G.R. No.

186471
People Vs. De Leon
The Prosecutions Version of Facts
On November 9, 2003, at about 5 oclock in the afternoon, a confidential informant arrived at
the office of the Station Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation Task Force at the Novaliches
Police Station in Quezon City and reported the illegal activities of a person named Rodante
De Leon.
Thereafter, Police Senior Inspector (P/SInsp.) Nilo Wong formed a team for a buy-bust
operation with PO2 Magcalayo as poseur-buyer. A pre-operation report was prepared.
P/SInsp. Wong then handed to PO2 Magcalayo two (2) pieces of PhP 100 bills as buy-bust
money and on which PO2 Magcalayo wrote his initials NM.
At around 6:30 p.m. in the evening, the team proceeded Barangay Sta. Monica,
Novaliches, Quezon City, where the confidential informant introduced PO2 Magcalayo to
appellant as a buyer of shabu. PO2 Magcalayo then asked appellant if he had shabu and the
latter answered in the affirmative and asked him how much he would buy. PO2 Magcalayo
handed the money and, in return, appellant handed him one (1) plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance. He then scratched his head, which was the pre-arranged signal
that the transaction was consummated, and thereafter arrested appellant. He recovered the
buy-bust money from appellant as PO2 Collado approached them and handcuffed appellant.
Upon frisking appellant, PO2 Collado discovered another plastic sachet on the person of
appellant.
Afterwards, appellant was brought to the police station for investigation. PO2 Collado then
placed his initials on the sachet and the evidence was subsequently turned over to the
police investigator, who prepared a request for its laboratory examination.
PO2 Collado, PO1 Mendoza, PO2 Paculdar, and PO2 Magcalayo then brought the transparent
plastic sachets containing the white crystalline substance subject of the buy-bust operation
to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. A Forensic
Chemical Officer, conducted a qualitative examination on the specimens, which yielded
positive results.
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, appellant testified that, prior to his arrest, he was a police officer
in Cubao, Quezon City for 10 years. On November 9, 2003, at around 3 oclock in the
afternoon, he went to Barangay Sta. Monica, Novaliches, Quezon City to look for
a kumpadre from whom he intended to borrow money when policemen accosted him and
poked their guns at him. The people around him ran, and as he was the only one left on the
scene, the policemen asked him to sit down. He told SPO3 Concepcion, whom he knew, that
he was a police officer but he was told to shut up and to explain his side at the police station
instead.
Upon arrival at the police station in Novaliches, Quezon City, his wallet, with his I.D. and
police badge, were taken from him. PO2 Magcalayo told him that he had a fake police I.D.
When appellant tried to explain himself, PO2 Magcalayo allegedly kicked him saying, Hindi
na uso ang pulis, sundalo na ang nakaupo ngayon.
The following night, he was presented on inquest during which he was charged with violation
of Secs. 5 and 11 of RA 9165. He denied all the charges against him claiming that the
alleged shabu marked as Exhibits B-1 and B-2 came from the arresting police officers. He did

not file a case against them, because he had no money and because he knew that he was
not guilty.
On cross-examination, appellant further testified that he was a follow-up operative at the
Station Investigation Division of Police Station 7. He admitted that he was separated from
the service because he was absent without official leave due to a business problem he had
to attend to. He likewise said that he did not know his arresting officers, whom he saw then
for the first time, and that he was not familiar with RA 9165.
After trial, the RTC convicted appellant.
On April 4, 2008, the CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
The Issues
Is Buy Bust Operation Valid Arrest?
Buy-Bust Operation Was Valid
Appellant further argues that the buy-bust operation was full of irregularities, rendering it
illegal. He notes that the Pre-Operation Report was full of discrepancies.
The arguments are specious. Such irregularities cannot overturn the finding of the presence
in this case of the elements of violations of Secs. 5 and 11, Art. II of RA 9165.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for
the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal
plan.[22] In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective
method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal
safeguards is undertaken.[23]
In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that the buy-bust operation conducted by the
police officers, who made use of entrapment to capture appellant in the act of selling a
dangerous drug, was valid and legal. Moreover, the defense has failed to show any evidence
of ill motive on the part of the police officers. Even appellant himself declared that it was the
first time he met the police officers during his cross-examination. There was, therefore, no
motive for the police officers to frame up appellant.
Likewise, the identity of appellant as the person who sold the dangerous drugs to PO2
Magcalayo and the one in possession of the shabu cannot be doubted anymore. Such
positive identification prevails over appellants defenses of denial and alibi. These defenses
have been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor, for they can easily be concocted but
difficult to prove, and they are common and standard defense ploys in most prosecutions
arising from violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.[24]
Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse appellant of such a grave offense, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial
court with respect to the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over appellants bare allegation.
[25]

We, therefore, uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
and find that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the guilt of appellant
beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, appellant Rodante De Leon y Dela Rosa guilty of the crimes charged
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 128587

People Vs. Laguio

March 16, 2007

Facts
On 16 May 1996, at about 7:00 p.m., police operatives of the DILG arrested SPO2
Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano, for unlawful possession of shabu. In
the course of the investigation of the three arrested persons, Redentor Teck, alias Frank, and
Joseph Junio were identified as the source of the drug. An entrapment operation was then set
after the three were prevailed upon to call their source and pretends to order another supply
of shabu.
At around 11:00 p.m. that same date, Teck and Junio were arrested while they were
about to hand over another bag of shabu to SPO2 De Dios and company. Questioned, Teck
and Junio informed the police operatives that they were working as talent manager and
gymnast instructor, respectively, of Glamour Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang.
The two did not disclose their source of shabu but admitted that they were working for
Wang. They said they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu early the following morning and
that their employer (Wang) could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate. The
police operatives decided to look for Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities of Teck
and Junio. Police Inspector Coronel and his men then proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment
and placed the same under surveillance.
Prosecution witness Police Inspector Coronel testified that at about 2:10 a.m. of 17
May 1996, Wang, who was described to the operatives by Teck, came out of the apartment
and walked towards a parked BMW car. On nearing the car, he (witness) together with
Captain Margallo and two other police officers approached Wang, introduced themselves to
him as police officers, asked his name and, upon hearing that he was Lawrence Wang,
immediately frisked him and asked him to open the back compartment of the BMW
car.7 When frisked, there was found inside the front right pocket of Wang and confiscated
from him an unlicensed AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic Back-up Pistol loaded with
ammunitions. At the same time, the other members of the operatives searched the BMW car
and found inside it were the following items:
32 transparent plastic bags of shabu;
cash in the amount ofP650,000.00;
one electronic and one mechanical scales; and
an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine.
Then and there, Wang resisted the warrantless arrest and search.
Three (3) separate Informations filed against Lawrence C. Wang in the court of origin.
Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act
Illegal Possession of Firearms
Violation of Comelec Gun Ban
During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all the Informations and
instead interposed a continuing objection to the admissibility of the evidence obtained by
the police operatives. Thus, the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not Guilty" be entered for
him.5 Thereafter, joint trial of the three (3) consolidated cases followed.
Wang was granted 25 days from said date within which to file his intended Demurrer to
Evidence.\
On 9 January 1997, Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence, 11 praying for his
acquittal and the dismissal of the three (3) cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and
search warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecutions evidence against him.

On 12 February 1997, the prosecution filed its Opposition alleging that the
warrantless search was legal as an incident to the lawful arrest and that it has proven its
case, so it is now time for the defense to present its evidence.
On 13 March 1997, the respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued
the herein assailed Resolution14 granting Wangs Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of
all charges for lack of evidence.
Issues:
Whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in this case
despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant.
Ruling:
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace officer may arrest a person
without a warrant:
(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it, and
(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
None of these circumstances were present when the accused was arrested. The accused was
merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car
when the police officers arrested and frisked him and searched his car. The accused was not
committing any visible offense at the time of his arrest. Neither was there an indication that
he was about to commit a crime or that he had just committed an offense. The unlicensed
AMT Cal.380 9mm Automatic Back-up Pistol that the accused had in his possession was
concealed inside the right front pocket of his pants. The arresting officers had no information
and knowledge that the accused was carrying an unlicensed handgun, nor did they see him
in possession thereof immediately prior to his arrest.
The 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo Pistol with magazine that were
found and seized from the car were not in plain view. The shabu were in the trunk
compartment, and the Daewoo handgun was underneath the drivers seat of the car. The
police officers had no information, or knowledge that the banned articles were inside the car,
or that the accused had placed them there. The police officers searched the car on mere
suspicion that there was shabu therein.
Clearly therefore, the warrantless arrest of the accused and the search of his person and the
car were without probable cause and could not be licit. The arrest of the accused did not fall
under any of the exception to the requirements of warrantless arrests, (Sec. 5, Rule 113,
Rules of Court) and is therefore, unlawful and derogatory of his constitutional right of liberty.
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded the
search, and finding no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental
search is likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence
thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of
evidence.
Prosecution posits that "inasmuch as it has been shown in the present case that the seizure
without warrant of the regulated drugs and unlicensed firearms in the accuseds possession
had been validly made upon probable cause and under exigent circumstances, then the
warrantless arrest of the accused must necessarily have to be regarded as having been
made on the occasion of the commission of the crime in flagrante delicto, and therefore
constitutionally and statutorily permissible and lawful." 28 In effect, the People now contends
that the warrantless search preceded the warrantless arrest. Since the case falls under an

exception to the general rule requiring search warrant prior to a valid search and seizure,
the police officers were justified in requiring the private respondent to open his BMW cars
trunk to see if he was carrying illegal drugs.
Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully
effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on
personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was
the author of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has
escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of
Section 5 to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any suspicious
behavior on the part of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the
attention of the police. He was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was
about to enter the parked BMW car when the police operatives arrested him, frisked and
searched his person and commanded him to open the compartment of the car, which was
later on found to be owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible
offense then. Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under
paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt
act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting
officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante
delicto arrest.
Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5. What is
clearly established from the testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was arrested
mainly on the information that he was the employer of Teck and Junio who were previously
arrested and charged for illegal transport of shabu. Teck and Junio did not even categorically
identify Wang to be their source of the shabu they were caught with in flagrante delicto.
Upon the duos declaration that there will be a delivery of shabu on the early morning of the
following day, May 17, which is only a few hours thereafter, and that Wang may be found in
Maria Orosa Apartment along Maria Orosa Street, the arresting officers conducted
"surveillance" operation in front of said apartment, hoping to find a person which will match
the description of one Lawrence Wang, the employer of Teck and Junio. These circumstances
do not sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause based on personal knowledge
as required in paragraph (b) of Section 5.
And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless arrest
was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise
unlawful.
The Peoples contention that Wang waived his right against unreasonable search and seizure
has no factual basis. While we agree in principle that consent will validate an otherwise
illegal search, however, based on the evidence on record, Wang resisted his arrest and the
search on his person and belongings. 32 The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was
any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee.33 Moreover, the continuing objection to the validity of the
warrantless arrest made of record during the arraignment bolsters Wangs claim that he
resisted the warrantless arrest and search.

G.R. No. 170180 November 23, 2007

Valdez Vs. People
Around 8:30 p.m. of 17 March 2003, he was conducting the routine patrol along San Benito
Norte, Aringay, La Union together with Aratas and Ordoo when they noticed petitioner,
lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus. The tanods observed that petitioner, who appeared
suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for something. They thus approached him but the
latter purportedly attempted to run away. They chased him, put him under arrest and
thereafter brought him to the house of Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado (Mercado) where
he, as averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his bag. Petitioners bag
allegedly contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried marijuana
leaves wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. It was then that petitioner was taken to the
police station for further investigation.[9]
Aratas and Ordoo corroborated Bautistas testimony on most material points. On crossexamination, however, Aratas admitted that he himself brought out the contents of
petitioners bag before petitioner was taken to the house of Mercado. Nonetheless, he
claimed that at Mercados house, it was petitioner himself who brought out the contents of
his bag upon orders from Mercado. For his part, Ordoo testified that it was he who was
ordered by Mercado to open petitioners bag and that it was then that they saw the
purported contents thereof.
The prosecution likewise presented Police Inspector Laya, the forensic chemist who
conducted the examination of the marijuana allegedly confiscated from petitioner. Laya
disclosed on cross-examination, however, that he had knowledge neither of how the
marijuana was taken from petitioner nor of how the said substance reached the police
officers. Moreover, he could not identify whose marking was on the inside of the cellophane
wrapping the marijuana leaves.
The charges were denied by petitioner. As the defenses sole witness, he testified that at
around 8:30 p.m. on 17 March 2003, he arrived in Aringay from his place in Santol, La Union.
After alighting from the bus, petitioner claimed that he went to the house of a friend to drink
water and then proceeded to walk to his brothers house. As he was walking, prosecution
witness Ordoo, a cousin of his brothers wife, allegedly approached him and asked where he
was going. Petitioner replied that he was going to his brothers house. Ordoo then
purportedly requested to see the contents of his bag and appellant acceded. It was at this
point that Bautista and Aratas joined them. After inspecting all the contents of his bag,
petitioner testified that he was restrained by the tanod and taken to the house of Mercado. It
was Aratas who carried the bag until they reached their destination. [13]
Petitioner maintained that at Mercados house, his bag was opened by the tanod and
Mercado himself. They took out an item wrapped in newspaper, which later turned out to be
marijuana leaves. Petitioner denied ownership thereof. He claimed to have been threatened
with imprisonment by his arrestors if he did not give the prohibited drugs to someone from
the east in order for them to apprehend such person. As petitioner declined, he was brought
to the police station and charged with the instant offense. Although petitioner divulged that
it was he who opened and took out the contents of his bag at his friends house, he averred
that it was one of the tanod who did so at Mercados house and that it was only there that
they saw the marijuana for the first time.
Finding that the prosecution had proven petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC
rendered judgment against him to be guilty.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals found no cogent reason to overturn the presumption of regularity and
agreed with the RTC that there was probable cause to arrest petitioner.
In this appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts that his guilt of the crime
charged had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue:
W/N the warrantless arrest effected against him by the barangay tanod was unlawful.
W/N the warrantless search of his bag that followed was likewise contrary to law and the
marijuana leaves purportedly seized from him are inadmissible in evidence for being the
fruit of a poisonous tree.
Ruling:
At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find any objection by
petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his
active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed
to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his
arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his
person. Petitioners warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.
However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable
to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. The
search, conducted as it was without a warrant, is justified only if it were incidental to a lawful
arrest.[19] Evaluating the evidence on record in its totality, as earlier intimated, the
reasonable conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as well.
Petitioner maintains, in a nutshell, that after he was approached by the tanod and asked to
show the contents of his bag, he was simply herded without explanation and taken to the
house of the barangay captain. On their way there, it was Aratas who carried his bag. He
denies ownership over the contraband allegedly found in his bag and asserts that he saw it
for the first time at the barangay captains house.
Even casting aside petitioners version and basing the resolution of this case on the general
thrust of the prosecution evidence, the unlawfulness of petitioners arrest stands out just the
same.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions on which
a person may be arrested without a warrant, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b)
When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not one of these
circumstances was obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By their own admission,
petitioner was not committing an offense at the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he

appear to be then committing an offense.

either to justify petitioners warrantless arrest.

The tanod did not have probable cause

For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2)
elements must be present:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Here, petitioners act of looking around after getting off the bus was but natural as he was
finding his way to his destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as
the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to
charge the tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was actually
engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity. More importantly, petitioner
testified that he did not run away but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod when they
approached him.
Even taking the prosecutions version generally as the truth, in line with our assumption from
the start, the conclusion will not be any different. It is not unreasonable to expect that
petitioner, walking the street at night, after being closely observed and then later tailed by
three unknown persons, would attempt to flee at their approach. Flight per se is not
synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to ones consciousness of guilt.
Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they appeared dubious, cannot
be viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate his
warrantless arrest. If at all, the search most permissible for the tanod to conduct under the
prevailing backdrop of the case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion they have been
harboring based on petitioners behavior.
However, a stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio,[27] must precede a warrantless
arrest, be limited to the persons outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine
reason, in light of the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
Accordingly, petitioners waiver of his right to question his arrest notwithstanding, the
marijuana leaves allegedly taken during the search cannot be admitted in evidence against
him as they were seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful.
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The following searches and seizures are
deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1) search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view
(3) customs searches (4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless
search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an
arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court
recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests
effected in hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.
When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante
delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot
therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless search conducted on petitioner was
incidental to a lawful arrest.

Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized marijuana leaves for being the fruit of
an unlawful search is not the lone cause that militates against the case of the prosecution.
We likewise find that it has failed to convincingly establish the identity of the marijuana
leaves purportedly taken from petitioners bag.
In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails to overcome the presumption
of innocence which petitioner enjoys. The failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements
of the offense beyond reasonable doubt must perforce result in petitioners exoneration from
criminal liability.