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 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under thedoctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The courtgenerally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an orderand judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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 The Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, Senior United States District Judge,District of Utah, sitting by designation.
F I L E D
United States Court of AppealsTenth Circuit
AUG 27 2001
PATRICK FISHER 
Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSTENTH CIRCUIT
 NEGUEST SHAWL,Plaintiff-Appellant,v.No. 99-1409DILLARD’S INC.,Defendant-Appellee.(D.C. No. 98-M-2276)(D. Colo.)
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
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Before
 BRISCOE, McWILLIAMS,
Circuit Judges, and
JENKINS
,
 
DistrictJudge.
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Plaintiff Neguest Shawl appeals the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant Dillard’s Inc., on her claims based on 42 U.S.C.§ 1981. On appeal, she contends the district court erred in granting summary judgment because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dillard'sviolated (1) the contracts clause of Section 1981; and (2) the “full and equal
 
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benefits” clause of Section 1981. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.§ 1291. We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to the contracts clauseclaim, but remand the grant of summary judgment on the full and equal benefitsclaim for clarification.I.
Shawl, a United States citizen of Ethiopian descent, was shopping in theshoe department at defendant’s store in the Park Meadows Mall on August 12,1997. Shawl thought the salesperson who assisted her was unhelpful andunpleasant, and she did not want him to realize a commission on her sale. Shetook the sandals she selected to the register and asked another salesperson to holdthem, but was informed the sandals could not be held since they were on sale. Shawl told the salesperson at the register that if the sandals were there when shereturned the next day, she might purchase them. Shawl testified that thesalesperson at the register was not pleasant to her. Shawl and her companionthen left the store. As they neared another store in the mall, Shawl wasapproached by a security agent from Dillard’s. He stated the store was unable tofind the shoes she had tried on and that she was the last person the salespersonhad seen with the shoes. She was asked to return to the store. When shereturned to the store, the salesperson at the register produced the sandals. Shawlcompleted a complaint form with the store.
 
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 Shawl originally filed suit on September 17, 1997, in state court claimingonly the state law torts of false imprisonment and defamation. Her federal suitasserted the state law claims in addition to the two Section 1981 claims. OnJanuary 4, 1999, she voluntarily dismissed the state court action. The federaldistrict court granted summary judgment for Dillard's as to her state tort claims. 3On October 19, 1998, Shawl filed suit in federal district court assertingtwo separate 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims: (1) violation of her right to make andenforce contracts, and (2) violation of her right to the full and equal benefit of the laws.
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 Dillard's moved for summary judgment, arguing as to the former therewas no contract to support a Section 1981 contracts clause claim and, as to thelatter, such a claim can only be brought against state actors. Although the districtcourt held that a full and equal benefits clause claim can be stated against a  private actor, it granted summary judgment in favor of Dillard's, holding: “Withrespect to the benefits – opportunity to contract claim under [the Section] 1981amendments . . . the facts in my view do not add up to an interference with heropportunity to buy those sandals.” Aplt. App. at 39-40. Judgment was entereddismissing Shawl's action.On appeal, Shawl presents two issues: (1) whether the district court erredin ruling on summary judgment that a plaintiff must show that defendant refusedto contract in order to establish a claim under § 1981; and (2) whether the districtcourt erred in ruling on summary judgment that the equal benefits clause of § 1981 is limited to interference with contracts.

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