161. Albos v.

Embisan, 743 SCRA 283, November 26, 2014

162. Locsin v. Hizon, 735 SCRA 547, September 17, 2014
163. People v. Pagkalinawan, 614 SCRA 202, March 03, 2010
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Buy-bust Operations; Meaning of
Instigation and Entrapment. instigation is the means by which the accused is lured
into commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. On the other hand,
entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or
capturing a lawbreaker.
Distinction bet. Entrapment and instigation.ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION.
While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the
purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions to be deplored, and while instigation, as
distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes
been held to prevent the act being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that no
defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely
placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the decoy solicitation of persons
seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were
present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of
cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation
merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will
not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him, free from the influence of
instigation of detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as a supposed
confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided
the original design was formed independently of such agent; and where a person
approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities,
and, the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no
defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liuor that the purchase was made by a
spotter, detective, or hired informer, but there are cases holding the contratry.

Buy-bust operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of

apprehending drug peddlers due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards
is undertaken. One form of entrapment is the buy-bust operation. It is legal and been
approved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard
to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.

In determining the validity of a buy-bust operation, Court has

consistency applied the objective test, the details of the purported transaction
during the buy-bust operation must clearly and adequately shown, i.e., the initial contact
between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to chase, and the promise or
payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the
illegal drug subject of the sale. It further emphasized that the manner by which the
initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the
drug, the payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether
to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by
courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an
offense.

A police offers act of soliciting drugs from the accused during a

buy-bust operation or what is known as a decoy solicitation is not prohibited
by law and does not render the buy-bust operation invalid. Contrary to
appellants argument that the acts of the informant and the poseur-buyer in pretending
that they were in need of shabu instigated or induced him to violate the Anti-Drugs Law,
a police officers act of soliciting drugs from the accused during a buy-bust operation, or
what is known as a decoy solicitation is not prohibited by law and does not render the
buy-bust operation invalid.

Essential Elements of the Crime of Illegal Sale of Prohibited Drugs.

It bears stressing that what is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of drugs is the
proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of corpus delicti. In other words, the essential elements of the crime of illegal sale
of prohibited drugs are: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another;
and (2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a prohibited drug.

Evidence; Failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with Section

21 is not fatal; What is essential is the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. As can be gleaned from
the language of Section 21 of the Implementing Rules, it is clear that the failure of the
law enforcers to comply strictly with it is not fatal. It does not render appellants arrest
illegal nor the evidence adduced against him inadmissible. What is essential is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

164. Santillano v. People 614 SCRA 164, March 03, 2010

Criminal Procedure; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; While the Rules of
Court does not require that the lower courts is mandated; To justify a
relaxation of the Rules, there should be an effort on the part of the party
invoking liberality to at least explain its failure to comply with the Rules. While the Rules of Court does not require that the lower court be impleaded, proof of
service of the petition on the lower court is mandated. The People, thus, correctly
maintains that service of the petition upon the Sandiganbayan should have been made.
There have been exceptional cases where we have set aside procedural defects to
correct a patent injustice. To justify a relaxation of the Rules, however, there should be
an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to at least explain its failure to
comply with the Rules. Jurisprudence holds that the utter disregard of the Rules cannot
be justified by harking to substantial justice and the policy of liberal construction of the
Rules. Technical rules of procedure are not meant to frustrate the ends of justice. Raher,
they serve to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and, thus , effectively
prevent the clogging of court dockets.

The Law punishes not only public offeicers who commit prohibited
acts enumerated under Section 3 but also those who induce or cause the
public official to commit those offenses. - The Law punishes not only public offeicers

who commit prohibited acts enumerated under Section 3 but also those who induce or
cause the public official to commit those offenses. This is supported by Sec. 9, which
includes private persons as liable for violations under Secs. 3, 4, 4, and 6.

Conspiracy; Private persons found acting in conspiracy with public

officers may be held liable for the applicable offenses found in Section 3 of the
law. Go, citing Luciano v. Estrella, 34 SCRA 769 (1970), Singian Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,
478 SCRA 348 (2005) and Domingo v Sandiganbayan, laid to rest the debate on a private
persons culpability in cases involving RA 3019 by unequivocally stating that private
persons found acting in conspiracy with public officers may be held liable for the
applicable offenses found in Sec. 3 of the law.

Proof of conspiracy need not be direct or actual; Rule 133 of the

Rules of Court on circumstantial evidence applies to this case. - Proof of
conspiracy need not be direct or actual. Indeed, prosecutors would be hard-pressed to
secure a conviction for those charged under RA 3019 if direct evidence were required
to be established. Rule 133 of the Rules of Court on circumstantial evidence applies to
this case.

165. People v. Rubio, 667 SCRA 753, March 07, 2012

Criminal Law; Rape; Three Guiding Principles in the Prosecution of Rape Cases.
In deciding rape cases, We are guided by these three well-entrenched principles:(a) an
accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove and even more difficult to disprove;
(b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with utmost caution; and (c) the evidence of the prosecution must stand on
its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense. As a result of these guiding principles, the credibility of the victim becomes the
single most important issue.

Evidence; Witnesses; When it comes to credibility, the trial courts assessment

deserves great weight, having the full opportunity to observe directly the
witnesses department and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better
position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly.
When it comes to credibility, the trial courts assessment deserves great weight, and is
even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity
to observe directly the witnesses deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is
in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly.

Child Witnesses; It bears stressing that testimonies of child victims are given
full weight and credit, for youth and immaturity are badges of truth. It bears
stressing that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for youth and

immaturity are badges of truth. In People v. Perez, the Court aptly held: This Court has
held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature
deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender age, would
concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter
pervert herself by being subject to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the
desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth. It is highly improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet
exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if
what she claims is not true.

Criminal Law; Qualified Rape; Elements of Qualified Rape. The elements of rape
as provided in the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are as follows:ART. 266-A. Rape, When and
How Committed. Rape is committed (1.)

By a man who shall

have

knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:a.

force, threat or intimidation;b.
otherwise unconscious;c.
authority;d.

carnal

Through

When the offended party is deprived of reason or is

By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of

When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is

demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. And
one of the aggravating circumstances that would qualify the crime and raise the penalty
to death is: ART. 266-B. Penalties The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of
rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
(1)

When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a

parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the

third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.

Rape; Evidence; Witnesses; The complainants testimony - if credible, natural,

convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things
May suffice to support a conviction of rape. The testimony of AAA stated that
accused-appellant had carnal knowledge with her, and, thus, being AAAs father, he is
presumed to have employed force and/or intimidation. The fear towards her father was
more than enough to intimidate her to submit to his lewd advances without shouting for
help. The sole testimony of a rape victim, if credible, suffices to convict. The
complainants testimony if credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things may suffice to support a conviction of rape. This
Court finds that the testimony of AAA is straightforward and convincing with no
inconsistency with regard to the material elements of the crime of rape

Failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not make voluntary the
victims submission to perpetrators lust. Besides, physical resistance is not
an essential element of rape. Accused-appellant seeks to deny the charge against
him by stating that the victim did not shout during the alleged bestial act. The Court has

declared repeatedly that failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance [does] not make
voluntary [the victims] submission to [the perpetrators] lust. Besides, physical resistance
is not an essential element of rape.

Supreme Court has reiterated that lust is no respecter of time and place; Rape
may even be committed in the same room where other family members also
sleep. Accused-appellant further claims that it is unlikely that rape was committed,
because the house where it allegedly occurred only has one room and was then being
occupied by three families. This is of no consequence. This Court has reiterated that lust
is no respecter of time and place.[31] Rape may even be committed in the same room
where other family members also sleep.[32] Besides, it must be noted that the rape
occurred in the early afternoon and not in the evening when the rest of the occupants
are presumably sleeping in the cramped space.

Evidence; Medical Examination; Medical examination of the victim is not

indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victims testimony
alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime. We must
bear in mind that a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a
prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to
convict the accused of the crime. In fact, a doctors certificate is merely corroborative in
character and not an indispensable requirement in proving the commission of rape. The
presence of healed or fresh hymenal laceration is not an element of rape. [34] However, it
is the best physical evidence of forcible defloration. Thus, the findings of Dr. Reyes
corroborate and support the testimony of AAA.

Qualified rape; Penalties; Death Penalty; Since all the elements of qualified
rape were duly alleged and proved during the trial, the proper penalty should
be death according to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. However, with
the effectivity of RA 9346, the imposition of the supreme penalty of death has
been prohibited. Since all the elements of qualified rape were duly alleged and
proved during the trial, the proper penalty should be death according to Article 266-B of
the RPC. However, with the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death has been prohibited. Pursuant to Section 2 of the Act, the
penalty to be meted out should be reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

Civil Indemnity; Moral Damages; Civil indemnity, which is actually in the

nature of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory upon the finding of
the fact of rape; Moral damages are automatically granted in a rape case
without need of further proof other than the fact of its commission, for it is
assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to
such an award. The trial court correctly awarded PhP 75,000 as civil indemnity, but
the amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded has to be modified consonant to

current jurisprudence. Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or

compensatory damages, is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.[36] Moral
damages are automatically granted in a rape case without need of further proof other
than the fact of its commission, for it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered
moral injuries entitling her to such an award.[37] According to prevailing jurisprudence,
the amount of moral damages should be PhP 75,000.[38] Likewise, exemplary damages
should have been PhP 30,000, and this is awarded in order to serve as public example
and to protect the young from sexual abuse.

166. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pagayatan, 644 SCRA 133, February 23,
2011

Remedial Law; Actions; Judgments; Res Judicata; Res Judicata means a matter
adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment; Elements of Res Judicata In Lanuza v. Court of Appeals,[15] the Court
discussed the principle of res judicata, to wit:Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a
thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. The
doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment, on the merits rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and
constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or
cause of action. The elements of res judicata are (a) identity of parties or at least such as
representing the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity
in the two (2) particulars is such that any judgment which may be rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration.
The second element of res judicata is not present; Res judicata, therefore,
cannot

apply.

The issue before Us is whether the RTC acted properly in ordering the deposit or
payment to the landowner of the preliminary valuation of the land made by the PARAD.
This

is

considering

that

Sec.

16(e)

of

RA

6657

clearly

requires

the initial

valuation made by the DAR and LBP be deposited or paid to the landowner before
taking possession of the latters property, not the preliminary valuation made by the
PARAD. Evidently, the second element of res judicata is not present. The relief prayed for
in Lubrica is that the amount for deposit in favor of the landowner be determined on the
basis of the time of payment and not of the time of taking. But here, the prayer of the
LBP is for the deposit of the valuation of the LBP and DAR and not that of the PARAD.
These are two distinct and separate issues. Res judicata, therefore, cannot apply.

Principle of Stare Decisis; The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by

lower courts to doctrinal rules established by the court in its final decisions.
The Court explained the principle in Ting v. Velez-Ting: The principle of stare decisis

enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final
decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. Basically, it is a
bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues, necessary for two simple reasons:
economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the
Civil Code.

Eminent Domain; Just compensation; It is the purchase price offered by the

Department of Agrarian Reform in its notice of acquisition of the land that
must be deposited in an accessible bank in the name of the landowner before
taking possession of the land not the valuation of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator. The LBP posits that under Sec. 16(e) of RA 6657, and as
espoused in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, it is the purchase price
offered by the DAR in its notice of acquisition of the land that must be deposited in an
accessible bank in the name of the landowner before taking possession of the land, not
the valuation of the PARAD. The Court agrees with the LBP.

It is only after the Department of Agrarian Reform has made its final
determination of the initial valuation of the land that the landowner may
resort to the judicial determination of the just compensation for the land. Conspicuously, there is no mention of the PARAD in the foregoing Sec. 16(e) when it
speaks of the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or LBP bonds in accordance with this Act. Moreover, it is only after
the DAR has made its final determination of the initial valuation of the land that the
landowner may resort to the judicial determination of the just compensation for the land.
Clearly, therefore, it is the initial valuation made by the DAR and LBP that is contained in
the letter-offer to the landowner under Sec. 16(a), said valuation of which must be
deposited and released to the landowner prior to taking possession of the property.

Sec. 16 of the RA 6657 only allows the release of the initial valuation of the
Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the Philippines to the
landowner prior to the determination by the courts of the final just
compensation due. The length of time that has elapsed that the landowner has not
received any compensation for the land cannot justify the release of the PARAD valuation
to the landowner. Sec. 16 of RA 6657 only allows the release of the initial valuation of the
DAR and the LBP to the landowner prior to the determination by the courts of the final
just compensation due. Besides, it must be stressed that it was only sometime in 2003
that the assignee of the landowner filed a petition for determination of just compensation
with the PARAD.Clearly, the landowner slept on his right to demand payment of the initial
valuation of the land. Nevertheless, such lapse of time demands that the DAR and the
LBP act with dispatch in determining such initial valuation and to deposit it in favor of the
landowner at the soonest possible time.

167. People v. Marcelino, Jr., 652 SCRA 362, June 15, 2011

Criminal Law; Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002; Illegal Sale of

Dangerous Drugs; For the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, the
following elements must be proved: (1) the identities of the buyer and the
seller, the object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
its payment. For the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, the following
elements must be proved: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. The presence of
these elements was proved by the trial court and later affirmed by the appellate court in
the present case. The delivery of the illegal drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by
the seller of marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction.

Evidence; Witnesses; In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act,

the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, who are police officers, are given
credence for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Generally, in cases involving
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, who are
police officers, are given credence for they are presumed to have performed their duties
in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. In the present case, the
testimonies of the arresting officers as to what happened during the day the buy-bust
was conducted were candid and expressed in a straightforward manner; thus, in the
absence of any improper motive, said statements are given full faith and credit

168. People v. Sitco, 620 SCRA 561, May 14, 2010

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Witnesses; Policemen; A police officers

involvement in illegal drug activities makes him a polluted source and renders
his testimony against the accused suspect, at best it is like a pot calling a
kettle black. We start with the credibility of the lone prosecution witness, Buan,
whose testimony Sitco has assailed at every turn. Sitco insists and with reason that Buan
cannot competently make a plausible account of something of which he himself was
equally culpable. Sitcos assault on the credibility of Buan is well-taken. As it were, Buans
involvement as a police officer in illegal drug activities makes him a polluted source and
renders his testimony against Sitco and Bagtas suspect, at best. It is like a pot calling a
kettle black. To be believed, testimonial evidence should come only from the mouth of a
credible witness. Given his service record, Buan can hardly qualify as a witness worthy,
under the limited confines of this case, of full faith and credit. And lest it be overlooked,
Buan is a rogue cop, having, per his own admission, been arrested for indulging in a pot
session, eventually charged and dismissed from the police service. It would appear, thus,
that Buans had been a user. His arrest for joining a pot session only confirms this
undesirable habit. The Court, to be sure, has taken stock of the well-settled rule that
prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of police buy-bust
operators, and that the trial courts finding on the police-witness credibility deserves
respect. Juxtaposed with this rule, however, is the postulate that when confronted with

circumstances that would support a reasonable doubt in favor of the accused, then
acquittal or the least liability is in order. Buans involvement in drugs and his alleged
attempt to extort money from appellant Sitco in exchange for his freedom has put his
credibility under a heavy cloud.

Presumption of Innocence; The constitutional presumption of innocence

requires courts to take a more than casual consideration of

every

circumstances or doubt proving the innocence of the petitioner. The imperative

of proof beyond reasonable doubt has a vital role in our criminal justice system, the
accused, during a criminal prosecution, having a stake interest of immense importance,
both because of the possibility that he may lose his freedom if convicted and because of
the certainty that his conviction will leave a permanent stain on his reputation and name.
As articulated in Rabanal v. People: Law and jurisprudence demand proof beyond
reasonable doubt before any person may be deprived of his life, liberty, or even property.
Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the petitioner to be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and to overcome the presumption, nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. The constitutional
presumption of innocence requires courts to take a more than casual
consideration of every circumstances or doubt proving the innocence of
petitioner.

Chain of Custody Rule; The chain of custody requirement is essential to

ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed
through the monitoring and tracking of the movements of the seized drugs
from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the
court.

But over and above the credibility of the prosecutions lone witness as ground for
acquittal looms the matter of the custodial chain, a term which has gained traction in the
prosecution of drug-related cases. In prosecutions involving narcotics and other illegal
substances, the substance itself constitutes part of the corpus delicti of the offense and the
fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Of
chief concern in drug cases then is the requirement that the prosecution prove that what
was seized by police officers is the same item presented in court. This identification, as
we have held in the past, must be established with moral certainty and is a function of
the rule on chain of custody. The chain of custody requirement is essential to ensure that
doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the monitoring and
tracking of the movements of the seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the
forensic chemist, and finally to the court.

Buy-Bust Operations; On account of the built danger of abuse that it carries, a

buy-bust operation is governed by specific procedures on the seizure and

custody of drugs, separately from the general law procedures geared to

ensure that the rights of persons under criminal investigation and of the
accused accused facing a criminal charge are safeguarded.- The Court reiterates
that, on account of the built-in danger of abuse that it carries, a buy-bust operation is
governed by specific procedures on the seizure and custody of drugs, separately from
the general law procedures geared to ensure that the rights of persons under criminal
investigation and of the accused facing a criminal charge are safeguarded. To reiterate,
the chain of custody requirement is necessary in order to remove doubts as to the
identity of the evidence, by monitoring and tracking custody of the seized drugs from the
accused, until they reach the court. We find that the procedure and statutory safeguards
prescribed for compliance by drug enforcement agencies have not been followed in this
case. A failure to comply with the aforequoted Sec. 21(1) of RA 9165 implies a
concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the identity of the seized
illegal items as part of the corpus delicti.
Although the non-presentation of some of the witnesses who can attest to an
unbroken chain of custody of evidence may, in some instances, be excused,
there should be a justifying factor for the prosecution to dispense with their
testimonies. Although the non-presentation of some of the witnesses who can attest
to an unbroken chain of custody of evidence may, in some instances, be excused, there
should be a justifying factor for the prosecution to dispense with their testimonies.
In People v. Denoman, the Court discussed the saving mechanism provided by Sec.
21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA
9165. Denoman explains that the aforementioned provision contains a saving
mechanism to ensure that not every case of non-compliance will permanently prejudice
the prosecutions case. The saving mechanism applies when the prosecution recognizes
and explains the lapse or lapses in the prescribed procedures. In this case, the
prosecution did not even acknowledge and discuss the reasons for the missing links in
the chain.

169. Urbano v. People, 576 SCRA 826, January 20, 2009

Criminal Law; Homicide; Mitigating Circumstances; Self-Defense; The third requisite
of self-defense is present: (1) when no provocation at all was given to the aggressor;
(2) when, even if provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if the
provocation was sufficient, it was not given by the person defending himself; or (4)
when even if provocation was given by the person defending himself, it was not
proximate and immediate to the act of aggression; The victims insulting remarks
directed at the accused, and uttered immediately before the fist fight constitute
sufficient

provocation.

When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential

element of self-defense, the reference is to an unjust or improper conduct of the offended party
capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone; it is not enough that the provocative act be
unreasonable or annoying; the provocation must be sufficient to excite one to commit the
wrongful act and should immediately precede the act. This third requisite of self-defense is
present: (1) when no provocation at all was given to the aggressor; (2) when, even if provocation
was given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if the provocation was sufficient, it was not given

by the person defending himself; or (4) when even if a provocation was given by the person
defending himself, it was not proximate and immediate to the act of aggression.

In the instant case, Tomeldens insulting remarks directed at petitioner and uttered
immediately before the fist fight constituted sufficient provocation. This is not to mention
other irritating statements made by the deceased while they were having beer in
Bugallon. Petitioner was the one provoked and challenged to a fist fight.

While intent to kill may be presumed from the fact of the death of the victim, this
mitigating factor may still be considered when attendant facts and circumstances so
warrant. The mitigating circumstance that petitioner had no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed should also be appreciated in his favor. While intent to kill may be
presumed from the fact of the death of the victim, this mitigating factor may still be considered
when attendant facts and circumstances so warrant, as in the instant case. Consider: Petitioner
tried to avoid the fight, being very much smaller than Tomelden. He tried to parry the blows of
Tomelden, albeit he was able, during the scuffle, to connect a lucky punch that ended the fight.
And lest it be overlooked, petitioner helped carry his unconscious co-worker to the office of the
LIWADs general manager. Surely, such gesture cannot reasonably be expected from, and would
be unbecoming of, one intending to commit so grave a wrong as killing the victim. A bareknuckle fight as a means to parry the challenge issued by Tomelden was commensurate to the
potential violence petitioner was facing. It was just unfortunate that Tomelden died from that
lucky punch, an eventuality that could have possibly been averted had he had the financial
means to get the proper medical attention. Thus, it is clear that the mitigating circumstance of
no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed must also be appreciated in favor of
petitioner while finding him guilty of homicide. That petitioner landed a lucky punch at
Tomeldens face while their co-workers were trying to separate them is a compelling indicium that
he never intended so grave a wrong as to kill the victim.

170. TSPIC Corporation v. TSPIC Employees Union, 545 SCRA 215, February 13,
2008
Labor

Law;

Labor

Union;

Collectie

Bargaining

Agreement;

Collective

Bargaining Agreement is the law that the parties and they are obliged to
comply with its provisions.- It is familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that
the CBA is the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its
provisions. We said so inHonda Phils., Inc. v. Samahan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa
Honda: A collective bargaining agreement or CBA refers to the negotiated contract
between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of
work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. As in all
contracts, the parties in a CBA may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and

conditions as they may deem convenient provided these are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy. Thus, where the CBA is clear and
unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties and compliance therewith is
mandated by the express policy of the law.

Contracts; Interpretation of Contracts; As a general rule. In the interpretation

of contract, the intention of the parties is to be pursued; It is the duty of the
courts to place a practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due
consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the purpose which it
is intended to serve. As a general rule, in the interpretation of a contract, the
intention of the parties is to be pursued. Littera necat spiritus vivificat. An instrument
must be interpreted according to the intention of the parties. It is the duty of the courts
to place a practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to the
context in which it is negotiated and the purpose which it is intended to serve. Absurd
and illogical interpretations should also be avoided. Considering that the parties have
unequivocally agreed to substitute the benefits granted under the CBA with those
granted under wage orders, the agreement must prevail and be given full effect.

It is familiar rule in interpretation of contracts that conflicting provisions

should be harmonized to give effect to all; When general and specific
provisions are inconsistent, the specific provision shall be paramount to and
govern the general provision. - Paragraph (b) is a general provision which allows a
salary increase to all those who are qualified. It, however, clashes with the last
paragraph which specifically states that the salary increases for the years 2001 and
2002 shall be deemed inclusive of wage increases subsequent to those granted under
WO No. 7. It is a familiar rule in interpretation of contracts that conflicting provisions
should be harmonized to give effect to all. Likewise, when general and specific provisions
are inconsistent, the specific provision shall be paramount to and govern the general
provision.[22] Thus, it may be reasonably concluded that TSPIC granted the salary
increases under the condition that any wage order that may be subsequently issued shall
be credited against the previously granted increase.

Diminution of Benefits; Diminution of benefits is the unilateral withdrawal by

the employer of benefits already enjoyed by the employees; Circumstances
when there is diminution of benefits. Diminution of benefits is the unilateral
withdrawal by the employer of benefits already enjoyed by the employees. There is
diminution of benefits when it is shown that: (1) the grant or benefit is founded on a
policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period; (2) the practice is consistent and
deliberate; (3) the practice is not due to error in the construction or application of a
doubtful or difficult question of law; and (4) the diminution or discontinuance is done
unilaterally by the employer.

An erroneously granted benefit may be withdrawn without violating the

prohibition against non-diminution of benefits. As correctly pointed out by TSPIC,
the overpayment of its employees was a result of an error. This error was immediately
rectified by TSPIC upon its discovery. We have ruled before that an erroneously granted

benefit may be withdrawn without violating the prohibition against non-diminution of

benefits. We ruled in Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. NLRC: Absent clear
administrative guidelines, Petitioner Corporation cannot be faulted for erroneous
application of the law. Payment may be said to have been made by reason of a mistake
in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of law. (Article 2155,
in relation to Article 2154 of the Civil Code). Since it is a past error that is being
corrected, no vested right may be said to have arisen nor any diminution of benefit
under Article 100 of the Labor Code may be said to have resulted by virtue of the
correction.

Constitutional Law; Social Justice; Though it is the states responsibility to

afford protection to labor, this policy should not be used as an instrument to
oppress management and capital; In resolving disputes between labor and
capital, fairness and justice should always prevail. it should be reiterated that
though it is the states responsibility to afford protection to labor, this policy should not
be used as an instrument to oppress management and capital. In resolving disputes
between labor and capital, fairness and justice should always prevail. We ruled
in Norkis Union v. Norkis Trading that in the resolution of labor cases, we have always
been guided by the State policy enshrined in the Constitution: social justice and
protection of the working class. Social justice does not, however, mandate
that every dispute should be automatically decided in favor of labor. In any case, justice
is to be granted to the deserving and dispensed in the light of the established facts and
the applicable law and doctrine.

171. Benguet Corporation v. Department of Environment Resources-Mines

Adjudication Board, 545 SCRA 196, February 13, 2008
Arbitration; Mines Adjudication Board; Appeals; A decision of the Mines
Adjudication Board must first be appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court before recourse to the Court may be had. The last
paragraph of Section 79 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of
1995 states, A petition for review by certiorari and question of law may be filed by the
aggrieved party with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order
or decision of the [MAB]. However, this Court has already invalidated such provision
in Carpio v. Sulu Resources Development Corp., ruling that a decision of the MAB must
first be appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, before
recourse to this Court may be had.

A contractual stipulation that requires prior resort to voluntary arbitration

before the parties can go directly to court is not illegal and it is in fact
promoted by the State. In RA 9285 or the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
2004, the Congress reiterated the efficacy of arbitration as an alternative mode of
dispute resolution by stating in Sec. 32 thereof that domestic arbitration shall still be
governed by RA 876. Clearly, a contractual stipulation that requires prior resort to
voluntary arbitration before the parties can go directly to court is not illegal and is in fact

promoted by the State. Thus, petitioner correctly cites several cases whereby arbitration
clauses have been upheld by this Court.

Distinction between Voluntary and Compulsory Arbitration. J.G. Realtys

contention, that prior resort to arbitration is unavailing in the instant case because the
POAs mandate is to arbitrate disputes involving mineral agreements, is misplaced. A
distinction must be made between voluntary and compulsory arbitration. In Ludo and
Luym Corporation v. Saordino, the Court had the occasion to distinguish between the two
types of arbitrations: Comparatively, in Reformist Union of R.B. Liner, Inc. vs. NLRC,
compulsory arbitration has been defined both as the process of settlement of labor
disputes by a government agency which has the authority to investigate and to
make an award which is binding on all the parties, and as a mode of arbitration where
the parties are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by
a third party. While a voluntary arbitrator is not part of the governmental unit or
labor departments personnel, said arbitrator renders arbitration services provided for
under labor laws.

Civil Law; Unjust Enrichment; Definition of Unjust Enrichment; There is no

unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to such
benefit. - In Car Cool Philippines, Inc. v. Ushio Realty and Development Corporation, we
defined unjust enrichment, as follows: We have held that [t]here is unjust enrichment
when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and
good conscience. Article 22 of the Civil Code provides that [e]very person who through
an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
return the same to him. The principle of unjust enrichment under Article 22 requires two
conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2)
that such benefit is derived at anothers expense or damage. There is no unjust
enrichment when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to such benefit.

172. Steel Corporation of the Philippines v. Equitable PCI Bank Inc., 635 SCRA
403, November 17, 2010

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Actions; Consolidation of Cases; It is a timehonored principle that when two or more cases involve the same parties and
affect closely related subject matters, they must be consolidated and jointly
tried, in order to serve the best interests of the parties and to settle
expeditiously the issues involved. It is a time-honored principle that when two or
more cases involve the same parties and affect closely related subject matters, they
must be consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best interests of the parties
and to settle expeditiously the issues involved. In other words, consolidation is proper

wherever the subject matter involved and relief demanded in the different suits make it
expedient for the court to determine all of the issues involved and adjudicate the rights
of the parties by hearing the suits together.
Consolidation aims to attain justice with the least expense and vexation to the
parties-litigants. The purpose of this rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against
oppression and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets, and simplify the work of the trial
court. In short, consolidation aims to attain justice with the least expense and vexation to the
parties-litigants. It contributes to the swift dispensation of justice, and is in accord with the aim of
affording the parties a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of their cases before the
courts. Further, it results in the avoidance of the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered by the courts in two or more cases, which would otherwise require a single judgment.

Appeals; Assignment of Errors; The general rule provides that an assignment

of error is essential to appellate review and only those assigned will be
considered. Exceptions. The general rule provides that an assignment of error is
essential to appellate review and only those assigned will be considered, [19] save for the
following exceptions: (1) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over
the subject matter; (2) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain
or clerical errors within the contemplation of the law; (3) matters not assigned as errors
on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and
complete resolution of the case or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing
piecemeal justice; (4) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in
the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted
which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (5) matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (6) matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but which the determination of a question properly
assigned is dependent.[20]None of these exceptions exists in this case.

To warrant consideration on appeal, there must be discussion of the error

assigned, else, the error will be deemed abandoned or waived. In Abedes v.
Court of Appeals, this Court emphasized the difference of appeals in criminal cases and
in civil cases by saying, Issues not raised in the pleadings, as opposed to ordinary
appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, are deemed
waived or abandoned. Essentially, to warrant consideration on appeal, there must be
discussion of the error assigned, else, the error will be deemed abandoned or waived.

173. Seneres v. Commission on Elections, 585 SCRA 557, April 16, 2009

Election

Law;

Election

Contests;

Electoral

Tribunals;

Certiorari;

While

certiorari is the proper remedy to question any final order, ruling and decision
of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers, there must be a showing that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse
of discretion and that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy

in

the

ordinary

course

of

law.

A special civil action for certiorari may be availed of when the tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law for the purpose of annulling the proceeding. It is the proper remedy to question
any final order, ruling and decision of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. For certiorari to prosper, however, there must be a
showing that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion and that there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the
present case, a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law was
available to Seeres. The 1987 Constitution cannot be more explicit in this regard. Its
Article VI, Section 17 states: Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members.

Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction
over elections relating to the election, returns, and qualifications ends, and
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals own jurisdiction begins. - The
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals (HRETs) sole and exclusive jurisdiction over
contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House
of Representatives begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction
over elections relating to the election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs
own jurisdiction begins.

Party-List

System;

Where

the

right

of

the

nominees

as

party-list

representatives had been recognized and declared by a resolution of the

COMELEC and the nominees had taken their oath and already assumed their
offices in the House of Representatives, the proper recourse would have been
to file a petition for quo warranto before the HRET within 10 days from receipt
of the Resolution and not a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Without a doubt, at the time Seeres filed this petition before this Court on July 23, 2007,
the right of the nominees as party-list representatives had been recognized and declared
in the July 19, 2007 Resolution and the nominees had taken their oath and already
assumed their offices in the House of Representatives. As such, the proper recourse
would have been to file a petition for quo warranto before the HRET within ten (10) days
from receipt of the July 19, 2007 Resolution and not a petition for certiorari before this
Court. Since Seneres failed to file a petition for quo warranto before the HRET within 10
days from receipt of the July 19, 2007 Resolution declaring the validity of Robles
Certificate of Nomination, said Resolution of the COMELEC has already become final and
executory. Thus, this petition has now become moot and can be dismissed outright. And

even if we entertain the instant special civil action, still, petitioners postulations are
bereft of merit

Party-List System; Electioneering; Partisan Political Activity; Words and

Phrases; As long as the acts embraced under Sec. 79 of the Omnibus Election
Code pertain to or are in connection with the nomination of a candidate by a
party or organization, then such are treated as internal matters and cannot be
considered as electioneering or partisan political activity the twin acts of
signing and filing a Certificate of Nomination are purely internal processes of the party or
organization and are not designed to enable or ensure the victory of the candidate in the
elections.

Guided by the above perspective, Robles act of submitting a nomination list for BUHAY
cannot, without more, be considered electioneering or partisan political activity within
the context of the Election Code. First of all, petitioner did not aver that Robles
committed any of the five (5) acts defined in the aforequoted Sec. 79(b) of the Code, let
alone adduce proof to show the fact of commission. Second, even if Robles performed
any of the previously mentioned acts, Sec. 79 of the Code is nonetheless unequivocal
that if the same is done only for the purpose of enhancing the chances of aspirants for
nominations for candidacy to a public office by a political party, agreement, or coalition
of parties, it is not considered as a prohibited electioneering or partisan election activity.
From this provision, one can conclude that as long as the acts embraced under Sec. 79
pertain to or are in connection with the nomination of a candidate by a party or
organization, then such are treated as internal matters and cannot be considered as
electioneering or partisan political activity. The twin acts of signing and filing a Certificate
of Nomination are purely internal processes of the party or organization and are not
designed to enable or ensure the victory of the candidate in the elections. The act of
Robles of submitting the certificate nominating Velarde and others was merely in
compliance with the COMELEC requirements for nomination of party-list representatives
and, hence, cannot be treated as electioneering or partisan political activity proscribed
under by Sec. 2(4) of Art. IX(B) of the Constitution for civil servants. Moreover, despite
the fact that Robles is a nominating officer, as well as Chief of the LRTA, petitioner was
unable to cite any legal provision that prohibits his concurrent positions of LRTA President
and acting president of a party-list organization or that bars him from nominating.

It is irrelevant who among a party-list organizations officials sign the

Certificate of Nomination, as long as the signatory was so authorized by said
organization. the nomination of Velarde, Coscolluela, Tieng, Monsod, and Villarama to
the 2007 party-list elections was, in the final analysis, an act of the National Council of
BUHAY. Robles role in the nominating process was limited to signing, on behalf of BUHAY,
and submitting the partys Certificate of Nomination to the COMELEC. The act of
nominating BUHAYs representatives was veritably a direct and official act of the National
Council of BUHAY and not Robles. Be that as it may, it is irrelevant who among BUHAYs
officials signs the Certificate of Nomination, as long as the signatory was so authorized

by BUHAY. The alleged disqualification of Robles as nominating officer is indeed a nonissue and does not affect the act of the National Council of nominating Velarde and
others. Hence, the Certificate of Nomination, albeit signed by Robles, is still the product
of a valid and legal act of the National Council of BUHAY. Robles connection with LRTA
could not really be considered as a factor invalidating the nomination process.

Hold-Over Doctrine; As general rule, officers and directors a corporation hold

over after the expiration of their terms until such time as their successors are
elected

or

appointed.

Petitioner Seeres further maintains that at the time the Certificate of Nomination was
submitted, Robles term as President of BUHAY had already expired, thus effectively
nullifying the Certificate of Nomination and the nomination process. Again, petitioners
contention is untenable. As a general rule, officers and directors of a corporation hold
over after the expiration of their terms until such time as their successors are elected or
appointed.[33] Sec. 23 of the Corporation Code contains a provision to this effect, thus:
Section 23. The board of directors or trustees.Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the
corporate powers of all corporations formed under this Code shall be exercised, all
business conducted and all property of such corporations controlled and held by the
board of directors or trustees to be elected from among the holders of stocks, or where
there is no stock, from among the members of the corporation, who shall hold office for
one (1) year until their successors are elected and qualified. The holdover doctrine has,
to be sure, a purpose which is at once legal as it is practical. It accords validity to what
would otherwise be deemed as dubious corporate acts and gives continuity to a
corporate enterprise in its relation to outsiders.[34] This is the analogical situation
obtaining in the present case.

De Facto Officers; Authorities are almost unanimous that one who continues
with the discharge of the functions of an office after the expiration of his or
her legal term no successor having in the meantime, been appointed or
chosen-is commonly regarded as a de facto officer, even where no provision is
made by law for his holding over and there is nothing to indicate the contrary.
Authorities are almost unanimous that one who continues with the discharge of the
functions of an office after the expiration of his or her legal term no successor having, in
the meantime, been appointed or chosen is commonly regarded as a de facto officer,
even where no provision is made by law for his holding over and there is nothing to
indicate the contrary. By fiction of law, the acts of such de facto officer are considered
valid and effective. So it must be for the acts of Robles while serving as a hold-over
Buhay President. Among these acts was the submission of the nomination certificate for
the May 14, 2007 elections.

Estoppel; As a principle of equity rooted on natural justice, the bar of

estoppels

precludes

a person from going

back

on

his

own

acts

and

representations to the prejudice of another whom he has led to rely upon

them. As a final consideration, it bears to state that petitioner is estopped from
questioning the authority of Robles as President of BUHAY. As a principle of equity rooted
on natural justice, the bar of estoppel precludes a person from going back on his own
acts and representations to the prejudice of another whom he has led to rely upon them.
Again, it cannot be denied that Robles, as BUHAY President, signed all manifestations of
the partys desire to participate in the 2001 and 2004 elections, as well as all Certificates
of Nomination. In fact, the corresponding certificate for the 2004 elections included
petitioner as one of the nominees. During this time, Robles term as President had already
expired, and yet, petitioner never questioned Robles authority to sign the Certificate of
Nomination. As a matter of fact, petitioner even benefited from the nomination, because
he earned a seat in the House of Representatives as a result of the partys
success. Clearly, petitioner cannot now be heard to argue that Robles term as president
of BUHAY has long since expired, and that his act of submitting the Certificate of
Nomination and the manifestation to participate in the 2007 elections is null and void. He
is already precluded from doing so.

174. People v. Maningding, 657 SCRA 804, September 14, 2011

Remedial Law; Appeals; The trial courts assessment of the credibility of a

witness is entitled to great weight, sometimes even with finality. in People v.
Gabrino[33] that the factual determination of the RTC should not be disturbed unless there
is a showing of misinterpretation of materials facts or that it is tainted with grave abuse
of discretion: We have held time and again that the trial courts assessment of the
credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, sometimes even with
finality. As We have reiterated in the very recent case of People v. Jose Pepito
Combate, where there is no showing that the trial court overlooked or
misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion,
then We do not disturb and interfere with its assessment of the facts and the
credibility of the witnesses. This is clearly because the judge in the trial court
was the one who personally heard the accused and the witnesses, and
observed their demeanor as well as the manner in which they testified during
trial.

Criminal Law; Murder; Self-Defense; When an accused claims the justifying

circumstance of self-defense, an accused admits the commission of the act of
killing; the burden of evidence shifts to the accuseds side in clearly and
convincingly proving that the elements of self-defense exist that could justify
the accuseds act. Preliminarily, it is a settled rule that when an accused claims the
justifying circumstance of self-defense, an accused admits the commission of the act of

killing. The burden of evidence, therefore, shifts to the accuseds side in clearly and
convincingly proving that the elements of self-defense exist that could justify the
accuseds act. In this case, considering that at the outset, accused-appellant has already
maintained a claim of self-defense, the burden of evidence rests upon him in proving his
act of stabbing as justifiable under the circumstances.
Requisites of Self-defense. According to Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, any
person who acts in defense of his person or rights do not incur any criminal liability
provided that the following requisites concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Conversely, the accused must
be able to establish that all three circumstances concur in order for the accuseds act to
be justified under the law.

Words and Phrases; Definition of Unlawful Aggression. In the case of unlawful

aggression, People v. Gabrino, following the ruling in People v. Manulit, explained, thus:
Unlawful aggression is defined as an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict
real imminent injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong,
positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. It presupposes actual, sudden,
unexpected or imminent danger not merely threatening and intimidating action. It is
present only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones life.

Treachery; There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which
tends directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Art.
248 of the Code states that [a]ny person who, not falling within the provisions of Article
246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua, to death if committed with x x x treachery. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. These means or methods are made in the form of a swift, deliberate and
unexpected attack, without any warning and affording the victim, which is usually
unarmed and unsuspecting, no chance at all to resist or escape the impending attack.

175. People v. Rosialda, 629 SCRA 507, August 25, 2010

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Elements.

In People v. Darisan, the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of sale of
dangerous drugs: In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following
elements must first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and
(2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
Frame-Up;

Burden

of

Evidence;

Once

the

prosecution

overcomes

the

presumption of innocence by proving the elements of the crime and the

identity of the accused as perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of

evidence then shifts to the defense which shall then test the strength of the
prosecutions case either by showing that no crime was in fact committed ot
the accused could not have the committed or did not commit the imputed
crime, or at the very least, by casting doubt on the guilt of the accused.
As correctly ruled by the courts a quo, for the defense of frame-up to prosper, the
accused must present clear and convincing evidence of such fact. It must be noted at
this juncture that a prima facie case against Rosialda had already been established. The
burden of evidence now lies with him to prove his defense of frame-up. Correlatively, the
Court ruled in People v. Rodrigo: Once the prosecution overcomes the presumption of
innocence by proving the elements of the crime and the identity of the accused as
perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence then shifts to the
defense which shall then test the strength of the prosecutions case either by showing
that no crime was in fact committed or that the accused could not have committed or did
not commit the imputed crime, or at the very least, by casting doubt on the guilt of the
accused.

Chain of Custody Rule; The failure of the prosecution to show that the police
officers conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the
evidence confiscated pursuant to said guidelines, it is not fatal and ndoes not
automatically render accused-appellants arrest illegal or the items seized or
confiscated from him inadmissible the implementing rules offer some
flexibility when a proviso added that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
Anent the second element, Rosialda raises the issue that there is a violation of Sec. 21,
Art. II of RA 9165, particularly the requirement that the alleged dangerous drugs seized
by the apprehending officers be photographed in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel. Rosialda argues that such failure to comply with the provision of the law is
fatal to his conviction. This contention is untenable. The Court made the following
enlightening disquisition on this matter in People v. Rivera: The procedure to be followed
in the custody and handling of seized dangerous drugs is outlined in Section 21,
paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 which stipulates: (1) The apprehending
team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The same is implemented by Section 21(a),
Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, viz.: (a)

The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items. The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers
conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence
confiscated pursuant to said guidelines, is not fatal and does not automatically
render accused-appellants arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from
him inadmissible. Indeed, the implementing rules offer some flexibility when a proviso
added that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items. The same provision clearly states as well, that it must still be shown that
there exists justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence have been preserved.

176. People v. Dela Cruz, 612 SCRA 738, February 16, 2010
Criminal Law; Murder; Elements. For the charge of murder to prosper, the prosecution must
prove that: (1) the offender killed the victim, (2) through treachery, or by any of the other
five qualifying circumstances, duly alleged in the Information. Generally, the elements of murder
are:1. That a person was killed.2. That the accused killed him.3. That the killing was attended
by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248.4.The killing is not parricide or
infanticide

Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Elements. There is treachery when the

offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The
essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift,
deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be considered, two elements must
concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no
opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted

177. South African Airways v. CIR, 612 SCRA 665, February 16 2010

Taxation; Tax Refund; Since an action for a tax refund partakes of the nature of
an exemption, which cannot be allowed unless granted in the most explicit and
categorical language, it is strictly construed against the claimant who must
discharge

such

burden

convincingly.

Preliminarily, we emphasize that petitioner is claiming that it is exempted from being

taxed for its sale of passage documents in the Philippines. Petitioner, however, failed to
sufficiently prove such contention. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Acesite
(Philippines) Hotel Corporation, we held, Since an action for a tax refund partakes of the
nature of an exemption, which cannot be allowed unless granted in the most explicit and
categorical language, it is strictly construed against the claimant who must discharge
such burden convincingly.

Income Taxation; Air Transportation; Gross Philippine Billings; As long as the

uplifts of passengers and cargo occur to or from the Philippines, income is
included in Gross Philippine Billings. Prior to the 1997 NIRC, GPB referred to
revenues from uplifts anywhere in the world, provided that the passage documents were
sold in the Philippines. Legislature departed from such concept in the 1997 NIRC where
GPB is now defined under Sec. 28(A)(3)(a): Gross Philippine Billings refers to the amount
of gross revenue derived from carriage of persons, excess baggage, cargo and mail
originating from the Philippines in a continuous and uninterrupted flight, irrespective of
the place of sale or issue and the place of payment of the ticket or passage document.
Now, it is the place of sale that is irrelevant; as long as the uplifts of passengers and
cargo occur to or from the Philippines, income is included in GPB.

Off-line air carriers having general sales agents in the Philippines are
engaged in or doing business in the Philippines and that their income from
sales of passage documents here is income from within the Philippines.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. British Overseas Airways Corporation (British
Overseas Airways), which was decided under similar factual circumstances, this Court
ruled that off-line air carriers having general sales agents in the Philippines are engaged
in or doing business in the Philippines and that their income from sales of passage
documents here is income from within the Philippines. Thus, in that case, we held the offline air carrier liable for the 32% tax on its taxable income.

Sec. 28 (A)(3)(a) of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code does not, in any
categorical term, exempt all international carriers from the coverage of Sec.
28(A)(1) of the 1997 NIRC-had legislatures intentions been to completely
exclude all international air carriers from the application of the general rule
under Sec. 28(A)(1), it would have used the appropriate language to do so. We point out that Sec. 28(A)(3)(a) of the 1997 NIRC does not, in any categorical term,
exempt all international air carriers from the coverage of Sec. 28(A)(1) of the 1997 NIRC.

Certainly, had legislatures intentions been to completely exclude all international air
carriers from the application of the general rule under Sec. 28(A)(1), it would have used
the appropriate language to do so; but the legislature did not. Thus, the logical
interpretation of such provisions is that, if Sec. 28(A)(3)(a) is applicable to a taxpayer,
then the general rule under Sec. 28(A)(1) would not apply. If, however, Sec. 28(A)(3)(a)
does not apply, a resident foreign corporation, whether an international air carrier or not,
would be liable for the tax under Sec. 28(A)(1)

Evidence;

Statutory

Construction;

It

is

well-settled

doctrine

in

this

jurisdiction that statements made by individual members of Congress in the

consideration of a bill do not necessarily reflect the sense of that body and
are, consequently, not controlling in the interpretation of law. - Petitioner further
reiterates its argument that the intention of Congress in amending the definition of GPB
is to exempt off-line air carriers from income tax by citing the pronouncements made by
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile during the deliberations on the provisions of the 1997 NIRC.
Such pronouncements, however, are not controlling on this Court. We said in Espino v.
Cleofe: A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and intention
of the law-making body must be sought, first of all, in the words of the statute itself, read
and considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly-accepted and most obvious
significations, according to good and approved usage and without resorting to forced or
subtle construction. Courts, therefore, as a rule, cannot presume that the law-making
body does not know the meaning of words and rules of grammar. Consequently, the
grammatical reading of a statute must be presumed to yield its correct sense. x x x It is
also a well-settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that statements made by
individual members of Congress in the consideration of a bill do not
necessarily reflect the sense of that body and are, consequently, not
controlling in the interpretation of law.

Words and Phrases; An exception is defined as that which would otherwise be

included in the provision from which it is excepted, a clause which exempts
something from the operation of a statute by express words; An exception
need not be introduced by the words except or unless an exception will
be construed as such if it removes something from the operation of the
provision of law; If an international air carrier maintains flights to and from
the Philippines, it shall be taxed at the rate of 2 % of its Gross Philippine
Billings, while international carriers that do not have flights to and from the
Philippines but nonetheless earn income from other activities in the country
will

be

taxed

at

the

rate

of

32%

of

such

income.

Sec. 28(A)(1) of the 1997 NIRC is a general rule that resident foreign corporations are
liable for 32% tax on all income from sources within the Philippines. Sec. 28(A)(3) is an
exception to this general rule. An exception is defined as that which would otherwise be
included in the provision from which it is excepted. It is a clause which exempts

something from the operation of a statue by express words. Further, an exception need
not be introduced by the words except or unless. An exception will be construed as such
if it removes something from the operation of a provision of law. In the instant case, the
general rule is that resident foreign corporations shall be liable for a 32% income tax on
their income from within the Philippines, except for resident foreign corporations that are
international carriers that derive income from carriage of persons, excess baggage,
cargo and mail originating from the Philippines which shall be taxed at 2 1/2% of their
Gross Philippine Billings. Petitioner, being an international carrier with no flights
originating from the Philippines, does not fall under the exception. As such, petitioner
must

fall

under

the

general

rule.

This

principle

is

embodied

in

the

Latin

maxim, exception firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis, which means, a thing not
being excepted must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule. To
reiterate, the correct interpretation of the above provisions is that, if an international air
carrier maintains flights to and from the Philippines, it shall be taxed at the rate of 2
1/2% of its Gross Philippine Billings, while international air carriers that do not have
flights to and from the Philippines but nonetheless earn income from other activities in
the country will be taxed at the rate of 32% of such income.

Compensation; Taxes cannot be subject to compensation for the simple reason

that the government and the taxpayer are not creditors and debtors of each
other debts are due to the Government in its sovereign capacity. And we
ruled in Philex Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, thus: In several
instances prior to the instant case, we have already made the pronouncement that taxes
cannot be subject to compensation for the simple reason that the government and the
taxpayer are not creditors and debtors of each other. There is a material distinction
between a tax and debt. Debts are due to the Government in its corporate capacity,
while taxes are due to the Government in its sovereign capacity. We find no cogent
reason to deviate from the aforementioned distinction.

Even though petitioner is not entitled to a refund due to the question on the
propriety of petitioners tax return subject of the instant controversy, it would
not be proper to deny such claim without making a determination of
petitioners liability under Sec. 28(A)(1). - petitioners similar tax refund claim
assumes that the tax return that it filed was correct. Given, however, the finding of the
CTA that petitioner, although not liable under Sec. 28(A)(3)(a) of the 1997 NIRC, is liable
under Sec. 28(A)(1), the correctness of the return filed by petitioner is now put in doubt.
As such, we cannot grant the prayer for a refund. Be that as it may, this Court is unable
to affirm the assailed decision and resolution of the CTA En Banc on the outright denial of
petitioners claim for a refund. Even though petitioner is not entitled to a refund due to
the question on the propriety of petitioners tax return subject of the instant controversy,
it would not be proper to deny such claim without making a determination of petitioners

liability under Sec. 28(A)(1). It must be remembered that the tax under Sec. 28(A)(3)(a)
is based on GPB, while Sec. 28(A)(1) is based on taxable income, that is, gross income
less deductions and exemptions, if any. It cannot be assumed that petitioners liabilities
under the two provisions would be the same. There is a need to make a determination of
petitioners liability under Sec. 28(A)(1) to establish whether a tax refund is forthcoming
or that a tax deficiency exists. The assailed decision fails to mention having computed
for the tax due under Sec. 28(A)(1) and the records are bereft of any evidence sufficient
to establish petitioners taxable income. There is a necessity to receive evidence to
establish such amount vis--vis the claim for refund. It is only after such amount is
established that a tax refund or deficiency may be correctly pronounced.

178. Abbas v. Abbas, 689 SCRA 646, January 30, 2013

Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Formal Requisites of Marriage. As the

marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No.
209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions
that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2)
A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each
other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2). A defect in any of the essential requisites
shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45. An irregularity in the formal
requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible
for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Art. 35. The
following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (3) Those solemnized without a
license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Disputable Presumptions; Presumption of Regularity;
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption
that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or
other evidence to the contrary; The presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty. Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption
that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other
evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No such
affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing
her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact,
proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No.
996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said
license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption
that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Marriage License; Evidence; The certification
of the Local Civil Registrar that hteir office had no record of a marriage license
was adequate to prove the issuance of said license. - In the case of Cario v.

Cario, following the case of Republic, it was held that the certification of the Local Civil
Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the
non-issuance of said license. The case of Cario further held that the presumed validity
of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the
party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the
required marriage license had been secured. Gloria has failed to discharge that burden,
and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued.
It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that would
not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent.
No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Glorias failure to
produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized
without a license is void from the from the beginning, except those exempt
from the license requirement under Article 27-34, Chapter 2, Title 1 of the
same Code. All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was
conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a
valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of
any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except
as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage
solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the
license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.

179. Baculi v. Belen, 681 SCRA 489, September 24, 2012

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Contempt; Rule 71, Sections 2 and 11 of
the Rules of Court lay down the proper remedies from a judgment in direct and
indirect contempt proceedings, respectively. Rule 71, Secs. 2 and 11 of the Rules
of Court lay down the proper remedies from a judgment in direct and indirect contempt
proceedings, respectively. For direct contempt, the Rules states: Sec. 2. Remedy
therefrom.The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal
therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The
execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition,
provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and
conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be
decided against him. In indirect contempt proceedings, the Rules states: Sec. 11. Review
of judgment or final order; bond for stay.The judgment or final order of a court in a
case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the proper court as in criminal cases. But
execution of the judgment or final order shall not be suspended until a bond is filed by
the person adjudged in contempt, in an amount fixed by the court from which the appeal
is taken, conditioned that if the appeal be decided against him he will abide by and
perform the judgment or final order.

Administrative Law; Judges; The Supreme Court has stressed that disciplinary
proceedings and criminal actions brought against a judge in relation to the
performance of his or her official functions are neither complementary nor
suppletory to the appropriate judicial remedies. Time and again, We have
stressed that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions brought against a judge in

relation to the performance of his or her official functions are neither complementary nor
suppletory to the appropriate judicial remedies. They are also not a substitute to such
remedies. Any party who may feel aggrieved should resort to these remedies, and
exhaust them, instead of resorting to disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions.

A judge cannot be held administratively liable at every turn for every

erroneous decision. A judge cannot be held administratively liable at every turn for
every erroneous decision. The error must be gross and deliberate, a product of a
perverted judicial mind, or a result of gross ignorance of the law. This is as it should be,
for no one tasked to determine the facts in light of the evidence adduced or interpret and
apply the law, following prescribed rules, can be infallible.30 All that is expected from a
judge is to "follow the rules prescribed to ensure a fair and impartial hearing, assess the
different factors that emerge therefrom and bear on the issues presented, and on the
basis of the conclusions he finds established, adjudicate the case accordingly."

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Contempt; The formal charge has to be
specific enough to inform the person, against whom contempt proceedings are
being conducted that he or she must complain to the court; otherwise, he or
she will be cited for contempt. In Calimlim, the Judge issued an Order requiring the
petitioners to explain their failure to bring the accused before the RTC for his scheduled
arraignment. We held in that case that such Order was not yet sufficient to initiate the
contempt proceedings because it did not yet amount to a show-cause order directing the
petitioners to explain why they should not be cited in contempt. The formal charge has
to be specific enough to inform the person, against whom contempt proceedings are
being conducted, that he or she must explain to the court; otherwise, he or she will be
cited in contempt. The Order must express this in clear and unambiguous language.

In contempt proceedings, the respondent must be given the right to defend

himself or herself and have a day in court. a basic requirement of due
process. In contempt proceedings, the respondent must be given the right to defend
himself or herself and have a day in courta basic requirement of due process. This is
especially so in indirect contempt proceedings, as the court cannot decide them
summarily pursuant to the Rules of Court. As We have stated in Calimlim, in indirect
contempt proceedings, the respondent must be given the opportunity to comment on
the charge against him or her, and there must be a hearing, and the court must
investigate the charge and consider the respondents answer.

180. Aqualab Philippines, Inc. v. Heirs of Marcelino Pagobo, 603 SCRA 435,
October 12, 2009

Civil Law; Prescription; The prescriptive period for the reconveyance of

fraudulently registered real property is 10 years reckoned from the date of the
issuance of the certificate of the title, if the plaintiff is not in possession. Thus,
one who is in actual possession of a piece of land on a claim of ownership
thereof way until his possession is disturbed or his title is attached before
taking steps to vindicate his right. An action for annulment of title or
reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in possession of the

property subject of the acts. And the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of
fraudulently registered real property is 10 years, reckoned from the date of the issuance
of the certificate of title, if the plaintiff is not in possession. Thus, one who is in actual
possession of a piece of land on a claim of ownership thereof may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right.

Property; Possession; A buyerof real property that is in the possession of a

person other than the seller must be wary, and a buyer who does not
investigate the rights of the one in possession can hardly be regarded as a
buyer in good faith. In the instant case, again based on the hypothetically admitted
allegations in the complaint, it would appear that Anthony Gaw Kache, Aqualabs
predecessor-in-interest, was not in possession of subject lots. Such a fact should have
put Aqualab on guard relative to the possessors (respondents) interest over subject
lots. A buyer of real property that is in the possession of a person other than the seller
must be wary, and a buyer who does not investigate the rights of the one in possession
can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith.