code because (a) Angela
stayed in her office for only three days; and (b) the circumstance of a female
offender and a female offended party is not one of those included in the
definition of kidnapping or serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the
RPC.
The trial courts reliance on Angelas testimony is misplaced becausethe
records do not show that Angela had the capacity to distinguish right from
wrong when she testified in open court. The appellants point out that she was
merely six years old at the time. Although Angela took an oath before she
testified, the trial judge failed to ask any questions to determine whether or not
she could distinguish right from wrong, and comprehend the obligation of
telling the truth before the court. Hence, one of the standards in determining
the credibility of a child witness was not followed. There is, thus, a veritable
doubt that Angela told the truth when she testified.
Moreover, Angelas testimony is, besides being inconsistent on material
points, contrary to ordinary human experience. Angela did not shout or
cry when she was forced to leave the school premises and brought to
the Jollibee Restaurant. Angela could have easily sought help from the security
guard at the exit gate of the school and from the customers in the restaurant,
or even from the tricycle and taxi drivers; but Angela did not. Angela even
admitted that she voluntarily went with the appellants. She did not cry while
detained in the office of appellant Bisda, and even admitted that it was only
that time when she was rescued that she cried. The conduct of Angela, the
appellants insist, is contrary to ordinary human experience, knowledge and
observation. By her own admission in her sworn statement [26] to the PAOCTF
agents, Angela was assisted by her parents while she was giving the said
statement. This raised doubts as to the veracity of her testimony.
The contentions of the appellants are bereft of merit.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No.
7659 reads:

157 | P a g e

ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
I. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the
accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (As
amended by RA No. 7659).[27]
For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping or serious illegal detention,
the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of the crime, namely, (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he
kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the
commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present:
(a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is
committed by simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made;
or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.
[28]
If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the
duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and
illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his
detention is immaterial.[29] The word female in paragraph 1(4) of Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code refers to the gender of the victim and not of the
offender.
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the
victims liberty under any of the above-mentioned circumstances, coupled with
indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same. [30] There must be
a purposeful or knowing action by the accused to forcibly restrain the victim
because taking coupled with intent completes the offense. [31] Kidnapping which
involves the detention of another is by its nature a continuing crime. [32]
The victims lack of consent is also a fundamental element of kidnapping.
The involuntariness of the seizure and detention is the very essence of the
crime.[33] The general rule is that the prosecution is burdened to prove lack of
consent on the part of the victim. However, where the victim is a minor
especially if she is only five years old, lack of consent is presumed. She is
incompetent to assent to seizure and illegal detention. [34] In this case, Angela
was merely five years old when she was kidnapped; thus incapable of giving
consent. The consent of such child could place the appellants in no better
position than if the act had been done against her will. The appellants cannot
rely on Angelas initial willingness to go along with them to the restaurant. As
Judge Shepherd stated in State v. Chisenhall:[35]

It is clear that the consent of the child, obtained by means of persuasion, is no defense,
since the result of such persuasion is just as great an evil as if it had been
accomplished by other means.
A kidnapper should not be rewarded with an acquittal simply because she
is ingenious enough to conceal her true motive from her victim until she is able
to transport the latter to another place.
Although Angela was free to roam around in the dirty house, to draw and
to watch television during the entire period of her detention, and was regularly
fed and bathed, the appellants are nevertheless guilty of kidnapping and
illegally detaining the five-year-old child. As Judge McGill of the United States
Court of Appeals said in United States v. McCabe[36],to accept a childs desire
for food, comfort as the type of will or consent contemplated in the context of
kidnapping would render the concept meaningless.
In People v. Baldogo,[37] this Court held that illegal serious detention under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, includes not only the
imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of her liberty in whatever
form and for whatever length of time. It includes a situation where the victim
cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention or is restricted or
impeded in his liberty to move.[38] In this case, the door to the office of appellant
Bisda was locked while Angela was detained therein. Even if she wanted to
escape and go home, Angela, at her age, could not do so all by herself. During
the period of her confinement, Angela was under the control of the appellants.
The helpless child was waiting and hoping that she would be brought home, or
that her parents would come and fetch her.
The prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
appellants conspired to kidnap and illegally detain Angela. The appellants
testimonies even buttressed the testimonies of both the victim and the other
witnesses for the prosecution.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy
when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.
[39]
In People v. Pagalasan,[40] this Court held that conspiracy need not be
proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had
acted with a common purpose and design. [41] Conspiracy may be implied if it is
proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently independent of each other were, in fact,
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and
a concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found, continues until the object
of it has been accomplished unless abandoned or broken up. [42] To hold an
accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to
have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.
[43]
There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose.[44]
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates
which follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its
probable and natural consequences even though it was not intended as part of
the original design.[45] Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the

158 | P a g e

accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral

acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.
[46]
Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and
by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a
prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law, chargeable with intending
that result.[47]Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another
conspirator unless such act differs radically and substantively from that which
they intended to commit.[48] As Judge Learned Hand put it in United States v.
Andolscheck,[49] when a conspirator embarks upon a criminal venture of
indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its content and membership, so
be it that they fall within the common purposes as he understands them.
The appellants enveigled Angela into going with them by telling her that
her parents were waiting for her at the Jollibee Restaurant. Appellant Bisda
poked a knife at Angela and held her hands so tightly that the helpless child
had no recourse but to come along. The appellants transported Angela on
board a taxi and brought her to Cubao, and then to appellant Bisdas office at
No. 1258 Paz St., Paco, Manila. The appellants tied her hands, covered her
mouth with scotch tape, and detained her from September 3, 1998 until
September 8, 1998, when she was providentially rescued by the operatives of
the PAOCTF.
The collective, concerted and synchronized acts of the appellants before,
during and after the kidnapping and the illegal detention of Angela constitute
indubitable proof that the appellants conspired with each other to attain a
common objective, i.e., to kidnap Angela and detain her illegally. The
appellants are thus principals by direct participation in the kidnapping of
Angela and illegally detaining her.
Appellant Basilan cannot escape conviction for the crime charged on her
barefaced claim that she merely accompanied appellant Bisda to the latters
office with the victim in tow. The records show that the appellant presented as
her sole witness Atty. Aurelio Trampe, Jr., then PAOCTF Legal and
Investigation Division Chief, who testified that when she surrendered to him,
the appellant admitted that she and appellant Bisda had kidnapped Angela:
ATTY. SALAMERA:
This court would like to be cleared (sic). Did she admit to you the
condition of the alleged kidnapping on September 3, 1998?
WITNESS:
She volunteered that statement that she was together with Ms. Alma
Besda (sic) kidnap (sic) Angela Michelle Soriano.[50]
The appellants contention that the prosecution failed to establish that
Angela understood the nature of an oath and the need for her to tell the truth
must fail.
Section 1, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of evidence provides that the
examination of witnesses shall be under oath or affirmation: [51]
SECTION 1. Examination to be done in open court. The examination of witnesses
presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or
affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a
different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally. (1a). [52]

An oath is defined as an outward pledge, given by the person taking it

that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his
responsibility to God.[53] The object of the rule is to affect the conscience of the
witness and thus compel him to speak the truth, and also to lay him open to
punishment for perjury in case he willfully falsifies. [54] A witness must be
sensible to the obligation of an oath before he can be permitted to testify. [55] It is
not, however, essential that he knows how he will be punished if he testify
falsely.[56] Under modem statutes, a person is not disqualified as a witness
simply because he is unable to tell the nature of the oath administered to a
witness.[57] In order that one may be competent as a witness, it is not necessary
that he has a definite knowledge of the difference between his duty to tell the
truth after being sworn and before, or that he be able to state it, but it is
necessary that he be conscious that there is a difference. [58] It cannot be
argued that simply because a child witness is not examined on the nature of
the oath and the need for her to tell the whole truth, the competency of the
witness and the truth of her testimony are impaired. If a party against whom a
witness is presented believes that the witness is incompetent or is not aware of
his obligation and responsibility to tell the truth and the consequence of him
testifying falsely, such party may pray for leave to conduct a voire
dire examination on such witness to test his competency.[59] The court
may motu proprioconduct the voir dire examination. In United States v.
Buncad,[60] this Court held that when a child of tender age is presented as a
witness, it is the duty of the judge to examine the child to determine his
competency. InRepublic v. Court of Appeals,[61] this Court held that:
[W]hen a witness is produced, it is a right and privilege accorded to the adverse party
to object to his examination on the ground of incompetency to testify. If a party knows
before trial that a witness is incompetent, objection must be made before trial that a
witness is incompetent, objection must be made before he has given any testimony; if
the incompetency appears on the trial, it must be interposed as soon as it becomes
apparent.[62]
The competency of a person to take the prescribed oath is a question for
the trial court to decide.[63]
If a party admits proof to be taken in a case without an oath, after the
testimony has been acted upon by the court, and made the basis of a
judgment, such party can no longer object to the admissibility of the said
testimony.[64] He is estopped from raising the issue in the appellate court. This
was the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[65] thus:
Simply put, any objection to the admissibility of evidence should be made at the time
such evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the objection to its admissibility
becomes apparent, otherwise the objection will be considered waived and such
evidence will form part of the records of the case as competent and admissible
evidence. The failure of petitioner to interpose a timely objection to the presentation of
Divinaflors testimony results in the waiver of any objection to the admissibility thereof
and he is therefore barred from raising said issue on appeal.
In this case, Angela was six years old when she testified. [66] She took an oath to
tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth before she testified on
direct examination. There was nary a whimper of protest or objection on the
part of the appellants to Angelas competence as a witness and the

159 | P a g e

prosecutions failure to propound questions to determine whether Angela

understood her obligation and responsibility of telling the truth respecting the
matter of her testimony before the court. The appellants did not even bother
requesting the trial court for leave to conduct a voir dire examination of Angela.
After the prosecution terminated its direct examination, the appellants
thereafter cross-examined Angela extensively and intensively on the matter of
her testimony on direct examination. It was only in this Court that the
appellants raised the matter for the first time, that there was failure on the part
of the prosecution to examine Angela on the nature of her oath, and to
ascertain whether she had the capacity to distinguish right from wrong. It is too
late in the day for the appellants to raise the issue.
The determination of the competence and capability of a child as a
witness rests primarily with the trial judge. [67] The trial court correctly found
Angela a competent witness and her testimony entitled to full probative weight.
Any child regardless of age, can be a competent witness if she can perceive
and perceiving, can make known to others, and that she is capable of relating
truthfully facts for which she is examined. [68] In People v. Mendiola,[69] this Court
found the six-year-old victim competent and her testimony credible. Also
in Dulla v. Court of Appeals, [70] this Court gave credence to the testimony of a
three-year-old victim. It has been the consistent ruling of the Court that the
findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of witnesses
and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions
anchored on said findings are accorded by the appellate courts high respect if
not conclusive effect absent clear and convincing evidence that the trial court
ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances
which if considered warrants a reversal or modification of the outcome of the
case.[71] In this case, the Court finds no basis to deviate from the findings and
conclusions of the trial court on the competency of Angela, and the probative
weight of her testimony.
Appellants must come to grips with case law that testimonies of child
victims are given full weight and credit. The testimony of children of sound
mind is likewise to be more correct and truthful than that of older persons.
[72]
In People vs. Alba,[73] this Court ruled that children of sound mind are likely
to be more observant of incidents which take place within their view than older
persons, and their testimonies are likely more correct in detail than that of
older persons. Angela was barely six years old when she testified. Considering
her tender years, innocent and guileless, it is incredible that Angela would
testify falsely that the appellants took her from the school through threats and
detained her in the dirty house for five days. In People v. Dela Cruz,[74] this
Court also ruled that ample margin of error and understanding should be
accorded to young witnesses who, much more than adults, would be gripped
with tension due to the novelty and the experience in testifying before the trial
court.
The credibility of Angela and the verisimilitude of her testimony is not
impaired by her failure to shout for help when the appellants took her, or to
make any attempt to call her parents or to escape from her captors and to use
the telephone to call her parents. At five years old, she could not be expected
to act and react to her kidnapping and detention like an adult should. She did

not shout and seek help from the school security guards because the
appellants told Angela that her parents were waiting for her. Appellant Basilan
was the niece of Angelas yaya. She then believed that nothing was amiss. It
was only when she failed to see her parents that Angela blamed herself for
going with the appellants in the first place.
Atty. Laracas:
Now, they told you that your parents were at Jollibee. When you
did not see your parents, what did you do?
Witness:
I told myself, why did I go with them.
Atty. Laracas:
So you just told that to yourself?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Atty. Laracas:
So initially, Angela, you are not blaming yourself when you
went with Jenny Rose?
Witness:
Yes, maam.[75]
The evidence on record shows that appellant Bisda poked a knife at
Angela and her hands were held tightly by the appellants as they proceeded to
the restaurant from the school. Although the Soriano spouses were by Angelas
side when the latter gave her sworn statement [76] in the PAOCTF office, there is
no showing on record that the spouses ever influenced their daughter to
prevaricate. Significantly, the appellants counsel did not even cross-examine
Angela on her sworn statement.
In this case, appellant Bisda asserts that Angelas testimony contains four
inconsistencies on material points; hence, is incredible. First, Angela testified
on cross-examination that the appellants approached her but she did not talk
to them.[77] In contrast, Angela testified on cross-examination that she saw
appellant Basilan, and talked to her.[78] Second, Angela testified on direct
examination that she first came to know the identities of the kidnappers when
she was brought to the dirty house. [79] Angela contradicted herself when she
testified on cross-examination that when she was brought to the said house,
she already knew appellant Basilan.[80] Third, Angela testified on direct
examination that she went with the appellants to the Jollibee Restaurant when
they held her hands firmly.[81]On cross-examination, Angela testified that the
appellants threatened her when they kidnapped her by pointing a knife at her
which made her cry.[82]Angela further contradicted herself when she testified on
direct examination that the appellants pointed a knife at her one night.
[83]
Fourth, Angela said that when she was in the office of appellant Bisda in
Paco, Manila, her feet were tied and her mouth was covered with scotch tape.
[84]
However, on cross-examination, Angela revealed that she was free to roam
around and even watched television and made drawings. [85]
Anent the first and second set of inconsistencies adverted to by the
appellants, the same pertain only to minor and peripheral matters and not to
the principal occurrence or the elements of the crime charged, and the positive
identification of the appellants. Hence, the credibility of Angela, and that of her

160 | P a g e

testimony were not impaired by the said inconsistencies. [86] The inscrutable fact
is that the appellants took the victim from the school and detained her at the
office of appellant Bisda at No. 1258 Paz St., Paco, Manila, until she was
rescued. Whether or not Angela talked with the appellants as she was being
brought to the restaurant or that she came to know of the identities of the
kidnappers before or when she was brought to the dirty house, are
inconsequential. The overwhelming evidence on record is that no other than
the appellants kidnapped her from her school and illegally detained her from
September 3 to 8, 1998. Indeed, when asked to point and identify her
kidnappers, Angela did so spontaneously and positively.[87]
Pros. Junio:
If you see... this Alma Besda (sic), if you will be able to see her
again, if you see her again, will you be able to recognize her?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Pros. Junio:
Will you point to her.
(The witness is pointing to a lady, seated at the second from the left
at the corner at the last seat.)
Court:
Identify yourself.
(The person pointed to, stood up and identified herself as Alma
Besda [sic]).
Pros. Junio:
What about Jenny Rose, will you be able to recognize her?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Pros. Junio:
You point to her Angel.
(The witness is pointing to the first lady seated on the left side)
Court:
Stand up and identify yourself.
The lady stood up and identified herself as Jenny Rose Basilan. [88]
Appellant Basilan did not controvert the evidence of the prosecution that she
was the niece of the yaya of the victim, and that the said appellant, at one
time, went to the Soriano residence where Angela saw and met her. The victim
was, thus, acquainted with appellant Basilan even before the kidnapping.
Angela testified on direct examination, thus:
Atty. Junio:
So when Alma and Jenny Rose told you that Mommy and Daddy
were at Jollibee, what did you do?
Witness:
I did not want to go with them but they held me firm.
Pros. Junio:
What part of the body did they hold firmly?
Witness:
My hands.
Pros. Junio:

After Alma and Jenny Rose held your hand firmly, what did, where
did you go?
Witness:
To Jollibee.[89]
Angela was not asked by the public prosecutor whether or not the
appellants threatened her with any weapon before proceeding to the Jollibee
Restaurant. The additional fact was revealed by Angela, ironically, on crossexamination:
Atty. Salamera:
Now, were you threatened on September 3 at around eleven in
the morning when both accused allegedly abducted you?
Witness:
Yes, sir.
Atty. Salamera:
There are two accused, who threatened you?
Witness:
They pointed knife against me.
Atty. Salamera:
Who pointed the knife upon your person?
Witness:
Alma, sir.
Atty. Salamera:
Did you cry?
Witness:
Yes, sir.
Atty. Salamera:
Did you also cry inside the Jollibee?
Witness:
No, sir.
Atty. Salamera:
Was Alma still holding a knife at the Jollibee?
Witness:
No, sir.[90]
The prosecutor tried on re-direct to take advantage of Angelas revelation
but the appellants counsel, realizing that he had just committed a faux
pas, objected to the questions of the public prosecutor. It turned out that the
latter was himself confused because instead of adverting to a knife, as testified
to by Angela, he blurted that appellant Bisda used a gun in intimidating the
victim. Even Angela must have been bewildered by the repartees of the
prosecution and the appellants counsel such that, instead of answering one
time, to the questions of the prosecutor, she said one night.
Redirect:
Pros. Junio:
Angel, how many times did Alma and Jenny Rose point a knife at
you?
Atty. Salamera:
Objection. Improper at this point in time. First it was not covered.
Pros. Junio:

161 | P a g e

How many times did Alma point a gun?

Atty. Salamera:
Knife, your Honor.
Pros. Junio:
It was covered on cross.
Court:
Objection denied. Overruled. Witness may answer.
Witness:
One night.[91]
There was, thus, no inconsistency in Angelas testimony on this point.
Angelas hands were tied, and her mouth was covered with scotch tape
the day after she was brought to the dirty house. Angela testified on direct
examination, thus:
Pros. Junio:
Okay, where did you go?
Witness:
To the dirty house.
Pros. Junio:
Who was with you or who were with you at that time?
Witness:
Alma Besda (sic) and Jenny Rose, maam.
Pros. Junio:
Where is this dirty house located?
Witness:
I do not know, maam.
Pros. Junio:
Upon arriving at that dirty house, what did you do?
Witness:
They changed my clothes once.
Pros. Junio:
Do you remember the color of the dress?
Witness:
No, maam.
Pros. Junio:
After they changed your dress or your clothes, what happened
next? What did they do to you?
Witness:
They fed me, maam.
Pros. Junio:
After they fed you, what did you do?
Witness:
They send (sic) me to sleep.
Pros. Junio:
When you woke up, what did they do to you?
Witness:
They fed me (pinamiryenda) (sic)
Pros. Junio:
After you ate your miryenda (sic) what else did they do to you?

Witness:
They allowed me to watch tv, maam.
Pros. Junio:
What about your hands, your mouth, what did they do?
Witness:
They tied my hands.
Pros. Junio;
And your mouth?
Witness:
It was sealed with scotch tape.
Pros. Junio;
And your feet?
Witness:
They were also tied, maam.
Pros. Junio:
Who tied your hands?
Witness:
The two of them, maam.
Pros. Junio:
Will you mention their names again?
Witness:
Alma Besda (sic) and Jenny Rose.[92]
On cross-examination, Angela testified that on the day she was rescued, she
could watch the television, make drawings and roam around the room:
Atty. Larracas:
You did . . . At that time you were allegedly rescued, Jenny
Rosewas not at the place where you were rescued?
Witness:
She was not there, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
All along you were watching tv (sic) at the place where you were
taken?
Witness:
Only once, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
And when you were not watching tv (sic), what were you doing
Angela in that dirty house?
Witness:
I was drawing, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
So you watched tv once and the rest of the time you were
drawing?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
Of course, you cannot draw if your hands were tied, Angela?
Witness:
Yes, mam.

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Atty. Larracas:
So your hands were not tied?
Witness:
No, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
You can move along freely at that time?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
You can walk?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
You can drink?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
Of course, you cannot walk if your feet were tied and cannot drink
ifyour mouth was sealed?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
When the police arrived, what were you doing?
Witness:
I cried, maam.[93]
It is not quite clear whether the counsel for the appellants were asking about
Angelas activities during her detention, or during her rescue. Taking into
account Angelas answers, it is evident that her hands were tied and her mouth
covered with scotch tape the day after she was kidnapped, but that she was
free to roam around the room, practice on her drawings and watch television
during the rest of the period of her detention.
PROPER PENALTIES
The appellants aver that the prosecution failed to prove that in kidnapping
and illegally detaining the victim, they intended to demand ransom from her
parents. William Soriano, the victims father, failed to prove that the appellants
or any of them called through the telephone demanding ransom. The collective
testimonies of police operatives Tito Tuanggang, Ricardo Dandan and George
Torrente were hearsay evidence; hence, barren of probative weight. The trial
court likewise failed to take into account the voluntary surrender of appellant
Basilan.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, posits the view that the
prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove that the
appellants and no other demanded ransom from the parents of the victim.
The appellants contention does not hold water. Admittedly, the
prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence that the appellants demanded
ransom for the release of the victim. However, the prosecution adduced
circumstantial evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants,

or at least one of them, demanded ransom from the Soriano spouses for
the release of their daughter.
To warrant the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention for ransom, the prosecution must prove beyond
reasonable doubt: (a) intent on the part of the accused todeprive the victim of
his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of
the accused, which is ransom for the victim or other person for the release of
the victim. The purpose of the offender in extorting ransom is a qualifying
circumstance which may be proved by his words and overt acts before, during
and after the kidnapping and detention of the victim. [94] Neither actual demand
for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed.
[95]
Ransom as employed in the law is so used in its common or ordinary sense;
meaning, a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or consideration paid
or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment
that releases from captivity.[96] It may include benefits not necessarily pecuniary
which may accrue to the kidnapper as a condition for the release of the victim.
[97]

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove the qualifyingcircumstance if

(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are proven; (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. The circumstances
proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion of others as the
one who demanded ransom. The circumstances proved must be consistent
with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and
that at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis
except that of guilty.[98] The prosecution must rely on the strength of its
evidence and not on the weakness of that of the appellants.[99]
In this case, the chain of circumstantial evidence adduced by the
prosecution proves that no one other than the appellants or one of them called
up the spouses Soriano through the telephone and demanded ransom of
P5,000,000:
1. Appellant Basilan is the niece of Wendy Salingatog, who was for a time
the housemaid of appellant Bisda;
2. The appellants kidnapped Angela shortly before noon on September 3,
1998, and detained her at No. 1258 Paz Street, Paco, Manila, where appellant
Bisda held office;
3. The following morning, William was informed by his landlady that a
woman had earlier called up over the telephone requesting her to inform
William that she (the caller), would call again the next day, September 5, 1998;
4. On September 5, 1998, William received a telephone call from a
woman demanding a ransom of P5,000,000 for Angelas freedom. When
William complained that he did not have the amount, she told William that she
cannot be responsible for it and that she would inquire from
herbosses. Williams testimony reads:
Pros. Junio:
And what did she tell you?
Witness:

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She told me KUNG GUSTO MO PANG MAKITA IYONG

ANAK MO, MAGHANDA KA NG FIVE MILLION PESOS.
Pros. Junio:
What did you told (sic) her if any?
Witness:
SAAN AKO KUKUHA NG FIVE MILLION PESOS? ALAM
MONAMAN NA NAKATIRA LANG AKO SA APARTMENT.
Pros. Junio:
What did she say?
Witness:
She answered, HINDI KO MASASAGOT YAN.
Pros. Junio:
Did she tell you why she could not respond to you?
Witness:
She continued to say TATANUNGIN KO NA LANG SA
AKING MGA BOSS.[100]
5. In the morning of September 7, 1998, Inspector Ricardo Dandan and
SPO4 Tito Tuanggang, acting on an anonymous tip, rushed to the vicinity of
No. 1303 Paz Street, Paco, Manila, the office of the MSC Freight Service, to
conduct surveillance operations. Later in the afternoon, they saw appellant
Bisda emerging from a small house about fifty meters from the office of the
MSC Freight Service;
6. At about 3:40 p.m. on September 8, 1998, appellant Bisda emerged
from the house at No. 1258 Paz Street, and went to the small store near the
house. Chief Inspector Dandan and Tito Tuanggang were about two meters
from the store and saw appellant Bisda enter the same, lift the telephone and
talk to someone over the telephone;
7. At about the same time, William received a telephone call from a
woman demanding where the money was and when William replied that he
was ready with P25,000, the woman replied: Hindi ko masasagot iyan,
dadalhin na lang namin ang bata sa aking boss. When William intimatedthat
he could raise P50,000 but pleaded for more time to produce the amount, the
woman retorted: Hindi ko masasagot iyan. Williams testimony reads:
Pros. Junio:
On September 8, 1998, at about 3:40 in the afternoon, what
happened if any?
Witness:
At around 3:40 in the afternoon of September 8, a lady caller
called again. I answered the telephone.
Pros. Junio:
Who was this lady caller?
Witness:
I would say, my perception is it was the same lady caller who
called the first time I answered the telephone.
Pros. Junio:
And what did she tell you?
Witness:
And she told me where is the money.

Pros. Junio:
And what did you tell her?
Witness:
And I also told her if its okey with you, my twenty-five is ready.
Pros. Junio:
Then what did she say?
Witness:
She said HINDI KO MASASAGOT IYAN, DADALIN NA LANG
NAMIN ANG BATA SA AKING BOSS.
Pros. Junio:
What happened next after that?
Witness:
I would like to plead that I will make it fifty thousand, just give me
ample time.
Pros. Junio:
How did she react to your suggestion?
Witness:
HINDI KO MASASAGOT IYAN. Then she hanged (sic) the phone.
[101]

8. After making the telephone call, appellant Bisda left the store and
returned to the house at No. 1258 Paz Street, Paco, Manila;
9. The operatives from the PAOCTF followed appellant Bisda and
confronted her before she could enter the house. The operatives then barged
into the premises of No. 1258 Paz Street where they saw Angela in the room;
10. When William arrived at the PAOCTF office, with Angela that day, he
inquired from appellant Bisda why she kidnapped Angela and what she would
do with the P5,000,000 ransom she was demanding, and the appellant
replied: Kuya, wag (sic) kang nang maghusga, pareho lang tayong
biktima. When William asked Alma: Biktima, saan? The appellant replied: Ang
anak ko, kinidnap din nila.
In light of the foregoing facts, there can be no other conclusion than that
appellant Bisda demanded a ransom of P5,000,000 from William Soriano;
hence, she is GUILTY of kidnapping for ransom. Being a conspirator, appellant
Basilan is also guilty of the said crime. The penalty for kidnapping for ransom
is death, a single and indivisible penalty. The aggravating circumstance of use
of a motor vehicle under Article 14, paragraph 20 of the Revised Penal Code
was attendant in the commission of the crime. [102] However, said circumstance,
as well as the voluntary surrender of appellant Basilan, are inconsequential in
the penalties to be imposed on the said appellants, conformably to Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code.[103]

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CIVIL LIABILITIES OF THE APPELLANTS

The trial court awarded P100,000 moral damages to the spouses William
and Marymae Soriano, the parents of the victim. The trial court did not award
any moral and exemplary damages to the victim. The decision of the trial court
has to be modified. Under Article 2219, paragraph 7, of the New Civil Code,
moral damages may be awarded to a victim of illegal arrest and detention. In
this case, the appellants poked a knife on the victim as they took her from the
school. The appellants also tied her hands, and placed scotch tape on her
mouth. The hapless victim was so shocked when operatives of the PAOCTF
barged into the office of appellant Bisda, and took custody of the victim that
she cried profusely. The victim suffered trauma, mental, physical and
psychological ordeal. There is, thus, sufficient basis for an award of moral
damages in theamount of P300,000.[104] Since there were demands for ransom,
not to mention the use by the appellants of a vehicle to transport the victim
from the school to the Jollibee Restaurant and to the office of appellant Bisda,
the victim is entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.
[105]
Although the victim claims that the appellants took her earrings, the
prosecution failed to prove the value of the same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Marikina City, Branch 272, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The
appellants, Alma Bisda and Generosa Jenny Rose Basilan, are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom under paragraph 4 and the
last paragraph of Article 267, of the Revised Penal Code, and are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. The appellants are hereby
directed to pay jointly and severally to the victim Angela Michelle Soriano the
amount of P300,000 by way of moral damages and P 100,000 by way of
exemplary damages. Costs against the appellants.
Three Justices of the Court maintain their position that Rep. Act
No.7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty;
nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is
constitutional, and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case
at bar.
In accordance with Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659 amending Section 83
of the Revised Penal Code, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded,
upon finality of this Decision, to the Office of the President for possible
exercise of the pardoning power. Costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.