Salonga v.

Farrales
FACTS: Farrales was the titled owner of a parcel of residential land that was leased. Prior to the acquisition by Farrales of
the land, Salonga was already a lessee of a portion of the land. She had built a house and paid rentals thereon. Farrales
then filed an ejectment case for nonpayment of rentals against Salonga. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of
Farrales, and ordered Salonga and the other lessees to vacate the portion occupied by them and to pay rentals in arrears,
attorneys fees and costs. However, even before the rendition of the decision of the lower court, in a compromise
agreement, Farrales sold to Pascual et al. the areas occupied by them. Salonga offered to purchase from Farrales the
portion of land that she was leasing, but Farrales persistently refused the offer and insisted to execute the judgment
rendered in the ejectment case because Farrales wanted the payment of the portion of the land to be in cash but Salonga
did not have any money for that purpose.
ISSUE: Whether a legal contract exists between the petitioner and the defendant.
RULING: No. No compromise agreement to sell the land in question was ever perfected between the Salonga and
Farrales. It is elementary that consent is an essential element for the existence of a contract, and where it is wanting, the
contract is non-existent. The essence of consent is the conformity of the parties on the terms of the contract, the
acceptance by one of the offer made by the other. The contract to sell is a bilateral contract. Where there is merely an offer
by one party, without the acceptance of the other, there is no consent.
It appears in this case that the offeree, the defendant-appellee Julita B. Farrales not only did not accept, but rejected the
offer of plaintiffs-appellants, spouses Salonga to buy the land in question. There being no consent there is. therefore, no
contract to sell to speak of.