Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. CA

4/8/2016
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 297
VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998
469
Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 122191. October 8, 1998.
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO
A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Conflict of Laws; Actions; Where the factual antecedents
satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, the
problem could present a conflicts case.Where the factual
antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign
element, we agree with petitioner that the problem herein could
present a conflicts case. A factual situation that cuts across
territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more
states is said to contain a foreign element. The presence of a
foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of
individuals and associations are rarely confined to the geographic
limits of their birth or conception.
Same; Same; The forms in which a foreign element may appear
are many, such as the fact that one party is a resident Philippine
national, and that the other is a resident foreign corporation.The
forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The
foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the
parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a
contract between nationals of one State involves properties situated
in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a
complex form. In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in
the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine
national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign
corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with the
petitioner SAUDIA as a flight stewardess, events did transpire
during her many occasions of travel across national borders,
particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and
vice versa, that caused a conflicts situation to arise.
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000153f1a604fba724bad6003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False
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Same; Same; Damages; While Article 19 of the Civil Code

merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its
provisions; Violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with
judicially enforceable remedies in the municipal forum.Although
Article 19
________________
*
FIRST DIV ISION.
470
470
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its

provisions. Thus, we agree with private respondents assertion that
violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially
enforceable remedies in the municipal forum. Based on the
allegations in the Amended Complaint, read in the light of the Rules
of Court on jurisdiction we find that the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit. Its authority to try and hear the case is provided for under
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691.
Same; Same; Forum Non Conveniens; Forum Shopping;
Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, vex, harass,
or oppress the defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him needless
expense or disturbance, but unless the balance is strongly in favor of
the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed.Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of
the parties, also weigh heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon City
assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of the
litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is quite
obvious. Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are equally
important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum,
vex, harass, or oppress the defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him
needless expense or disturbance. But unless the balance is strongly
in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should
rarely be disturbed.
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Same; Same; Forcing a party to seek remedial action in a place

where she no longer maintains substantial connections would cause
a fundamental unfairness to her.Weighing the relative claims of
the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the case in the
Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would
be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action
elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer
maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a
fundamental unfairness to her.
Same; Same; A party effectively submits to the trial courts
jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the complaint on
grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.The records show that
petitioner SAUDIA has filed several motions praying for the
dismissal of Moradas Amended Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an
Answer In Ex Abundante Cautelam dated February 20, 1995. What
is very patent and explicit from the motions filed, is that SAUDIA
prayed for other
471
471
reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has

effectively submitted to the trial courts jurisdiction by praying for
the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack
of jurisdiction.
Same; Choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important
questions: (1) What legal system should control a given situation
where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states;
and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the
situation.As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choiceof-law problems seek to answer two important questions: (1) What
legal system should control a given situation where some of the
significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what
extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.
Same; Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should
intrinsically advance both notions of justice and predictability, they
do not always do so, in which case the forum is then faced with the
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problem of deciding which of these two important values should be

stressed.Several theories have been propounded in order to
identify the legal system that should ultimately control. Although
ideally, all choice-of-law theories should intrinsically advance both
notions of justice and predictability, they do not always do so. The
forum is then faced with the problem of deciding which of these two
important values should be stressed.
Same; Characterization or Doctrine of Qualification; Words
and Phrases; Characterization is the process of deciding whether or
not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts
rule.Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to
determine under what category a certain set of facts or rules fall.
This process is known as characterization, or the doctrine of
qualification. It is the process of deciding whether or not the facts
relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule. The
purpose of characterization is to enable the forum to select the
proper law.
Same; Same; An essential element of conflict rules is the
indication of a test or connecting factor or point of contact.
Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a
factual situation, event, or operative fact. An essential element of
conflict rules is the indication of a test or connecting factor or
point of contact. Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual
relation472
472

ship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor

or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of
celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
Same; Same; Test Factors or Points of Contact or
Connecting Factors.Note that one or more circumstances may be
present to serve as the possible test for the determination of the
applicable law. These test factors or points of contact or
connecting factors could be any of the following: (1) the
nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of
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sojourn, or his origin; (2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such
as a corporation; (3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a
thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is
decisive when real rights are involved; (4) the place where an act
has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract
has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort
committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts
and torts; (5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect,
e.g., the place of performance of contractual duties, or the place
where a power of attorney is to be exercised; (6) the intention of the
contracting parties as to the law that should govern their
agreement, the lex loci intentionis; (7) the place where judicial or
administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex forithe
law of the forumis particularly important because, as we have
seen earlier, matters of procedure not going to the substance of the
claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies
whenever the content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is
excluded from application in a given case for the reason that it falls
under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically
all legal relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such.
It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts of
affreightment. (Italics ours.)
Same; Same; Same; Torts; Where the action is one involving
torts, the connecting factor or point of contact could be the place
or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred; The
Philippines is the situs of the tort where it is in the Philippines
where the defendant allegedly deceived the plaintiff, a citizen
residing and working here, and the fact that certain acts or parts of
the injury occurred in another country is of no moment, for what is
important is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the
injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights
of the plaintiff
473
473
had lodged.Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is

one involving torts, the connecting factor or point of contact
could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci
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actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case,

we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the
place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because
it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private
respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her,
she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of
its rights and in the performance of its duties, act with justice, give
her her due and observe honesty and good faith. Instead,
petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or
parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no
moment. For in our view what is important here is the place where
the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person,
reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had
lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent).
All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs
of the alleged tort.
Same; Same; Same; Same; State of the Most Significant
Relationship Rule; The State of the most significant relationship
rule is the appropriate modern theory on tort liability to apply in
the instant case.With the widespread criticism of the traditional
rule of lex loci delicti commissi, modern theories and rules on tort
liability have been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to
arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the modern theories
on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the State of the
most significant relationship rule, which in our view should be
appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of this case. In
applying said principle to determine the State which has the most
significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into
account and evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where the injury
occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties; and (d) the place
where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the Philippines is the
situs of the tort complained of and the place having the most
interest in the problem, the Philippine law on tort liability should
have
474
474
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paramount application to and control in the resolution of the legal

issues arising therein.As already discussed, there is basis for the
claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines.
There is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident
Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign
corporation engaged here in the business of international air
carriage. Thus, the relationship between the parties was centered
here, although it should be stressed that this suit is not based on
mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that the
Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter in this
dispute, raised by private respondent as plaintiff below against
defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has been properly
established. Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is
the situs of the tort complained of and the place having the most
interest in the problem, we find, by way of recapitulation, that the
Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount application
to and control in the resolution of the legal issues arising out of this
case. Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the complaint;
the appropriate venue is in Quezon City, which could properly
apply Philippine law.
Same; Pleadings and Practice; Evidence; A party whose cause of
action is based on a Philippine law has no obligation to plead and
prove the law of another State.We find untenable petitioners
insistence that [s]ince private respondent instituted this suit, she
has the burden of pleading and proving the applicable Saudi law on
the matter. As aptly said by private respondent, she has no
obligation to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia since her cause of action is based on Articles 19 and 21 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and
subsequent pleadings, she never alleged that Saudi law should
govern this case. And as correctly held by the respondent appellate
court, considering that it was the petitioner who was invoking the
applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, then the burden was on it
[petitioner] to plead and to establish what the law of Saudi Arabia
is.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court

of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioner.
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475
475
Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar & Asuncion Law Offices for

private respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the1 Rules
of Court seeks to annul and set aside 2the Resolution dated
September 27, 1995 and
the Decision dated April 410, 1996
3
of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 36533, and
the
5
6
7
Orders dated August 29, 1994 and February 2, 1995 that
8
were issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-93-18394.
The pertinent antecedent facts which gave rise 9 to the
instant petition, as stated in the questioned Decision, are as
follows:
On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a
Flight Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. x x
x
On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia,
plaintiff went to a disco dance with fellow crew members Thamer
AlGazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Because it
was almost morning when they returned to their hotels, they agreed
to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer. When they were
in te (sic) room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly after he did,
________________
1
Annex A, PETITION, October 13, 1995; rollo, p. 36.
Annex A, SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION, April 30, 1996; rollo, pp. 88-102.

Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo L1. Salas, and concurred in by
Associate Justice Jorge S. Imperial and Associate Justice Pacita CaizaresNye.

4
Entitled Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. Hon. Judge Rodolfo A. Ortiz, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon

City and Milagros P. Morada.
5
Issued by respondent Judge Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz of Branch 89, Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City.

6
Annex B, PETITION, October 13, 1995; rollo, pp. 37-39.
Annex B, PETITION, October 13, 1995; rollo, p. 40.
Entitled Milagros P. Morada vs. Saudi Arabian Airlines.
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9
Supra, note 2.
476
476

Thamer attempted to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and

several security personnel heard her cries for help and rescued her.
Later, the Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and Allah
Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several
SAUDIA officials interrogated her about the Jakarta incident. They
then requested her to go back to Jakarta to help arrange the release
of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal Officer Sirah
Akkad and base manager Baharini negotiated with the police for
the immediate release of the detained crew members but did not
succeed because plaintiff refused to cooperate. She was afraid that
she might be tricked into something she did not want because of her
inability to understand the local dialect. She also declined to sign a
blank paper and a document written in the local dialect. Eventually,
SAUDIA allowed plaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred her from
the Jakarta flights.
Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi
Arabian government, the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport
Thamer and Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they
were again put in service by defendant SAUDIA (sic). In September
1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the
Jakarta incident was already behind her, her superiors requested
her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the
police station where the police took her passport and questioned her
about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police
put pressure on her to make a statement dropping the case against
Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the police
return her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight
out of Jeddah.
One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, a few minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila,
plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to
take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal
Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA
office brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a
document written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary
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to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out,

plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on June
27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
477
477

Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to
report to Jeddah once again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for
further investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from
SAUDIAs Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the investigation
was routinary and that it posed no danger to her.
In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same
Saudi court on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June
28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an
interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one hour of
interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as her
plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the
airline had forbidden her to take flight. At the Inflight Service
Office where she was told to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick
took away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah, at the
crew quarters, until further orders.
On July 3, 1993, a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff
to the same court where the judge, to her astonishment and shock,
rendered a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to
five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she
realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer
and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff
guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to
the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing
with the
10
male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.
Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her

employer, petitioner SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was
denied any assistance. She then asked the Philippine
Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal.
Meanwhile, to pay for her upkeep, she worked on the
domestic flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer
and Allah
11
continued to serve in the international flights.
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of
Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to12
leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila,
she was
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________________
10
Decision, pp. 2-4; see rollo, pp. 89-91.
11
Private respondents Comment; rollo, p. 50.
12
Ibid., pp. 50-51.

478
478

terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being

informed of the cause.
13
On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint for
damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi (AlBalawi), its country manager.
On January
19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion
14
To Dismiss which raised the following grounds, to wit: (1)
that the Complaint states no cause of action against
SAUDIA; (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in
interest; (3) that the claim or demand set forth in the
Complaint has been waived, abandoned or otherwise
extinguished; and (4) that the trial court has no jurisdiction
to try the case.
On February 10, 151994, Morada filed her Opposition
(To
16
Motion to Dismiss). SAUDIA filed a reply thereto on
March 3, 1994.
17
On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an Amended Complaint
wherein Al-Balawi was dropped as party defendant. On
August 11, 1994, SAUDIA filed its 18Manifestation and
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint.
19
The trial court issued an Order dated August 29, 1994
denying the Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by
SAUDIA.
20
From the Order of respondent Judge denying the
Motion to Dismiss, SAUDIA21filed on September 20, 1994, its
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated August 29,
1994. It alleged that the trial court has no jurisdiction to
hear and try
________________
13
Dated November 19, 1993, and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-
18394, Branch 89, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

14
Dated January 14, 1994.
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15
Dated February 4, 1994.
16
Reply dated March 1, 1994.
17
Records, pp. 65-84.
18
Rollo, p. 65.
19
Supra, note 6.
20
Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz.
21
Dated September 19, 1994.

479
479
the case on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code, since the
proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi
22
Arabia. On October 14, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition
(To Defendants 23
Motion for Reconsideration).
In the Reply filed with the trial court on October 24,
1994, SAUDIA alleged that since its Motion for
Reconsideration raised lack of jurisdiction as its cause of
action, the Omnibus Motion Rule does not apply, even if
that ground is raised for the first time on appeal.
Additionally, SAUDIA alleged that the Philippines does not
have any substantial interest in the prosecution of the
instant case, and hence, without jurisdiction to adjudicate
the same.
24
Respondent Judge subsequently issued another Order
dated February 2, 1995, denying SAUDIAs Motion for
Reconsideration. The pertinent portion of the assailed Order
reads as follows:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration of defendant Saudi
Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel, on September 20, 1994, and
the Opposition thereto of the plaintiff filed, thru counsel, on October
14, 1994, as well as the Reply therewith of defendant Saudi
Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel, on October 24, 1994,
considering that a perusal of the plaintiffs Amended Complaint,
which is one for the recovery of actual, moral and exemplary
damages plus attorneys fees, upon the basis of the applicable
Philippine law, Article 21 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines,
is, clearly, within the jurisdiction of this Court as regards the subject
matter, and there being nothing new of substance which might
cause the reversal or modification of the order sought to be
reconsidered, the motion for reconsideration of the defendant, is
DENIED.
25
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25
SO ORDERED.
Consequently, on February 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed its

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
Issuance of
________________
22
Records, pp. 108-116.
23
Records, pp. 117-128.
24
Supra, note 7.
25
Ibid.
480
480

Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary
26
Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated
a Resolution
27
with Temporary Restraining Order dated February 23,
1995, prohibiting the respondent Judge from further
conducting any proceeding, unless otherwise directed, in the
interim.
28
In another Resolution promulgated on September 27,
1995, now assailed, the appellate court denied SAUDIAs
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
dated February 18, 1995, to wit:
The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is
hereby DENIED, after considering the Answer, with Prayer to
Deny Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Rollo, p. 135) the Reply and
Rejoinder, it appearing that herein petitioner is not clearly entitled
thereto (Unciano Paramedical College, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et
al., G.R. No. 100335, April 7, 1993, Second Division).
SO ORDERED.
On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA

filed with this Honorable
29
Court the instant Petition for Review with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order dated October 13, 1995.
However, during the pendency of the instant Petition,
30
respondent Court of Appeals rendered the Decision dated
April 10, 1996, now also assailed. It ruled that the
Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the
Amended Complaints basis for recovery of damages is
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Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the

jurisdiction of respondent Court. It further held that
certiorari is not the proper remedy in a denial of a Motion to
Dismiss, inasmuch as the petitioner should have proceeded
to trial, and in case of an adverse ruling, find recourse in an
appeal.
________________
26
Dated February 18, 1995; see supra, note 4.
27
Supra, note 7.
28
Records, p. 180.
29
Rollo, pp. 1-44.
30
Supra, note 2.
481
481
On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for

31
Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
dated April 30, 1996, given due course by32 this Court. After
both parties submitted their Memoranda, the instant case
is now deemed submitted for decision.
Petitioner SAUDIA raised the following issues:
I.
The trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try Civil Case No. Q93-18394 based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code since the proper
law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia inasmuch
as this case involves what is known in private international law as a
conflicts problem. Otherwise, the Republic of the Philippines will sit
in judgment of the acts done by another sovereign state which is
abhorred.
II.
Leave of court before filing a supplemental pleading is not a
jurisdictional requirement. Besides, the matter as to absence of
leave of court is now moot and academic when this Honorable Court
required the respondents to comment on petitioners April 30, 1996
Supplemental Petition For Review With Prayer For A Temporary
Restraining Order Within Ten (10) Days From Notice Thereof.
Further, the Revised Rules of Court should be construed with
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liberality pursuant to Section 2, Rule 1 thereof.

III.
Petitioner received on April 22, 1996 the April 10, 1996 decision
in CA-G.R. SP No. 36533 entitled Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Hon.
Rodolfo A. Ortiz, et al. and filed its April 30, 1996 Supplemental
Petition For Review With Prayer For A Temporary Restraining
Order on May 7, 1996 at 10:29 a.m. or within the 15-day
reglementary period as provided for under Section 1, Rule 45 of the
Revised
________________
31
Rollo, pp. 80-86.
32
Memorandum for Petitioner dated October 9, 1996, rollo, pp. 149-180; and
Memorandum for Private Respondent, October 30, 1996, rollo, pp. 182-210.
482
482

Rules of Court. Therefore, the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 36533 has

not yet become final and executory
and this Honorable Court can
33
take cognizance of this case.
From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents, the

following issues emerge for our resolution:
I.
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
CITY HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY CIVIL CASE NO.
Q-93-18394 ENTITLED MILAGROS P. MORADA V. SAUDI
ARABIAN AIRLINES.
II.
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
RULING THAT IN THIS CASE PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULD
GOVERN.
Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict of laws

that must be settled at the outset. It maintains that private
respondents claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in
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the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of

a foreign element qualifies the instant case for the
application of the law of the Kingdom of34 Saudi Arabia, by
virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule.
On the other hand, private respondent contends35 that
since
her Amended Complaint is based on Articles 19 and
36
21 of
________________
33
Rollo, pp. 157-159. All caps in the original.
34
Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 14, rollo, p. 162.
35
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
36
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall

compensate the latter for the damages.
483
483
the Civil Code,

then the instant case is properly a matter of
37
domestic law.
Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this case,
there is no dispute that the interplay of events occurred in
two states, the Philippines and Saudi Arabia.
As stated
by private respondent in her Amended
38
Complaint dated June 23, 1994:
2. Defendant SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES or
SAUDIA is a foreign airlines corporation doing
business in the Philippines. It may be served with
summons and other court processes at Travel Wide
Associated Sales (Phils.), Inc., 3rd Floor, Cougar
Building, 114 Valero St., Salcedo Village, Makati,
Metro Manila.x x x x x x x x x
6. Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of
the Saudi Arabian government, the Indonesian
authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after
two weeks of detention. Eventually, they were again
put in service by defendant SAUDIA. In September
1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to
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Manila.
7. On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought
that the Jakarta incident was already behind her,
her superiors requested her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy,
Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the
police station where the police took her passport and
questioned her about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy
simply stood by as the police put pressure on her to
make a statement dropping the case against Thamer
and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the
police return her passport and allowed her to catch
the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
8. One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutes before the
departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not
allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to
take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Meniewy, the
Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a
certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought her to a
Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document
written in Arabic. They told her that this was
necessary to close the case against Thamer and
Allah. As it
________________
37
Memorandum for Private Respondent, p. 9, rollo, p. 190.
38
Records, pp. 65-71.

484
484

turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before

the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to
Manila.
9. Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned
plaintiff to report to Jeddah once again and see
Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further investigation.
Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from
SAUDIAs Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the
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investigation was routinary and that it posed no

danger to her.
10. In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff
to the same Saudi court on June 27, 1993. Nothing
happened then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge
interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about
the Jakarta incident. After one hour of
interrogation, they let her go. At the airport,
however, just as her plane was about to take off, a
SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had
forbidden her to take that flight. At the Inflight
Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary
of Mr. Yahya Saddick took away her passport and
told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew quarters,
until further orders.
11. On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again
escorted plaintiff to the same court where the judge,
to her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision,
translated to her in English, sentencing her to five
months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then
did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her,
together with Thamer and Allah, for what happened
in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1)
adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing, and listening
to the music in violation of Islamic laws; (3)
socializing with the male crew, in contravention of
Islamic tradition.
12. Because SAUDIA refused to lend her a hand in the
case, plaintiff sought the help of the Philippine
Embassy in Jeddah. The latter helped her pursue
an appeal from the decision of the court. To pay for
her upkeep, she worked on the domestic flights of
defendant SAUDIA while, ironically, Thamer
and
39
Allah freely served the international flights.
Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the
existence of a foreign element, we agree with petitioner that
the problem herein could present a conflicts case.
A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is
affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to
________________
39
Supra, note 17, pp. 65-68.
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485
485
contain a foreign element. The presence of a foreign

element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of
individuals and associations are rarely confined
to the
40
geographic limits of their birth or conception.
The41 forms in which this foreign element may appear are
many. The foreign element may simply consist in the fact
that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a
foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one
State involves properties situated in another State. In other
42
cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form.
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the
fact that private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine
national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign
corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada
with the petitioner SAUDIA as a flight stewardess, events
did transpire during her many occasions of travel across
national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a
conflicts situation to arise.
We thus find private respondents assertion that the case
is purely domestic, imprecise. A conflicts problem
presents
43
itself here, and the question of jurisdiction confronts the
court a quo.
After a careful 44study of the private respondents
Amended Complaint, and the Comment thereon, we note
that she aptly predicated her cause of action on Articles 19
and 21 of the New Civil Code.
On one hand, Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides:
________________
40
Salonga, Private International Law, 1995 edition, p. 3.
41
Ibid., citing Cheshire and North, Private International Law, p. 5 by
P.M. North and J.J. Faucett (Butterworths; London, 1992).

42
Ibid.
43
Paras, Philippine Conflict of Laws, sixth edition (1984), p. 24, citing
Leflar, The Law of Conflict of Laws, pp. 5-6.

44
Supra, note 17.

486
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486

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith.
On the other hand, Article 21 of the New Civil Code

provides:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for damages.
Thus, in45 Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs. Court of

Appeals, this Court held that:
The aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to
expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate
legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the
statutes.
Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law,

Article 21 gives flesh to its provisions. Thus, we agree with
private respondents assertion that violations of Articles 19
and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies
in the municipal forum.
46
Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint,
47
read in the light of the Rules of Court on jurisdiction we
find that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City48
possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.
Its authority
________________
45
83 SCRA 237, 247.
46
Supra, note 17, at p. 6. Morada prays that judgment be rendered
against SAUDIA, ordering it to pay: (1) not less than P250,000.00 as

actual damages; (2) P4 million in moral damages; (3) P500,000.00 in
exemplary damages; and (4) P500,000.00 in attorneys fees.
47
48
Baguioro v. Barrios, 77 Phil. 120.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is
defined as the authority of a court to hear and decide cases of the
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487
487
to try and hear the case is provided for under Section 1 of

Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
x x x x x x x x x
(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and
cost or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in
Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned
items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
(Emphasis ours)
x x x x x x x x x
And following Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of

Courtthe venue, Quezon City, is appropriate:
SEC. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance.[Now Regional Trial
Court]
(a) x x x x x x x x x
(b) Personal actions.All other actions may be commenced and
tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may
be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides, at the
election of the plaintiff.
Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the

parties, also weigh heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon City
assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of
the litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained
is quite obvious. Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair
trial are equally important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of
an inconvenient forum, vex, harass, or oppress the
defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense or
disturbance.
________________
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general class to which the proceedings in question belong. (Reyes v.

Diaz, 73 Phil. 484, 487)
488
488

But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant,

49
the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a
quo found it best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it
refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing
plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action
elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no
longer maintains substantial connections. That would have
caused a fundamental unfairness to her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no
unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been
shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the
plaintiff (now private respondent) should be upheld.
Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over
the persons of the parties herein. By filing her Complaint
and Amended Complaint with the trial court, private
respondent has voluntarily submitted herself to the
jurisdiction of the court.
The records 50show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed
several motions praying for the dismissal of Moradas
Amended Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an Answer In Ex
Abundante Cautelam dated February 20, 1995. What is
very patent and explicit from the motions filed, is that
SAUDIA prayed for other reliefs under the premises.
Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has effectively submitted to
the trial courts jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of
the Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of
jurisdiction.
________________
49
Supra, note 37, p. 58, citing Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, 350
U.S. 501, 67 Sup. Ct. 839 (1947).

50
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss dated January 14, 1994; Reply (to
Plaintiffs Opposition) dated February 19, 1994; Comment (to Plaintiffs

Motion to Admit Amended Complaint dated June 23, 1994) dated July 20,
1994; Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint dated
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June
23,
1994
under
date
August
11,
1994;
and
Motion
for
Reconsideration dated September 19, 1994.

489
489
As held
by this Court in Republic vs. Ker and Company,
51
Ltd.:
We observe that the motion to dismiss filed on April 14, 1962, aside
from disputing the lower courts jurisdiction over defendants
person, prayed for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
plaintiffs cause of action has prescribed. By interposing such second
ground in its motion to dismiss, Ker and Co., Ltd. availed of an
affirmative defense on the basis of which it prayed the court to
resolve controversy in its favor. For the court to validly decide the
said plea of defendant Ker & Co., Ltd., it necessarily had to acquire
jurisdiction upon the latters person, who, being the proponent of
the affirmative defense, should be deemed to have abandoned its
special appearance and voluntarily submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the court.
Similarly, the case of De Midgely vs. Ferandos, held that:

When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to
the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole
and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If
his motion is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction
of the court over his person, he thereby submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. A special appearance by motion made for
the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person will be held to be a general appearance, if the party in said
motion should, for example, ask for a dismissal of the action upon
the further ground
that the court had no jurisdiction over the
52
subject matter.
Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Thus, we find that the
trial court has jurisdiction over the case and that its
exercise thereof, justified.
As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-oflaw problems seek to answer two important questions: (1)
What legal system should control a given situation where
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________________
51
18 SCRA 207, 213-214.
52
64 SCRA 23, 31.

490
490

some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states;

and (2) to what extent
should the chosen legal system
53
regulate the situation.
Several theories have been propounded in order to
identify the legal system that should ultimately control.
Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should
intrinsically advance both notions of justice and
predictability, they do not always do so. The forum is then
faced with the problem of deciding
which of these two
54
important values should be stressed.
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to
determine under what category a certain set of facts or rules
fall. This process is known as characterization, or the
doctrine of qualification. It is the process of deciding
whether or not the facts relate to55 the kind of question
specified in a conflicts rule.
The purpose of
characterization
is to enable the forum to select the proper
56
law.
Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation,
57
but a factual situation, event, or operative fact. An
essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a test
or connecting factor or point of contact. Choice-of-law
rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as
property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or
point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of
celebration, 58the place of performance, or the place of
wrongdoing.
Note that one or more circumstances may be present to
serve as the possible test for the determination of the
applica________________
53
Coquia and Pangalangan, Conflict of Laws, 1995 edition, p. 65,
citing Von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60

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Cornell L. Rev. 927 (1975).

54
Ibid.
55
Supra, note 40 at p. 94, citing Falconbridge, Essays on the Conflict
of Laws, p. 50.
56
57
Ibid.
Supra, note 37 at p. 136; cf. Mussbaum, Principle of Private
International Law, p. 173; and Rabel, The Conflict of Laws: A

Comparative Study, pp. 51-52.
58
Supra, note 37, p. 137.

491
491

59
ble law. These test factors or points of contact or

connecting factors could be any of the following:
(1) the nationality of a person, his domicile, his
residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a
corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing
is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex
situs is decisive when real rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus,
such as the place where a contract has been made, a
marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort
committed. The lex loci actus is particularly
important in contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into
effect, e.g., the place of performance of contractual
duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be
exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law
that should govern their agreement, the lex loci
intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative
proceedings are instituted or done. The lex forithe
law of the forumis particularly important because,
as we have seen earlier, matters of procedure not
going to the substance of the claim involved are
governed by it; and because the lex fori applies
whenever the content of the otherwise applicable
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foreign law is excluded from application in a given

case for the reason that it falls under one of the
exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of
practically all legal relationships of the ship and of
its master or owner as such. It also covers
contractual relationships
particularly contracts of
60
affreightment. (Italics ours.)
After a careful study of the pleadings on record, including
allegations in the Amended Complaint deemed admitted for
purposes of the motion to dismiss, we are convinced that
there is reasonable basis for private respondents assertion
that
________________
59
Ibid.
60
Supra, note 37 at pp. 138-139.

492
492

although she was already working in Manila, petitioner

brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would
merely testify in an investigation of the charges she made
against the two SAUDIA crew members for the attack on
her person while they were in Jakarta. As it turned out, she
was the one made to face trial for very serious charges,
including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and
tradition.
There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that
the handing over or turning over of the person of private
respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner may have acted
beyond its duties as employer. Petitioners purported act
contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused
additional humiliation, misery and suffering of private
respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitated the
arrest, detention and prosecution of private respondent
under the guise of petitioners authority as employer, taking
advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she reposed
upon it. As purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the
alleged conviction and imprisonment of private respondent
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was wrongful. But these capped the injury or harm allegedly

inflicted upon her person and reputation, for which
petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide
compensation or redress for the wrongs done, once duly
proven.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one
involving torts, the connecting factor or point of contact
could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex
loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a
conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a
situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct
took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where
petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina
residing and working here. According to her, she had
honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its
rights and in the performance of its duties, act with justice,
give her her due and observe honesty and good faith.
Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That
certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in
another country is of no moment. For in our view what is
important here is the place where the
493
493
over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the

person, reputation, social standing and human rights of
complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below
(herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis
to identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional
rule of lex loci61 delicti commissi, modern theories and rules on
tort liability have been advanced to offer fresh judicial
approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with
the modern theories on tort liability, we find here an
occasion to apply the State of the most significant
relationship rule, which in our view should be appropriate
to apply now, given the factual context of this case.
In applying said principle to determine the State which
has the most significant relationship, the following contacts
are to be taken into account and evaluated according to
their relative importance with respect to the particular
issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place
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where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the

domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties; and (d) the place where
the
62
relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that
overall injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There
is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident
Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign
corporation engaged here in the business of international
air carriage. Thus, the relationship between the parties
was centered here, although it should be stressed that this
suit is not based on mere labor law violations. From the
record, the claim that the Philippines has the most
significant contact
________________
61
Includes the (1) German rule of elective concurrence; (2) State of the
most significant relationship rule (the Second Restatement of 1969); (3)

State-interest analysis; and (4) Cavers Principle of Preference.
62
Supra, note 37, p. 396.

494
494

63
with the matter in this dispute, raised by private

respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein
petitioner), in our view, has been properly established.
Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the
situs of the tort complained of and the place having the
most interest in the problem, we find, by way of
recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort liability
should have paramount application to and control in the
resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case.
Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court
has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of
the complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon City,
which could properly apply Philip-pine law. Moreover, we
find untenable petitioners insistence that [s]ince private
respondent instituted this suit, she has the burden of
pleading64 and proving the applicable Saudi law on the
matter. As aptly said by private respondent, she has no
obligation to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of
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Saudi Arabia since her cause of action is based on Articles

19 and 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. In her
Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings, she
never
65
alleged that Saudi law should govern this case. And as
correctly held by the respondent appellate court,
considering that it was the petitioner who was invoking the
applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, then the burden
was on it [petitioner]
to plead and to establish what the law
66
of Saudi Arabia is.
Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent
appellate court in upholding the trial courts denial of
defendants (herein petitioners) motion to dismiss the case.
Not only was jurisdiction in order and venue properly laid,
but appeal after trial was obviously available, and
expeditious trial itself indicated by the nature of the case at
hand. Indubitably, the
________________
63
Supra, note 59, p. 79, citing Ruben v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y.
288, 305, 113 N.E. 2d 424, 431.

64
Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 22; rollo, p. 170.
65
Memorandum for Private Respondent, pp. 21-22; rollo, pp. 202-203.
66
CA Decision, p. 10; rollo, p. 97.

495
495
Philippines is the state intimately concerned with the

ultimate outcome of the case below, not just for the benefit of
all the litigants, but also for the vindication of the countrys
system of law and justice in a transnational setting. With
these guidelines in mind, the trial court must proceed to try
and adjudge the case in the light of relevant Philippine law,
with due consideration of the foreign element or elements
involved. Nothing said herein, of course, should be
construed as prejudging the results of the case in any
manner whatsoever.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is
hereby DISMISSED Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 entitled
Milagros P. Morada vs. Saudi Arabia Airlines is hereby
REMANDED to Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 89 for further proceedings.
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SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and
Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed, Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 remanded
to lower court.
Notes.Forum-shopping originated as a concept in
private international law, where non-resident litigants are
given the option to choose the forum or place wherein to
bring their suit for various reasons or excuses, including to
secure procedural advantages, to annoy and harass the
defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a more
friendly venue. (First Philippine International Bank vs.
Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 259 [1996])
After having acquired jurisdiction over a plaintiff foreign
corporation by virtue of the filing of the original complaint,
the Philippine court now has the discretion, based on the
facts of the case, to either give due course to the suit or
dismiss it, on the principle of forum non conveniens.
(Communication Materials and Design, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 260 SCRA 673 [1996])
o0o
496
496

Everett Steamship Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 122494. October 8, 1998.
EVERETT STEAMSHIP CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and HERNANDEZ TRADING CO.,
INC., respondents.
Common Carriers; Contracts; Bills of Lading; A stipulation in
the bill of lading limiting the common carriers liability for loss or
destruction of a cargo to a certain sum, unless the shipper or owner
declares a greater value, is sanctioned by law.A stipulation in the
bill of lading limiting the common carriers liability for loss or
destruction of a cargo to a certain sum, unless the shipper or owner
declares a greater value, is sanctioned by law, particularly Articles
1749 and 1750 of the Civil Code.
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Same; Same; Same; Contracts of Adhesion; Contracts of adhe-L;

sion are not invalid per se.The trial courts ratiocination that
private respondent could not have fairly and freely agreed to the
limited liability clause in the bill of lading because the said
conditions were printed in small letters does not make the bill of
lading invalid. We ruled in PAL, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals that the
juris-prudence on the matter reveals the consistent holding of the
court that contracts of adhesion are not invalid per se and that it
has on numerous occasions upheld the binding effect thereof. Also,
in Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Sweet Lines,
Inc. this Court, speaking through the learned Justice Florenz D. Regalado, held: x x x Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, et al., instructs us
that contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready-made
form of contract on the other x x x are contracts not entirely
prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to
reject it entirely; if he adheres he gives his consent. In the present
case, not even an allegation of ignorance of a party excuses noncompliance with the contractual stipulations since the responsibility
for ensuring full comprehension of the provisions of a contract of
carriage devolves not on the carrier but on the owner, shipper, or
consignee as the case may be. (Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Greater vigilance is required of the
courts when dealing with contracts of adhesion in that the said
con________________
*
SECOND DIV ISION.
497
497
tracts must be carefully scrutinized in order to shield the unwary

(or weaker party) from deceptive schemes contained in ready-made
contracts.Greater vigilance, however, is required of the courts
when dealing with contracts of adhesion in that the said contracts
must be carefully scrutinized in order to shield the unwary (or
weaker party) from deceptive schemes contained in ready-made
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covenants, such as the bill of lading in question. The stringent

requirement which the courts are enjoined to observe is in
recognition of Article 24 of the Civil Code which mandates that (i)n
all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties
is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance,
indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the
courts must be vigilant for his protection.
Same; Same; Same; Even if the consignee is not a signatory to
the contract of carriage between the shipper and the carrier, the
consignee can still be bound by the contract.The next issue to be
resolved is whether or not private respondent, as consignee, who is
not a signatory to the bill of lading is bound by the stipulations
thereof. Again, in Sea-Land Service, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court (supra), we held that even if the consignee was not a
signatory to the contract of carriage between the shipper and the
carrier, the consignee can still be bound by the contract. Speaking
through Mr. Chief Justice Narvasa, we ruled: To begin with, there
is no question of the right, in principle, of a consignee in a bill of
lading to recover from the carrier or shipper for loss of, or damage to
goods being transported under said bill, although that document
may have beenas in practice it oftentimes isdrawn up only by
the consignor and the carrier without the intervention of the
consignee. x x x.
Same; Same; Same; When the consignee formally claims
reimbursement for the missing goods from the common carrier and
subsequently files a case against the latter based on the very same
bill of lading, it accepts the provisions of the contract and thereby
makes itself a party thereto.When private respondent formally
claimed reimbursement for the missing goods from petitioner and
subsequently filed a case against the latter based on the very same
bill of lading, it (private respondent) accepted the provisions of the
contract and thereby made itself a party thereto, or at least has
come to court to enforce it. Thus, private respondent cannot now
reject or disregard the carriers limited liability stipulation in the bill
of lading. In
498
498

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other words, private respondent is bound by the whole stipulations

in the bill of lading and must respect the same.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court

of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Soo, Gutierrez, Leogardo & Lee for petitioner.
Atilano Huaben B. Lim for private respondent.
MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner Everett Steamship Corporation, through
this
1
petition for review, seeks the reversal of the decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated June 14, 1995, in CA-G.R. No.
428093, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Kalookan City, Branch 126, in Civil Case No. C15532, finding petitioner liable to private respondent
Hernan-dez Trading Co., Inc. for the value of the lost cargo.
Private respondent imported three crates of bus spare
parts marked as MARCO C/No. 12, MARCO C/No. 13 and
MARCO C/No. 14, from its supplier, Maruman Trading
Company, Ltd. (Maruman Trading), a foreign corporation
based in Inazawa, Aichi, Japan. The crates were shipped
from
Nagoya,
Japan
to
Manila
on
board
ADELFAEVERETTE, a vessel owned by petitioners
principal, Everett Orient Lines. The said crates were
covered by Bill of Lading No. NGO53MN.
Upon arrival of the port of Manila, it was discovered that
the crate marked MARCO C/No. 14 was missing. This was
confirmed and admitted by petitioner in its letter of January
13, 1992 addressed to private respondent, which thereafter
made a formal claim upon petitioner for the value of the lost
cargo amounting to One Million Five Hundred Fifty Two
________________
1
Penned by Justice Pacita Canizares-Nye and concurred in by Justices
Conchita Carpio-Morales and Antonio P. Solano; Rollo, pp. 33-40.

499
499
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Thousand Five Hundred (1,552,500.00) Yen, the amount

shown in an Invoice No. MTM-941, dated November 14,
1991. However, petitioner offered to pay only One Hundred
Thousand (100,000.00) Yen, the maximum amount
stipulated under Clause 18 of the covering bill of lading
which limits the liability of petitioner.
Private respondent rejected the offer and thereafter
instituted a suit for collection docketed as Civil Case No. C15532, against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, Branch 126.
At the pre-trial conference, both parties manifested that
they have no testimonial evidence to offer and agreed
instead to file their respective memoranda.
2
On July 16, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in
favor of private respondent, ordering petitioner to pay: (a)
1,552,500.00; (b) 20,000.00 or its peso equivalent
representing the actual value of the lost cargo and the
material and packaging cost; (c) 10% of the total amount as
an award for and as contingent attorneys fees; and (d) to
pay the cost of the suit. The trial court ruled:
Considering defendants categorical admission of loss and its failure
to overcome the presumption of negligence and fault, the Court
conclusively finds defendant liable to the plaintiff. The next point of
inquiry the Court wants to resolve is the extent of the liability of the
defendant. As stated earlier, plaintiff contends that defendant
should be held liable for the whole value for the loss of the goods in
the amount of 1,552,500.00 because the terms appearing at the
back of the bill of lading was so written in fine prints and that the
same was not signed by plaintiff or shipper thus, they are not
bound by the clause stated in paragraph 18 of the bill of lading. On
the other hand, defendant merely admitted that it lost the shipment
but shall be liable only up to the amount of 100,000.00.
The Court subscribes to the provisions of Article 1750 of the New
Civil Code
Art. 1750. A contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner
or shipper for the loss, destruction or de________________
2
Penned by Judge Oscar M. Payawal, Rollo, pp. 43-50.
500
500
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terioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under

the circumstances, and has been fairly and freely agreed upon.
It is required, however, that the contract must be reasonable
and just under the circumstances and has been fairly and freely
agreed upon. The requirements provided in Art. 1750 of the New
Civil Code must be complied with before a common carrier can claim
a limitation of its pecuniary liability in case of loss, destruction of
deterioration of the goods it has undertaken to transport.
In the case at bar, the Court is of the view that the
requirements of said article have not been met. The fact that those
conditions are printed at the back of the bill of lading in letters so
small that they are hard to read would not warrant the presumption
that the plaintiff or its supplier was aware of these conditions such
that he had fairly and freely agreed to these conditions. It can not
be said that the plaintiff had actually entered into a contract with
the defendant, embodying the conditions as printed at the back of
the bill of lading that was issued by the defendant to plaintiff.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals deleted the award of

attorneys fees but affirmed the trial courts findings with
the additional observation that private respondent can not
be bound by the terms and conditions of the bill of lading
because it was not privy to the contract of carriage. It said:
As to the amount of liability, no evidence appears on record to show
that the appellee (Hernandez Trading Co.) consented to the terms of
the Bill of Lading. The shipper named in the Bill of Lading is
Maruman Trading Co., Ltd. whom the appellant (Everett Steamship
Corp.) contracted with for the transportation of the lost goods.
Even assuming arguendo that the shipper Maruman Trading
Co., Ltd. accepted the terms of the bill of lading when it delivered
the cargo to the appellant, still it does not necessarily follow that
appellee Hernandez Trading Company as consignee is bound
thereby considering that the latter was never privy to the shipping
contract.
x x x x x x x x x
Never having entered into a contract with the appellant,
appellee should therefore not be bound by any of the terms and
conditions in the bill of lading.
501

501
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Hence, it follows that the appellee may recover the full value of the
shipment lost, the basis of which is not the breach of contract as
appellee was never a privy to the any contract with the appellant,
but is based on Article 1735 of the New Civil Code, there being no
evidence to prove satisfactorily that the appellant has overcome the
presumption of negligence provided for in the law.
Petitioner now comes to us arguing that the Court of

Appeals erred (1) in ruling that the consent of the consignee
to the terms and conditions of the bill of lading is necessary
to make such stipulations binding upon it; (2) in holding
that the carriers limited package liability as stipulated in
the bill of lading does not apply in the instant case; and (3)
in allowing private respondent to fully recover the full
alleged value of its lost cargo.
We shall first resolve the validity of the limited liability
clause in the bill of lading.
A stipulation in the bill of lading limiting the common
carriers liability for loss or destruction of a cargo to a
certain sum, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater
value, is sanctioned by law, particularly Articles 1749 and
1750 of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1749. A stipulation that the common carriers liabilityis
limited to the value of the goods appearing in the bill of
lading,unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value, is
binding.
ART. 1750. A contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the
owner or shipper for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the
goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances,
and has been freely and fairly agreed upon.
Such limited-liability clause has also been

consistently
3
upheld by this Court in a number of cases. Thus, in SeaLand
________________
3
St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. vs. Macondray & Co., 70
SCRA 122 [1976]; Sea Land Services, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 153 SCRA 552 [1987]; Pan American World Airways, Inc. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 164 SCRA 268 [1988]; Phil. Airlines, Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 63 [1996].
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502
502

4
Service, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled:

It seems clear that even if said section 4 (5) of the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act did not exist, the validity and binding effect of the
liability limitation clause in the bill of lading here are nevertheless
fully sustainable on the basis alone of the cited Civil Code
Provisions. That said stipulation is just and reasonable is arguable
from the fact that it echoes Art. 1750 itself in providing a limit to
liability only if a greater value is not declared for the shipment in
the bill of lading. To hold otherwise would amount to questioning
the justness and fairness of the law itself, and this the private
respondent does not pretend to do. But over and above that
consideration, the just and reasonable character of such stipulation
is implicit in it giving the shipper or owner the option of avoiding
accrual of liability limitation by the simple and surely far from
onerous expedient of declaring the nature and value of the
shipment in the bill of lading.
Pursuant to the afore-quoted provisions of law, it is required

that the stipulation limiting the common carriers liability
for loss must be reasonable and just under the
circumstances, and has been freely and fairly agreed upon.
The bill of lading subject of the present controversy
specifically provides, among others:
18. All claims for which the carrier may be liable shall be adjusted
and settled on the basis of the shippers net invoice cost plus freight
and insurance premiums, if paid, and in no event shall the carrier
be liable for any loss of possible profits or any consequential loss.
The carrier shall not be liable for any loss of or any damage to or
in any connection with, goods in an amount exceeding One
Hundred Thousand Yen in Japanese Currency (100,000.00) or its
equivalent in any other currency per package or customary freight
unit (whichever is least) unless the value of the goods higher than
this amount is declared in writing by the shipper before receipt of
the goods by the carrier and inserted in the Bill of Lading and extra
freight is paid as required. (Emphasis supplied)
________________
37/43
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4
153 SCRA 552 [1987].

503
503
The above stipulations are, to our mind, reasonable and

just. In the bill of lading, the carrier made it clear that its
liability would only be up to One Hundred Thousand
(100,000.00) Yen. However, the shipper, Maruman
Trading, had the option to declare a higher valuation if the
value of its cargo was higher than the limited liability of the
carrier. Considering that the shipper did not declare a
higher valuation, it had itself to blame for not complying
with the stipulations.
The trial courts ratiocination that private respondent
could not have fairly and freely agreed to the limited
liability clause in the bill of lading because the said
conditions were printed in small letters does not make the
bill of lading invalid.
5
We ruled in PAL, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals that the
jurisprudence on the matter reveals the consistent holding
of the court that contracts of adhesion are not invalid per se
and that it has on numerous occasions upheld the binding
effect thereof. Also, in Philippine American
General
6
Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Sweet Lines, Inc.
this Court,
speaking through the learned Justice Florenz D. Regalado,
held:
x x x Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, et al., instructs us that
contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready-made
form of contract on the other x x x are contracts not entirely
prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to
reject it entirely; if he adheres he gives his consent. In the present
case, not even an allegation of ignorance of a party excuses noncompliance with the contractual stipulations since the responsibility
for ensuring full comprehension of the provisions of a contract of
carriage devolves not on the carrier but on the owner, shipper, or
consignee as the case may be. (Emphasis supplied)
7
It was further explained in Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals

that stipulations in contracts of adhesion are valid and
binding.
38/43
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________________
5
255 SCRA 48, 58 [1996].
212 SCRA 194, 212-213 [1992].
91 SCRA 223 [1979]; Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
255 SCRA 63 [1996].

504
504

While it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket
x x, he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. Such
provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage,
and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latters
lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation. It is what is known as
a contract of adhesion, in regards which it has been said that
contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready-made form
of contract on the other, as the plane ticket in the case at bar, are
contracts not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the
contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives
his consent. x x x, a contract limiting liability upon an agreed
valuation does not offend against the policy of the law forbidding
one from contracting against his own negligence. (Emphasis
supplied)
Greater vigilance, however, is required of the courts when

dealing with contracts of adhesion in that the said contracts
must be carefully scrutinized in order to shield the unwary
(or weaker party) from8 deceptive schemes contained in
ready-made covenants, such as the bill of lading in
question. The stringent requirement which the courts are
enjoined to observe is in recognition of Article 24 of the Civil
Code which mandates that (i)n all contractual, property or
other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage
on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence,
mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts
must be vigilant for his protection.
The shipper, Maruman Trading, we assume, has been
extensively engaged in the trading business. It can not be
said to be ignorant of the business transactions it entered
into involving the shipment of its goods to its customers.
The shipper could not have known, or should know the
stipulations in the bill of lading and there it should have
39/43
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declared a higher valuation of the goods shipped. Moreover,

Maruman Trading has not been heard to complain that it
has been deceived or
________________
8
Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development Corporation, G.R.
No. 126699, August 7, 1998. See also Qua Chee Gan vs. Law Union and
Rock Insurance Co., Ltd., 98 Phil. 95 [1955].
505
505
rushed into agreeing to ship the cargo in petitioners vessel.

In fact, it was not even impleaded in this case.
The next issue to be resolved is whether or not private
respondent, as consignee, who is not a signatory to the bill of
lading is bound by the stipulations thereof.
Again, in Sea-Land Service, Inc. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court (supra), we held that even if the consignee
was not a signatory to the contract of carriage between the
shipper and the carrier, the consignee can still be bound by
the contract. Speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Narvasa,
we ruled:
To begin with, there is no question of the right, in principle, of a
consignee in a bill of lading to recover from the carrier or shipper for
loss of, or damage to goods being transported under said bill,
although that document may have beenas in practice it oftentimes
isdrawn up only by the consignor and the carrier without the
intervention of the consignee. x x x.
x x x the right of a party in the same situation as respondent
here, to recover for loss of a shipment consigned to him under a bill
of lading drawn up only by and between the shipper and the
carrier, springs from either a relation of agency that may exist
between him and the shipper or consignor, or his status as stranger
in whose favor some stipulation is made in said contract, and who
becomes a party thereto when he demands fulfillment of that
stipulation, in this case the delivery of the goods or cargo shipped.
In neither capacity can he assert personally, in bar to any provision
of the bill of lading, the alleged circumstance that fair and free
agreement to such provision was vitiated by its being in such fine
print as to be hardly readable. Parenthetically, it may be observed
40/43
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that in one comparatively recent case (Phoenix Assurance Company

vs. Macondray & Co., Inc., 64 SCRA 15) where this Court found
that a similar package limitation clause was printed in the
smallest type on the back of the bill of lading, it nonetheless ruled
that the consignee was bound thereby on the strength of authority
holding that such provisions on liability limitation are as much a
part of a bill of lading as though physically in it and as though
placed therein by agreement of the parties.
There can, therefore, be no doubt or equivocation about the
validity and enforceability of freely-agreed-upon stipulations in a
contract of carriage or bill of lading limiting the liability of the
carrier to an agreed valuation unless the shipper declares a higher
value
506
506

and inserts it into said contract or bill. This proposition, moreover,

rests upon an almost uniform weight of authority. (Italics supplied)
When private respondent formally claimed reimbursement

for the missing goods from petitioner and subsequently filed
a case against the latter based on the very same bill of
lading, it (private respondent) accepted the provisions of the
contract and thereby made itself9 a party thereto, or at least
has come to court to enforce it. Thus, private respondent
cannot now reject or disregard the carriers limited liability
stipulation in the bill of lading. In other words, private
respondent is bound by the whole stipulations in the bill of
lading and must respect the same.
Private respondent, however, insists that the carrier
should be liable for the full value of the lost cargo in the
amount of 1,552,500.00, considering that the shipper,
Maruman Trading, had fully declared the shipment x x x,
the contents of each
crate, the dimensions, weight and value
10
of the contents, as shown in the commercial Invoice No.
MTM-941.
This claim was denied by petitioner, contending that it
did not know of the contents, quantity and value of the
shipment which consisted of three pre-packed crates
described in Bill of Lading
No. NGO-53MN merely as 3
11
CASES SPARE PARTS.
The bill of lading in question confirms petitioners
41/43
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contention. To defeat the carriers limited liability, the

aforecited Clause 18 of the bill of lading requires that the
shipper should have declared in writing a higher valuation
of its goods before receipt thereof by the carrier and insert
the said declaration in the bill of lading, with the extra
freight paid. These requirements in the bill of lading were
never complied with by the shipper, hence, the liability of
the carrier under the limited liability clause stands. The
commercial Invoice No. MTM________________
9
See Mendoza vs. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 90 Phil. 836, 845-846.
10
Rollo, p. 116.
11
Rollo, p. 13.
507
507
941 does not in itself sufficiently and convincingly show that

petitioner has knowledge of the value of the cargo as
contended by private respondent. No other evidence was
proffered by private respondent to support its contention.
Thus, we are convinced that petitioner should be liable for
the full value of the lost cargo.
In fine, the liability of petitioner for the loss of the cargo
is limited to One Hundred Thousand (100,000.00) Yen,
pursuant to Clause 18 of the bill of lading.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated June 14, 1995 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 42803 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Actg. C.J.), Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.
Judgment reversed and set aside.
Notes.Parties to sales contracts and/or bills of lading
are bound by arbitration clauses thereat. (Puromines, Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 281 [1993])
The validity of provisions limiting the liability of carriers
contained in bills of lading have been consistently upheld,
42/43
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though the Supreme Court has likewise cautioned against

blind reliance on adhesion contracts where the facts and
circumstances warrant that they should be disregarded.
(Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 48
[1996])
A contract of adhesion is one in which one of the
contracting parties imposes a ready-made form of contract
which the other party may accept or reject, but cannot
modify. (Polotan, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 247
[1998])
o0o
508
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 297

VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998

Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 122191. October 8, 1998.

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 297

Same; Same; Damages; While Article 19 of the Civil Code

FIRST DIV ISION.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 297

Same; Same; Forcing a party to seek remedial action in a place

VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998

Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. Court of Appeals

reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 297

problem of deciding which of these two important values should be

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 297

VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998

Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. Court of Appeals

had lodged.Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 297

actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case,

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 297

Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. Court of Appeals

paramount application to and control in the resolution of the legal

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 297

VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998

Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. Court of Appeals

Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar & Asuncion Law Offices for

Annex A, PETITION, October 13, 1995; rollo, p. 36.

Annex A, SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION, April 30, 1996; rollo, pp. 88-102.

Associate Justice Jorge S. Imperial and Associate Justice Pacita CaizaresNye.

capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon

Issued by respondent Judge Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz of Branch 89, Regional

Trial Court of Quezon City.

Annex B, PETITION, October 13, 1995; rollo, pp. 37-39.

Annex B, PETITION, October 13, 1995; rollo, p. 40.

Entitled Milagros P. Morada vs. Saudi Arabian Airlines.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 297

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Thamer attempted to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 297

to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out,

VOL. 297, OCTOBER 8, 1998

Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. Court of Appeals

Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 297

Decision, pp. 2-4; see rollo, pp. 89-91.

Private respondents Comment; rollo, p. 50.

Ibid., pp. 50-51.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being

18394, Branch 89, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

Dated January 14, 1994.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 297

Dated February 4, 1994.

Reply dated March 1, 1994.

Records, pp. 65-84.