The Psychological Record, 1997,47, 637-648

ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION: HISTORICAL

AND CURRENT ISSUES

JULIAN C. LESLIE
University of Ulster at Jordanstown

A number of social factors are combining to raise the profile

of ethical issues for behavior analysts and behavior-modification
professionals, as for all psychologists . Some popular
misconceptions have led to behavior modification being seen as
coercive. These misconceptions are rebutted , and the ethical
basis of behavior modification in behavioral analysis is examined.
The key features of contemporary behavioral analysis and
behavior modification are the public specification of objectives
and methods, and the use of functional analysis. However,
current problems with functional analysis may make the use of
higher order principles such as professional codes of ethics
appropriate. Ethical concerns raised by the particular examples of
social validity measures and parent training programs are
reviewed . These emphasize the importance of putting behavior
modification into its social context and thus ensuring that the
values of the wider community are acknowledged.

According to the ''folk psychology" of Western societies, individuals are

generally held to be responsible for their own actions. Occasionally,
however, behavior is said to be caused by other, external, factors, or
responsibility is attributed to other individuals. This is a "mixed model," and
it could be said to be either philosophically sophisticated or even confused.
Is it reasonable to state that one general class of cause (for example, the
external environment) is sometimes effective but otherwise not? Hineline
(1992) suggests that this tendency to vary our explanatory model derives
from our using "bipolar causal talk" in the explanation of psychological
phenomena (and thus mimicking the sort of bipolar explanation common in
many other areas of discourse) even though three entities, the
environment, the person, and his or her behavior, are involved. It certainly
seems to be true that we switch from time to time between speaking of a
I am indebted to Ronny Swain and Bryan Roche for their incisive comments on an
earlier version of this paper. Reprint requests may be sent to J. C. Leslie, School of
Behavioral Science, University of Ulster at Jordanstown , Co. Antrim , Northern Ireland BT37
DaB, UK. (Email : JC.Leslie@ulst.ac.uk)

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one-way causal link between the individual and behavior to speaking of a

one-way causal link between the environment and behavior. Western
traditions, and the legal systems that reflect them, do not generally
distinguish between cause and responsibility, so once an agency is said to
be the cause of an event, it is also said to be responsible for that event.
Consequently, we switch between generally holding people-including
ourselves-responsible for their own actions to occasionally attributing the
responsibility to external factors, including other people.
It may be that this systematic ambiguity in Western philosophies, as to
where the responsibility for any particular action lies, makes it less likely
that clients will blame psychologists when they are unhappy with the
process or the outcome of treatment they have received. Whether or not it
is the case that clients tended not to blame psychologists, complaints
against psychologists used to be comparatively rare in Britain and Ireland.
However, the frequency of complaints has begun to change: Lindsay (1995)
reports a marked increase in Britain in the last few years and Leslie (1996a)
finds a similar trend, based on a much smaller population of psychologists
and clients, in Ireland. Lindsay suggests that change is occurring because
clients now attach more importance to the societal value of professional
competence and less to that of collective responsibility among
professionals. That is, they will be more likely to question the professional
competence of individual psychologists, and less likely to assume that ''they
[the professionals] know best." Consequently, they are now more critical of
the professional behavior of individuals providing services. Whatever the
reason for the change, this is an appropriate time to review some general
and specific ethical issues from the standpoint of behavioral analysis and
behavior modification.
Beginning with general issues, there are some curious conundrums, at
least from the perspective of behavioral analysis. As indicated, the
conventional view is that individuals are responsible for some, but not all,
actions. My view is that no proponent of a science-based psychology can
accept this because it implies that some actions are "caused" whereas
others are not (but see Staddon, 1993, for a different interpretation).
However, if we take "responsible for" to mean "mediated by," cognitive
psychologists would assert that many, perhaps all, actions are the
responsibility of the individual. Indeed, one could argue that it is this device,
of using mediation to reestablish homocentric values and concepts, that
renders cognitivism so appealing. Behavior analysts, in contrast, are known
to, indeed they are expected to, roundly reject the notion of locating the
cause of any human action in the individual. In Skinner's and other behavior
analysts' terms, the individual is not the cause of behavior, but is the locus
of action of a large number of external factors.
In the vernacular, as well as in more formal philosophical accounts, the
notion of responsibility is strongly linked to ethical concerns, and, perhaps
because of the ambiguity of the cognitivist position on responsibility, those
outside psychology have taken a considerable interest in the position of
behaviorists or behavior analysts. The general behavior-analysis view

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removes the ambiguity and adopts an apparently straightforward

determinist position. This position, as Skinner (1971) controversially points
out, rejects traditional notions of human freedom of the will, or of action. All
sorts of complexities arise, however, because the notion of individual
agency is deeply embedded in the language we use to describe our own
behavior and that of others. Staddon (1993) suggests that Skinner's radical
attack on the notion of human agency is excessive for a number of reasons.
Amongst these are that in the first place we are not yet in a position to
account for all human behavior, or even a significant fraction of it, in our
deterministic framework, and secondly that the "feeling of freedom" that
people may have or aspire to is logically unrelated to the issue as to
whether human behavior is in principle predictable.
Misconceptions about the Ethical Implications of Behavior Modification
I will return to an explicit consideration of the general stance of
behavioral analysis on ethical issues, but it should first be acknowledged
that a number of factors have led to behavioral analysis and behavior
modification being seen as coercive or manipulative. One of these is
Skinner's use of the language of control; on many occasions he asserts
that the goal of a science of behavior is the prediction and control of human
behavior. Despite the fact that he combines his notion of control with an
emphatic rejection of human autonomy, and that he also provides lengthy
discussions of these complex issues (see, for example, Skinner, 1974), it
has still been possible to portray behavioral analYSiS, rather than other
approaches to psychology, as involving things being done to the individual,
rather than being concerned with the interaction between individual and
environment. Dinsmoor (1992) notes that in his use of language Skinner
always seems to adopt an extreme position in order to provoke his critics.
He has often succeeded in doing this to the extent that his critics have
taken up extreme and untenable positions themselves, but, as Dinsmoor
further notes, it does not appear upon mature reflection that those
intemperate critics have come to understand Skinner's actual position.
Skinner's contemporary, J. R. Kantor, always takes great pains to
distinguish his position, or at least his use of language, from Skinner's. He
writes, for example, of the mutual and coordinate relationship of stimulus
and response, and he describes his position as "interbehavioral" or
interactionist (see, for example, Kantor, 1933). These terms are used, I
believe, primarily to avoid the regular, but unfair, criticism that Skinner's
work receives for apparently promoting the control of human behavior.
Another source of the view that applications of behavioral analysis are
inherently coercive arises from the presumed link between behavioral
analysis and S-R psychology. Although Skinner and others in behavioral
analYSis (for example, Leslie, 1996b) reject some of the key features of S-R
psychology, such as that put forward by Hull (1943), behavioral analysis is
nonetheless frequently described as S-R psychology. Consequently,
behavioral analysis is criticized for proposing mechanistic explanations that

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are seen to be inadequate and demeaning. The argument runs roughly

thus: (1) Behavior modification is based on behavioral analysis; (2)
behavioral analysis is a species of S-R psychology, (3) S-R psychology
claims that all human actions are caused by overt or covert immediately
preceding stimuli; and (4) this elicitation model of causation implies that all
behavior is forced out, or coerced from individuals, particularly in behaviormodification schemes where the contingencies of reinforcement are made
explicit. Behavior analysts would take issue with several steps in this
muddled argument and flatly reject Step 2: Behavior analysis is not a type
or S-R psychology, because (see Step 3) it does not use a mechanistic
model where each response is caused by an immediately preceding
stimulus. Rather, it states that a response occurs because of the
individual's previous behavior and its consequences in this and similar
situations. Nonetheless, the presumed link between behavioral analysis
and S-R psychology contributes to the misrepresentation of behavioral
analysis as coercive.
A third contribution to the view that behavioral analysis is coercive
comes from media misrepresentations. Although there are a small number
of documented cases (with media reports mostly in the 1960s or 1970s)
where procedures that were explicitly derived from behavioral principles
were used in an abusive fashion, there have been a much larger number of
occasions where highly aversive procedures, such as torture and
brainwashing, were incorrectly described as behavior modification. Turkat
and Feuerstein (1978) report that in 27 articles in the New York Times over
a 5-year period which referred to "behavior modification," more than half
made errors of this kind. However, in a follow-up, Carey, Carey, and Turkat
(1983) find that in the following 5 years the number of references had fallen
to 14 with only three serious misrepresentations. Carey et al. conclude that
"although the portrayal of behavior modification in our survey was generally
positive, negative media presentations of behavior modification continue to
haunt its professional image." There is a similar pattern in the academic
literature, where behavioral analysis is frequently portrayed as having
coercive totalitarian tendencies. Todd and Morris (1992) note that these
misrepresentations come from the political left (for example, Lewontin,
Rose, & Kamin, 1984) as well as the right (Williams, 1980). They conclude
that this unscholarly behavior derives from failures to read original and
contemporary sources. For example, since 1970 the applied behavioral
analysis literature has dealt primarily with use of positive reinforcement in
the study of human behavior, but the field's detractors write of it as being
concerned with the aversive control of the behavior of nonhuman animals,
or with the use of electroshock therapy with humans who are not able to
refuse treatment. As Todd and Morris point out, such presentation is totally
erroneous, and the extensive use of positive reinforcement with, for
example, people with learning disabilities leads to their empowerment
rather than their oppression.
All these factors combine to produce a negative attitude to behavior
modification which has been measured in, for example, an experimental

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641

study where all participants watched the same video material of a teacher
using reinforcement techniques with children. If the video material was
labeled as "humanistic education" it was rated more favorably and as more
likely to promote academic learning and emotional growth, than if it was
labeled as "behavior modification" (Woolfolk, Woolfolk, & Wilson, 1977). A
similar phenomenon is evident in the results of a survey where several
student groups were asked whether behavior modification should be used
with various target groups (Boivin, Sewell, & Scott, 1986). The attitudes
expressed depended on whether the target group was one stigmatized by
the group from which the students were drawn.
To summarize, various long-standing factors combine to make it
likely that behavior modification will be inaccurately perceived as
coercive. However, this perception seems to be lessening, and this trend
may be continued by exercises such as the present one from within
behavioral analysis which seek to explicitly identify and comment upon
misconceptions, and it may be appropriate for behavior analysts to take
further steps in other media to correct these errors. I will now briefly
review the ethical foundations of behavior modification from the
perspective of behavioral analysis itself, and I will go on to consider
some contemporary issues.
The Ethics of Behavioral Analysis and Behavior Modification
It is not usual for psychologists to give prominence to ethical issues,
and Skinner is no exception. However, in writing about the application of
behavioral analysis to significant issues in human behavior, Skinner (1953,
1971, and elsewhere) stresses three issues which have general ethical
implications: the use of positive reinforcement, the minimization of
punishment contingencies, and the specification of objectives. The first two
of these taken together produce a policy of "accentuating the positive," of
focusing on the reinforcement of desirable behavior, rather than on the
elimination of undesirable behavior. In the broader sphere, the
recommendation of positive reinforcement with minimization of punishment
is an effective public relations strategy which counters the negative media
image discussed above. It is not, however, an "ethically neutral" approach.
Rather, it involves a set of judgments that have ethical components. These
are firstly the view that, other things being equal, positive reinforcement
contingencies are preferable to those that involve aversive events, in that
they are morally more acceptable. Secondly, there is the view that
pragmatically positive reinforcement contingencies are preferable because
they do not generate undesirable "side-effects" (such as fear, escape, and
avoidance). Thirdly, there is the judgment, based like the second one on
research findings, that positive reinforcement contingencies are at least as
effective as those involving aversive events. However, as we shall see later,
this final judgment is not the inevitable conclusion of an analysis of the
behavioral analysis literature.
Skinner's third precept, the importance of the specification of

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objectives, has proved the least controversial and perhaps the most
important in establishing behavior modification as a major strategy for
psychological and behavioral change. This precept also has ethical
implications. Making the specification of objectives a high priority helps
rebut the claim that behavior modification is manipulative. That is, in
behavioral analysis or behavior modification it is standard procedure for the
client and the psychologist or other professional to agree the objectives and
methods of treatment prior to the start of that treatment. Consequently, and
in contrast with some psychoanalytic traditions, the client of a behavioral
program is aware of, and in agreement with, the key elements of treatment
throughout the process.
Further ethical implications of the behavior-analysis approach emerge
if we consider a recent and useful summary by a behavior analyst which
addresses all the points originally made by Skinner. Owens (1995) states
that the general strategy when a client and therapist come together to
resolve a behavioral problem should be as follows: A functional analysis of
the client's problem should lead to shared decisions on objectives and
methods of treatment, but that all the treatments selected should involve
positive reinforcement. The additional explicit feature here is the reference
to functional analysis, which has become a very important part of the
contemporary behavior analysis strategy. Functional analysis has become
important because another feature of the Skinnerian inheritance is a
commitment to the use of effective contingencies, or the view that if a
contingency has powerful effects on behavior it should be regarded as
important (see Sidman, 1960, for a discussion of this and alternative
theoretical perspectives). In considering the problems of a particular client,
we need to know which contingencies currently maintain his or her behavior
or could change it if they were introduced. Identifying currently effective
contingencies is the objective of a functional analysis of their behavior,
which should occur through a behavioral assessment and form the basis of
the intervention strategy. Obviously, it is important that the "correct"
contingencies be identified, and much effort has been directed in recent
years to the development of techniques of functional analysis. Currently
there is a consensus about the importance of functional analysis, but none
as to how it should be carried out. The lack of consensus raises an ethical
issue, because if a treatment is selected based on an inaccurate functional
analysis it is likely to be unsuccessful, and the behavioral analysis
practitioner will, by his or her own standards, have behaved in a
professionally incompetent fashion.
In Owens's scheme, the second step towards resolution of a behavioral
problem is a shared decision between the behavioral analysis practitioner
and the client about the objectives and methods of treatment. This is
certainly a crucial event, from an ethical point of view, because, as outlined
earlier, it reduces the risk that the clients' are coerced by having the
practitioner impose treatments or objectives unbeknown to them. However,
ethical issues remain. Owens states: "the individual ... and the
professional ... form an equal partnership where it is recognized that both

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are attempting to solve a common problem and both have clearly defined
areas of expertise. The professional has the technical expertise, knowing
how likely it is that certain options are feasible; the person with the problem
has personal expertise, knowing more about their own life than anyone else
and which of the available options are preferable to others." (p. 14). Given
the power differential between professionals and clients, a truly equal
partnership is a rather unlikely scenario, and a great deal more social
power rests with even the best-intentioned professional than with the client.
Consequently, the professional should engage in various routine
procedures to ensure that treatment decisions are made on the equal basis
which Owens recommends. These procedures should, where possible,
involve sharing information with colleagues about the decisions made and
the basis for them. Whether or not it is possible to involve colleagues
directly, the information should be made public in the form of a contract
between the professional and the client which states the methods and
objectives, and the reasons for these choices.
Let us now examine the view, shared by Skinner and Owens, that
punishment should not be used, and thus positive reinforcement should be
used more or less exclusively. In general, situations involving aversive
events set up a variety of contingencies that can produce unwanted and
sometimes unexpected outcomes. A punitive regime in school, for example,
may produce compliant, or at least docile, behavior during class, at the
possible costs of frequent school refusal, parent dissatisfaction, and
students who do not wish to continue in education and who have negative
attitudes to school when they themselves become parents. Nonetheless, a
functional analysis may reveal how we can influence the behavior that is of
central concern, and it may suggest interventions that do involve aversive
events. For example, difficult issues often arise in the treatment of selfinjurious behavior, which can prove insensitive to the introduction of positive
reinforcement contingencies designed to increase the frequency of
alternative behavior. If, in such a case, functional analysis has suggested
that a punishment contingency might prove effective, its use should surely
be considered (see Rolider, Cummings, & Van Houten, 1991, for an
example of this).
To summarize the foregoing discussion, behavior analysts concur with
others, including many moral philosophers, in recommending that positive
reinforcement be preferred to punishment contingencies. Further, they
recommend that the objectives of any intervention in a client's life to change
their behavior should be made explicit, they should be based on a full
consideration of the methods of intervention and their possible
consequences, and the results of that consideration should be available to
the client. However, behavior analysts do not hold the view that punishment
(or other procedures involving aversive events) are a/ways wrong. Rather
they believe that these procedures are most often wrong because their
overall effect will be to reduce the quality of life for the client (or, more
broadly, for all those influenced by the treatment program). The best
decisions about treatment or intervention will be based on case-specific

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functional analysis. Both the general principles of behavior and much

professional experience indicate that there will be no completely general
rules about what is best for the client.
A further question that arises at this point is whether there should be
any higher order prinCiples that might overrule the results of the casespecific functional analysis. This is a matter of current concern in many
public services in the USA which are required to operate under the "least
restrictive alternative" (LRA) principle. That is, there is a legal requirement
that in certain cases, for example those involving individuals with learning
disabilities, the treatment selected should not be unduly restrictive. As
Johnston and Sherman (1993) note, although this practice appears to be a
step towards protecting the individual against unnecessary infringement of
human rights by the state, there are problems with definition of "restrictive,"
and implementation of this principle in fixed or formulaic ways conflicts with
the ethical standards derived from behavioral analysis. Typically, the LRA
principle is taken to support the use of a hierarchy of treatment methods
where at least some of the "less restrictive" methods are used before a
procedure considered severely restrictive is used. The main issue identified
by Johnston and Sherman is the same one that arises from our
consideration of functional analysis here: There is no hierarchy of methods
that will apply to all individuals. Rather, a consideration of the individual
case (that is, a functional analysis) is required, and this mayor may not
produce results that are consistent with the use of a fixed hierarchy of
methods. If "incorrect" methods, as defined by a functional analysis, are
used time will be lost in which, as Johnston and Sherman point out, the
client will continue to suffer the "restrictions" imposed by the behavioral
problem (for example, self-injurious behavior). The logic of this argument is
that it may be ethical to implement a technique deemed to be more
restrictive, or involve more aversive features, rather than wasting time on
ineffective methods.
It could be objected to the argument developed here that it amounts,
in the end, to a claim that the behavior analysts know best, and that
treatment decisions for their clients should not be imposed by another
authority. Certainly, as indicated earlier, methods of functional analysis,
which are central to the argument, are less than perfect. Therefore it may
be reasonable for the wider community to impose restraints on
behavioral analysis and behavior modification, especially when, as
Johnston and Sherman further point out, treatment decisions are often
made by paraprofessionals, or even nonprofessionals. However, as
functional analysis develops we should appraise the wider community of
its increasing effectiveness as the basis for intervention and treatment.
Indeed, it would be a valuable exercise in itself to bring the ideas of
functional analysis to that wider audience.
Other higher order principles that might override the results of
functional analysis are embedded in ethical codes for professional
psychologists (for example, American Psychological Association, 1992).
Such codes are in principle subject to the same analysis as that applied

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here to the LRA principle. They derive from the average views of a wider
community, in this case one of practicing psychologists, and specific
ethical principles may not be supported by functional analysis. They are
sets of higher order principles, and again it could be said that until
behavior analysis achieves a higher standard of competence in
functional analysis it is wise to operate strictly within a professional code
of ethics. Once it becomes clear that a particular code conflicts with the
regularly obtained results of functional analysis in certain cases, it
should be possible for the profession to modify the corresponding
aspects of the code. Hypothetically, it might be established that there is a
type of agoraphobia where functional analysis regularly indicates that
successful intervention involves making the client's home environment
less attractive (and thus making the outside world more attractive), but
current ethical codes are likely to proscribe such intervention. This
process of accruing evidence and then relating it to the existing code
amounts to the empirical assessment of higher order principles.
Applications to Contemporary Issues
The latter part of this discussion brings us close to two issues which
have become more important in the last two decades of practice in
behavior modification, and which each have ethical implications that are
worth exploring. These are social validity and parent training.
Wolf (1978) defined social validity of behavioral analysis as assessing
public opinion on the social significance of its goals, the appropriateness of
its procedures and the importance of its effects. Since then, social validity
assessments have been included in around one-fifth of the reports
published in two of the main journals (Kennedy, 1992). Use of social validity
techniques raises a variety of ethical issues which must be balanced in the
final design of programs. For example, these techniques regularly show
that the use of physical punishment is markedly less acceptable to the
general public than other possible aversive interventions (see for example,
Blampied & Kahan, 1992). We have seen that a general ban on certain
procedures may be in conflict with the results of functional analysis, but, on
balance, social validity exercises help to ensure that behavior analysts
behave in a more ethical fashion. That is, social validity is enhanced if
participants other than clients and the wider community are fully informed
about the choice of methods and goals of a program, are able to debate
these with the designers of the program, and thus be actively involved in
the design. This involvement is clearly consistent with the general objective
stated earlier of making public the aims and objectives of any program, and
may indeed go further by involving a wider range of people in selecting
those aims and objectives.
Parent training, and involvement of parents, other carers, and family
members in the implementation of behavior-modification programs,
similarly carries possible ethical costs and benefits. The possible costs are
serious because there are real risks that the procedures will not be

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implemented properly by nonprofessionals. This could be a very serious

matter in the particular case, and the professional with overall
responsibility could be said to have behaved unethically in not monitoring
sufficiently the implementation of the program by the parents or other
nonprofessionals. Furthermore, there may be wider cost in the perception
by the community that implementation was left to nonprofessionals and
that the whole scheme was a failure. However, there are also substantial
potential ethical benefits as well. Professionals in the public services know
that they will always operate in an environment where resources are
severely limited, and they will certainly not be able to deliver directly all the
services that have been requested. Consequently, parent training which is
competently delivered, and in programs which are adequately monitored,
may be an excellent use of their time in providing services for the greatest
number of people. The provision of services to the greatest number of
people is another ethical value which would be endorsed by behavior
analysts as well as by psychologists in general. Additionally, such
programs ensure that the objectives and values embodied in the programs
are shared with the parents.
The ethical issues raised by social validity measures and parent
training programs are not essentially different from those discussed earlier,
but they do provide specific examples of an important trend. This trend is
towards putting behavioral analysis and behavior modification into a
broader social context (see Bernstein, 1982, for a useful model of this).
From an ethical point of view, the social context is always crucial, and those
occasions where it is conspicuous make it easier to identify ethical issues
that are always present. That is, even in the traditional narrowly defined
case, where a behavior-modification professional is working directly with
one client, what is done must be made available to, and justified to, the
wider community.
Summary and Conclusions
Although all provision of psychological services raises ethical issues,
regardless of its theoretical underpinnings, behavior modification has
always received considerable scrutiny. That scrutiny has often been
complicated by the existence of a negative image of behavior modification,
based on a number of popular, and long-held, misconceptions. These
include the view that behavior modifiers seek to impose control over human
behavior, that behavioral analysis is a type of mechanistic S-R psychology,
and that aversive and punitive methods are routinely part of behavior
modification. All these misconceptions should be corrected as a preliminary
to considering the actual ethical basis of behavior modification.
Throughout the development of behavior modification, the specification
of objectives has been a key feature, and this procedure provides a
protection against unethical conduct, as well as providing methodological
rigor. It should be recognized, however, that a professional always holds
great social power while working with a client, and that although a public

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647

statement of agreed methods and objectives is of great value, that

statement will not on its own ensure that the client plays an equal part in
their selection. The client's interest will be further protected by other steps
towards making the selection of methods and objectives a formal and
public process, such as the use of a written contract (Everstine et aI., 1980,
provide a sample contract) and the active involvement of other
professionals and the wider community.
Skinner took the view that positive reinforcement should be preferred
because punishment was undesirable and ineffective. This judgment has
been replaced in contemporary behavioral analysis and behavior
modification by the view that functional analysis is the key part of behavioral
assessment, and that its results should determine the methods of choice.
At present, functional analysis techniques are not as valid or reliable as
might be wished, and the limitations should temper the reliance placed on
their results. Indeed, these limitations may justify relying instead on higher
order principles, such as the LRA principle or professional codes of ethics.
However, as the effective domain of functional analysis is extended by
empirical findings, behavior-modification professionals will see the use of
functional analysis as increasingly justified on ethical grounds. The general
ethical principle here is one of effectiveness: Once the objectives of
treatment or intervention have been agreed, a competent professional
should select, or recommend, the most effective method of realizing those
objectives, without ignoring the importance of possible side effects.
The issues of social validity and parent training both make explicit the
social context of behavior modification, and thus highlight ethical issues
concerned with the values embodied in any behavior-modification program,
and whether they are shared by the wider community. There is a general
need for behavior analysts to articulate the relationship between their work
and the values of the wider community.
In conclusion, this brief and selective review of historical and
contemporary issues in behavior modification shows there is a sound
basis for examining ethical issues in behavior modification, once some
widespread misconceptions have been cleared away. Behavior
modification can then be seen as the application of behavioral analysis,
with a basic ethical rationale of achieving publicly agreed objectives
through selection of effective methods. However, ethical concerns
remain about how these aims can be achieved while ensuring that the
interests and values of clients are protected.

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