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Engineering Geology, 24 (1987) 207--215

207

Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., Amsterdam -- Printed in The Netherlands

THE TETON DAM F A I L U R E -- A DISCUSSION

E.M. FUCIK

57 South Deere Park Drive, Highland Park, IL 60035 (U.S.A.)


(Accepted for publication December 1986)

This discussion will deal with the " w e t seam" which was discovered in
the spring of 1978, after t he r e p o r t on the failure of T e t o n Dam, prepared
by the Independent Review Panel, had been submitted. The members of the
I n d ep en d en t Panel visited the site in June 1978 and had an o p p o r t u n i t y to
inspect the excavated key trench on the left a b u t m e n t , and t o see the exposed
wet seam in its original condition. After this inspection, each Panel m e m b e r
submitted his c om m e nt s to R.B. Jansen, t h e n Assistant Commissioner of
the Bureau o f Reclamation. Although most of the Panel members believed
that if th e wet seam had been present in the right a b u t m e n t , it would have
been a contributing factor in causing the failure t o occur earlier t han it
would have otherwise, the present writer is, as far as he knows, the onl y
m e m b e r who believes t hat the wet seam m ay well have been t he primary
cause o f the failure of T e t o n Dam.
The presence of the " w e t s e a m " in the left rem nant of T e t o n Dam came
as a complete surprise to everyone c onne c ted with t he project. It was found
when the excavation of the left a b u t m e n t had been carried down t o a b o u t
elevation 5115 MSL, a b o u t 215 ft. below the crest of t he dam. The excavation o f the left a b u t m e n t was under t a ke n in an effort t o uncover any evidence
which might have supported, or refuted, the conclusions regarding the probable failure causes, as put forward in the reports of t he I n d e p e n d e n t Panel
and th e Interior Review Group. The excavation had been com pl et ed down t o
the lowest level of the key t r e n c h in the left a b u t m e n t when the presence of
a wet seam, running the full width of the core, and a b o u t 3 ft. to 5 ft. thick,
was uncovered. This seam was t h e n carefully explored, b o t h by driving a
100 ft. long adit into the seam and drilling some 30 vertical bore holes in t he
left r e m n a n t to determine the ext ent of the wet seam.
The wet seam was determined to be about 3--4 ft. thick, and to cover an
area of at least 5 acres. It was not completely continuous, as seen f r o m t he
exposed face, but lensatic in nature. The material in the seam was very soft
and n o t as dense as t he surrounding dry material. Free water was present in
t he seam, as evidenced by the fact t hat when test pits were dug in the b o t t o m
of th e adit, t h e y filled with water overnight! And this was some t w o years
after the placing of t he fill in this area, and in a location perhaps 100 ft.
above th e ground watertable.

0013-7952/87/$03.50

1987 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.

208
Fig.1 shows a cross-section of the dam, indicating the location of the wet
seam, where it was uncovered. It can be seen that the seam occurred just
above the level at which the dam work was suspended during the winter o f
1974--75. Exploration of the seam by bore holes indicated t h a t t he seam
existed just above the 1974--75 winter shut<lown surface t h r o u g h o u t most
{or all) o f the left dam remnant. Fig.2 is a picture of the wet seam as it
appeared in June 1978, and Fig.3 is a picture of the entrance to the adit
which was excavated into and just above the seam. Fig .4 shows the free water
which collected in the b o t t o m of the adit overnight.
Fig.5 shows a view of the excavated face of the left a b u t m e n t . The wet
seam is seen as a dark area at the b o t t o m of the picture. The dense, dry unif o r m nature of the fill can be seen in contrast to the wet, soft material of the
wet seam.
No clear explanation has been found to explain t he presence of the wet
seam. In a paper delivered to the 13th ICOLD Congress in New Delhi in
1979, Messrs. D.J. Duck, R. W. Kramer, and L.W. Davidson of the U.S.B.R.,
gave a list o f possible causes, as shown in Table I. It can be seen from this
compilation that there was no consensus as to the reason for the existence of
the wet seam.
The original reports of the I nde pe nde nt Panel and the Interior Review
Group b o t h generally agreed t ha t the probable cause of the T e t o n Dam failure
was th e loss of material due to piping of this material from the key t rench
fill into the cracks in the rock sides and the b o t t o m of the trench. This piping led to greater and greater flows into the key t rench causing failure.
Although there are many good theoretical reasons for believing that this was
the cause for the failure, no actual evidence of any piping, or incipient piping was f o u n d either during the excavation of the remaining fill in the key
trench r emn an t on the right a b u t m e n t , or later during the excavation of t he
entire intact k ey trench on the left a b u t m e n t . As seen in Fig.6, t he right abutment k ey trench, and in Fig.7, t he excavated key trench on the left a b u t m e n t ,

r-- ~ DAM
CREST El 53340
~7

WETSPOTS
(~

--

WETSPOTS

51oo
CMP No.3

WINTER
SHUTDOWN

\
~

F
l
24+50

Fig.1. Cross-sectionof Teton Dam.

/
/
/

I
u

v'I'--OMP No.2
CMP No,1

S4"DIA.
ADIT

209

Fig.2. Wet s e a m as p h o t o g r a p h e d in 1977.

Fig.3. A d i t e n t r a n c e into and above t h e w e t seam.

the r o ck jointing was a b o u t the same in b o t h trenches, although the vertical


joints ran toward the river on t he right {failure) a b u t m e n t , and away f r o m
the river on the left a b u t m e n t . If piping into the rock joints in t he right key
t r en ch was th e immediate cause of failure one might expect t o have f o u n d
some evidence of the beginnings of piping action either in the r e m n a n t of the
right a b u t m e n t , or in the left a b u t m e n t , where the entire key t rench was
intact, and subjected t o intense scrutiny when the fill in it was excavated in
1978. However, t he r e was no evidence whatsoever of any piping of fill

210

Fig.4. O v e r n i g h t a c c u m u l a t i o n o f w a t e r in b o t t o m o f adit.

Fig.5. E x c a v a t e d face of left abutment seam, at bottom o f photograph, is s e e n as a w e t


s o f t m a t e r i a l in c o n t r a s t t o t h e u p p e r , d r y , u n i f o r m n a t u r e o f t h e fill.

material at the b o t t o m or sides of the key trench, in either the r e m n a n t on


the right a b u t m e n t or the entire key trench on the left abutment. Thus, it
must be concluded t ha t the onl y evidence as to t he cause o f failure as described in th e reports o f the I n d e p e n d e n t Panel and the first report o f the
Interior Review G r oup is circumstantial. This is not surprising since bot h
reports were written prior t o the discovery of the wet seam in the spring of
1978.

211

TABLE I
Causes of wet seams (from Duck et al., 1979) .1
Cause

1. High percentages of an
amorphous mineral and
calcium carbonate
equivalent
2. Earthwork placement
practices
3. Insufficient removal of
material from winter
shut-down surface
4. Frost action on surface
of soil during spring
start-up period
5. Frost lenses created
during winter shut-down
6. Frozen material from borrow
placed in fill
7. Snow and rain during May of
1975
8. Placement of fill wet of
optimum
9. Mixing of wet and dry
material on fill surface
10. Reservoir water entry into
low-density, highpermeability layer
11. Piping through embankment
at El. 1558+12. Solutioning of calcium
carbonate
13. Excessive capillary
pressure
14. Hydraulic fracturing
15. Differential movement
cracks
16. Structural movement during
failure

I.R.G. Final Report


(Interior Review
Group)

I.P. R e v i e w .2

(Independent
Panel)

CC

CC

CC

NC

NC

NC

NC
NC
CC

CC

NC

NC

CC
CC

NC

NC

NC

NC

NC

NC
NC
NC
NC

* l c c = contributing cause; NC = non-contributing cause.


*2Prevalent opinion as determined by authors.

It is t h e w r i t e r ' s o p i n i o n t h a t t h e w e t s e a m m a y w e l l h a v e b e e n t h e p r i m a r y
cause of the failure of the Teton Dam. The tests and observations made of the
w e t s e a m c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e t h a t it m u s t h a v e e x i s t e d a t t h e t i m e o f f a i l u r e ,
s i n c e n o w a t e r has b e e n p r e s e n t a t t h e e l e v a t i o n o f t h e w e t s e a m s i n c e t h e
day the reservoir was e m p t i e d b y the failure. If the wet seam existed either

212

Fig.6. Excavated right abutment key trench.

Fig.7. Excavated left abutment key trench.

213

in the same condition as when it was excavated, or as a soft, low density


seam which permitted the easy entrance o f water from the reservoir edge of
the seam, it can readily be imagined that reservoir pressure may have been
transmitted through the seam, to the downstream edge of Zone 1 (core}
material. If this had occurred, and if the wet seam was present at the right
abutment, a blow-out might have started at the downstream edge of the
seam, due to the presence of headwater pressure which had been transmitted
through the free water in the wet seam. It has been seen that free water was
present in the wet seam when it was uncovered in 1978, and it is hard to
imagine that this free water was not in existence at the time of failure.
The wet seam has been shown to exist at or just above the level of the fill
as it was during the winter shut-down of 1974--75. Fig.8 is a sketch showing
the elevation of the fill during the 1974--75 shut<lown, and it can be seen
that winter surface intersects the right a b u t m e n t foundation at about the
horizontal location of the first observed blow-out in the face of the dam,
although at a lower elevation than the blow-out level. Thus, it would seem
possible that, if the wet seam, with free water in it, was present in the right
a b u t m e n t at the time of failure, it could indeed have had an important role
in causing the failure.
One can imagine a soft, wet layer in Zone 1, the core of the dam, being
filled with water from the rising reservoir, and then as the reservoir rose, the
pressure from the reservoir, gradually increasing at the downstream contact
of Zone 1 with more pervious material in Zone 2, the shell, until erosion
occurred in the shell material and piping took place through the wet seam
and the downstream shell.
One piece of evidence from the original excavation of the remnant on the
right abutment may have a bearing on whether or not the wet seam did exist
in the right a b u t m e n t at the time of failure. The following excerpt is taken
from the Independent Panel Report*l: "Near Sta. 13+15 at El. 5215, the
embankment for the first time was found extremely wet continuously across
the width of the key trench. Some free water was encountered. The fill was
extremely m u d d y over the surface of the grout cap. Between the grout cap
and the upstream key-trench wall, the backhoe sank up to the axle. Even
under the lighter ground pressure of the small dozer, the fill was spongy and
quick. The in-place embankment remaining at this elevation was very limited
in axial extent, being about 15 ft. A transverse vertical face was cut by hand
3 to 4 ft. to the key-trench invert rock. By probing over this vertical surface,
a softer, wetter horizon was detected. Penetration resistance readings were in
the 170-psi range while readings above were in the 400-psi range and those
below averaged 330-psi. Because this horizon was everywhere within 15 in.
of the rock, and in such close proximity to the face of the breach it was n o t
possible to determine if the wetter horizon existed pre-failure or was created
during the failure."
* 1 R e p o r t to U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e I n t e r i o r and S t a t e of I d a h o o n Failure o f T e t o n
Dam, I n d e p e n d e n t Panel to Review Cause o f T e t o n D a m Failure, D e c e m b e r 197 6.

214
~-p..

STA 25+00

STA. 20+00
TOP OF DAM

STA. 15+00
533

o~^,~r,,J,P,IT

~'

............

5300
5200

\TUNNEL

,(~-~\\\\\\"~\

-.

ROCK ~
AP,ROX.

5200

,9,,-,5

5100

"

5000

i/,

5o0o

'-- zo,,,, E o F

REMAINING
EMBAN KMEN"r

ELEVATION

INITIAL BREACH

LOOKING DOWNSTREAM

WET SEAM
El 5110

VIEW A-A

Fig.8. Cross-section of dam showing 1974--75 shut-down.

Note the reference to "free w a t e r " in the wet area, which existed "continuously across the width o f the ke y t r e n c h " . The presence o f "free w a t e r "
was a notable characteristic of the wet seam in the left a b u t m e n t . The wet
area found in the right a b u t m e n t r e m n a n t was at an elevation considerably
above the winter shut-down surface of 1974--75, so its existence is certainly
not a positive p r o o f of the presence o f a wet seam in the area o f the failure.
It seems to the present writer that the discovery of the wet seam, its location and its physical condition must be account ed for in any final conclusion
regarding the causes of the T e t on Dam failure. Its presence, and the reasons
for its very existence are certainly not self-evident. It seems reasonably certain
that the wet seam was caused by events that t o o k place during and/ or
immediately following the winter shut~lown of 1974--75, but a complete
explanation of w hy the material in the wet seam is so soft and light in weight,
and wh y free water would flow into the pits dug in the b o t t o m of t he
e x p l o r a t o r y adit a year after the failure is b e y o n d the writer's comprehension. Several recent occasions o f very soft layers having been found in fills
that were placed during winter conditions have been brought to the writer's
a tten tio n , but in these cases very little care was taken to prevent freezing of
the fill before or during the placement. However, at T et on Dam t he record
indicates that the danger of placing fill on a frozen surface seems to have
been taken into account when placing operations were resumed in the spring
of 1975.

215
In a paper delivered at the International Conference on Case Histories in
Geotechnical Engineering in May 1984, G.A. Leonards and L.W. Davidson
presented a hypothesis concerning the cause of the failure of Teton Dam in
which t h e y concluded that a horizontal layer of high permeability existed in
the right abutment key trench at the point of failure. This very permeable
layer was caused by over-compaction at very low water content. The permeable layer rapidly filled with water from the reservoir and collapsed. The
water flowing into the interstice caused a horizontal fracture allowing water
under pressure to flow from open joints upstream to open joints downstream
in the key trench walls. Fill material was then eroded into the open rock
joints in the key trench and failure resulted by piping. The Leonards-Davidson paper seemed to imply that the cause of the wet seam was due to
the same general mechanism as the hypothesis for the right a b u t m e n t failure,
namely a series of layers compacted very dry of optimum, which collapsed
upon wetting and became very permeable, transmitting water throughout the
layers to form the wet seam. This hypothesis would mean that a very large
and thick part of the dam was uniformly compacted in a drier condition
than the rest of the dam. Since the wet seam was 4 ft. thick, at least, and at
least 5 acres in extent it seems unlikely that most or all of this seam would
have been compacted in such a way that all of it would be in a condition to
absorb water and become so very wet. Also the excavated face of the left
a b u t m e n t remnant, as seen in Fig.5, shows one or two wet spots, but nothing
to compare with the wet seam itself. It seems hard to understand w h y the
wet seam is the only section, and a large one, to have been compacted in such
a way as to have collapsed and absorbed water as per the Leonards--Davidson
hypothesis. Thus the writer concludes that a more likely cause of the wet
seam is somehow connected with the effects of the winter shut<lown of
1974--75.
The writer is in complete agreement with the conclusions of the Independent Panel and Interior Group reports where they point out the dangers
inherent in placing fine-grained backfill against the open joints in the rock
at the sides and b o t t o m of the key trench. However, the discovery of the wet
seam, and its possible connection with the failure lead the writer to the conviction that no positive conclusions can now be reached as to the exact
cause of failure o f the Teton Dam.
The recommendations of the reports concerning proper design and construction procedures to be followed when designing and building a dam
founded on highly jointed rock are certainly sound ones, but these same
recommendations could have been made after a review of the plans and specification and a study of the geological reports which existed prior to the start
of construction! Nothing found in any of the explorations made after the
failure gave any concrete evidence that pointed to piping of the key trench
material into the rock joints as the cause of failure.
The engineering profession has certainly gained by the study given by the
Panels to the design of Teton Dam, and by the conclusions and recommendations contained in their reports, but the writer is now not convinced that the
primary cause for the actual failure of Teton Dam has been conclusively
determined.

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