1AC Borders

Contention 1: Harms
Border surveillance produces a site of perpetual warfare
Miller 13 (Todd, has researched and written about US-Mexican border
issues for more than 10 years. He has worked on both sides of the border for
BorderLinks in Tucson, Arizona, and Witness for Peace in Oaxaca, Mexico. He
now writes on border and immigration issues for NACLA Report on the
Americas and its blog Border Wars, among other places, Surveillance Surge
on the Border: How to Turn the US-Mexican Border into a War Zone, Truth
Out, 7-11-13, http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/17513-surveillance-surgeon-the-border-how-to-turn-the-us-mexican-border-into-a-war-zone)//MJ
The first thing I did at the Border Security Expo in Phoenix this March was climb the brown explosionresistant tower, 30 feet high and 10 feet wide, directly in the center of the spacious room that holds this

From a platform where, assumedly, a border guard would stand,

you could take in the constellation of small booths offering the surveillance
industrys finest products, including a staggering multitude of ways to
monitor, chase, capture, or even kill people, thanks to modernistic arrays of
cameras and sensors, up-armored jeeps, the latest in guns, and even
surveillance balloons. Although at the time, headlines in the Southwest emphasized potential cuts
annual trade show.

to future border-security budgets thanks to Congresss sequester, the vast Phoenix Convention Center
hall -- where the defense and security industries strut their stuff for law enforcement and the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) -- told quite a different story. Clearly, the expanding global industry of border
security wasnt about to go anywhere. It was as if the milling crowds of business people, government
officials, and Border Patrol agents sensed that they were about to be truly in the money thanks to
immigration reform, no matter what version of it did or didnt pass Congress. And it looks like they were
absolutely right. All around me in that tower were poster-sized fiery photos demonstrating ways it could

A border like the one just over 100

miles away between the United States and Mexico, it seemed to say, was not so
much a place that divided people in situations of unprecedented global
inequality, but a site of constant war-like danger. Below me were booths as far as the
help thwart massive attacks and fireball-style explosions.

eye could see surrounded by Disneyesque fake desert shrubbery, barbed wire, sand bags, and desert
camouflage. Throw in the products on display and you could almost believe that you were wandering
through a militarized border zone with a Hollywood flair. To an awed potential customer, a salesman in a
suit and tie demonstrated a mini-drone that fits in your hand like a Frisbee. It seemed to catch the
technological fetishism that makes Expo the extravaganza it is. Later I asked him what such a drone would
be used for. To see whats over the next hill, he replied. Until you visit the yearly Expo, its easy enough

the U.S. borderlands are today ground zero for the rise, growth, and
spread of a domestic surveillance state. On June 27th, the Senate passed the Border
Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act . Along
to forget that

with the claim that it offers a path to citizenship to millions of the undocumented living in the United States

promises to build the

largest border-policing and surveillance apparatus ever seen in the United
States. The result, Senator John McCain proudly said, will be the most militarized
border since the fall of the Berlin Wall. This border surge, a phrase coined by
Senator Chuck Schumer, is also a surveillance surge. The Senate bill provides for the
hiring of almost 19,000 new Border Patrol agents, the building of 700
additional miles of walls, fences, and barriers, and an investment of billions of
dollars in the latest surveillance technologies, including drones. In this, the
bill only continues in a post-9/11 tradition in which our southern divide has
become an on-the-ground laboratory for the development of a surveillance
(with many stringent requirements), in its more than 1,000 pages it

state whose mission is already moving well beond those borderlands. Calling
this immigration reform is like calling the National Security Agencys
expanding global surveillance system a domestic telecommunications
upgrade. Its really all about the country that the United States is becoming
-- one of the police and the policed. But whatever happens, its time to stop
thinking of all this as immigration reform. It represents what may be the
most intense concentration of the surveillance state in a single location ever
witnessed -- a place where the Constitution has an asterisk, which means that
anything goes and dystopian worlds of all sorts can be invented. The Los Angeles
Times has written that, if passed, the bill would also be a boost to defense contractors and an economic
stimulus for border communities, creating thousands of jobs that could raise home prices and spur
consumer spending around border security stations. It sounds like Keynesian economics, but of a whole
different sort. In a world where basic services are being cut, an emerging policing apparatus in the
borderlands is flourishing. As Mattea Kramer and Chris Hellman reported at TomDispatch in February, since
September 11, 2001, the United States has spent $791 billion on homeland security alone, an inflation-

In those borderlands, we are

seeing the birth of a military-industrial-immigration complex. It seems
destined to shape our future.
adjusted $300 billion more than the cost of the entire New Deal.

Militarized surveillance leads to a significant number of

deaths on the border
Johnson 07 (Kevin R., Kevin R. Johnson is Mabie-Apallas Professor of
Public Interest Law and Chicano/a Studies at the University of California Davis
, Opening the Floodgates: Why America Needs to Rethink its Immigration
Policies, http://nyupress.org/books/9780814743096/) Franzy
In the 1990s, the U.S. government heightened immigration enforcement by
massing forces along its southern border with Mexico. These measures
have resulted in a human toll that is nothing less than horrific. A
week rarely goes by without press reports of undocumented Mexican
immigrants who have died on the long, treacherous journey to the
United States.93 The title of one November 2002 New York Times article tells it all: Skeletons Tell
Tale of Gamble by Immigrants.94 Unfortunately, many migrants die in the desert
seeking nothing more than to make a better life for themselves and their
families in the United States.95 The vast majority of the border crossers in no
way can be characterized as dangers to the national security or the public
safety of the nation. They are simply seeking economic opportunity in this
country. Military-style operations on the southwest border have
channeled immigrants into remote, desolate locations where
thousands have died agonizing deaths from heat, cold, and
dehydration.96 At various times, to add to the danger, military forces have
patrolled the border. In one infamous incident, Marines a few years ago
mistakenly shot and killed a teenage goatherder (and U.S. citizen), Esequiel
Hernandez, Jr. As of March 2006, the California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation attributed more
than 3,000 deaths to a single southern California border operation known as Operation Gatekeeper.97

Numerous other operations have been put into place in the U.S.-Mexico
border region. All have had similar deadly impacts. Despite the death toll, the U.S.
government continues to pursue enforcement operations with great vigor. Indeed, Congress
consistently enacts proposals designed to bolster border enforcement, with

such proposals often representing the only items of political consensus when
it comes to immigration reform. Operation Gatekeeper demonstrates the U.S.
governments callous indifference to the human suffering caused by its
aggressive border enforcement policy. In the words of one informed
commentator, [t]he real tragedy of [Operation] Gatekeeper . . . is
the direct link . . . to the staggering rise in the number of deaths
among border crossers. [The U.S. government] has forced these crossers
to attempt entry in areas plagued by extreme weather conditions and rugged
terrain that [the U.S. government] knows to present mortal danger .98 In
planning Operation Gatekeeper, the U.S. government knew that its strategy
would risk many lives but proceeded nonetheless . As another observer concludes,
Operation Gatekeeper, as an enforcement immigration policy
financed and politically supported by the U.S. government, flagrantly
violates international human rights because this policy was
deliberately formulated to maximize the physical risks of Mexican
migrant workers, thereby ensuring that hundreds of them would
die.99 Apparently, the government rationalized the deaths of migrants as collateral damage in the
war on illegal immigration. Even before the 1990s, the Border Patrol had a
reputation for committing human rights abuses against immigrants and U.S.
citizens of Mexican ancestry.100 Created to police the U.S.-Mexican border,
the Border Patrol has historically been plagued by reports of brutality,
shootings, beatings, and killings.101 Amnesty International, American Friends Service
Committee, and Human Rights Watch have all issued reports documenting recent human rights abuses by
the Border Patrol.102 Migrants face other perils on their journey through the U.S.-Mexico border region.

Robberies,
murders, and rapes of immigrants are commonplace. Lawlessness
reigns along the U.S.-Mexican border. Absent serious reform efforts,
nothing seems likely to change.
Criminals frequently prey upon unlawful entrants seeking to evade border inspection.

Surveillance also leads to sexual violence and labor

exploitation
Johnson 07 (Kevin R., Kevin R. Johnson is Mabie-Apallas Professor of
Public Interest Law and Chicano/a Studies at the University of California Davis
, Opening the Floodgates: Why America Needs to Rethink its Immigration
Policies, http://nyupress.org/books/9780814743096/) Franzy
For years, many migrants have depended on smugglers for passage into the
United States. However, since the new border operations went into effect ,
heightened immigration restrictions and bolstered immigration enforcement
have caused a rapid increase in the fees charged by smugglers. Smuggling
fees increased from a few hundred to a couple of thousand dollars. It now is
much more expensive to come to the United States than before the new
border operations went into effect in the 1990s .103 Some migrants lack the
cash to travel. To pay for the trip, many are forced to become indebted
to their smugglers. Smuggling debts have been paid through forced labor,
thus taking the exploitation of undocumented workers to new and frightening

levels. Failure to work off the debts may result in brutal

consequences. But a migrants ability to pay is not the only problem with human trafficking. The
passage itself is replete with hazards. Among the many risks faced by
migrants is the possibility of being abandoned. In May 2003, nineteen
migrants, including a five-year-old child, died of asphyxiation, heat exposure,
and dehydration in the back of a smugglers truck in South Texas. The
smuggler had fled, leaving the migrants to die. One of the dead had worked five years in
the United States before he returned to Mexico to fetch his children, hoping to provide them comforts he

Today, because of the money to be made in

this black market, criminal syndicates thrive in the trafficking of
human beings. A product of ill-considered law enforcement, these syndicates resemble the crime
could not give them in Mexico.104

networks that emerged in response to the federal governments efforts during Prohibitions ban on the
commerce in alcohol. Criminal elements grew and asserted control over a new lucrative industry. But it

Some undocumented immigrants have been enslaved.

Reports of slavery have increased dramatically in the past few years.
One 2005 report concluded as follows: Our research identified 57 forced labor
operations in almost a dozen cities in California between 1998 and 2003,
involving more than 500 individuals from 18 countries. . . . Victims labored in
several economic sectors including prostitution and sex services (47.4%),
domestic service (33.3%), mail order brides (5.3%), sweatshops (5.3%), and
agriculture (1.8%). . . . Victims of forced labor often suffer severe hardships
and deprivations. Their captors often subject them to beatings,
threats, and other forms of physical and psychological abuse . They live in
gets worse.

conditions of deprivation and despair. Their captors may threaten their families. Perpetrators exert near
total control over victims, creating a situation of dependency. Victims come to believe they cannot

They are terrified of their captors but also fear law enforcement, a
fear often based on bad experiences with police and other government
officials in their countries of origin.105 Today, in no small part because of the
operation of the immigration laws, cases of involuntary servitude regularly
make the news.106
leave. . . .

Curtailing surveillance is key its the lynchpin of border

militarization
Kalhan 14 (Anil, IMMIGRATION SURVEILLANCE, Maryland Law Review,
Volume 74, Number 1)
migration and mobility surveillance functionsidentification,
screening and authorization, mobility tracking and control, and information
sharingplay crucial but underappreciated roles in immigration control processes
These four sets of

across the entire spectrum of migration and travel. In the growing number of contexts in which

immigration control activities now take place, enforcement actors engage in extensive
collection, storage, analysis, and dissemination of personal information, in
order to identify individuals, screen them and authorize their activities,
enable monitoring and control over their travel, and share information with
other actors who bear immigration control responsibilities. Initially deployed for
traditional immigration enforcement purposes, and expanded largely in the name of security, these
surveillance technologies and processes are qualitatively remaking the nature
of immigration governance, as a number of examples illustrate.

Structural violence is the largest proximate cause of warcreates priming that psychologically structures escalation
Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 4
(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn)
(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and
Peace, pg. 19-22)
This large and at first sight messy Part VII is central to this anthologys thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized,
bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes,
Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Dalys version of US apartheid in Chicagos South Side
(Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the smelly
working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that
overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that
characterize the US inner city to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form
of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable),

Absolutely central to our approach is a

blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close
attention to the little violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of
everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More
rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34).

important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of violence studies that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often
forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and
dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of small wars and invisible
genocides (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics,
emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public
morgues. The

violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of
reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even
the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are
flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for
vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian
1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it

is absolutely necessary to make just

such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal
times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the
concept of genocide into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is),
an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal
practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by ordinary good-enough
citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in
the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for
managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute

the small wars and invisible

genocides to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California,
Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are invisible genocides not because they are
secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that
are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for
granted. In this regard, Bourdieus partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of
misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of normal
social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of
everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglias notion of peacetime crimes - crimini di pace
- imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime

crimes suggests the

possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied
systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during
peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border
raids on illegal aliens versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee Trail of Tears.
Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal
stability is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied strangleholds. Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. It is an easy-toidentify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace.
Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial
prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience.

The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the
mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of
mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for
the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the normative socializing experience for ethnic
minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is
essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise goodenough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic,
permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal
acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to
recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social
exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which
normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for
alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamins view
of late modern history as a chronic state of emergency (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here
the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other midtwentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients,
between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other total institutions. Making

that
decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the
willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social
consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no
primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the
common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable
have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the
sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the
moment. Erik Erikson referred to pseudo- speciation as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as
less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that
precede the sudden, seemingly unintelligible outbreaks of mass violence .

Collective denial and misrecognition

are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional
roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for
example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic
priests who celebrate the death of angel-babies, and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to

Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of

violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu
hungry families.

(1977, 1996) means by symbolic violence, the violence that is often nus-recognized for something else, usually something
good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls terror as usual. All these terms are meant to reveal a public
secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and peace-time crimes.
Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in
systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in
social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies
rneconnaissance as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence,
and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point
(Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and
other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical
mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic

domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of
power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or
group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of controlling processes (Nader 1997b)
that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence
which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative
experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What
makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that

mass violence is part of a

continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators,
collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even
justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools,
churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early warning signs (Charney 1991), the priming (as Hinton,
ed., 2002 calls it), or the genocidal continuum (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing
certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable social
parasites (the nursing home elderly, welfare queens, undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday
life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house
gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

You should privilege everyday violence for two reasons- A)

social bias underrepresents its effects B) its effects are
exponential, not linear which means even if the only
causes a small amount of structural violence, its terminal
impacts are huge
Nixon 11
(Rob, Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Slow
Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, pgs. 2-3)
Three primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need

to rethink-politically,
violence." By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs
gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an
attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event
or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility.
We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor
instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a
range of temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational , narrative, and
strategic challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence. Climate change, the thawing
cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermaths of wars, acidifying
oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes present formidable
representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act decisively. The long
dyings-the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological that result from war's toxic aftermaths
or climate change-are underrepresented in strategic planning as well as in human memory. Had
imaginatively, and theoretically-what I call "slow

Summers advocated invading Africa with weapons of mass destruction, his proposal would have fallen under conventional
definitions of violence and been perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. Advocating

invading countries
with mass forms of slow-motion toxicity, however, requires rethinking our accepted assumptions
of violence to include slow violence. Such a rethinking requires that we complicate
conventional assumptions about violence as a highly visible act that is newsworthy because it is event
focused, time bound, and body bound. We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow

violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions-from domestic abuse to
posttraumatic stress and, in particular, environmental calamities. A major challenge is representational: how to devise arresting
stories, images, and symbols adequate to the pervasive but elusive violence of delayed effects. Crucially, slow

violence is often not just attritional but also exponential,

operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term,
proliferating conflicts in situations where the conditions for
sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded.

The Control
The biopolitics of borders justifies the management of life
and death, pushing immigrants to extreme situations and
insurmountable danger
Ajana 05 (Btihaj, Lecturer in Culture, Digital Humanities & Creative
Industries Education Lead (Digital Humanities, Surveillance, and Biopolitics),
http://www.sociology.org/content/2005/tier1/ajana_biopolitics.pdf) Franzy
The biopolitics of borders is precisely the management of that
waiting-to-live, the management of that non-life (the waiting-to-live and the
non-life of those who are forcibly placed in detention centres), and at times, it is the management of

The death of thousand of refugees and clandestine migrants

drowned in the sea (for instance, in the Strait of Gibraltar which is argued
to be becoming the worlds largest mass grave) , asphyxiated in trucks (as
was the fate of 58 Chinese immigrants who died in 2000 inside an airtight
truck at the port of Dover), crushed under trains (the case of the Channel
Tunnel) and killed in deserts (in the US-Mexican border for example). It is
the management of bodies that do not matter. It is the
management of the bodies of those to whom the status of the homo
sacer (Agamben, 1998: 8) is attributed. It is the management of those whose death has fallen
into the abyss of insignificance and whose killing is not sacrificial (except to the few). On the other
hand, the biopolitics of borders is also the management of life; the life of
those who are capable of performing responsible self-government (Rose, 1999:
259) and self-surveillance i.e. those who can demonstrate their legitimacy
through worthy computer-readable passports/ID cards that provide the
ontological basis for the exercising and fixing of identity and citizenship at the
border. The juxtaposition of death and life at the borders is by no means an
ad hoc occurrence but an affirmation of the inadequate immigration policies
and the immanentist (Nancy, 1991: 3) politics of absolute enclosure. From this emerges the
issue of sorting that may override the term racism as long as it is not
designated to a specific race or insofar as it is racism without race as Balibar
prefers to put it. Racism for Foucault (2003 [1976]: 255) (and here racism has a
figurative function just as the metaphors of leprosy and plague do) is that
which creates fragmentation within the biological continuum and caesuras
within species-bodies so that biopolitical sorting and (sub)divisions could take
place between those who are deemed to be superior and those who are
made to be perceived as the inferior type all with the aim to preserve the
well-being, safety, security and purity of the healthy (powerful)
population (virtues which are undoubtedly contributing to the naturalisation and takendeath.

forgrantedness of institutional racism, and the inscription of modes of exclusionary differentiations in many

Embedded within this

biopolitical overdetermination is a murderous enterprise. Murderous not insofar as it
involves extermination (although this might still be the case) but inasmuch as it exerts a
biopower that exposes someone to death, increasing the risk of
death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion,
rejection, and so on (Foucault 2003 [1976]: 256), and inasmuch as it is based on a certain
subtle ways so that the need of accountability is made redundant.)

occluded but inevitable and thus constitutive violence (Zylinska, 2004: 530); a symbolic violence
(manifested, for instance, in the act of naming as Butler (in Zylinska, 2004) and Derrida argue asylum
seekers, detainees, deportees, illegal immigrants, etc) as well as a material one (for example, placing
asylum seekers and illegal immigrants in detention centres), attesting to that epistemic impulse to
resuscitate the leftover of late modernity and the residual of disciplinary powers that seek to eliminate and
ostracise the unwanted-other through the insidious refashioning of the final solution for the asylum and
immigration question. Such an image has been captured by Braidotti (1994: 20): Once, landing at Paris
International Airport, I saw all of these in between areas occupied by immigrants from various parts of the
former French empire; they had arrived, but were not allowed entry, so they camped in these luxurious
transit zones, waiting. The dead, panoptical heart of the new European Community will scrutinize them and

The
biopolitics of borders stands as the quintessential domain for this
kind of sorting, this kind of racism pervading Western socio-political
imaginary and permeating the rhetoric of national and territorial
sovereignty despite its monolithic use of euphemism. It is precisely this task
not allow them in easily: it is crowded at the margins and non-belonging can be hell.

of sorting and this act of fragmenting that contemporary modes of border security and surveillance are
designed making the management of misery and misfortune a potentially profitable activity (Rose,
1999: 260) and evaporating the political into a perpetual state of technicism (Coward, 1999: 18) where
control and security are resting upon vast investments in new information and communications
technologies in order to filter access and minimise, if not eradicate, the infiltration and riskiness of the
unwanted. For instance, in chapter six of the White Paper, Secure Borders, Safe Haven (2002), the UK
government outlines a host of techniques and strategies aimed at controlling borders and tightening
security including the use of Gamma X-ray scanners, heartbeat sensors, and millimetric wave imaging to

Other surveillance techniques involve the use of

biometrics which consists of an enrolment phase (European Commission, 2005: 46)
detect humans smuggled in vehicles.

where physical attributes such as fingerprints, DNA patterns, retina, iris, face, voice, etc are used to
collect, process, and store biometric samples onto a database for subsequent usage during the
recognition phase in which these data are matched against the real-time data input in order to verify
identity. Authorities have been keen on integrating biometric identifiers into ID cards and passports as a
means of strengthening security, enhancing modes of identification and facilitating the exchange of data
between different countries. Further application of biometrics in information sharing can be seen in the EUwide database EURODAC (Koslowski, 2003: 11), used to store the fingerprints of asylum applicants in order
to prevent multiple applications in several member states or what is referred to as the so-called asylum
shopping. Added to that, the employment of a broad array of private actors (employers, banks, hospitals,
educational institutions, marriage register offices, etc) to perform the role of gatekeepers (Lahav, in
Koslowski, 2003: 5) (or more accurately, borderkeepers) and reinforce immigration controls from within
the internal and ubiquitous borders, constituting a multiplicity of points for the collection, inscription,
accumulation and distribution of information relevant to the management of risk (Rose, 1999: 260), and
the administration of life and death.

This surveillance causes two forms of biopolitical control in the form of extreme order
and extreme exclusion.

Ajana 2005 (Btihaj Ajana. Lecturer in Culture, Digital Humanities &

Creative Industries @ Kings College London. Surveillance and Biopolitics,
Electronic Journal of Sociology thw_)
In a chapter called Panopticism, Foucault (1975) begins by outlining two major forms through which
discipline and surveillance were exerted. The first being the spatialisation of the plague-stricken town by
means of segmenting and immobilising space as well as placing individuals within enclosures and under

surveillance involves tactics of individualizing

disciplines (Foucault, 1975: 199) which proceed from a system of permanent
registration (registering the details of each inhabitant of the town) as well as
mechanisms of distribution (in which each inhabitant is related to his [their] place, his
[their] body and his condition) so that the disease is met by order, eradicating any confusion
severe and permanent supervision. Such

that may emerge out of the mixing of bodies, be these living or dead. The second organisational form is
that of the treatment of the leper which, unlike the plague and its segmentations, functions by means of

separation and exclusion of the leper from the healthy community through

mechanisms of branding, dichotomisation and exile-enclosure. From these

two different images (plague and leprosy) which underlies the two different projects (segmentation
and separation), Foucault goes on to explain the two ways of exerting (political) power:
discipline on the hand (as is the case with the plague), and exclusion on the other (as is
the case with leprosy). However, and despite the difference of the two modes, they are not incompatible
ones (Foucault, 1995: 199) for power functions by way of excluding the infected (here, the image of the
leper stands as an emblematic figure of beggars, vagabonds, madmen, etc, just as the image of the
plague symbolises all forms of confusion and disorder) and individualising the excluded so much so that
lepers (all those who are symbolised by this image) are treated as plague victims (all those who are caught
up within disorderly spaces). Hence, power is but a concurrent amalgamation of the two forms, and
according to Foucault, Benthams Panopticon is par excellence the architectural figure of this composition

an observing supervisor
placed in a central tower and who can see without being seen, serves as a compelling
paradigm for the kind of surveillance that is intrinsic to the compound
power of exclusion and individualization . As Elden (2002: 244) explains, the model
of the Panopticon is where the space of exclusion (of the figurative leper) is rigidly
regimented and controlled (as is the case with the figurative plague victim). The idea that
visibility is a trap (Foucault, 1975: 200) (i.e. the presence of the tall tower at the centre does not
(1975: 200). Benthams utilitarian plan for a prison which is based on

necessarily mean the supervisor is watching), that collective individualities are overridden by separated
individualities (the treatment of lepers as a plague victims the trinity of segmentation, individualisation

that power is unverifiable (uncertainty about whether/when

one is being watched), is what makes the model of Panopticon such a subtle and
effective architectural apparatus. Power does not need to be enforced but
merely internalised through mechanisms of self-regulation. Such
mechanisms render the observed as simultaneously the bearer (subject) of
and the one subjected to power. Not that the Panopticon is merely a method of observation
and separation) and

devoid of other disciplinary modes of power but it is also a machine that could be used to carry out
experiments, to alter behaviour, to train or correct individuals (Foucault, 1975: 203) within a variety of
institutional spaces, ranging from prisons to schools, hospitals, factories, etc. It is, hence, the way in which

different technologies and spaces of

surveillance and discipline that Foucault places the notion of disciplinary society under the umbrella of
panopticism in order to capture the diagrammatic strategies underlying power relations and in which
positions and identities are fundamental features vis--vis the functioning
of panoptical surveillance.:
the metaphor of the Panopticon encapsulates

The extreme order is achieved by the creation of a

homogenized identitybodies are classified into
hierarchical schemes by processes of racialization and
sexualization
Lulbheld 2 (Elthne, Entry Denied Controlling sexuality at the Border,
book)
sexuality, gender, race, and class were explicitly considered when
U.S. officials made decisions about whom to admit and exclude . But contrary to
Historically.

both conservative and liberal critics. I suggest that these were never self-evident attributes that people

Foucault's framework suggests that immigration-control

practices, down to their most mundane procedural details, produced and naturalized these
identities. Therefore, sexuality-and by extension, race. gender, and class-have been
central to immigration control since its inception not because these are
essential or biological identities that can be discovered within individual
already "had." Rather,

bodies. but because sexualization. racialization, and so on are larger social

processes whose presence is made evident by the classification of bodies into
hierarchical schemes. Such classification schemes. which were rooted in
histories of imperialism and modern state formation. ensured that those
granted admission were incorporated into relations of surveillance and
discipline within the United States. Although immigration officials no longer explicitly
categorize bodies within racial taxonomies or automatically exclude lesbians and gay men. that does not
mean that racialization, sexualization. and other similar processes have been abolished. Nor does it mean
that there are no longer disparities inimmigration access on the basis of sexuality, race, and other

even when racial

criteria were excised from immigration law in 1965.lawmakers nonetheless
intended for neutral admission criteria to have distinctly racial effects . By
categories. On the contrary. David Reimers's research compellingly suggests that

replacing the discriminatory national origins quota system with preferences that were based mainly on
family ties. lawmakers expected that "the great bulk of immigrants henceforth will not merely hail from the
same parent countries as our present citizens' but will be their closer reletives.w In other words,

although openly racist provisions were removed, the law was nonetheless
intended to uphold the virtual exclusion of immigrants of color . Reimer's argument
echoes the decades of research on equal access to education and employment, which shows that

seemingly neutral bureaucratic requirements often generate racist, hetero

sexist, and classist effects. Various architects of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
apparently understood and tried to manipulate this fact. But even if they had not intended to discriminate,
the 1965 INA might still have had discriminatory consequences. As Naomi Zack explains, "much
institutional [discrimination] in the United States at this time is not intentional" but is nonetheless evident
when one examines the outcomes, rather than intentions, of particular policies." Thus, to suggest that the
seemingly neutral provisions of immigration law mark the "end" of immigration discrimination ignores both
Reimers's specific research on the 1965 INA and the voluminous general scholarship on institutional
discrimination.

Foucault's work particularly contributes to our understanding of

how immigration inequalities are institutionally reproduced by drawing
attention to supposedly neutral, mundane practices of inspection and
regimes of knowledge that actually discipline and subject immigrants in
racializing, sexualizing, and other ways .?" Consequently, rather than proclaiming the demise
of discrimination in immigration access, we would be better served by developing more
complex and nuanced accounts of how sexualization, racialization, and other
processes continue to be imposed and contested at multiple levels in the
immigration system today, including through inspection procedures and
knowledge regimes. The importance of such analyses inheres not only in the
scale and impact of contemporary immigration, but also in the fact that
relations of power and inequality at the border cannot be separated from
inequitable global relations that structure migration patterns or from social
hierarchies within the United States. Finally, Foucault draws attention to the ways that
inspection procedures and decision-making at the border are tied to recordkeeping and writing practices that comprise "a means of control and a
method of domination,"?' As he explains, inspection is accompanied by "a
system of intense registration and of documentary accumulation 'v- These
writing practices at once constitute each individual as a "describable,
analysable object" and as part of a larger corpus of knowledge that involves
"the measurement of overall phenomena, the characterization of collective
facts, the calculation of gaps between individuals, of their distribution in a
given 'populanon."' This knowledge is used for distinctly disciplinary ends. Foucault's analysis of
how official immigration records function as essential elements of a larger disciplinary system has
important implications for immigration scholarship. At the very least, it suggests that scholars need to

critically evaluate how the written materials on which we draw are part of, and therefore help to reproduce,
the disciplinary apparatus that subjectifies immigrants. Equally, methods for reading official documents
against the grain, utilized by scholars such as those engaged in subaltern studies, may prove to have great
relevance for immigration scholarship too.

A2 DA things the DA gets its impact off of enemy

images, and those are self fulfilling
However, biopolitics ensures that the normalized identity
does not prevent the immigrants from being dichotomized
into the evil foreign as opposed to the secure
domestic. This process creates the boundaries that justify
killing in the name of saving life. This society of control
spreads across the globe as the domestic populous
becomes ever more isolated. Those binaries create
opposing identities that dehumanize all Others and induce
unending conflicts
Talbot 8 (Stephen Talbot @ the Defence Science and Technology
Organisation, 21 March 2008'Us' and 'Them': Terrorism, Conflict and (O)ther
Discursive Formations http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/1/17.html thw_)
Identity
creation through negation entails making a statement of in-group identity
with reference to what it is not, or does not consist of, for example I am a Christian, not a
Muslim. Strategies employed in the negation of the Other also include:
marginalisation of ethnic and religious groups through naming; racialisation;
criminalisation; and stigmatisation. Response strategies of the out-group
include: collective resistance to ascribed identities; group empowerment;
demands for collective group rights (territorial claims) in an attempt to secure
greater autonomy, legitimisation and social control (Rummens, 2001, p.18). 6. The
This, according to Coleman is the fundamental aspect of the in-groups identity (17).

outgroup images become negative, homogeneous, abstract and stereotypicalparticularly in regards to

the productions of enemy

images which contain an emotional dimension of strong dislikethese

images tend to become self-fulfilling and self-reinforcing , serving important interests and
needs (Coleman, 2004, pp.17-18; Stein, 1999; Toscano, 1998). 5.15 Implicit within Us/Them, East/West,

The
use of these non-specific yet all-inclusive tags also serves to dehumanise and
depersonalise a highly abstracted Other . In turn, depersonalisation allows social
Good/Bad and Self/Other binaries is the notion that opposing identities are relatively homogenous.

stereotyping, group cohesiveness and collective action to occur. The construction of absolutist discourses
of this kind are an important vehicle for understanding conflict: [a]lthough generally described as

communities as loci of production, transmission, and evolution of group

foster conflict through the negotiation and manipulation of social
representations (LCC, 2001, p.6). 5.16 Here, the demarcation of the common
enemy/Other assists with the mobilisation of one group against another (Aho,
1994). Identity demarcation of this kind further allows the mobilisation of audiences to
carry out conflict. President Bush for example has made many references to evil doers. He has
integrated and homogenous,
membership

been quoted as saying we're on the hunt...got the evildoers on the run...we're bringing them to justice
and they kill without mercy because they hate our freedoms... (Sample, 2006, The White House, 2001).

The emotive language used in speech acts of this kind are designed to elicit
in-group distinctiveness and cohesion through the negation and

disparagement of the out-group (terrorist organisations). The use of terms evil doers,
them, and they are interesting however in the sense that they refer to an enemy that extends beyond
the confines of terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda. 7. A clear and simplified depiction of good (us) and

By
framing their conflict within a discourse which accentuates a struggle
between good and evil, both religious terrorist groups and their Western-led protagonists,
view non-members of either camp to be infidels or apostates (Cronin, 2003) and
immoral or fanatical respectively. The maintenance of such a discourse can be
seen as serving a dual purpose; namely, to dehumanise the respective victi ms on both
sides of the conflict, and sustain in-group and out-group identities .
evil (them) that serves many functions (Brown and Gaertner, 2001; Coleman, 2004, p.18). 5.17

The plan
The United States federal government should
substantially curtail its surveillance of the United States
Mexico border.

Solvency
Easier immigration solves a myriad of problems deaths,
racism, technological competitiveness, and national
security
Johnson 07 (Kevin R., Kevin R. Johnson is Mabie-Apallas Professor of
Public Interest Law and Chicano/a Studies at the University of California Davis
, Opening the Floodgates: Why America Needs to Rethink its Immigration
Policies, http://nyupress.org/books/9780814743096/) Franzy
The presence of undocumented immigrants in the United States is a
plain reality that needs to be addressed. Open borders would provide
a pragmatic, long-term solution to this nations undocumentedimmigrant and related immigration problems . Freeing up migration
through a liberal admissions policy would recognize that the enforcement of
closed borders cannot stifle the strong, perhaps irresistible, economic, social,
and political pressures that fuel todays international migration . Border
controls, as currently configured in the United States, simply waste
billions of dollars and result in thousands of deaths. They have not
ended, and cannot end, unlawful immigration . Like the United Statess
failed prohibition of the alcohol trade in the early twentieth century, effective
enforcement of the immigration laws to halt undocumented immigration has
proven virtually impossible. To make matters worse, border enforcement
shares many of Prohibitions negative side effects: increased criminal activity,
abusive law enforcement practices, and a caseload crisis in the courts. An
inability to enforce the laws, whether they prohibit alcohol or dramatically
restrict immigration, undermines and damages the legitimacy and moral
force of the law. Elimination of border controls would help eliminate these
costs by making the laws more realistic. As summarized in Chapter 2, history shows that
the cyclical fear of a flood of immigrants of different races destroying U.S. society often reaches fever
pitch. These nativist outbursts have never been justified .

The United States, however, has

responded to the anti-immigrant impulse and has taken extreme action in the
name of self-preservation. Time and time again, it has targeted vulnerable
minorities, excluding, deporting, and otherwise punishing them for real and
imagined offenses. History records these episodes with regret, embarrassment, and disbelief. But
the errors are repeated and entirely predictable. Even though it may seem ridiculous
today, U.S. society once considered the German and the Irish unassimilable
races that diluted and degraded Anglo-Saxon racial purity.4 Although Chinese and
Japanese immigrants were despised groups that generated a plethora of immigration restrictions in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,5 today people of Chinese and Japanese descent in the
United States have higher average incomes than whites.6 Southern and Eastern Europeans, whose
immigration led to the creation of the national-origins quota system in 1924, are now generally viewed as
part of the mainstream, rather than as people of different, inferior races.7 The United States unfortunately

Since September 11, 2001, security concerns have

distorted immigration law and policy in ways that, years from now, history
almost assuredly will record with regret .8 Some observers, including the restrictionist
has failed to learn from its mistakes.

Samuel Huntington, have complained that current levels of immigration have made the assimilation of
immigrants difficult.9 However, the United States has a long history of successfully integrating immigrants
into U.S. society. The waves of immigration in the early twentieth century were, as a percentage of the U.S.

population, larger than the current levels of immigration.10 Over the course of the twentieth century, the
nation slowly but surely adjusted. Unassimilable

aliens are now part of mainstream

America. This past success suggests that the United States could fully integrate immigrants into civil
society in a legal regime without borders. Moreover, given the influence of U.S. culture
throughout the world in this high-tech information age, we might well expect
immigrants today to be much more familiar with the United States, to be
prepared for faster integration into society, and to be more capable of making
informed judgments about immigration than were immigrants of previous
generations. As time goes by, integration into U.S. society may be easier than it currently is. In any
event, Latina/os currently are assimilating into U.S. social life. Despite popular perceptions, most Latina/o
immigrants, the largest component of the current immigration cohort, assimilate into the United States to
a large degree. As a group, they learn English, participate in the workforce to a larger extent than nativeborn citizens, and embrace widely accepted Americanoften denominated familyvalues.11 By
economic and political measures, for example, Cuban Americans on average are better off than the
average U.S. citizen.12 Not all Latina/os are Cuban, or course, and many have not achieved similar levels
of economic success. But the fact remains that immigrants assimilate to a far greater degree than is
recognized by the restrictionists. The assimilation of Latina/os can also be seen in their increasing political
importance. Politicians across the political spectrum, including President Bush, increasingly and
aggressively court the Latina/o vote. Mainstream politicians often take care to avoid taking positions on
immigration and related issues that would tend to alienate this growing segment of the electorate.13 The
backlash against California governor Pete Wilsons support for Proposition 187 in 1994 taught Republican
politicians the potential downside of taking strong anti-immigrant positions that anger Latina/os.14 Since
then, most mainstream Republican politicians have studiously avoided taking positions that could be
characterized as anti-immigrant and anti-Latina/o. Not surprisingly, given the growing Latina/o population,
Latina/os in recent years have greatly increased their representation in elected offices,15 which

A move away from closed

borders is called for at this time in U.S. history. The law should be changed
to create the legal presumption that a noncitizen can enter the
country unless it can be demonstrated that he or she would pose a
danger to the national security and public safety. This, of course,
effectively would turn current U.S. immigration law on its head. Open, not closed,
demonstrates their increasing integration into U.S. social life.

borders would be the norm. Easy, not difficult, entry would be the result. A less dramatic change in the law
would be to allow labor migration within the nations that are a party to the North American Free Trade
Agreement. Over the past thirty years, a regional common market, which includes labor migration between
and among the member states, has evolved in the European Union. A similar labor migration agreement
among the NAFTA nations would recognize that migration from Mexico, perhaps Latin America generally, is

Globalization,
technological advances, and changing conceptions of the nation-state require
serious study of new approaches to immigration and border controls.17
Besides limiting the abuses and injuries that enforcement of the current
immigration laws cause immigrants and U.S. citizens, a system of easy entry
promises many benefitseconomic and otherwiseto the United States.
Importantly, allowing free labor migration would permit the U.S. government
to effectively and efficiently focus enforcement efforts on protecting national
security and public safety, a high priority after the terrorist acts of September
11, 2001.
inevitable,16 and must be managed responsibly, efficiently, and safely.

2AC to Terror DA Each type of surveillance technology

has its limitations and is proven to be widely inefficient
Ortega 13 (Bob, Border technology remains flawed,
http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/20130524border-technologyflawed.html)
Faulty ground sensors
The ground sensors offer one example of the challenge of making sure technology
works properly. About 13,400 have been deployed piecemeal along the border over several decades. They
are typically placed along known or suspected migrant or smuggler routes, and may detect vibrations (for
foot traffic), metal (for vehicles) or have acoustic or infrared sensors. Sensors from the Vietnam War era
remain in use.

A possible false alarm from a ground sensor, and faulty radio communications, may have
contributed to the death of Border Patrol Agen t Nicholas Ivie in a friendly-fire
incident Oct. 2. As is often the case with sensor alarms, agents didnt detect
anyone but each other when they arrived . Ivie, responding separately, apparently
mistook the other agents for smugglers and opened fire . One of the agents
shot and killed him.
But false alarms are nothing new.

only 4 percent of the alarm

signals detected migrants or smugglers (34 percent were confirmed false
alarms, 62 percent couldnt be determined ). The sensors, which run on batteries,
frequently fail because of corrosion or bugs eating through wires.
In 2005, Homeland Securitys inspector general reported that

They were supposed to be replaced as part of the $1.1 billion Secure Border Initiative, a massive 2006
effort to boost security at the border. But most of the money was spent on a problematic network of hightech towers, known as SBInet.
The towers, to be equipped with video and infrared cameras and radar, were to cover the whole border. By
the time Homeland Security pulled the plug in 2010, after a host of problems, the contractor, Boeing, had
completed only 15 towers covering a 72-mile stretch of Arizonas border. Most of the old ground sensors
with their false-alarm problems remained.
In January 2011, Homeland Security launched another initiative, the Arizona Border Surveillance
Technology Plan.
That plan called for spending $1.5 billion over 10 years to integrate the SBInet towers, build new camera
towers, buy trucks loaded with surveillance gear and replace 525 ground sensors in Arizona with more
sophisticated military models. The military sensors use a combination of technologies that can distinguish
more accurately between, say, a four-legged coyote and the two-legged kind, and can even detect the
direction of travel.

eight years after the problems were identified

the sensors still had not been replaced.
But CBP confirmed this past week that

However, under the new technology plan, Arizona agents have received:
Twenty-three hand-held thermal-imaging devices (like night-vision binoculars).
Two scope trucks modified Ford 150 4x4 trucks with day and night cameras mounted on retractable
poles.
Twelve agent portable surveillance systems, which include radar, video and infrared video sensors and
can be carried in a box and set up on tripods.

Drone problems

Drones, too, have proven problematic. So far, CBP has acquired 10 drones, all versions of the
Predator B made by General Atomics, for about $18 million apiece. CBPs unarmed drones carry radar,
video and infrared sensors.
Theoretically, the drones can fly for up to 20 hours at a time. But last year, according to CBP, the drones

CBP spent so much of its budget

buying the drones that it hadnt set aside enough to operate them.
flew an average of 94 minutes a day. The main problem:

Theyre on the ground most of the time for lack of funding, said Adam Isacson, a regional security-policy
analyst for the Washington Office on Latin America, a human-rights organization that studies the effects of
U.S. policies on Latin America. They cost $3,234 an hour to operate. They havent had the budget for
maintenance or crews.

Homeland Securitys inspector general found that, because of poor

planning, CBP not only flew the drones less than one-third the number of
planned hours in 2011, but also had to use $25 million from other budgets
pay for the hours the drones did fly.
Last year,

CBP also didnt have enough operational support equipment at the airfields
where the drones are based, and didnt prioritize missions effectively, the inspector general
found all findings with which CBP concurred. Flight hours last year rose 30 percent from the year before,
to 5,700, but were still well below half the target hours. Budget cuts this year because of the congressional
sequester are likely to further limit flight hours, Isacson said.
The drones are sensitive to high winds and thunderstorms . They face Federal Aviation
Administration flight restrictions because they are less able than manned aircraft to detect other aircraft
and avoid collisions.

And their use raises privacy concerns.

At a Senate hearing in March, Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla., cited reports that DHS

has customized

its drone fleet to carry out domestic surveillance missions such as identifying civilians
carrying guns ... that fly in the face of civil liberties. We must ask whether the trade-off in
terms of border security is worth the privacy sacrifice.
But CBP officials have said they believe FAA concerns and other issues can be addressed, and that drones
can help increase surveillance wherever its most needed.
More coordination
In practice,

every piece of technology at the border has limitations :

Eight aerostats, or tethered radar blimps, that CBP is taking over from the military, cant be
flown in high winds, and the line-of-sight radar makes them less effective in
rugged, mountainous areas, which is much of the Tucson Sector. In May 2011, an aerostat
crashed in a Sierra Vista neighborhood after coming loose in 50-mile-an-hour wind gusts.
CBP limits the use of its 16

Blackhawk helicopters because the high rate at which they guzzle fuel makes

them very expensive to operate, according to pilots; and CBP budget documents confirm plans to
temporarily ground nine of the 16 Blackhawks next year pending enough money for renovations.

The 16 workhorse P-3 Orion surveillance aircraft are, on average, 42 years old. Refurbishing costs $28
million apiece.
But the bigger issue is a lack of coordination in fitting all of the pieces together and making effective use of
the data they provide, said Rick Van Schoik, director of the North American Center for Transborder Studies
at Arizona State University in Phoenix. Its still hard for CBP to figure out what we get out of all these
billions that have been spent, he said, which hampers planning for the future.

A2 Terror/Security DA: framing politics through the risk of

individuals and the border produces a police state bent on
racist purges. [keep in the 1AC just maybe not in the
same space]
This homogenized standard of normality culminates in the
ultimate police state that must continue to purge the
undesirable in order to survive.
Salter 2004 (Mark B., School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa,
Ontario, Passports, Mobility, and Security: How smart can the border be?)
At the border, all visitors, including Americans, have a greatly circumscribed set of
rights. Border officials have wide powers of search, seizure, detention, and of
course, the ability to exclude travelers from the country. Once admitted into the
country, however, one's rights, including the right to due process, come into effect. Under this system, the
intense application of state power through the examination at the border substitutes for wider police
powers of surveillance once inside American territory. Simply, an examination at the border cannot deter or
detect a motivated criminal. Limits in intelligence-gathering and information-sharing will inevitably lead to
the admission of more terrorists. The openness on which America prides itself proves to be a weakness in
terms of terrorist activities. Thus, controls

have been tightened at the border and the

surveillance of high-risk nationals will be extended domestically . Because the
examination of the 9/11 terrorists failed, the Homeland Security Department and other federal law
enforcement agencies aim to continue the surveillance of high-risk individuals within American territory.
The transition from undesirable visitors to high-risk marks a significant shift in discourse. The

exclusion of undesirable visitors indicates knowledge of the individual, if only

as undesirable. However, defining individuals as high-risk indicates a lack
of precise knowledge, suggesting only suspicions based on statistics,
sociology, and narratives. As the government defines individuals as highrisk, it encourages a cycle of insecurity that leads to the increase of police
powers and bureaucratic structures of control. Bigo (2002) has made this argument in the
European context, but we believe that it can be extended to the post-9/11 American context also. For
example, after the capture of Abdullah Al Muhajir (born Jose Padilla), Attorney General John Ashcroft said,
Al Qaeda officials knew that as a citizen of the United States holding a valid U.S. passport, Al Muhajir
would be able to travel freely in the U.S. without drawing attention to himself (2002b). Al Muhajir was
high-risk precisely because of his mobility, not because of something that had been proven in court.
Ashcroft petitioned to have Al Muhajir declared an enemy combatant, leading to a severe circumscription
of his rights, which would normally be unconceivable.

Whereas previous border security regimes focused on the actual examination

between the agent of the government and the traveler, the surveillance
regime aims to make the agents of the government present but invisible so
that travelers police themselves. By surveillance we invoke the work
of Foucault who describes an architecture of power and authority by which
individuals come to police themselves in addition to being policed from
outside (1977:189).8 This surveillance strategy operates most efficiently when
surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its
action [consequently] the perfection of power should tend to render its actual
exercise unnecessary (Foucault, 1977:201). The topography of these surveillance strategies have
been studied productively by Lyon (2001, 2003)and Bigo. This surveillance system applies to

the border security regime, and in the case of the US-VISIT, to the entire mobile
population of border-crossers.
In addition to an extended examination at the border, the US-VISIT special registration program continues
the work of domestic monitoring of high-risk visitors. Aliens are initially fingerprinted and photographed at
the border. They must report any change in their employment, schooling, or residence details to the
government within ten days, and must also report in person to an BCIS official after one month and one
year, where they are interviewed and are compared to the records of their fingerprints and photograph,
after which their are also recorded. The function of the program is to define, regulate, and identify foreign
visitors in the country. While

the extended examination strengthens the

discernment functions of the contemporary border regime, the collection and
verification of biometric information and residence details indicate a shift in
the mode of policing from examination to surveillance .
This surveillance regime imitates the 1994 Californian Proposition 187 that required all state employees to
act as de facto immigration inspectors and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 that offered a mechanism by which anyone could report illegal immigrants or their employers. The
proposed Terrorist Information and Prevention System (TIPS) creates a national neighborhood watch
program. Through a toll-free telephone number American transportation workers, truckers, letter carriers,
train conductors, ship captains, utility employees, and other members of the USA Citizen Corps may
identify suspected terrorists, who will then be questioned by authorities.
Tom Ridge,

the head of Homeland Security, has also launched a public

awareness campaign. The Citizens' Preparedness Guideencourages every citizen to be vigilant
toward suspicious individuals, packages, and situations. The guide enlists all 280 million Americans
into the war on terror. For example, Shiels reported programs that trained airline passengers to restrain
hijackers (2002); andUSA Today ran a feature Here's what to do if you're hijacked, in which an expert on

Do your own
screening and profiling. You want to look into their eyes. You can tell a lot
about people by looking in their eyes. Are they shifty? Are they nervous?
terrorist attacks suggested: You want to take a good look at who's getting on board.

(Sloan, 2002). This is epitomized in the campaign slogan: Don't be afraid, be ready.9 We would argue
that the campaign in fact urges citizens to be afraid in an economy of danger .
Simply put, buying duct tape and extra water does not attack the roots of global terrorismrather it places
American citizens in the position of continuous threat against which they can only be ready to victims. The
primary functions of this public campaign are to distract the populace from the external war on terror
(which seems unable to reach its goalswitness the absence of Saddam Hussein or Osama bin Laden) and

Reinforcing the notion that all

citizens are watching each other leads each individual to attempt to appear
as normal as possible. Examination has been supplanted by a surveillance
regime, in which every citizen is both watched and a watcher
to enlist the populace's help in policing the national population.