Poor Internal Governance in Chinese Environmental NGOs:

Chinese Social Activity as Uncivil

by

Yijiang (Karina) Qian

Submitted to the Department of

Political Science in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree of

Bachelor of Arts Honors

At

Stanford University

June 2010

©2010 Yijiang Qian

All rights reserved

The author hereby grants to Stanford University permission to reproduce and to distribute
paper and electronic copies of this thesis document to the public in whole or in part.

Signature of Author……………………………………………………………………
Department of Political Science
May 20, 2010

Certified by…………………………………………………………………………...
Jean C. Oi
Professor of Political Science
Thesis Adviser

Certified by…………………………………………………………………………...
Larry Diamond
Professor of Political Science
Thesis Adviser
 ii

Accepted by…………………………………………………………………………...
Beatriz Magaloni
Associate Professor of Political Science
Director of Honors Program
ABSTRACT

To understand the nature and implications of China’s recent surge in social

activity, my research examines how new civil society organizations (CSOs) were founded

and are internally governed, their potential for social change, and how history, society,

donors, and the government influenced their development. Based on case studies of five

environmental CSOs, my research finds an empirical pattern of poor internal governance.

CSOs are often uninstitionalized, undemocratic, and unsustainably dependent on their

founders for legitimacy, connections, and resources. Indeed, a charismatic leader with

status and skills is almost necessary to lead a successful CSO in the hierarchical logic of

the Chinese socio-political environment. Charismatic Chinese leaders often use

personalized authority systems that preclude the development of stable, effective

institutions. These findings suggest that what may be developing in China is not a

permanent ‘civil society,’ but a charismatic mobilization that may not outlast its first

generation of founding pioneers.

 iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to all the individuals without whom this thesis would not have been
possible.
To my advisers, Professors Larry Diamond and Jean Oi, who read previous,
laborious drafts and provided their incisive advice. This thesis would have been a
verbose, confusing monstrosity if not for them.
To my interviewees, some of whom graciously shared their lives with me for
short, but wonderful intervals of time that I will always remember fondly. I sincerely
hope that I have not misrepresented the substance or spirit of our conversations, and that
this thesis faithfully reflects reality.
Any and all errors, misunderstandings, and omissions are my responsibility only.
And to Undergraduate Research Programs, which generously provided me with
the funds to conduct the fieldwork for this thesis. It would have been impossible without
their faith in me to carry out the initial proposals I submitted.
I am immensely grateful to you all for your assistance.
And to my family – Mom, Dad, and Vanessa – who have unceasingly supported
me throughout my best, worst, and craziest moments. They have been right too many
times and I could never do anything that they did not support.
 iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract …..……….............…………..……..……….............…………..…..……...ii
Acknowledgements.....…………..……..……….............….....………..…...……….iii
Table of Contents…..……….............…………..……..……….............…….……iv-v
Abbreviations…..……….............…………..……..………...................……....……vi
Chapter I: Understanding Civil Society in China ……..………................……
1

Theoretical Underpinnings…………..……….............…….…….....................4
Research and Methodology……………………………………………….…...6
Précis of Study……………………………………………………………...…9

Chapter II: Common Assumptions about Chinese NGOs ……............................10

Assumption One – “Autonomy is All that Matters” ..…………………...…..10

Assumption Two – “Civil Society is Always Civil”…………………….......15
Assumption Three – “Advocacy is an NGO’s Greatest Duty”……..…….….20
NGOs Positively Changing the State…………….................................20
NGOs Being Used by the State ………..…….......….............................21
Alternative Methods for Changing the State………….
………..............23

Chapter III: Poor Internal Governance in Chinese NGOs…................................26

Founding Histories…………………………..……………………………….26
Tongji University Student Green Group……………………….…..
….26
Friends of Nature (FON)………………………………………………..28
Global Village Beijing (GVB) ………………..……………..…………30
Alxa SEE (Society Entrepreneur Ecology) …………...…...…………32
 v

Echoing Steppe (ES) ………………………………………………….…36

Poor Internal Governance as an Empirical Pattern…………………………..38
Internal Governance, Not Autonomy, Predicts NGO Efficacy……………....40

Chapter IV: Chinese NGOs as Charismatic Communities....................................44

Charismatic Mobilization …………………………………….………….45

Examples of Charismatic Communities………………..………………...47
Tongji University Student Green Group …...................................47
Friends of Nature (FON) ……………………….......…….
………….49
Global Village Beijing (GVB) ….…………..….…………..
………...54
Alxa SEE (Society Entrepreneur Ecology) ………………………...56
Echoing Steppe (ES).……….……………………………..…………..62
Comparison of SEE, Echoing Steppe, and Tongji University Group……63
Charismatic Mobilization as a Descriptive Model……..……..….............65

Chapter V: Chinese NGOs as Not Democratic or Institutionalized......................69

The Internal Operation of Democratic, Institutionalized NGOs.…...........70
Autonomous but not Institutionalized or Democratic…..………………..72
Best Strategies for NGOs in Autocracies……...........................................75
Better Democratic, Institutionalized Socializers…………………….…...77

Chapter VI: Contextualizing Poor Internal Governance………………………..82

Societal-Historical Reasons ………………..………………..……….….83

External Actor-Centric Reasons ………………..………………….........86
The donor-centric explanation………………..………………..........86
The client-centric explanation………………..
……………………....88
State-Oriented Reasons ………………..……………………….………..89

Chapter VII: Conclusion: Implications and Avenues for Further Research…...93

Re-Addressing the Assumptions in the Literature…………………….....94

Assumption One: “Autonomy is Everything”
………………..........94
Assumption Two: “Civil Society is Always Civil” …….……….....94
Assumption Three: “Advocacy is an NGO’s Greatest
Duty”…….96
Theoretical Implications for the China Literature…………………….....99
Solutions to the Problem of Poor Internal Governance………..……….101
Avenues for Further Research………………………………...………..103
 vi

Appendix A – Interview List…………………………………………...................104

ABBREVIATIONS

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

CSO Civil Society Organization

ENGO Environmental NGO

CENGO Chinese Environmental NGO

GONGO Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organization

FON Friends of Nature

GVB Global Village Beijing

SEE Alxa SEE

 vii

ES Echoing Steppe

PACT PACT, an International Capacity Training Organization

 1

CHAPTER I

UNDERSTANDING CIVIL SOCIETY IN CHINA

“A vibrant civil society and the rule of law help a country develop politically, economically,
socially, and culturally. The President should request, and the Congress should provide,
significant additional funds to support U.S. government and U.S. NGO programs working to
build the institutions of civil society and rule of law in China.”1

“China: Civil Society Key to Defeating AIDS2”

The 2005 Congressional-Executive Commission on China states, “China has 3 million

social organizations, but only 280,000 are registered.”3 The opaque, biased nature of non-

governmental organization (NGO) registration with the Ministry of Civil Affairs keeps some

grassroots groups from registering. Official government numbers do not fully capture the extent

of the recent increase in organized social activity in China. Given the historical importance of

grassroots social activity and the swift punishment of it in the past,4 scholars have scrambled to

study the nature and implications of this surge for state-society relations.5
1
“Annual Report for 2003,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, October 22, 2003,
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/annualRpt/annRpt2003.php, accessed January 24, 2010.
2
China: Civil Society Key to Defeating AIDS,” Human Rights Watch, September 27, 2007,
http://china.hrw.org/press/news_release/china_civil_society_key_to_defeating_aids, accessed January 24, 2010.
3
Zhao Ling and Dong Shuhua, “New Regulations on Social Organizations to be Issued This Year: Civil Society
Organizations to Receive Appropriate Encouragement” [Xin shetuan tiaoli nian nei chutai: minjian zuzhi jiang huo
shidu guli], Southern Weekend (Online), 18 May 2005. As quoted in the “Report of the 2005 Congressional-
Executive Commission on China,” First Session of the One Hundred Ninth Congress, October 11, 2005,
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/annualRpt/annualRpt05/index.php, accessed January 21, 2010, p. 81-82.
4
For example, the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations.
5
"Chinese Associations, Civil Society, and State Corporatism: Disputed Terrain," in Jonathan Unger (ed.),
Associations and the Chinese State: Contested Spaces (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2008),
http://docs.google.com/viewer?
a=v&q=cache:C1gp13Uao48J:rspas.anu.edu.au/ccc/pubs/UngerBooks/IntroUnger.pdf+state+corporatism+chinese+
ngos&hl=en&gl=us&sig=AHIEtbStShERwyJvwyaULWU6rmnvMVIlmA, accessed January 21, 2010; Thomas
Heberer, “China: Creating Civil Society Structures Top Down?”, University of Duisburg-Essen,
http://www.wreac.org/events/all-events/details/34-china-creating-civil-society-structures-top-down, accessed
January 21, 2010; Taru Salmenkari, “Searching for a Chinese Civil Society Model,” University of Helsinki,
http://cin.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/22/3/397, accessed January 21, 2010; Julia Greenwood Bentley,
“Survival Strategies for Civil Society Organizations in China,” The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law,
Vol. 6, Issue 2, January 2004, http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol6iss2/art_1.htm, accessed January 24, 2010;
Anthony Saich, “Negotiating the State: The Development of Social Organizations in China,” The China Quarterly,
 2

Much analysis of China’s emerging social organizations has been conducted within a

‘civil society and democratization’ framework. This argument holds that a robust, self-regulating

civil society can facilitate democratization by serving as an important alternative to the existing

authoritarian regime. Civil society can expose government failures, advocate differing

ideologies, and generate the pressure necessary to force elites to accept democratization.6

Scholars have invoked China’s incipient civil society as critical to solving a whole host of its

biggest social problems, from pollution7 to the spread of AIDS.8

But recent developments question whether the literature is jumping to conclusions.

Proponents have made several assumptions about the operation of these new social groups, but it

is unclear these assumptions are warranted. My research cautions against placing so much store

in these organizations’ restorative abilities without closer analysis of their internal governance.

Friends of Nature, China’s first domestic environmental NGO, is an exemplary case of

how poor internal governance inhibited a NGO’s capacity for effecting change. FON has been a

trailblazer in environmental activism. It trained an entire generation of NGO leaders, with former

No. 161 (Mar. 2000), pp. 124-141; Zhang Ye, “China’s Emerging Civil Society,” August 2003, Brookings
Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2003/08china_ye.asp, accessed January 24, 2010; Jennifer Turner,
"Small Government, Big (Green?) Society: Emerging Partnerships to Solve China's Environmental Problems,"
Harvard Asian Quarterly, 2004; Ma Qiusha, “The Governance of NGOs in China Since 1978: How Much
Autonomy?” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 3, September 2002, pp. 305-328.
6
Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Bruce Gilley,
China’s Democratic Future: how it will happen and where it will lead, (Columbia University Press, New York:
2004).
7
“Chinese Civil Society on Climate Change: Consensus and Strategies,” Hintergrundinformationen, November 17,
2009, http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:Gckibqb0o9AJ:www.eu-
china.net/web/cms/upload/pdf/materialien/eu-
china_2009_hintergrund_14.pdf+china+civil+society&hl=en&gl=us&sig=AHIEtbRFNltZSQHE3xLmbxiE80DLF7
7BQQ, accessed January 21, 2010.
8
“Civil society can do more to fight AIDS,” Xinhua, July 31, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-
07/31/content_11802136.htm, accessed January 21, 2010; Sara Davis, “Unleash Civil Society in China To Save
Lives,” Human Rights Watch, July 4, 2005, http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/07/05/china11277.htm, accessed
January 21, 2010; “UN AIDS chief in China to push for stronger civil society,” AFP Shanghai, November 25, 2009,
http://www.terradaily.com/reports/UN_AIDS_chief_in_China_to_push_for_stronger_civil_society_999.html,
accessed January 24, 2010.
 3

staff going all over China to found ENGOs.9 But in 2008, FON had been inactive for almost a

year and a half due to deep, closed-door discussions for building basic institutional capacity.10

This was an NGO that had difficulty surviving its founder.

FON’s work ground to a halt after its founding leader, Liang Congjie, was no longer able

to lead. FON was left without a mission or management structure. Staff had little understanding

of FON’s mission. Their work in the past had been based on FON’s vision as interpreted by

Liang, and on the power of his personal network. The staff trusted in Liang’s vision and his

ability to carry that out sufficiently to not concern themselves further. There was little discussion

within FON about its future, management or staff members’ satisfaction that would have served

as a basis for continued operation without Liang. The organizational structure of FON was

simply not amenable to this discourse. This dearth of debate can be attributed to Liang’s status as

a charismatic, decorated leader of China’s environmental movement. Staff members trusted him

to know best and to make the big, groundbreaking decisions that they personally may not have

been able to carry out and for which they did not want to be held accountable. FON’s

dependence on Liang weakened its internal governance structure. It lacked direction and

cohesion once Liang was unable to lead. FON eventually brought in an external capacity-

building NGO named PACT to hold difficult, personal closed-door meetings with staff.

Together, they re-conceived of FON’s mission, management structure, programs, and role in the

environmental movement.11 FON survived a difficult transition process by constructing anew the

basic infrastructure of a NGO through consensus-building. But some NGOs might not.

9
Jiang Ru and Leonard Ortolano, “Development of Citizen-Organized Environmental NGOs in China,” Voluntas,
Vol. 20, No. 2 (June 2009).
10
Interview 27, with FON staffer, Beijing, China.
11
Interview 37, with PACT staffer, Beijing, China.
 4

The story of FON’s transition raises questions about China’s new social organizations. It

compels a closer look at the assumptions in the rosy literature on Chinese NGOs. NGOs formerly

thought to be cohesive, well-governed lasting institutions may actually be so dependent on their

leaders as to be transient, ineffectual and unstable. How effective can NGOs be at effecting

change if they are limited-term entities attempting to address complicated, long-term problems

like pollution or desertification? Why do NGOs grow dependent on their founders? Does this

dependence – and the resulting poor internal governance – affect NGO efficacy?

This thesis will reconcile a lack of communication between the empirical literature on

civil society in China and the theoretical literature on civil society. But the case of FON also

raises the possibility that what may be developing in China is not civil society at all. Another

literature – on charismatic mobilization – may be useful in understanding the reality of Chinese

environmental NGOs (CENGOs).

This thesis will examine the key assumptions of the literature on Chinese NGOs by

taking a closer look at the internal characteristics of China’s new social organizations. It will use

case studies of CENGOs to test these assumptions: whether autonomy is sufficient to make an

NGO, whether NGOs always facilitate democracy, and if an NGO’s highest duty is advocacy.

Theoretical Underpinnings

Two possible explanations for NGO dependence on founders are the political

environment for NGOs in China and the influence of Western grant-makers. Walzer posits,

“Only a democratic state can create a democratic civil society;…the roughly equal and widely

dispersed capabilities that sustain [associational] networks have to be fostered by the democratic
 5

state.”12 Can democratic, Chinese NGOs exist under the current regime? In what ways can an

autocratic government limit the democratic nature or institutionalization of NGOs?

Scholars of the Middle East have argued that the state and poor internal governance limit

the efficacy of civil society organizations (CSOs).13 One study found that a “restrictive legal

framework can inhibit a CSO’s ability to clearly define its vision.”14 It also recommended that

Arab CSOs adopt “democratic, transparent, and accountable structures” and refine “their vision,

mission, and strategies in a participatory way (i.e., with the involvement of members).”15

Another study in Palestine found that most CSO staff are not active in decision-making due to

“their passivity or lack of competence.”16 It argued that the internal governance of CSOs was ““a

mirror reflection of the Palestinian political system based on individual decision making,

patronage, and clientelism” and a lack of rules organizing internal relations.”17 In Bangladesh,

Lewis noted that “personalized, charisma driven power relations [exist] within most NGOs.”18
12
Michael Walzer, “The Civil Society Argument,” in Gershon Shafir, eds., The citizenship debates: a reader,
(University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1998), p. 305.
13
A minimal definition holds civil society as a distinct area of governance between the private and the public
spheres. It consists of voluntary associations representing various interests and values, whose members who are free
to enter and exit. Civil society organizations include interest groups, chambers of commerce, and bowling
associations. The NGO sector is one subset of civil society, and consists of organizations devoted to public concerns
like human rights, judicial reform, and the environment. See Thomas Carothers and William Barndt, “Civil
Society,” Foreign Policy, No. 117 (Winter, 1999-2000), pp. 19-20.
14
Ziad Abdel Samad, “Civil Society in the Arab Region: Its Necessary Role and the Obstacles to Fulfillment,” The
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, Vol. 9, Issue 2, April 2007,
http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol9iss2/special_1.htm, accessed January 4, 2010; Pauline Jones Luong and
Erika Weinthal, “The NGO Paradox: Democratic Goals and Non-Democratic Outcomes in Kazakhstan,” Europe-
Asia Studies, Vol. 51, No. 7 (Nov., 1999), pp. 1267-1284.
15
Ibid.
16
As quoted in, Samad, “Civil Society in the Arab Region,” from Yasser Shalabi, Al-Ta’thirat al-Dawleya ‘ala
Tahdid Ro’aa al-Monathmat Ghayr al-Hokomeyya al-Felastineyya wa-Adwareha [International and Local impacts
on the Visions and Roles of Palestinian NGOs], MA thesis (Bir Zeit, Palestine: Bir Zeit University, 2001), p. 152.
17
As quoted in (originally in Arabic) Islah Jad, “The Demobilization of the Palestinian Women’s Movement in
Palestine: From Empowered Active Militants to Powerless and Stateless “Citizens,”” The MIT Electronic Journal of
Middle East Studies: Crossing Boundaries, New Perspectives on the Middle East (Spring 2008),
http://www.palestinejournal.net/gmh/MIT_journal_spring-2008.pdf, pp. 100, from Shalabi, Al-Ta’thirat al-Dawleya
‘ala Tahdid Ro’aa al-Monathmat Ghayr al-Hokomeyya al-Felastineyya wa-Adwareha, p. 154.
18
David Lewis, “On the difficulty of studying ‘civil society’: Reflections on NGOs, state, and democracy in
Bangladesh,” Contributions to Indian sociology, Vol. 38, No. 3 (2004), pp. 316.
 6

He also posits the existence of patron-client relationships in the NGO sector, which might have

been transferred “from wider contexts of social relations into these NGO structures.”19

Civil society scholars have also argued that non-profit donors force CSOs to overly focus

on professionalization and advocacy and foster donor dependency.20 In some countries, Western

foundations have created a new, civic elite that is highly educated, upper to middle class, and

English speaking. As many Chinese NGOs rely on foreign funding,21 do Western donors’ focus

on professionalization and advocacy affirm NGO dependence on charismatic, ‘elite’ leaders?

Research and Methodology

This thesis will use two sets of case studies. The first set includes two of the largest

Chinese environmental NGOs (CENGOs). As two of the most successful, developed and well-

funded CENGOs, these NGOs are arguably the most institutionalized, influential and effective in

their political and social objectives. The second set of case studies is a cross-section of three

different types of CSOs working on desertification in Inner Mongolia. Although two of the three

organizations from this set do not qualify as NGOs, analysis of their founding histories still sheds

19
Ibid.
20
Tim Bartley, “How Foundations Shape Social Movements: The Construction of An Organizational Field and the
Rise of Forest Certification,” Social Problems, Vol. 54, pp. 229-254 and Paul DiMaggio, “Constructing an
Organizational Field as a Professional Project: U.S. Art Museums, 1920-1940,” in Walter Powell and Paul
DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, (University of Chicago Press: Chicago,
1991), pp. 267-292.
21
With regard to the organizations analyzed in the case studies – both FON and GVB rely heavily on foreign
funding, from foreign foundations, international NGOs, and foreign corporations like Nokia. At least FON has
recently also received donations from newly-created domestic foundations like the Nandu Foundation. These two
organizations have been played up in the international media much more than the others, even despite the number of
international partnerships formed by SEE. SEE receives its funding from its corporate membership. The Tongji
University trip was partly subsidized by the university and local business sponsors who made some in-kind
contributions. But the students paid for most of the trip. During the school year, the Tongji group generally operates
based on university subsidies and student contributions. Finally, Echoing Steppe previously received some money
from Friends of Nature for a joint program in Mandu. Other than this, ES generally does not receive external
contributions and only infrequent financial or in-kind contributions from members. Most of its operating fees come
from Chen himself.
 7

critical light on the development of CENGOs – specifically, on factors that prevent loose

networks from institutionalizing and expanding into NGOs. CSOs in this second set all focus on

desertification, but there is a wide spectrum of variability in their backgrounds, development

trajectories, staff and target client demographics, and programming. Analysis of these two sets of

case studies will inform our understanding of the developmental history, nature, function, and

possible effect of social groups on China’s political development.

I analyze CENGOs because they have had the “important role of exploring the

boundaries of advocacy in China.”22 The surge of social activity began with the founding of

Friends of Nature, the first grassroots CENGO, in 1994. Many scholars have evaluated the

contentious potential of Chinese CSOs through case studies of ENGOs.23 Environmentalism is

22
Nick Young, “Searching for Civil Society,” 250 NGOs in China (Hong Kong: China Development Brief, 2001),
pp. 9-19; Caroline Cooper, “Quietly Sowing the Seeds of Activism,” Far Eastern Economic Review, April 10, 2003,
pp. 28-31; Chinese NGO’s: Carving a Niche Within Constraints, A January 2003 report from the U.S. Embassy in
Beijing, http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/sandt/ngos.htm, accessed January 24, 2010; Ho, “Greening Without
Conflict?”, pp. 893-921; Anna Brettell, “Environmental non-governmental organizations in the People’s Republic of
China: Innocents in a co-opted environmental movement?” The Journal of Pacific Asia, Vol. 6, 2000, pp. 27-56.
23 Peter Ho and Richard L. Edmonds, China's embedded activism: opportunities and constraints of a social
movement, Routledge: London, 2008; Caroline M. Cooper, “‘This is Our Way In’: The Civil Society of
Environmental NGOs in South-West China,” Government and Opposition, Vol. 41, Issue 1, pp. 109-136;
Guobin Yang, “Environmental NGOs and Institutional Dynamics in China,” The China Quarterly, Vol. 181,
2005, pp. 46-66; Peter Ho, “Greening Without Conflict? Environmentalism, NGOs, and Civil Society in
China,” Development and Change, Vol. 32 (2001), pp. 893-921; Elizabeth C. Economy, “China’s
Environmental Movement,” Testimony before the Congressional Executive Commission on China Roundtable
on Environmental NGOs in China: Encouraging Action and Addressing Public Grievances, Council on Foreign
Relations, February 7, 2005, http://www.cfr.org/publication/7770, accessed January 5, 2010; Kin-man Chan
and Yan Zhou, “Political Opportunity and Anti-dam Movement in China,” The Chinese University of Hong
Kong,
http://docs.google.com/viewer?
a=v&q=cache:9Btxa9jC5yYJ:www.istr.org/conferences/barcelona/cd/pdf/abstracts/Chan.Kin-
man.pdf+china+environmental+NGOs+political+impact&hl=en&gl=us&sig=AHIEtbSDIj7pLrO4JD9SzwtMXbP7
Lkh_JA, accessed January 5, 2010; Timothy Hildebrandt and Jennifer L. Turner, “Green Activism? Reassessing the
Role of Environmental NGOs in China,” in Jonathan Schwartz and Shawn Shieh, eds, State and Society Responses
to Social Welfare Needs: Serving the People (New York: Routledge, 2009); Jennifer L. Turner, “The Growing Role
of Chinese Green NGOs and Environmental Journalists in China,” Testimony for the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, http://www.cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/012703/turnerHandout.php, accessed January 5,
2010; Ho, “Greening Without Conflict?”, pp. 893-921.
 8

also one of the most active grassroots sectors, with over 128 citizen-organized NGOs.24

This thesis will use Ru and Ortolano’s definition of ‘citizen-organized’ – founded by

citizens and with leaders elected without state intervention – to define grassroots NGOs.25 And it

will use Salamon and Anheier’s definition of NGOs – organized, private, self-governing,

nonprofit, socially oriented, and voluntary.26

Interview data was gathered during two trips to China: one twelve-week trip from June

-September 2008 and one eight-week trip from July-September 2009. I conducted over eighty

interviews with government officials, NGO staffers, NGO researchers, environmental volunteers,

Chinese, international, and Mongolian environmental experts, Mongolian and Han herders and

dairy farmers, student green groups, international NGO staff, lawyers, intellectuals, bloggers,

and Chinese and Mongolian student environmental researchers. I directly observed several

NGOs’ activities in Inner Mongolia. I collected qualitative data because this thesis focuses on the

operation of NGOs, which is difficult to quantify quantitatively. I supplement interview data

with primary and secondary sources, including news, reports, and scholarly articles.

As a case study of a modest number of social organizations in a specific issue area, this

thesis faces clear limitations. While it is difficult to generalize the experiences of these groups,

this thesis will highlight institutional and functional patterns meriting deeper consideration in

analysis of environmentalism and civil society in China. These case studies may also provide

generalizable conclusions about the nature and implications of these recently minted social

groups and their relation to the state. But these conclusions must be qualified given the unique

24
Ru and Ortolano, “Development of Citizen-Organized Environmental NGOs in China,” pp. 141.
25
Ibid, pp. 149.
26
Lester M. Salamon and Helmut K. Anheier, Defining the nonprofit sector: a cross-national analysis (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1997), pp. 33-34.
 9

situation of CENGOs. Official support for environmentalism and ENGOs’ longer, established

history afforded them some protection from state interference. Characteristics observable

between the different CSOs will also provide generalizable conclusions. The situational logic

chapter will posit societal, political, and donor-related explanations for the development patterns

of CENGOs in the case studies.

Précis of Study

The first following chapter, chapter two, will review existing literature on civil society in

China and examine common scholarly assumptions about Chinese NGOs. Chapter two will then

test if these assumptions hold when compared to the internal operation of several CENGOs. To

do so, chapter three will delve into the case studies to identify an empirical pattern of poor

internal governance that suggests analysis of NGOs’ internal workings is key to evaluating their

potential political impact. Chapter four will argue that CSO development in China is often

characterized by charismatic mobilization. The resulting importance of charismatic authority in a

NGO means that the founding leader’s personal preferences, skills, social position, and charisma

are better factors for predicting an NGO’s efficacy than its level of autonomy. Chapter five will

analyze the internal operation of these charismatic communities. It will argue that though these

CENGOs may be autonomous, they are not institutionalized or democratic. This thesis will

contend that, in China’s unique socio-political environment, NGOs might be more effective if

they were also democratic, institutionalized socializers rather than only the charismatic, informal

groups that they are today. Chapter six will posit possible explanations for the pattern of poor

internal governance by drawing upon historical, social, and political analysis. Chapter seven will

conclude by evaluating the implications of its findings for state-society relations.

 10

CHAPTER II

COMMON ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT CHINESE NGOS

The literature on CSOs in China primarily investigates if these new social groups are a

positive or negative political force, and what methods they will employ to influence state-society

relations. As will be detailed below, scholars analyzing the current state of Chinese CSOs usually

form one of two contrasting conclusions. Negative – arguing that these social groups have little

transformative political potential and will only aid in maintaining the existing regime. Or

positive – positing the transformative political potential of these social groups as a nascent civil

society that could tip the balance of power toward society and democracy. A fault of the

literature is that it fails to capture the nuances involved in the operation of these CSOs near the

edge of the law. Both stances are guilty of assuming that autonomy is of primary concern in

considering if an NGO is a ‘true’ NGO that can advance political development.

Assumption One – “Autonomy is All that Matters”

Some scholars argue that social organizations are only politically relevant if they coalesce

into a permanent civil society. Civil society should have a continuing capacity for effecting
 11

change, whether through advocacy, fostering citizenship, or creating social capital. As

established organizations, CSOs are less capable of effecting direct, grassroots change unless

immensely powerful vis-à-vis the state. Their work is often more indirect and professionalized.

The primary debate in this camp is over autonomy. Key to Western theories is the

stipulation that civil society must be autonomous, independent of the government and

corporations. Many scholars argue that the Western conception of civil society does not exist in

China because the government regulates most CSOs.27 “Autonomy is all that matters” is the most

extreme view. The scholars below comprise of a wide spectrum of views.

Many of these scholars hold that social organizations are politically influential only when

permitted by the state.28 This corporatism thesis hearkens from fifteen years ago, though some

scholars have recently updated it. Such studies assume an omniscient degree of state control that

never existed under Mao, and is unlikely to exist today. This perspective holds that these groups

have little autonomy and are but manifestations of state corporatism. It draws on early literature

characterizing China as a monolithic state. Proponents have proffered state corporatist models

that depict state domination of social organizations through co-optation, licensing, registration,

27
Directly, Chinese CSOs cannot legally exist without registration with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, a complicated
bureaucratic process that is not neutral, entailing government approval and surveillance of the substance of NGO
programming and behavior. Indirectly, the government can and has been willing to prosecute members of Chinese
CSOs – registered or not – that step across ambiguous and fluctuating standards of acceptable behavior. In both
these senses, Chinese civil society operates at the whim of the government and does not independently exist.
28
Thomas Heberer, “China: Creating Civil Society Structures Top Down?”, University of Duisburg-Essen,
http://www.wreac.org/events/all-events/details/34-china-creating-civil-society-structures-top-down, accessed
January 21, 2010; Taru Salmenkari, “Searching for a Chinese Civil Society Model,” Institute for Asian and African
Studies, University of Helsinki, http://cin.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/22/3/397, accessed January 21, 2010;
Jiang Ru, “Environmental NGOs in China: The Interplay of State Controls, Agency Interests and NGO Strategies,”
PhD Dissertation, Stanford University, Civil and Environmental Engineering, August 2004; Jonathan Unger and
Anita Chan, "China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model", The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 33
(January 1995), pp. 29-53; Xin Zhang and Richard Baum, “Civil Society and the Anatomy of a Rural NGO,” The
China Journal, No. 52 (Jul. 2004), pp. 97-107; B. Michael Frolic, “State-Led Civil Society,” pp. 46-67 in Timothy
Brook and B. Michael Frolic (eds), Civil Society in China, M.E. Sharpe Inc.: Armonk, New York, 1997; Margaret
Pearson, “The Janus Face of Business Associations in China: Socialist Corporatism in Foreign Enterprises,” The
Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 31 (Jan., 1994), pp. 25-46.
 12

overlapping leadership, managerial or financial constraints, or government sponsorship and

supervision.29 Frolic conceived of “state-led civil society,”30 Pearson, “socialist corporatism,”31

Zhang and Baum, corporatism in form but not in essence,32 and Ru, “state and agency

corporatism.”33 Pure state corporatism holds that ‘Chinese civil society’ pre-empts development

of real, autonomous, and contentious social interest groups, transmits state interests to society,

and enhances state governance capacity at the expense of independent social development.

One problem with this focus on autonomy is that scholars often treat this question as the

end all and be all of civil society in China. Does a lack of autonomy mean the end of the

application of Western civil society theory to China and therefore, to analysis of these new social

groups? To what extent do organizations have to be autonomous for them to count as

‘authentic’?34 It is a mistake to dismiss civil society as a theoretical framework because these

organizations do not exhibit the same levels of autonomy as a Western NGO. That measure of

autonomy may be faulty due to issues of cultural, historical or societal applicability. But there

29 Unger and Chan, "China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model", pp. 29-53; Zhang and Baum, “Civil
Society and the Anatomy of a Rural NGO,” pp. 97-107.
30
Frolic, “State-Led Civil Society,” pp. 46-67.
31
Pearson, “The Janus Face of Business Associations in China,” pp. 25-46.
32 Zhang and Baum, “Civil Society and the Anatomy of a Rural NGO,” pp. 97-107.
33
Ru falls into this category because he finds both state and agency corporatism in modern China. He also argues
that NGOs can do more as registered, legal NGOs and generally do not suffer much state interference once they
overcome the hurdle of registration with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. But these registered NGOs are often self-
censored in their operation so as to avoid state interference. This resembles a classic corporatist argument because
NGOs are only really effective when ‘activated’ or ‘validated’ by the state through successful legal registration.
Because the state would not grant registration to NGOs that posed an obstacle to state capacity or legitimacy, these
NGOs arguably exist because they either aid or cannot be expected to oppose the state. In comparison with the early
state corporatists, however, Ru avoids many of the criticisms below, i.e. about failing to acknowledge NGO
independence. See pages 258-304.
34
Ru does differ from traditional corporatism. He argues that NGOs that fit into a corporatist model can still be
effective and ‘authentic.’ I agree that autonomy is just one of the factors to consider in assessing ‘authenticity.’ And
though Ru does analyze organizational characteristics affecting NGO activities, including influential NGO leaders
and elite allies, he does not address any internal organizational characteristics of NGOs.
 13

are ‘corporatist’ Western organizations that scholars deem authentic. Scandinavian CSOs exhibit

what has been treated as a benign state corporatism due to positive political outcomes

produced.35 Second, sticking a state corporatism model on these CSOs ignores their growing

independence and struggles to gain more policy influence. My research suggests that one must

use a tailored approach to deal with the autonomy question, originating in China and sensitive to

the unique nuances of CSOs’ social and political environment.

These statements on state corporatism are also imprecise. Different NGOs have different

relationships with the state – and within the state, with different agencies. The state-NGO

relationship is dynamic and cannot be captured by a static, sweeping generalization. Recent

scholarship argues that CSOs have become skilled at staking out space to operate. Corporatism

exists, and is most evident in NGO registration and the forced closure of some organizations. But

it is not as extreme as early scholars theorized. And corporatism may be helpful to some extent.

Ru argues that some registered NGOs experience limited state interference after registration and

can thus operate more effectively than unregistered NGOs.36

A counter-argument is that social organizations do have transformative political potential

because they are increasingly operating as free agents and multiplying in number. 37 White,

Howell and Shang proposed the “dual dynamic of civil society.” The political dynamic entails

the emergence of social organizations through political resistance and struggle. The market

dynamic holds that China’s transition from a socialist to market economy shifted the balance of

power between state and society in society’s favor. This shift created the structural conditions

35
Norbert Gotz, “Century of Corporatism or Century of Civil Society? The Northern European Experience,” in
Norbert Gotz and Jorg Hackmann, Civil society in the Baltic Sea region, (Ashgate Publishing: 2003), pp. 37-62.
36
Ru, “Environmental NGOs in China,” pp.258-304.
37
Ma Qiusha, “Non-Governmental Organizations in Contemporary China Paving the Way to Civil Society?,”
(Routledge: London, 2005).
 14

and resources for new, private, and unrecognized social organizations.38 Several scholars argue:

[T]he overall government attitude toward NGOs appears more relaxed than in the past, owing in part to the
Chinese government’s recognition that it can no longer meet the vast social and economic needs of a
modernizing nation… NGOs have an important role in filling some of the service gaps left by the transition
to a market economy and the resulting decentralization of [political] authority [in] reducing socioeconomic
disparities and conflict, and monitoring the [local] government.39&40

This helps explain increased state openness to social organizations. Especially since the state’s

legitimacy is no longer ideological but performance-based, contingent on the state’s ability to

provide economic growth and benefits. Also, Government-Operated NGOs (GONGOs) have

been useful in reaping foreign aid to fund what sometimes effectively constitute sub-branches of

state agencies.41 The 2003 SARS outbreak and 2008 Sichuan earthquake were key episodes in

which Chinese CSOs demonstrated their value by innovatively providing services in ways the

state could not or had not before. Such work has been a boon to the government in improving

governance capacity. Yet it does not prove state corporatism as state and society interests will

inevitably merge in some instances. While NGOs’ responses may aid the state, their work also

exposes state failures. But neither do these convergences disprove state corporatism. They affirm

the idea that the state will listen to NGOs only when it is advantageous and convenient.

Chinese social organizations have also manipulated gaps in the state for their own

survival, further endangering the corporatism thesis.42 Perry, Sidel, and Wasserstrom and Liu

38
Gordon White, Jude Howell, and Xiaoyuan Shang, In Search of Civil Society: Market Reform and Social Change
in Contemporary China, (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1996), pp. 211.
39
Julia Greenwood Bentley, “Survival Strategies for Civil Society Organizations in China,” The International
Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, Vol. 6, Issue 2, January 2004,
http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol6iss2/art_1.htm, accessed January 24, 2010.
40
“Annual Report, 2003,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, One Hundred Eighth Congress, October
2, 2003, pp. 59.
41
Chen Jie, “The NGO Community in China: Expanding Linkages with Transnational Civil Society and Their
Democratic Implications,” China Perspective, November-December 2006,
http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/document3083.html, accessed January 24, 2010;
42
Unless one adopts a paranoid perspective holding that such gaps in state efficacy are intentionally designed and
controllable by the state.
 15

explored how worker associations, liberal legal organizations, and student associations attempted

to break out of state control and carve out proprietary political space, usually by mimicking

official organizational structures and spaces.43 Bentley describes “survival strategies,” including

linkages with international media, CSOs, and transnational organizations, allies in government,

alliances with elite journalists, “affiliation[s] with government or academic institutions,”

consciously avoiding a political or advocacy role, focusing on projects that complement

government policy or address neglected areas, cooperating with the government when possible,

and steering clear of provocative actions or rhetoric.44 Most groups take advantage of lax or

inconsistent state policy implementation,45 including of regulations on NGO registration and

taxation. Groups also take advantage of the ambiguity and fluidity of government tolerance for

CSO activities. Bentley quotes a Chinese social activist:

In China you do things not because there is a legal channel to do them: you occupy the space before the
government claims it, and the legal mechanisms all happen after the fact .... Use the space you have--don’t
wait for policies and laws, because you have to create new ways of doing things.46

Most CSOs were optimistic about their ability to indirectly persuade the state to permit greater

autonomy for social organizations, based on their positive record of cooperation and efficacy.47

Assumption Two – “Civil Society is Always Civil”

Do social organizations actively and positively affect state-society relations or do they

simply provide substitute state services without real input in policymaking? Even if these CSOs

43
Elizabeth J. Perry, “Labor’s Battle for Political Space: The Role of Worker Associations in Contemporary
China,” pp. 302-325; Mark Sidel, “Dissident and Liberal Legal Scholars and Organizations in Beijing and the
Chinese State in the 1980s,” pp. 327-346; Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom and Liu Xinyong, “Student Associations and
Mass Movements,” pp. 362-393 all in in Deborah S. Davis, et. al, Urban Spaces in Contemporary China
(Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1995).
44
Bentley, “Survival Strategies for Civil Society Organizations in China,” accessed January 24, 2010.
45
Ru, “Environmental NGOs in China,” August 2004.
46
Bentley, “Survival Strategies for Civil Society Organizations in China,” accessed January 24, 2010.
47
Ibid.
 16

are increasingly independent, are they also effective at bringing about political change that

otherwise would not happen? Are they representing an authentic grassroots perspective? Most

scholars in this group are too sunny in their predictions about the positive effects of social

organizations. These authors assume that politically active CSOs must be a positive force that

can promote democratic ideals like freedom, transparency, and participation.48 They are guilty of

making both assumptions covered thus far. They believe autonomy is everything because

autonomy will always bring about positive political change. “Civil society is always civil” is the

most extreme view. The scholars below comprise a spectrum of views, between which exist

numerous nuances. Few agree outright with this view. But many do, to varying degrees, imply it.

Democratic associations that produce positive social capital have democratic internal

governance structures.49 Diamond’s model of a ‘democratic, institutionalized’ civil society offers

a framework for analyzing if an association is democratic, sustainable and effective.50

Rosenblum calls this argument that “the internal life of associations mirror liberal democratic

practices and principles” the “congruence thesis,” and rejects it.51 She questions the extent to

48
Ibid; Jie, “The NGO Community in China,” accessed January 24, 2010; Elizabeth Economy, The river runs
black: the environmental challenge to China’s future, (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, New York, 2004); Fengshi
Wu, “Democratization and Civil Society in East Asia: Environmental GONGO Autonomy: Unintended
Consequences of State Strategies in China,” The Good Society, Vol. 12, Issue 1 (2003), pp. 35-45; Michael Buesgen,
“Environmental NGOs’ role in expanding social spaces – diversification with Chinese characteristics: a case study
of ENGOs’ opposition to the Nujiang dam in China’s Yunnan Province,” China Journal of Social Work, Vol. 1,
Issue 2, July 2008, pp. 160-171; Seungho Lee, “Environmental Movements and Social Organizations in Shanghai,”
China Information, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2007, pp. 269-297; Yang, “Environmental NGOs and Institutional Dynamics in
China,” pp. 46-66; Anthony Saich, “Negotiating the State: The Development of Social Organizations in China,” The
China Quarterly, Vol. 161, 2000; Turner, "Small Government, Big (Green?) Society," 2004; Qiusha, “The
Governance of NGOs in China Since 1978: How Much Autonomy?” pp. 305-328; Nick Young, “NGOs: the Diverse
Origins, Changing Nature and Growing Internationalization of the Species,” preface of a Special Report 200
International NGOs in China, China Development Brief, January 2005.
49
Putnam, Making Democracy Work, p. 175; Cohen and Rogers, Associations and Democracy, (1995); Skocpol,
"Advocates without Members," 1999; Harry Eckstein, Regarding politics: essays on political theory, stability, and
change (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA: 1992); Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 227-233.
50
Diamond, Developing Democracy, 1999.
51
Rosenblum, Membership and morals, pp. 36.
 17

which “practices shaped in one association spill over to other contexts” and to which institutions

can be designed to promote specific values.52

Others argue that some hierarchically organized associations – like the Boy Scouts – are

seen as beneficial to democracy, whereas some vertical ones – like the Ku Klux Klan – are not.

Horizontal organization is a necessary but not sufficient predictor of democratic social capital.

But Rosenblum acknowledges the bad moral “effects of incongruence between associational life

and liberal democracy.”53 She concludes, “If we cannot show conclusively where or how

“participation begets participation,” there are a host of good reasons, moral but also practical and

organizational, why an absence of participatory experience can make collective action harder.”54

These scholars draw upon recent literature breaking open the black box of state, like

Lieberthal’s fragmented authoritarianism.55 Saich emphasizes that state-society relations vary

within China, positing state cooptation is often symbiotic and leave both parties changed.56 He

argues that, in “negotiating the state,” CSOs influence the state to their advantage. O’Brien posits

“boundary-spanning contention” that is neither transgressive nor contained. He argues that

NGOs in China “[operate] near the boundary of authorized channels,” “[employ] the rhetoric and

commitments of the powerful to curb” power, and “[exploit] divisions within officialdom.”57

Others argue that CSOs operating near the boundary of what is acceptable “push the envelope”

of what society demands vis-à-vis the state, upping the standards of future policy.58
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid, pp. 39.
54
Ibid.
55
“One Introduction: The “Fragmented Authoritarianism” Model and Its Limitations,” in Kenneth G. Lieberthal and
David M. Lampton, eds., Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, (University of California
Press, Berkeley, CA: 1992), pp. 6-12.
56
Saich, “Negotiating the State,” pp. 138-9.
57
Kevin O’Brien, “Neither Transgressive Nor Contained: Boundary-Spanning Contention in China,” Mobilization,
Vol. 8, No. 1, February 2003, pp. 53.
58
Ye, “China’s Emerging Civil Society,” accessed January 24, 2010; Turner, "Small Government, Big (Green?)
 18

Many scholars bypassed conceptual grappling over autonomy, going ahead with

“concrete historical or empirical analyses of Chinese society.”59 They assessed in practice the

applicability of Western theories through case studies evaluating the autonomy of certain

CSOs.60 But it is not enough for CSOs to be independent. NGOs should be institutionalized to be

optimally effective. They should represent their interests in a structured, predictable way that

allows for greater cooperation between NGOs and improved negotiation with the state.

Much of the positive literature has focused on the increasing autonomy and power of

‘Chinese civil society,’ with “pure” civil society as the “valid goal.”61 Recent studies have

portrayed true civil society in China as “in the throes of birth,”62 “immature,”63 “emerging,”64

“nascent,”65 or “burgeoning.”66 The growing visibility of these CSOs and the apparent existence

of independent Chinese CSOs convinced scholars that civil society theory may be increasingly

applicable. But scholars take for granted that if there is civil society in China, it will be a positive

force for democracy. They neglected the part of the Western civil society theory that specifies

that civil society can be uncivil and a negative political influence in certain conditions.

Society.”
59
Guobin Yang, “Civil Society in China: A Dynamic Field of Study,” China Review International, Vol. 9, No. 1,
Spring 2002, pp. 12.
60
For examples, see various articles on Chinese youth organizations, Catholic churches, and local trade unions in
Brook and Frolic, Civil Society in China, 1997.
61
Ibid.
62
Yang, “Civil Society in China,” pp. 12.
63
Shi Yin-hong, “The Issue of Civil Society in China and Its Complexity,” in Yoichiro Sato, ed., Growth and
Governance in Asia, Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004, p. 228.
64
Ye, “China’s Emerging Civil Society,” June 2003.
65
Heath B. Chamberlain, “On the Search for Civil Society in China”, Modern China, Vol. 19, No. 2, Symposium:
“Public Sphere/Civil Society in China?” Paradigmatic Issues in Chinese Studies, III (Apr.,1993), 199-215; “A
nascent civil society within a transforming environment,” CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report China (Mainland),
NGO Research Center, Tsinghua University, April 2006,
http://www.civicus.org/new/media/CSI_China_Executive_Summary.pdf, accessed January 24, 2010; Clements
Stubbs Ostergaard, "Citizens, groups and nascent civil society in China: towards an understanding of the 1989
student demonstrations," China Information, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1989, pp. 28-41.
66
Sharon Liang, ''Walking the Tightrope: Civil Society Organizations in China,'' China Rights Forum, No. 3,
September 2003, pp. 11-5.
 19

Civil society facilitates the democratic norms of cooperation and negotiation through the

creation of ‘social capital,’ a product of reciprocity and trust. NGOs coordinate collective action

and cultivate a sense of social purpose and community in individuals who otherwise may feel

powerless in their actions. But these actions do not benefit democracy unless they are applied in

the interest of democratization.67 Subversive organizations may work toward the advancement of

democracy, like Solidarity in Poland, or oppose democracy, like al-Qaeda. NGOs that facilitate

democratization must have democratic functions. Another factor is whether civil society

exacerbates societal divisions by nourishing the independent growth of divided populations68

instead of “cutting across social cleavages” 69 to unite disparate groups.

Rather than promoting democratic principles, such a civil society would perpetuate

hierarchical norms and work against the cultivation of a democratic culture and growth of a

responsible citizenry. Both are critical to China’s potential democratic future, whether as

antecedents for democratization or key to democratic consolidation post-regime change. New

democracies with a non-participatory citizenry, authoritarian enclaves, or persistent autocratic

culture are more susceptible to corruption, extreme nationalism, and democratic backsliding.

This these will follow those scholars who evaluate whether Chinese CSOs can add to or

detract from the potential for democratization. Madsen argued, “some [CSOs] are certainly more

‘civil than others…Those with the quality of ‘civility’ might eventually contribute to the creation

of a democratic public sphere. Those without it may simply push China closer toward anarchic

67
Sheri Berman, "Civil Society and Political Institutionalization," American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 40, No. 5
(1997), pp. 562-574.
68
Foley and Edwards, "The Paradox of Civil Society," pp. 41-42.
69
Robert Putnam "Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America," PS: Political
Science and Politics, Vol. 28 (December 1995), pp. 664-5.
 20

fragmentation.”70 Madsen’s concern with civility runs through his case study. He concludes,

“however one evaluates the civil status of the Chinese Catholic Church, the actions of that

church often lack civil consequences,” because its activity – however independent – “sometimes

leads to fragmentation, and potentially, anarchy.”71 White, Howell, and Shang argue that civil

society “has an ambiguous political potential. It contains the seeds of both political construction

and collapse.”72 The “diverse, fragmented, and potentially destabilizing character of China’s

‘civil society’ means that it “is as much of an obstacle as an impetus to democratization.””73 Lu

concludes, “the growth of autonomous NGOs in China will not necessarily result in the

development of civil society, at least not civil society defined as possessing the quality of

‘civility,’ such as being-rule abiding and concerned with public [ends].”74

Assumption Three – “Advocacy is an NGO’s Greatest Duty”

To what extent are these social organizations a positive political marker? How can we tell

which organizations will have a positive impact and which will have negative societal effects?

And in what ways do these organizations bring about positive social change? This next section

will look at theories of how NGOs effect change and whether they have had a positive or

negative political impact thus far. Specifically, it will consider the assumption that NGOs should

focus on advocacy because it is the most effective method of changing the state.
70
Richard Madsen, “The Public Sphere, Civil Society, and Moral Community: A Research Agenda for
Contemporary China Studies,” Modern China, Vol. 19, No. 2, Symposium: “Public Sphere”/“Civil Society” in
China? Paradigmatic Issues in Chinese Studies, III (Apr., 1993), pp. 183-198.
71
Richard Madsen, China’s Catholics: tragedy and hope in an emerging civil society, University of California
Press, Berkeley, CA: 1998, pp. 127, as quoted in Guobin Yang, “Civil Society in China: A Dynamic Field of
Study,” China Review International, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 2002, pp. 9,
72
White, Howell, and Shang, In Search of Civil Society, pp. 215, as quoted in Yang, “Civil Society in China,” pp.
10.
73
Ibid, pp. 216.
74
Yiyi Lu, Non-Governmental Organisations in China, Vol. 5 of China policy series, Taylor & Francis, 2009, pp.
145.
 21

NGOs Positively Changing the State. Ma concludes that the increasing number of NGOs

in China, though culturally distinct in their close relationship with the government, belies good

prospects for the development of true civil society in China.75 Young and Turner argue that the

proliferation and development trajectory of CENGOs thus far – increasingly independent and

influential – bodes well for their political potential. Cooper posits a “local state associational

model” in the tradition of Oi’s ‘local state corporatism,’76 describing the development of Chinese

civil society as the congruence of state and associational interests.77 She emphasizes the role of

local-level forces, arguing that “a growing number of [CENGOs] constitute not only an effective

force in tackling environmental issues, but also a civil society that is starting to transform state-

society relations.”78 ENGOs use the environment as a “pliant entry point” for “work[ing]

diversely across topics,” and thrive on “locally created politically opportunity structures [and]

collaboration with international support.”79 Chen Jie posits that, “transnational linkages of

Chinese NGOs nurture a more healthy and autonomous third sector, thus having potential to

facilitate socio-political pluralization” and “preparing a more cohesive, civil and dynamic society

for the ultimate tipping moment of democratization.”80 Economy argues that CENGOs “play a

critical role in advancing transparency, rule of law, and official accountability within the Chinese

political system [and have thus] become a significant force for political reform.”81

75
Ma, “Non-Governmental Organizations in Contemporary China Paving the Way to Civil Society?” 2005.
76
Jean Oi, “Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China,” World Politics,
Vol. 45, No. 1 (1992).
77
Cooper, “‘This is Our Way In,’” pp. 113.
78
Ibid, pp. 109.
79
Ibid, pp. 135.
80
Chen Jie, “The NGO Community in China,” pp. 15.
81
Economy, “China’s Environmental Movement,” accessed January 5, 2010.
 22

Yang82 argues that ENGOs “constitute a new field where citizens may practise political

skills, organize and participate in civic action, and test political limits.”83 They also contribute to

the “larger current of civil society development in China” and may shape politics in the long run

by using “boundary-spanning” actions to “push back political boundaries.”84

NGOs Being Used by the State. Lo and Leung still see the state as the biggest obstacle to

NGO efficacy. They argue, “[t]he regime’s lack of a democratic tradition imposes tremendous

institutional constraints on the further pursuit of a popular approach to environmental

governance…There is no independent non-government green group for organizing fragmented

public opinion into a powerful political force.”85 Brettell agrees that the state “co-opted an

environmental movement by pre-empting the formation of strong” CENGOs.86 Schwartz posits

that the state has accepted the need to draw upon civil society for environmental protection,

albeit in a top-down manner. He concludes civil society has had a limited impact due to internal

problems with education and training and external problems due to a lack of influence, access to

state and international resources, and clarity about the parameters of permitted activity.87

Others emphasize the highly fragmented and localized nature of grassroots

environmentalism in China. They question its potential for mobilizing the large-scale, enduring

demonstrations that have brought about political change elsewhere. Ho argues that the state’s

acceptance of environmentalism meant that it “was [robbed] of the opportunity… to openly

82
Yang, “Environmental NGOs and Institutional Dynamics in China,” pp. 46-66.
83
Ibid.
84
Ibid.
85
Carlos Wing Hung Lo and Sai Wing Leung, “Environmental Agency and Public Opinion in Guangzhou: The
Limits of a Popular Approach to Environmental Governance,” The China Quarterly, No. 163 (Sept. 2003), pp. 704.
86
Brettell, “Environmental non-governmental organizations in the People’s Republic of China,” pp. 27-56.
87
Jonathan Schwartz, “Environmental NGOs in China: Roles and Limits,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1 (Spring,
2004), pp. 47.
 23

confront the Chinese government.”88 And it was confrontation that ignited politically charged

environmental activism in the West and post-Communist countries.89 “Chinese green activists

profess…a greening without conflict, an environmentalism with a safe distance from direct

political action.”90 Ho distinguishes contentious politics from politics. He argues that “green

social organizations are increasingly courting government approval and influence in policy-

making, rather than seeking a potentially dangerous confrontation with the national state.”91

Except at the local level, where open confrontation is “sometimes even encouraged by the central

state.”92 Ho concludes environmentalism may become a “social force” if it takes advantage of its

roots in the state “to win influence in [policy-making]” and “gain experience with participatory

actions that can give the citizenry a voice.”93 Subsequently, Ho and Edmonds argue that

environmentalism has “resourcefully adapted to, rather than opposed to, the political conditions

of its era.”94 CENGOs cannot be contentious, but they can effect political change if they work

within the system. Their very existence is not a radical or political change.

On the other hand, Stalley and Yang posit a lack of societal support as a primary obstacle

to contentious environmental activism. They found that strong environmentalism among

university students in Beijing, traditionally an important audience for social movements, was

unlikely to develop into a contentious “independent grassroots movement or becoming a source

of pressure for political change.”95 Students were unlikely to blame state policies or participate in

88
Ho, “Greening Without Conflict,” pp. 893.
89
Ho, “Greening Without Conflict,” pp. 893.
90
Ibid, pp. 916.
91
Ibid, pp. 917.
92
Ibid.
93
Ibid, pp. 918.
94
Peter Ho and Richard Edmonds, “Perspectives of time and change: Rethinking embedded environmental activism
in China,” China Information, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 331-344.
95
Phillip Stalley and Dongning Yang, “An Emerging Environmental Movement in China?” The China Quarterly,
 24

activities that were not officially sanctioned. They did not “see a strong need for NGOs” to

protect environment and generally trust the government to handle environmental protection.96

Alternative Methods for Changing the State. Advocacy is “a method and a process of

influencing decision-makers and public perceptions about an issue of concern, and mobilizing

community action to achieve social change, including legislative and policy reform, to address

the concern.”97 Advocacy NGOs are often highly professionalized.98 But professionalization99

increases the organizational requirement for NGOs. It makes it more difficult for marginalized,

poor and disperse populations to successfully organize into NGOs for their own defense.

The literature makes the assumption of evaluating CENGOs’ capacity for change in terms

of their ability to advocate for policy changes rather than looking at their ability to socialize

“subjects” into “citizens.” In fact, the “civil society argument” has two parts. It can be

summarized as “a "dense network of civil associations" [that] is said to promote the stability and

efficacy of the democratic polity through the effects of association on citizens' "habits of the

heart" and the ability of associations to mobilize citizens on behalf of public causes.”100 This

argument can be split in two different conceptions of civil society: Civil Society I emphasizes

“the ability of associational life in general and the habits of association in particular to foster

patterns of civility in the actions of citizens in a democratic polity,” and thereby promote good

Vol. 186 (2006), pp. 333.

96
Ibid, p. 352.
97
Julia Cabassi and David Wilson, Renewing our voice: code of good practice for NGOs responding to HIV/AIDS,
Oxfam: 2004, pp. 50.
98
Theda Skocpol, "Advocates without Members: The Recent Transformation of American Civic Life," chapter 13 in
Civic Engagement in American Democracy, edited by Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina (Washington DC and
New York: Brookings Institution Press and Russell Sage Foundation, 1999).
99
Peter Frumkin, On Being Nonprofit: A Conceptual and Policy Primer, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
MA: 2002).
100
Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, "The Paradox of Civil Society," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 3 (July
1996), pp. 38.
 25

governance. Civil Society II “lays special emphasis on civil society as a sphere of action that is

independent of the state and that is capable--precisely for this reason--of energizing resistance to

a tyrannical regime.” Civil Society II focuses on the function of civil society and groups

identified by the action of resistance. Groups must be capable of leveraging their independence

to check the state, so autonomy is key. But Civil Society I emphasizes the form of civil society,

and the characteristics of those groups most effective in building democratic social capital.

Thus, NGOs can effect positive change in a number of ways. Civil society can limit state

power and hold the state accountable to the law in a manifestation of vertical accountability.101

NGOs may also mobilize public support to pressure politicians into adopting institutional

reforms. A pluralistic civil society, with a wide array of NGOs representing different interests,

can promote tolerance and unity. A NGO can bring together people with various interests,

backgrounds, and opinions in support of a common cause. NGOs can act as a channel for the

political representation of citizen interests. NGOs can facilitate the transformation of the public

from subjects to citizens of the state by inculcating them with civic values and skills.

Only two authors mention socialization as a method of achieving change. Otherwise,

socialization is only used as an example of an additional advantage. Stalley and Yang’s article is

circular, citing lack of societal support as the reason for anemic environmental activism. But

might it also be the case that NGOs are incapable of serving this function because they are

plagued by poor internal governance? Is poor internal governance one of the greatest obstacles to

NGOs fulfilling their potential as effectors of change?

The following chapter will use the case studies to test these assumptions and analyze how

NGOs actually operate. As my research will show, NGOs’ internal governance characteristics
101
Diamond, Developing Democracy, pp. 218-221.
 26

and function as socializers are just as important as their level of autonomy and role as advocates.

Internal management critically affects implementation. Socialization of the public, participants,

and staff can make advocacy more effective in convincing people environmentalism is a key

issue. This is because the structure and positioning of an organization affects its ability to

conduct advocacy. In assuming advocacy is everything, scholars and NGOs do not analyze or

invest in internal management. They fail to capture the full political potential of NGOs.

This thesis is not arguing that CENGOs are ineffective. It does not attempt to discount

their work, as they have made considerable achievements. But CENGOs can be more effective in

whatever they do – advocacy or socialization – if they are institutionalized and democratic.

Institutionalization, in particular, is critical to the existence of permanent, effective CSOs that

can bring about lasting change. Uninstitutionalized NGOs may quickly flicker out of existence,

regardless of how successful they are in their founder’s lifetime. This is especially true for NGOs

that are reliant on their founders’ charismatic authority to operate.

CHAPTER III

POOR INTERNAL GOVERNANCE IN CHINESE NGOS

An effective CSO must be institutionalized and well-organized. But the case studies

demonstrate an empirical pattern of poor internal governance that is neither. Rather, most CSOs

in the case studies are autonomous but exhibit informal, vertical organization and a crippling

dependence on the founding leader’s personalized authority. Poor internal governance, not lack

of autonomy, is what inhibits the permanence, efficacy, and positive impact of CENGOs.

Unfortunately, the founder’s personal connections do not translate into institutional NGO

contacts due to the traditionally personal nature of personal connections (guanxi). Without
 27

strong, connected leaders to direct these poorly governed NGOs, they may not be able to survive

beyond the leader’s lifetime. The dissipation of first-generation NGOs does not bode well for the

development of a Chinese civil society that could potentially aid in democratization.

This chapter will detail the founding histories of CSOs in the case studies before deriving

an empirical pattern of poor internal governance. It will conclude by arguing that autonomy is

not the best predictor of an organization’s efficacy or governance capacity. Rather, the quality of

internal governance is key in evaluating the transformative political potential of CENGOs.

Founding Histories

Tongji University Student Green Group. This organization is not a NGO. It is a student

group based at Tongji University in Shanghai. Chinese student green groups hold regular

environmental education activities on campus and in neighboring middle schools. They engage

in advocacy to save wildlife, encourage people not to use disposable chopsticks, and participate

in conservation activities like collecting old batteries for recycling. Like other student groups,

students spent a third of their time and budget every school year on a summer “Green Camp.”

This is a trip to a faraway environmentally-sensitive area to do research and environmental

education.102 Ten students, mostly from Tongji University, planned the trip with limited funding

from their school. This particular trip counts as a successful summer “green camp,” but only

because it was primarily organized by a student’s godfather with connections in Inner Mongolia.

Students participated in a three-day preparatory training in Shanghai before the trip. They

engaged in superficial research, arriving at a conclusion commonly rejected by most scholars:

that simple over-herding caused desertification.103 They prepared a number of posters for
102
Interviews 3-4, by author, Beijing, China.
103
Interviews 58-59, by author, Hohhot, Lanqi, and Baiqi, Inner Mongolia, China.
 28

environmental education in city squares, aiming to educate the local population about the

negative effects of over-herding. They also prepared a survey for farmers and herders.

Thanks to the godfather’s personal guanxi, students also had the opportunity to visit

several dairy cow villages and to interview officials from the Lanqi agricultural bureau. Students

successfully conducted environmental education activities for adults and children in Lanqi and

Baiqi city squares. They questioned locals about their knowledge of desertification, gave tips for

conserving energy, and gave away eco-friendly grocery bags. Students interviewed villagers in

immigrant herder villages (yemingcun) near Lanqi and Baiqi. These immigrant herders’ land was

seized by the state to create ecological protection areas. They were forced to relocate and raise

dairy cows in state-built villages devoted to milk production. The milk is sold at a fixed, low

price to the state or to one of two big dairy companies, Mengniu and Yili.

There are few herders left in the countryside who have not been re-settled into dairy cow

villages. But students were mostly unable to interview actual herders due to the language barrier.

Most herders only speak Mongolian, not Mandarin. They only successfully interviewed one Han

and one Mongolian herder in herding areas on the outskirts of Baiqi city.

Students in over 200 universities, including the Tongji University group, are part of the

Green Student Environmental Action Network (GSEAN).104 GSEAN holds training activities and

the College Environmental Forum, an annual national conference of college green groups.

Friends of Nature (FON). Founded in 1994 by Liang Congjie, a well-known historian,

Friends of Nature is often hailed as China’s first environmental NGO. Economy says:

The birth of the contemporary environmental movement in China might be dated to the early 1990s, when a
group of students and scholars searching for an activist outlet in the post-Tiananmen period approached

104
Interview 13, by author, 2008 College Environmental Forum, Changsha, China.
 29

Liang, an unassuming and highly articulate historian, with the idea of establishing an environmental NGO.
Liang’s distinguished reform lineage made him a natural choice. His grandfather was the famous Qing
dynasty reformer Liang Qichao, and his father, Liang Sicheng, was a renowned architect in Beijing…he
holds a position in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, a formal government body with
a notable reform orientation, affording him a political platform as well as a degree of political protection
that less well-positioned Chinese would not have. While Liang doubted his ability to start such an
organization, given his lack of expertise in environmental affairs and China’s lack of tradition in nonstate
organized activity...a vice director of the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) had
suggested to Liang that he use his voice to accomplish something positive in environmental protection.
With the support and guidance of his friends, Liang drafted a mission statement and charter for an
environmental NGO…[Liang invited the] Chinese Academy of Culture… to oversee the organization.105

FON’s original charter emphasized environmental education. FON has led several successful

campaigns to raise awareness about the poaching of the snub-nosed monkey and Tibetan

antelope.106 FON works to improve environmental curriculum in rural schools and promote

conservation in urban areas.107

FON is also notable for the rapid growth in its number of due-paying members. Anyone

may be a member. They only need to submit a nominal membership fee of 50 RMB108 and

commit to one green project, even if it is just personally refusing to use plastic bags. Liang said,

“The membership is everybody. It’s less like a Western environmental lobby and more like a

club. We have a homey atmosphere.”109 But the growth of FON’s membership has been limited

by the state, which prohibits creation of regional branches and continues to be highly concerned

about the disruptive potential of NGOs. As of 2004, FON had six full-time and two part-time

staff, a significant volunteer base, and 1,500 members. FON could have more members, branch

offices and affiliations but has limited itself to avoid being viewed as a threat by the state.110

105
Economy, The river runs black, pp. 146.
106
“Introduction,” Friends of Nature, http://www.fon.org.cn/channal.php?cid=616, accessed January 24, 2010.
107
Ibid; Economy, The river runs black, pp. 147; Ru and Ortolano, “Development of Citizen-Organized
Environmental NGOs in China,” pp. 151.
108
Around 7 USD.
109
Ron Gluckman, “Turning Red China Green,” Asiaweek Magazine, August 2000,
http://www.gluckman.com/Liang.html, accessed January 24, 2010.
110
Schwartz, “Environmental NGOs in China: Roles and Limits,” pp. 39.
 30

Though four people founded Friends of Nature, Liang Congjie led the organization until

2006.111 Towards the end of his time at FON, he appointed an Executive Director in an attempt to

reduce his role in the organization. He intended to simply oversee the NGO’s work as the

founder. But conflicts between management philosophies led Xue Ye, the appointed Executive

Director, to resign and Liang to step back in as the primary leader. After Liang was no longer

able to lead the organization, Liang Xiaoyan, another of the original founders of FON from the

Chinese Academy of Culture, became director.112 As of 2009, Li Bo, who has a M.S. in Natural

Resources Management from Cornell and previous experience with indigenous communities and

biodiversity conservation in Southwest China, is director of the organization.113

Liang is respected as one of the founders of the environmental movement in China.114

After Liang retired, staff members were allowed to re-think FON’s existing programs and their

role in the organization.115 Some interested in specific aspects of environmentalism – clean

development, for example – conducted research on these issues.116 Staff sometimes even visited

other NGOs that had programs in those sectors, with the goal of bringing back what they had

learned to create a similar FON program. Staff members described it as a cathartic, difficult, and

private process but as a necessary structural improvement.

Global Village Beijing (GVB) was founded in 1996 by Liao Xiaoyi. Liao was formerly a

researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Science and a Visiting Scholar at the Institute for

111
Interviews 27, 19, 31 and 24, by author, Beijing, China.
112
Interview 24, by author, in Beijing, China.
113
Michael Zhang, “Recent Environmental Law and Public Participation News,” Green Law, April 14, 2010,
http://www.greenlaw.org.cn/enblog/?tag=friends-of-nature, accessed May 2, 2010.
114
Interview 7, by author, Beijing, China.
115
Interviews 27, 19, 31 and 24, by author, Beijing, China.
116
Interview 27, by author, Beijing, China.
 31

International Environmental Politics at North Carolina State University.117 GVB is registered as a

private corporation under the Industry and Commerce Administration Bureau of Beijing, but is

run as a non-profit. In the past, Liao independently produced a weekly environmental education

program broadcast on CCTV, the state channel. Liao also produced a TV series and a

documentary about women’s environmental activism while she was at North Carolina.

GVB advocates ““a green lifestyle, which entails saving water, sorting garbage to

facilitate recycling, using public transportation, saying “No” to wildlife products, and using

recyclable commodities.”118 It also focuses on increasing public awareness and involvement and

the creation of an “ecological culture.”119 GVB contributed to the development of “green

communities,” trained journalists reporting on environmental issues, and produced various

environmental publications and conservation guides. GVB has a training center 70 kilometers

outside of Beijing aimed at providing “biodiversity protection, environmental education,

consultation, and training programs to the public.”120 GVB has worked with several communities

in Beijing to set up waste sorting programs.121

At any time, GVB has anywhere from seven to fifteen permanent staff. But its TV

117
“Sheri Xiaoyi Liao,” OECD FORUM 2007,
http://www.oecd.org/speaker/0,2879,en_21571361_37578380_35996222_1_1_1_1,00.html, accessed January 24,
2010.
118
Ibid.
119
Ibid; “Global Village Beijing,” International Fund for China’s Environment,
http://www.ifce.org/gvb/introduction.html, accessed January 24, 2010; “Global Village Beijing,” CityWeekend
Magazine, http://www.cityweekend.com.cn/beijing/listings/community/environmental/has/global-village-beijing/,
accessed January 24, 2010; “Liao Xiaoyi,” China.org.cn, January 29, 2006,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/cgw2006/198224.htm, accessed January 24, 2010; “Back to basics,” China
Daily, November 25, 2009, http://www.china.org.cn/environment/2009-11/25/content_18949524.htm, accessed
January 24, 2010.
120
“Section VI: Feature Boxes of NGO Participants,” Hong Kong Conference Report, China Environment Series 4,
Woodrow Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Project, 2001,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/cgreen-en-5.pdf, accessed May 4, 2010, pp. 38.
121
Zhou Yiyan, “Liao Xiaoyi: Greening the Lifestyle,” China Today,
http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/ctenglish/se/txt/2010-03/07/content_252197.htm, accessed February 15, 2010.
 32

programs had a significant viewership and hundreds have participated in its public activities.

GVB has many volunteers and participants but no registered members.122 It is not a membership

association. In 2002, Liao became Environmental Advisor of the Beijing Olympic Games.

Several of her recommendations for a “Green Olympics” were adopted, including a state ban on

free plastic bags. GVB has also been a key part of several policy campaigns, including one

recommending that companies do not set the air conditioning below 26 degrees Celsius in the

summer in order to conserve energy. But it is unclear if these changes in regulation were a

product of GVB and other ENGOs’ advocacy efforts. They could also have been government

efforts at currying popular support for its green initiatives in advance of the 2008 Olympics.

GVB and Liao have now turned their focus to building a green community in Daping, a

village in Sichuan that was devastated by the 2008 earthquake. As chief of the LOHAS housing

project, Liao “advocates post-disaster reconstruction of residential areas that follows ecological

principles,…to help local people realize sustainable development…and to develop ecotourism,

handicrafts and organic farming, as well as green lifestyles.”123 GVB has “built 80 eco-dwellings

and two 120-square-meter clinics, in addition to getting a few other projects underway, including

a 150-square-meter workshop, 80 sets of energy-saving stoves, two 400-square-meter village

halls, and biogas and waste sorting systems.”124 GVB has a “15-year contract and 51-percent

stake” in the village’s economic success. It will implement a “governance model made up of an

association of the villagers, the NGO, and local government so that once set up, its economic

model can be sustainable…[but] overall success remains to be seen.”125

122
“Section VI,” Woodrow Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Project, pp. 38.
123
Yiyan, “Liao Xiaoyi,” accessed February 15, 2010.
124
Ibid.
125
Nancy Zhang, “Discovering a life of harmony,” Shanghai Daily, December 22, 2009,
http://www.shanghaidaily.com/sp/article/2009/200912/20091222/article_423364.htm, accessed March 25, 2010.
 33

Finally, it is unclear how ordinary people interested in participating in GVB can do so

other than applying to be staff, since many of its programs do not depend on volunteer labor.

Some, like the TV programs, depend on specialized skills average Chinese are unlikely to have.

Others, like the green community projects, require a specific community’s support as a coherent

whole rather than as individuals.

When requested by funders to better distribute authority within GVB, Liao Xiaoyi

appointed an Executive Director. But she very much appeared in control despite having an

ambiguous position. She was attempting to fundraise for various projects – plastic bags folded up

into plush-toy leaves on key chains, and rebuilding schools after the Sichuan earthquake – when

I visited in 2008.126 Liao said she generally no longer agreed to interviews because she was too

busy. However, I had the opportunity to visit with the Secretary General of Alxa SEE, the next

NGO, when they met to discuss possible financial support by SEE for GVB.

Alxa SEE (Society Entrepreneur Ecology). Founded on June 5, 2004, Alxa SEE was

created by 80 of China’s wealthiest entrepreneurs – including the CEO of Internet giant Sina – to

address desertification in Inner Mongolia.127 SEE is the first entrepreneur-founded NGO in

China. It does not have funding problems. In fact, SEE had accrued a surplus of over 2 million

Renminbi because it was not even able to spend all the membership fees it receives each year.

Desertification in Inner Mongolia and, most prominently, in the Westernmost county of Alashan,

has created persistent, worsening dust storms in Beijing. This public problem, which affects

citizens’ health and enterprise operation near Beijing, made the entrepreneurs feel a common

126
Interview 39, by author, Beijing, China.
127
“Alxa SEE Ecological Association (SEE),” China CSR Map, http://www.chinacsrmap.org/E_OrgShow.asp?
CCMOrg_ID=209, accessed January 24, 2010.
 34

sense of social responsibility. They pooled resources to preserve the ecology and environment of

Alashan, “contain the occurrence of dust storms, and [encourage] Chinese enterprises at home to

take on more social responsibility.”128 All founding entrepreneurs committed to annually

investing 10 million RMB in SEE to combat desertification in Alashan.

But Alxa SEE is not entirely open to public membership. Ordinary citizens can only

become Associate Members, who “have the [right] to bring forward suggestions and

comments…, receive documents of the Association… attend related activities … and jointly sign

to require the Association to make statement in writing about projects and finances; but [do] not

have the rights of decision making, election, and voting.”129 Council Members pay a yearly

membership fee of 100,000 RMB and also “have the rights of decision making, election, and

voting, and [the duty of] participating in decision making, activities and donations of [SEE].”130

People with aggregate donations over 1 million RMB become Perpetual Council Members who

“enjoy the rights and [obligations] of Council Members for [life].”

Charter members voted on and approved a declaration defining the mission of SEE:

“The vision of SEE is to promote the sustainable development of nature and humanity, and create value
through the integration of ecological, economic, and social benefits. The mission of SEE is to solve
desertification through comprehensive community development, to urge Chinese entrepreneurs to
undertake more ecological and social responsibility, and to promote corporate environmental protection
and sustainable development.”131

SEE and an international NGO, the Nature Conservancy, offer a biannual SEE-TNC

Ecological Award. The award recognizes CENGOs doing pioneering work in environmental

128
“Office Introduction,” Alxa Local Project Office, Alxa SEE, http://www.see.org.cn/English/noWrap.html,
accessed January 24, 2010.
129
“ALXA SEE Ecological Association,” Alxa SEE, http://see.sina.com.cn/en/xh/index.shtml, accessed January 24,
2010.
130
Ibid.
131
“Alxa SEE Ecological Association (SEE),” China CSR Map, accessed January 24, 2010.
 35

protection.132 A Business Cooperation Office assists companies with incorporating environmental

protection and sustainable development into their operations.133 Its NGO Cooperation Bureau

gives 2.5 million RMB a year in grants to ENGOs nationwide.134

SEE also has an office in Alashan, Inner Mongolia that operates eco-development

programs.135 The program operates on a village-level basis in cooperation with the local

government. Participating villages elect a NGO representative who runs based on a platform of

projects they propose to bring in for the village. These might include alternative energy sources

like windmills, solar panels, water pipes or community development programs like libraries. All

NGO representatives meet with SEE staff and local officials twice a year, where they discuss

their villages’ project proposals. All representatives then vote on which projects would benefit

the most from the funding. Money is dispersed according to the results. Villagers are also

financial stakeholders. This helps ensure that villagers are committed to maintaining the projects.

Each project is funded by villagers’ contributions, local government funds, and SEE funds. The

local farmers and herders carry out and implement all elections and projects. SEE staff are

facilitators who provide help if necessary. SEE also brings in external auditors to evaluate its

programs, like the Corporate Social Responsibility Council. It also works with international

NGOs like Heifer International.

Many NGO representatives were current or past elected village leaders.136 When asked

how he would compare being a NGO representative to being a village leader, one herder praised

132
Interview 9, by author, Alashan, Inner Mongolia, China.
133
Ibid.
134
“SEE Fund: Introduction,” Alxa SEE, http://www.see.org.cn/English/summary.html, accessed January 24, 2010.
135
Interviews 54, 51, 11, and 35, by author, Alashan, Inner Mongolia, China.
136
Interview 64, by author, Alashan, Inner Mongolia, China.
 36

SEE as enabling villagers to be self-sufficient and feel like their own managers.137 One of his

village’s projects was building water pipes from the nearest town to their settlements in the

countryside. They also bought windmills to power the televisions in their houses.138 I asked him

what he thought would have happened if the windmill program had been a government, rather

than NGO, initiative.139 He said villagers would not have been able to choose their own windmill.

The government-picked windmill probably would have been too complicated for them to fix

themselves. The windmill that the villagers bought was simple but functional. So when it broke

they were able to fix it themselves without having to pay for a repairman. Being a government

representative meant that he had to go to meetings and receive orders or information about what

was going to happen. As a SEE representative, he went to meetings and represented his village

and fought for what they wanted. He enjoyed having a say in what happened to his family and

neighbors. He did concede, however, that there was not much campaigning involved in the SEE

representative elections. Other villagers chose him because of his previous leadership

experience. Another farming village representative stated that, if SEE disappeared tomorrow,

their program could continue since they were already capable of governing themselves.140

The SEE office at Alashan also cooperated with the county government to employ local

workers. Both workers in summer 2008 were ethnic Mongols from Alashan. Their salary was

lower than that of regular SEE staff, and was paid half by the government and half by SEE.141

The new Alashan office director in 2008 had previously worked as a staffer there before

leaving to work for the World Wildlife Fund, an international ENGO. WWF was more

137
Ibid.
138
Interviews 65-66, by author, Alashan, Inner Mongolia, China.
139
Interview 64.
140
Interview 65.
141
Interview 54, by author, Alashan, Inner Mongolia, China.
 37

professional, bureaucratic and fixed in its structure, management, methods and programs than

SEE. He had learned a lot at WWF, but often felt like he was only part of the bureaucracy

there.142 There was little room for innovation, because WWF had a good conception of who they

were as a NGO, what they did, and what they did not do. As an ordinary staff member, he was

not able to push forward innovation. He returned to become the office director because he felt he

would have the opportunity to take an active role in shaping the programs and the management

of SEE. SEE gave him greater license to innovate and adapt program.

Echoing Steppe (ES) is also not an NGO. It is a loosely organized social organization led

by Chen Jiqun, a Han who herded sheep for 15 years while being ‘reeducated’ in Inner Mongolia

during the Cultural Revolution.143 ES really only consists of two members – Chen and his

assistant. ES deals predominantly with ethnic (and linguistic) Mongolians, though it includes a

few Han Chinese who were also reeducated in Inner Mongolia.

In addition to lacking a real structure, stable membership or funding, ES also lacks a true,

specific mission. Chen believes the traditional Mongolian way of life is best suited for the

grassland. The best way to preserve the grassland is to preserve Mongolian culture. Thus, ES

aims to preserve the grassland by helping Mongolian herders protect their ancestral land and way

of life. For example, ES was pioneering a small-scale collective management initiative. Herders

would pool their private plots of land together so everyone could herd on the larger, communal

land in a miniature replica of the nomadic herding traditionally practiced by Mongolians.144

ES also provides herders with free Mongolian translations of central government land

142
Interview 51, by author, Alashan, Inner Mongolia, China.
143
Interview 60, by author, Mandu, Inner Mongolia, China.
144
Interview 62, by author, Mandu, Inner Mongolia, China.
 38

laws and speeches with which to defend themselves and their land from unfair seizure. Drawing

on his national connections, Chen has also been able to get officially approved Mongolian

translations of central government land laws and state speeches through the Ethnic Minority

University in Beijing, for distribution throughout Inner Mongolia. The central government only

publishes laws in Mandarin and never in any minority languages.145 Mongolian spiritual leaders

distribute these translated laws as pamphlets in villages all over Inner Mongolia. These

translations educate farmers about their property rights under the law.

ES is a network of concerned, invested people with previous experience in Inner

Mongolia. ES also teachers herders how to use computers, holds legal training for village

leaders, replants grass, and helps herders set up eco-tourism companies. When I visited Mandu

with ES, Chen and his assistant were working with scholars from universities in the province of

Inner Mongolia and the independent country of Mongolia.146 They were jointly conducting a

research project on the sociological, environmental and economic effects of land privatization

policies. The country of Mongolia was considering a land privatization policy similar to China’s,

which ties households to a specific plot of land and forbids communal grazing areas and nomadic

herding. The joint research team selected two villages each in Inner Mongolia and Mongolia

with similar environmental conditions and at the same longitudes. They sought to prove that land

privatization increases the onset and speed of desertification, reduces the economic output of the

area, and erodes Mongolian cultural traditions and social units. They conducted quantitative

analysis of villagers’ household incomes and measurements of grassland degradation. They also

carried out qualitative research in the form of interviews with randomly selected villagers.

145
Interviews 60 and 61, by author, Mandu, Inner Mongolia.
146
Interviews 60, 61, 63, 78, 79, and 80, by author, Mandu, Inner Mongolia.
 39

Chen relies on his personal connections to implement his ideas.147 He retains working

knowledge of Mongolian. He has several local political contacts though he still experiences

resistance from the local public security bureau and regional government. The son of a professor

at Beijing University and as a famous artist with work in the National Gallery, he also has

connections within academia and the government.

For example, Chen was able to procure an official map of Mandu.148 This exercise was to

make villagers aware of the boundaries of their property, as they previously had no conception of

private property. So when government officials or corporations attempted to buy or take their

land, villagers would be able to defend their lawful territory or at least demand a fair price. Chen

was able to implement this program because he lived in Mandu. The current Mandu village

leader was one of Chen’s students. They maintained a good relationship throughout the years.149

The village leader accompanied researchers to villagers’ homes, lending the team a greater

degree of legitimacy. His actions facilitated the research group’s discussion of with villagers.

The village leader also gave Chen an official list of the villagers living in Mandu and their

respective household incomes.

Poor Internal Governance as an Empirical Pattern

The pattern of poor internal governance in these case studies is of CSOs with informal,

vertical organization – and specifically, personalized authority. That is, authority concentrated in

and reflected by one leader. Due to its specific nature, personalized authority can have manifestly

different consequences. In FON, it leads to the founding of spin-off CSOs created by former staff

147
Interview 60, by author, Mandu, Inner Mongolia.
148
Ibid.
149
Interviews 81 and 82, by author, Mandu, Inner Mongolia.
 40

and participants. In GVB, it leads to a high turnover rate and no spin-off organizations as both

the power and the sanctity of the guiding vision are closely guarded. Personalized authority in ES

inhibits its institutionalization due to Chen’s lack of a desire to expand and professionalize, even

though ES has worthwhile objectives, programming, and a strong grassroots connection. The

combined personalized authority of the eighty entrepreneurs in SEE prevents the domination of

the organization by one leader. It also created a fairly democratic governance structure that

satisfies all stakeholders through elections. The lack of a single, clear personalized authority in

the Tongji group led to a lack of vision and action that doomed their trip to inefficacy.

A single, clear personalized authority is a key feature of poor internal governance. But

the extent to which personalized authority is negative varies according to the person wielding

authority. It is similar to autocracies in which the nature of the regime depends on the ruler. SEE

shows that personalization can be mitigated if charismatic actors are all strong stakeholders and

are forced to cooperate. Interest is insufficient to make someone a strong stakeholder in a

voluntary association. New organizations are constantly being founded. People can always find

new vehicles for their interest. Their interests are also continually changing. To be a strong

stakeholder, a person should also have a substantial financial and social commitment to the CSO.

Another characteristic of poor internal governance is informality. As NGOs can only

offer low wages, most staff are recent college graduates with little experience. Many graduates

choose this work because they could not find a job in the private sector. For example, English-

speaking capacity is low in NGO staffers as most advanced speakers take more competitive,

high-paying jobs in the private sector.150 This creates problems of high turnover, obstructs the

creation of more delegated decision-making mechanisms and inhibits formalization. The attitude
150
Interview 9, by author, Beijing, China.
 41

of many NGO leaders is also an obstacle. Many leaders want to distinguish themselves from

faceless state and corporate bureaucracies and create more ‘family-like,’ welcoming, and open

NGOs. This open approach can nurture the growth and innovation of skilled leaders. But

delegated decision-making structures are difficult to create when there is no significant gradation

in the level of experience or skill among staff. Informal, less skilled staff are more likely to avoid

sticking their heads out. Most NGOs lack any strict decision-making structure and often decide

to just ‘discuss issues together’ or submit ideas to the leader. In most cases, then, the lack of

strict, formal rules causes staff to simply defer to the leader for fear of censure or error.

Internal Governance, Not Autonomy, Predicts NGO Efficacy

Even autonomous, citizen-organized social groups are prone to poor internal governance.

Poor internal governance significantly erodes NGO efficacy. In some cases, autocratic regimes

can be more efficient than democratic ones because they can concentrate their resources. But

CSOs are almost all resource-poor. Even the most charismatic leaders cannot mobilize the force

or finances to strong-arm policies through, because the implementation of NGO programs relies

on many different actors over which the leader does not have control. Dictators, on the other

hand, can co-opt or force all other actors to cooperate. Implementation of programs in autocratic

NGOs thus suffers. Personalized governance based on charismatic authority is also not

conducive to institutionalization. Personalized NGOs are prone to failure once the founder is

incapacitated. Vertical governance in voluntary organizations also leads to high turnover, low

staff quality, low institutional memory, and reduced receptiveness to bottom-up feedback from

staff or clients. Vertically organized NGOs are characterized by strict, autocratic decision-
 42

making hierarchies.151 They often do not sufficiently understand their constituents’ changing

needs to design good programs. Even if they had well-designed programs, poorly governed

NGOs do not have sufficient, stable skilled human capital to implement and maintain them.

The assumption that autonomy is sufficient to make a ‘true’ NGO is problematic. All

organizations in the case studies enjoy differing levels of autonomy. But all are citizen-organized

and all but one suffer from poor internal governance. The extent to which the organizations were

poorly governed varied not according to level of autonomy, but with the preferences, capacity,

skills, and charisma of its founding leader.

Ru’s autonomy-based classification scheme would classify most NGOs in the case

studies as de facto NGOs. The exception is SEE, which is registered as an NGO in Inner

Mongolia but not in Beijing. SEE has deep ties with the local and provincial governments in

Inner Mongolia. Cooperation in funding projects, the economic benefit of SEE initiatives, and

regional officials’ eagerness for private investment have established SEE’s strong regional ties.

But its lack of registration in Beijing has posed problems when SEE held events in Beijing.152

De facto NGOs exist but are not officially registered with the state as NGOs.153 Most

citizen-organized NGOs fall into this category. De facto NGOs constitute self-censored civil

society. They have a high incentive to censor their activities to stay under the radar and avoid

state interference.154 Authorities generally leave de facto NGOs alone as long as they do not

engage in confrontational activity. Ru argues that FON, as a de facto NGO, suffers from

151
Personalized governance is when these vertical, decision-making hierarchies mainly consist of the leader as the
decision-maker and the staff as implementers. These management structures often cause poor internal governance
because there is no delegated decision-making and staff have little say.
152
Interviews 9 and 35, by author, Beijing, China.
153
They can be affiliated with other registered NGOs, registered as enterprises, or not registered at all.
154
Ibid, pp. 259-263.
 43

legitimacy constraints due to its lack of direct legal registration.155 Chapter five will explore how

these legitimacy issues help foster the observed pattern of personalized authority and poor

internal governance in the case studies. Ru contends that de facto NGOs’ lack of registration

means they experience virtually no state control.156 But many NGOs fall into this category, so

more thorough analysis of their various levels of autonomy is warranted.

FON is regarded as the first autonomous, citizen-organized NGO though it is indirectly

registered with the state. FON is technically registered as a branch of the China Culture Institute,

a national NGO registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs in Beijing.157 GVB is also a de facto

NGO. It is registered as an enterprise rather than an NGO. Largely the effort of one man,

Echoing Steppe is not legally registered in any capacity. The Tongji Group is registered as a

student group with Tongji University and the China Youth League.

As the most autonomous group, Echoing Steppe would be expected to be the most

‘authentic,’ effective and best-governed NGO. But it is hardly an NGO at all, and not so much

due to government interference – although that does exist, from the provincial government and

the local public security bureau.158 Rather, its lack of institutionalization, structure, consistent

programming and membership stems from its inability to find stable funding from international

or domestic sources. That is partly a result of the reluctance and refusal of the leader to play by

the rules of traditional grant making or invest in ES as an institution.

The most ineffective and poorly governed CSO, the Tongji Group, is also the least

155
Ibid, pp. 302-303.
156
Specifically, Ru says, “The fact that supervisory organizations and affiliated organizations sponsored NGOs’ to
register with civil affairs offices for their own benefits is key evidence of agency control, and the fact that all studied
de facto NGOs have experienced virtually no state control is key evidence of no control.” See page 95.
157
Ibid, pp. 27.
158
Interviews 60 and 61, by author, Mandu, Inner Mongolia, China.
 44

autonomous. But that can be attributed less to state interference than to a lack of preparation,

expertise, and experience among members. As a student group, the members, structure, and

programs are constantly in flux. The Tongji group has little institutional memory. Two of the

most effective and autonomous NGOs, FON and GVB, are also two of the most poorly

governed. They are arguably even worse than the Tongji Group, which is not really governed at

all and does not have an organizational structure. Objectively, the Tongji Group is almost more

equal and its poor governance more explainable than FON or GVB. FON and GVB are NGOs,

but suffer greatly from the personalized authority problems associated with charismatic

mobilization – which will be discussed in the next chapter. The most autonomous NGOs may

neither be the most effective nor the best governed.

SEE is the least autonomous but one of the most effective NGOs. It has socialized several

villages in Alashan and taught participating villagers to be their own managers. In addition to

self-governance, SEE programs have inculcated participants with the civic virtues and skills

associated with elections and the collective decision-making that goes into deciding which

projects get funded. They also support other domestic ENGOs with grants through its NGO

Cooperation Bureau. SEE is the most democratic, institutionalized NGO in the case studies.

Poor internal governance does not discriminate in terms of autonomy. In fact, CENGOs

might have more staying power if they were not autonomous. For example, if CENGOs were

GONGOs whose existence was guaranteed by a government entity. But their ability to have

transformative political impact would be greatly circumscribed. As autonomous, de facto NGOs,

the CSOs in the case studies must institutionalize and adopt formal governance structures if they

are to continue to exist. So if autonomy is necessary to ‘Chinese civil society,’ strong internal
 45

governance structures are also necessary. The overemphasis on autonomy is unmerited.

The following chapter will present charismatic mobilization theory. It will argue that the

skills, position, and personal preferences of a NGO’s founding leader have more influence on the

efficacy and management of a NGO than autonomy.

CHAPTER IV

CHINESE NGOS AS CHARISMATIC COMMUNITIES

The development of poor internal governance structures in the case studies is best

modeled theoretically as a consequence of charismatic mobilization. CENGOs are charismatic

communities founded by well-connected leaders. Charismatic communities are characterized by

informal, personalized authority structures that make the organization dependent on the founding

leader for connections, interpretation of the mission, and direction. Charismatic communities

cannot survive past their founding leaders without bureaucratization, and institutionalization into

NGOs with formal, bureaucratic management structures that delegate decision-making structure

and responsibility. Charismatic authority and personal legitimacy in these CSOs must be

replaced by bureaucratic authority and institutional validity if CENGOs are to have a lasting

political impact past their leaders’ lifetime.

This chapter will argue that the skills, position, and preferences of a NGO’s founding

leader are a better predictor of the efficacy and governance of a NGO than autonomy. Under the

charismatic mobilization framework, the absence of a single, clear charismatic leader will doom

an organization to inefficacy. But a democratically inspired leader can construct a democratic,

 46

institutionalized NGO if they design the structure of the NGO to reflect democratic principles.

But a leader more familiar with autocratic, hierarchical management often founds a poorly

governed organization that fits the empirical pattern described in the past chapter.

Yet charismatic mobilization does not satisfactorily describing the internal workings of a

poorly governed NGO, other than stating the founding leader’s preeminence. This next chapter

will use civil society theory to model the internal dynamics of poorly governed CENGOs.

Charismatic Mobilization

Weber defines charismatic authority as “resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity,

heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order

revealed or ordained by him.”159 It is “specifically irrational,” free from all rules, and a

“revolutionary force” that repudiates the past.160 The “bearer of charisma enjoys loyalty and

authority by virtue of a mission [or vision] believed to be embodied in him” that often

overthrows custom, law or tradition.161 Groups organized based on charismatic authority are

“charismatic communities.” Staff are not technically trained “officials” but the leader’s

“disciples,” chosen based on their charismatic qualities. The opposite of charismatic authority is

rational, bureaucratic authority, which obeys intellectually analyzable rules.162

If charismatic communities are to become permanent, charismatic authority must be

routinized because it is not stable in its pure form. Charismatic communities are marked by their

commitment to the leader’s mission. The incapacitation of a leader robs the group of its

159
Max Weber, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, editors, Economy and society: an outline of interpretive
sociology, Volume 1, (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA: 1978), pp. 215.
160
Ibid, pp. 243-244.
161
Ibid, pp. 244.
162
Ibid, pp. 243-244.
 47

aggregating element, its mission, and its ability to function. Leadership succession is charismatic

communities’ primary obstacle faced by charismatic groups. Solving this problem is key to their

survival. Weber outlines several solutions. Institutionalization, which Weber calls routinization,

occurs when the “ideal and material interests of the followers [are invested] in the continuation

and the continual reactivation of the [charismatic] community…on a stable everyday basis.”163

Charismatic communities thereby create a bureaucracy and re-establish CSO operation based on

bureaucratic authority. Traditionalization is the “search for a new charismatic leader on the basis

of criteria of the qualities which will fit him for the position of authority.” 164

This thesis will draw upon Andreas’ conception of charismatic mobilization, a

modification of Weber’s theory. Andreas defines charisma as “the ability of a leader to mobilize

people without the benefits or constraints of a formal organization.”165 In charismatic

mobilizations, “[a] commonly accepted mission defined by charismatic individuals produces

cohesion [within] a charismatic hierarchy of authority, in which a central leader is surrounded by

disciples chosen because of their devotion to the cause…. The movement is bound together by

informal networks, and decision making and promotion take place without set rules and

procedures.”166 In contrast, bureaucratic mobilization is the production of cohesion by a:

[B]ureaucratic hierarchy of authority with formal decision-making procedures and a clear chain of
command. Authority resides in offices and does not depend on the personal characteristics of the
individuals who occupy these offices, and promotion is carried out through formal processes based on
technical qualifications.167

Bureaucratic mobilization produces institutionalized, well-organized NGOs that are sustainable

163
Ibid, pp. 246.
164
Ibid, pp. 250.
165
Joel Andreas, “The Structure of Charismatic Mobilization: A Case Study of Rebellion During the Chinese
Cultural Revolution,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 72, No. 3 (June 2007), pp. 437.
166
Ibid.
167
Ibid.
 48

beyond the incapacitation of any single member because the NGO as an institution is valid.

Charismatic mobilizations that are properly institutionalized can develop a bureaucratic

hierarchy of authority and become fully functional, lasting NGOs. But social movements require

a combination of “both: they are inspired by a mission that challenges the legitimacy of the

existing order, but they also depend on formal organizational structures and norms that facilitate

cohesion and collective action.”168

Charismatic mobilizations are relatively easy to initiate given sufficient charisma because

they require little investment in management structure, human capital, and skill. Initially, the

charismatic draw of the leader and his or her mission is sufficient to establish a loosely organized

charismatic mobilization. Charismatic mobilizations may manifest not several charismatic

communities united by one vision and connected by one charismatic leader. But charismatic

mobilization is very transitory given the difficulty of finding a suitable, charismatic successor.

The lack of a successor may cripple or wipe out a social group. Solving the succession problem

is more difficult in CENGOs because they are voluntary organizations. Members are not as

compelled to find or agree on a charismatic successor, and can easily leave the organization if

dissatisfied. NGOs also normally reject traditional solutions based on heredity, ritual, and

revelation. The opportunity costs of leaving are low because dissatisfied members can go

elsewhere to found their own NGOs.

Examples of Charismatic Communities

The Tongji University Student Green Group provides contrapositive proof of the thesis

that a NGO leader determines the efficacy of an NGO. Because it does not have a single, clear

168
Ibid.
 49

charismatic authority figure, the Tongji group cannot be an effective organization.

The Tongji group had a student trip leader, who was active during the school year,

managed the group logistics, relations with the university, and pre-trip preparation. But she was

not responsible for logistics in Inner Mongolia. She recruited the help of a schoolmate whose

godfather was director of a technical college in Hohhot, the provincial capital. Her godfather’s

staff planned the trip in Inner Mongolia – the hostels, transportation, meals, and even protection

in the form of members of the local mafia in some cities. There was confusion about the exact

hierarchy of authority – who was in charge and when. This was also complicated by the adults on

the trip. They drove the students from Lanqi to Baiqi city, set them up at the hostels, took them

to dinner, and drove them to villages and farms outside of the cities. The adults also represented

another possible source of authority that was never clarified. In Lanqi, the group met up with

friends of the godfather for dinner. Many adults gave due deference to the goddaughter because

they were helping the group as a favor to her godfather. Doting on his goddaughter affirmed that

personal connection. Students and adults were confused about who was in charge. Even if an

activity were scheduled, the group couldn’t go anywhere until the adults with the vans arrived.

The leadership structure was further complicated by the godfather’s status as an authority figure.

But his status was unclear because it was an independent student group. He was an external,

adult figure not related to the group’s daily operation.

The Tongji group did not have a clear hierarchy of authority or a single, uncontested

leader. The lack of a charismatic authority corresponds with the group’s very limited governance

capacity and overall inefficacy. The lack of a formal management structure eroded the capacity

of this group to effect change. There was limited pre-planning about where to go, what to
 50

accomplish, how to carry out interviews, or even evaluation of how events went.

The experience of the Tongji group affirms the necessity of a single charismatic, well-

connected leader to the development of a successful, citizen-organized social group. That most

leaders choose to adopt informal management structures is largely a result of convenience,

choice, and experience. It is much more difficult to construct functional, democratic, formal

structures - especially if one is leading a charismatic movement in which the vision, rather than

the method, is of primary import. Few of these charismatic leaders have had sufficient

experience with democratic structures to construct them on their own. Finally, the Tongji group

also demonstrates the need for the charismatic leader to have elite connections. The trip only

succeeded because of the godfather’s connections and willingness to arrange logistics for the

group. Without such elite connections, the group could have done little.

There are other reasons behind the failure of the trip to be effective. Management

structures in student groups are notoriously difficult to create given that there are few significant

distinctions in skill or background between students that allow for a legitimate, functioning

hierarchy. Students also resist impositions of authority by their peers. Any such management

structures are also difficult to stabilize given the fluidity of these organizations. Older students

graduate and newer ones join. This is not to say that student organizations cannot be effective or

institutionalized, but that it is very difficult for them to have consistent long-term effects. As

history can testify, major political change in China has been initiated by student mobilization.

Friends of Nature (FON) and the rest of the case studies directly prove the relationship

between the charismatic leader and the fate of the CSO. Liang stated that, “In contrast to the

typical Chinese organization which is formal and hierarchical, FON is one big family where
 51

everyone is equal and positions outside the organization do not matter.”169 But at least up until

Liang’s departure, FON exhibited characteristics of charismatic mobilization.

While FON does not exhibit the characteristics of a traditional Chinese bureaucracy, this

may not be a positive factor. Informal groups must be able to organize collective action to

function, even if they do not do so through formal structures.170 A lack of formality limits the

group’s efficacy in planning and implementing complex projects. That FON lacks characteristics

of a bureaucratic hierarchy does not mean that it is not a charismatic hierarchy. CSOs need

formal management structures and norms facilitating cohesion.171 Large families need strong

parents to unite them. This informal, charismatic structure is potentially worse than a formal,

bureaucratic one. Andreas’ and Weber’s analysis of the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the

dynastic system show that charismatic mobilization traditionally do not bode well for China.172

What about the idea that “everyone is equal and positions outside the organization do not

matter”? 173 The existence of staff and a NGO director means that some people are functionally

different – an idea that the second phrase does not preclude. Positions inside FON do matter even

if just for logistics. Someone must arrange the activities to which others attend.

FON’s dependence on the founding NGO leader generated a vertical management style.

Scholars have previously noted FON’s dependence on Liang’s cultural and political capital.

Schwartz174 and Yang175 questioned the sustainability of FON given its reliance on personal

169
“Biography of Congjie Liang,” Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundation, 2000,
http://www.rmaf.org.ph/Awardees/Biography/BiographyLiangCon.htm, accessed January 24, 2010.
170
Ibid.
171
Andreas, “The Structure of Charismatic Mobilization,” pp. 437.
172
Ibid; Weber, Economy and society, Volume 1.
173
“Biography of Congjie Liang,” accessed January 24, 2010.
174
Schwartz, “Environmental NGOs in China: Roles and Limits,” pp. 40.
175
Yang, “Environmental NGOs and Institutional Dynamics in China,” pp. 60-61.
 52

authority and connections. Ho and Edmonds explicitly link vertical management structure with

poor internal governance and FON.176 Economy’s account of FON’s founding history captures

well FON’s initial reliance on Liang’s existing personal capital. 177 The Ramon Magsaysay

biography also notes, “Liang has made extensive use of his connections, not only to the

Communist Party but also to the media and other institutions with which FON (and Liang

personally) enjoys good relations.”178 Yang identifies Liang as an organizational entrepreneur

who “combines cultural prestige with political capital.”179 Schwartz says:

Liang’s connections play an important part in FN successes. The fact that Liang Congjie is both a famous
person with many personal contacts, and is a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference Standing Committee, buffers FN from potentially hostile criticisms by government officials.
Liang’s status has also enabled him to successfully achieve domestic and international credibility for FN,
and attract domestic and international funding. He can convey FN ideas directly to government decision
makers, forcing many otherwise unsympathetic officials to consider his agenda.180

Personalized authority and the lack of a clear, formal decision-making structure meant that most

“major and minor decisions [fell to Liang], with or without consultation of subordinate staff.”181

Liang’s original cultural and political capital developed into charismatic authority as he

became the ‘father’ of the environmental movement. Liang was originally a good candidate

because of the traditional authority he had inherited due to his ‘reform heritage.’ His ancestors’

reform efforts established his interest in the environmental movement – despite his lack of field

expertise – as genuine, legitimate, and potentially powerful. Liang’s persona as an environmental

hero was sealed with news reports by international and national TV networks and newspapers,

awards given him by international organizations, and financial support from international

176
Ho and Edmonds, China's embedded activism, pp. 33.
177
Economy, The river runs black, pp. 146.
178
“Biography of Congjie Liang,” Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundation, accessed January 24, 2010.
179
Yang, “Environmental NGOs and Institutional Dynamics in China,” pp. 60-61.
180
Schwartz, “Environmental NGOs in China: Roles and Limits,” pp. 40.
181
Ho and Edmonds, China's embedded activism, pp. 33.
 53

organizations as FON became the “darling of western environmentalists.”182

Liang is hailed as “the soul of China’s non-governmental environmental protection.”183

As such, many do believe that Liang embodies part of the “green mission.” FON was actually

founded by a group of four professors from the Academy for Chinese Culture. But most sources

only identify Liang as the founder. This common reporting error demonstrates the extent to

which he personally embodies this mythology. Finally, much of the founding discourse of FON

deals with Liang’s status as a pioneer of CSOs and environmentalism who made history as the

first to tackle ambiguous government non-profit laws. Liang said, “[We] knew from television

about Greenpeace, but there wasn't anything like that in China… My friends and I began

wondering, why not have something like that here?”184

But to what extent are Liang and FON revolutionary if Liang sees FON as more “homey”

than conflict-creating? And insofar as FON sees its primary role as assisting the government to

improve environmental education? While not revolutionary in repudiating the state, these NGOs

and FON are revolutionary in repudiating the conspicuous consumption of contemporary

Chinese society and in challenging a historical tradition that has never seen NGOs before.185

They are pioneers in their field. Weber’s discussion of charisma in religious movements reveals

that charismatic leaders can be revolutionary in challenging society and current thought.186

FON has at times confronted the local government, though it has usually done so with the

support of the central government. The central government has deliberately created a “political
182
Gluckman, “Turning Red China Green,” accessed January 24, 2010.
183
Zhang Tingting, “The Soul of China’s Environmental NGOs,” China.org.cn, February 20, 2006,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/158625.htm, accessed January 4, 2010.
184
Katherine Ellison, “Let one hundred NGOs bloom,” Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, Vol. 4, No. 7,
2006, Ecological Society of America, pp. 392-392, http://www.esajournals.org/doi/full/10.1890/1540-
9295%282006%29004%5B0392%3ALOHNB%5D2.0.CO%3B2, accessed January 4, 2010.
185
Weber, Economy and society, pp. 250-260.
186
Ibid.
 54

system with multiple levels of authority [to reduce] uncertainties [for the central government]

and [to avoid blame when local authorities use repression].”187 FON has taken advantage of this

political system to circumvent destructive local governments and advance its revolutionary

agenda at a national level. Finally, FON has been revolutionary in pushing the boundaries of

what the state considers acceptable NGO behavior.

The concept of FON staff as disciples is affirmed by the number of FON staff who have

gone on to found their own NGOs. FON’s website says: “possibly FON’s greatest achievement

is helping to foster a growing network of grassroots environmental NGOs throughout China.”188

Ru and Ortolano extensively detailed the connections between founders of CENGOs.189 They

agree, “FON has had a particularly extensive influence on China’s environmental movement.

Founders of 17 of the 67 citizen-organized ENGOs examined here were once FON members

staff, volunteers or supporters.”190 Some of Liang’s disciples have even gone on to gather their

own followers. Each disciple has thus become “an agent of the common mission” of

environmental education, “borrowing the charismatic authority of the central leader [to help

establish their legitimacy], but also generating his or her own authority.”

Finally, this conception of FON as a charismatic community helps explain how it has

been able to accomplish so much with less than ten staff. This network of charismatic authority

has greater reach than one institutionalized NGO. The former requires much less management

than the latter, which needs a complicated, bureaucratic hierarchy. It is also a better fit for the

political situation, given the illegality of establishing regional affiliations or branch offices. As

187
Yongshun Cai, “Power Structure and Regime Resilience: Contentious Politics in China,” British Journal of
Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom: 2008), pp. 411.
188
“About FON,” Friends of Nature, http://www.fon.org.cn/channal.php?cid=774, accessed January 4, 2010.
189
Ru and Ortolano, “Development of Citizen-Organized Environmental NGOs in China,” pp. 151.
190
Ibid.
 55

Schwartz says, “This approach cannot be as effective as close collaboration with branch offices

and a large and active membership, but is less likely to draw negative attention from the

government.”191 But it has less ‘depth’ because though many may volunteer, they cannot become

seriously involved into the organization. Schwartz notes, “Another concern is that applicants for

membership often want to be active. [FON] lacks the capacity to meet such requests and would

prefer more “checkbook activism.””192

As salaries offered at FON are relatively low, staff with a strong interest in its work and a

real stake in its future are critical to its continued existence. Interest was the only thing keeping

staff and volunteers in FON. The only way to ensure the future of FON was to give staffers a

greater role in the organization so as to make them larger stakeholders in its continued existence.

Previous scholars’ preoccupation with the survivability of CENGOs also affirms the

suitability of the charismatic mobilization theory. As Schwartz says:

Barring Liang’s presence, it is unlikely that FN would enjoy its current level of international and domestic
recognition and prestige. FN members express concern that when Liang departs, the limited freedom of
action currently enjoyed by FN will be constrained and the very existence of the organization will come
into question....193

Global Village Beijing (GVB). GVB was also marked by poor internal governance and

exhibits a vertical, informal management structure. GVB’s dependence on Liao Xiaoyi’s

personal connections and capabilities have also been well documented. Yang posits that she

represents a second type of organizational entrepreneur who is “strong in professional expertise

and international connections:”194

[GVB’s] growth has depended significantly on foreign funding. Liao’s educational experience in the

191
Schwartz, “Environmental NGOs in China: Roles and Limits,” pp. 39.
192
Ibid, pp. 39.
193
Schwartz, “Environmental NGOs in China: Roles and Limits,” pp. 40.
194
Ibid.
 56

United States and personal ties with international organizations have helped in her fundraising efforts.
Under Liao’s leadership, GVB quickly developed a reputation. She was also among those invited to meet
the visiting US President Bill Clinton in 1998. In 2000, Liao won the prestigious Sophie Prize, a major
international environmental prize.195

Schwartz says, cryptically, “In some respects, GVB faces a more uncertain future since control

over GVB is more tightly situated in the director’s hands.”196

The story is similar: the charismatic leader attracts volunteers, makes political and

international connections, and directs the organization according to their vision. Most decisions

also end up in the founder’s hands. The low-paying salary and high turn-over rate are both

causes and effects of this personalized structure. Even when Liao appointed a ‘director’ for

GVB, she played second fiddle to Liao, who had an ambiguous role as ‘founder.’ For example,

in a fundraising meeting with SEE and a domestic foundation, Liao talked the entire time. The

‘director’ sat at Liao’s side, getting up once to hand out Liao’s and her own business cards.197

The predominance of Liao’s personalized authority in GVB helps explain the rapid

changes in its work. GVB has progressed from environmental education TV programs to an

educational center and finally, an eco-village in Sichuan. These major changes in GVB’s mission

are quickly and easily decided by Liao, rather than by the NGO as a functional unit.

That Liao is interchangeable with GVB in the literature and news reports highlights the

degree of personalization. Many of the TV programs GVB produced were essentially produced

by Liao. In some biographies and reports, Liao produced them; in others, credit is given to GVB.

Whereas Liang of FON employed his personal cultural and political capital, whereas Liao

capitalized on her “professional expertise and international connections.” There is also a major

difference in their level of capital: Liang was credible and legitimate on a domestic level and
195
Ibid.
196
Ibid.
197
Interview 39, by author, Beijing, China.
 57

Liao, on an international one.

Liao’s charismatic authority hit a high when she became known as “Queen Green.”198 Her

status as “arguably the most famous woman environmental-protection activist in China”199 was

sealed by reports in international and national TV networks and newspapers, international

awards like the Sophie Award,200 and financial support from international organizations.

The commonly accepted vision defined by Liao is that of a “green lifestyle” as part of a

grassroots approach to sustainability.201 Some do believe that Liao embodies this vision of a

green lifestyle. Like Liang and FON, Liao and GVB were also revolutionary in pushing the

boundary of what is acceptable for NGOs and pioneering CSOs and environmentalism.

But GVB differs from FON in not focusing on the creation of smaller regional NGOs by

staff and volunteers. Global Village Beijing has only facilitated the creation of one other NGO.202

This is unsurprising given the high turnover rate.203 Two interviewees separately told me that

GVB has trouble retaining staff, as the young people who work there often cannot cope with

Liao’s management style. Though young people are willing to work for minimal salaries, they

are more used to being independent. Since the salaries are so low, there is little opportunity cost

to simply working elsewhere. Many staff leave GVB once it became apparent that they would

have little decision-making power. If the leader is unwilling to share power and experiences with

disciples, they leave and do not carry on the mission.

198
“The Greening of Liao Xiaoyi,” Beijing This Month, February 2001,
http://www.btmbeijing.com/contents/en/btm/2001-02/beijinginaction/greening, accessed January 4, 2010.
199
Ibid.
200
“Global Village Beijing Founder Honored with the William J. Clinton Global Citizen Award,” July 7, 2009, One
Tribe Creative,
http://onetribecreative.blogspot.com/2009/07/global-village-beijing-founder-honored.html, accessed January 4,
2010.
201
“Liao Xiaoyi,” China.org.cn, accessed January 24, 2010.
202
Ru and Ortolano, “Development of Citizen-Organized Environmental NGOs in China,” pp. 152.
203
Interviews 19 and 35, with author, Beijing, China.
 58

GVB has yet to experience a leadership crisis like FON. Whether or not it can overcome

the succession problem is still unresolved. But its high turnover rate does not bode well because

it precludes the accumulation of institutional capacity and memory beyond Liao herself and the

development of real stakeholders in GVB. It also suggests a dependence on Liao that is even

greater than FON’s dependence on Liang. The primary problem with personalized authority

structures in low-paying voluntary organizations, then, is simply that people choose to leave.

Alxa SEE (Society Entrepreneur Ecology). The concentration of authority in one person

can be beneficial. An autocrat dedicated to reform, accountability and democracy can more

effectively and rapidly bring about such changes than a democratic leader. The comparative

success of SEE in maintaining democratic internal governance structures is a result of

institutional dedication to principles of democracy. Also critical are mechanisms to ensure

respect for these ideals and curb the effects of charismatic mobilization. SEE fits into the

charismatic mobilization paradigm in a different, positive way.

SEE began with an entrepreneur concerned about desertification. He made the conscious

decision to involve more entrepreneurs, though not because the problem is so complex. All

organizations working in Inner Mongolia are dealing with the same problem. But no other NGO

has recruited help from peers in the same way as SEE. FON and GVB are tackling even bigger

issues in their goals to promote environmental education and a “green lifestyle.” Another

possibility is the founder’s charisma, command of management skills, and the greater quantity of

resources – financial, human, and social – at his disposal. While this may be true, it is difficult to

believe that entrepreneurs are more open to social ventures than academics – a parallel class of

peers Liang Congjie of FON could have drawn upon – or activists – the peers with whom Liao
 59

Xiaoyi could have allied. There was a real choice in the decision to recruit other entrepreneurs

into SEE. The founder’s ability to create a complicated management structure and recruit over 80

of his peers into making a financial and time commitment attests to his charisma. His ability to

mobilize people is apparent, but he distinguished himself in choosing to create a formal,

democratic internal governance structure.

Though membership in Alxa SEE is limited by a high financial threshold, the unique

organizational structure allows for members’ equal say and participation. Proceedings are

arguably equal and democratic as the 80 founders are all Perpetual Council Members. In contrast

to FON and GVB, members are stakeholders not just out of personal interest but because they

invested financial resources into SEE. For example, the selection procedure for management

figures “turned from single-candidate election into a competitive election”204 as more members

wanted to have a say in how their money was spent.

The status of the Charter Members was both formally and informally equal. Formally,

they had all committed to contributing the same base amount of money and all enjoyed the status

of being Charter Members and Perpetual Council Members. Informally, they were all wealthy

entrepreneurs who were the heads of their own companies. Some entrepreneurs were no doubt

wealthier than others. But it seems unlikely that this created a sort of informal hierarchy. The

aggregation of so many people accustomed to being agents of personalized authority in their own

enterprises made the emergence of a single, clear personalized authority structure unlikely. Once

the decision had been made to make SEE a group effort, a democratic structure was required to

keep SEE a group effort. Furthermore, all entrepreneurs had chosen to participate in SEE, and

204
“A Summary on the First Session of SEE Council Meeting,” Alxa SEE, June 29, 2005,
http://see.sina.com.cn/en/2005/0629/35.html, accessed January 4, 2010.
 60

were free to leave at any time. It is likely that some entrepreneurs might have defected if they felt

that the organization was not adequately representing or taking into account their interests.

My research also suggests that they were all part of the same social network. Other social

relationships were at play. As the entrepreneurs ran in similar circles, their participation

constitutes a multi-person, repeated game in which their reputation was at stake. One

entrepreneur was key in raising interest among his friends about the project but the high turnout

was the result of the activation of multiple personal networks. The desire to not lose professional

and personal “face”205 and financial support by losing Charter Members represents a strong

incentive for the entire leadership structure of SEE – from the Secretary-General and director of

the Inner Mongolia office – to be accountable.

There is a stark difference between being accountable to a collective membership and to a

charismatic leader, as is the case in FON and GVB. As a body of people that vote to decide

organizational issues, the perspective of the SEE membership cannot be predicted or checked in

the same way as with a charismatic leader. An unsure program officer in FON or GVB could

easily approach the director for consultation, and would know quickly what the ‘right’ course of

action would be. There is a reduced need for formal management because these NGOs are small

and informal enough that staff can simply consult the leader when they have questions, and carry

out their decision. Or, staff will carry out their ideas but with the blessing – implicit or explicit –

of the leader, since ideas unpopular with the founder are unlikely to be carried out.

An unsure program officer in SEE cannot simply consult their leader, because short of an

actual vote nobody can really predict, consult, or know what the membership – as the collective

leadership – will think about a certain issue. Thus, there is a strong need for a formal
205
In China, “face” (mianzi) is a phrase denoting personal reputation.
 61

management structure because SEE is large enough that the organization could not function

efficiently without one. There is also a need for an established vision to guide program staff and

directors in developing and implementing ideas. But there is also room for interpretation of what

exactly falls under the mission statement, allowing for innovation by program staff to better

address problems they observe in the field. This innovation need not be directly approved by

directors before implementation, but can be tested and expanded if successful or remain an

important test case if unsuccessful.

Given the symmetry of the members’ relationships, they probably would have had equal

opportunities to speak and be heard. They all equally feel invested and have a shared sense of

responsibility in the NGO as a collective endeavor. The existence of collective action dilemmas

is affirmed by the fact that members pushed for the leadership selection procedure to change

“from single-candidate election into a competitive election.”206

The discussion of election procedure continued past who qualified as a candidate into

whether there was a sufficient quorum to vote. Every candidate made a brief campaign speech,

though one entrepreneur demanded that his candidacy be transferred to the president of his

company, “who had more time and energy to participate in the work of the association.”207

Scholars often argue that the success of an election depends on the losing candidates’

ability to accept defeat. The SEE website references the speech of Wang Weijia, who lost the

election but declared, “Though I lost the election, I am glad…Within only several hours…we’ve

actually obtained such satisfactory election results out of a chaos of procedures. It proves that our

entrepreneurs have very strong, democratic consciousness. I have failed to be elected, but I

206
“A Summary on the First Session of SEE Council Meeting,” Alxa SEE, June 29, 2005,
http://see.sina.com.cn/en/2005/0629/35.html, accessed January 4, 2010.
207
Ibid.
 62

participated in, let us applaud for the future success of the association.”208

As of 2008, SEE also had a strong internal management system in its regional office in

Alashan, Inner Mongolia. That villagers serve as NGO representatives and actively participate in

choosing projects and contributing financially affirms the sustainability and grassroots nature of

its work. The use of explicitly democratic mechanisms like open elections among participating

villagers for the NGO representative post and among the NGO representatives for selecting

funded programs affirms SEE’s democratic internal management structure. This type of structure

is especially important with regard to maintaining a constructive, mutual relationship between

NGO staff and villagers as the ‘clients’ SEE hopes to aid.

There was also constructive dialogue between the staff in Alashan and the office director,

though the level of such could vary widely based on the personal management styles of each

director. The new director in 2008 chose to run the office democratically, according to open,

transparent principles espoused by SEE’s charter. It was a strategic decision that strengthened his

own position and increased organizational efficacy. But it was also a personal decision based on

personal commitment to these principles. He encouraged everyone’s input in the meetings, from

interns to NGO representatives, government officials, and staff.

The strong, democratic management structure and the principles of transparency,

accountability, and equality in membership. The maintenance of a comparatively higher quality

of internal governance in SEE is a result of a dedication to democracy and the enforcement of

mechanisms of accountability embedded into the organizational structure. For example, the

elections established a spirit of equality among members and accountability of officials to the

membership. The division of responsibility allows for innovation in attempting to better address
208
Ibid.
 63

the needs of the clients or increase efficiency, but also accountability to the members as financial

and social investors. In China’s unique socio-political environment, accountability is a deliberate

choice against the status quo. And, at least in this case, accountability is also a result of a

successful charismatic mobilization – though directed toward more positive results.

There were both practical and ideological incentives for democratic internal governance.

These incentives functioned on structural (organizational) levels and personal levels. Practically,

a formal, democratic structure is better suited for the heavily-grassroots type projects SEE

conducts in Alashan, for the group-based membership structure, the relative parity of members,

and the size of the organization. Members, staff and citizen participants are personally

committed to these grassroots, bottom-up, democratic principles and SEE’s institutions as formal

laws that are to be respected. The organization as a whole was structured to promote and

maintain these principles. These institutional mechanisms – the use of elections, involvement of

villagers and local government, focus on accountability – help ensure these principles are upheld.

Echoing Steppe (ES). This group exists mainly through the effort of one man, Chen

Jiqun. ES is very much a charismatic group dependent on Chen’s vision and charisma for

implementation. My research suggests the group has not institutionalized or expanded because

Chen does not see the need for permanent programs, an established management structure or

full-time staff. He said he believes in short-term programs designed to meet the immediate needs

of communities rather than institutionalizing and expanding CSO staff and establishing

permanent programs.209 Chen was reluctant to invest in the organizational capacity of ES. He

works mainly in the town of Mandu, near the border with the country of Mongolia. Chen’s

209
Interviews 60 and 61, by author, Mandu, Inner Mongolia, China.
 64

strong local connections there have facilitated the implementation of his programs, including the

joint research trip with Mongolian universities in 2008.

But Chen has faced difficulty securing stable, significant funding for his organization. He

previously conducted a joint project with FON that involved teaching herders basic computer

skills and educating them about desertification and central government land laws. But funding

was abruptly cut off after several years. His lack of institutional progress and inability to ensure

the future existence of ES were major obstacles to securing funding. Few people were willing to

give money to one person to carry out these programs. At the same time, the lack of funding

perpetuates these problems. His lack of international or nonprofit contacts, non-profit fundraising

skills, and reluctance to formalize have obstructed ES’ hopes for continued efficacy. Chen could

receive capacity training or simply hire people, even interns, to conduct necessary fundraising

and lay the groundwork for expansion. But Chen sees his work as a work of personal passion for

the grassland that he wishes to pass on and communicate to others. It is not an organizational or

institutional effort, but personal on every level. In this case, the charismatic authority has chosen

to ignore some key aspects of maintaining authority. Chen had no in hiring elite, professional

non-profit staff or spreading the mission to disciples who would found their own CSOs.

Comparison of SEE, Echoing Steppe, and Tongji University Group

The three organizations addressing desertification in Inner Mongolia fall along different

points in the spectrum of formal organization. The formal but not personalized management

structure of SEE highlights its nature as a fairly democratic, institutionalized NGO. The Tongji

student group was neither formal nor personalized and generally quite chaotic. Echoing Steppe is

not formal but highly personalized as one person, Chen Jiqun, does most of the work. There are
 65

thus different levels of institutionalization: SEE is a strong NGO, Tongji is a loosely organized

student group, and ES is more a personal social network than an NGO. ES affirms the idea that

an NGO leader’s personal connections are key to an NGO’s success. But China has had great

success accessing strong local and national contacts. A better reason why Chen has not been

more successful in expanding ES is that he does not see the need for institutionalization. His area

of work is also quite specific, requiring relative fluency in Mongolian as well as Mandarin. So

finding more staff with the same dedication to Mandu, ability to speak both Mandarin and

Mongolian is difficult, and willingness to work for a very low salary is difficult.

Tongji demonstrates the disconnection between what is needed on the ground by locals

and what ‘NGO’ staff or ‘social activists,’ usually from the cities, can offer. SEE shows that

more democratic, institutionalized NGOs are possible, even in authoritarian China. However, it

is a very special NGO given its strong entrepreneurial backing. But recent changes in leadership,

a dispute between the Secretary-General and the Vice Secretary-General, and an exodus of staff

from the Beijing office do cast doubt on the extent to which SEE – and specifically, the Beijing

office – is continuously democratic and institutionalized.

The three also have different levels of local participation and engagement. SEE had an

agreement with the local government to hire locals from the Alashan region. Tongji had no local

members and little local interaction as a consequence of lack of interest and the language barrier.

ES was entirely fueled by local energy, channeled by Chen Jiqun. Chen, while Han, had

extensive experience in Mandu, and was almost an honorary local community member.

They also had different relationships with the local, regional and central governments.

SEE cooperates with the Ministry of Environment. Generally, most local governments are eager
 66

to work with SEE and want to see it expand its work.210 Local governments see it as a huge boon

that high profile, wealthy and capable entrepreneurs want to come and help sustainably develop

their jurisdictions. SEE has also established a good reputation of facilitating economic growth

and satisfying the populace while maintaining strong working relationships with the government.

The Tongji University group had personal and academic relations that it leveraged to its

benefit.211 It brought a signed statement from Tongji University officially presenting the group

and stating its purpose, in the event that identification was required.212 Finally, ES has close ties

with the village, township and, to an extent, central governments. But not with the regional and

provincial governments, which see it as simply agitating the populace and obstructing their

policy goals. ES sees itself as empowering local villagers to ensure proper regional government

enforcement of central government land laws.

The organizations also have different perspectives toward the government. SEE figures

that government interference in environmental issues is unavoidable. As such, it works with both

villagers and government officials to make policy changes palpable to constituents. So when

herders were forcibly settled into a village to raise dairy cows, SEE worked with Heifer

International and the herders to create a safer and cleaner cow pen and milking station. SEE sees

cooperation with the (local) government as necessary to effective, long-term, scalable change.213

On the other hand, ES empowers locals to confront and change regional government policy,

leveraging central government rhetoric to do so. Chen believes that government interference is

avoidable or can be mitigated if locals are aware of their rights and can present a rational,

210
Interview 67, by author, Alashan, Inner Mongolia, China.
211
Interview 57, by author, Hohhot, Inner Mongolia, China.
212
Interview 58, by author, Baiqi, Inner Mongolia, China.
213
Interview 51, by author, Alashan, Inner Mongolia, China.
 67

compelling argument grounded in the law.

Finally, SEE addresses extreme desertification in Alashan. It is the westernmost county in

Inner Mongolia and one of the poorest. It sits right at the edge of the encroaching desert. The

Tongji group attempted to educate younger students and locals about desertification in cities in

central Inner Mongolia, even though most herding and desertification goes on in the rural areas.

Finally, ES works to prevent desertification in Northeast Inner Mongolia. This area has some of

the best-preserved grassland in Inner Mongolia, and is still in the hands of the locals.

Charismatic Mobilization as a Descriptive Model

The charisma, skills, preferences and connections of the NGO leader determine its

success. Manifestations of charismatic mobilization differ because they depend on the leader’s

preference, abilities, position and ideas. SEE is more democratic because its founding leader

intended for it to be so and created it as a consensus-based restricted membership organization.

FON and GVB are successful organizations based on personal authority. The case of the Tongji

group demonstrated how at loss, ineffective, and unsuccessful CSOs can be if they do not have a

single, clear leader. Chen’s unwillingness to invest in the structure and management of Echoing

Steppe precluded its growth into an NGO.

Charismatic authority is a subtype of the personalized authority identified in the case

studies. The latter constitutes the concentration of authority around one person. The former is the

concentration of authority around one person via the use of charisma. Personalized authority may

also be produced by traditional means – for example, a prince may inherit a kingdom on the basis

of heredity. Liang Congjie is arguably the most successful charismatic authority in the case

studies because he has successfully developed a network of ‘local disciples’ to advance his
 68

mission. The specificity of Chen Jiqun’s work and the functional, closed nature of Liao Xiaoyi’s

authority were much less personally ‘charismatic.’ But both Chen and Liao pioneered different

fields and have been remarkably successful in implementing innovative programs. The founders

of SEE are arguably the most effective charismatic authorities as they chose to involve a much

larger circle of entrepreneurs to support the organization socially and financially. They also

chose to value equality, contention and local investiture. They deliberately instituted mechanisms

of accountability to ensure that these principles are upheld while still maintaining a formalized,

professional management structure that allows for bottom-up innovation and response.

The case studies reveal that the CSOs’ founding histories reflect the principles of

charismatic mobilization. But after the initial founding of the CSO, the charismatic leader to

determines the CSO’s internal governance structure. The internal governance of the CSOs are

similar to the structure of charismatic groups. Many NGOs are led by famous, well-connected

leaders who exhibit charisma as “the ability of a leader to mobilize people without the benefits or

constraints of a formal organization.”214 The founding history of many NGOs is characterized by

charismatic mobilization, in which a charismatic leader attracts followers to his vision. Poor

management endangers the sustainability of even the most successful NGOs.

This chapter has argued that a well, connected charismatic leader as important to the

creation of a successful NGO as autonomy or advocacy. But it is important to distinguish

between charismatic mobilization and personal charisma. There is a plethora of definitions and

typologies of charisma in the sociological literature. This thesis uses one, functional definition of

charisma – the ability to mobilize people without the aid of an organization. But different

methods can be used to mobilize people – through the use of personal charisma or of functional
214
Andreas, “The Structure of Charismatic Mobilization,” pp. 437.
 69

tools like learned skills. Therefore, even though GVB and FON are both products of charismatic

mobilization, Liang and Liao exhibit different types of charisma and are not equally charismatic

as people. FON spreads its message through people – Liang’s ‘disciples’ and FON’s many NGO

offshoots. GVB spreads its message through TV shows and community programs.

But the level of the leader’s personal charisma does matter for the internal operation of

the organization. Yiyi Lu explains the poor internal state of many NGOs:

[Once NGO leaders’] work has brought them rewards such as fame and professional opportunities…[some]
are unable to convince those around them that they care about the NGOs’ missions more than about these
personal gains. At the same time their success is dependent on their being portrayed as high-minded
individuals who put self-interest aside to pursue public causes. This discrepancy between the public image
and the actual behaviour of NGO leaders as observed by their colleagues appears to be an important reason
why there is often a great deal of cynicism among NGO staff about the motives of their leaders…The
prevalent cynicism among NGO staff has contributed to an internal culture in many NGOs which is
characterized by a lack of trust and openness between leaders and other members, a lack of institutional
loyalty, much backbiting and incessant power struggles. While many NGO staff complain about the self-
serving behaviour of their leaders, many of them also inadvertently reveal that they themselves do not
always put the interest of their organizations above their own.…215

Charismatic leaders are better at holding organizations together with their personal weight.

Liang’s charisma has helped FON create a whole generation of NGO leaders to spread FON’s

mission. Liao’s lack of personal charisma has created problems for GVB with very high turnover

and a lack of organizational consistency. But the existence of a charismatic leader does not

preclude infighting between ‘disciples’ or power struggles. For example, even though there were

technically four founders of FON, Liang emerged later on to be the primary figure in the

organization’s founding. It was only until Liang was unable to lead that Liang Xiaoyan – not

related to Liang Congjie, but another of the original four founders – became director of FON.

And a deputy leader at SEE intimated to me, shortly after his departure from the organization,

that many of the most democratic aspects of the organization were about to change.216

215
Yiyi Lu, “Environmental Civil Society and Governance in China,” Chatham House: Asia Programme, August
2005, www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/3268_china160805.pdf, accessed February 24, 2010, pp. 6.
216
Interview 15, by author, Beijing, China.
 70

Charismatic mobilization theory fails to capture the internal interactions between staff in

NGOs. While it does not argue that all NGO staff look adoringly upon their leaders, it does not

say much about how charismatic communities operate other than that most decision-making

power resides in the leader. Charismatic mobilization theory does not account for this cynical

internal culture in NGOs. If staff members are so devoted to the mission as defined by the

founder, why is there so much backstabbing and cynicism in the operation of NGOs? One reason

may be that there are variations in this internal culture depending on the NGO leader’s type and

level of charisma. My research suggests that there was comparatively less cynicism – evinced by

the number of related grassroots NGOs that have sprung up – in FON under Liang Congjie due

to his strong personal charisma. There is much more cynicism in GVB under Liao Xiaoyi due to

her reliance on technical skills and functional connections for mobilization. Another argument is

that this cynical internal culture results from a lack of an institutionalized, democratic internal

governance structure that delegates decision-making authority and welcomes discussion.

CHAPTER V

CHINESE NGOS AS NOT DEMOCRATIC OR INSTITUTIONALIZED

Well-governed groups are institutionalized and democratic, though they may have an

operational hierarchy. Charismatic communities are, by definition, not institutionalized or

democratic. Charismatic structures are inherently vertical and autocratic in their concentration of

decision-making power in one person. The informal governance structures of charismatic

communities are transitory, impermanent, and “take place without set rules and procedures.”217

217
Andreas, “The Structure of Charismatic Mobilization,” pp. 437.
 71

CSOs that are not democratic or institutionalized are less effectual in engaging the state,

whether it is through advocacy or socialization. Personalized, informal CSOs are much less

effective in inculcating civic virtues and skills in participants as there are few collective action

dilemmas when decision-making power is concentrated in the leader. The internal specifics of

poor governance are best explained by the CSOs’ status as not democratic or institutionalized.

Many of the CSOs in the case studies focus on changing the state through policy-making

advocacy. Because China is an autocracy, significant change in policy must have high-level

government support. As such, many scholars question whether successful NGO advocacy

campaigns were actually a significant factor in pushing for reform.218 Or, if they are smartly

utilized by the government to drum up publicity, participation and support for the green

initiatives it pursues. Many scholars neglect to consider that CSOs can also critically increase

rights consciousness, political participation, and feelings of citizenship so as to empower and

teach the public to fight for their rights. Rather than focusing solely on advocacy, which can be

quickly negated by the state, CSOs might also invest on shaping their own internal management

to maximize participants’ experience of the CSO as a miniature exercise in democracy. The

existing literature’s overemphasis on advocacy is unmerited.

The Internal Operation of Democratic, Institutionalized NGOs

Ideally, democratic NGOs should employ the democratic principles they espouse in

governing their internal affairs. They should utilize a horizontally organized management system

and democratic methods, including cooperation and compromise, to achieve democratic goals.

218
Ho, “Greening Without Conflict,” pp. 893; Schwartz, “Environmental NGOs in China: Roles and Limits,” pp.
47; Brettell, “Environmental non-governmental organizations in the People’s Republic of China,” pp. 27-56; Lo and
Leung, “Environmental Agency and Public Opinion in Guangzhou,” pp. 704; Ho and Edmonds, China's embedded
activism, pp. 33.
 72

Membership in NGOs should be a miniature exercise in democracy that instills greater

understanding of the rights and duties of citizenship.

NGOs should be democratic in form and function to promote the civic virtues,

participation, and socializing change touted as benefits of civil society. Civic virtues include

“attention to the public good, habits of cooperation, toleration, respect for others, respect for the

rule of law, willingness to participate in public life, self-confidence, and efficacy.”219 Another is

“generalized reciprocity,” which improves democratic governance by increasing citizen

compliance with democratic laws and improving citizens' ability to demand state accountability

and “sanction [the state] when [it] fail[s] to perform.”220 While apolitical, these civic virtues

“[facilitate and are generated] by many kinds of associative activity, including not only apolitical

civic groups but also social movements.”221 Civil skills are necessary for political action – “how

to organize themselves, run meetings, write letters, argue issues, and make speeches”222 – and are

practiced by citizens in the public fora of CSOs and the media.223 Associations also “teach their

members skills that are useful in political associations and institutions.”224 Verba posits that

associations teaching civil skills lower the ‘human’ resource barriers to political participation,

thus increasing participation and improving the quality of democracy.

Transfer of such skills requires “relatively dense [face-to-face] interactions between

219
Archon Fung, “Associations and Democracy: Between Theories, Hopes, and Realities,” Annual Review of
Sociology, Vol. 29, (August 2003), pp. 534.
220
As quoted in Fung, “Associations and Democracy,” pp. 519-520, from Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The
Collapse and Revival of American Community, New York: Simon & Schuster (2000), pp. 134. He explains the
concept further: ““I’ll do for you now, without expecting anything immediately in return and perhaps even without
even knowing you, confident that down the road you or someone else will return the favor.”
221
Putnam, Bowling Alone, pp. 152-154.
222
Fung, “Associations and Democracy,” pp. 520.
223
Ibid.
224
As quoted in Ibid, pp. 520, from Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, Associations and Democracy, Verso: London,
1995 and Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady, Voice and equality: civic voluntarism in American
politics, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1995.
 73

members,” which are best fostered by membership associations.225 Horizontally organized CSOs

are more likely to “imbue civil skills and virtues than hierarchically, or vertically, organized

associations.” Horizontal associations “bring together agents of equivalent status and power”

whereas vertical ones “link unequal agents in asymmetric relations of hierarchy and

dependence.”226 Vertical relations, as between patrons and clients, are not mutual.227 They are

less effective in generating generalized reciprocity, social trust, “or a shared sense of

responsibility for collective endeavors.”228 Vertical relations “eliminate collective action

dilemmas”229 with established decision-making hierarchies. But the “experience of arriving at

mutually acceptable decisions and overcoming dilemmas of mutual cooperation is …what makes

participation in civic associations so beneficial for facilitating wider social cooperation.”230 In

comparison, Skocpol’s “advocates without members” associations – vertically-organized, run by

225
Fung, “Associations and Democracy,” pp. 521.
226
Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1993), pp. 173.
227
Finally, critics of the horizontal/vertical paradigm have argued that horizontally organized groups may be prone
to indecision, incapacitation due to an inability to agree or mob rule, as Jefferson feared about democracy in
America. In this sense they may not be much better than vertically organized groups, which may be more efficient. I
would specify, though, that poor internal governance in this thesis is not equivalent to vertical organization. An
organization with good internal governance should still have a skilled leadership and staff to manage volunteers and
optimize their efforts, just as democracies also have hierarchies and leadership. Democratic hierarchies, though, are
grounded in mechanisms of accountability to the people and limited by horizontal accountability to other officials in
the government. As NGO officials are accountable to the people for their job and legitimacy, democratic hierarchies
see much more frank, opinionated discussion by all staff and volunteers alike.
Internal NGO relations, even if asymmetric, can be mutual rather than dependent. For example, the
decision to fire someone would not be entirely under one person’s purview. All decisions would be monitored by a
board of directors or approved by participants. Subordinates have equal opportunities to speak and to be heard.
Thus, they feel invested in the programs and have a shared sense of responsibility for collective endeavors. This
helps create collective action dilemmas that mirror democratic politics that require negotiation, compromise and
tolerance to resolve. The process of coming to mutually acceptable decisions affirms civic values and skills through
repetition. In this sense, the phrase ‘vertically-organized’ taken literally is confusing in its lack of specificity. Some
or most NGOs with strong internal governance would also be literally vertically organized. I thus prefer poor
internal governance, even though Putnam uses the horizontal-vertical terminology.
228
Ibid.
229
Fung, “Associations and Democracy,” pp. 521.
230
Carles Boix and Daniel Posner, “Making Social Capital Work: A Review of Robert Putnam’s Making
Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy,” Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Paper No. 96-4,
June 1996, pp. 4.
 74

unelected NGO professionals and entailing little interaction between members who often only

make financial contributions – are less adept in fostering this type of democracy.

Autonomous but Not Institutionalized or Democratic

Huntington defines institutionalization as autonomy, coherence, adaptability, and

complexity.231 Diamond adapts Huntington’s model to evaluate the institutionalization of NGOs

rather than political parties.232 Institutionalized NGOs must be autonomous from actors that

would manipulate them, including the state. NGOs must be coherent – members should agree

about the mission, structure, and administration. NGOs should also be complex, with multiple,

elaborate functions and substructures at local, regional, and national levels. Finally, NGOs must

adapt to changing political and social situations, like democratization or fluctuating state

regulations. This model evaluates the institutionalization of NGOs to measure their potential for

political impact, which can be positive or negative.

With the exception of SEE, these CENGOs are de facto NGOs with a high degree of

autonomy from the state. But FON, GVB and ES are not adaptable because they may not survive

the incapacitation of their founding leaders. Neither are they complex, as they are usually quite

small – maximum fifteen members – and only operate in one location. Charismatic communities

like FON, GVB, and ES are incoherent because the leader has a monopoly on the interpretation

of the CSO’s mission. Even if they are autonomous, they exhibit a commandist structure rather

than a coherent, adaptable, and complex one.233

But GVB now has two offices – one in Beijing and one in Daping, Sichuan where Liao is
231
Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 12
as cited in Diamond, Developing Democracy, pp. 218-221.
232
Diamond, Developing Democracy, pp. 218-221.
233
Ho and Edmonds, China's embedded activism, pp. 33.
 75

leading the LOHAS eco-village project.234 But its educational television programming,

journalism trainings, and other activities in Beijing have slowed to a trickle since the beginning

of the Sichuan project. Instead of an increase in complexity, GVB has changed focus as the

leader’s interpretation of the NGO’s mission changed. This change in focus does represent a

level of adaptation to the Sichuan earthquake and the new political opportunities it opened up.

But this does not change the fact that GVB likely could not survive the departure of its leader.

SEE has also changed its focus from the Alashan office – which still operates – to

domestic grant making in China.235 But my research suggests that the main difference is that the

adaptation in SEE is more cumulative. SEE has not diverted funds or staff from the Alashan

office to its new NGO Cooperation Bureau. But GVB’s programs in Beijing have suffered as a

result of the change in focus to Daping village. The personnel, composition and nature of GVB

have changed whereas the personnel, composition, and nature of SEE have simply expanded to

account for these new initiatives. This is because Liao has dramatically changed her focus and

GVB, as a charismatic community, has dramatically changed along with her. But the new

governance initiative in Daping – similar to SEE’s programs in involving the local government,

villagers, and GVB – is encouraging and might meet its target of becoming sustainable. But it is

difficult to tell because the project is still very new.

The Tongji Group does not really have any authority structure. But anarchy does not

equal democracy. Instead, the lack of a real leader meant that there was little decision-making

within the organization. Members generally ended up doing what they wanted with little

consultation from others. Any consultation was not between members of an organization

234
“Global Village of Beijing GVB,” Wiser Earth, accessed March 25, 2010.
235
Interview 35, by author, Beijing, China.
 76

concerned about that group’s activities or mission, but between friends deciding what they

wanted to do for the night.236 There is not enough of a coherent structure to evaluate for

institutionalization. The constant flux in governance of the group from school year to school

year, the groups’ relatively circumscribed autonomy, the lack of complexity or institutional

capacity or memory demonstrate that it is hardly governed and hardly an NGO. In its lack of a

real management structure, the Tongji Group is also neither institutionalized nor democratic.

SEE’s use of elections in its projects and its own internal governance make it the most

democratic CENGO in the case studies.237 It is also the most institutionalized, and has the

greatest need for a functioning governance structure because it is the largest and most complex.

It has two offices, in Alashan and in Beijing, twenty staff, and over eighty council members. It

has a clear mission statement that the council members voted on and passed. As SEE leadership

is chosen by the council members, SEE could adapt if the Chairman or Secretary-General were

incapacitated. That is because they are part of a larger organization that has sufficient

institutional legitimacy, capacity, and resources to exist independently of one specific person.

Furthermore, the use of elections to select NGO representatives from each village,

governing NGO council members, and which projects are funded demonstrate that there is

significant debate within SEE. Villagers and local officials are engaging with SEE staff and each

other in the type of dense, face-to-face interactions that teach civic values and skills. That these

participants are coming together as agents of equal status and power – the villagers, SEE, and the

government each contribute one third of the funds necessary for a project – generates the “shared

sense of responsibility for collective endeavors” that is prized by theorists for its transformative

236
Interviews 57 and 58, by author, Hohhot, Lanqi, and Baiqi, Inner Mongolia, China.
237
Interviews 15, 35, 51, and 52, by author, Beijing, China.
 77

political potential. This is also true for the elections within the membership of SEE, in which

entrepreneurs come together as equal actors to elect the SEE leadership.

Best Strategies for NGOs in Autocracies

This chapter has argued that most CSOs analyzed in the case studies are not democratic

or institutionalized. They cannot imbue the sort of civic skills and values so highly valued by

scholars of civil society. But they can theoretically promote democratization in other ways – by

facilitating open, public deliberation, improving ways in which interests are translated into d

policy, resisting political authority, acting as a countervailing power against the state, and

checking autocrats. Fung notes, however, that associations that successfully resist illegitimate

political powers in autocracies are unlikely to foster civic virtues because “those operating under

severe repression often do not have democratic internal governance.” 238 The “exigencies of

survival and effectiveness press many [associations] to adopt forms that are neither open,

transparent, horizontal, nor clearly accountable.”239 Fung is right in many respects. The next

chapter will detail how the “exigencies of survival” in China affirm poor internal governance.

But Fung’s argument may not be entirely true with regard to China. SEE has managed to

survive as a democratic, institutionalized NGO in a repressive society. Fung discusses

associations that successfully resist illegitimate political powers. But no associations have ever

successfully resisted the illegitimate political powers of the state – neither the Catholic Church,

nor political dissidents. Even NGOs that are not officially registered in any capacity self-censor

to escape state interference.240 Most scholars and activists have accepted that social organizations

238
Fung, “Associations and Democracy,” pp. 523.
239
Ibid.
240
Ru, “Environmental NGOs in China,” August 2004.
 78

cannot resist state interference. Rather, they focus instead on strategies for escaping state

interference – even at the cost of censoring themselves.

The strategy of direct resistance does not work in China. Associations are not

successfully resisting the state and are largely ineffective at changing it. Furthermore, few

scholars now believe that popular resistance could lead to abrupt democratization in China.241

Given the proven inefficacy of direct resistance and the higher possibility of gradual

democratization,242 Chinese associations might increase their efficacy by changing their focus to

inculcating civic values and virtues in citizens through socialization and participation.

Democratic, institutionalized NGOs that emphasize face-to-face interaction best promote

this socialization. In autocracies undergoing reform,243 associations may have democratic internal

governance. SEE is democratic, institutionalized and socializing herders, farmers, and even local

officials in Inner Mongolia into real, participatory citizens.244

But the charismatic, informally governed NGOs that largely populate China’s social

landscape fail to provide the type of participatory experience that teaches these civic virtues.

Most scholars agree that NGOs cannot promote the associational effects listed above if they are

vertically-organized and inhibit open discussion and participation. Vertical organization includes

autocratic, personalized authority structures like the ones in charismatic communities. An

absence of participatory experience in today’s CENGOs makes collective action more difficult.

This holds true whether collective action is in the form of NGOs or a political movement.
241
For example, see Edward Friedman, “A Comparative Politics of Democratization in China,” Journal of
Contemporary China, Vol. 12, No. 34, pp. 103-123; Minxin Pei, ““Creeping Democratization” in China,” Journal
of Democracy, Vol. 6, No. 4 (October 1995), pp. 65-79; Gordon White, “Democratization and Economic Reform in
China,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 31 (Jan. 1994), pp. 73-92.
242
Ibid.
243
White, “Democratization and Economic Reform in China,” pp. 73-92.
244
I primarily analyze the Alashan office, with which I had the most contact, and that significant changes have come
about in the Beijing office since the bulk of my fieldwork in 2008.
 79

Better Democratic, Institutionalized Socializers

This chapter argued that NGOs might also consider socialization as a method of effecting

long-term political change. The assumption that advocacy is an NGOs’ greatest duty is

problematic. Several organizations in the case studies focus on advocacy despite the extensive

literature discounting the efficacy of ENGOs’ attempts at advocacy.

Global Village Beijing has been a key part of several policy campaigns, including one

recommending that companies do not set the air conditioning below 26 degrees Celsius and a

ban on free plastic bags. In addition to joining GVB on these campaigns, Friends of Nature led

campaigns to improve the protection of endangered animals like the snub-nosed monkey and

Tibetan antelope. Echoing Steppe challenges existing policy in attempting to restore Mongolian

herders’ traditional way of life by pooling communal land to simulate nomadic herding. ES also

educates herders to protect their land from encroachment by the government or companies.

These NGOs might be more effective in their advocacy campaigns if they had more

participatory internal governance structures. More than simply winning on one specific issue,

participatory advocacy campaigns that teach participants, volunteers, and the public civic skills

and the value of debate could train more future leaders, volunteers, and activists. Or, at the very

least, make participants more open and likely to participate in future advocacy campaigns.

The 26 degrees air conditioning campaign was successful. Premier Wen Jiabao publicly

urged government offices and hotels affiliated with the Beijing Olympics to keep to this

maximum.245 The 26-degree Celsius maximum is now a standard government regulation. But it is

245
Minnie Chan, “Wen lays down law on saving energy: Premier says air conditioner thermostats must not be set
lower than 26 degrees Celsius in government offices,” South China Morning Post, July 5, 2005,
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-134438779/wen-lays-down-law.html, accessed March 25, 2010; ““26-
degree Campaign” saves energy in Beijing,” Xinhua News Agency, June 27, 2004,
 80

unclear whether this is due to the efforts of the CENGOs. China has consistently faced energy

crises in the summers as oil prices have soared, coal stockpiles have dwindled, and the electricity

system has become increasingly strained.246 The State Council has consistently pushed this

standard. Ho and Edmonds would argue that CENGOs have not been contentious because the

state has embraced environmentalism as part of the solution to the resource crises it faces. This

brings into question the idea that the success of these campaigns is a result of NGO advocacy. It

suggests that, when convenient, the government will adopt ‘green’ policies to alleviate publicity

and legitimacy crises and to appear environment-friendly. This 26-degree Celsius campaign

fortunately coincided with planning for a ‘Green’ Beijing Olympics in 2008.

But enforcement is still inconsistent. The Shanghai Daily reported, “More than half of the

city’s public buildings have failed to obey power-saving rules setting air-conditioning at 26

degrees Celsius, according to local energy authorities.”247 Spotty enforcement demonstrates the

government’s lack of commitment to fully enforcing these reforms.

The no plastic bag campaign was also successful. It was another joint effort of several

NGOs, including FON and GVB. The State Council announced on January 8, 2008 a national

ban on free plastic bags and on the manufacture, use and sale of bags less than 0.00098 inches

thick.248 The Council mandated that stores clearly mark the price of the bags, which cannot be
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-06/27/content_343184.htm, accessed May 5, 2010; “Electricity
Demand Hits Record High as Beijing Swelters,” Xinhua News Agency, June 27, 2007,
http://spanish.china.org.cn/english/China/215191.htm, accessed May 7, 2010; “Hotels told to keep temperatures no
lower than 26 degrees,” Xinhua News Agency, July 14, 2007, http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1P2-
16180653.html, accessed May 9, 2010; Ker Munthit, “Beijing scraps plan to tell hotels to shut down air-
conditioning,” The America’s Intelligence Wire, July 7, 2004,
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-21907951_ITM, accessed May 9, 2010.
246
Louisa Lim, “China swelters as energy crisis soars,” BBC News, June 22, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3828801.stm, accessed May 15, 2010.
247
As quoted in Thomas L. Friedman, “Op-Ed Columnist; China In Three Colors,” New York Times, September 23,
2007, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A04E4DA143CF930A1575AC0A9619C8B63, accessed
May 9, 2010.
248
John Vidal and David Stanway, “China boosts global war against menace of the plastic bag,” The Guardian,
 81

included in the price of other products. Violators face fines or confiscation of goods and profits.

This policy change also occurred in advance of the 2008 Olympics. In May 2009, the

government announced that the number of plastic bags used in supermarkets over the past year

had decreased by 66 percent to 40 billion bags, saving 1.6 million tons of petroleum.249 Some

ENGOs expressed concern that companies were profiting off of this green measure, as markets

now charge for plastic bags.250 The no plastic bag policy was advantageous for a government

increasingly addicted to oil. But again, enforcement is spotty. The government has had trouble

fully enforcing the ban, especially in small businesses.

In comparison, neither the Beijing nor Alashan offices of SEE attempt advocacy. Even

though it has strong connections with the local government in Alashan, SEE does not push for

changes to existing policy. SEE facilitates implementation of local initiatives that are proposed

and advanced by NGO representatives who often also act as village officials. These initiatives

are meant to help villagers cope with state policies. For example, SEE does not advocate for an

end to the displacement of farmers and herders into dairy villages. SEE helps villagers build and

improve infrastructure for dairy production to increase profitability and villagers’ quality of life.

A major problem with immigrant dairy villages in Inner Mongolia is that the milk is sold at low,

fixed prices to big dairy companies or to the state. It is not very profitable and represents a step

January 12, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/jan/12/plasticbags.recycling, accessed May 9,

2010; “China bans free plastic shopping bags,” New York Times, January 9, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/09/world/asia/09iht-plastic.1.9097939.html, accessed May 9, 2010; David Biello,
“China Sacks Plastic Bags,” Scientific American, May 23, 2008, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?
id=china-sacks-plastic-bags, accessed May 9, 2010; “China announces plastic bag ban,” BBC News, January 9,
2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7178287.stm, accessed May 9, 2010.
249
“One year after plastic bag ban, how is China dong?” Xinhua News Agency, May 26, 2009,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2009-05/26/content_7944466.htm, accessed May 9, 2010; Jonathan Watts,
“China plastic bag ban ‘has saved 1.6m tonnes of oil,’” The Guardian, May 22, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/may/22/china-plastic-bags-ban-success, accessed May 9, 2010.
250
Sun Yunlong, “Plastic bags suggest complexity of China green movement,” Xinhua News Agency, June 6, 2008,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-06/06/content_8320694.htm, accessed May 9, 2010.
 82

down in many of these herders’ and farmers’ standard of living. SEE helps take pressure off of

the local government for taking away villagers’ traditional way of life and means for survival.

For example, a farming village in Yaoba township was literally less than a mile away

from the edge of the expanding desert.251 The amount of arable land had plummeted and the local

government dramatically limited the amount of farming permissible. The township government

began transforming Yaoba into a dairy village, building a basic cow pen and milking facility.

SEE worked with the township government and Heifer International to provide villagers with

more dairy cows, better milking equipment, and a cleaner cow pen and milking facility. The

village sells the milk to the highest bidder and is beginning to turn a profit. The Yaoba township

party secretary expressed great enthusiasm for SEE’s work because it helped him alleviate the

pressure of disgruntled villagers. He said that before SEE began working in this particular

village, villagers were highly dissatisfied because they were losing their way of life to

desertification and facing increasing poverty. One day some villagers banded together to express

their frustration with the government’s failure to meet its promise of economic development.

They began throwing trash at the township party office. The party secretary said that now, they

have fewer problems with this village and it is pleasant for him to visit there.

In supplementing local government policy, SEE makes policy changes more palatable to

villagers. SEE can do so partly because desertification is imminent in Alashan. The desert is

expanding so fast and is so close to Alashan that villagers know that they cannot continue living

in their traditional way of life. Local government policies have greater legitimacy because

villagers see there is a pressing need for change. The government is not trying to cheat villagers

out of perfectly good land. SEE programs do not change the state through policy advocacy.
251
Interview 67, by author, Alashan, Inner Mongolia, China.
 83

Rather, the democratic nature of SEE programs inculcates villagers with civic skills and values

like self-governance. Educating these villagers to be citizens is a long-term political investment

that may do more to change relations between villagers and the local government than any

advocacy campaign. This improved relationship between local state and society may strengthen

the state in the short-term. But in fundamentally changing the terms of state-society engagement,

SEE is indirectly reforming the state and making it more responsive to villagers’ voices.

Continued change over time could culminate in real reform.

Most NGO advocacy campaigns do little to change policy, though they may aid the state

in drumming up popularity for green measures advantageous for the government. When NGO

advocacy conflicts with state policy, the government generally fails to respond. But when state

and society interests converge, the state allows NGOs to build popular support, increase

participation, and improve the state’s green image. But NGOs cannot reasonably be expected to

effect significant changes to policy without government backing. Most NGO campaigns are

permitted to exist because they either aid or do not threaten the state. As such, a better method of

promoting long-term political change might be through socialization of program participants. In

addition to advocacy, NGOs should thus also shore up their internal governance structures as a

long-term investment in institutional efficacy and in creating a democratic culture.

CHAPTER VI
 84

CONTEXTUALIZING POOR INTERNAL GOVERNANCE

Having modeled the pattern of poor internal governance found in the case studies, this

next section will explain why this organizational phenomenon exists. Why do founding leaders

continue to have so much influence over their NGOs? As these leaders probably want their

NGOs to have a real impact on the environment and society, why do they not structure their

NGOs to be long-lasting? Why do staff members go along with these poor internal governance

structures? How do these terribly inefficient structures survive even in the leader’s lifetime? This

chapter will answer these questions in providing societal-historical, external-actor, and state-

oriented reasons for the poor internal governance found in the case studies.

The autonomy of de facto NGOs creates a continual legitimacy problem. The existence of

a legitimacy deficit, in China’s hierarchical culture, affirms poor internal governance structures.

This is not to say that autonomy creates poor internal governance. It is unlikely that non-

autonomous NGOs have better internal governance structures. But autonomy is insufficient to

create an NGO capable of having a positive political impact. This finding also suggests that poor

internal governance is an endemic problem among nascent citizen-organized CSOs in China.

Finally, this chapter argues that the traditional grant-making focus on advocacy provides

perverse incentives for the concentration of personalized authority in NGO leaders. The

overemphasis among Western NGO professionals on advocacy and professionalization may

actually be an obstacle to the ‘authenticity,’ positive political impact, and institutionalization of

CENGOs. The literature’s assumptions about autonomy and advocacy do not hold true for first-

generation NGOs in autocratic countries with hierarchical traditions.

 85

Societal-Historical Reasons

Other societal, corporate, and state governance structures in China are overwhelmingly

hierarchical, and have been throughout much of Chinese history. An adaptation of Eckstein’s

theory of congruence holds that structures of authority are replicated throughout society,

including in civil society.252 In describing Chinese society, Schurmann highlighted guanxi as a

major feature of societal interactions predicated on a functional hierarchy.253 Gernet posited the

origin of Chinese hierarchy in Confucian social norms and ancient legal codes developed in the

Tang Dynasty.254 Chinese culture and Chinese society are highly hierarchical and collective-

oriented. It is no surprise that Chinese civil society would be similarly hierarchical.

To quote a study of Chinese management, “While many institutions are initially shaped

by political and legislative actions, those that survive do so because they express and support

enduring cultural values.”255 Successful CSOs reflect cultural values. Other scholars have argued

that reform and modernization have not changed the essentially hierarchical nature of Chinese

society. Reform has only swapped out the basis for hierarchical selection, now based on money

as well as on traditional factors like merit and social status. The military, party,256 bureaucracy,

judiciary, social relationships257 and most businesses258 still rely on rigid management

252
Eckstein, Regarding politics (1992), pp. 221.
253
Franz Schurmann, Ideology and organization in Communist China (University of California Press, Berkeley,
CA: 1973).
254
Jacques Gernet, translated by JR Foster A History of Chinese Civilization, (Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge, 1982).
255
Malcolm Warner, Culture and management in Asia (Routledge: London, 2003), pp. 25.
256
Andrew Walder, “The Party Elite and China's Trajectory of Change,” China: An International Journal, Vol. 2,
No. 2, 2004, pp. 189-209.
257
Lu, for example, documents how more established Environmental NGOs look down at new, ‘amateur’
organizations. See Yiyi Lu, “Environmental Civil Society and Governance in China,” Chatham House: Asia
Programme, August 2005, www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/3268_china160805.pdf, accessed February 24, 2010.
258
Qin Xiao, The theory of the firm and Chinese enterprise reform: the case of China International Trust and
Investment Corporation, (Routledge, 2004), pp. 61-90.
 86

hierarchies. The primary difference now is that the red versus expert debate has been settled in

favor of bureaucrats.259 And now it is easier to buy a higher position in the hierarchy.

Also, many NGO leaders grew up during the Cultural Revolution. State authority

structures then were even more personalized than they are now.260 Indeed, Andreas analyzes

Mao’s Cultural Revolution as a prime example of charismatic mobilization.261 Organizational

management studies have shown that values are a key part of decision-making. Values are

“typically ingrained during childhood and then reinforced or refined by experiences during

adolescence and adulthood.”262 Directive – or hierarchical – decision-making and authoritarian

values were common in the communist system that dominated political, social, and economic life

during these NGO leaders’ childhood and adolescence.263 It is reasonable to believe Chinese

NGO managers, like Chinese business managers, will favor directive decision-making methods –

partly due to their early exposure to authoritarianism as an accepted management value.

Also, a common NGO survival strategy is for NGO leaders to wear different hats. 264

NGO leaders often hold other academic, corporate or government positions. In these positions,

leaders have significantly less creative power to shape the nature of their position. The

259
Xiaowei Zang, “The consolidation of political technocracy in China: The fourteenth and fifteenth central
committees of the CCP,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 (Sept. 1999), pp.
101-113; Hong Yung Lee, From revolutionary cadres to party technocrats in socialist China, (University of
California Press: Berkeley, CA, 1991); Dennis Ray, ““Red and Expert” and China’s Cultural Revolution,” Pacific
Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Spring, 1970), pp. 22-33.
260
Richard H. Solomon, Mao’s revolution and the Chinese political culture, (University of California Press:
Berkeley, CA, 1971), pp. 130-133, 216-256; Lawrence R. Sullivan, “Leadership and Authority in the Chinese
Communist Party: Perspectives from the 1950s,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Winter, 1986-1987), pp. 605-633.
261
Andreas, “The Structure of Charismatic Mobilization,” pp. 437.
262
Maris Martinsons and Robert Davison, “Strategic decision making and support systems: Comparison of
American, Japanese and Chinese management,” Decision Support Systems, Vol. 43, 2007, pp. 284-300.
263
Solomon, Mao’s revolution and the Chinese political culture, pp. 130-133, 216-256; R. Sullivan, “Leadership
and Authority in the Chinese Communist Party,” pp. 605-633.
264
Perry, “Labor’s Battle for Political Space,” pp. 302-325; Sidel, “Dissident and Liberal Legal Scholars,” pp. 327-
346; Wasserstrom and Xinyong, “Student Associations and Mass Movements,” pp. 362-393 all in Davis, et. al,
Urban Spaces in Contemporary China, 1995.
 87

characteristics of that position are often well established in society. For example, a professor is

always treated with due deference because society accords them a certain level of respect.

Insofar as academia, government and corporations are also hierarchies, NGO leaders are

accustomed to employing personalized leadership in other aspects of their life. For example, a

professor will be part of a hierarchy based on their political standing as well as the quality of

their research.265 They cannot easily change their position in the hierarchy and must navigate

around their superiors to shield their NGO from government and university interference.

Individual leaders’ management styles are fairly static. If they do change, leadership and

management styles change over time, rather than location or position. It is less likely that one

person will engage in an authoritarian management style in their role as a public official and then

employ a distinct, democratic style as the leader of an NGO. This is especially true when there

are no external incentives to change one’s management style, because the rest of society employs

the same, authoritarian style. As such, the authoritarian or directive style is perceived as

acceptable and common and has become an important way of blending in with the crowd. Any

incentive to employ a more democratic style is internal and related to the leader’s perception of

how an NGO should theoretically and ideally be run. This choice would also face external

resistance because it is not common in society and sticks out as someone trying to be different.

Finally, connections in China are traditionally personal rather than institutional. A

charismatic leader with personal connections is key to founding a successful NGO in China. But

these connections leave with the leader. For example, a key connection is with a sympathizer in

the government who can keep the NGO on the right side of the state. But these state officials

265
Interviews 10, 18, and 32, by author, Beijing, China. This is especially true for professors of social science. The
reverse is also true, and is why political leaders like to meet with famous Chinese academics.
 88

may only be willing to share information with the prominent founder. It is also possible that the

famous founder cultivated a strong relationship with this particular state bureau or official, so the

connection is highly personal. The same officials might not be similarly helpful if it were just the

NGO as an organization asking for aid, rather than a friend asking for a favor. Founders access

these connections in a personal way and take personal affront to refusal. This type of political

connection is critical to NGOs looking to protect themselves against state intervention.

External Actor-Centric Reasons

Poor internal governance causes a cyclical reaction. The causes and effects of poor

internal governance cause donors and clients as external actors to depend on a leader’s individual

credibility instead of an organization’s institutional credibility. Poor internal governance

reaffirms personalized authority at the cost of organizational integrity and stability.

The donor-centric explanation holds that both foreign and domestic donors favor giving

to high-profile, charismatic founders. This is due to problems of poor internal governance, lack

of institutionalization, and instances of nonprofit corruption. Donors can more easily hold high-

profile founders accountable given their public status. It is more difficult to hold amorphous,

constantly changing, biased, and unstable NGOs accountable for donations, especially if they are

not institutionalized. It is difficult to even work with an organization that is always changing,

transitory and little to lose if its initiatives fail. Donors also feel validated when their grantees are

honored publicly, either by other foundations or in the news.266 The lack of domestic funds for

CENGOs has made many dependent on foreign grants. Foreign grant-making procedure is

geared toward high-profile advocacy organizations that can effect significant policy change.
266
Interviews 87, 88, 89, 19, 26, and 1, by author, Beijing, China and over the telephone.
 89

Donors thereby shape CENGOs into more hierarchical, professionalized organizations that

mirror NGOs in their home countries. In the US, this focus on advocacy and professionalization

has created a new class of NGOs that are “advocates without members.”267

These advocacy groups are becoming increasingly detached from their membership base.

Staff-heavy, ‘professionalized’ advocacy groups are “managed from the top with few

opportunities for member leverage from below.”268 Advocacy groups hire their top-level staff

rather than electing them. Election previously forced better-educated, wealthier people to climb

the “ladders of vast membership associations…[and interact with] citizens of humble [means and

prospects].”269 The multi-tiered election process used by old membership federations ensured

accountability in a way that appointment of “nonprofit professionals” in today’s supralocal

institutions does not. Money comes from wealthy donors rather than members. This pattern

partly mirrors rent-seeking states that subsist on external sources of funding rather than taxes.

These NGOs’ cannot produce radical change because of how they are managed and because they

are often distant from the grassroots and clients they aim to aid. This structure creates a group of

educated NGO professionals who “do not arrive at their positions by working up from the grass-

roots groups they supervise.”270 They often manage CSOs in a top-down manner so as to

facilitate policy-making advocacy rather than promoting citizenship as a moral value.

Foreign funders’ general reluctance to trust non-registered NGOs or NGOs not officially

registered can be tempered by a high profile, professional and accountable founder. Another

reason for donors’ preferences may be the influence that such founders are able to wield in

267
Skocpol, "Advocates without Members," chapter 13 in Civic Engagement in American Democracy.
268
Ibid, pp. 499-500.
269
Ibid.
270
Ibid.
 90

official circles. This influence helps shield their CSO and the donating foundation from

government interference. Donors want to support the most effective NGOs. In China’s

hierarchical society, an NGO leader’s social position can significantly help develop that NGO’s

capacity. Donors prefer famous founders because they may be able to make their organizations

more effective and wide reaching in the short-run by flexing their connections. They seem to

hope that these NGOs will somehow become independent enough to operate after the founder’s

incapacitation, or that capacity building could help NGOs re-establish themselves. Donors’

preference for professionalization ironically inhibits NGO institutionalization in China and

facilitates the survival, at least in the short-term, of highly personalized, unsustainable NGOs.

Foundations’ grant-making preferences also moderate or neglect radical and indigenous

NGOs, and discourage grassroots organizing.271 Donors have arguably pushed CENGOs toward

less contentious tactics that involve working within the system to influence policymaking.

The client-centric explanation posits that the newness of NGOs as a social development

in China and their ambiguous legal and social status make it difficult for their clients – the public

– to understand what NGOs are and to trust what they do. Confusion over what a ‘NGO’ is and

does is amplified by de facto NGOs’ lack of official non-profit registration. For example, citizens

unfamiliar with the specifics of the non-profit political environment could easily become

confused about the motives or legitimacy of a de facto NGO registered as a business. An NGO

staff member told me that once when they went to a village to distribute pamphlets, but villagers

were afraid to interact.272 Some even asked the staffer if they were members of the Falun Gong

271
Bartley, “How Foundations Shape Social Movements,” pp. 229-254; DiMaggio, “Constructing an Organizational
Field as a Professional Project,” pp. 267-292.
272
Interview 56, with author, in Hohhot, Inner Mongolia, China.
 91

spiritual group, which is illegal in China and whose members are highly persecuted by the state.

It is uncertain whether being officially registered as an NGO will ever denote the sort of

public-mindedness, transparency, and legitimacy in China that 501(c)(3) status does in the US.

The poorly-written and poorly-enforced financial transparency measures in NGO regulation and

the biased, opaque nature of NGO registration are to blame. The former means that it is possible

for organizations to pretend to be NGOs and then disappear with thousands in donations. The

latter problem leaves some legitimate NGOs without official NGO status and some ‘illegitimate’

NGOs273 with official status. This financial and political situation makes the official “NGO” label

an unreliable indicator of public legitimacy. This suggests that even non-autonomous or legally

registered NGOs might also face legitimacy problems that foster poor internal governance.

As a result, NGOs often must rely on the personal reputation and connections of their

founder to be successful. Government officials and even ordinary citizens are more likely to

believe that they can hold a prominent person publicly accountable. People may be reluctant to

trust a group of random strangers, a self-declared ‘NGO’ that is not legally registered, or even a

government-operated NGO. But citizens are more likely to trust a public figure – like a professor

– who is easily identifiable and traceable either by their name or profession. It is also more likely

that a prominent person would have the skills and resources to help them. Citizens would also

have a more effective insurance policy because they could more effectively complain if the

public figure did not follow through. If a famous professor promises to aid a villager but instead

damages their financial, physical, or social prospects, the citizen could more easily sell the story

to a newspaper, friends, or officials for sympathy or remuneration.

273
For instance, government organized NGOs (GONGOs).
 92

State-Oriented Reasons

Government policies indirectly and directly affirm poor internal governance structures.

Indirectly, the ambiguous and ever-fluctuating nature of the state-determined boundary of what

is tolerable behavior for NGOs causes many citizen-organized CENGOs to self-censor. These

CENGOs thereby create a buffer zone between their activities and the boundary so that they are

not caught on the wrong side when the boundary changes. Some radical NGOs push this

boundary, but many do not. Even those who push it will quickly draw back if it is clear that they

have gone too far. This self-censorship is an important survival tactic.274 My research suggests

that NGOs often stay several steps within the boundary of what is acceptable to ensure safety.275

But what constitutes acceptable behavior differs for specific NGOs because the boundary also

depends on a number of other, unpredictable factors like that particular NGO’s guanxi.

This buffer extends not just to NGO programming but also to their institutionalization.

The government might perceive a large, professional and institutionalized organization as more

threatening than an informal, charismatic group. Insofar as mimicking the structure and function

of government entities is an NGO survival tactic, 276 changing the NGOs’ internal governance

structure into something markedly democratic might also raise a red flag. However, it is much

less likely to attract attention than high profile, confrontational advocacy campaigns. Even

changing the NGO’s structure so as to be different from other social, state, and private

organizations might catch state attention.

But it would also draw unwanted attention if all NGOs were to coordinate a collective

274
Ru, “Environmental NGOs in China,” August 2004.
275
Interviews 34 and 40, by author, Beijing, China.
276
Perry, “Labor’s Battle for Political Space,” pp. 302-325; Sidel, “Dissident and Liberal Legal Scholars,” pp. 327-
346; Wasserstrom and Xinyong, “Student Associations and Mass Movements,” pp. 362-393 all in Davis, et. al,
Urban Spaces in Contemporary China, 1995.
 93

increase in their institutional capacity. Especially as the most effective and successful CENGOs

maintain close, dependent relationships with government entities. The government is notoriously

hierarchical and personalized. As the more informal, autocratic and personalized management

structure is similar to government structure, it may be more acceptable. This lack of

institutionalization might actually be a strategic choice in helping NGOs maintain a low profile.

The government is still wary of NGOs, especially those with many members and a

complex structure of regional offices. A membership association with thousands of members

nation-wide that elects its leadership would be very visible and could easily be perceived as a

threat. Insofar as even some advocacy groups are still regarded as controversial, membership

associations addressing these same issues would be treading on even thinner ice. Greenpeace, an

international NGO that operates as a membership organization in the U.S. chooses, for political

reasons, to operate as an advocacy-focused organization in China.277 But an NGO that inculcates

members with civic virtues need not be a thousand-member association. It only needs to be

democratic and institutionalized in its internal governance – that is, have a delegated decision-

making structure, encourage open discussion among all staff members to maximize collective

action dilemmas. SEE has demonstrated on a small-scale that this is possible in China.

The lack of fair, strictly enforced non-profit laws create an environment that facilitates

poor internal governance. As Lu argued in her book on Chinese civil society,

Although NGOs need autonomy to perform their essential functions, a state that lacks the capacity to
enforce rules within the NGO sector may impede, rather than encourage, the good performance of Chinese
NGOs. Dependent autonomy is not a type of state-society relations that favours the interest of the state.
Neither is it a good foundation for a healthy civil society.278

The biased nature of legal registration and the lack of strong laws ensuring the accountability and

277
Interview 16, by author, Beijing, China.
278
Yiyi Lu, Non-Governmental Organisations in China (Taylor & Francis, New York: 2009), pp. 145.
 94

transparency of NGOs make grant-making in China a more politically, financially, and ethically

hazardous exercise than in the United States. The difficulty of grant making in such an

environment partly forces donors to rely on prominent personages that is not conducive to

building as democratic or institutionalized a civil society as possible. The sheer difficulty of

giving in China also reduces the amount of grant-making to CENGOs. The relative lack of

funding available in China compared to the need for grants and a traditional grant-making

procedure that refuses to fund operating costs mean that NGOs can only offer low salaries and

hire relatively unqualified staff. This, combined with charismatic authority structures, often leads

to high turnover. It then becomes both an unwise investment and inconvenient to build human

capacity in the NGO if staff members are just going to leave quickly.

To the extent that a “restrictive legal framework [may] inhibit a CSO’s ability to clearly

define its vision,”279 the difficulty of legally registering also affirms poor governance structures

and lack of institutionalization. This may especially be true since clearly identifying one’s

mission makes dodging figurative bullets more difficult when it comes to the boundaries of

acceptability.280 A leader can creatively interpret an ambiguous NGO mission so as to always

stay within the boundary. But a clearly defined mission ties the NGO to a specific position that

might not always be within the fluctuating boundary. The lack of institutionalization might

actually make the NGO more flexible in adapting to changing political environments.281

Finally, the NGO may have been directly warned off of further institutionalization by the

state or their allies in government. The most successful NGOs have strong political connections

279
Samad, “Civil Society in the Arab Region,” accessed January 4, 2010; Luong and Weinthal, “The NGO
Paradox,” pp. 1267-1284.
280
Interviews 34 and 40, by author, Beijing, China.
281
Ibid.
 95

that they use these to keep abreast of new policies. They carefully navigate the line between what

is and is not acceptable so as to avoid government censure.282 Such allies may have directly

cautioned the NGO against further institutionalization or more democratic internal governance.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS AND AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This thesis used case studies of Chinese environmental CSOs to analyze if and how they

may have a positive political impact on China’s prospects for democratization. This thesis

explained how a range of factors contribute to charismatic authority and poor internal

governance structures in grassroots CENGOs. The development of poor internal governance is

best explained as a symptom of the charismatic mobilization used in the creation of these NGOs.

Indeed, a charismatic leader with status and skills is necessary to found a successful CSO in the

hierarchical logic of the Chinese socio-political environment. After the founding of the NGO, it

is up to the leader to decide the NGOs’ governance structure. Unfortunately, NGO leaders often

choose personalized authority systems that preclude the development of stable, effective

institutions. The details of NGO internal operation reveal that most of the CENGOs in the case

studies are undemocratic and uninstitutionalized. Poorly governed NGOs are unsustainably

dependent on their founders for legitimacy, connections, and resources.

My findings suggest that the development of civil society in China – regardless of

282
This model of state-society interaction is affirmed by Jiang Ru’s analysis of self-censored civil society. See Ru,
“Environmental NGOs in China,” August 2004.
 96

autonomy – may not bring about the vaunted quickening of democracy that scholars and

practitioners so fervently claim. It also suggests that what may be developing in China is not a

permanent ‘civil society,’ but rather a charismatic, social mobilization. Such a mobilization may

not outlast its first generation of founding pioneers without significant external and self-

evaluation among CENGOs and donors.

As many factors behind the development of this phenomenon are deeply entrenched in

Chinese society, the current political environment, and Western grant-making standards, the

prospects for change are quite dim. But the effects of these factors may be mitigated by

innovative management structures or founding visions, as in the case of SEE. Alxa SEE is a

democratic, institutionalized NGO that has survived and flourished in China. Rather than

focusing only on education and advocacy, CENGOs should also look inward and reform their

own internal governance structures. In doing so, CENGOs would set a good example for other

institutions and accustom Chinese citizens to participation, debate, and consensus building.

Re-Addressing the Assumptions in the Literature

Assumption One: “Autonomy is Everything.” Many scholars of Chinese civil society

argue that the existence of autonomous NGOs is a significant predictor of the existence of civil

society. But most of the Western civil society literature holds that autonomy is necessary but not

sufficient to the existence of civil society. My research found that an NGO leader’s skills,

preferences, and position are better predictors of an NGO’s success than its level of autonomy.

And while most organizations in the case studies were autonomous, de facto NGOs, they still

had significant problems with poor internal governance.

 97

Assumption Two: “Civil Society is Always Civil.” Another common assumption is that

any civil society is a good civil society that can contribute to the development of a democratic

culture. They assume an autonomous NGO with democratic or liberal goals distinct from state

policy – in this case, environmental protection – is democratic. They fail to consider whether the

internal governance structures of these NGOs are democratic and institutionalized.

This thesis sifted through the Western literature on civil society to carefully distinguish

between civil society as a neutral political amplifier that can facilitate both democracy and

autocracy and a democratic, institutionalized civil society that can actively and effectively aid the

possible onset of democratization. My research distinguished between the characteristics and

implications of democratic, institutionalized civil society and of charismatic, informal NGOs that

may not facilitate positive political change. Undemocratic, uninstitutionalized organizations can

work against the prospects for democratization by fractioning a society and creating ‘uncivil’

CSOs that encourage hierarchy, insularity, and exclusivity. Such CSOs do not facilitate the type

of crosscutting connections critical to political opposition, whether its aim is rapid

democratization through revolution or gradual political change through reform. Neither do they

inspire trust in the public – in the democratic principles or pressing issues that they stand for or

in social organizations as a method of organization, participation, and social interaction.

Even autonomous NGOs may have negative political effects. Autonomous NGOs that are

founded through charismatic mobilization, dependent on their founding leaders, and managed

based on personalized authority can perpetuate hierarchical social structures. These structures

limit the institutionalization of even the most effective and well-known NGOs. They reduce

voluntary participants, rank-and-file staff, and even clients to subjects who may have little say in
 98

the NGOs’ programming, mission, or their own participation.

Poorly governed NGOs are also less effective representing citizens’ interests to the state.

They are less capable of receiving and processing grassroots feedback, whether it is feedback on

their performance or on the substantive issues with which NGOs are concerned. As such, they

have greater difficulty advancing effective, functional policies that coincide with locals’ interests

as well as environmentalism. One Beijing-based NGO, for example, advocated against a dam

supported by villagers who saw it as potentially improving their quality of life.283 The ensuing

debate was highly controversial and generated very bad publicity for the NGO. The NGO should

have been more responsive to villagers’ concerns and might employ education campaigns or

sustainable development initiatives.284 But CENGO advocacy programs might still contribute to

policy reform, a possibility that is discussed below.

Assumption Three: “Advocacy is an NGO’s Greatest Duty.” Finally, promoting advocacy

and professionalization as NGOs’ primary goal is an unreasonable requirement for Chinese

activists. As highly confrontational advocacy NGOs would be quickly quashed by the state, most

NGOs instead focus on establishing government connections. Political change requires the

support of high-level players. As such, donors’ focus on policy advocacy creates an

overemphasis on maintaining high-level government, corporate, and academic contacts. In the

process of working at such a high-up, professionalized level, these NGOs lose touch with the

grassroots. A professional advocacy organization does not need grassroots discussion or

283
Interview 91, by author, Beijing, China.
284
Sebastian Mallaby, “NGOs: Fighting Poverty, Hurting the Poor,” Foreign Policy, September/October 2004,
accessed at Civil Society Observer, UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service, Information You Can Use: A Bi-
monthly Service for the UN and Civil Society, Vol. 1, Issue 5, October-November 2004, http://www.un-
ngls.org/orf/cso/cso5/ngos.htm, accessed January 24, 2010.
 99

experience, but professional contacts and expertise. This does not encourage the participation or

civic commitment that may be more effective in an autocracy. Instead, both domestic and

international ENGOs in China spend lots of money holding networking conferences with

officials and academics to establish government relations, because all exist and operate in China

at the pleasure of the Chinese government.

Many of the largest CENGOs are based in Beijing and Shanghai. But they deal with

environmental issues in undeveloped regions of China – like desertification in Inner Mongolia.

As such, they have little understanding of the local environment. And their work may also

complicated by ethnic issues. For example, staffers at CENGOs are most often Han Chinese. But

in Inner Mongolia, many of the herders and farmers affected by desertification or accused of

being responsible for such are Mongols and speak only Mongolian.

There is also a disconnect between foreign foundations and the grassroots, ethnic NGOs

that are based in these communities. For example, Echoing Steppe and some other grassroots

organizations in Inner Mongolia once attempted to apply for money from foreign foundations.

But they were rejected. This rejection of CENGOs across the spectrum – from research-based

NGOs in Inner Mongolian universities, to professional NGOs run by lawyers, and Echoing

Steppe – led to a misconception among Mongolian activists that international organizations

would only grant money to organizations led by ethnic Hans.285 While extreme, this example

demonstrates the potentially negative effects of transnational grant-making standards.

The language barrier is also a problem, because foundations require grant applications to

be submitted in English or at the very least, Mandarin Chinese. Some grant officers will accept

Mandarin applications and personally translate them into English, but this takes a rare
285
Interviews 19, 56, and 60, by author, Beijing, Hohhot, and Mandu, China.
 100

willingness to go out of their way to support grassroots groups.286 This is especially true in Inner

Mongolia, because few people can read the Mongolian script used there. The up-down script

used Inner Mongolia differs from the script used in the country of Mongolia, which is Cyrillic-

based. But many of the grassroots ethnic Mongolian CSOs operate primarily in Mongolian.

Transnational standards of professionalization are understandable given foreign

foundations’ need to be accountable to their own, English-speaking donors. These language

barriers demonstrate how transnational standards can be barriers to grassroots organization. And

how the desire for ‘professionalization’ can perpetuate a gap between the people affected by

environmental issues and elite-led NGOs funded by international donors. The lack of a tradition

of giving in China, of tax refunds for donations and, until recently, of domestic philanthropic

foundations mean many CENGOs have had to turn to external sources for money to expand and

institutionalize. It is unfortunate when grassroots ENGOs cannot access foreign financial

resources due to a lack of professionalization. Because it is often ethnic, grassroots NGOs that

most closely represent and address a community’s interests.

This is not to say that advocacy or professionalization is not useful. Or that socialization

is the most useful function of an NGO. Rather, the best practices vary for each organization.

Grant-makers, activists, and scholars should have a broader perspective when it comes to NGOs

to fund, to found or work in, and to study as legitimate and interesting. But donors and NGOs

should also consider how their own internal governance problems limit their efficacy and how

they can effect grassroots long-term political change in ways other than advocacy.

My research suggests that grassroots level political participation may be as politically

effective – or even more so – than advocacy. Historical analysis based on Taiwan and the
286
Phone interview 87, by author.
 101

Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) own promise of gradual, socialist democratization suggests

that gradual democratization is more likely in China.287 As such, it is baffling why so many

studies of environmentalism and civil society focus on evaluating NGOs’ capacity for

contentious politics and advancing policy change. Democratic associational effects are as

important in laying the groundwork for gradual democratization than direct, public efforts at

advocacy. Advocacy campaigns are large-scale, highly visible and, thus, are prime targets for

state cooptation or repression. They often face direct, concerted opposition from the state and are

rarely effective. When they are effective, it is usually only on a case-by-case basis or as a result

of favorable external, political factors rather than the success of an NGO advocacy campaign.

These advocacy programs may simply be channeling social tensions in state-accepted forms and

facilitating popular support for government policy when permitted by the state.

On the other hand, it is more difficult to co-opt or repress the creation of dispersed, small-

scale, normal every-day networks of reciprocity and trust in grassroots NGOs and especially

unregistered NGOs. Even if gradual democratization would also require the mobilization of

social movements, such movements would need a large base of potential support for collective

action that is currently lacking in China. The trust, reciprocity and experience necessary to

organize such movements, build publicity, and recruit support would have to be ‘learned’ – not

from the state, so from civil society. Democratically governed membership federations, even if
287
Friedman, “A Comparative Politics of Democratization in China,” pp. 103-123; Pei, ““Creeping
Democratization” in China,” pp. 65-79; White, “Democratization and Economic Reform in China,” pp. 73-92; Bruce
J. Dickson, “China’s Democratization and the Taiwan Experience,” Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Apr. 1998), pp.
349-364; Bruce J. Dickson, “Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party Adaptation,” Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. 115, No. 4 (Winter, 2000-2001), pp. 517-540; Jacques deLisle, “Democratization in Greater
China: Introduction,” Spring 2004, Foreign Policy Research Institute,
http://www.fpri.org/orbis/4802/delisle.democratizationgreaterchina.pdf, pp. 193-203, accessed May 15, 2010;
Joseph Fewsmith, “Will China Democratize? If So, When and How?” Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1, No. 2,
pp. 151-54, http://www.tfd.org.tw/docs/dj0102/151-154.pdf, accessed May 15, 2010; Yang Yao, “A Chinese Way of
Democratization?” Working Paper of the China Center for Economic Research, Peking University, October 16,
2009, http://en.ccer.edu.cn/download/6747-1.pdf, accessed May 15, 2010.
 102

difficult to create, might be more effectively promote democracy.

Theoretical Implications for the China Literature

This thesis differs from previous studies of civil society and environmental NGOs in

China in three ways. First, the existing literature analyzed environmentalism and CENGOs

through social movement frameworks or in comparison with environmental movements in the

West. Insofar as these frameworks deal with contentious political groups, scholars have chiefly

examined whether CENGOs can influence environmental policy-making rather than examining

if they can have potentially positive associational impacts. Most scholars have applied Civil

Society II theory as this is traditionally seen as more fitting under an autocracy, whereas this

thesis focused on Civil Society I theory. This thesis analyzed CENGOs through an ‘associative’

civil society, rather than ‘resistant’ civil society, framework. This thesis analyzed civil society’s

potential for aiding democratization by playing a “constitutive role” in “[creating and sustaining]

a set of new democratic norms which regulate the behaviour of the state and the character of

political relations between state and the ‘public sphere’ of society and individual citizens.”288

Studies have identified a pattern of personal dominance in CENGOs. But none have

drawn out the impacts of such personalized authority on NGOs’ potential for political influence.

Ho writes, “What is striking about the social organizations …is their heavy dependence on

strong and charismatic leadership, which can prove problematic in the long run.”289 Turner

opined that the “expansion of green civil society in China is more dependent on improving

organizational capacity of NGOs than an increase in political space.”290 Many NGOs “are

288
Gordon White, “Civil Society, Democratization and Development: Clearing the Analytical Ground,” in Peter
Burnell and Peter Calvert, Civil society in democratization, (Routledge, London: 2004), pp. 15.
289
Ho, “Greening Without Conflict?,” pp. 914.
290
Turner, “The Growing Role of Chinese Green NGOs,” accessed January 5, 2010
 103

creations of one motivated individual who defines the organization. These groups are still very

new, but it is unclear if some of these groups could function if the founder left. Most groups lack

knowledge of managing a nonprofit organization or the experience in setting up membership

systems.”291 Schwartz puts it this way:

Environmental NGOs face immense constraints on their activities, including…breaking a heavy

dependence on key, charismatic figures to attract domestic and international attention and buffer
themselves from hostile officials.292

Yang points out:

[The] importance of charismatic organizational entrepreneurs in building some flagship organizations may
be a constraining factor because of excessive reliance on such leadership. If charismatic leaders are
essential for creating organizations, long-term organizational growth depends on a professional staff and
new generations of leaders. This process will be crucial to the long-term sustainability of these
organizations.293

Ru and Ortolano’s study of founders of 76 CENGOs also found that “the relatively high status of

[citizen-organized] ENGO founders together with their guanxi was instrumental in facilitating

the work of their organizations.”294 Ho and Edmonds identify poor internal management:

The majority of NGOs also considered poor internal management to be among the main constraints in their
operations. The lack of a clear and democratic structure for decision-making is perceived as a vital problem
in this respect. It is not uncommon for all major and minor decisions to be taken by the NGO leader, with
or without consultation of subordinate staff. Moreover, should the leader for some reason become
incapacitated, the organization is generally hamstrung until leadership is resumed. This top-down and
commandist structure of Chinese NGOs is intertwined with the phenomenon of guanxi … it is overly
obvious that linkages of NGOs with the state still exhibit a strongly personalized rather than an
institutionalized character. Political influence is mostly gained through individual connections, personal
prestige and the networks of one particular person within an NGO (usually the leader), as a result of which
there is a certain degree of detachment from the organization itself. A drafter of environmental regulations
stated: “When people from NGOs are asked to participate in political discussions, it is not by asking their
organization to participate, but a particular individual from that NGO”295

But though they diagnose the problem of poor internal governance and its impact on possible

institutionalization and sustainability, Ho and Edmonds only offer one possible explanation.

291
Ibid.
292
Schwartz, “Environmental NGOs in China,” pp. 40.
293
Yang, “Environmental NGOs and Institutional Dynamics in China,” pp. 61-62.
294
Ru and Ortolano, “Development of Citizen-Organized Environmental NGOs in China,” pp. 153-155.
295
Ho and Edmonds, China's embedded activism, pp. 33.
 104

They propose the development of NGOs according to personal rather than institutional guanxi, as

is traditional in the Confucian system. This thesis has argued there are additional societal,

historical, state, and donor-related explanations necessary to fully explain the phenomenon.

Neither do any of the scholars provide a model for describing this phenomenon of poor internal

governance, whereas this thesis has proposed charismatic mobilization as a descriptive theory.

Solutions to the Problem of Poor Internal Governance

My research suggests several possible remedies to the problem of poor internal

governance, including technology, youth, training, innovative leadership, and time. New,

equalizing technologies may force NGOs to improve their internal governance. For example, the

open nature of the Internet means that the public can more easily hold NGOs and their leaders

accountable for their actions. Such technologies may also render the internal governance

question useless. For example, if NGO programs are Internet or mobile-based and do not require

personal interaction, NGOs may be able to remotely promote socialization regardless of their

internal governance structure. An open-source, citizen-powered website may be able to promote

participation regardless of who built or manages it.

Another solution is constant infusion of youthful talent. Often only young people are

willing to work at NGOs because of the low salaries and lack of prestige. Despite their

willingness to accept low salaries, the individual spirit of the new generation means that few will

work for extensive period of time under conditions of poor internal governance. They have

become used to having their voices heard and to having a say. One interviewee cited the

changing zeitgeist and culture in modern China to explain the occurrence of some recent shake-
 105

ups within NGOs, including Global Village Beijing.296 Discussion, opinion, and participation are

increasingly significant components of the Chinese political and social experience. And as

Chinese culture becomes increasingly individual, independent and participatory, Chinese NGOs

can also employ more delegated, participatory internal governance structures.

Another option could be specifically targeted, capacity training involving the entire

organization. My research has also shown that responsible, democratically-minded leaders can

mitigate personalized authority problems by employing innovative management structures or by

focusing on democratic, participatory principles in their founding visions, as in the case of SEE.

It may be possible to train NGO leaders to deliberately create formal management structures in

which decision-making power is dispersed and there is a set mission statement agreed upon by

the entire membership and staff. Finally, the most effective antidote may simply be time. It is a

sad truth for the development of civil society in China, but time will weed out NGOs that can

survive the trial-by-fire of losing their founding leader and those that cannot.

Avenues for Further Research

As my study is limited in scope, further research is needed into NGOs’ ability to produce

individual-level normative change by inculcating civic values, skills, and participation in the

Chinese public. It would also be worthwhile to investigate if other developing countries with

autocratic traditions and no history of civil society experience the same pattern of charismatic

mobilization and poor internal governance in their first generation of civil society. Also, whether

other charismatic communities have successfully institutionalized, and what techniques they

found successful. Further research into how ‘Western’ grant-making structure is employed in

296
Interview 34, with author, Beijing, China.
 106

countries outside of the West – specifically, in culturally different countries and in autocracies –

is also merited to investigate the extent to which poor internal governance is donor-supported.

Also useful would be investigation into the internal governance and institutionalization of

Chinese NGOs outside of the environmental sector, to see if these other NGOs exhibit patterns

similar to CENGOs. Finally, a follow-up study analyzing the internal governance of CENGOs

after the departure of their founding leaders would provide interesting insights into what type of

NGOs survive this transition period, how and why.

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW LIST

This appendix lists the 87 interviews conducted for this thesis. Some of the interviewees

were interviewed more than once or over a prolonged course of time. Specifically, I spent

roughly one week each with the Alxa SEE office in Alashan, Inner Mongolia, with the Tongji

Student Green Group while it was on its Green Camp in Inner Mongolia, and with Echoing

Steppe during the course of a research trip to Mandu, Inner Mongolia.

No. Interviewee’s Organizational Affiliation/Profession

1 Global Greengrants Fund
2 Green Society Environmental Action Network
 107

3 Beijing Green Student Forum

4 Beijing Green Student Forum
5 Beijing University
6 Beijing University
7 Friends of Nature
8 Beijing Green Student Forum/Friends of Nature
9 Alxa SEE
10 Beijing University
11 SEE
12 International Forum for China’s Environment
13 China Environment Forum/ Green Society Environmental Action Network
14 China Youth for Climate Action Network
15 SEE
16 Greenpeace China
17 Nature Conservancy
18 Beijing University
19 Ford Foundation
20 Conservation International
21 Aurora Tech Forum
22 Nature University
23 Pacific Environment
24 Friends of Nature
25 Nature Conservancy
26 Heinrich Boll Foundation
27 Friends of Nature
28 Greenpeace
29 Shanghai Jiaotong University/the Climate Group
30 Nature Conservancy
31 PACT
32 Beijing University
33 Greenpeace
34 Tsinghua University
35 SEE
36 Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs
37 International Forum for China’s Environment
38 Beijing Normal University
39 Global Village Beijing
40 Institute of Chinese Culture
41 Open Constitution Initiative
42 Open Constitution Initiative
43 UCLA Law
44 Open Constitution Initiative/ The Transition Project
45 Open Constitution Initiative
46 Open Constitution Initiative
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47 Han Hai Sha/Tian Xia Xi

48 Han Hai Sha
49 Shanghai Jiaotong University
50 Paradise Steppe
51 SEE
52 SEE
53 SEE
54 SEE
55 Inner Mongolian Reforestation Company
56 Echo Ecology in Pasturing Area Research Centre of Inner Mongolia
57 Tongji University Green Group
58 Tongji University Green Group
59 Beijing Agricultural University
60 Echoing Steppe
61 Echoing Steppe
62 Inner Mongolia Technical College of Construction
63 Inner Mongolia Agricultural University
64 Former Village Leader/SEE
65 Former Village Leader/SEE
66 SEE
67 Township Party Secretary
68 Corporate Responsibility Council
69 Mongolian Herder
70 Han Herder
71 Han Dairy Farmer
72 Director of City Agricultural Bureau
73 Student
74 Village leader
75 Dairy farmer
76 Dairy farmer
77 Dairy farmer
78 Inner Mongolia Agricultural University
79 Inner Mongolia School of Social Sciences
80 Mongolia School of Social Sciences (Mongolian People’s Republic)
81 Village Leader
82 Former Village Party Secretary
83 Mongolian Herder
84 Mongolian Herder
85 Village Party Secretary
86 Township Party Secretary
87 National Endowment for Democracy
88 USAID
89 Freedom House