Karnataka High Court

M. Hanumantha Reddy vs Government Of Mysore on 7 April, 1952

Equivalent citations: AIR 1953 Kant 132, AIR 1953 Mys 132
Author: Balakrishnaiya
Bench: Balakrishnaiya
ORDER Balakrishnaiya, J.
1. This petition was filed under Section 497, Cr. P. C. and another petition under Section 498 was
filed on 4-4-52 in Court, supported by an affidavit and a Doctor's certificate. Both these petitions
contain a prayer for enlarging the petitioner on bail. The Advocate-General stated that there was
no objection to treat the earlier petition itself as having been filed under Section 498.
2. For an alleged attempt made on 24-3-1952 to commit murder by strangulation, the petitioner
was arrested and a case against him was registered under Section 307, I. P. C. The applications
for bail filed by him in the Court of the City Magistrate, Bangalore, before whom he was
produced in the course of investigation, have been rejected.
3. The offence under Section 307, I. P. C. is a non-bailable one. The Criminal Procedure Code
under Section 496 provides for granting bail in offences Other than non-bailable, and Section
497 regulates the admission to bail in non-bailable cases. While under Section 496 a person may
be released on bail invariably on an application in that behalf, Section 497 places a limitation on
the powers of a Magistrate in that respect. A distinction is drawn under Section 497 between nonbailable offences which are punishable with death or transportation for life and other nonbailable offences. A Magistrate is vested with discretion to release any person accused of a nonbailable offence on bail except in cases where there appear reasonable grounds for believing that
the person is guilty of an offence punishable with death or transportation for life. It is argued for
the prosecution that the offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner is of a grave
and serious character punishable with transportation for life, that in the light of the evidence so
far collected, the Magistrate has come to the reasonable belief that such an offence has been
committed and refused to admit the petitioner to bail and that in such circumstances the High
Court ought not to interfere with the discretion exercised by the Magistrate unless the order
rejecting the bail is perverse or manifestly wrong. On the other hand, it is contended on behalf of
the petitioner that no offence punishable with transportation for life has been committed and
even so, the High Court has unfettered discretion under Section 498, Cr. P. C. to grant bail if the
circumstances of the case permit, irrespective of the limitations imposed by Section 497 on the
trial Magistrate.
4. The most important point for consideration is whether the High Court has extended powers
under Section 498, Cr. P. C. The latter part of Section 493 runs thus:
"......and the High Court or Court of Session may, in any case whether there be an appeal on
conviction or not, direct that any person be admitted to bail, or that the bail required by a police
officer or Magistrate be reduced."

The powers of the High Court and the court of Session under Section 498 are of a concurrent
jurisdiction with that of a Magistrate. It is seen on a comparison of Sections 497 and 498 that the
High Court is invested with power under Section 498, Cr. P. C. as a Court of superior, appellate
or revisional jurisdiction and has vast powers to direct that any person be admitted to bail in any
case. From the wording of Section 498, Cr. P. C.:
"It is manifest that the discretion given to this Court and also to the Court of Session, is
unrestricted in any way by the terms of the statute. Two things follow from this, firstly that the
discretion is one which must be judicially exercised and secondly that the Court has power if it
does grant bail to grant it on such conditions as the circumstances of the case and the public
interest may require." (Per Boys J. in --'Emperor v. H. L. Hutchinson', AIR 1931 All. 356 at p.
360 (A)).
5. It has been strenuously argued that the direction given by Section 498 is limited by or in
practice limited by, the conditions found in Section 497 and there is some support for the
proposition in reported decisions but the preponderance of authority appears to be in favour of
the view that under Section 498 the High Court has unrestricted powers for directing bail in any
case to any person. The discretion of the High Court is not limited to the consideration set out by
Section 497 but that consideration is to be considered along with all the circumstances of the
case. I am therefore of opinion that Section 498 is not controlled by Section 497 so as to preclude
the consideration by the High Court of the other circumstances in order to entitle any person to
bail. No reported decision of this Court, directly bearing on this point, was brought to my notice
but two unreported decisions were cited by the learned Advocate-General as supporting the
proposition that Section 498 is controlled by Section 497. I am inclined to think that those cases
do not support that view. In -- 'Cr. Petns. Nos. 7 and 13 of 1951-52 (B)', the learned Judge
observed that "the High Court is bound to follow the general law as a rule and not depart from it
except under special circumstances, especially so in the initial stages of a case; see -- 'Boudville,
H. M. v. Ernperor', AIR 1925 Rang 129 (C)."
In other petition -- 'Crl. Petn. No. 121 of 1951-52 (D)' where the argument that the High Court
has extended powers was advanced at the Bar his Lordship Vasudevamurthy J. observed that:
"While it may be that this Court has under Section 498, Cr. F. C. some such larger powers, I am
not prepared to say that in the present case there are any special grounds for so enlarging the
petitioner on bail."
It is seen that these decisions do recognise the extended powers of the High Court in the matter
of granting bail under Section 498, but such powers should be exercised only where there are
special grounds or exceptional circumstances. The general trend of opinion as expressed in the
several decisions of the High Courts in India is also the same. Thus in -- 'AIR 1931 All. 356 (A)'
Mukerji J. observed:
"The High Court's power of granting bail is conferred on it by Section 498 and is entirely
unfettered by any conditions."
Boys J. the other Judge constituting the Bench in the same case observed that:

"the Legislature has given the High Court and the Court of Session discretion (to act under
Section 497) unfettered by any limitation other than that which controls all discretionary powers
vested in a Judge viz., that the discretion must be exercised judicially."
6. A later Full Bench decision of the same Court reported in -- 'Joglekar, K. N. v. Emperor', AIR
1931 All 504 (E) has in fact approved and reiterated the opinion of the Division Bench; Sir
Sulaiman Ag. C. J., Young and King JJ. held that:
"Section 498, Cr. P. C. gives an unfettered discretion to the High Court or the Court of Session to
admit an accused person on bail. It is a mistake to imagine that Section 498 is controlled by the
limitations of Section 497 except when there are not reasonable grounds for believing that the
accused committed the offence, or there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty,
in which cases it becomes a duty to release him. Magistrates can proceed under Section 497 only
and their discretion is regulated by the provisions of that section; but Section 493 confers upon a
Sessions Judge or the High Court wide powers to grant bail which are not handicapped by the
restrictions in the preceding section. The discretion is unfettered, but of course it cannot be
exercised arbitrarily but must be exercised judicially. There is no hard and fast rule and no
inflexible principle governing such discretion. The only principle that is established is that there
should be a judicial exercise of that discretion. It is not any one single circumstance which
necessarily concludes the decision, but it is the cumulative effect of all the combined
circumstances that must weigh with the Court. The considerations are too numerous to be
classified or catalogued exhaustively."
This, if I may say so with great respect, is a correct statement of the present position of the law
on the point. This decision has been followed by a recent case of the High Court of Madhya
Bharat reported in -- 'Vasant v. State', AIR 1951 Madh-B. 104 (P), Rege J. observed that:
"The wide powers conferred by Section 498, Cr. P. C. are not intended to be exercised in an
arbitrary manner, but judicially and so as not to make a violent departure from the provisions of
Section 497 of the Code. This, I may add with respect is the 'ratio decidendi' of decisions of High
Courts In India of which I would refer to --'Joglekar, K. N. v. Emperor', AIR 1931 All 504 (FB)
(E); -- 'Keshav Vasudeo v. Emperor', AIR 1933 Bom 492 (G); -- 'Ashraf Ali v. Emperor', AIR
1915 Cal 784 (H); -- 'Boudville, H. M. v. Emperor', AIR 1925 Rang 129 (C). Section 498 as I
look at it provides for cases in which considerations other than the gravity of the case make it
expedient that this accused should have freedom during the trial."
7. A substantially similar view was taken by Thomas C. J, in -- 'Emperor v. Abhairaj Kunwar',
AIR, 1940 Oudh 8 (I) in connection with an application for bail in a case where the offence was
under Section 307, I. P. C., as in the present case. The learned Judge held that "under Section 498
the High Court has power to release a person on bail in any case, that is to say the power in
granting bail in non-bailable offence is unrestricted, but that power has to be used judicially and
not in an arbitrary manner."
The High Court of Lahore in -- 'Emperor v. Krishnagopal', AIR 1933 Lah 925 (J) has followed
the Full Bench decision of Allahabad cited above and expressed that "under Section 498, Cr. P.
C. the High Court and the Court of Session have an unfettered discretion in the matter of

granting bail, but the discretion must be exercised judicially and not arbitrarily and that in the
exercise of the powers under that section the limitations imposed by Section 497 on the power of
other authorities to grant bail should ordinarily be taken into consideration."
A similar interpretation has been put in a recent case of Patna High Court reported in -- 'Sagri
Bhagat v. State of Bihar', (K). At page 500 the learned Judge observed thus:
"Lastly I must point out that Section 498, Cr. P. C, under which a High Court passes an order for
bail has given an unfettered discretion to the High Court or the Court of Session to admit an
accused person to bail and as was pointed out by a F. B. of the High Court in -- 'AIR 1931 All
504 (FB) (E)'."
8. I shall now proceed to examine some of the decisions which have been cited in favour of the
view that the powers under Section 498, Cr. P. C. are limited and controlled by the conditions
laid down by Section 497. In -- 'AIR 1915 Cal 784 (H)' it was held that:
"We think that the rule laid down in Section 497 for the guidance of Courts other than the High
Court is a rule founded upon justice and equity and one which should be followed by us as well
as by every other Court unless anything appears to the contrary. The extended powers given to
the High Court under Section 498 are certainly not, to be used to get rid of this very reasonable
and proper provision of the law."
9. This case is followed by -- 'Gul v. Emperor', AIR 1928 Sind 142 (L), in which the learned
Judges lay down that "both on principle and authority Section 498 must be interpreted as being
controlled by the provisions of Section 497; -- 'Emperor T. Sowrindra Mohan', 37 Cal 412 (M)
and -- 'AIR 1915 Cal 784 (H)' followed."
10. It is seen that the extended powers vested in the High Court under Section 498 is recognised
by the Calcutta case which is followed by the High Court of Sind. These cases do not very much
further the view advanced by the prosecution. Duckworth J. in -- 'AIR 1925 Rang 129 (C)' held
thus:
"but a High Court is not limited within the bounds of Section 497 and it has absolute discretion
in the matter. As however, the Legislature has placed the initial stage of dealing with crimes with
Magistrates and having, in effect, enacted that persons accused of non-bailable offences shall be
detained in custody except when there are, in the opinion of the Magistrate dealing with the case,
no reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed the offence charged against
him, a High Court is bound to follow the general law as a rule and not to depart from it except
under very special circumstances especially so in the initial stages of a case."
It may be mentioned in passing that this case has been noticed in one of the unreported cases of
this Court referred to above. The question sub-sequenty came up for decision before the Full
Bench of the same Court -- 'Emperor v. Nga San, Htwa', AIR 1927 Rang 205 (FB) (N), which
reads thus:

"With regard to the decision in -- 'AIR 1925 Rang 129 (C)' while I agree that the learned Judge
exercised his discretion properly in that case, certain of his dicta are not happily worded. I do not
think that the amended Section 497 limits the powers of Magistrates in granting bail in case of
non-bailable offences except in cases punishable with transportation for life or with death."
The learned Judge goes on to say:
"But a High Court is not limited within the bounds of that Section 497. It has absolute discretion
in the maker."
This, of course, is quite accurate. That absolute discretion is given by Section 498. In the
subsequent passage the learned Judge states:
"A High court is bound to follow the general law as a rule".
The word 'bound' is not happy and would seem to negative the absolute discretion given by
Section 498. The more accurate method of stating the principle seems to be this. Though the
discretion is absolute the High Court must exercise it judicially, and since the Legislature has
chosen to entrust the initial stage of dealing with questions of bait to Magistrates and while
giving Magistrates an unfettered discretion of granting of bail in all cases except two classes, i.e.,
cases punishable with death and cases punishable with transportation for life, the High Court
ought not to grant bail in such cases except for exceptional and very special reasons."
11. The same question and substantially in the same form came up for decision before the
Bombay High Court reported in -- 'AIR 1933 Bom 492 (G) where Broomfleld and Divatia JJ.
held:
"Having regard to Section 498 it is_ clear that the power of the Sessions Judge like the power of
the High Court, is unlimited and not fettered, as the discretion of the Magistrate is by the
provisions of Sub-section (i), Section 497 except of course in this case that the Sessions Judge
like the High Court will naturally not grant bail in a case which comes under the clause in
Question unless there are some good grounds for doing so."
12. It is thus seen that the earlier view of the single Judge has been modified and the general
view of the majority has been accepted. The principles deducible from a consideration of these
decisions are that under Section 493 the High Court and the Court of Session are vested with
extended jurisdiction and that such extended jurisdiction should only be used in exceptional
circumstances. I therefore hold that the High Court has unfettered discretion under Section 498
and is not precluded from taking special circumstances into consideration for granting bail regard
being had to the rule of general law under Section 497, Cr. P. C.
13. The grant or refusal of bail depends upon the particular circumstances of each case. The mere
fact that an offence is punishable by transportation for life is not by itself sufficient to refuse bail
under Section 498. There is abundant authority for the view that even in cases punishable with
death or transportation for life Courts have granted bail in view of the special circumstances in
those cases. To illustrate from the cases considered herein bail is granted for offences under

Section 121-A in -- 'AIR 1931 All 356 (A) and -- 'AIR 1931 All 504 (E); so also for an alleged
offence under Sections 307 and 302 read with Section 109, I. P. C. in --'AIR 1940 Oudh 8 (I)' and
-- 'AIR 1933 Lah 925 (J) respectively. In 'AIR 1933 Bom 492 (G)' the offence was under Section
409 and bail was granted. All these cases at any rate are punishable with transportation for life.
14. Considering the circumstances of the present case I am of opinion that there exist special
circumstances which make it just and proper to release the accused on bail. On behalf of the
petitioner an affidavit has been filed countersigned by the father of the petitioner who is a
responsible officer in Government service (but who happens to be at present disabled by an
accident and undergoing treatment as an in patient in the hospital) and in that affidavit it is
affirmed that the petitioner is mentally very much depressed showing tendencies to commit
suicide and otherwise subject to delusions, that the petitioner was under the treatment of one Dr.
K. Subba Rao in December 1951 and was later obtaining prescriptions from the Victoria Hospital
and that he still continues to be in a depressed state of health requiring treatment. Dr. Subba Rao
referred to therein has issued a certificate to the effect that he was treating the petitioner for
neurasthenia associated with mental delusions and a suicidal frame of mind. The dontor must be
presumed to be a disinterested person, interested only with the health of his patient; his
certificate is therefore entitled to some weight. As against this, the Investigating officer in an
affidavit filed by him avers that the story of sickness is merely an afterthought and that the
petitioner pleaded unsoundness of mind only in his, second petition for bail and this fact
presumably 'may go to indicate that the sickness is a mere fake and set up to concoct false
defence. I am not inclined to express any opinion on the merits of the case nor about the alleged
sickness. The affidavit on behalf of the petitioner supported by the Doctor's certificate indicates
prima facie that the petitioner is sick and in a bad state of health. The trial Magistrate at the
conclusion of his order has stated that "the police will be instructed to afford all medical facilities
to the accused till he is produced before Court on 31-3-52."
The prosecution frankly admitted that they have neither got the petitioner examined by a Doctor
nor afforded any facility for his treatment, the explanation being that in the opinion of the
Investigating Officer the petitioner is not apparently sick. It is rather difficult to proffer the
diagnosis of the Investigating Officer to the certificate of qualified doctor. To a suggestion by the
Court that the prosecution may arrange at the cost of the petitioner to get him examined by an
expert doctor, and if need be, to admit him into the Mental Hospital the prosecution expressed its
unwillingness to do so. If a person is sick and is suffering from neurasthenia, associated with
mental delusion as the certificate of the Doctor testifies, I think it is but just and reasonable to
afford facilities for treatment by enlarging him on bail. It is stated that the investigation is now
complete and consequently no question of any danger of the evidence of the prosecution being
tampered with arises.
15. In the affidavit filed by the Investigating Officer two objections are raised viz. that it is
apprehended that if the petitioner is released on bail he is likely to get up a false defence in his
favour and that the petition will escape the ends of justice by not attending the Court and making
himself scarce. If it is intended that the petitioner should be locked up so as to hamper in his
defence I am unable to subscribe to that view. The policy of law is to grant bail rather than refuse
it in cases of under-trial prisoners and the Court should be lenient till they are convicted. It is the
glorious principle of criminal justice that a man is considered to be innocent till he is found

guilty & when he is accused of an offence he must have freedom to defend himself. I am
supported in this view by the observations of Mukherji J. in the case reported in -- 'AIR 1931 All
356 (A)'. The learned Judge states thus:
"The principle to be deduced from Sections 496 and 497 is that grant of bail is the rule and
refusal is the exception. An accused person is presumed under law to be innocent till his guilt is
proved. As a presumably innocent person he is entitled to every freedom and every opportunity
to look after his case. An accused person if he enjoys freedom will be in a much better position to
look after his case and to properly defend himself than if he were in custody."
The next objection that the petitioner will escape the ends of justice by not attending to the Court
and making himself scarce is really an important one. The only legitimate purpose to be served
by keeping a person under trial in detention is to secure attendance at the trial. The circumstances
as gathered from the affidavits in this case are that the petitioner is a Law Graduate and an
Advocate; his father is one of the Deputy Commissioners in the State service and that the
petitioner is willing to furnish adequate security to appear whenever called upon. It appears to
me that in the circumstances there are no reasonable grounds for apprehension of the prosecution
that the petitioner is likely to abscond or otherwise make himself scarce.
16. What remains for consideration is regarding the terms of security upon which the petitioner
may be enlarged. Taking all the aspects of the case into consideration I direct that the petitioner
shall furnish two sureties for Rs. 10,000/- (ten thousand) each and in addition execute a personal
bond for a like sum to the satisfaction of the trial Court. The special circumstances existing in
this case as can be gathered from the affidavits and other papers filed do Justify the petitioner to
be released on bail at present and I order accordingly on the terms indicated, above. It must of
course be specifically understood that the principal ground upon which the bail is granted is the
consideration of health and when the deterioration of health vanishes and the petitioner regains
his normal state, nothing prevents the prosecution from applying for the cancellation of the bail if
such a step is deemed necessary in the interests of justice.
17. Order accordingly.

Case Law 489-F, PPC

CASE LAWS ON SECTION 489-F PPC
2005
1. 2007 P cr LJ 1492:
S.497 (5) Petition for cancellation of bail. (Bail cancels).
Bail granting order proceeded on mere technicalities and
was conspicuous for the absence of any mention of
respondents / accusers undertaking. Bail granted by Trial
court offence under section 489-F P.P.C. did not attract the
prohibitory clause of Sec 497(1) Cr P c ,but mere fact that

the Prohibitory clause was not attracted, accused would not

ipso facto become entitled to grant of bail.
2. 2007 P cr LJ 1064:
S.498 Petition for Pre-arrest bail (confirmed)
Offence under section 489-F PPC ,though was non-bailable
,but High Court could not ignore the fact that the offence
did not fall within the ambit of Prohibitory clause of Sec
497 Cr PC , and in the absence of exceptional
circumstances.
3. 2007 P cr LJ 997:
Quashing of F.I.R. (Dismissed).
Most important ingredient of offence under section 489-F
PPC . being issuance of a Cheque dishonestly, and was
bounced by the bank.
Plea of the petitioner is that .during the pendency of Civil
suit, Criminal proceedings could not be initiated.
4. 2007 P cr LJ 388:
497(5) &498 Cr P C . Cancellation of bail .(Petition
Accepted).
Petition to the extent of co-accused was dismissed because
no role was attributed to the co-accused in the F.I.R. and
investigation, Prosecutions whole evidence revolves around
the accused who was main culprit. So the petition is
accepted to the extent of main accused.
5. 2007 YLR 1264 :
S 497 Cr P C. (Admitted Post Arrest Bail)
F.I.R. Lodged with delay of four years against accused and
co-accused .Complainant alleged in F.I.R that despite
payment of amount to accused, no land was got allotted in
his favour .and matter was reported to Punchayat accused
gave to complainant cheques which were later on
dishonored .That complainant himself was involved in case
registered under Sec 489-F PPC .Sec 468,470, and 420
PPC had been added later. Pre-arrest bail of co-accused had
been confirmed by High Court. Rule of consistency was
attracted to the case of accused and admitted post arrest
bail.

6. 2007 YLR 1277:

Sec 497 Cr P C (Bail admitted)
The amount of Cheque in question had not been mentioned
in the F.I.R. at all. Cheque was issued about three months
prior to reporting of matter to the police. Neither Cheque
issued by accused nor its attested copy was available on
record of the case and no Bank officer had been cited as
witness.
7. 2007 YLR 1280:
Sec.497 Cr P C. (Bail granted)
Section 489-F PPC, Maximum punishment for offence
under section 489-F PPC, not more than three years,
Present case was not covered by prohibition contained in
section 497 Cr PC. F.I.R. did not indicate the purpose for
which a huge amount was given to accused by the
complainant and did not show any effort for seeking the
return of said amount.
8. 2007 YLR 1120.
Section 497 Cr P C. (Bail Granted ).
Section 489-F . Maximum Punishment not more than three
years. Not fall in Prohibitory Clause of 497 Cr P C . F.I.R.
did not indicate the purpose for which a huge amount was
given to accused by the complainant and did not show any
effort for seeking the return of said amount.
9. 2007 YLR 1354.
Section 497 Cr P C. (Bail Granted).
Section 489-F. Accused was in Jail since one year. Challan
was submitted but no progress. Offence did not fall within
prohibitory clause of section 497 Cr P C. ( Keeping
accused behind the bars for an indefinite period of time
would not serve or advance prosecutions case, rather same
would amount to punishment before conviction, which was
not permissible under CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE ).
10. 2007 YLR 1020 (1) :
Section 498 Cr.P.C. ( Pre arrest bail was dismissed)
Section 489-F. Accused failed to appear before the court
and had also not furnished surety bonds as directed by the

court. Accused who stood nominated in F.I.R, had misused

concession of Pre-arrest bail.Bail application was
dismissed.
11.PLD 2006 Lah 752 (a) :
Purpose of 489-F was to curb the fraudulent or dishonest
issuance of cheques to cause dishonest gain or to cause
dishonest loss, before approaching the investigation agency
or launching a Criminal Prosecution the payee could give a
notice to the drawer after dishonor of cheque.
10. 2006 MLD 1184(b) :
High Court holding that civil suit and criminal proceedings
were two different remedies provided by law having
different consequences as in commission of an offence.
Exercise of right of filing of suit could not create any
hindrance in way of lodging F.I.R. Under Section 489-F
P.P.C.
11. 2006 P Cr L J.157, 2005 P Cr L J.684 , 2005 YLR
1565 :
Petitioner in his application filed under section 22-A Cr
PC . for registration of case for offence under section 489-F
PPC, against the person who issued a cheque in favour of
the petitioner and was bounced. But the Additional Session
Judge dismissed his application on ground that which had
introduced offence under Section 489-F PPC had died its
natural death, and honorable High Court set aside the order
of Additional Session Judge.
12. 2006 YLR 1826 :
Section 489-F. No retrospective effect of this section, and
accused could not have been tried for the offence under
Sec. 489-F PPC.
13. PLD 2006 Lah 434(a):
Section 489-F. Provision of section489-F, Cr.P.C. is a valid
and living law. (2005 P.Cr.L.J 1462).(Shabbar Raza Rizvi ).
14. 2006 YLR 1852 (b):
Section 489-F would only be relevant where in respect of a

loan or non-fulfillment of an obligation. The cheque was

issued and got dishonored the way mentioned under said
section.
15. 2006 P.Cr.L.J. 187(a):
Quashing of F.I.R.
The cheque was issued before the section 489-F on the
statute book. So no retrospective operation. F.I.R. Quashed.
17.PLD 2005 Lah 607 (b):
Rational behind the enactment of Sec.489-F PPC. Does not
call for a mechanical action immediately when a cheque is
returned by a banker, but it used only in the matter of
payment of loan, business transactions, genuine disputes
and contractual obligations may not constitute for the
offence.
18.2005 SCMR 306:
Quashing of F.I.R.
Cheque was dishonored and complainant laughed an F.I.R.
against the accused. Accused raised plea that the disputed
entire amount was paid but from different account. F.I.R.
was quashed.
19. 2005 P.Cr.L.J 144 :
Quashing of F.I.R.
Cheque was dishonored and complainant laughed an F.I.R
against the accused but during investigation he had been
found prima-facie innocent and F.I.R was quashed.
20.2006 P.Cr.L.J 522(a) :
Sec 497(2)
Sec 489-F. Bail Grant Of
Civil court was to determine as to whether the agreement in
question was enforceable under the law or notCheque
which was dishonored by the Bank on presentation had
been issued by the first party as guarantee in favour of the
second party---Second party was to recover the amount
through the Court of law at the risk and cost of the first
party---Case against accused, therefore, to all intents and
purposes was of further inquiry within the meaning of

S.497(2), Cr.P.C.Offence under section 489-F P.P.C. did

not fall within the prohibitory clause of S.497(1),Cr.P.C.
and bail in such cases was a rule and refusal an exception
Accused being a lady was also entitled to grant of bail
under first proviso to S.497,Cr.P.C,--Consideration for
grant of bail before arrest and for grant of after arrest being
altogether different, dismissal of the application of the
accused for pre-arrest bail by the High Court earlier had no
hearing on the merits of the present application for postarrest bail---Accused was in jail for the last about two
months--- Bail was allowed to accused in circumstances.
2007 P.Cr.L.J 100:
S.489-F-Bail. Grant of--Accused issued a cheque as earnest money to complainant,
which prima facie was not an obligationReal intention of
the parties with regard to the agreement would be
determined by the Trial Court after recording evidence
Offence for which accused was charged ,did not fall under
prohibited clause of Sec.497,Cr.P.C.Accused was behind
the bars and no more required for further investigationTo
keep accused behind the bars for an indefinite period would
not serve any use full purpose--- Accused was admitted to
bail, in circumstances.
4). 2004 YLR 2675:
Sec.489-F P.P.C.
Bail Grant of.
Both accused and complainant were doing business with
each other and issuance of some cheques could be in course
of such businesseven otherwise accused was not
involved in a case falling within prohibitory clause of
Sec.497. Cr.P.C. and grant of bail in such like cases was a
rule and refusal was an exception and no exceptional
circumstances existed in case for refusal of bail to him--Nothing was to be recovered from accused and he could
not be kept in jail for indefinite period---Accused was
admitted to bail, in circumstances.