Political Parties and Foreign Policy: A Structuralist Approach

Author(s): Gary King

Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Mar., 1986), pp. 83-101
Published by: International Society of Political Psychology
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Vol. 7, No. 1, 1986

PoliticalPsychology,

PoliticalPartiesand ForeignPolicy:A
Structuralist
Approach1
Gary King2

Thisarticleintroduces
and approachofstructural
thetheory
anthropology
and appliesitto a probleminAmerican
thisappoliticalscience.Through
and the"twopresidencies
proach,the"bipartisan
policyhypothesis"
foreign
arereformulated
andreconsidered.
Untilnowparticipants
inthe
hypothesis"
debateovereachhaveonlyrarely
builton,orevencited,theother's
research.
An additional
conventional
wisdominsupproblemis thatthewidespread
the
two
is
with
inconsistent
systematic
portof
hypotheses
scholarly
analyses.
Thispaperdemonstrates
thatthetwohypotheses
aredrawnfromthesame
structure.
Each hypothesis
modelit implies
and thetheoretical
underlying
is conceptually
andempirically
extended
to takeintoaccountthedifferences
between
leadersandmembers.
and
Then,historical
congressional
examples
statistical
thatthe
analysesofHouserollcalldataareusedto demonstrate
whilesometimes
are
members,
hypotheses,
forthecongressional
supported
decisionmaking.Conclusions
that
farmoreapplicabletoleadership
suggest
conventional
wisdombe revisedto takethesedifferences
intoaccount.
KEY WORDS: congress;foreignpolicy;leaders;politicalparties;presidency;
structural
anthropology

INTRODUCTION

is a theory
Structural
and an approachwhichhas not
anthropology
oftenbeenconsidered
or usedin politicalscienceresearch.
Thispaperinthecritical
comments
onan earlier
version
ofthisworkbyGeraldBenjamin,
'I appreciate
Leon
D. Epstein,BarbaraHinckley,
Herbert
M. Kritzer,
BeatriceL. Lewis,AnnMcCann,and
RichardM. Merelman.
I am also grateful
forthesuggestions
especially
of theeditorand
referees.
anonymous
of Politics,NewYorkUniversity,
NewYork,NewYork 10003.
2Department
83

0162-895X/86/0300-0083$05.00/1
? 1986 InternationalSocietyof Political Psychology

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84

King

troducesstructuralism
and appliesit to a researchproblemin American
One
result
is
that
thisshouldmakeit easierforothersto use the
politics.
in
and
other
areas of politicalscience.Structural
antheory
approach
as
Levi-Strauss
and
thropology, eloquently
explicated
by
(1963,1966,1969)
others,impliesseveralassumptions.
is dividedintotwocategories:
surface
levelorconFirst,all ofculture
tentand deepstructure.
Socialscientists
neverobservemorethantheconto inferto thestructures.
tent,butwe should,itis argued,alwaysattempt
Thestructuralist
is
to
discover
structures
whichunderlie
anddetermine
goal
a variety
of surfacelevelculturalphenomena.
taketheform
ofbinary
andallmeanSecond,allstructures
oppositions,
fromthesecontrasts.
Thesymbol
doesnot
ingisderived
"red,"forexample,
mean"stop"without
itscontrast
withtheopposingsymbol"green,"
andits
associatedconcept,"go" (Leach,1970).Socialpsychologists,
forexample,
havelongidentified
socialgroupsprimarily
inrelation
to eachother(Comminsand Lockwood,1979).Politicalscientists
usuallyreferto powerrelawitha vertical
as in up:down::superordination:subortionships
metaphor:
class::"onyourwayto thetop":"falling
class:lower
dination::upper
bythe
wayside."
Structural
sometimes
andassumeor assert
anthropologists
go further
thatthesebinaryoppositions
arefundamental
characteristics
ofthehuman
it is inmind,butalthoughthisassumption
maybe of academicinterest,
unobservable
andusually
fortheanalysis
oftheresearch
herently
unnecessary
Schwartz
problem
beingconsidered.
(1981:159),forexample,
distinguishes
betweenthreelevels of universality
in dual classification.
The most
are"formal
whichincludefundamental
methaphysical
universals,"
assumptionsaboutthebinarynatureofhumanthought.
In between,
are"substantiveuniversals,
whichare observable
butdo seemto existin nature(e.g.,
hot-cold,left-right,
up-down).Finally,thereare "sociological
universals,"
whichare "thealignment
of certainmoraland socialstatesto particular
substantive
contrasts."
It is usefulto add to Schwartz's
hierarchy
political
whichI defineas thealignment
of certainpoliticalphenomena
universals,
withthemorebasicsubstantive
or social-psychological
contrasts.
that
it
is
to
allsocieties
Third,Levi-Strauss
unnecessaryexamine
argued
to
orto comparea variety
oftimeperiods discover
fundamental
structures.
Forjustas messages
whichwereceive
fromdifferent
sensescanbetransforma story),
thepastexistsonlyas a struced intoeachother(e.g.,visualizing
of the present.Thus, diachronic(overtime)and
tural transformation
(cross-cultural)
analysesaretwowaysofdoingthesamething
synchronic
characteristics
and,byso doing,uncovering
important
lookingforstructure
of humanculture.

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Political Parties and ForeignPolicy

85

ofthisstructural
onewhich
Byusinga version
anthropological
approach,
is unencumbered
thispaperidenbymanyofitsmetaphysical
assumptions,
tifiesand examinestwo binaryoppositions
at the levelof the political
Thegoalis notto learnabouttheformal
universals
ofthehuman
universal.3
tolearnaboutthesetwopolitical
andtheir
relabrain,butinstead
oppositions
inAmerican
isofinterest
whenwemovefrom
tionships
politics.
Deepstructure
thepoliticaluniversals
to thesocial-psychological
and substantive
universalsinorderto assistinunderstanding
and explaining
thesurface-level
relaof
concern
to
social
scientists.
tionships
In the sectionswhichfollow,two binaryoppositionsexistingin
Americanpoliticsare introduced.
betweenthetwoare first
Relationships
with
conventional
These
are
explored
however,
assumptions.
assumptions,
foundtobeinconsistent
withavailablescholarly
A better
evidence.
explanationoftherelationship
between
theoppositions
isthenpresented
alongwith
data. Finally,afterarguingthatone structural
supporting
explanation
underlies
bothoppositions,
extensions
to othersurface-level
are
phenomena
made.It turnsoutthatstructural
a usefulapproach
anthropology
provides
whichhelpsuncover
between
several
literatures
considered
relationships
rarely
butwhicharein factinexorably
combined.
related
andbeneficially
together,
As a result,newlyhypothesized
relationships
amongseveraldata setsare
derived.The data,in turn,providethefirstsystematic
evidenceof several
theoretical
important
relationships.
THE REPUBLICAN/DEMOCRATIC AND FOREIGN
POLICY/DOMESTIC POLICY BINARY OPPOSITIONS

The twobinaryoppositions
considered
hereare thedistinctions
betwocategories
tweenthepartiesandbetween
ofpublicpolicy.Considerfirst
theoppositions
theDemocratic
andtheRepublican
between
parties.Clearly
thisbinarycategorization
existsin mostpartsoftheAmerican
culture:
For
theaveragecitizen,
tobe identified
withtheDemocratic
is
to
party generally
moreliberalpositions.To be electedas a Republican
is, in general,
prefer
to takemoreconservative
issuestands.
andDemocrats
meetindifferent
national,
state,andlocal
Republicans
conventions
to choosea variety
ofpartycandidates;
fordifferent
vote
they
candidates
in different
or
caucuses
and
sit
on
different
sidesof
primaries
an aislein bothhousesof congress,
in all butone of thestatelegislatures,
3AlthoughonlyU.S. cultureis considered,the oppositionsintroducedbelow can be extended
to othernationsusing slightlymore generalterminology.

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86

King

oflocal(city,county,
Forexamandinthousands
town,etc.)governments.
is defined
byTajfel(1982:24) as "thatpartoftheinple,"SocialIdentity"
whichderives
fromtheirknowledge
dividuals'
of... membership
self-concept
withthevalueandemotional
of
[in]a socialgroup...together
significance
For officeholders
socialidentity
to their
thatmembership."
refers
directly
partyidentification.
theRepublican/Democratic
distinction
isclearenoughtogive
Although
theboundarybetweenthetwois notwelldepartiesseparatemeanings,
fined.Ratesofsplit-ticket
and"drop-off"
"roll-off,"
voting,
1970)
(Burnham,
are high;theproportion
of theelectorate
witha politicalparty
identifying
is farfromcomplete;
ofthosewhodo identify
witha political
variable
party,
and Jacobson,
votein accordwiththeirparty(Crotty
numbers
1980);party
identification
is volatile,as areaggregate
electionreturns;
legislators
rarely
use theirpartymembership
as thesole cue forvotingdecisions(Clausen,
distinctiveness
ofaspectsofthepartiesseem
1973);andeventheideological
to havedeclined.
In sum,theboundary
between
thepartiesis crossedeasilyand often,
and can be considered
"loose"[seeLeach(1976:33-36)fora definition
of
a 'boundary'
andMerelman
for
and
of
definitions
the
con(1984) examples
is looser,theparty
ceptas it is usedhere].Buteventhoughtheboundary
distinction
is farfrombeinglost.Inthegeneral
Allen
andWilder(1975)
case,
aresimilar,
theminimal
findthatevenwhengroupbeliefs
processofin and
outgroupcategorization
is enoughto makeingroupfavoritism
(see
persist
also Billigand Tajfel,1973;Sole et al., 1975).In fact,thereis evensome
counter-intuitive
thatwhengroupshavesimilar
evidence
values,intergroup
- plausibly
discrimination
is actuallyheightened
in orderto protectgroup
distinctiveness.
boundaries
areweakening
butdo notseemindanger
So, party
of losingtheirmeaning.
to be considered
hereis thedistinction
The secondbinaryopposition
theAmerican
between
"bipartisan"
approachto foreign
policyandtheparto keep
tisanapproachto domestic
policies.It is an oftenstatedaspiration
deliberations
andpublic
policy,inbothcongressional
politicsoutofforeign
"Politicsstopsat thewater'sedge,"itis oftenwritten
discussion.
(Blissand
thatevenwhenpoliticsis part
Johnson,
1975).Thisdistinction
guarantees
itis usuallywithin
of
therhetorical
constraints
of foreign
policydecisions,
thewaycitizens
andleadersdealwith
Theboundary
between
bipartisanship.
as itoncewas,butitdoes
anddomestic
policiesmaynotbe as strong
foreign
existand is clearlyrelevant.
Thereis a largebodyofsocial-psychological
workwhichmaypartially
of theseoppositions
in termsof in group/out
explaintheexistence
group
distinctions.
Forexample,
Stein(1976)findsina review
ofempirical
literature
fromseveraldisciplines
thatinter-group
"conflict
internal
cohedoesincrease
sion undercertainconditions."Tajfel (1982) findsagreementwiththispro-

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PoliticalPartiesand ForeignPolicy

87

Freudandearlyfrustration-aggression
theorists.
from,
position
amongothers,
Otherconsequences
of in group/out
conflict
for
which
Tajfelcites
group
evidence
includetheincreased
of
oritsproevaluation
the
"positive
ingroup
ducts."
For the Democratic/Republican
opposition,the mostpronounced
and
attitudinal
distinctions
are
cognitive
likelyto occurwhenthepartiestry
to changethestatusandpowerofeachother(BrownandRoss,1982).Relevantexamplesof accentuated
outgroupdiscriminapartydistinctiveness,
and
of
levels
verbal
combat
includelegislative
tion,
heightened
inter-party
or otherleadersof thepartieshavetheir
motionsforwhichthepresident
at stake,electoral
in whichthereis an attackon the
reputation
campaigns
oftheopposition
veryexistence
group,and in debatesin whichtheparties
attackfundamental
on whichtheoppositionmakesitscase.
principles
A majorparadoxof thesetwooppositions
is thatthesamepolitical
actorswhoarepushedapartbythepartyopposition
arepulledtogether
on
Wewillseethatforparty
thesecross-pressures
leaders,
policymatters.
foreign
areexaggerated.
Oneofthecontributions
ofthispaper,therefore,
istosugforunderstanding
thisproblem.
gesta framework

OPPOSITION SIMILARITIES

thesetwooppositions
havebeentreated
oras
Traditionally,
separately
after
are
onlypartially
related;
all, they primafaciedifferent
phenomena.
Butcan theybe usefully
studiedtogether?
Arethetwobinaryoppositions
related?Andiftheyare,whatformdoestherelationship
take?Guidedby
alternative
answersto thesequestionsare nowexplored.
structuralism,
One conventional
and clearlyplausibleconnection
is thatreferred
to
Cecil
V.
Crabb
"Thetwo
by
(1957: 198),and mentioned
by manyothers:
factors
thatnormally
to favortheachievement
important
maybe expected
of bipartisan
in foreign
affairsare the nonideological
nature
cooperation
ofAmerican
incongress."
partiesandtheabsenceof strict
partydiscipline
Put differently,
whenthereis lesspartisanship
be(i.e., weakboundaries
tweentheparties),
in foreign
bipartisanship
policyis easierto achieve.The
is thatwhenthedefinitional,
and behavioral
bounhypothesis
attitudinal,
theRepublican
andtheDemocratic
darybetween
partiesbreaksdown,the
between
anddomestic
boundary
foreign
policybipartisanship
policypartisanandlesspermeable;
thatis, partisan
shipbecomestighter
politicswouldbe
lesslikelyto crosstheboundary
andinfectforeign
policydecision-making.
That ProfessorCrabb refersto the loose party boundaryby its
"nonideological"natureemphasizesthatthisculturalcode is verydifferent
fromtightly-bounded
codes, such as ideologyor religion.

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88

King

of therelationship
thetwoopposithisstatement
between
Although
ofevidence.
tionsistheoretically
itis notsupported
reasonable,
bya variety
Considerthreecontradictory
and cross-sectional
historical
examples.
thereis considerable
evidence
thatAmerican
First,although
political
arebecoming
morepermeable,
andJacobloose,andporous(Crotty
parties
son, 1980),thereis also evidence-orat leastwidespread
expertopinionthatpartisan
theforeign
politicsareincreasingly
infecting
policyarena.As
consider
Chace(1978)as representative
of scholarly,
evidence,
journalistic,
and otheropinion:"Thekindof broadconsensus
thatobtainedduringthe
eraandwhichbecamea shibboleth
ofAmerican
postwar
foreign
policymay
no longerbe possibleshortof war."
Consistent
withthisis a dramatic
increasein suggestions
of howto
theforeign-bipartisan/domestic-partisan
Theseproposals
tighten
boundary.
includecreating
ad hoc bipartisan
to followimportant
groupsin congress
foreign
policyissues(Hamilton,1978),increasing
congressional
expertise
committees
of the president's
cabinetand
(Rourke,1977),establishing
members
of congress(Manning,1977),increasing
politically
responsible
behaviorfromAmerica's
leaders(Bax, 1977),and havingthepresident
act
inwayswhichwouldencourage
in
leaders
to
work
more
closeparty
congress
on foreign
lytogether
policyissues(FryeandRogers,1979).Ofcourse,direct
empirical
analyseswouldbe betterevidenceof thispoint,butnoneexist.4
inthishistorical
in
oftheboundary
Therefore,
example,thestrength
each of thetwobinaryoppositions
seemedto varytogetherdeloosely
finedboundaries
betweenforeign
and domestic
politicsbeingmorelikely
whentherearelooselydefined
of an inverse
parties.Theinitialhypothesis
consistent
with
conventional
is
not
relationship,
although
wisdom,
supported
in thisfirstexample.
As a secondexample,
consider
twotypesofpeoplegenerally
distinguished bysocioeconomic
levels(witheducationweighted
heavilyin thedistinction).Mostanalyseshaveshownpoliticalpartiestobe moresalienttothose
intheupperSES groups;thesegroupsaremorepolarized
lines
alongpartisan
andaremorelikelyto identify
with,andbe activein,a politicalpartythan
lowerSES groups(Ladd and Lipset,1971;Ladd withHadley,1978).
However,upperSES groupsare also morelikelyto supporta bipartisanforeign
policyandto prefer
bipartisan
foreign
policies.For example,
JohnMueller(1973:Ch. 5) identifies
a "follower
as characterizmentality"
ingpeoplewho,"takeas cuesfortheirownopinion[onwarin particular
and on foreign
affairsin general]theissuepositionof prominent
opinion
whichcouldusefully
4Thereis muchresearch
establish
thisrelationship.
One examplemight
be to content
analyzesamplesofdebateson theHouseandSenatefloorson foreign
andon
domestic
couldthenbe compared
policyissues.Levelsof conflict
and assessed.

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PoliticalPartiesand ForeignPolicy

89

thepresident.
showthat
Mueller's
leaders,"
especially
clearly
analyses
survey
of "followers."
higherSES groupshavehigherproportions
It mayseemsomewhat
thatthosein upperSES groups
contradictory
arebothmorepartisan
andmorelikelyto be "followers,"
since
particularly
theparticular
theleadermaynotbe conpathon whichtheyarefollowing
sistent
withtheir
someone
relatively
strong
partisan
predispositions.
However,
witha clearunderstanding
of thedifferences
betweenthepartiesis likely
tounderstand
whenthisboundary
shouldbe breached,
andwouldtherefore
be morelikelyto supportsuchan actionunderappropriate
circumstances.
Thus, in this second example,for those groupsin whichthe
is tight,
thebipartisan
Republican/Democratic
boundary
policy/parforeign
tisandomestic
is
also
Thisisadditional
evidence
policyboundary
tight.
against
theoriginalhypothesis;
theoppositions
do seemto varytogether.
As a finalexample,considerthedifferences
betweenmembers
and
leadersof theHouse of Representatives.
Sinceleadership
in theHouse is
it is a safeassumption
solelybasedon thepoliticalpartydistinctions,
that
the Republican/Democratic
is
fortheleadersthanthe
boundary tighter
members.
The questionthenconcerns
thesalienceof theotheropposition
to thesetwogroups;theproposition
aboveindicates
thatthisboundary
is
forthemembers,
whilethetwoprevious
tighter
thereverse.
examples
suggest
Establishingthis latter possibility-thatthe porousness of the
Republican/Democratic
boundaryvariesin the same directionas the
foreign/domestic
policyboundary-wouldprovidethe firstsystematic
evidenceof this"bipartisan
in thispaperor in
foreign
policy"hypothesis,
theliterature.
Withrollcall data fromthefirstsession(forcomparability)
of each
of fivepost-presidential
electioncongresses
thisquestioncan
(1961-1977),
be explored.Byincluding
thosevoteson whichthepresident
tooka public
andusingtherepresentative's
position(seeCongressional
voteas
Quarterly)
theunitofanalysis,
thoserollcallsinwhicha largerproportion
ofrepresentatives
votedareweighted
moreheavily.
somerepresentatives
Although
might
avoidcontroversial
examination
of rollcalls
votes,a cursory
("important")
indicates
thatthisweighting
isgenerally
inaccordwithconceptual
importance.
A potential
withtheanalysisis theclustering
ofobservations
problem
and byrollcall,possiblycausingan underestimation
by representative
of
thestandard
errors.
becausethedatasetis so large(154,709voting
However,
decisions),all of thestandarderrorsare verysmall,and a correction
is
therefore
notlikelyto changethisappreciably.5
since
decisions
Also,
many
incongress
areconcluded
without
a formalrollcall,
longbeforeor entirely
SSincethisis a pooledcross-sectional
wouldproduceinefficient
design,heteroskedasticity
and
biasedestimates.
An analysisof theresiduals,
no majorproblems.
indicates
however,

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90

King

theremaybe a selection
bias(seeBarnowetal., 1980).Finally,
becauseonly
the firstcongressional
sessionof each presidency
was used, honeymoon
effects(Manheim,1979) may cause problems.However,becausethese
itis unlikely
effect,
analysesarenotcloselyrelatedtoa possiblehoneymoon
to greatly
altertheresults.Further
analysisof othersessionswouldnevertheless
beveryuseful.Qualifications
aside,thesedataremain
amongthebest
whichare availableat present
to analyzethesequestions.
In orderto facilitate
all equationsexplaintheprobability
comparison,
and all controlforthe effectsof region
of votingwiththe president,
"In"(i.e.,president's)
and"Out"(i.e.,opposileadership,
party
(north/south),
arenot
tion)partymembership
(Republican/Democratic
partydifferences
to In/Outpartydifferences),
issuearea,presiverystrongin comparison
ofthisprocedure
is totakeintoacdent,andtimeperiod.Theconsequence
rivalhypotheses
countseveral
aboutvoting
withthepresident.6
The
plausible
modelis a logisticanalysisof tabulardata. In partymembers
areexpected
tosupport
morethanOutpartymembers.
In thecaseofbiparthepresident
tisandecision-making,
theIn/Outpartysplitin supportof thepresident
is
to be greateron domesticthanon foreign
hypothesized
policydecisions.
In orderto allowforthepossibility
thatthereis morevariation
within
thebroadcategories
ofdomestic
andforeign
there
policythanbetween
them,
are threeforeign
policyand fourdomestic
roll
of
calls.
policycategories
Thiscodingofpolicycategories
isconsistent
withvariedresults
from
separatestudies
lyconducted
domestic
[seeKessel(1974)andClausen(1973)forsimilar
codingsand Hughes(1978)forsimilarforeign
policycodings)].
Thefigures
arepresented
withall years(1961-1977)
combined
because
indicated
that
similar
hold
preliminary
analyses
relationships
generally up
overtimeandbecauseofthebenefits
ofsavingspaceandreducing
complexthepredicted
valuesof a logisticequationexplaining
ity.Figure1 presents
theprobability
ofthepartyleadervoting
withthepresident.'
Estimated
probabilities
fortheIn and Outpartiesacrossthesevenpolicyareasappearin
theFigure.The largerthedifference
between
theIn and Out partiesfora
area
vertical
distance
between
thelinesinthefigure),
particular
policy
(the
thestronger
are thepartyboundariesforthatpolicyarea.
The firstthingto noticeaboutFigure1 is that,as expected,
In party
members
oftheHouseofRepresentatives
(thetoplineinthefigure)
support

thepossibility
reduces
thatleaders
andmembers
controls
thesestatistical
substantially
6Including
rather
thandesign.
do so bycoincidence
whovotewiththepresident
Forthisanalysis,
of eachpartyaretheonlyrealleadersin congress.
7Theformalleadership
Ifthetopthree
whovotesisconsidered.
leaders
leaderfrom
eachparty
ranking
onlythehighest
votesonlyinthecaseofa tie),theroll
theSpeaker,whobytradition
do notvote(excluding
call is excludedfromtheanalysis.

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91

Political Parties and ForeignPolicy

thepresident
farmoreoftenthanOutpartymembers
(thelowerline).But
which
couldplausibly
also
that
for
defense
indicates
Figure1
except
policy
of
than
a
more
a
domestic
be explained
Vietnam
policy
by
becoming
foreign
issue(which,incidentally,
supportsthefirstexample,above)-thereis a
In foreign
inleadership
forthepresident:
difference
support
policy,
striking
ofan In partycongressional
leadersupporting
thepresident
theprobability
is about25percentage
leaders(excluding
defense).
pointsmorethanOutparty
forthepresident
isabouttwice
thissplitinparty
However,
leadership
support
leaderas greatinthefourdomestic
Thus,amongtheparty
policycategories.
a verytightboundary,
betweenpoliticsin
ship,thereis a cleardifference,
foreignpolicy-whichtendsto be bipartisan-andpoliticsin domestic
Thisis witnessed
bythecleardistinction
policy- whichtendstobe partisan.
betweentheleftand rightsidesof thefigure.
In a parallelpresentation,
thesamedata,butforthe
Figure2 displays
thetwofigures
between
of theHouse. The difference
generalmembership
thereis considerably
lessdistinction
is dramatic:
(i.e.,
Amongthemembers
betweenforeignand domesticpolicydecision-making
looserboundaries)
still
Thereis, however,
theleftandrightsidesofthefigure).
(i.e., between
PROBABILITY
OF THE

PARTY

.90

WITHTHE

.80

LEADER
VOTING

PRESIDENT

.70
.60

IN PARTY

A
/
OUTPARTY

.50
.40

.30

For- For- DeSo- Gov't EnAgrieign eign fense cial Mgt ergy culture
Trade Aid
Welfare
POLICY AREA

forthepresident.
Source:Percentsupport
Mg. 1. In and Outpartyleadership
Note:
fromthePM,MI logitmodel.d.f. = 48, G2 = 10667.35.
agescomputed
Forall figures,
modelabbreviations
areas follows:
Issueorpolicyarea(I), Presi-

dent(P), Party
Leader's
position
(L), andparty
membership
(M).

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King

92

aid decisionsthere
For example,on votingforforeign
somerelationship.
of a
in theprobability
is on theaverageno In and Out partydifference
in
the
In
with
the
government
representative
voting
president. contrast,
In partymembers
are abouttenpointsmorelikely
management
category,
thedifButalthough
thanOut partymembers.
to votewiththepresident
nowhere
near
as tight
the
boundaries
are
ferences
areinthecorrect
direction,
in Figure1.
as forthepartyleadersrepresented
Thusin thisexample,as in theprevious
two,thetwobinaryopposiWhentheRepublican/Democratic
is
tionstendto varytogether:
boundary
tight(as forthe partyleaders),the Foreign-Bipartisan/Domestic-Partisan
is also tight.Whentherearesomewhat
weakerpartydistinctions
boundary
therearealso looserdistinctions
between
(as forHousemembers),
typesof
orpartisan)
indifferent
ordomestic).
(bipartisan
policyareas(foreign
politics
It is clearthatan alternative
is needed.
explanation
TWO BINARY OPPOSITIONS-ONE
UNDERLYING STRUCTURE

Theinitialproposition
wasthatthetwocodesvariedinversely:
When
the boundarybetweenone was tightthe othershouldbe loose. This
.79
PROBABILITY

IN PARTY
MEMBER

.60
/

OF A

REPRESENTATIVE
.50
VOTING
WITH

THE

PRESIDENT

.40

OUT PARTY

MEMBER

.30

.20

.1o

I
Foreign
Trade

I .

For- DeSo- Gov't En- Agrieign fense cial Mgt ergy culture
Aid
Welfare
POLICY AREAS

Fig. 2. In and Out partyrepresentatives'

supportforthePresident.Source: Percentages computedfromthePLM,MI logitmodel. d.f. = 108, G2 = 4982.28; MI component: d.f. = 6, G2 = 315.17.

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Political Parties and ForeignPolicy

93

- although
- wassupnotextensively
exploredintheliterature
proposition
and
conventional
science
wisdom.
It
political
portedbyplausibleargument
in
known
in
fact"
and
as
a
"well
as
comments
articles
many
scholarly
appears
fromthreeexamples
evidence
demonstrated
textbooks.
However,empirical
theboundaries
between
thecodes
notthecase.Rather,
thatthiswasprobably
was
the
other
code
was
loose
one
code
when
seemedtovarytogether
loose,
with
no
but
ofa relationship
as well.Thisleavesuswithevidence
explanation.
to recognize
thatimitis important
In orderto derivean explanation,
is
thusfaris thateachof thesebinaryoppositions
plicitin thediscussion
a signalormetaphoric
symbolfortheother.It wasimpliedthattheopposior apartor thatone causedtheother.An alternative
tionsvariedtogether
is thatthetwo
tobe offered,
andthebasisfortheexplanation
formulation,
toeachother.In other
aremetonymic;
words,
theyarecontiguous
oppositions
is a structural
one binaryopposition
transformation
oftheother:Onefununderlies
bothdistinctions.
damentalstructure
bebasisforthesetwocodesis thedistinction
Thecommonstructural
"same"and"different;"
tween"we"and"they"
between
(or,moregenerally,
to thesurfacetheformer
areusedbecausetheyhavemoredirectrelevance
ofinterest).
Theconceptof"we"doesnothavemeaning
levelrelationships
anddefined.
untiltheopposingconceptof"they"is contrasted
Thisdistincin manyareas: For example,David Truman's"Wave
tionis recognized
is basedon thisdistinction:
Theory"ofinterest
"Organizagroupformation
hewrites
tionbegetscounterorganization,"
(Truman,1956).Impliedis that
thecounterorganization
without
theoriginalorganization,
wouldnothave
itself
thefirst
defined
as a group(as "we")without
(andidengroupforming
themselves
as
"we"
and
else
as
"they").
tifying
everyone
canbe appliedtoMiddleEastern
ConcomiThesameprinciple
politics:
tantwiththesharpincreasein immigration
of Jewsto Palestineearlierin
was
thiscentury
andtheirself-identification
as "we,"and othersas "they,"
of theArabslivingin thearea as "we,"and theJewsas
theself-definition
at linguistic
distinctiveness
also increased
"they"(Safran,1978); efforts
not exist
for
could
this
example,
period(Seckback,1974).War,
during
without
thewe/they
opposition.
whichdo notderive
Thereare,of course,manypoliticalphenomena
froma we/they
as whenpoliticalactionis basedon a senseof
distinction,
or consensus.In thefirstpresidential
forexample,
elections,
community
thatthepoliticalpartyto whomthespeaker
emphasized
politicalrhetoric
or in factactuallywas,thewillof thenation.
belongedbestrepresented,
JohnAnderson's1976"NationalUnityParty,"and Reagan's1984appeal
fora "newpatriotism"
are morerecentexamples.
The current
can be reformulated
Democratic/Republican
opposition
in this manner as "my party/otherparty," and the Foreignbinary opposition can also be viewed as
Bipartisan/Domestic-Partisan

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94

King

Insteadofthedivision
thewe/they
distinction.
beingbetween
parredefining
ties,it is betweentheU.S. and theworld(or betweentheU.S. and parts
thesetwooppositions
arereallysurfaceoftheworld).Fromthisperspective,
of thesamewe/they
or transformations
level(or content)manifestations
structural
opposition.
- thebinary
- and
Thusfara relationship
varying
together
oppositions
- a structural
- havebeenassembled.
an underlying
But
identity
explanation
interest
is ofacademicandexploratory
(andremains
although
deepstructure
as presently
an inference),
itis thepoliticalcontent
conceptualized
entirely
to politicalscientists.
Thesefindings
must
thatis moreoftenof interest
In
substantive
therefore
be relatedbackto theoriginal
sum,
why
problem.8
of interest?
is thisstructural
relationship
The basicobservation
is thatstrongandclearlydefined
politicalpartiesleadtothebipartisan
offoreign
operation
policyandtheusualpartisan
ofdomestic
follows
With"strong"
operation
policy.Theexplanation
directly:
thereis thepossibility
of
parties,thatis witha strong
we/they
opposition,
an agreement
betweenthepartyleaders;theleaderscan speakmoreconfortheirpartymembers
and can makecompromises
withopposifidently
tionpartyleadersmoreeasily.9
Furthermore,
(i.e.,interparty
bipartisanship
is mostlikelywhentheissuedefines
thewe/they
as
agreement)
opposition
theUnitedStatesversusothernations;ofcourse,bipartisanship
is possible
in otherissueareas,butitseemslikely
to be mostfrequent
in foreign
policy.
distinction
leads to
Thus,a strong,well-defined
Republican/Democratic
clearer
boundaries
between
anddomestic
foreign
policybipartisanship
policy
Based on systematic
redefines
the
evidence,thiseffectively
partisanship.
bipartisan
foreign
policyhypothesis.
STRUCTURAL EXTENSIONS

Thereare numerous(surface-level)
manifestations
of thestructural
wavetheory
ofinterest
we/they
binary
opposition.
ExamplesfromTruman's
and fromMiddleEasternpoliticshavealreadybeenprogroupformation
vided.Widevarieties
ofotherapplications
couldbeexplicated
inconsiderable
of socialgroup
detail.For a fewshortexamples,consider:Explanations
forthepsychological
andsociological
ofthe
solidarity;
arguments
necessity
8L6vi-Strauss
havebeensatisfied
I concentrate
on using
here,butforpresent
might
purposes,
structural
to understand
thesurface-level
of primary
interest
to
anthropology
phenomena
politicalscientists.
forthosecircumstances
wheninter-group
doesnotleadto ingroup
90n evidence
competition
cohesion.See Tajfel(1982:16);RabbieanddeBrey
(1971);RabbieandWilkens
(1971);Rabbie and Huygen(1974);Rabbieet al. (1974);and Horwitzand Rabbie(1982).

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PoliticalPartiesand ForeignPolicy

95

andracism;exploraoritssurrogates;
ethnocentricity
understanding
family
of
the
ofthe
ofthenation-state;
tionsoftheorigins
explanations development
the
for
which
some
creates;
certain
advertising
products
political
party; loyalty
tocertain
teams(whicharenotcoincidently
theappealofsportsandloyalty
andcities);andthetremendous
namedforlocalproducts
appealoftheOlym"The
U.S. versesThe
events
as
titles
some
network
television
pics (one
the
be
extended.
The
list
could
Instead, approachsuggested
bythis
World").
onepoliticalissue
to examining
methodinthispaperis limited
structuralist
relatedto theoriginaltwobinaryoppositions.
ofthewe/they
surfacelevelmanifestation
Another
binaryopposition
in theconand thepresidency
between
is theinstitutional
congress
rivalry
ductofforeign
in
that
policy.Thisbinary
foreign
policy
opposition
suggests
to supportthe
aremorelikelyto crosstheopposition
boundary
legislators
thecongress/presidency
In domestic
boundary
policy,however,
president.
shoulddrop.
becomesmoresalientand supportforthepresident
on thelevelof
Thusfar,party,policy,and institutional
oppositions
All threeseemto be relatedto the
havebeenidentified.
politicaluniversals
someofthe
structure.
Crabb(1957:7) describes
samesocial-psychological
betweenthese:
distinctions
- relations
andrelations
theexWhilethetwoproblems
between
theparties
between
- areintimately
canresult
ecutive
andlegislative
branches
connected,
onlyconfusion
fromregarding
thetwo
themas identical
problems.
Harmony
mayprevailbetween
branches
ofgovernment
concerned
withforeign
butthisfactalonewillnot
affairs;
in theforeign
guarantee
bipartisan
co-operation
policyrealm.(Crabb,1957:7)

The questionof boundaries

between
theHouseand thepresidency
is
addressed
he
byPolsby(1968).An institutionalized
explicitly
organization
thatis to say,differentiated
well-bounded,
arguesis, interalia, "relatively
An increaseinthisboundedness
fromitsenvironment."
or institutionalizationis clearlyobservedbya decreaseintheturnover
of members,
increase
in theaveragelengthof service,
increasein theseniority
of successful
canin and
didatesforSpeaker,and sharpdeclineof lateralcareermovement,
outoftheHouseand,insomenotablecases,alsoinandoutofthespeakerdistinction
between
ship.Thus,therehasbeen,overtime,a clearerwe/they
and
the
congress
presidency.
Fromtheconclusion
abovethatthestrength
of theboundaries
vary
in thesamedirection,
thestronger
between
and itsenboundary
congress
and thusbetweencongress
and thepresidency,
shouldlead to
vironment,
an increased
of
between
the
two
of governbranches
possibility agreement
in
this
should
be
most
affairs
wherethe
ment; agreement
apparent foreign
is
reformulated
to
for
incentive
we/theyopposition
provide
congresconsensus.
sional/presidential
It shouldbe notedthatthecongress/presidency
distinction
is an institutionalopposition,whereastheothersare cognitiveor social oppositions.The

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King

96

onthebasisofcognitive
originated
probably
congress/presidency
opposition
once
to thefounders,
butthisinstitutional
relevant
distinction,
oppositions
thewe/they
and exaggerated
in place,probablyencouraged
opcognitive
blurswhenconsidering
politicalpartieswhich,
position.The distinction
havebeeninsitugovernment,
althoughnevera formalpartof American
tionalizedsinceitsinception.
is clearly
thecongressional/presidential
becoming
boundary
Although
inforeign
from
whether
theliterature
tighter
(Polsby,1968),itisnotapparent
increasein agreement
between
affairsthishas resultedin the predicted
Whatisoften
ofcongress
andthepresident.
calledthetwopresidenmembers
ciesliterature
byWildavsky
(1966)]is farfromcon[basedonthehypothesis
sensuson eitherthe levelor the trendof congressional
supportforthe
versusdomestic
In fact,evengiventheplausion foreign
affairs.
president
ble case Wildavsky
makesforit, thereexistsno satisfactory
systematic
workinthetwo
thatpublished
evidenceofthishypothesis.
(It is interesting
and bipartisan
foreign
rarelyciteeachother
policyliteratures
presidencies
orbuildon eachother's
work.Thestructuralist
herehelps
approach
employed
makethisconnection.)
and
Forexample,
LeLoupandShull(1979)updateWildavsky's
analysis
find
for
his
thesis
that
the
to
for
appear
support
congressional
support
presidentis greater
on foreign
thanon domestic
affairs
butfindthattherelationinrecent
withthisanalysis,
andwith
years.Theproblem
shipis notas strong
is
that
their
measure
of
is
no
Wildavsky's
longer
originalarticle,
support
becauseof whatCQ callsits
beingcompiledby Congressional
Quarterly
"dubiousquality."Lee Sigelman(1979)usesa different
measureand finds
noappreciable
and
Forpotential
difference
between
domestic
foreign
support.
with
the
and
see
Shull
problems
Sigelmanstudy LeLoup
(1980).
In orderto providea moresystematic
examination
of thisquestion,
thedata analyzedin Figures1 and 2 can be examinedfurther.
Againdata
arepresented
forthemembers
andthepartyleaders.Thehypothesis
is that
as a consequence
of thetightboundaries
betweencongress
and thepresiwillsupport
thepresident
moreon foreign
dent,boththeleadersandmembers
thanondomestic
affairs
rollcalls.Furthermore,
from
theeffects
ofstratificationobserved
shouldbe stronger
above,therelationship
amongtheleaders
thanthefollowers.
valuesof a logisticequationexplaining
the
Figure3 reports
predicted
oftheparty
leadervoting
withthepresident
foreachoftheseven
probability
that,withdefense
policyareas.Itsuggests
policyas a possible
exception
again,
decisionson foreign
affairsare farmorelikelyto be supportive
leadership
on domestic
affairs.
Thedifference
ofthepresident
thanaredecisions
is also
Theprobability
with
ofa congressional
leaderofeither
striking:
party
voting
the presidentapproachescertaintyforforeignaffairsbut remainsa full25

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PoliticalPartiesand ForeignPolicy

97

1.00

PROBABILITY .90
OF THE
PARTY

LEADER

VOTING
WITH THE
PRESIDENT

.80
.70

.60

For- For- DeSo- Gov't En- Agrieign eign fense cial Mgt ergy culture
Trade Aid
Welfare
POLICY AREA

fromthe
forthePresident.
Source:Percentages
computed
Fig.3. Partyleadership
support
PM,I logitmodel. d.f. = 9, G2 = 11940.89; PM component:d.f. = 9, G2 = 54313.98.

Supportforthepresipolicydecisions.
percentage
pointslowerfordomestic
inforeign
tradethanforeign
dentis somewhat
aid,andthereis some
higher
variationin supportamongthedomesticpolicies,but,againexceptfor
and domestic
is betweenforeign
distinction
policies.
defense,theprimary
thesis
Thus,amongpartyleadersin theHouse,thetwopresidencies
ofleaderWithforeign
is wellsupported:
probability
policycomesa greater
withtheincumbent
president.
shipagreement
ofthe
a parallelanalysisforthegeneralmembership
Figure4 provides
of a representative
House. As is apparent,
theprobability
votingwiththe
affairs.
between
anddomestic
is notsubstantially
different
foreign
president
is in a foreign
In fact,theweakestsupportforthepresident
policyarea
withtheargument
thatthosehigher
(foreign
aid). Whilethisis consistent
tendto supporttighter
in American's
hierarchies
stratification
boundaries,
it does notsupportthepresent
argument.
frompreviousexamplesthat
To review:It was initially
hypothesized
between
"we"and "they"shouldresultin
moreclearlydefinedboundaries
of we/they
moreintra-group
cohesionandthusa greater
agreepossibility
menton important
this
case
issues.
For
executive-legislative
(in
foreign
policy)
thisgeneralization
but
remains
accurateforthepartyleadership
relations,
notforthegeneralmembership.
the
Therefore,
although partyleadership
thusfar,themembers
can
fitnicely
intothestructural
explanation
presented
be
considered
an
only
exception.
A possibleexplanation
of thisexception
can be foundin a closerexin
It
of historical
amination
changes congress. has alreadybeenobserved
thatcongress
has steadily
becomemoreboundedfromthepresidency
(and

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98

King
.80
.70
.60
PROBABILITY
OF A
REPRESENTATIVE
VOTING WITH
.50
THE
PRESIDENT

.4o_
.30
.20

So- Gov't En- AgriFor- For- Deeign eign fense cial Mgt ergy culture
WelTrade Aid
fare
POLICY AREA

Source:Percentages
Fig. 4. Partymembership
supportforthePresident.
computed
fromthePLM,I logitmodel.d.f. = 114,G = 5297.41;PLM component:
d.f. = 19,
G = 39665.76.

in
Thistrendcan easilybe seenas resulting,
therestof itsenvironment).
inthelegislative
involvement
(Davidpart,froma greater
presidential
process
son and Oleszek,1981:36-9;Wayne,1978:8, passim).In otherwords,as
a methodof protecting
has set
itselffrompresidential
hegemony,
congress
decentralization.
which
institutional
decision-making
emphasize
procedures
up
ifcongress
One indication
of theprobableconsequence
had becomemore
centralized
is thegreater
for
the
president
amongtheformalparty
support
Centralization
would
the
leaders
more
whichin
influence,
give
leadership:
would
The
dominance.
current
turn,
probably
promote
presidential
"strategy"
- oneofdivideorbe conquered
- preserves
ofdecentralization
congressional
BarbaraHinckley
illustraseveral
(1978:206)provides
prerogative.
important
tionsof thisargument:
Theseniority
creates
a committee
ofparty
leadersinsystem
leadership
independent
thepresident.
incommittees
andsubcommittees
cangenerate
cluding
Specialization
to presidential
influence.
Midterm
elections
counter
subgovernments
impenetrable
ofPresidential
theeffect
coattails
from
thepreceding
backafter
two
election,
cutting
termthefirstfullstrength
of a president's
yearsof a four-year
partisan
support.

Whilethe institutions
and groupsmentioned
above becomevery
cohesivein thefaceof stronger
boundaries
what
unitesthecountry
(e.g.,
thana goodwar?),clearer
inthewe/they
better
boundaries
distinction
have,

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PoliticalPartiesand ForeignPolicy

99

cohesion.Always
in thecongressional
intra-group
example,discouraged
the
took
of
and
its
(whether
logicalapproach
congress
jealous
power position,
inor not)ofdecentralizing
intended
and,as a result,reducing
presidential
whocaninfluence
Thatis, "becausetherearefewermembers
fluence.
large
must
ofpointsat whichpresidents
thenumber
oftheircolleagues,
numbers
more."
is...that
much
the
influence
to
(Davis, 1979).
congress
attempt
inthiscase,is lesspresidential
theresultofstronger
boundaries,
Therefore,
in congressand lessinstitutional
influence
agreement.
CONCLUSIONS

intheform
In thelanguageofstructural
deepstructure,
anthropology,
to
of thewe/they
seems
have
been
identified.
Several
binaryopposition,
havebeen
manifestations
rather
thanstructural)
surface-level
(i.e., content
elaborate
ofLevi-Strauss'
Reminiscent
andexplained.
contingency
explored
intermsofall possiblecombinations
structure
tablesexpressing
underlying
also foundthatthetranslation
thisanalysis
ofcultural
processfrom
artifact,
has notbeenuniform.
to surface-level
structure
phenomena
Profoundhistorical
of, politicalparties,
changesin, and dynamics
and
verses
relations,
bipartisanship partisanship,
congressional-presidential
More
framework.
within
this
understood
all
be
area
can
effects
usefully
policy
havebeenestablished:
thefollowing
structural
analogiesbetween
formally,
policy:domesticpolicy::conwe:they::Republican:Democrat::foreign
between
Whentheboundaries
anyofthesepairsis strong,
gress:president.
betweenanyotherpairis also likelyto be strong.
theboundary
Thisapproachhas also helpedto connectand relatetwoliteratures
with
literatures
and
the
the"twopresidencies"
"bipartisan
foreign
policy"
andstructural
butwithnumerous
substantive
fewcross-references
currently
ofconsidering
the
some
of
benefits
Thispaperhasdemonstrated
relationships.
thesetwoliteratures
simultaneously.
ofandsystematic
Theapproachhasalsoledtotheoretical
justification
and
thetwopresidencies
evidenceforboththebipartisan
policy
foreign
andfifty
thousand
ofmorethanonehundred
Ananalysis
voting
hypotheses.
bothhypotheses,
terms
sometimes
decisionsfromfivepresidential
supports
is substantially
buttherelationship
amongtheleadersthanamong
stronger
of theU.S. House of Representatives.
the members
Thus,conventional
visiblegroup-is more
wisdom- whichmaybe basedmoreon thishighly
leadersand
areappliedto congressional
plausiblewhenseparatehypotheses
members.
theuniquepositionoftheparty
Theanalysishasalso helpedtoclarify
- cross-pressured
incongress
oftwostructural
at theintersection
leadership

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100

King

The congress/presidency
theleadersto
oppositions.
opposition
encourages
sidewithcongress
andagainstthepresident.
It suggests
thattheleadersresist
at persuasion
and protectcongressional
presidential
attempts
prerogative.
However,theRepublican/Democratic
opposition
pushestheseleadersin a
different
direction.
Forindecentralized
suchas theU.S. conorganizations
is power;so, to acquireinformation
and perhapsa
gress,information
endorsement
of favoredpolicyobjectives,
theleadershaveinpresidential
centives
to associatewiththepresident.
Thisassociationgivestheleaders
- whichresults
moreofa presidential
thanothermembers
infar
perspective
the
for
the
leaders
than
the
membergreater
support
president
by
by general
forcogniship.Beinga leaderin theU.S. House,then,has consequences
tionthatbeinga member
doesnothave.Theresultforthepartyleadership
is a difficult
positionand an ambiguousrole.
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