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research-article2014
Article
Abstract
This article reports on perceptions of the effectiveness of nonprofit organization
boards of directors and changes in governance behavior obtained from the first
1,446 users of a free online board performance self-assessment tool known as the
Board Check-Up (www.boardcheckup.com), Board Effectiveness Survey Application
(BESA). Respondents came from 122 organizations in Canada, the United States,
Australia, and other countries. The article describes the conceptual framework for
the study and the underlying theory of change on which it is based. It presents findings
on the types of governance issues respondents perceived as most problematic in
their boards. It also describes changes in governance behavior and practices reported
by respondents, who completed an impact assessment some time after the use of
the online self-assessment tool. The results provide empirical support for the value
of utilizing the online board performance self-assessment application and insights into
its impact as a means of making changes in the governance process. Next steps in this
international longitudinal research study are discussed.
Keywords
nonprofit organizations, boards of directors, online self-assessment, board
performance, board effectiveness, change, governance behavior, governance
practices, governance process
1University
2University
Corresponding Author:
Yvonne D. Harrison, Department of Public Administration and Policy, Rockefeller College of Public
Affairs and Policy, University at Albany, State University of New York, 135 Western Ave., Milne Hall 217,
Albany, NY 12203, USA.
Email: yharrison@albany.edu
Introduction
In recent years, nonprofit organizations throughout the world have been forced to
respond more rapidly to changing conditions in the economic, social, technological,
and political environments in which they operate. Making decisions about the future is
an important aspect of nonprofit governance; hence, it is vital that this process should
be as effective as it can be. The focal point for governance decisions in nonprofit organizations is the board of directors.
One of the few practices that have been empirically linked to improvements in
governance effectiveness is board performance evaluation (Gazley & Browers, 2013;
Herman & Renz, 2004). This has led to a recurring theme in the literature on nonprofit
governance calling on boards to conduct regular assessments of their performance (see
Barber, 2012; Carver, 2006; Dowdy, 1996; Lorsch, 1995; Nadler, 2004; Phillips,
2012). Some governance experts have developed models that define what they believe
to be optimal models of board governance then base the measurement of effectiveness
on how closely the board approaches the model (Carver, 2006; Chait, Holland, &
Taylor, 1996; Dowdy, 1996; Lorsch, 1995; Nadler, 2004; Schwartz, 2001). Holland
(1991) suggested that, even though many nonprofits agree with the need to evaluate
their performance, most lack the resources and/or know-how to develop sophisticated
instruments for doing the job and analyzing the results. Finally, missing altogether
from the nonprofit governance literature is a detailed examination of the use of one
particular approach to assessing board performancethat of online self-assessments
by board members themselves and those with whom they interact. There are also no
longitudinal studies of the extent to which self-assessment of board performance leads
to actual changes in board behavior or the ultimate effect of such changes on the
impact of the board on the organization it governs.
This article is the first study to report on the effect of an online board performance
self-assessment application developed to increase the capacity of boards to make
changes in governance practices. It reports on perceptions of the effectiveness of nonprofit boards of directors and changes in governance behavior as reported by the first
1,446 users of an online tool developed to conduct research and fill a gap in a boards
technical capacity to assess its own performance. It goes further by reporting how and
why boards change, or fail to change, their governance practices over time and what
factors are associated with changes in perceptions of board effectiveness. The results
of this research will be helpful in addressing a long-standing problem that Holland
(1991) first discussedthe under-performance of boards of directors of nonprofit
organizations. As he suggested, the problem of under-performance may not necessarily be one of ineptitude, but rather an inability to undertake the task of performance
assessment.
The article presents preliminary results from this longitudinal study within the following framework of research questions:
Research Question 1: What issues are most commonly seen as challenges to the
effectiveness of nonprofit boards of directors and how do they change over time?
Research Question 2: To what extent does online self-assessment of board performance result in changes in board behavior and nonprofit governance practices?
Research Question 3: What factors are associated with perceptions of nonprofit
board effectiveness?
The article begins with a brief overview of the literature on nonprofit governance.
This is followed by a discussion of the theory and conceptual framework underlying
the larger study. The research methodology and findings, organized under the three
research questions, follow. The article concludes with a discussion of the findings and
next steps in the research.
Literature Review
To inform the proposed research, an overview of the study context is presented. This
includes the literature on the governance of nonprofit organizations.
Recent trends indicate that governments throughout the world are increasingly partnering with the nonprofit sector as a means of building social capital and community,
solving socio-economic problems, and providing a viable and lower cost alternative to
government and the market in the provision of public goods and services (Blackenburg,
2000; Brock, 2002; Rifkin, 2003). This new form of participation has manifested itself
in pressures for nonprofit organizations to be more accountable and effective (Brock,
2002; Candler & Dumont, 2010; Chait et al., 1996; Chait, Ryan, & Taylor, 2005; Hall
& Kennedy, 2008). As Hall and Kennedy (2008) have pointed out, however, a central
problem with nonprofit accountability and effectiveness is a lack of consensus on
which organizational characteristics are most likely to correlate with effective program outcomes in specific areas (p. 310). With no agreement on what constitutes
nonprofit organizational effectiveness, they suggest that characteristics of boards of
directors are among the most important indicators . . . (p. 310).
One characteristic of nonprofit organizations is the governing role volunteers play
in directing and overseeing their performance to ensure they are effective, responsible and accountable for their actions (Cornforth, 2012). In the corporate governance
literature, for-profit boards of directors, while paid, play similar roles in overseeing
and regulating the behavior of private corporations to ensure they return value to
company shareholders (Davies, 2000; Miller, 2002). Davies (2000) suggests the role
for-profit boards of directors play as accountability agents (i.e., in governing agency
problems) is not well understood. Miller (2002) suggests the role is even less clear in
the nonprofit sector.
Ostrower (2007), who conducted the first large-scale representative study of U.S.
nonprofit boards of directors, states that the SarbanesOxley corporate governance
legislation has had the by-product effect of increasing expectations for nonprofits to be
more accountable and effective and that many boards responded by adopting corporate
governance practices. The problem Murray (2004), Herman and Renz (2004, 1998),
and Ostrower (2007) have pointed out is that empirical research has not validated the
claim that adoption of these practices will increase accountability and effectiveness.
The OECD (2005) reveals an additional problem; most corporate governance practices were not developed with the issues that challenge nonprofit governing boards and
organizations in mind.
In an empirical study of Canadian charities, Salterio and Legresley (2011) found
charities with budget sizes between Can$1 million and Can$10 million faced accountability and effectiveness challenges that smaller and larger sized charities did not.
They attribute the problem to the greater complexity of financial reporting and lack of
staff and capability to prepare such reports. This research provides empirical support
for the assertion nonprofit organizational governance scholars have frequently made
with respect to the significance of organizational size and other organizational variables on nonprofit governance effectiveness (Cornforth, 2012; Ostrower, 2007;
Ostrower & Stone, 2010).
Phillips (2012), who reviewed nonprofit regulatory reforms in Canada, asserts that
increased competition for scarce resources, technological changes in how nonprofit
organizations operate and raise financial resources, and a number of high-profile fundraising scandals have resulted in a reframing of regulatory policy from a focus on
informed donors to the well-performing charity (p. 808). The response of the
Canadian federal government has been to introduce new guides on fundraising . . . to
ensure governance systems are up to state determined standards . . . and sector-led
certification systems are in place to create a community of practice for self-improvement (p. 811). Phillips concludes that the goal of these reforms is to communicate to
the public that federal governmentregistered charities have met certain standards. At
the same time, the reforms increase governance effectiveness by providing charities
with information about where they need to make improvements. While Phillips suggests that the purpose of this type of co-regulatory regime is to increase accountability
and effectiveness of nonprofits, she acknowledges that it is largely based on untested
assumptions about what makes a charitable organization effective.
In the United States, Barber (2012) notes similar regulatory concerns and challenges with regard to charitable fundraising. Barber, like Phillips, reports limits to
solving fundraising challenges through donor information. He suggests the trend in
the United States is toward greater emphasis on performance assessment and oversight of charitable solicitations and fundrasing practices by nonprofit organizations.
By way of example, in the State of New York, the Office of the State Comptroller
(OSC) has developed a program to help nonprofit leaders detect and prevent fraud in
their organizations, which they estimate amounts to a potential loss of US$6.6 billion in organizational revenue in the State of New York alone (Office of State
Comptroller, Division of State Government Accountability, 2013). The Attorney
General has also responded to these and other regulatory concerns with changes in
nonprofit law that will modernize nonprofit organizations (see Nonprofit
Revitalization Act [NRA] at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneidermansnonprofit-revitali-zation-act-signed-law). This new law, which became effective
July 1, 2014, will, among other things, increase the fiduciary role of nonprofit boards
of directors (e.g., legal authority and oversight), formalize the leadership role of the
board chair (e.g., the CEO cannot also be the board chair1), and make it easier for
boards to meet and govern virtually through modern information and communications technology (ICT; Schneiderman, 2013).
While the intent of New Yorks NRA is to improve accountability and effectiveness
through reforms that respond to specific nonprofit and public policy and administration problems, some are concerned about the capacity of nonprofits and their volunteer
boards of directors to implement these reforms. A review of the nonprofit governance
literature suggests that the validity of the assumption that accountability and effectiveness will be improved with increases in information and oversight of charitable actions
has yet to be proven (see Barber, 2012; Cornforth, 2012; Miller, 2002; Phillips, 2012).
Finally, as the empirical evidence presented in this section suggests (e.g., Salterio &
Legresley, 2010), when examining the effect of nonprofit governance reforms, particular attention should be paid to the influence of organization size and other contingency variables.
Socio-Technical Theory
This theory posits that change derived from the application of technology to organizational problems will not be successful unless it takes into account the social needs of
those affected (i.e., end-users). In the board performance self-assessment context, this
includes the people involved in the governance process and those who coordinate the
task of board performance self-assessment. Perception that the process of online selfassessment of board performance is effective is therefore dependent upon end-user
attitudes that the practice of board performance self-assessment is useful (Davis,
1989) and the assessment tool offers users certain benefits such as taking less time to
complete, providing an opportunity for the gathering and surfacing of opinions, providing sufficient information to make governance process improvement decisions,
and so forth (Schilling, Oeser, & Schaub, 2007). It is hypothesized that those who
have positive perceptions of the usefulness of the online board performance assessment process will be more likely to (a) use the application, (b) derive satisfaction
from use, (c) perceive use results in benefits (i.e., change governance behavior and
practices), and (d) tell others about the value of it in the nonprofit organizational
governance context.
Measures
The measures to assess board performance come from the grounded theory work of
Murray (2009) who developed them from statements provided by individuals who
serve on, interact with, or act as consultants to, boards (e.g., executive directors,
other top managers, staff, key volunteers, and external stakeholders) over a 30-year
period. Measures are organized in two dimensions: those related to issues that challenge the governance process (i.e., what boards do) and measures related to issues
that influence the effectiveness of the governance process (i.e., how boards govern).
These two dimensions produce the following nine sets of criteria from which issues
that challenge the governance process can be surfaced and board performance can be
assessed.
Perception of Board
Effectiveness:
(Time 1)
Formal Structure
Board Meetings
Board Composition and Development
Culture
Board Leadership (CEO and Chair)
Perception of Online
Board
Performance
Assessment Process
Effectiveness
(Time 2)
(Time 1)
Changes in Governance
Practices
Changes in Perceptions of the
Boards Impact on the
Effectiveness of the
Organization
(Time 2)
Individual Characteristics of respondents (age, gender, experience, time, role, PU of BESA, Coordination time, job
stress)
Board Characteristics (model,, size, recruitment type, # meetings, experience with performance assessment, board
support, BESA coordination, BESA meeting type, facilitator, additional information reviewed, roles of participants,)
Organization Characteristics (size (budget and FTE), age, purpose, activity, mission, financial situation, affiliation (e.g.
branch, chapter, standalone)
Technology Characteristics (BESA Ease of Use and Satisfaction with BESA, Use of B ESA Procedure, BESA Future
Intention, BESA Social Network Effect, Level of Board Use of Technology)
Environment Characteristics (Experiencing major cr ises)
Note. BESA = Board Effectiveness Survey Application; FTE = Number of Full Time Equivalent workers;
PU = Perceived Usefulness of Board Performance Assessment.
Research Methodology
A quantitative survey research design was used to measure perceived board performance and explore a number of hypotheses regarding why some boards make changes
in governance practices and improve their effectiveness through the practice of online
self-assessment of board performance as a result. This section begins with a description of the survey instruments followed by a description of the sampling method, sample size, and overview of the datasets and techniques used to analyze study data.
Instrumentation
Board Performance Self-Assessment Questionnaire (BPSAQ). The BPSAQ was used to
collect initial and follow-up assessments of board performance. This survey instrument is free and accessible online at www.boardcheckup.com to nonprofit organizations that register their board and consent to participate in the research. It asks
respondents to indicate perceptions of the extent to which a range of governance issues
exist in the organizations board using a 4-point Likert-type scale, where 1 is agree
strongly that the issue is a problem in the organization, 2 is agree somewhat, 3 is disagree somewhat, and 4 is disagree strongly (plus options for dont know and does not
apply). The more the respondent agrees with an item, the more the item is seen as an
issue facing the board. A diagnostic instrument that measures the extent to which performance issues are perceived to exist at Time 1 is important in that it establishes a
baseline measure of governance behavior against which the efficacy of the online tool
and reporting system on subsequent board performance improvement decisions can be
measured at Time 2 (Reagan-Cirincione & Rohrbaugh, 1992).
The instrument also includes a global measure of perceived overall effectiveness of
the board and six items relating to the perceived effectiveness of the organization (e.g.,
mission, finances, efficiency, learning, morale, and reputation). Additional items relate
to characteristics of responding organizations (e.g., size, mission, type, level of independence) and the individuals who serve on them (e.g., demographics, role, time in
position, time on board, and years of experience). Contextual variables external to the
board are also included (e.g., financial situation, crises).
It was decided to use an online survey for several reasons.
1. As noted earlier in the article, while boards may recognize the need to assess
performance, there may be a gap in their capability to carry out the technical
aspects of board performance assessments (Holland, 1991). As well, many do
not have the financial resources to acquire this expertise. One objective of this
research, then, was to use our research expertise and knowledge about the governance process and ICT to fill this gap in board capacity.
2. For research purposed, we wanted to reach a large number of boards to test a
number of theories. An online instrument would not only increase the size and
diversity of the sample obtained, it would allow for tests of information system
hypotheses.
3. It was felt that an online instrument designed for busy leadership volunteers
would be more attractive to them over a mailed or hand-distributed pencil and
paper version.
4. Finally, it was our desire to provide a confidential public service benefit in the
form of a trusted university-sponsored applied research project that was useful,
accessible, easy to use, and free to as large a public as possible.
Impact of the Board Performance Self-Assessment Questionnaire (IBPSAQ). The IBPSAQ
was taken at a second point in time immediately prior to follow-up retakes of the original BPSAQ. It asked respondents to describe in their own words changes in governance practices in the nine dimensions of board performance made since the previous
self-assessment. They were also asked about the procedure the board used to process
assessment results and the effectiveness of the boards decision making using a modified form of John Rohrbaughs Group Decision-Making Effectiveness questionnaire.
They were further asked for their perception of the impact of the board on the performance of the organization in a number of areas. These included mission achievement,
10
11
Research Findings
Results are presented under the headings of the three research questions listed in the
Introduction to this paper.
12
Retake 1
Retake 2
Rank
M (n)
SD
Rank
M (n)
SD
Rank
M (n)
SD
2.44 (973)
1.01
2.71 (203)
1.01
3.00 (32)
0.98
2.54 (1,059)
1.03
2.96 (211)
0.95
2.83 (36)
1.00
2.56 (1,085)
0.94
2.92 (210)
0.92
2.92 (36)
1.14
2.58 (1,061)
0.99
16
3.26 (206)
0.85
23
3.38 (34)
0.98
2.58 (992)
1.04
2.89 (205)
1.05
14
3.23 (31)
0.88
2.67 (1,121)
1.01
2.79 (213)
0.96
2.89 (37)
1.10
2.69 (1,016)
1.04
17
3.31 (36)
0.92
2.71 (1,095)
0.98
13
3.18 (212)
0.89
13
3.17 (35)
0.95
2.73 (947)
1.01
14
3.21 (190)
0.88
18
3.31 (32)
0.99
2.79 (1,128)
0.95
10
3.05 (216)
0.85
11
3.17 (36)
0.94
10
The board seems confused about its role in fundraising for the organization
(Board Responsibility for Resource Development). Rank change from 7 to 17
by the third assessment.
The board has not approved an overall strategy for fundraising (Board
Responsibility for Resource Development). Rank change from 4 to 23 by the
third assessment.
13
Rank
M (n)
SD
Retake 1
Rank
M (n)
Retake 2
SD Rank
M (n)
SD
1
2
1
2
2
1
3
4
5
6
7
2.96 (1,085)
3.05 (1,148)
3.14 (1,167)
3.15 (1,161)
3.17 (1,163)
0.69
0.64
0.67
0.69
0.60
3
4
5
6
7
3.19 (223)
3.29 (223)
3.35 (223)
3.45 (223)
3.46 (223)
0.59
0.59
0.58
0.56
0.48
3
4
5
8
6
3.33 (37)
3.35 (37)
3.42 (37)
3.69 (37)
3.51 (37)
8
9
8
9
7
9
0.63
0.56
0.88
0.40
0.53
The board never seems to have time to explore external challenges and opportunities that the organization might face (Board Responsibility for Planning).
Rank change from 5 to 14 by the third assessment.
A broader view of respondent perceptions in Table 2 shows that, while individual
items may have shifted, the overall rank order of issues within the nine dimensions of
board effectiveness assessed in Figure 1 does not shift much. Changes in the rank
order from Time 1 to Time 2 suggest boards are making progress in addressing specific
board performance challenges in some dimensions. For example, issues related to the
boards role in performance assessment and carrying out its basic fiduciary responsibilities were ranked lower than board composition and development, which was
ranked the most problematic in the second retake survey. This suggests that the tool
may have been influential in helping boards identify and deal with some (but not all)
issues that challenge governance effectiveness at different points in time.
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to determine the effect of repeated assessments
on perceptions of board effectiveness in the nine dimensions assessed. The findings
show significant positive perceptual differences between the first and third assessment
lending empirical support for the assertion that board performance evaluation improves
board effectiveness: Composition and Development, F(2, 1417) = 30.352, p = .000;
Structures and Process, F(2, 1420) = 29.039, p = .000; Performance Assessment,
F(2, 1418) = 28.727, p = .000; Board Culture, F(2, 1400) = 16.624, p = .000;
Fundraising, F(2, 1299) = 15.337, p = .000; Planning, F(2, 1423) = 14.727, p = .000;
Basic Role and Responsibilities, F(2, 1424) = 11.858, p = .000; Meetings, F(2, 1410)
= 11.303, p = .000; and Leadership, F(2, 1401) = 5.325, p = .005.
Upon further analysis, using a computed measure of overall board effectiveness
(based on the sum of scores in all dimensions of board effectiveness assessed), it was
found that, in each country, the mean scores upon repeat assessment were significantly
higher (better) than the initial scores: Canada, F(2, 521) = 16.10, p = .000; the United
14
States, F(2, 480) = 5.11, p = .006; Australia, F(1, 144) = 4.26, p = .041; and those
where a country of origin was not specified, F(2, 241) = 3.96, p = .020.
15
Number
of boards
Percentage of boards
implementing change
70
95
5
4
6
71
6
5
82
76
55 (chair)
83 (CEO)
75 (board)
67
71
organizations were also examined, such as organizational age, size of budget, and
number of full-time equivalent workers. Finally, using our computed overall measure
of board effectiveness4 the analysis revealed the following variables to be statistically
significant:
Positive correlations between respondent characteristics and perception of board effectiveness. The following variables were positively correlated with a tendency to perceive
the board as doing an overall effective job of governing:
The greater the value of what respondents believed they themselves contributed
to the board, r(1304) = .425, p < .001
16
Table 4. Types of Changes Respondents Wanted Their Boards to Make That They Did Not
Make.
Dimension: Issue type
Board Culture
Board Leadership
Resource
Development
Board Structure
Board Composition
Number of respondents
6
4
2
1
The greater the clarity with which respondents felt their roles were communicated to them, r(1304) = .347, p < .001
The older the age of the respondent, r(1304) = .228, p < .001
The greater the number of years the respondent had observed the board, r(1304)
= .138, p < .001
The greater the total number of years the respondent had experience on all
boards, r(1304) = .097, p = .001
The greater age of the organization of which the respondent was a part, r(978)
= .094, p < .01
The larger the size of the budget of the organization of which the respondent
was a part, r(978) = .184, p < .001
The larger the organizations size in terms of numbers of full-time equivalent
employees, r(978) = .174, p < .001.
Negative correlates of perception of board effectiveness. The following variables were
correlated with a tendency to perceive the board as doing an overall effective job of
governing:
The fewer the hours respondents devoted to board work per week, r(1304) =
.066, p < .001
The further away respondents roles were from those of the chair and CEO,
r(1396) = .125, p < .001
17
Of course, it is understood that the above results represent correlations only; therefore, no causal connections can be inferred from them. Nevertheless, it is interesting
to speculate on possible reasons for the linking of these variables. For example, with
regard to the finding that the fewer the hours devoted to board work, the more favorably board performance is viewed, it is quite possible that for various reasons, the
board may be perceived as being so effective that it does not require much time or
effort. Alternatively, it is not hard to believe that some of those who serve on or interact with boards that place high value on time would be likely to see their boards as
effective because they believe that the time they contribute to them is efficient.
The finding that perceptions of board performance varied by respondent role perspective lends support to Miles Law, which suggests, where you stand depends on
where you sit (Miles, 1978, p. 399). This leads to the question of why one role will
lead to a different perception of board effectiveness than another. The finding may be
explained by closeness to the officer position. More specifically, the closer people
are to officer positions, the more likely their perceptions will be shaped by awareness
of backstage governance situations and challenges.
The findings also suggest that perceptions of board effectiveness may be more
favorable when individuals are clear about their own role in the organization and
believe their contributions to the board are of value. In such situations, they are less
likely to experience confusion about the governance process. These findings support
governance theorist Jan Kooiman (2003) who has suggested perceptions . . . may play
a role in the less formal and personalized aspects of governance (p. 12). He also suggests that governance ineffectiveness can result from the tensions that can arise within
and between roles when the people who occupy them have differing perceptions of
what is involved or are unclear about what is expected of them. It is also likely that
those who have served on boards for an extended period of time (more years) may be
more positive about board effectiveness because they have learned how to maximize
the value of their role contributions.
Finally, the findings above further suggest that perceptions of board effectiveness
may be more likely to be favorable in older and larger nonprofit organizations. Again,
this is consistent with Kooimans (2003) theory of governance effectiveness and role
clarity, as older and larger organizations are more likely to have more clearly articulated governing roles and have dedicated support for recruiting the best possible individuals to fill them.
To explore in greater depth which of the variables above are significant predictors
of perceptions of board effectiveness, a series of stepwise linear regression analyses
were conducted. The results are depicted in Tables 5 through 7.
In the initial assessment of perceived board performance, seven of the significant
correlates of board effectiveness discussed were also significant predictors. That is,
controlling for the other variables, each variable resulted in a significant change in
perception of board effectiveness. While the number of respondents who participated
in the second and third assessments was significantly smaller, and the results are limited by the sample, they are nonetheless worth mentioning. By the second assessment,
the regression analysis suggests that only three of the variables were predictors and by
18
SE B
SE B
Model 2
SE B
Model 3
SE B
Model 4
Perceived value of role 25.5 1.66 .43*** 19.96 1.69 .34*** 20.26 1.66 .34*** 20.14 1.66
contributions
Clarity of role
15.33 1.59 .28*** 14.59 1.57 .26*** 14.15 1.56
expectations
Organizational size
6.25 1.07 .16*** 5.83 1.07
budget
Age
3.06 0.877
Role
Hours/week
Years board experience
R2
.19***
.252***
.276*
.285*
F for change in R2
236.63
175.57
132.11
103.20
Variables
Model 1
.09**
.289***
84.31
5.78
.15***
.25*** 13.10
SE B
.34*** 18.95
Model 5
.143
5.67
.24*** 13.70
.33*** 19.67
0.874 .092
2.76
1.04
.096** 3.45
.95 .086* 3.08
.236
.296*
72.43
1.07
1.67
1.77
SE B
Model 6
Table 5. Summary of Stepwise Regression for Variables Predicting Initial Self-Assessment of Board Performance (n = 1,054).
.14
.24***
.33***
0.88 .08**
1.07 .09**
.95
.09**
.11
.06*
.299*
62.99
1.07
1.56
1.64
SE B
Model 7
19
Table 6. Summary of Stepwise Regression for Variables Predicting First Retake Assessment
of Board Effectiveness (n = 140).
Model 1
Variables
Retake 1
Perceived
value of role
contributions
Clarity of role
expectations
Age
R2
F for change in R2
Model 2
SE B
27.76
4.24
Model 3
SE B
SE B
.484*** 19.09
4.50
.35***
19.59
4.44
.31***
.234
42.84***
.322
17.97***
5.48*
Retake 2
Perceived value of
role contributions
R2
F for change in R2
41.189
SE B
8.37
.423
24.174***
.65***
the third, only one of the three was. The two variables that were the strongest predictors in each of the models above were respondent role clarity and perception of the
value of the respondents role contributions. These findings lend further support for
Kooimans (2003) theory of the importance of role clarity in explaining perceptions of
governance effectiveness. Simply put, when respondents are clear about their own
roles, they are more likely to contribute to the governance process and see the board as
a whole as being effective.
Taken together, these findings, along with those reported on the changes boards
made in governance practices, support the conclusion that online self-assessment of
board performance is an effective means of supporting changes in the governance
process (i.e., facilitating reflection and board conversation in the performance context,
making board performance improvement decisions, and implementing them in ways
that improve role clarity and the effectiveness of the governance process).
20
Conclusion
In this article, preliminary results were presented from a longitudinal study exploring
the effect of online self-assessment on nonprofit board performance. Given the nature
of the self-selected sample, the results of this research do not permit generalizations to
be made about the way all those involved with boards perceive them. It is also important to note that the findings represent only Stage 1 of the change process in boards of
directors of nonprofit organizations. It does this by providing a theory-based tool that
helps boards change by raising awareness of the need to change. In this regard, board
performance self-assessment challenges the status quo by surfacing information to
help boards consider what governance practices might be in need of change. This is a
necessary, but by no means sufficient, condition to bring about improvements in governance and (potentially) organizational effectiveness. What motivates boards to make
changes in governance practices is the subject of further research related to this project. Some of the very interesting findings that deserve further exploration as our
research advances are as follows:
Of the boards that did not make changes, respondents identified reasons such as
lack of need for change or a need to address other, higher, priority issues. Quite
possibly, there are other reasons for this kind of inaction, which can be studied
by other methods.
Of the boards that did make changes, some respondents identified additional
changes they wished their boards had made. The question remains, why were
these wished for changes not made. For example, it may be that it is easier to
change certain aspects of board meetings or the boards structures and procedures than it is to change elements of a boards informal culture or the leadership behavior of its chair or CEO.
In addition to helping boards change governance practices and behavior, over
time, the practice of online performance self-assessment appears to have had a
positive impact on perceptions of board effectiveness. However, it is valuable
to explore in more depth the reasons for perceived board effectiveness. For
example, the initial findings reported here regarding the closeness of board
members to board leaders and the time individuals spend on board work need
to be analyzed further in conjunction with additional variables.
The next phase of this research will address these and other questions relating to
the various theories that underlie the change process. This research will fill a gap in
the literature as well as add to the very limited longitudinal data on changes in board
governance behavior and practices through online self-assessment of board
performance.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.
21
The author(s) declared receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article: The Institute for Nonprofit Studies, Mount Royal University
in Calgary, Alberta, Canada, The University of Albany, SUNY through the Faculty Research
Award Programs (FRAP A and B), New York, USA, and Rockefeller College of Public Affairs
and Policy, University at Albany, New York, USA.
Notes
1. The law was amended to delay the implementation of this provision until January 1, 2016.
2. Due to the limited size of the sample of organizations, analysis of data at the organization
level was not possible. This meant that hypothesized relationships between variables and
the adoption and use of the online application to make changes in governance practices
could not be tested. This will be the subject of future analysis as the sample of organizations increases.
3. We invited all registered users to take the Impact of the Board Performance Self-Assessment
Questionnaire (IBPSAQ) after it was designed and pre-tested in September 2012. No
further email requests were made once it was programmed into the Board Effectiveness
Survey Application (BESA) to precede each retake assessment of board performance. Our
sample size, therefore, is dependent on (a) board decision making to conduct follow-up
performance assessments and (b) the frequency of those decisions. Future research will
report on natural patterns in board performance assessment behavior.
4. It is fully understood that perceptions of effectiveness and actual effectiveness (as measured by independent objective observers, for example) are not the same. Care must be
taken in interpreting the results.
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Author Biographies
Yvonne D. Harrison is Assistant Professor in the Department of Public Administration and
Policy at the University at Albany, State University of New York. She was formerly Assistant
Professor in the Center for Nonprofit and Social Enterprise Management at Seattle University
in Seattle, WA, USA.
Vic Murray is currently Adjunct Professor in the School of Public Administration at the
University of Victoria, British Columbia, Canada. He was formerly the Director of the Nonprofit
Management and Leadership Program in the Schulich School of Business at York University in
Toronto, Ontario, Canada.