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Abstract
The use of ones own experience as a model to make inferences about the experiences of others is theorized to be
the means by which a variety of introspectively based social strategies developed for both competing and cooperating
with one another (e.g. gratitude, grudging, sympathy, empathy, deception, pretending and sorrow). The proposition
that this ability is a byproduct of self-awareness is developed in some detail and the predictions which follow from
this model of social intelligence are considered in light of the evidence. 1998 Elsevier Science B.V.
Keywords: Self-awareness; Mental-state attribution; Social cognition; Consciousness; Mind; Self-recognition; Mindlessness
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dence supports this argument. When initially confronted with their reflections in mirrors, gorillas
show an avid interest in the image and just like
chimpanzees and orangutans, spend substantial
amounts of time orienting toward and looking at
the mirror (Suarez and Gallup, 1981). For a further discussion and analysis of the gorillas failure
to evidence self-recognition see Gallup (1991,
1997).
2. Self-conception
What are we to make of these species differences in mirror self-recognition? Many animals
appear to lack a cognitive category for processing
mirrored information about themselves. Indeed, it
can be argued that it may be heuristically valuable
to suppose that organisms capable of recognizing
themselves in mirrors are creatures that can conceive of themselves (Gallup, 1991).
There are at least three discernable components
to self-conception; a sense of continuity, a sense
of personal agency and a sense of identity (see
also Povinelli, 1995; Povinelli and Cant, 1995).
Individuals who are self-aware, as evidenced by
being able to become the object of their own
attention, experience a sense of psychological continuity over time and space. For example, your
interests, attitudes and values remain much the
same from one day to the next and from one
situation to another. This temporal/spatial stability in the mental attributes that characterize you
(and often distinguish you from others) is what
gives rise to your underlying sense of continuity.
Organisms that can conceive of themselves also
develop an important sense of personal agency as
a result of interacting and informally experimenting with both animate and inanimate features of
the world around them. They learn, in effect, that
what they do, when they do it and how they do it
can sometimes produce or at least influence a
variety of different outcomes. In other words,
they come to realize that they can exercise a
degree of control over certain things and it is out
of these kinds of response contingent experiences
that a sense of personal agency emerges. Povinelli
and Cant (1995) speculate that being in constant
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3. Mental-state attribution
It has been argued that rather than being mutually exclusive cognitive domains, self-awareness,
consciousness and mind are all part and parcel of
the same underlying process (Gallup, 1983). Thus,
according to the model that has been developed,
organisms that can recognize themselves in mirrors ought to differ in some fundamental way
from those that fail to realize that their behavior
is the source of the behavior depicted in the
image. However, before reviewing the evidence
that bears on this point it would be appropriate to
expand on and elaborate some of the assumptions
and implications of this approach. The term
mind refers to the ability to use your experience
and your mental states to make inferences about
what others know, how they feel, or what they
want. In this sense mind is roughly synonymous
with the terms mental-state attribution, social
cognition and Machiavellian intelligence
(Whiten and Byrne, 1988).
While it is probably true that no two people
ever experience the same event in exactly the same
way, since we are members of the same species we
share similar sensory equipment and underlying
neurological hardware. As a consequence there is
bound to be considerable overlap between your
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4. Mindlessness
In terms of tangible/empirical implications, this
model predicts that species that can recognize
themselves in mirrors ought to differ in some
fairly definitive but at the same time subtle ways
from those that cannot. If it is the case that
organisms which fail to recognize themselves in
mirrors do so because of an inability to conceive
of themselves in the first place, then they should
fail to show evidence of a variety of introspectively based social strategies such as grudging,
gratitude, sympathy, empathy, attribution, intentional deception, sorrow, pretending, boredom
and role playing. The distinction that is being
made here is between the presence or absence of
mind and surprising as it may seem, the presence
or absence of mind is not obvious. It is not
obvious for several reasons. As we have already
seen by virtue of anthropomorphism, in the absence of any hard evidence people nevertheless
tend to treat animals as if they had minds. Just as
someone once said that fish would be the last ones
to discover water, because we have minds we tend
to take minds for granted. We are so immersed in
mind that it is difficult to conceive of its absence.
As a consequence one way to make this capacity
stand out in relief is to provide some examples of
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with blindfolds and then confront you with another person wearing a blindfold, you would
probably use your prior experience with visual
obstructions to infer and model their obstructed
visual state. Someone born with blindsight ought
to be incapable of making these kinds of inferences about visual experiences in others.
What would it be like to experience a momentary lapse of mind? An example that many people
can identify with is what could be called a mindless conversation. The prototypical instance of
this involves a situation in which someone approaches you and abruptly begins a conversation
as if you had been privileged either to their prior
experiences or their thoughts. So that rather than
giving you the necessary background information
to set the stage for a conversation, they might
come up to you and say, what do you think we
ought to do about that? Your response, of
course, would be, do about what? Or they might
approach you out of the clear blue and say gee,
that really makes me mad! Once again your
response would be what makes you mad? In
each of these instances there is a momentary
breakdown of the speakers ability to take into
account the mental state of the other person. In
order to convey a message it requires that the
listener be given adequate background information so as to create an appropriate mentalistic
context for the message to be meaningful.
Finally there is the issue of what it would be
like not have a mind in the first place. Imagine for
the moment that you have a dog and your dog
returns home one day in distress with quills embedded in its nose as a consequence of an encounter with a porcupine. With a concern for your
pets well-being it is essential that you take steps
to have those quills removed. You could either
take your dog to a veterinarian and have him/her
do it, or you could get a pair of pliers and attempt
to extract the quills yourself. If you were to opt
for the latter alternative it would probably prove
to be an excruciating ordeal. It is not that you
would experience any physical pain as a consequence, but as you used the pliers to extract the
barbed quills from your dogs nose and witnessed
its reaction you would probably find it virtually
impossible not to empathize with what you as-
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5. Evidence of mind
When tested under appropriate conditions, species that can recognize themselves in mirrors
should show evidence of being able to use their
experience to make inferences about mental states
in others. Thus, according to my model, chimpanzees should pass (at least some) tests of mental-state attribution, whereas rhesus monkeys
ought to consistently fail such tests. Although the
data that bear on these different outcomes are far
from complete, preliminary results are consistent
with the model. Table 1 summarizes the results
from a number of recent experimental studies on
mental-state attribution in chimpanzees and different species of macaques. On the basis of these
Chimpanzeesa
Macaquesa
+
+
+
+
+
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6. Concluding comments
One way to characterize what we know about
social cognition and mental-state attribution from
an evolutionary perspective would be to say that
many species may have clever brains but blank
minds (Humphrey, 1982). Clever brains in the
sense that they can learn, remember and solve a
variety of problems, but blank minds in the sense
that they lack the capacity to represent mental
states in themselves or others. If a species fails to
show evidence of self-conception, there is no reason to assume that it is aware of what it is doing.
As evidence by the behavior of sleepwalkers and
blindsight patients, you do not need to know
what you are doing in order to do it in an
appropriate way.
According to the present account of social intelligence, we may be the source of our own intelligence. Although there are reasons to believe that
self-conception evolved for reasons that are unrelated to social intelligence (Povinelli and Cant,
1995; Gallup, 1997), self-awareness and mentalstate attribution in humans have been maintained
and elaborated because of the advantages of being
able to take into account the experiences and
intentions of each other. When it came to competing and cooperating among one another for resources, the ability to model different features of
our respective mental worlds for purposes of developing a variety of introspectively based social
strategies (e.g. gratitude, grudging, deception,
sympathy, sorrow and pretending) represented a
significant advantage (Humphrey, 1976). Indeed,
from this perspective, the evolution of language
itself may have been driven largely by pressures to
fine tune this emerging capacity for social intelligence. According to this model, language evolved
to accomplish two ends; (1) to enable us to more
effectively share experiences and mental-states
and (2) to create a means of manipulating experiences and mental states in one another. It is
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References
Anderson, J.R., 1984. The development of self-recognition: a
review. Dev. Psychobiol. 17, 3549.
Anderson, J.R., 1994. The monkey in the mirror: a strange
conspecific. In: Parker, S.T., Mitchell, R.W., Boccia, M.L.
(Eds.), Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 315329.
Anderson, J.R., Montant, M., Schmitt, D., 1996. Rhesus
monkeys fail to use gaze direction as an experimenter-given
cue in an object-choice task. Behav. Process. 37, 4755.
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