Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
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'1'Iwclasslc thcory of concept structure held that concepts are composed
of lhe logical combination of separately necessary and joint1y sufficient
enturcs. Although this conceptionhas beenlargely abandonedin philosophy and psychology over the past 20 years, it was the basis for the classical
work in the development of concepts and categories, including that of
both Piaget and Vygotsky. Piaget (1962; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958) held that
oung children, being logically deficient, are incapable of forming true
ioncepts. They are necessarily limited to preconcepts: concepts that rest
on prototypes, that confuse the whole with the part, and that do not
oordinate intension and extension. Piaget' s early research concerned the
reference of words by very young children, including what to a logician is
the oddity of referring to one's grandmother's house as "Lausanne," the
name of the town (confusing part with whole); or referring to each individual slug as "the slug" (confusing intension with extension). Later,
Inhelder and Piaget (1958) studied the composition of categories in a wellknown series of class inclusion tasks. The class inclusion task requires a
subject to answer questions of the following kind: "Here are four daisies
[pointing to a group] and six roses [again pointing to pictured flowers]; are
there more roses or more flowers?" As has now been well established in
further studies, children aged 7 or younger reply that there are more
reses.' To Piaget this indicated that young children cannot coordinate
intension and extension, and that they cannot maintain the parts and
whole separately to set up the equation A + A' = B.
Vygotsky, like Piaget, accepted a classicallogical definition of concept,
and, based on his work with a concept formation task similar to one used
by Inhelder and Piaget, he also concluded that younger children were
preconceptual (Vygotsky, 1986). He found that children move through a
sequence of preconceptual stages of heaps, chain-concepts, collections,
and pseudoconcepts. True logical concepts, he maintained, are not
achieved until adolescence, with the construction of taxonomic hierarchies. Vygotsky saw the problem of conceptual change in childhood in
terms of the difference between spontaneous and scientific concepts. He
summed up the issue as follows:
The two processes - the development of spontaneous and of
nonspontaneous concepts - are related and constantly influence
each other. They are parts of a single process: the development of
concept formation, which is affected by varying externa I and inter-
v"
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Nelson (1974)proposed that the child's interactions with the world determine the child's view of the functions of objects, which in turn motivates
1'111
the basis for the forrnation of COIll'l'pllllllld ti", 11'11111111/; of t'lI'1y wun]
The functional core hypothesis (FClI) dlllllll'd 1111I1 chlldren f01'l1l 1'011
cepts of objects based on object function and [orm, with function 1I/llhl'
core of the concept and form its probabilistic periphery, used to ItklllHy
instances of the concept. The child's concept becomes the basis for wonl
meaning, with the first words mapped onto already formed conccpts,
The word is then extended to other objects sharing form and function
features, thus recognized as instances of the child's concept. This hy
pothesis argued against a mo del of the abstraction of perceptual features
as the basis for concept formation and word meaning on the following
grounds: Given that any object or set of objects can be described in terrn:
of an indefinite number of features, and related to one another on thc
basis of similarity along an indefinite number of dimensions, formng
concepts by abstracting features from encounters with the world assumes that there is already some motivating factor that makes some
properties relevant and others not." The child's experience with objects
was assumed as the motivating factor. Evidence in favor of the model
carne primarily from an analysis of the words that children learned for
objects that they could do things with. Additional evidence was sought
in experiments that posed form against function as the basis for forming
concepts.
During the 1970s a number of contradictory studies were reported that
aimed to test the predictions of the functional core hypothesis by pitting
function against perception. However, this became recognized as a false
issue (Nelson, 1978b, 1979)on the following grounds. First, the FCH did
not claim that children do not notice or rely on perceptual features, but
rather that child-experience-based functional characteristics are more
central to their concepts of objects. Second, function can be conceptualized in a number of ways. Intrinsic function - what something does can be a perceptual feature as well (for example, characteristic movement ar noise). Therefore, in these cases there is no difference between
functional and perceptual features of an object, and the argument reduces to the claim that some features are more important than others, a
claim empirical tests did not in fact support (e.g., Bowerman, 1976).
Extrinsic function, however, relates an object to something else, primarily to the people who interact with it. Although all interaction involves perception, the relation of person to object cannot be said to be a
perceptual feature of the object; rather, it is a matter of perspective,
intention, or stance. Moreover, extrinsic function may (but need not)
involve the conventional uses of objects, for example, that telephones
111' tl/'Hld
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restrlcons on
1111I'11'01
j.-, I
rized across objects and
Markman, 1980).
CVClllH
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as those that undcrlic lhe fornuulun II1 111\11111111111 1I1t'I'III'1'hlt'H" (:IVI'II 1111'
explicit inclusive asymmetry and ll'lllHllllvlly
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of the difficulty that even young schoolchlklrvn havc with 1111'/-1(' 1'1111
tions, the answer must be no, but then some way of relating lh(' Iwp
types developmentalIy must be found.
Vygotsky's theory of conceptual development based on the contrturt
between spontaneous and scientific concepts addressed the problcm (11
integrating spontaneously developed conceptual knowledge with "scicn
tific" or "theortical" cultural systems mediated through language. Thl
problem, central to the thesis of this book, is this: how to reconcikndividually and informalIy - often implicitly - constructed knowledge
systems with culturalIy derived, formalIy organized, explicit systems 01
knowledge, when the two incorporate different concepts and conceptual
relations but refer to the same domain of knowledge.
The problem in its essential form is pervasive from the beginning of
the child's acquisition of Ianguage; the Ianguage that the child learns
initialIy implicitly incorporates cultural knowledge systems that are only
partialIy and imperfectly represented - and in important cases not represented at alI - in the child' s prelinguistic experientialIy based knowledge
system. The problem is acute for words that denote superordinate categories. Because superordinate categories do not exist as such in the real
world, but only in the language used to talk about them, the child
cannot have a prelinguistic concept that is the equivalent of the adult
superordinate concept. The child's problem then is to find a way of
forming word meanings for superordinate classes that map the adult
meaning system appropriately. Event representations provide a basis for
such meanings.
Event Representations and Categories:
The Syntagmatic-Paradigmatic System
As is now welI documented, young children have organized knowledge
of familiar reliably structured events, such as having Iunch (Chapter 4).
Thus they have an event category of eating Iunch, a category whose extension includes alI the successive occasions of Iunch, and whose intension
includes the specification of necessary components - actions, objects,
persons. Events incorporate two types of hierarchies. First, events can
be said to be organized hierarchicalIy, in that they may be composed of
smaller event units. For example, the "eating Iunch" event may be composed of subevents of preparation, eating the main meaI, eating dessert,
ite
IIIVII 11",,,,,
wlrh "1111'1'\'111 tluhgo1tlH
rwhOl'dillllll10lhe main goal of eating
111111'11. M()I'('()Vl'I',
lhe "cuung lunch" cvcnt s part of a larger event se'1"I'II\'C rc-prcscnttng a typical day. This type of organization can be seen
HI II pnl'l-whole hierarchical structure.
1\ second type of hierarchy involves the combination of two or more
,'Vl'I1tS
into a more general category. For example, Iunch can be consid"I'l'<.I an instance of the meai category, which includes as welI dinner,
hn-nkfast, British tea, Iate-night snack, and so on. In turn, dinner might
!t(, differentiated into the subtypes family, party, restaurant, formal, and
\I on. Rifkin (LucarielIo & Rifkin, 1986) has demonstrated that such
nclusive hierarchies of event categories reflect the same kind of psycho10gicaIreality as object categories for adults. In addition, event categories
provide the functionaI basis for construction of higher-order object cate!\ories, and it is this relation that is most significant to the developmental
lssues in focus here.
In brief, the claim is that children begin with functionalIy derived
.ategories at the basic leveI, and that these categories are recombined
into larger groups that enter into open slots in events, thus forming
"slot-filler" categories. These categories are not true taxonomic hierarchial structures, but form the basis for the formation of such structures,
which are constructed in colIaboration with adult instruction and experience with the categoricaI structure of the adult Ianguage.
Illd
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rdot.fllli.'l' Il(.'1H-1
urc gl'oupcd log~'lllcl' on the basis of similar
1111111111111I1
,'oll'H, not on the basis of complementary roles.
1'111l'xduHivl' focus on objects and object taxonomies in psychology
'
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h,tI to the assumption that the thematic relation is primitive and that
11", prcschoolcr must overcome it in arder to achieve the taxonomic
I "HllIlii':ation. In contrast,
the event knowledge perspective on concep111111
"l'presentations incorporates complementary (or thematic) as welI as
"III,'gorical (or taxonomic) relations, and demonstrates both how they
11'1'rolated and why they may be called on in different tasks. The view
111'1'('is that both complementary and categorical configurations are
IIIIHCdin the same conceptual organization but display different relations
wilhin that organization. Thus the relation between individual experien1IIIIIybased event knowledge and the construction of abstract category
knowledge is a dynamic, constructive one that results in interacting
planes of knowledge organization.
,iubstitutability.
The slot-filler category proposal points to an empirical
nnd rational basis for concept formation that has been neglected in both
classical and contemporary studies. Substitutability is not included in the
Iraditional accounts of the basis for category formation ar associations which include similarity and contiguity - and it has been little discussed
in any literature. Substitutability, unlike contiguity, is not apparent in
ony single real-world context; items that substitute for one another in an
event are not necessarily present in the same context at the same time.
Moreover, such items need bear little similarity to one another; for example, bananas, cookies, and pudding may be alternative lunch dessert
slot-fillers for a child but are not similar in appearance, texture, or taste.
The traditional bases for associations of similarity and contiguity do not
explain the basis for slot-filler categories. Substitutability, a paradigmatic
relation, does.
Consider again the schematic to categorical shift proposed by Mandler
(1979). From the perspective of the syntagmatic-paradigmatic
basis for
category formation, this move can be seen as the emergence of one
structural type from the analysis of another, not as a substitution of one
type for another. In this form of the proposal categorical structures are
assumed not to replace the schematic structures, but to complement
them. Schematic structures continue to be relied on by older children
and adults, even for many purposes where categorical structures are
",,,
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1I11t1
Htlhol'lllllllll'II'I'IIIHhy holh mothcrs and chil111\'11,
'l'ho 11011bnHIclevei termBtcndcd to uppcar most frequently in the
1lllIll'xlof familiar ovcnts. such as eating lunch or getting dressed. Moth"1'/1provided clucs to the use of the hierarchical terms, such as, "What
l.lnd of a drink do you want?" following with alternative possibilities in
1111.'
drink category. Another discourse clue was provided by using basic
lvvcl items in the same syntactic frame as the hgher-level category term,
uch as the following: "Let's put on your clothes. Put on your shirt, put
nn your socks." In this context the term "clothes" can be extracted as a
general slot-filler term for items that are "put on."
The development over time of the construction of these relations belween events and object categories can be seen in transcripts of the prebed talk between 2-year-old Emily and her father [see Chapter 4; Nelson
(1989c)]. Alternative slot-fillers were found in Emily's talk about food,
typically embedded in talk about breakfast. An early example from 22!
months is the following monologue:
(1) Emmy like cornbread and toast.
I don' t like [?] apples and [?]
I like toast and muffins.
Food I like and [muffins] too.
I don't like anything ... cept for that, that bread daddy
has ...
Here we see that already Emily is using the general term "food" as an
alterna tive to the basic level terms of specific items.
In the pre-bed dialogues with Emily's father there are many discussions of what she would like to eat for breakfast the next day. For example, when Emily was not quite 2 the following discussion took place:
(2) E: What we have on breakfast day? What we have?
F: What will we have for breakfast? You know, tomorrow
morning, you're going to have yogurt, and bananas and
wheat germ, like mommy gave you this morning, remember that? Instead of an egg tomorrow we're going
to have yogurt and bananas and wheat germ ...
Later, Emily enters into the dialogue more actively, specifying what she
wants, as in the following dialogue from almost 27 months:
(3) F: We'll get up ... and we'Il go down and have breakfast,
you can choose what type of egg you want,
IH
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In these discussions, Emily's breakfast food category was highly constrained to the particular situation and did not stray from the alternatives
specified by this particular family (e.g., yogurt, cereal, fruit, eggs). It did
not wander into domains of pizza, hamburgers, or other items appropriate for dinner. That is, her category of alternatives for breakfast was
specific to that event - it constituted a slot-filler category of breakfast
foods.
These examples highlight the critical relation of language to the conceptualization of objects and events. Emily's monologues reveal that her
event representations are not independent of linguistic formulations and
of particular linguistic input from her parents. Thus even when Emily is
2 years of age we cannot speak of a conceptual system that is independent of language; rather, the two evolve together interdependently.
Note, however, that the language that simultaneously expresses and
shapes Emily's representations is not the abstract language of categories
but the concrete language of experience. To be sure, her language includes category terms, but these are particularized to specific experience.
The coordination of the child's language of categories with that of the
adult takes place in everyday activities and the discourse surrounding
them. The child' s MERs reflect the systematization of her experience in
"".
'''''''''t''''''!J!
AA
t
I"
Atililt
Represenlational
System
/~
Presentation
(Parole)
do~
1
Child
Semantic
ti
L
1
Adult
, .. "" .
Represenlation
>(00
1
<r
Child
Conceptual
Systern
1
o------c>----O
1
c::>--a--O
Figure 8.1. Mediation of the child' s semantic system by the adult' s partial
representation and presentation system and the child's conceptual system.
Source: K. Nelson, Making sense: The acquisitian af shared meaning (1985).
Permission to reprint from Academic Press.
the world, but this system is not the system that organizes the relevant
cultural categories. The conventional cultural system is displayed to the
child, not systematically as in a school text, but in bits and pieces
through adult-child talk. The child acquires a partial system mediated
by both the adult's partial system and the child's conceptual system.
Figure 8.1 illustrates this processo The important points to be noted are
(1) that the adult's representation is an incomplete structure in comparison with the cultural system as a whole, (2) that its display in speech is a
partial and disconnected representation of the adult system as a whole,
and (3) that what the child gets from this display is an incomplete, errorprone construction based on both prior (nonhierarchical) concepts and
language use. The adult's talk about a category displays certain rela-
I'~III
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8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
Proximity Value
"1"
MOI(NINO,
I'ANIII
IlHUlH
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;;=t ti\j
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SOCKS
IIHI ',ti
SWEATER
UNDERSHIRT
UNDERWEAR
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BLOUSE
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MORNING
MAIN
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MORNING
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UNDEI'lWEAR
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JEANS
ISHIRT
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SHORTS
SUIT
BRA
OUTSIDE,
COAT
JACKET
MAIN
OUTSIDE
VEST
VEST
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SNOWSUIT
SCARF
SCARF
MITTEN
HAT
ccessosv
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MITTENS
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OUTSIDE,
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8.0
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BELT
TIE
BOOT
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4.0
2.0
Proximity Value
SNEAKER
0fB"no,
BRA
PANTIES
SLlP
ROBE
NIGHTGOWN
BATHROBE
SLlPPER
JEANS
SLACKS
TUXEDO
IV
2PIECE SUIT
UNIFORM
__----------------------~r--I
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
'
2.0
Proximity Value
Source:
11/1,'011111,'011'
11/ C",,\llifll'l
Group/Condition
iiems
prorllll'I'tlll!I
Animals
,'011111/11,nnulliknt,
Uothing
Food
Mt'llIl
K1
Taxonomic
SIot-filIer
8
8
5.88
6.25
4.00
9.12
7.88
10.87
8.711
7
7
8.86
11.29
7.57
12.43
9.43
19.00
8.6
14.211
8
8
17.25
14.00
13.00
10.62
27.63
12.25
19.2~
12.2(
K2
Taxonomic
Slot-filIer
Grade 2
Taxonomic
Slot-filIer
1/IIIII'IIII'SI/I/1
5.\!
Source: Nelson & Nelson (1990), table 1, p. 435. Used with permission of the
publisher.
111
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List Recall. A standard test of the establishment of categorical organization in semantic memory is the recall of categorized word lists. In general
it has been found that young children do not recall more from lists
containing members of the same category than from random lists, and
they do not cluster category members together in recall (e.g., Nelson,
1969). Several experiments have been carried out using this paradigm to
test the psychological reality of slot-filler categories. Two recall experiments (Lucariello & Nelson, 1985) presented 4-year-old children with
three kinds of lists - conventional category, slot-filler category, and
thematic - under free recall and cued recall, with either slot-filler or
superordinate cues. Briefly, these young children recalled significantly
more from the slot-filler list than from either of the other lists, and the
best recall was found with the slot-filler list and script cues. Clustering
was significantly better with the slot-filler list as well.
These results have been replicated with Korean children (Yu & Nelson, 1993; Yu, 1993). In Yu's studies it was found that 7-year-olds performed as well with the taxonomic list as with the slot-filler list, suggesting that they had integrated the slot-filler categories into a hierarchically
composed taxonomic category. In her last two experiments (Yu, 1993),
the same results emerged under different study conditions. Four-yearolds did consistently better with the slot-filler list, and they were able to
use strategy instructions with this list but not with the taxonomic list,
I11
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II
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dlltlll'l'tI 1'1111'1'1',1'11.
l luwcver, whcn a
I !IIII" 1111'1'1
IIIHkWllH dt'fllgIK'd to lnclude loolfl lH'1 Hlolrillcritems, kinder1\11111'1\
l'hlldn'I\ I"l'lll.lilyIorrncd such a eatcgory (Kyratzis, 1989).
11\HOIl\l'Hllldi~Han cffort has been made to explain the slot-filler effect
I,y H'dudl1g il to somethng more "basie" sueh as association in semantic
IIII'IIIOI'Ybctwccn superordinate terms and slot-filler terms, or to strong
IIHIIII'lalivityand high typicality. These efforts again seem to misread the
lut-lller claims. whieh are based in the hypothesis that semantie mem111
y associates and typieal members of eategories derive from the
1'1'1'Hcmantieeoneeptual relations based on event seripts (and other sche111(\UC
or part-whole relations). Associativity and typicality are them\,Ives effeets to be explained; the proposal of slot-filler organization is
t!1'signed to explain these effects, not to be an alterna tive explanation to
Ihemo To be explicit: We would expect slot-filler items to be highly assoeiucd in memory and to form the most typical members of many eategofies, at least for young ehildren. Beeause associativity and typicality
rffects are at least in part the result of slot-filler organization, they cannot negate slot-filler claims.
One line of researeh reported in Lueariello and eolleagues (1992) was
an exeeption to the finding from the eategory production and list memory studies of slot-filler superiority to thematic organization. This task
was a foreed-ehoice picture task in whieh 4- and 7-year-old ehildren were
presented with triads of line drawings and asked to pick whieh of two
pietures "goes with" the target picture. Each ehoiee pair eonsisted of two
of the following: a related eategory member from the same seript (a slotfiller), a eategory member from a different seript (taxonomic), or a thematie associate. When the two eategory associates were paired, slot-filler
ehoiees predominated over taxonomic, as expeeted. But when thematic
associates were included as ehoiees, they were ehosen signifieant1y more
frequent1y by ehildren of both ages in eomparison to both other types.
SeU (1992) reported a similar finding with a similar picture-ehoice task,
indicating that fourth-grade ehildren make event-based ehoices more
frequently than they make eategorical ehoices. Why do 7- and 9-yearolds ehoose thematie associates in this task?
To address this question, it is of interest to eonsider a different line of
researeh initiated by Markman and Hutehinson (1984) and eontinued by
Markman and her eolleagues and others in the years sinee. These researehers have used triads of pictures, one of which is the target picture.
I,1111U,lUuU'
l lu-
bllHIH 01'
n.lI.
C:
'1': 1,(111.
'l'ldl\ns vou
l'HIl \.'nl
As Wertsch points out, this excerpt not only reveals the explicit
teaching of everyday category vocabulary that does on in the school,
but also illustrates the mixture of experience language and formal language. In the first exchange, the teacher not only accepts but also
elicits the formulation "you eat" instead of the category term "food,"
but in the last exchange she switches to the formal verb "eliminate"
and substitutes the category term (or linguistic object) "fumiture" for
the informal functional category. This excerpt illustrates the implied
process of integration of everyday knowledge with the structures of
cultural categories.
The inclusion relation that is critical to hierarchical categories is
used to relate scientific concepts in taxonomic structures and has also
infiltrated the common language to a greater or lesser extent. Children
can learn the superordinate language that incorporates the inclusion
relation without yet understanding its implications (e.g., the transitivity and asymmetry of its relations). The question that has not yet been
adequately addressed is how children may come to understand these
relations, and how the instructional efforts in school advance this understanding. The issue here is how conceptual reorganization and restructuring proceeds with examples that are simply displayed in cultural talk and through explicit instruction that formally lays out how
systems such as taxonomic categories are structured. Conceptual restructuring on the basis of both implicit and explicit demands from the
11
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dllll\lIl"H01 knowlIH" "" 1',,1111'"11110/'."'111/11'1'1111'/li'ltlt,ld
& (;\'1"'111'(liJ9I\.b)j.
(',III'y (PIH'1) 1111/'1
lil(I\'('d Ilw ldcu that chlld l'cn'Hconceptual knowledge
I', 1'/f'I.lldl,ild 111
li'!'IllHof thcorics that guide the acquisition and structure
"I "'llIltllll't 111 nn arco, a claim based in the philosophy and history of
111'111'1',
'1'lwol'i<'\H
apply within and not across domains of knowledge;
IIi IV"II'H
thoorlcs differ from chemical theories, whieh differ from bologi,11IIH'ol"iI..'H, and so on. Thus the theory proposal effectively partitions
111,'11111)1..1
into different domains of knowledge, at least some of whieh
,111'dlllrncd to be specified innately; in Carey's view these are basic naive
IIII'OI'lcsof the physical and the psychologieal worlds.
!lInce Carey's work, it has been argued that children also construct
1IIIIIogicaltheories applicable specifically to the world of plants and aniIIIIIIH,
as well as to such biologieal processes as birth, death, illness, and
dlgcstion: These claims seem partieularly relevant to children's organizallun of knowledge in domains such as animais and food, but as we have
1'1..'11, this organization tends to be in terms of experience: zoo animals,
101'111 animals, pets; breakfast foods, dinner foods, snacks."
The idea of theories as representational structures alterna tive to the
t I'oditionally accepted hierarchies of categories has been given weight by
recent research indieating that children have deeper knowledge of category members than the surface similarities implicated in perceptually
based categories. Keil (1989) has explicated this in terms of a "characteristic to defining shift," proposing that young children's categories of both
"natural kind" terms and artifact terms are organized in terms of characteristic properties, whereas older children's categories rest on deeper,
essential properties. For example, younger children might define "island" in terms of sun and palm trees, whereas older children will define
it in terms of land surrounded by water. S. Gelman's research program
(e.g., Gelman & Markman, 1986; Gelman & Coley, 1991), in contrast, has
been designed to show that even very young children recognize that
natural kind terms such as "bird" imply unobservable properties and
that terms such as "bird" may be used to infer characteristics such as
"fly," "builds nests," and "lays eggs."
There is general agreement now that children are not simply prisoners
of their perceptual systems, but are engaged in organizing knowledge at
a deeper level and making connections among originally somewhat disparate concepts. The source of such deep knowledge, however, remains
in questiono Some is directly taught and learned, some is constructed
through inference. Even universal knowledge constructs such as that
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children but rather are directly taughl IIH III'PIH',111'H 01 blnlH, '1'1111/111 WI'
are to take the theory claims seriously, wc neod 10 IIl-1kwherc the 111('0111'
come from: On what basis does a child construct a theory? By Llw 11111(' 11
child is in grade school it seems quite reasonable to believe that slw 1111
constructed from various sources, including verbalIy conveycd knowl
edge, mini- or proto-theories that serve to organize and explain COI11 11101 I
phenomena.
However, it also seems reasonable that since theorics 0"1'
about phenomena
in the real world, presumably, they must be con
structed on the basis of pretheoretical knowledge about the real world,
just as scientific theories are based on pretheoretical knowledge. Prethco
retical knowledge is gained in the ubiquitous process of making senso.
Theory building begns with a descriptive knowledge base in any field,
The distinction between descriptive theory and explanatory theory haH
been ma de in different ways by both Chomsky (1965) and Mayr (1982). A
descriptive theory is concerned with how things are in the world; an
explanatory theory is concerned with why they are the way they are. For
the individual child, as for science, description necessarily precedes explanation, and smalI-scale explanation precedes general theory. This is not to
deny the validity of the claim that all observation and description are in
some sense biased by one's interests (and in science by one's theory). But,
simply put, to ask for an explanation of something is already to have
knowledge of that something. If we are not to revert recursively to innate
knowledge we must account for its initial acquisition.
Thus the attribution
of theory structures to the knowledge
that
young children possess in certain domains is, from the present view, a
questionable practice, especialIy when theorists equate a child' s theories directly with scientists' theories (Copnik. 1993b, p. 100), even
though the child' s theories are held to be implicit, not explicit, as are
the scientists'. Theories in science are constructed according to wellunderstood,
systematicalIy
organized knowledge domains, in accordance with formal principIes of theory construction,
including some
form of hypothetico-deductive
logic. Scientific theories define a set of
concepts and order these within an explanatory system of causal relations. They are the property of a community of scientists and are in
princple testable against newly discovered facts. A new theoretical
advance may be originated by an individual, but it remains a hypothetical proposal until or unless it is accepted as valid by the community.
The child's implicit "theory" has no such validation procedure, and the
implicit theory by definition remains individual and unshared.
Any
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Situation: Bedtime
Child: Why does Daddy, James (big brother), and me have
blue eyes and you have green eyes?
Parent: (Told her she got her eyes from Daddy. Then said
goodnight and left the room.)
Child: (child calIs mother back 5 minutes later) 1 like Pee
Wee Herman and 1 have blue eyes. Daddy likes
Pee Wee Herman and he has blue eyes. James likes
Pee Wee Herman and he has blue eyes. If you liked
Pee Wee Herman you could get blue eyes too.
Parent: (I told her it would take more than my liking Pee Wee
Herman to make my eyes blue. 1 realized that she
didn't understand me, so 1 explained that God
gave me this color and that they couldn't be
changed.)
Child: Could you try to like Pee Wee Herman so we could
see if your eyes turn blue?
Parent: (I said 1 would think about it, but if my eyes stayed
green it was ok.)
II
[I,
data about the world she inhabits, including especially the people attend-