Rule 63

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND OTHER REMEDIES 3
RULE 63
DECLARATORY
RELIEF AND SIMILAR
REMEDIES
ANG~CABRERA~CALDINO~CHUPUNGCO~JOSOL~MARAVILLA~SAGUINSIN~SAN JOSE~SUVA~TOLENTINO~TOLENTINO~UY
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (SBCA, Monday Class) S.Y 2012-2013
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ALMEDA, et al. vs. BATHALA MARKETING INDUSTRIES, INC.
G.R. No. 150806. January 28, 2008.
Nachura, J.:
Digested by: TOLENTINO, Julie Ann B.
FACTS: Sometime in May 1997, respondent Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., as lessee, renewed
its Contract of Lease with Ponciano L. Almeda (Ponciano), as lessor, husband of petitioner Eufemia
and father of petitioner Romel Almeda. Ponciano agreed to lease a portion of the Almeda
Compound for a term of four (4) years from May 1, 1997 unless sooner terminated as provided in
the contract. The contract of lease contained provisions that the rental rate shall be entitled to an
increase or reduction upon renewal due to change in the tax, charge or burden; and that in case an
extraordinary inflation or devaluation of Philippine Currency should supervene, the value of
Philippine peso at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment.
During the life of the agreement, petitioner advised respondent through a letter that the former shall
assess and collect Value Added Tax (VAT) on its monthly rentals and in another that its monthly
rental should be increased by 73% pursuant to condition of the contract and Article 1250 of the
Civil Code. Respondent opposed both, contending that the contract of lease was supposed to
include the VAT therein and that there was no extraordinary inflation. Respondent instituted an
action for declaratory relief for purposes of determining the correct interpretation of the conditions
of the lease contract to prevent damage and prejudice.
ISSUE: Whether the action for declaratory relief is the proper remedy considering that respondent
was already in breach of the contract when the petition was filed.
HELD: Yes. Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of
construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute, and for
a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a
petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary
is the general rule that such an action must be justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is
available under the circumstances. Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for
declaratory relief, as follows: 1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said
documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must
have been no breach of the documents in question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable
controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the
issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available through other
means or other forms of action or proceeding. It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are
present in the instant case. After petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the
months that followed, respondent complied with the terms and conditions set forth in their contract
of lease by paying the rentals stipulated therein. Respondent religiously fulfilled its obligations to
petitioners even during the pendency of the present suit. There is no showing that respondent
committed an act constituting a breach of the subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not
barred from instituting before the trial court the petition for declaratory relief.
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VELARDE vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY
G.R. No. 159357. April 28, 2004.
Panganiban, J.:
FACTS: On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief ("SJS Petition") before the
RTC-Manila against Velarde, together with His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister
Erao Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano as co-respondents. The
Petition prayed for the resolution of the question "whether or not the act of a religious leader like
any of herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urging
or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or
spirit of the constitutional provisions. The respondents in the initial case sought the dismissal of
the case for failure to state a cause of action. The Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the
Motions for Reconsideration filed by Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive
Minister Erao Manalo. The trial court claimed jurisdiction over the Petition and opined that the
"[e]ndorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the
separation clause."
ISSUE: (1) Whether the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy;
(2) Whether respondent have any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief
HELD: (1) No. A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely
anticipatory. 18 The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief fell short of this test. It miserably failed to
allege an existing controversy or dispute between the petitioner and the named respondents
therein. Further, the Petition did not sufficiently state what specific legal right of the petitioner was
violated by the respondents therein; and what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of
its rights, the law or the Constitution.
(2) None. An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will,
a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive
order, a regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to interpret or to determine the
validity of the written instrument and to seek a judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties
thereunder. The essential requisites of the action are as follows: (a) there is a justiciable
controversy; (b) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue is ripe for judicial
determination. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
challenged act. Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or
instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved. There was no
showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or its members as
registered voters would be adversely affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, if the
question at issue was not resolved. There was no allegation that SJS had suffered or would be
deprived of votes due to the acts imputed to the said respondents. Neither did it allege that any of
its members would be denied the right of suffrage or the privilege to be voted for a public office
they are seeking.
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PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 126911. April 30, 2003.
Carpio Morales, J:
FACTS: On May 22, 1987, the Monetary Board (MB) of the Central Bank of the Philippines, now
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, issued Resolution 505 prohibiting MBC to do business in the
Philippines, and placing its assets and affairs under receivership. The Resolution, was not served
on MBC until May 26, 1987, when the designated Receiver took over. The next banking day
following the issuance of the MB Resolution, respondent Jose Abad was at the MBC for the
purpose of pre-terminating the 71 Golden Time Deposits (GTDs) and re-depositing the fund
represented thereby into 28 new GTDs under the names of herein respondents individually or
jointly with each other. Respondents filed claims with the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation
(PDIC) for the payment of the twenty insured golden time deposits (GTDs) at the Manila Banking
Corporation (MBC). PDIC paid respondents the value of three claims; however, it withheld the
payment of the seventeen remaining claims due to a report that there was massive conversion and
substitution of trust and deposit accounts on at MBC-Iloilo. The intention was to maximize the
availment of PDIC coverage limited to P40, 000 by spreading out big accounts to as many
certificates under various nominees. Subsequently, PDIC filed a petition for declaratory relief
against respondents for a judicial declaration of the insurability of respondents' GTDs. The trial
court declared the GTDs of respondents to be deposit liabilities of MBC, hence, are liabilities of
PDIC as statutory insurer. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the holding of the trial court ordering
petitioner to pay the claims for the reason that an action for declaratory relief does not essentially
entail an executory process.
HELD: No. A petition for declaratory relief does not essentially entail an executory process. There
is nothing in its nature, however, that prohibits a counterclaim from being set-up in the same action.
A special civil action is after all not essentially different from an ordinary civil action, which is
generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of Court, except that the former deals with a
special subject matter which makes necessary some special regulation. But the identity between
their fundamental nature is such that the same rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do
apply to special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the
provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions. In affirming the decision of the CA,
the Supreme Court ruled that PDIC is liable only for deposits received by a bank in the usual
course of business. Since respondent Abad was at MBC soon after it opened at 9:00 a.m. of that
day, petitioner should not presume that MBC had no cash to cover the new GTDs of respondents
and conclude that there was no consideration for said GTDs. Petitioner having failed to overcome
the presumption that the ordinary course of business was followed, the Court found that the 28 new
GTDs were deposited in the usual course of business of MBC.
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DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, et al. vs. MANILA'S FINEST RETIREES
ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.
G.R. No. 169466. May 9, 2007.
Garcia, J.:
Digested by. TOLENTINO, Julie Ann B.
FACTS: In 1975, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 765 was issued constituting the Integrated National
Police (INP) to be composed of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) as the nucleus and the integrated
police forces as components thereof. On 26, 1977 INP Law was issued to professionalize the INP
and promote career development therein. On December 13, 1990, Republic Act No. 6975, PNP
Law, was enacted establishing the Philippine National Police, which shall be composed of the
members of the police forces who were integrated into the Integrated National Police as well as the
officers and enlisted personnel of the PC. A little less than eight (8) years later, or on February 25,
1998, R.A. No. 6975 was amended by R.A. No. 8551. The amendatory law reengineered the
retirement scheme in the police organization. Relevantly, PNP personnel, under the new law, stood
to collect more retirement benefits than what INP members of equivalent rank, who had retired
under the INP Law, received. Hence the petition for declaratory relief. The CSC, DBM,
NAPOLCOM and PNP, in their respective answers, asserted that the petitioners could not claim the
more generous retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6975 because at no time did they become PNP
members, having retired prior to the enactment of said law. On March 21, 2003, the RTC came out
with its decision 6 holding that R.A. No. 6975, as amended, did not abolish the INP but merely
provided for the absorption of its police functions by the PNP, and accordingly rendered judgment
for the INP retirees, holding the INP Retirees entitled to the same or identical retirement benefits
and such other benefits being granted, accorded and bestowed upon the PNP Retirees under the
PNP Law.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court in ordering the
immediate adjustments of the respondents' retirement benefits when the basic petition filed before
it was one for declaratory relief
HELD: There is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory relief that proscribes
the filing of a counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of the
complaint. A special civil action is after all not essentially different from an ordinary civil action,
which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of Court, except that the former deals
with a special subject matter which makes necessary some special regulation. But the identity
between their fundamental nature is such that the same rules governing ordinary civil suits may
and do apply to special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the
provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions. As petitioners in the RTC, pleaded
for the immediate adjustment of their retirement benefits which, significantly, the herein petitioners,
as respondents in the same court, did not object to. Being aware of said prayer, the petitioners then
already knew the logical consequence if, as it turned out, a declaratory judgment is rendered in the
respondents' favor.
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PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

G.R. No. 126911. April 30, 2003.
Carpio Morales, J:
FACTS: On May 22, 1987, the Monetary Board (MB) of the Central Bank of the Philippines, now
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, issued Resolution 505 prohibiting MBC to do business in the
Philippines, and placing its assets and affairs under receivership. The Resolution, was not served
on MBC until May 26, 1987, when the designated Receiver took over. The next banking day
following the issuance of the MB Resolution, respondent Jose Abad was at the MBC for the
purpose of pre-terminating the 71 Golden Time Deposits (GTDs) and re-depositing the fund
represented thereby into 28 new GTDs under the names of herein respondents individually or
jointly with each other. Respondents filed claims with the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation
(PDIC) for the payment of the twenty insured golden time deposits (GTDs) at the Manila Banking
Corporation (MBC). PDIC paid respondents the value of three claims; however, it withheld the
payment of the seventeen remaining claims due to a report that there was massive conversion and
substitution of trust and deposit accounts on at MBC-Iloilo. The intention was to maximize the
availment of PDIC coverage limited to P40, 000 by spreading out big accounts to as many
certificates under various nominees. Subsequently, PDIC filed a petition for declaratory relief
against respondents for a judicial declaration of the insurability of respondents' GTDs. The trial
court declared the GTDs of respondents to be deposit liabilities of MBC, hence, are liabilities of
PDIC as statutory insurer. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the holding of the trial court ordering
petitioner to pay the claims for the reason that an action for declaratory relief does not essentially
entail an executory process.
HELD: No. A petition for declaratory relief does not essentially entail an executory process. There
is nothing in its nature, however, that prohibits a counterclaim from being set-up in the same action.
A special civil action is after all not essentially different from an ordinary civil action, which is
generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of Court, except that the former deals with a
special subject matter which makes necessary some special regulation. But the identity between
their fundamental nature is such that the same rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do
apply to special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the
provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions. In affirming the decision of the CA,
the Supreme Court ruled that PDIC is liable only for deposits received by a bank in the usual
course of business. Since respondent Abad was at MBC soon after it opened at 9:00 a.m. of that
day, petitioner should not presume that MBC had no cash to cover the new GTDs of respondents
and conclude that there was no consideration for said GTDs. Petitioner having failed to overcome
the presumption that the ordinary course of business was followed, the Court found that the 28 new
GTDs were deposited in the usual course of business of MBC.
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ARANETA, et al. vs. GATMAITAN
G.R. Nos. L-8895 & L-9191. April 30, 1957.
Felix, J.:
FACTS: San Miguel Bay is considered as the most important fishing area in the Pacific side of the
Bicol region. Sometime in 1950, trawl operators from Malabon, Navotas and other places migrated
to this region for the purpose of using this particular method of fishing in said bay. On account of
the belief of sustenance fishermen that the operation of this kind of gear caused the depletion of
the marine resources of that area, there arose a general clamor among the majority of the
inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay. A resolution was
passed by the Municipal Mayors' League condemning the operation of trawls as the cause of the
wanton destruction of the shrimp specie and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to
regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay by declaring it closed for trawl fishing at a certain period of the
year. This was supported by the Provincial Governor, NAMFREL, and COMPADRE. In response to
these pleas, the President issued Executive Order No. 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San
Miguel Bay, but was amended by Executive Order No. 66 in answer to a resolution of the Provincial
Board of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of trawl fishing during the typhoon season
only. On November 2, 1954, however, Executive Order No. 80 was issued reviving Executive Order
No. 22, to take effect after December 31, 1954. A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to
the court by filing a complaint for injunction and/or declaratory relief with preliminary injunction with
the Court of First Instance of Manila.
ISSUE: Whether the constitutionality of an executive order can be ventilated in a declaratory relief
proceeding.
HELD: Yes. The constitutionality of an executive order can be ventilated in a declaratory relief
proceeding. (Hilado vs. De la Costa, 83 Phil., 471). The State's counsel contends that while
judgment could be stayed in injunction, receivership and patent accounting cases, the present
complaint, although styled "Injunction and/or Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Injunction," is one
for declaratory relief, there being no allegation sufficient to convince the Court that the plaintiffs
intended it to be one for injunction. But aside from the title of the complaint, plaintiffs pray for the
declaration of the nullity of Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80; the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, and for such other relief as may be deemed just and equitable. This Court
has already held that there are only two requisites to be satisfied if an injunction is to issue,
namely, the existence of the right sought to be protected, and that the acts against which the
injunction is to be directed are violative of said right (North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Serafin
Hidalgo, 63 Phil., 664). There is no question that in the case at bar, at least 11 of the complaining
trawl operators were duly licensed to operate in any of the national waters of the Philippines, and it
is undeniable that the executive enactments sought to be annulled are detrimental to their
interests. And considering further that the granting or refusal of an injunction, whether temporary or
permanent, rests in the sound discretion of the Court, taking into account the circumstances and
the facts of the particular case, the trial Court committed no abuse of discretion when it treated the
complaint as one for injunction and declaratory relief and executed the judgment pursuant to the
provisions of section 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
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JUMAMIL vs. CAF, et al.
G.R. No. 144570. September 21, 2005.
Corona, J.:
FACTS: In 1989, petitioner Jumamil filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for declaratory
relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and writ of restraining order against public respondents
Mayor Jose J. Cafe and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo, Davao del Norte. He
questioned the constitutionality of Municipal Resolution No. 7, enacting Appropriation Ordinance
No. 111, provided for an initial appropriation of P765,000 for the construction of stalls around a
proposed terminal fronting the Panabo Public Market which was destroyed by fire. Subsequently,
the petition was amended due to the passage of Resolution No. 49, denominated as Ordinance
No. 10, appropriating a further amount of P1,515,000 for the construction of additional stalls in the
same public market. However, prior to the passage of these resolutions, respondent Mayor Cafe
had already entered into contracts with those who advanced and deposited (with the municipal
treasurer) from their personal funds the sum of P40,000 each. Some of the parties were close
friends and/or relatives of the public respondents. The construction of the stalls which petitioner
sought to stop through the preliminary injunction in the RTC was nevertheless finished, rendering
the prayer therefor moot and academic. The leases of the stalls were then awarded by public raffle
which, however, was limited to those who had deposited P40,000 each. Thus, the petition was
amended anew to include the 57 awardees of the stalls as private respondents. Petition was
dismissed and such dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner had the legal standing to bring the petition for declaratory relief
HELD: None. There is an unbending rule that courts will not assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question unless the following requisites are satisfied: (1) there must be an actual
case calling for the exercise of judicial review; (2) the question before the Court must be ripe for
adjudication; (3) the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to do so; (4) the
question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and (5) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Unless a person's constitutional rights are
adversely affected by the statute or ordinance, he has no legal standing. Petitioner brought the
petition in his capacity as taxpayer of the Municipality of Panabo, Davao del Norte and not in his
personal capacity. He was questioning the official acts of the public respondents in passing the
ordinances and entering into the lease contracts with private respondents. A taxpayer need not be
a party to the contract to challenge its validity. Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. Petitioner did
not seasonably allege his interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public funds or the
specific injury to him as a result of the enforcement of the questioned resolutions and contracts. It
was only in the "Remark to Comment" he filed in this Court did he first assert that "he (was) willing
to engage in business and (was) interested to occupy a market stall." 32 Such claim was obviously
an afterthought.
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SANTOS vs. AQUINO, et al.
G.R. No. L-5101. November 28, 1953
Padilla, J.:
FACTS: The petitioner is the manager of a theater known as "Cine Concepcin," and the
respondents are the Municipal Mayor, the Municipal Council and the Municipal Treasurer, of
Malabon. The petitioner avers that Ordinance No. 61 imposes a license tax of P1,000 per annum
on the said theater in addition to a license tax on all tickets sold in theaters and cinemas in
Malabon, pursuant to Ordinance No. 58; that prior to 8 December 1946 the municipal license tax
paid by the petitioner on "Cine Concepcin" was P180, pursuant to Ordinance No. 9, series of
1945; that Ordinance No. 61, series of 1946, is ultra vires and repugnant to the provisions of the
Constitution on taxation; that its approval was not in accordance with law; that Ordinance No. 10,
series of 1947, is also null and void, because the Department of Finance that approved it acted in
excess and against the powers granted it by law, and is unjust, oppressive and confiscatory; and
that the adoption of both ordinances was the result of persecution of the petitioner by the
respondents because within a period of less than one and a half years, the Municipal Council of
Malabon adopted four ordinances increasing the taxes on cinematographs and theaters and
imposing a penalty of 20 per cent surcharge for late payment.
ISSUE: Whether the action is a petition for declaratory relief filed by the proper party in interest.
HELD: No. The action is not for declaratory relief if the terms of the ordinances assailed are not
ambiguous or of doubtful meaning which require a construction thereof by the Court. Granting that
the validity or legality of an ordinance may be drawn in question in an action for declaratory relief,
such relief must be asked before a violation of the ordinance be committed. The rule that actions
must be brought in the name of the real party in interest (section 2, Rule 3) applies to actions
brought under Rule 66 for declaratory relief. As to a theater, its owner, and not its manager, is the
real party in interest. Santos, the petitioner, does not aver nor does he testify that he is the owner
or part-owner of "Cine Concepcin." He alleges that he is only the manager thereof. For that
reason he is not an interested party. He has no interest in the theater known as "Cine Concepcin"
which may be affected by the municipal ordinances in question and for that reason he is not
entitled to bring this action either for declaratory relief or for prohibition, which apparently is the
purpose of the action as may be gleaned from the prayer of the petition. The rule that actions must
be brought in the name of the real party in interest 2 applies to actions brought under Rule 66 for
declaratory relief. The fact that he is the manager of the theater does not make him a real party in
interest.
EDADES vs. EDADES

G.R. No. L-8964. July 31, 1956.
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BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

FACTS: Plaintiff, Juan Edades, in his complaint alleges that he is an illegitimate son of
Emigdio Edades with Maria de Venecia, having been born when said Emigdio Edades was legally
married to Maxima Edades; that he had always enjoyed the continuous and uninterrupted
possession of the status of illegitimate child by direct and positive acts of his father and of the
legitimate children of the latter; that as such illegitimate child he is entitled to share in the
inheritance of his father under the law; and that as the legitimate children of his father will deny, as
in fact they have denied his right to inherit, and such denial may ripen into a costly litigation, he
brought the present action for the determination of his hereditary rights. The court dismissed the
petition upon motion holding that "An action for declaratory relief just for the purpose of clearing
away doubt, uncertainty, or insecurity to the plaintiff's status or rights would seem to be improper
and outside the purview of a declaratory relief. Neither can it be availed of for the purpose of
compelling recognition of such rights, if disputed or objected to."
ISSUE: Whether an action for declaratory relief is the proper action for the petitioner.
RULING: No. Under the law, an action for declaratory relief is proper when any person is interested
"under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute or
ordinance" in order to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument or statute, or to declare his rights or duties thereunder (section 1, Rule 66). Moreover,
the action should be predicated on the following conditions: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interest are adverse; (3) the
party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue
involved must be ripened for judicial determination. (Tolentino vs. Board of Accountancy, 90 Phil.,
83). Plaintiff's action seeking to determine his hereditary rights in the property of his alleged father
and incidentally the recognition of his status as an illegitimate son can not be maintained as one for
declaratory relief because it neither concerns a deed, will, contract or of her written instrument, nor
does it affect a statute or ordinance, the construction or validity of which is involved. Nor is it
predicated on any justifiable controversy, for the alleged right of inheritance which plaintiff desires
to assert has not yet accrued for the simple reason that his alleged father has not yet died. And the
law is clear that "the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent" (Article 777, new Civil Code).
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, et al. vs. VIRON TRANSPORTATION

CO., INC., et al
G.R. No. 170656. August 15, 2007.
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Carpio-Morales, J.:
FACTS: In 1969, the Court observed that vehicles have increased in number. Traffic congestion
has moved from bad to worse, from tolerable to critical. The number of people who use the
thoroughfares has multiplied and have remained unchecked and have reverberated to this day.
Traffic jams continue to clog the streets of Metro Manila, bringing vehicles to a standstill at main
road arteries during rush hour traffic and sapping people's energies and patience in the process.
The original case questions the authority of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA) to order the closure of provincial bus terminals along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue
(EDSA) and major thoroughfares of Metro Manila pursuant to E.O. 179 issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on February 10, 2003. The E.O. was issued based on the recommended plan
by the MMDA to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro
Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass transport system to
the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities". Judge Silvino T.
Pampilo, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila declared the E.O. as "unconstitutional as it
constitutes an unreasonable exercise of police power" acting upon the petition file by the
respondent Viron and Mencorp Transportation System, Inc.
ISSUE: Whether the requisites of declaratory relief and justiciable controversy are lacking.
HELD: No. The following are the essential requisites for a declaratory relief petition: (a) there must
be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and
(d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination. The requirement of the presence of a
justiciable controversy is satisfied when an actual controversy or the ripening seeds thereof exist
between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and the declaration sought will
help in ending the controversy. A question becomes justiciable when it is translated into a claim of
right which is actually contested. Under the circumstances, for respondents to wait for the actual
issuance by the MMDA of an order for the closure of respondents' bus terminals would be
foolhardy for, by then, the proper action to bring would no longer be for declaratory relief which,
under Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, must be brought before there is a breach or
violation of rights. The closure of their bus terminals would mean, among other things, the loss of
income from the operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely, respondents claim a
deprivation of their constitutional right to property without due process of law. Respondents have
thus amply demonstrated a "personal and substantial interest in the case such that they have
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the E.O.'s enforcement." Consequently, the
established rule that the constitutionality of a law or administrative issuance can be challenged by
one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement has been satisfied by
respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ORBECIDO III

G.R. No.154380. October 5, 2005.
Page
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Quisumbing, J.:
FACTS: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son
and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986,
Cipriano's wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000,
Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a
certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding
merit in the petition, the court granted the same.
ISSUE: Whether a petition for declaratory relief is applicable for a petition to remarry under Article
26 of the Family Code.
HELD: Yes. The Court noted that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court
actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief
are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons
whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. This case concerns the
applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later
acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The
interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to
protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his
capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue
raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation
ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage. The twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: (a) there is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.In this case, when Cipriano's wife was naturalized as an American
citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate
would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present
in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. However,
we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent
concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent's wife. It is settled rule that one
who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.
QUISUMBING, et al. vs. GARCIA, et al.

G.R. No.157527. December 8, 2008.
Page
23

Tinga, J.:
FACTS: The Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a financial audit on the Province of Cebu for
the period ending December 2004. Its audit team rendered a report, which states that"Several
contracts in the total amount of P102,092,841.47 were not supported with a Sangguniang
Panlalawigan resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor to enter into a contract, as required
under Section 22 of R.A. No. 7160." The audit team then recommended that, "Henceforth, the local
chief executive must secure a sanggunian resolution authorizing the former to enter into a contract
as provided under Section 22 of R.A. No. 7160." Gov. Garcia, in her capacity as the Provincial
Governor of Cebu, sought the reconsideration of the findings and recommendation of the COA.
However, without waiting for the resolution of the reconsideration sought, she instituted an action
for Declaratory Relief before the RTC of Cebu City. The trial court rendered the assailed Decision
declaring that Gov. Garcia need not secure prior authorization from the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Cebu before entering into the questioned contracts. Further, the trial court
declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan does not have juridical personality nor is it vested by
R.A. No. 7160 with authority to sue and be sued. The trial court accordingly dismissed the case
against respondent members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. On the question of the remedy of
declaratory relief being improper because a breach had already been committed, the trial court
held that the case would ripen into and be treated as an ordinary civil action.
ISSUE: Whether declaratory relief is the proper action.
HELD: No. Gov. Garcia's petition for declaratory relief should have been dismissed because it was
instituted after the COA had already found her in violation of Sec. 22 (c) of R.A. No. 7160. One of
the important requirements for a petition for declaratory relief under Sec. 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court is that it be filed before breach or violation of a deed, will, contract, other written instrument,
statute, executive order, regulation, ordinance or any other governmental regulation. It has been
held that the purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and
obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc., for their guidance in its enforcement
or compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach. It may be entertained only
before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract, etc. to which it refers. Where the law or
contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the court
can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. Under such circumstances, inasmuch as a
cause of action has already accrued in favor of one or the other party, there is nothing more for the
court to explain or clarify, short of a judgment or final order. Thus, the trial court erred in assuming
jurisdiction over the action despite the fact that the subject thereof had already been breached by
Gov. Garcia prior to the filing of the action. Nonetheless, the conversion of the petition into an
ordinary civil action is warranted under Sec. 6, Rule 63.
CJH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, et al.

G.R. No.172457. December 24, 2008.
Page
24

Tinga, J.:
FACTS: Proclamation No. 420 (the Proclamation) was issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos to
create a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in a portion of Camp John Hay in Baguio City. Section 3
thereof granted to the newly created SEZ the same incentives then already enjoyed by the Subic
SEZ. Among these incentives are the exemptions from the payment of taxes, both local and
national, for businesses located inside the SEZ, and the operation of the SEZ as a special customs
territory providing for tax and duty free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment. In line
with the Proclamation, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued Revenue Regulations No. 1297 while the Bureau of Customs (BOC) issued Customs Administrative Order No. 2-98. The two
issuances provided the rules and regulations to be implemented within the Camp John Hay SEZ.
Subsequently, however, Section 3 of the Proclamation was declared unconstitutional in part by the
Court. The decision attained finality when the Court en banc denied the motion for reconsideration.
While the motion for reconsideration was pending with the Court, on 16 January 2004 the Office of
the City Treasurer of Baguio sent a demand letter for the updated statements of real property taxes
due on real estate properties declared under the names of the Bases Conversion and
Development Authority and Camp John Hay Development Corporation totaling P101, 935,634.17
inclusive of penalties, as of January 10, 2004. Five months later the BOC followed suit.
ISSUE: Whether the remedy of declaratory relief proper in this case.
RULING: No. In National Dental Supply Co. v. Meer, this Court held that: From the opinion of the
former Chief Justice Moran may be deduced that the failure to incorporate CA No. 55 in section 1,
now Rule 64 is not due to an intention to repeal it but rather to the desire to leave its application to
the sound discretion of the court, which is the sole arbiter to determine whether a case is
meritorious or not. And even if it be desired to incorporate it in rule 66, it is doubted if it could be
done under the rule-making power of the Supreme Court considering that the nature of said
proviso is substantive and not adjective, its purpose being to lay down a policy as to the right of a
taxpayer to contest the collection of taxes on the part of a revenue officer or of the Government.
With the adoption of said proviso, our law-making body has asserted its policy on the matter, which
is to prohibit a taxpayer to question his liability for the payment of any tax that may be collected by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The power of taxation being legislative, all incidents are within the
control of the Legislature." In other words, it is our considered opinion that the proviso contained in
Commonwealth CA No. 55 is still in full force and effect and bars the plaintiff from filing the present
action.
OLLADA, et al. vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-11357. May 31, 1962.
Page
25

Dizon, J.:
FACTS: Felipe B. Ollada is a certified public accountant, having passed the examination given by
the Board of Accountancy, and is duly qualified to practice his profession. On July 28, 1952 his
name was placed on the rolls of certified public accountants authorized and accredited to practice
accountancy in the office of the Central Bank of the Philippines. In December, 1955, by reason of a
requirement of the Import-Export Department of said bank that CPAs submit to an accreditation
under oath before they could certify financial statements of their clients applying for import dollar
allocations with its office, Ollada's previous accreditation was nullified. Assailing said accreditation
requirement on the ground that it was (a) an unlawful invasion of the jurisdiction of the Board of
Accountancy, (b) in excess of the powers of the Central Bank and (c) unconstitutional in that it
unlawfully restrained the legitimate pursuit of one's trade, Ollada, for himself and allegedly on
behalf of numerous other CPAs, filed a petition for Declaratory Relief in the Court of First Instance
of Manila to nullify said accreditation requirement. Subsequently, respondent deleted in its
requirements the Application for Accreditation of Certified Public Accountants, paragraph 13 and
modified paragraph 14 thereof, as well as modified the Accreditation Card for Certified Public
Accountants.
ISSUE: Whether upon the facts alleged in the petition for Declaratory Relief and others elicited
from the parties and made of record by them prior to the issuance of the order appealed from, this
case was properly dismissed.
HELD: Yes. The Court agreed with the trial court that the respondent is not barred from
promulgating internal rules and regulations necessary to carry out its purpose pursuant to the
charter creating it provided, however, that such rules and regulations are not contrary to law, public
morals or public policy. The only objectionable features of respondent's aforementioned
requirement have already been eliminated by said respondent. It appears, therefore, that after
respondent had eliminated said objectionable features, the petition for declaratory relief has
become groundless and should be dismissed. A complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper if
filed after a contract, statute or right has been breached or violated. An action for declaratory relief
should be filed before there has been a breach of a contract, statute or right. The rule is that an
action for Declaratory Relief is proper only if adequate relief is not available through the means of
other existing forms of action or proceeding.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF FELISA LIM vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No.L-29535. February 27, 1971.
Page
26

Concepcion, J.:
FACTS: On September 30, 1960, petitioner Felisa Lim (alias Lam Bit Sha) filed a petition
alleging, inter alia, that she was formerly a citizen of the Philippines; that she lost her Philippine
citizenship, by reason of marriage to a Chinese in Canton, China, by whom she had two children;
that it is her intention to reacquire Philippine citizenship; that she has all the qualifications to be
repatriated, as shown by an affidavit of two Filipino citizens, appended to the petition; and that she
and her minor children are holders of immigration papers and were admitted into the Philippines,
as permanent residents, on March 14, 1960. Premised upon these allegations, Felisa Lim prayed
that she "be permitted to take the oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen and thus repatriated."
Despite the opposition thereto of the Government, the lower court rendered the aforementioned
decision declaring that Felisa Lim was a citizen of the Philippines before he marriage and that she
may be repatriated as such citizen.
ISSUE: Whether citizenship is a proper subject of Declaratory Relief.
HELD: No. Declaratory relief in this jurisdiction is a special civil action which may lie only when 'any
person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are
affected by statute or ordinance,' demands construction thereof for a declaration of his rights
thereunder. None of the above circumstances exists in the case under consideration. And this
Court has already held that there is no proceeding established by law or the rules by which any
person claiming to be a citizen may get a declaration in a court of justice to that effect or in regard
to his citizenship. It is now well settled that there is no proceeding established by law, or the rules,
for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual and that citizenship is not a proper
subject for declaratory judgment."
DY POCO vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, et al.

G.R. No.L-22313. March 31, 1966.
Page
27

Barrera, J.:
FACTS: Dy Poco filed a petition for declaratory judgment based on the allegations that petitionerappellant is a Filipino, having been born in 1910 in Cebu City, out of wedlock, of a Filipino mother,
Susana Apura, who died in 1928, and a Chinese father, Dy Poco, who died in 1915; that believing
himself at first to be a Chinese, petitioner secured alien certificates of registration in 1947 and
1951; that in 1952, petitioner-appellant, realizing his mistake, petitioned the Commissioner of
Immigration for cancellation of his name from the list of aliens, which petition was denied.
ISSUE: Whether the declaration of citizenship is a proper subject of a proceeding for declaratory
judgment.
HELD: No. As consistently ruled by the Supreme Court, the proceeding for declaratory relief is not
the proper and available remedy to secure a declaration of citizenship. Appellant's claim to
Philippine citizenship, or "exemption from compliance with the requirements of the Alien
Registration law", as he wants to put it, is based on his alleged illegitimacy or that, even if his
parents were legally married, he followed the citizenship of his Filipino mother when the latter
became a Filipino again upon the death of her Chinese husband in 1915. However, both the
Secretary of Justice and the lower court found these allegations not substantiated by evidence. In
other words, these material facts upon which the cause of actions was based, were and still are
subject to dispute or controversy. Consequently, no declaration based on such questioned facts
can be made.. Where a declaratory judgment as to a disputed fact would be determinative of
issues rather than a construction of definite stated rights, status, and other relations, commonly
expressed in written instruments, the case is not one for declaratory judgment. A declaratory
proceeding is also unavailable after a judicial investigation of disputed facts. Taking into
consideration the nature of a proceeding for declaratory judgment, wherein relief may be sought
only to declare rights, and not to determine or try issues, there is more valid reason for us to
adhere to the rule that a declaratory relief proceeding is unavailable where the judgment would
have to be made only after a judicial investigation of disputed facts.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF ANDRES SINGSON

PHILIPPINES
G.R. No.L-21855. January 30, 1968.
vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
Page
28

Makalintal, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization on October 12, 1959, with an alternative
prayer that he be permitted to present evidence of his Philippine citizenship and declared a Filipino
citizen accordingly. After due publication and hearing, there being no opposition from either the
office of the Solicitor General or the Provincial Fiscal, the lower court received the evidence for the
petitioner. It rendered its decision holding that inasmuch as petitioner was already a Filipino citizen
as borne out by the evidence presented, there was no need to give due course to his petition for
naturalization since it would serve no useful purpose for him. Accordingly, the lower court granted
petitioner's alternative prayer and declared him a citizen of the Philippines considering that the
petitioner has from the time he became of the age of discretion been considering himself a Filipino
citizen as shown in his residence certificates, stating therein his citizenship as a Filipino. He did not
register himself as an alien in the Bureau of Immigration. When he reached the age of majority, he
started exercising the right of suffrage and in 1941 made his declaration of intention to elect Filipino
citizenship.
ISSUE: Whether the lower court can declare the petitioner as citizen of the Philippines.
HELD: No. At the time the lower court rendered its decision of August 9, 1960, declaring petitioner
a citizen of the Philippines, the ruling in the Sy Quimsuan and Sen cases was no longer controlling.
The lower court thus premised that decision on jurisprudence which had already been modified
particularly by the case of Suy Chan vs. Republic (G.R. No. 14159, April 18, 1960), which held that
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship
of an individual. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a
given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a
remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the
adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a
pronouncement relative to, their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial
power. At times, the law permits the acquisition of a given status, such as naturalization, by judicial
decree. But, there is no similar legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to
declare that a given person is part of our citizenry."
It would seem therefore that the decision of August 9 was the result of an erroneous appreciation of
the applicable jurisprudence at the time. Even so, however, the error did not necessarily render the
decision void, and the same would acquire force and effect unless reversed on appeal or set aside
on other recognized grounds, such as fraud in its procurement.
IN RE: THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF OF HOSPICIO OBILES AND FOR
CANCELLATION OF ERRONEOUS REGISTRATION AS ALIEN. HOSPICIO OBILES vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-5204. March 27, 1953.
Page
29

Labrador, J.:
FACTS: In his petition for declaratory relief, petitioner alleges that he is a Filipino citizen by birth
and parentage, residing in Bacacay, Albay; that in the year 1941, because "of erroneous belief and
fear of criminal prosecution," petitioner registered himself with the municipal treasurer of Bacacay
as Chinese alien, but that notwithstanding said registration he never intended to give up his Filipino
citizenship, and that he continued to hold himself out as a Filipino citizen. The Solicitor General
filed an opposition, alleging that the petition contains no cause of action and that no actual
controversy has arisen against anyone, and that if the petitioner desires to establish his Filipino
citizenship, he should do so in another separate proceeding. The court sustained the opposition,
holding that there was no actual controversy involved in petitioner's petition, because petitioner is
merely in doubt as to his right and no one disputes his claim; that any declaration that the court
might render in the premises will not terminate the controversy, and it, therefore, dismissed the
petition.
ISSUE: Whether Declaratory Relief is the proper action in the case.
HELD: No. Such registration is not a deed or written instrument on which an action for declaratory
relief may be instituted. That instrument is not a contract in which another party or person is
involved. It is unilateral act of the petitioner himself not affecting or binding anyone else but himself,
nor creating any right or obligation on the part of any other party or on that of the State and
therefore no one has an interest therein except himself. The supposed fear in the mind of the
petitioner is not what the law considers as an actual controversy, or a justiciable controversy, which
requires the intervention of the courts of justice to predetermine the rights, obligations or liabilities
arising therefrom. The Solicitor General's opposition was not presented to deny the allegations of
his complaint, but to show that he has no cause of action because nobody has ever contested
petitioner's pretensions. The claim of the appellant that a controversy has arisen because the
Solicitor General has opposed his petition is clearly unfounded. What the petitioner desires is to be
declared a Filipino citizen in spite of his registration as a Chinese citizen. As contended by the
Solicitor General, petitioner's remedy is clearly not by an action for declaratory relief. For the
reason, therefore, that petitioner's action for declaratory relief is not the proper remedy, because
his desire is to be declared a Filipino citizen, and because the facts alleged in his petition constitute
no cause for a declaratory judgment
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (GSISEA) and

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM SUPERVISORS UNION (GSISSU),
petitioners,
vs.
Page
30

HON. JUDGE CARMELINO ALVENDIA of the Court of First Instance of Manila and
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), respondents.
G.R. No. L-15614 May 30, 1960
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

Digested by: John Daryl Josol
Facts: An action for declaratory relief was filed after the members of the GSISEA declared a
strike, who were, however, prevailed upon to return to work 4 days later. Said petition seeks a
resolution on the questions of whether the GSIS is exercising on the questions of whether the
GSIS is exercising governmental or proprietary functions under the existing laws; whether its
employees, who are governed by the Civil Service Law, can compel it to enter into a collective
bargaining agreement with regards to the terms and conditions of their employment; and, finally,
whether said employees can declare a strike. It is alleged "that a judicial declaration on the
abovementioned questions in relation to the pertinent provisions of law is necessary because of the
labor dispute now pending between the GSIS and its employees affiliated with the respondents
GSISEA and GSISSU." the respondents GSISEA and GSISSU filed a motion to dismiss the petition
on the grounds that it does not state a cause of action for declaratory relief; that the court does not
have jurisdiction over the subject matter for which relief is sought; and that any declaration by the
court on the questions raised is unnecessary and improper.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief is proper.
Ruling: No, In the case of GSIS vs. Castillo, et al., 98 Phil., 876; 52 Off. Gaz. (9) 4269; this Court
had already had occasion to pass upon the questions on which judicial declaration in the present
proceedings is sought. Inasmuch as the petition for declaratory relief in the present proceedings
was filed to determine whether or not the GSIS is a government agency performing governmental
functions, a question which has already been determined by no less than the highest court of the
land and in case in which the GSIS itself is a party, we do not see how the same could be justified.
If declaratory relief is not necessary or not proper where there is already an action pending in
another court involving the same issue, or where the plaintiff has another more effective relief, with
more reason should it be improper or unnecessary when, as in the instant case, it appears to be a
moot case, since it seeks to get a judgment on a pretended controversy, when in reality there is
none. Indeed, in its true light, the present petition for declaratory relief seems to be no more than a
request for an advisory opinion to which courts in this and other jurisdiction have cast a definite
aversion.It should, furthermore, be observed that the petition below seeking a judicial declaration
on whether members of the respondent unions as government employees can declare a strike was
filed after the latter had actually gone on strike. Under sec. 2, Rule 66, a complaint for declaratory
relief will not prosper if filed after a contractor statute, the construction of which is sought, has
already been breached.
Page
31
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF FELISA LIM (Alias Lam Bit Sha) FOR
REPATRIATION UNDER COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63. FELISA LIM (Alias Lam Bit
Sha), petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-29535. February 27, 1971
CONCEPCION, J p:
Facts: Petitioner Felisa Lim (alias Lam Bit Sha) filed with said court a petition alleging, inter alia,
that she was formerly a citizen of the Philippines; that she lost her Philippine citizenship, on
December 10, 1943, by reason of marriage to a Chinese in Canton, China, that it is her intention to
reacquire Philippine citizenship and to renounce all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign potentate,
state or sovereignty and, particularly, to China, of which she is at present a citizen; that she has all
the qualifications to be repatriated, as shown by an affidavit of two Filipino citizens, appended to
the petition; and that she and her minor children are holders of immigration papers and were
admitted into the Philippines, as permanent residents, on March 14, 1960. Premised upon these
allegations, Felisa Lim prayed that she "be permitted to take the oath of allegiance as a Filipino
citizen and thus repatriated." Despite the opposition thereto of the Government, the lower court
Page
32

rendered the aforementioned decision declaring that Felisa Lim was a citizen of the Philippines
before he marriage and that she may be repatriated as such citizen. The Solicitor General
appealed alleging that the lower court erred "in declaring petitioner 'repatriated' as a citizen of the
Philippines," upon the ground inter alia, that she had not duly established either the nationality of
her alleged father, Lorenzo, or her alleged relation with him.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in declaring the petitioner repatriated as a citizen of the
Philippines.
Ruling: Yes, as a consequence, her petition is, in effect, one for a declaratory relief, which this
Court has repeatedly held to be inapplicable to the political status of natural persons. An action for
a declaratory relief is not proper to resolve doubts concerning one's citizenship. In the case of
Feliseta Tan v. Republic had sought the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration,amended
her petition so as to convert it into one for a declaration that she is a citizen of the Philippines, the
court held that this petition would not lie because such a remedy of cancellation of alien certificate
of registration can only be held by virtue of a judgment of a competent court in an action where the
citizenship of parties is a material matter in issue, declaring the Filipino citizenship of the petitioner
and her children, and such declaration cannot be obtained directly because there is no proceeding
at present provided by law or the rules for such purpose.
Page
33
GUALBERTO
J.
DELA
LLANA,
petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE and THE BUDGET COMMISSIONER, respondents.
G.R. No. L-47245 December 9, 1977
CASTRO, C.J.:
Facts: A petition for declaratory relief has been filed regarding the forthcoming result of the
referendum will have a substantial bearing on the implementation of the second paragraph of
Amendment No. 3 approved in October, 1976 to the Constitution of the Philippines of 1973, which
provides that the "incumbent President of the Philippines (meaning President Marcos) shall be the
Prime Minister."
Issue: whether or not the petition for declaratory relief is proper.
Ruling: No, Presidential Decree No. 1229 which calls for the December 17, 1977 referendum
cannot therefore be said to suffer from any constitutional infirmity. If the people vote "yes,"
Amendment No. 3 will merely be reaffirmed and reinforced. If the people vote "no," the incumbent
President, heeding "the will" of the people, will - as he has categorically announced - resign; in
such situation, he will be merely exercising the prerogative, inherent in all public officials, to resign.
In either case the Constitution, as it now reads, will remain unaltered. The matter of whether or not
the holding of the December 17, 1977 referendum is unnecessary because the people, on several
occasions, had already expressed their assent to the incumbent President's continuance in office
and their approval of his programs of government, is a political and non-justiciable question,
involving as it does the wisdom, no more and no less, of the decision to call for a referendum. The
power to determine when a referendum should be called and what matter is important for referral to
the people, resides in the political branch of the Government, the exercise of which involves
consideration of a multitude of factors political, social, economic, etc. - normally outside the
periphery of competence of the courts.
Page
34
TEODORO TANDA, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. NARCISO N. ALDAYA, Defendant-Appellee.

G.R. Nos. L-9322-23. January 30, 1956
Facts: Tanda filed an action for the annulment of a certain contract of sale with pacto de retro
executed between him and Aldaya with the Court of First Instance, Cavite. The court declared that
the contract was valid. Tanda filed a motion to set aside judgment and a motion for new trial which
were denied; thus, prompting him to appeal with the Court of Appeals. Said court certified the case
to the Supreme Court, which likewise upheld the validity of the said contract.
After the decision became final and executory and the record was returned to the court of origin,
Tanda filed an action for declaratory relief questioning the correctness or validity of the decision
and contending that the decision is considered within the words other written instruments provided
in Section 1 of Rule 66 (now Rule 63). Aldaya filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the case
Page
35

states no cause of action and moved for the withdrawal of Original Title No. 114 in order that his
ownership may be consolidated and a new title will be issued in his name. The trial court granted
the motion to dismiss and the withdrawal of the original title. Hence, this petition was filed.
Issue: Whether or not petition for declaratory relief is proper.
Ruling: No, A court decision cannot be the subject of declaratory relief for the simple reason that if
a party is not agreeable to a decision either on questions of law or of fact, he may file with the trial
court a motion for reconsideration or a new trial in order that the defect may be corrected (section
1, Rule 37). The same remedy may be pursued by a party with regard to a decision of the Court of
Appeals or of the Supreme Court (section 1, Rule 54, section 1, Rule 55, in connection with section
1, Rule 53). A party may even seek relief from a judgment or order of an inferior court on the
ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence if he avails of that remedy within the
terms prescribed by section 1, Rule 38. In the present case, the fundamental reason why the
decision cannot be the subject of declaratory relief is predicated upon the principle of res judicata
which stamps the mark of finality in a case which has been fully and definitely litigated in court.
Page
36
FELIPE B. OLLADA, etc., vs.CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-11357 May 31, 1962
DIZON, J.:
Facts: Felipe B. Ollada is a certified public accountant, having passed the examination given by
the Board of Accountancy, and is duly qualified to practice his profession. In December, 1955, by
reason of a requirement of the Import-Export Department of said bank that CPAs submit to an
accreditation under oath before they could certify financial statements of their clients applying for
import dollar allocations with its office, Ollada's previous accreditation was nullified.
Pursuant to the new requirement, the Import-Export Department of the Central Bank issued
APPLICATION FOR ACCREDITATION OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS (CB-IED Form
No. 5) and ACCREDITATION CARD FOR CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS (CB-IED, Form
No. 6) for CPAs to accomplish under oath. Assailing said accreditation requirement on the ground
that it was (a) an unlawful invasion of the jurisdiction of the Board of Accountancy, (b) in excess of
the powers of the Central Bank and (c) unconstitutional in that it unlawfully restrained the legitimate
pursuit of one's trade, Ollada, for himself and allegedly on behalf of numerous other CPAs, filed a
petition for Declaratory Relief in the Court of First Instance of Manila to nullify said accreditation
requirement. Central Bank filed a motion to dismiss the petition for Declaratory Relief for lack of
cause of action. Its main contention was that the Central Bank has the responsibility of
administering the Monetary Banking System of the Republic and is authorized to prepare and
issue, through its Monetary Board, rules and regulations to make effective the discharge of such
responsibility; that the accreditation requirement alleged in the petition was issued in the exercise
of such power and authority; that the purpose of such requirement is not to regulate the practice of
accountancy in the Philippines but only the manner in which certified public accountants should
transact business with the Central Bank.
The trial court required respondent to submit within ten days from notice, proof that it had deleted
paragraph 13 and modified paragraph 14 of its CB-IED Form No. 5, as manifested in its
Page
37

memorandum, otherwise the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by petitioner would be
granted. Having complied with said order by submitting CB-ID Form No. 5 (formerly CB-IED Form
No. 5) showing that paragraph 13 of CB-IED Form No. 5 had been deleted, and paragraph 14
thereof had been modified, the court, on June 27, 1956, denied the petition for preliminary
injunction. On June 29, 1956, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that, despite the
deletion of paragraph 13 from respondent's CB-IED Form No. 5, it was still enforcing the rules and
regulations of the Philippine Institute of Accountants in its CB-IED Form No. 6 (ACCREDITATION
CARD FOR CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS) which was still a part of the questioned
accreditation requirement. The lower court, resolving the motion to dismiss filed by respondent,
dismissed the complaint stating that after respondent had eliminated said objectionable features,
the petition for declaratory relief has become groundless and should be dismissed
Issues: whether or not the petition for Declaratory Relief was properly dismissed.
Ruling: Yes, Petitioner commenced this action as, and clearly intended it to be one for Declaratory
Relief under the provisions of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. On the question of when a special civil
action of this nature would prosper, we have already held that the complaint for declaratory relief
will not prosper if filed after a contract, statute or right has been breached or violated. In the
present case such is precisely the situation arising from the facts alleged in the petition for
declaratory relief. As vigorously claimed by petitioner himself, respondent had already invaded or
violated his right and caused him injury all these giving him a complete cause of action
enforceable in an appropriate ordinary civil action or proceeding. An action for declaratory relief
should be filed before there has been a breach of a contract, statutes or right, and that it is
sufficient to bar such action, that there had been a breach which would constitute actionable
violation. The rule is that an action for Declaratory Relief is proper only if adequate relief is not
available through the means of other existing forms of action or proceeding
KAWASAKI PORT SERVICE CORPORATION, NAIKAI SHIPPING CO. LTD., NAIKAI TUG BOAT
SERVICE CO., THE PORT SERVICE CORPORATION, LICENSED LAND SEA PILOTS
ASSOCIATION, HAYAKOMA UNYU K.K., TOKYO KISEN COMPANY, LTD., OMORI KAISOTEN,
LTD., TOHOKU UNYU CO., LTD. AND SEITETSU UNYU CO., LTD., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. AUGUSTO M. AMORES, Judge of Br. XXIV, Court of First Instance of Manila, and
C.F. SHARP & CO., INC., respondents.
G.R. No. L-58340 July 16, 1991
BIDIN, J.:p
Facts: The private respondent C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc. filed a complaint for injunction and/or
declaratory relief against seventy-nine (79) Japanese corporations as defendants, among which
Page
38

are the petitioners herein. The complaint alleges, among others, that the plaintiff is a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines; that there is another corporation
organized under the law of Japan with the corporate name C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha; that the
plaintiff and C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha are in all respects separate and distinct from each other;
that C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha appears to have incurred obligations to several creditors amongst
which are defendants, also foreign corporations organized and existing under the laws of Japan;
that due to financial difficulties, C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha failed and/or refused to pay its
creditors; and that in view of the failure and/or refusal of said C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha to pay
its alleged obligations to defendants, the latter have been demanding or have been attempting to
demand from C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc., the payment of the alleged obligations to them of C.F. Sharp
Kabushiki Kaisha, notwithstanding that C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc. is a corporation separate and distinct
from that of C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha and that the former had no participation whatsoever or
liability in connection with the transactions between the latter and the defendants.
Since the defendants are non-residents, without business addresses in the Philippines but in
Japan, the private respondent prayed for leave of court to effect extraterritorial service of
summons. Subsequently, private respondent filed an urgent ex-parte motion dated June 23, 1980
for Extraterritorial Service of Summons Upon Defendants by registered mail with return cards
pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Acting on said motion, the respondent
judge issued an order dated June 30, 1980 granting the motion and authorizing extraterritorial
service of summons upon defendants to be effected by registered mail with return cards. Five of
the petitioners, contending that the lower court does not and cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
persons of defendants on the grounds that private respondent's action does not refer to its
personal status; that the action does not have for subject matter property contemplated in Section
17 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, that the action does not pray that defendants be excluded from
any interest or property in the Philippines; that no property of the defendants has been attached;
that the action is in personam; and that the action does not fall within any of the four cases
mentioned in Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not private respondent's complaint for injunction and/or declaratory relief is
within the purview of the provisions of Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling: No, where the complaint does not involve the personal status of plaintiff, nor any property
in the Philippines in which defendants have or claim an interest, or which the plaintiff has attached,
but purely an action for injunction, it is a personal action as well as an action in personam, not an
action in rem or quasi in rem. As a personal action, personal or substituted service of summons on
the defendants, not extraterritorial service, is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court. In an
action for injunction, extra-territorial service of summons and complaint upon the non-resident
defendants cannot subject them to the processes of the regional trial courts which are powerless to
reach them outside the region over which they exercise their authority. Extra-territorial service of
summons will not confer on the court jurisdiction or Power to compel them to obey its orders.
UNIVERSITY
vs.
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
petitioner,
Page
39

COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court (Branch 89), National Capital Region, Quezon City, Metro Manila, MANUEL ELIZALDE,
BALAYEM, MAHAYAG, DUL and LOBO, respondents.
G.R. No. 97827 February 9, 1993
ROMERO, J.:
Facts: UP allegedly sent Salazar and Bailen to Zagreb, Yugoslavia to attend the 12th International
Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences. There, Salazar and Bailen reiterated their
claim that the Tasaday find was a hoax. Their allegations were widely publicized in several dailies.
With these acts and utterances of Bailen and Salazar as well as newspaper reports and
commentaries on the matter as bases, on October 27, 1988, Elizalde and Tasaday representatives
Balayem, Mahayag, Dul and Lobo, filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief against
Salazar and Bailen. Plaintiffs further pray for judgment declaring plaintiff Tasadays to be a distinct
ethnic community within the territory defined under Presidential Proclamation No. 995 and hence
entitled to the benefits thereof. Salazar and Bailen filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that: the complaint failed to state a cause of action; the cause of action, if any, had already
prescribed; they are protected by the guarantees of free speech and academic freedom; the court
had no jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief in a civil action and no justiciable controversy exists.
Issue: Whether or not the judgment declaring plaintiff Tasadays to be a distinct ethnic community
within the territory proper.
Ruling: No, With respect to the prayer of the complaint for "judgment declaring plaintiff Tasadays to
be a distinct ethnic community within the territory defined under Presidential Proclamation No. 995"
the lower court is cautioned that the same is akin to a prayer for a judicial declaration of Philippine
citizenship which may not be granted in a petition for declaratory relief. As private respondents
themselves declare in their comment, the complaint was filed mainly to vindicate plaintiffs dignity
and honor, and to protect them from further vexation.
Page
40
TOMAS
B.
TADEO,
petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF PANGASINAN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF
MANGALDAN,
EMILIA ACOSTA and LEONCIO MAICONG, respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. L-16474 January 31, 1962
PADILLA, J.:
Facts: The appellees spouses filed against the appellant a complaint for estafa in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan, arising from the same facts alleged in civil case No.
10759 (criminal case No. 129); that the Court of First Instance dismissed civil case No. 10759; that
after the dismissal of the said civil case by the Court of First Instance, the Justice of the Peace
Court dismissed criminal case No. 129 for estafa against the appellant on the ground that the
dismissal of the civil case which was prejudicial precluded the continuation of the criminal case
which arose from the same transaction alleged in the civil case; that after the dismissal of civil case
No. 10759 by the Court of First Instance the appellant filed in the same Court a complaint against
the appellees spouses for declaratory judgment basing his cause of action upon the same
transaction alleged in civil case No. 10759, which was still pending hearing and determination (civil
case No. D-413); that after the appellant had instituted civil case No. D-413 in the Court of First
Instance the appellees spouses again filed a complaint for estafa against the appellant in the same
Justice of the Peace Court upon the same facts alleged in civil case No. 10759 and criminal case
No. 129, which already had been dismissed, and civil case No. D-413, still pending hearing and
determination (criminal case No. 263); that civil case No. D-413 is prejudicial to criminal case No.
Page
41

263; that the dismissal of civil case No. 10759 and criminal case No. 129 constitutes a bar to
further criminal prosecution of the appellant for estafa arising from the facts alleged therein; that all
these notwithstanding the appellee Provincial Fiscal and Special Counsel and the appellee Justice
of the Peace Court were conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal case No. 263 against
the appellant; that the act of the aforesaid appellees in conducting the preliminary investigation in
the said criminal case constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction; and
that there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law available to the appellant. The appellant prayed that the appellees be enjoined from conducting
the preliminary investigation in criminal case No. 263 for estafa against him.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief is proper
Ruling: No, The pendency of civil case No. D-413 for declaratory judgment, commenced by the
appellant against the appellees spouses in the Court of First Instance, was one of the reasons
given by the Justice of the Peace Court to dismiss criminal case No. 129. However, the appellant
not being one of the contracting parties to the deed of sale executed by the appellees spouses but
took part only as notary public before whom they acknowledged the execution thereof is not
entitled to file an action for declaratory judgment. None of his rights or duties thereunder need be
declared.
Another valid and good reason relied upon by the Court in denying the writ prayed for is that the
appellant has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the
appropriate case and at the opportune time, he may set up all defenses available to him and may
appeal from an adverse judgment.
SANTOS CHAN, SO MING LEE and AMBROSIO CABO CHENG, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
EMILIO L. GALANG in his capacity as Commissioner of Immigration, respondent-appellee.
G.R. No. L-21732 October 17, 1966
Page
42

BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Facts: A Portuguese national, So Ming Lee, was allowed to enter the Philippines on May 6, 1957,
as a temporary visitor until July 13, 1957, upon a P1,000 cash bond filed by Ambrosio Cabo
Cheng. She contracted marriage with Santos Chan, a Filipino citizen, she petitioned the
Commissioner of Immigration, on July 10, 1957, for the cancellation of her alien certificate of
registration, and for her permanent stay in the Philippines. Pending resolution of her petition, she
requested for a 30-day extension of her permit to remain in this country, which request was denied.
As she failed to depart on July 13, 1957 the date of expiration of her permitted stay the bond
posted for her was ordered forfeited.
The Commissioner of Immigration wrote to So Ming Lee, denying her request for reconsideration of
the confiscation of the bond and her petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of
registration due to the finding that both So and Chan having previous marriages So claimed to
be a divorcee their marriage to each other was without force and effect so that she could not
have acquired Filipino citizenship. The Commissioner advised So to leave within three days from
receipt of his letter or else appropriate action would be taken for her departure. a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by So Ming Lee, Santos Chan and Ambrosia Cabo
Cheng for (1) annulment of the Commissioner of Immigration's order denying So Ming Lee's
petition for cancellation of her alien certificate of registration and confiscation of the bond; (2)
declaration of So Ming Lee as a Filipino citizen; under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3)
refund of cash bond to Cheng; and (4) restraint of the arrest of So Ming Lee and of deportation
proceedings against her.
Instead of answering, as required by the court, the Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the petition had no cause of action and that it was premature because deportation
proceedings had not yet been terminated so that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction to
review the Commissioner's actuations. To the motion to dismiss, petitioners filed an opposition,
denying its alleged grounds and stating further that the petition may also be construed as one for
declaratory relief.
Issue: Whether or not the petition is considered as also for a declaratory relief.
Ruling: No, Declaratory relief is discretionary upon the court to entertain. It may refuse to exercise
the power to declare rights and to construe instruments in any case where the declaration or
construction is not necessary and proper at the time under all the circumstances. This is one such
case, for the proper forum in which to first resolve the dispute herein is the Board of
Commissioners.
Page
43
CHUA
U,
ET
AL.,
vs.
HON. MANUEL LIM, ETC., ET AL., respondents-appellants.
petitioners-appellees,
G.R. No. L-19639 February 26, 1965
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Facts: A declaratory judgment suit filed by petitioners-appellees, owners of factories producing
"bijon" (rice spaghetti), to annul Resolution No. 10 of the Rice and Corn Board that declared that
the "Bijon" industry is included within the terms of Republic Act No. 3018, nationalizing the Rice
and Corn Industry. At the original petitioners' behest, the court a quo issued a writ of preliminary
injunction upon a bond of P2,000.00, which was duly accomplished and filed. That in the
manufacture of Bijon, petitioners are using rice and/or corn as the principal ingredient;That in the
year 1960, the Congress of the Philippines passed a bill regulating the trade of palay, rice and
corn, which became and is now Republic Act No. 3018, and pursuant to said Act, the President of
the Philippines created the Rice and Corn Board to implement and carry out the provisions of said
Act and respondents are duly appointed and qualified members of the said Rice and Corn
Board;Rice and Corn Board ruled that the processing of rice and/or corn or its by-products are
included in the aforesaid Republic Act No. 3018 and the petitioners are within the purview of the
said Act.
Page
44

The lower court found for the petitioners, and declared that Republic Act No. 3018 did not include
"bijon" manufacturers, because the latter did not deal in rice or corn or any of its by-products, and
made its injunction permanent. Whereupon, the Rice and Corn Board, through the Solicitor
General, appealed directly to this Court on points of law.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief be dismissed.
Ruling: Yes, We agree with the Solicitor General that this case for declaratory judgment should
have been dismissed for several reasons. In the first place, from the time the Rice and Corn Board
issued a ruling that the petitioners-appellees were covered by the terms of Republic Act No. 3018,
the way was open for said petitioners to appeal the Board's ruling to its administrative superiors,
and thereafter institute an ordinary judicial action to contest the Board's ruling and prohibit it from
enforcing the ruling. This Court has repeatedly ruled that the remedy of declaratory judgment is
proper only if adequate relief is not available through other existing forms of action or proceeding,
courts are loath to interfere prematurely with administrative proceedings, and will not assume
jurisdiction of declaratory judgment proceedings until administrative remedies have been
exhausted.1
A second reason for denying relief is that the declaratory judgment herein sought would necessarily
affect also other manufacturers and processors of rice and corn derivative products (such as gawgaw, face powder, etc.), which were not represented in these proceedings.
In the third place, it is also the rule in this jurisdiction that action for declaratory judgment must be
brought before any breach of the statute or ordinance sought to be tested
Page
45

GEORGIA ADLAWAN, Owner, RAMON VILLORDON and MANUEL VILLORDON, Shareholders
and Operators/Managers of the GALLERA BAGONG LIPUNAN, and the SANGGUNIANG
BAYAN
OF
MINGLANILLA,
CEBU,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
Branch XIII, Cebu City, the PHILIPPINE GAME FOWL COMMISSION, NICOLAS ENAD,
ABELARDO LARUMBE and MARTINIANO DE LA CALSADA, all Shareholders of the
MINGLANILLA JUNIOR COLISEUM, respondents.
G.R. No. 73022 February 9, 1989
REGALADO, J.:
Facts: There were two cockpits operating under license in the municipality of Minglanilla, Cebu;
the Minglanilla Junior Coliseum now owned and operated by private respondents after their
acquisition thereof from their predecessor-in-interest Felix Obejero and theBag-Ong Bulangan, and
later also known as La Gallera de Minglanilla, which was established in 1967, then owned and
operated by Catalino Villaflor who was succeeded by several operators and eventually by herein
petitioners.
With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 449, otherwise known as the Cockfighting Law of
1974, which provided for the "one cockpit for every municipality" rule Resolution No. 40, Series of
1973, was passed wherein the municipal council "resolved to request the Municipal Mayor of this
municipality to make and issue a Certification to the effect that the "BAGONG BULANGAN" Cockpit
is the Municipal Cockpit at Calajoan of this municipality.
Aggrieved by the actuations and resolutions of the municipal council, herein private respondents
Nicolas Enad and Abelardo Larumbe filed an action for declaratory relief with injunction, as
petitioners praying for a judicial interpretation of their rights under all pertinent laws governing
cockpits, against the municipal council, the mayor, owner of Gallera before the of First Instance of
Cebu which in due course rendered the decision in favor of the petitioners and against the
respondents.
Issue: Whether or not other affirmative relief may be granted in a declaratory relief.
Ruling: This action was initiated on a petition for declaratory relief, ostensibly for a declaration of
the rights and obligations of the parties under the laws and ordinances involved therein or invoked
by them. Consequently, in such special civil action the judgment does not essentially entail an
executory process since generally, other than a declaration of such rights and duties, other
affirmative reliefs, as these are understood in ordinary civil actions, are not sought by the
proponent.
Page
46
However, the Court has held that although the action is for a declaratory judgment but the
allegations in the complaints are sufficient to make out a case for specific performance or recovery
of property with claims for damages, and the defendants did not raise an issue in the trial court to
challenge the remedy or form of the action availed of, the court can grant such affirmative relief as
may be warranted by the evidence. This decisional rule applies to the case at bar.
HILARION
C.
TOLENTINO,
plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY, ROBERT ORR FERGUSON and HANS HAUSAMANN,
defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-3062 September 28, 1951

Facts: This is an action for declaratory relief filed by plaintiff for the purpose of testing the
constitutionality of section 16-A of Commonwealth Act No. 3105, otherwise known as the Philippine
Accountancy Law, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 342. The ground advanced for the claim
of unconstitutionality is that "it is a class legislation since by its terms it excludes persons engaged
in other callings or professions from adopting, acquiring or using a trade name in connection with
the practice of such callings or professions." plaintiff is a Filipino citizen and a certified public
accountant duly admitted to the practice of accountancy and that the defendants Robert Orr
Page
47

Ferguson and Hans Hausamann are foreigners, the former being a British subject and the latter a
Swiss subject, both admitted to the practice of accountancy in the Philippines; that said two
defendants have been and are practicing their profession as certified public accountants under the
trade name "Fleming and Williamson"; and that Section 16-A of Act No. 3105 as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 342, authorizing accountants to practice their profession under a trade
name, is unconstitutional on the ground that it excludes persons engaged in other callings and
professions from adopting or acquiring or using a trade name.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief is proper.
Ruling: No, Plaintiff brought this action for the purpose of testing the constitutionality of
Commonwealth Act No. 342 because, according to the complaint, it constitutes class legislation for
"by its term it excludes persons engaged in other callings or professions from adopting, acquiring
or using a trade name in connection with such calling or profession." His main objection centers on
the exclusive character of the law which extends its benefits only to those engaged in the
profession of accountancy. It is obvious that he seeks the declaratory relief not for his own personal
benefit, or because his rights or prerogatives as an accountant, or as an individual, are adversely
affected, but rather for the benefit of persons belonging to other professions or callings, who are
not parties to this case. He does not claim having suffered any prejudice or damage to him or to his
rights or prerogatives as an accountant by the use of the disputed name by the defendants. His
complaint is rather addressed against the propriety of the use of said trade name by the
defendants because it is misleading and is liable to defraud the public. Plaintiff, therefore, has no
actual justiciable controversy against the herein defendants which may give him the right to secure
relief by asserting the unconstitutionality of the law in question. This case, therefore, does not
properly come under rule 66 of the Rules of Court which authorizes the institution of an action for
declaratory relief.
Page
48
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS FOR MANILA and

CONRADO SOLEDAD, EDMUNDO POSTRERO, MAXIMINO ABRUGENA, GERONIMO
DERILO, SANTOS GUINTO and EUSTAQUIO MARANAN, as employees and duly authorized
representatives of the House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, as Presiding Judge of Branch VI, Court of First
Instance of Manila, and JOSE and SUSANA COCHINGYAN, respondents.
G.R. No. L-21036 June 30, 1977
BARREDO, J.:
Facts:
There was pending before respondent court as Civil Case No. 52318, entitled Macario M.
Ofilada vs. Reparations Commission, Jose Cochingyan and Susana Cochingyan, a special civil
action for declaratory relief, wherein Ofilada, as the Second Receiver of the World War II Veterans
Enterprises, Inc., likewise pending in another Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
sought a judicial declaration as to whether, under the allocation granted to said Warvets to
purchase reparations goods, the conversion into pesos of the dollar prices of said goods should be
at the rate of two pesos to one dollar or at the prevailing market rate at the time for payment, which
would be much higher. On February 13, 1963, the Cochingyans filed in Civil Case No. 52318 then
already tried although not yet decided by Judge Gaudencio Cloribel who on February 9, 1963
had written the Secretary of Justice asking for permission to go on leave for a week starting
February 12, 1973 but who later changed the starting date to February 13, 1973- an ex-parte
motion asking permission to file a third party complaint which was forthwith granted. On the same
day, another motion was filed asking for immediate admission of the third party complaint, which
likewise, was forthwith granted.
Issue:
Whether or not third-party complaint is proper in an action for declaratory relief.
Page
49

Ruling:
No, It is obvious from this definition that a third-party complaint is inconceivable when the
main case is one for nothing more' than a declaratory relief. In a third-party complaint, the
defendant or third-party plaintiff is supposed to seek contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
other relief from the third-party defendant is respect to the claim of the plaintiff against him.
THE
VISAYAN
PACKING
CORPORATION,
petitioner,
vs.
THE REPARATIONS COMMISSION and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-29673 November 12, 1987
NARVASA, J.:
Page
50

Facts: The proceedings at bar had their origin in an agreement denominated "Contract of
Constitutional Purchase and Sale of nterparation Goods" entered into between petitioner Visayan
baking Corporation (VISPAC) and the Reparations Commission (REPACOM). Subject of the
contract were a cannery plant, a tin manufacturing plant, and three (3) filing boats sold to VISPAC,
for which it bound itself to pay the total price of P1,135,712.47 in ten (10) equal yearly installments
with interest.
Prior to the due date of the first installment, REPACOM sent VISPAC a written reminder thereof.
VISPAC's response was to file in the Court of First Instance of Manila two (2) special civil actions
for declaratory relief, alleging ambiguity in the contract between it and REPACOM consisting in the
agreement's failure to clearly state the precise time when the obligation to pay the first installment
of the price would arise.
On the other hand, when VISPAC subsequently failed, despite several demands, to pay the first
installment of the price (P135,712.47) on what REPACOM deemed to be the due date, the latter
instituted an ordinary civil action for collection thereof. VISPAC moved to dismiss this collection
suit on the ground of the pendency of the declaratory relief actions, arguing that until and unless
the latter were resolved, no cause of action could be deemed to exist in favor of REPACOM for
collection of said first installment.
VISPAC appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming error on the part of the Trial Court in not holding
that the collection suit was barred by the pendency of the declaratory relief cases earlier instituted.
But the declaratory relief actions had been earlier dismissed by Order of the Court of First Instance.
VISPAC also received an unfavorable verdict in its appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision
of the Trial Court in the collection action against it. VISPAC's contention is that it was error on the
Appellate Court's part to have affirmed the Trial Court's decision for the collection of the first
installment of the price due from it under its contract with REPACOM, because that money claim
should have been set up as a compulsory counterclaim in the declaratory relief action, and since
REPACOM had not done this, but had instead set it up in a separate suit, the claim had thereby
become barred.
Issue: Whether or not collection suit was barred by the pendency of the declaratory relief cases
earlier instituted.
Ruling: No, there is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory relief that
proscribes the filing of a counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of
the complaint. A special civil action is after an not essentially different from all ordinary civil action,
Page
51

which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of Court, except that the former deals
with a special subject matter which makes necessary some special regulation. But the Identity
between their fundamental nature is such that the same rules governing ordinary civil suits may
and do apply to special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the
provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions.
Ideally, in the case at bar, the separate action for collection should have been dismissed and set up
as a compulsory counterclaim in the declaratory relief suits, by way of an amended answer. This
was not done. The actions proceeded separately and were decided on the merits. The final verdict
was that the declaratory relief suits instituted by VISPAC were unmeritorious, quite without
foundation and, in the light of all the relevant facts, appear to have been initiated by VISPAC
merely to obstruct and delay the payment of the installments clearly due from it, payment of which
was decreed in the collection suit. Under the circumstances, and taking account of the not
inconsiderable lenght of time that the case at bar has been pending, it would be to do violence to
substantial justice to pronounce the proceedings fatally defective for breach of the rule on
compulsory counterclaims. Rules of procedure are after all laid down in order to attain justice. They
cannot be applied to prevent the achievement of that goal. Form cannot prevail over substance.
Page
52

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DECLARATORY RELIEF AND OTHER REMEDIES 3

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND OTHER REMEDIES 3

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND OTHER REMEDIES 3

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND OTHER REMEDIES 3

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND OTHER REMEDIES 3

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND OTHER REMEDIES 3

PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND OTHER REMEDIES 3

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND OTHER REMEDIES 3

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND OTHER REMEDIES 3

EDADES vs. EDADES

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND OTHER REMEDIES 3

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, et al. vs. VIRON TRANSPORTATION

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ORBECIDO III

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND OTHER REMEDIES 3

QUISUMBING, et al. vs. GARCIA, et al.

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND OTHER REMEDIES 3

CJH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, et al.

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OLLADA, et al. vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

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DECLARATORY RELIEF AND OTHER REMEDIES 3

DY POCO vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, et al.

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IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF ANDRES SINGSON

vs. REPUBLIC OF THE

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DECLARATORY RELIEF AND OTHER REMEDIES 3

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (GSISEA) and

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GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

Issue: Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief is proper.

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G.R. No. L-29535. February 27, 1971

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DECLARATORY RELIEF AND OTHER REMEDIES 3

Issue: whether or not the petition for declaratory relief is proper.

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TEODORO TANDA, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. NARCISO N. ALDAYA, Defendant-Appellee.

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND OTHER REMEDIES 3

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND OTHER REMEDIES 3

FELIPE B. OLLADA, etc., vs.CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

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DECLARATORY RELIEF AND OTHER REMEDIES 3

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND OTHER REMEDIES 3

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND OTHER REMEDIES 3

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Issue: Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief is proper

SANTOS CHAN, SO MING LEE and AMBROSIO CABO CHENG, petitioners-appellants,

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DECLARATORY RELIEF AND OTHER REMEDIES 3

G.R. No. L-19639 February 26, 1965

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

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Issue: Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief be dismissed.

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DECLARATORY RELIEF AND OTHER REMEDIES 3

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

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Issue: Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief is proper.

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