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the highest economic returns. Knowledge- and high-tech-intensive sectors contribute only
20% to Chinas GDP as opposed to around 30% for the EU and Japan and 40% for the US
(National Science Foundation 2012). The Chinese government has the potential to encourage
further innovation. However, this would likely require wide-ranging institutional changes,
such as liberalising the financial sector, strengthening the rule of law and encouraging
disruptive talent, which could challenge powerful vested interests and cultural norms. Many
analysts argue that the overriding concern of Chinese leaders will remain domestic political
stability, a proxy for the survival of the CCP (Breslin 2010; Jakobson 2013).
For example, Chinas public security budget, which is spent on internal security concerns, is
currently larger than its rapidly growing defence budget, partly owing to tensions in Xinjiang
and Tibet (IISS 2013, China 2010). Others stress Chinas distinct cultural roots, and contest
the view that its modernisation will lead to Westernisation or liberalisation (Weiwei 2011).
According to this view, an adversarial political system would not suit China, which has been
introducing progressive reforms to make the selection of leaders more transparent, gradually
conducting popular polls to inform policy decisions, and trying to boost meritocracy. China
will need to redefine itself and will probably do so in ways that do not replicate the experience
of the West. However, it will not be able to neglect the realities of an interconnected world or
deny its citizens aspirations.
Some argue that Chinas economic success has not translated into greater self-confidence on
the international level (Huang 2013), and that growth has propelled China to great powestatus
too quickly, making it a premature power. Most agree that Chinas foreign policy will
continue to be dictated largely by domestic concerns of growth and stability (Gill 2010). Until
now, two basic factors have accounted for Chinas foreign policy: the quest for resources and
markets, and the countrys normative approach to international affairs. Oil imports account for
over half of Chinas consumption and that share is expected to rise to 75% by 2035. Gas
imports grew steeply in the last few years and covered 22% of consumption in 2011, but gas
demand could triple by 2035 (EIA 2012b). Chinas worldview builds on the rejection of
Western hegemony and supports the democratisation of international relations and tolerance
of differences, which, according to the Chinese view, should be reconciled but not levelled out
(Wang and Rosenau 2009).
An equally important strand of Chinas foreign policy outlook aims to restore the countrys
standing after the century of humiliation. Chinas diplomacy has been described as riskaverse and self-interested (Shambaugh 2013). Great power peace will remain one of Chinas
overriding objectives; however, a harder tone can be expected when the country feels
confronted. An essentially reactive foreign policy, driven by domestic priorities and the quest
for status, carries two major consequences for the future: the risk of incidents around the
islands of the East and South China Seas spinning outof control (Jakobson 2013); and a lack
of initiative to solving global problems, which is a critical component of political influence in
an augmented world.
INDIA