I affirm.

I define A civil right as an enforceable right or privilege, which if interfered with by another
gives rise to an action for injury. Examples of civil rights are freedom of speech, press,
and assembly; the right to vote; freedom from involuntary servitude; and the right to
equality in public places.
Prefer definition: first definition provided by largest search engine, Google and also supported
by Cornell Law Review which often is invoked in most pragmatic policy discussions. Further,
this definition directly extrapolates not only the intentions of civil rights but examples of such
thereby providing a more holistic definition of the topic.
The topic gives arise to whether the right to be forgotten is analogous to a civil right, not another
extraneous normative framework. For instance, if I said a tomato ought to be a fruit, I am not
voicing if tomatoes are good for you or if tomatoes are a good thing - I am simply establishing
that according to a maxims of a fruit, a tomato ought to be one. This is distinct from ought is a
moral obligation since a civil right is at best a direct application of morality, but not a condition
constrained by it - skepticism or other epistemic indicts will not solve since they do not criticize
or function within the framework of civil rights. AND Theoretical implications that says moral
philosophy is key do not respond also to the AC - we can have moral implications to how we
ought to treat issues of equality, ie feminist equality comes first - but my only framing is how we
evaluate ought as a comparative modifier.
Wedgwood:

THE MEANING OF OUGHT Ralph Wedgwood

In this paper, I shall treat ought as a propositional operator wherever it occurs. There are at least some sentences where

consider
[the sentence]:(1) Drinking water ought to be clean and safe. No particular agent is
explicitly mentioned in this sentence: so how can this occurrence of ought stand
for a relation between an agent, a possible course of action and a time? It might be suggested that in a
it certainly seems overwhelmingly plausible that ought functions as a propositional operator. For example,

particular context of utterance, (1) will contain an implicit reference to an agent, a time, and a possible course of action

it would be
extraordinary if (1) [the sentence] could contain an implicit reference to a particular
agent, in a given context of utterance, unless the speaker actually had that agent in mind in making that
namely, the course of action of bringing it about that drinking water is clean and safe. But

utterance; and a speaker in uttering (1) need not have any particular agent x in mind such that by uttering (1) she means
to say that x ought to bring it about that drinking water is clean and safe. In that case, it might be suggested that the
speaker means to express the proposition that there is at least some agent who ought to bring it about that drinking water

But this proposition has a radically different logical form: it is an

existentially quantified proposition, not an atomic proposition. It is surely preferable
if the logical form of the proposition that our semantics assigns to an utterance of
a sentence bears some systematic relationship to the compositional structure of
the sentence. But our semantics will preclude the possibility of any such systematic
is clean and safe.

relationship if [the sentence](1) sometimes expresses an atomic proposition (when the

speaker has a particular agent in mind) and sometimes an existentially quantified proposition (when the speaker has no

avoid all these problems if we treat ought in (1) as a

propositional operator. Grammatically, ought in English is an auxiliary verb, like
the modal auxiliaries can and must. When an occurrence of ought modifies the main
verb of a sentence, it can be taken as a propositional operator applying to the
proposition that would be expressed by the unmodified form of that sentence. Thus, in (1), ought is a
propositional operator applying to the proposition that would be expressed by the
sentence Drinking water is clean and safe. If we treat ought as sometimes
functioning as a propositional operator, we would clearly achieve a more unified
account if we suppose that it always functions as such an operator. We would also be
particular agent in mind). We can

able to unify our account of the auxiliary verb ought with that of the modal auxiliaries can and must, which practically all
philosophers and semanticists would interpret as propositional operators.[5]

Thereby the standard is weighing how the right to be forgotten exists in congruence with the
standards of a civil right. The negative burden thereby is to show that the lack of the right to be
forgotten is on face bad categorically. Rights function under the paradigm of civil rights not in an
absolute sense, for instance, I can claim a right to free speech but that doesnt imply I can yell
fire in a movie theatre since it infringes on the safety of others. As long as the affirmative
provides a strong foundation for why The Right to be Forgotten functions as a civil right, you
affirm.
The thesis of the affirmative case is that The Right to be Forgotten is critical to settling power
imbalances and given those with unequal opportunities a more equal stance in society, meeting
the specific standard of most civil rights in that they prevent injury to an actor and head to
equality. This functions directly under a paradigm of civil rights because no civil rights
framework can support inequality in the determination of your own wills - the thesis under the
affirmative is not that the right to be forgotten absolutely solves the issues of power imbalances,
but simply helps alter the current structure that persecutes many individuals unfairly, often in
context of racial and sexist systems.
EXTEND The topic gives arise to whether the right to be forgotten is analogous to a civil
right, not another extraneous normative framework. For instance, if I said a tomato ought
to be a fruit, I am not voicing if tomatoes are good for you or if tomatoes are a good thing
- I am simply establishing that according to a maxims of a fruit, a tomato ought to be one.
This is distinct from ought is a moral obligation since a civil right is at best a direct
application of morality, but not a condition constrained by it - skepticism or other
epistemic indicts will not solve since they do not criticize or function within the
framework of civil rights. THEY LOSE THE FRAMEWORK DEBATE SINCE THEY ARE
APPEALING TO NORMATIVE OR EPISTEMIC PHILOSOPHY BUT FAIL TO ASSESS THE

RESOLUTION IS A PARADAMIC QUESTION. THIS IS A GAME OVER ISSUE SINCE THEY

DONT UNDERSTAND HOW THE OFFENSE WORKS.

WEIGHING
Prefer aff claims as I specifically helps those who are already disadvantaged in society - this
functions stronger on balance in corporations and states already at a power imbalance with
people of color. The AC contention therefore functions first since it gives those disadvantage the
power first to fight back a system that already targeted them.
Further - all negative claims are futile in which they defend only specific instances where the
right to be forgotten is bad, but it can be waived in those contexts. They do not deny that such
right is necessary in the cases of revenge porn or corporate mistrust which means the
affirmative is structurally ahead. This is an uncompromising issue since the affirmative isnt
attempting to maximize an issue but to prevent power imbalances. Game over issue.