PHILIP BRENT M.

CARIAGA

Luz M. Zaldivia v. Hon. Andres B. Reyes, Jr.

Facts:
Petitioner Zaldivia is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's
permit in the municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal.
She moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed but it
was denied. She appealed to the RTC and denial was sustained by the respondent
judge.
Petitioner filed for a petition for review on certiorari arguing that the case filed against
her is govern by the provisions on the Rules of Summary Procedure. She contends that
criminal cases like violations of municipal or city ordinances does not require preliminary
investigation and shall be filed directly to the court and not in the Prosecutors office.
She also invoked Act No. 3226 An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide when Prescription
Shall Begin to Run. Concluding that the case should have been dismissed since the
case against her was being filed in court way beyond the 2 month statutory period.
The prosecution contends that when the case was filed on the Prosecutors office it
suspends the prescriptive period.
Issue:
Whether or not the prescription of period ceased to run when the case was filed on the
prosecutors office?
Ruling:
As a general rule, the filing of the case in the prosecutors office is sufficient to interrupt
the running of the prescriptive period except when the case is covered by the Rules on
Summary Procedure. If it is any crime, you file it in the fiscals office; the running of the
prescriptive period is interrupted. But in the case at bar having only a penalty of arresto
menor it therefore falls under the provisions of the Rules on Summary Procedure. If it is
covered by the Summary Rules, the period continues. It must be the filing of the case in
court which will interrupt the period from running.

PHILIP BRENT M. CARIAGA

Reodica v CA 292 SCRA 87

Facts:
Isabelita Reodica was allegedly recklessly driving a van and hit Bonsol causing him
physical injuries and damage to property amounting to P 8,542.00. Three days after the
accident a complaint was filed before the fiscals office against the petitioner. She was
charged of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical
Injury." After pleading not guilty trial ensued. RTC of Makati rendered the decision
convicting petitioner of "quasi offense of reckless imprudence, resulting in damage to
property with slight physical injuries" with arresto mayor of 6 months imprisonment and
a fine of P 13,542.00. Petitioner made an appeal before the CA which re-affirmed the
lower courts decision. In its motion for reconsideration, petitioner now assails that
the court erred in giving its penalty on complex damage to property and slight physical
injuries both being light offenses over which the RTC has no jurisdiction and it cant
impose penalty in excess to what the law authorizes.
reversal of decision is still possible on ground of prescription or lack of jurisdiction.
Issues:
Whether or not the penalty imposed is correct.
Whether or not reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property and reckless
imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries are light felonies.
Whether or not there is a complex crime applying Article 48 of the RPC.
Whether or not the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time on
appeal.
Whether or not the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the case.
Whether the quasi offenses already prescribed.

Held:
1. On penalty imposed
The proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injury is public
censure (being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor see the exception in
the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies).
The proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property amounting
to 8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in minimum and medium periods.

2. Classification of each felony involved

Reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries is a light felony. Public censure
is classified under article 25 of RPC as a light penalty and it belongs on the graduated
scale in Article 71 of the RPC as a penalty next lower to arresto menor.
Reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property is punishable by a correctional
penalty of arresto mayor and thus belongs to less grave felony and not as a light felony
as claimed by petitioner.
3. Rule on complex crime
Art. 48 on penalty for complex crime provides that when a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same
to be applied in its maximum period. Both offenses cannot constitute a complex crime
because reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries is not either a grave or
less grave felony. Therefore each felony should be filed as a separate complaint subject
to distinct penalties.
4. Right to assail duplicity of information
Rule 120, section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that when two or more offenses are
charged in a single complaint and the accused fails to object against it before the trial,
the court may convict the accuse to as many offenses as charged and impose a penalty
for each of them. Complainant failed to make the objection before the trial therefore the
right to object has been waived.
5. Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the duration of the penalty and the fine
imposed as prescribed by law to the offense charged. Reckless imprudence resulting to
slight physical injuries and reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property is
within the jurisdiction of the MTC.
The case was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati and the
decision of the CA was set aside.

PHILIP BRENT M. CARIAGA

PEOPLE vs. ILARDE

FACTS: This is a case for adultery originated in the City of Iloilo. A man caught his
wife in an act of adultery. The next thing he did was to execute an affidavitcomplaint, which he filed in the office of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City. In his
affidavit he said, Im formally charging my wife and X and would request this
affidavit be considered as a formal complaint against them. While the case was
pending before the fiscal for investigation, he died. So the Fiscal asked how he can
file an information in court when there is no complaint because the rule is, the
complaint filed with the fiscals office is not the complaint contemplated by law; there
must be a complaint filed signed by the offended party. But in this case, the
complainant was already dead. Although there was an affidavit-complaint.
The fiscal knew that and so he prepared an information for adultery charging the
wife and her paramour. In the information he stated: The undersigned City Fiscal
upon sworn statement originally filed by the offended party, xerox copies of which
are hereto attached as annexes A and B xxx So what he did was to incorporate
the affidavit of the deceased offended husband in the information.
Now, the wife and the paramour moved to quash the information alleging lack of
jurisdiction upon the offense charged because under Article 344 of the RPC, the
requirement for the complaint of adultery was not complied with citing the case of
People vs. Santos, 101 Phil. 798, where it was held that the complaint filed in the
fiscals office for a private crime is not the complaint contemplated by law. On that
basis, RTC Judge Ilarde dismissed the case.
The prosecution went to the SC on certiorari.
HELD: The respondent trial court is wrong. The order of dismissal is hereby set
aside and is directed to proceed with the trial of the case. It must be borne in mind,
however, that this legal requirement was imposed out of consideration for the
aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through the scandal of a public trial. Thus, the law leaves it to the option of the
aggrieved spouse to seek judicial redress for the affront committed by the erring
spouse. And this, to Our mind, should be the overriding consideration in determining
the issue of whether or not the condition precedent prescribed by said Article 344
has been complied with. For needless to state, this Court should be guided by the
spirit, rather than the letter, of the law.
In the case at bar, the desire of the offended party to bring his wife and her alleged
paramour to justice is only too evident. Such determination of purpose on his part is
amply demonstrated in the dispatch [speed] by which he filed his complaint with the
fiscals office [because he filed the complaint the day after the crime happened]. The
strong and equivocal statement contained in the affidavit filed with the Fiscal's Office
that I am formally charging my wife of the crime of adultery and would request that
this affidavit be considered as a formal complaint against them is a clear show of
such intent.
The ruling in People vs. Santos is not applicable to the case at bar. In that case, the
sworn statement was not considered the complaint contemplated by Article 344 of

the Revised Penal Code because it was a mere narration of how the crime was
committed. Whereas, in the case at bar, in the affidavit-complaint submitted by the
offended husband, he not only narrated the facts and circumstances constituting the
crime of adultery, but he also explicitly and categorically charged private
respondents with the said offense Im charging my wife and her paramour with
adultery.
Moreover, in Santos, the SC noted that the information filed by the fiscal
commenced with the statement the undersigned fiscal accuses so and so, the
offended party not having been mentioned at all as one of the accusers. But in the
present case, it is as if the husband filed the case.
The affidavit of the husband here contains all the elements of a valid complaint
under Section 5, Rule I10 of the Rules of Court. What is more, said complaintaffidavit was attached to the information as an integral part thereof, and duly filed
with the court. Therefore, the affidavit complaint became the basis of the complaint
required by Section 5.

PHILIP BRENT M. CARIAGA

U.S. vs. TICZON

FACTS: A complaint was filed by the woman stating that while the offended party
was inside her house at night and all the doors were locked and all the windows
were closed, the accused surreptitiously entered the house and approached the
offended party who was asleep, raised her skirt and at that very moment the woman
woke up and resisted. [This can be an attempted rape but the element of the crime
was not fully accomplished because of an act or accident other than her own
resistance.] But sabi ng caption, for trespass to dwelling pwede man din.
HELD: Sabi mo, trespass. OK, eh di trespass! So the caption prevails. When the
facts appearing in the complaint or information are so stated that they are capable of
two or more interpretations, then the designation of the offense in the caption
controls.

PHILIP BRENT M. CARIAGA

PEOPLE vs. ABUYEN

FACTS: The accused here killed two (2) children, one was aged 6 years and the
other was 13 years old. He stabbed them. The information charges the accused with
the killing the 2 minors. There is no statement that there was treachery. All that the
information says is that the accused killed the 2 minors.
ISSUE: Was there a murder?
HELD: YES. When the accused killed the minors, that is equivalent of killing by
treachery and therefore qualifies the killing to murder.
It has, time and again, been held that the killing of minor children who, by reason of
their tender years, could not be expected to put up a defense is considered attended
with treachery even if the manner of attack was not shown. The allegation in the
Information that the victims are both minors is to be considered compliance with the
fundamental rule that the qualifying circumstances should be alleged in the
information.
It is commonly understood in practice that when the victim in physical injuries,
homicide, or murder cases is a child of tender years, he is described in the
information as a minor. Minority in such a case should not be equated with its
statutory meaning that is, below eighteen (18) years old. It is used not so much as
to state the age of the victim (otherwise, the charging fiscal would have simply
placed the exact ages) rather, it is more of a description of the state of helplessness
of the young victim.

PHILIP BRENT M. CARIAGA

PEOPLE vs. VENUS

FACTS: The City Fiscal of Manila file with the CFI of Manila an information charging
the accused with the crime of robbery in an inhabited house. The information
alleges, among others, that the accused is a habitual delinquent, he having been
previously convicted by final judgement rendered by a competent court, once for the
crime of attempted robbery in an inhabited house and once for theft, the date of his
last conviction being November 14, 1934.
There is habitual delinquency when, for a period of ten (10) years, from the date of
his last conviction or release for a crime of serious or less serious physical injuries,
robbery, theft, estafa and falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes, a third
time or oftener.
ISSUE: Was there a sufficient allegation of habitual delinquency?
HELD: NO. Habitual delinquency, can not be taken into account in the present case
because of the insufficiency of the allegation on this point in the city fiscal's
information. While the information specifies the particular offense (attempted robbery
in an inhabited house) for which the defendant-appellant was alleged to have
previously been convicted and also the date of the last conviction for theft which
occurred prior to the date of the commission of the offense now charged. But this
does not make the information sufficient in law for it fails to specify the date of the
conviction of the accused for the crime of attempted robbery. For all we know, the
two previous convictions for attempted robbery in an inhabited house and theft may
have taken place on the same date (November 14, 1934) or on two different dates
so close together as to warrant the court in considering the two convictions as only
one for the purposes of the application of the habitual delinquency law.
Upon the other hand, it may happen that a person accused of robo, hurto, estafa or
falsificacion may have been convicted of any of said offenses after the commission
of the crime with which he is charged. We have already held that previous
convictions in order to be considered for the purpose of imposing the additional
penalty for habitual delinquency, must precede the commission of the crime
charged. Other instances may be mentioned but those given suffice to demonstrate
the necessity of charging the existence of habitual delinquency with sufficient
clearness and certainty to enable the courts to properly apply the provisions of our
law on the subject.
It is therefore urged upon prosecuting attorneys that in the prosecution of cases of
this nature, they should not content themselves with a general averment of habitual
delinquency but should specify the dates:
1. of the commission of the previous crimes,
2. of the last conviction or release, and
3. of the other previous convictions or release of the accused.
Informations filed in these cases should be sufficiently clear and specific to avoid
the improper imposition of the additional penalty on a plea of guilty to a general
allegation of habitual delinquency, no less than the frequency with which hardened

criminals escape the imposition of the deserved additional penalty provided for by
law.

PHILIP BRENT M. CARIAGA

U.S. vs. YAO SIM

FACTS: The accused was charged with violation of the opium law. The opium law
was the predecessor, the great grandfather of the Dangerous Drugs Act. That was
the old law which prohibits the use and smoking of opium without the prescription of
a licensed practicing physician.
The accused argued that there is no crime committed because the information did
not allege that the accused has no prescription from a duly licensed or a practicing
physician. But the prosecution contended that it is for the accused to prove that he
has a prescription. The element of the crime is only smoking opium.

HELD: The SC said, the prosecution is correct. It is not part of the crime, it is a
matter of defense. The crime is smoking opium, period! But if you say you have
prescription, then you prove it.

PHILIP BRENT M. CARIAGA

PEOPLE vs. GOROSPE

FACTS: The accused is from Bulacan. He was a dealer of San Miguel products and
he is under the control of the Central Luzon Regional Office of San Miguel
Corporation (SMC) which is in San Fernando, Pampanga. So a representative of
SMC went to Bulucan, collected from him, he issued checks which were drawn in
Bulucan. The checks were received by the representative of SMC and went to the
Head Office in Pampanga and turned-over it. The Pampanga office of SMC
deposited the checks with its depositary bank in San Fernando, Pampanga. The
checks were sent to Bulacan for clearing. Talbog! With this, series of cases were
filed. Some cases were estafa. Some were for violation of BP 22.
The accused challenged it because all these cases were filed in San Fernando,
Pampanga eh. According to him, the cases should be filed in Bulacan. Remember,
the checks were Bulucan checks and it was dishonored also in Bulacan. He said, I
did not deliver it in San Fernando. I gave it to your representative. So the check was
delivered to a representative. So the delivery was made in Bulacan. Thus the
Pampanga court has no jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Is the contention of the accused correct?
HELD: NO! The crime is continuing because the crime continues up to the delivery
of the check to the Central Luzon Office of SMC in Pampanga. Under the Negotiable
Instruments Law, the delivery of the check must be made to a person who takes it as
a holder or bearer of the instrument. The checks are intended to be delivered in the
Head Office because it is the delivery in Pampanga which makes the payee the
bearer or the holder not the employer who went to Bulacan. In effect, it is a
continuing crime.
In respect of the Bouncing Checks case, it is likewise true that knowledge on the
part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an
essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the
accused be within one territory or another. Accordingly, jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the offense also lies in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.
Meaning, wherever the checks go, the knowledge of insufficiency is a continuing
element.