Rules 6-9

Civ Pro Rules 6-10 Cases
Atty. Dela Pea
[G.R. No. 158239 : January 25, 2012]

PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE, PETITIONER, VS. RAMON C. JAVELLANA, ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
Page
FIRST DIVISION
In Civil Case No. 79-M-97, Javellana averred that upon the execution of the deed
of conditional sale, he had paid the initial amount of P80,000.00 and had taken
possession of the parcels of land; that he had paid the balance of the purchase
price to Juvenal on different dates upon Juvenals representation that Margarita
had needed funds for the expenses of registration and payment of real estate tax;
and that in 1996, Priscilla had called to inquire about the mortgage constituted on
the parcels of land; and that he had told her then that the parcels of land had not
been mortgaged but had been sold to him.[5]
BERSAMIN, J.:
The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the defending
partys motion to dismiss is not an interlocutory but a final order because it puts an
end to the particular matter involved, or settles definitely the matter therein
disposed of, as to leave nothing for the trial court to do other than to execute the
order.[1] Accordingly, the claiming party has a fresh period of 15 days from notice of
the denial within which to appeal the denial.[2]
Antecedents
On September 8, 1979, Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold for
consideration of P160,000.00 to respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of
conditional sale two parcels of land with areas of 3,675 and 20,936 square meters
located in Barangay Mallis, Guiguinto, Bulacan. They agreed that Javellana would
pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the balance of P80,000.00
upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System (the
registration being undertaken by Margarita within a reasonable period of time); and
that should Margarita become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal
M. Alma Jose (Juvenal), and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would
receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the application for
registration.[3]
After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita without issue,
the vendors undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla, being Margaritas sole
surviving heir. However, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to cause the
registration of the properties under the Torrens System, and, instead, began to
improve the properties by dumping filling materials therein with the intention of
converting the parcels of land into a residential or industrial subdivision.[4] Faced
with Priscillas refusal to comply, Javellana commenced on February 10, 1997 an
action for specific performance, injunction, and damages against her in the
Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 79-M97 entitled Ramon C. Javellana, represented byAtty. Guillermo G. Blanco v.
Priscilla Alma Jose.
Javellana prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of

preliminary injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling materials in the
parcels of land; and that Priscilla be ordered to institute registration proceedings
and then to execute a final deed of sale in his favor.[6]
Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by
prescription; and that the complaint did not state a cause of action.[7]
The RTC initially denied Priscillas motion to dismiss on February 4, 1998.
[8]
However, upon her motion for reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself on June
24, 1999 and granted the motion to dismiss, opining that Javellana had no cause
of action against her due to her not being bound to comply with the terms of the
deed of conditional sale for not being a party thereto; that there was no evidence
showing the payment of the balance; that he had never demanded the registration
of the land from Margarita or Juvenal, or brought a suit for specific performance
against Margarita or Juvenal; and that his claim of paying the balance was not
credible.[9]
Javellana moved for reconsideration, contending that the presentation of evidence
of full payment was not necessary at that stage of the proceedings; and that in
resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, the
facts alleged in the complaint were hypothetically admitted and only the allegations
in the complaint should be considered in resolving the motion.[10] Nonetheless, he
attached to the motion for reconsideration the receipts showing the payments
made to Juvenal.[11] Moreover, he maintained that Priscilla could no longer
succeed to any rights respecting the parcels of land because he had meanwhile
acquired absolute ownership of them; and that the only thing that she, as sole heir,
had inherited from Margarita was the obligation to register them under the Torrens
System.[12]
On June 21, 2000, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of any
reason to disturb the order of June 24, 1999.[13]
In his appeal (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259), Javellana submitted the following as

errors of the RTC,[15] to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FACT
THAT PLAINTIFF-APELLANT HAD LONG COMPLIED WITH THE FULL
PAYMENT OF THE CONSIDERATION OF THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY AND HAD IMMEDIATELY TAKEN ACTUAL AND PHYSICAL
POSSESSION OF SAID PROPERTY UPON THE SIGNING OF THE
CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE;
II
THE TRIAL COURT OBVIOUSLY ERRED IN MAKING TWO CONFLICTING
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PROVISION OF THE CIVIL [CODE],
PARTICULARLY ARTICLE 1911, IN THE LIGHT OF THE TERMS OF THE
CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE;
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLEE BEING
NOT A PARTY TO THE CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY HER
MOTHER IN FAVOR OF PLAINTFF-APPELLANT IS NOT BOUND THEREBY AND
CAN NOT BE COMPELLED TO DO THE ACT REQUIRED IN THE SAID DEED
OF CONDITIONAL SALE;
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
WITHOUT HEARING THE CASE ON THE MERITS.
Priscilla countered that the June 21, 2000 order was not appealable; that the
appeal was not perfected on time; and that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping.
[16]
It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for certiorari in
the CA to assail the June 24, 1999 and June 21, 2000 orders dismissing his
Page
Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of appeal from the June 21, 2000 order,
[14]
which the RTC gave due course to, and the records were elevated to the Court
of Appeals (CA).

Atty. Dela Pea
complaint (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455). On August 6, 2001, however, the CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari,[17] finding that the RTC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the orders, and holding that it only committed, at
most, an error of judgment correctible by appeal in issuing the challenged orders.
On November 20, 2002, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
68259,[18] reversing and setting aside the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, and
remanding the records to the RTC for further proceedings in accordance with
law.[19] The CA explained that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action;
that Priscilla, as sole heir, succeeded to the rights and obligations of Margarita with
respect to the parcels of land; that Margaritas undertaking under the contract was
not a purely personal obligation but was transmissible to Priscilla, who was
consequently bound to comply with the obligation; that the action had not yet
prescribed due to its being actually one for quieting of title that was imprescriptible
brought by Javellana who had actual possession of the properties; and that based
on the
complaint, Javellana had been in actual possession since 1979, and the cloud on
his title had come about only when Priscilla had started dumping filling materials on
the premises.[20]
On May 9, 2003, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration, [21] stating that it
decided to give due course to the appeal even if filed out of time because
Javellana had no intention to delay the proceedings, as in fact he did not even
seek an extension of time to file his appellants brief; that current jurisprudence
afforded litigants the amplest opportunity to present their cases free from the
constraints of technicalities, such that even if an appeal was filed out of time, the
appellate court was given the discretion to nonetheless allow the appeal for
justifiable reasons.
Issues
Priscilla then brought this appeal, averring that the CA thereby erred in not
outrightly dismissing Javellanas appeal because: (a) the June 21, 2000 RTC order
was not appealable; (b) the notice of appeal had been filed belatedly by three
days; and (c) Javellana was guilty of forum shopping for filing in the CA a petition
for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC that were the subject matter of his
appeal pending in the CA. She posited that, even if the CAs decision to entertain
the appeal was affirmed, the RTCs dismissal of the complaint should nonetheless
be upheld because the complaint stated no cause of action, and the action had
already prescribed.
On his part, Javellana countered that the errors being assigned by Priscilla
CV No. 68259, and because the issue of ownership raised in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
68259 was different from the issue of grave abuse of discretion raised in C.A.-G.R.
SP No. 60455.
Ruling
The petition for review has no merit.
I
Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal was a final order and appealable
Priscilla submits that the order of June 21, 2000 was not the proper subject of an
appeal considering that Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that no
appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion for reconsideration.
Priscillas submission is erroneous and cannot be sustained.
First of all, the denial of Javellanas motion for reconsideration left nothing more to
be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97.
It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one. The Court has distinguished
between final and interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,[22] thuswise:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The
first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by
execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely
dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An
interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet
to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an
order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is:does the order or judgment leave
something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it
does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal
is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final
judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect
Page
involved questions of fact not proper for the Court to review through petition for
review on certiorari; that the June 21, 2000 RTC order, being a final order, was
appealable; that his appeal was perfected on time; and that he was not guilty of
forum shopping because at the time he filed the petition for certiorari the CA had
not yet rendered a decision in C.A.-G.R.

Atty. Dela Pea
that appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes
of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable;[23] but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a
special civil action for certiorari. The explanation for the differentiation of remedies
given in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is apt:
xxx The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid
multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing
and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals.
Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case
for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur
unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as
there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders
rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of
an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for
appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order
is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Then is certiorariunder Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a motion for
reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively an appeal from the final
order or judgment itself; and has expressly clarified that the prohibition against
appealing an order denying a motion for
reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an
interlocutory order.[24]
II
Appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA
Priscilla insists that Javellana filed his notice of appeal out of time. She points out
that he received a copy of the June 24, 1999 order on July 9, 1999, and filed his
motion for reconsideration on July 21, 1999 (or after the lapse of 12 days); that the
RTC denied his motion for reconsideration through the order of June 21, 2000, a
copy of which he received on July 13, 2000; that he had only three days from July
13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal; and that having
filed his notice of appeal on July 19, 2000, his appeal should have been dismissed
for being tardy by three days beyond the expiration of the reglementary period.
Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial
or reconsideration shall be allowed. (n)
Under the rule, Javellana had only the balance of three days from July 13, 2000, or
until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal due to the timely filing of his
motion for reconsideration interrupting the running of the period of appeal. As such,
his filing of the notice of appeal only on July 19, 2000 did not perfect his appeal on
time, as Priscilla insists.
The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld, however,
considering that the Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period rule in Neypes v.
Court of Appeals,[25] by which an aggrieved party desirous of appealing an adverse
judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a motion
for a new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit:
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole
prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and
inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing
appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the
Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for
parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
Page
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record
on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on
appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.

Atty. Dela Pea
The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has already
retroactively extended thefresh period rule to actions pending and undetermined
at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.[27] According to De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:[28]
Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of
procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws
do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule
against the retroactive operation of statues they may be given retroactive effect
on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not
violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch
as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
The fresh period rule is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15
days within which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for
reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of
procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to pending actions, such
as the present case.
Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the fresh period rule will amount to
injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final order were
issued two years later or in the year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment
and final order in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and
illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the
year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the fresh period rule while those later rulings of
the lower courts such as in the instant case, will not.[29]
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial
Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration.
Consequently, we rule that Javellanas notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to
the fresh period rule.
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions
for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or
partial) or any final order or resolution.[26]
Priscilla claims that Javellana engaged in forum shopping by filing a notice of

appeal and a petition forcertiorari against the same orders. As earlier noted, he
denies that his doing so violated the policy against forum shopping.
III
No forum shopping was committed
The Court expounded on the nature and purpose of forum shopping in In Re:
Reconstitution of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 303168 and 303169 and
Issuance of Owners Duplicate Certificates of Title In Lieu of Those Lost, Rolando
Edward G. Lim, Petitioner:[30]
For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same
essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical causes of action,
subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where different orders were
questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two
objectives were sought.
Should Javellanas present appeal now be held barred by his filing of the petition
for certiorari in the CA when his appeal in that court was yet pending?
We are aware that in Young v. Sy,[31] in which the petitioner filed a notice of appeal
to elevate the orders concerning the dismissal of her case due to non-suit to the
CA and a petition for certiorari in the CA assailing the same orders four months
later, the Court ruled that the successive filings of the notice of appeal and the
petition for certiorari to attain the same objective of nullifying the trial courts
dismissal orders constituted forum shopping that warranted the dismissal of both
cases. The Court said:
Ineluctably, the petitioner, by filing an ordinary appeal and a petition
for certiorari with the CA, engaged in forum shopping. When the petitioner
commenced the appeal, only four months had elapsed prior to her filing with the
CA the Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65 and which eventually came up to this
Court by way of the instant Petition (re: Non-Suit). The elements of
litis pendentia are present between the two suits. As the CA, through its Thirteenth
Division, correctly noted, both suits are founded on exactly the same facts and
refer to the same subject matterthe RTC Orders which dismissed Civil Case
No. SP-5703 (2000) for failure to prosecute. In both cases, the petitioner is
seeking the reversal of the RTC orders. The parties, the rights asserted, the
Page
Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment
has been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion
in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause or
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum
shopping happens when, in the two or more pending cases, there is identity of
parties, identity of rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs sought. Where
the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in the other, there is forum shopping. For litis
pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity
of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same acts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment
which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the other.

Atty. Dela Pea
issues professed, and the reliefs prayed for, are all the same. It is evident that the
judgment of one forum may amount to res judicata in the other.
xxxx
The remedies of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and
not alternative or cumulative. This is a firm judicial policy. The petitioner cannot
hedge her case by wagering two or more appeals, and, in the event that the
ordinary appeal lags significantly behind the others, she cannot post facto validate
this circumstance as a demonstration that the ordinary appeal had not been
speedy or adequate enough, in order to justify the recourse to Rule 65. This
practice, if adopted, would sanction the filing of multiple suits in multiple fora,
where each one, as the petitioner couches it, becomes a precautionary measure
for the rest, thereby increasing the chances of a favorable decision. This is the very
evil that the proscription on forum shopping seeks to put right. In Guaranteed
Hotels, Inc. v. Baltao, the Court stated that the grave evil sought to be avoided by
the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals of two
separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking
advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in
several different fora until a favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant
confusion, the Court adheres strictly to the rules against forum shopping, and any
violation of these rules results in the dismissal of the case.[32]
The same result was reached in Zosa v. Estrella,[33] which likewise involved the
successive filing of a notice of appeal and a petition for certiorari to challenge the
same orders, with the Court upholding the CAs dismissals of the appeal and the
petition for certiorari through separate decisions.
Yet, the outcome in Young v. Sy and Zosa v. Estrella is unjust here even if the
orders of the RTC being challenged through appeal and the petition
for certiorari were the same. The unjustness exists because the appeal and the
petition for certiorari actually sought different objectives. In his appeal in C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 68259, Javellana aimed to undo the RTCs erroneous dismissal of Civil
Case No. 79-M-97 to clear the way for his judicial demand for specific performance
to be tried and determined in due course by the RTC; but his petition
for certiorari had the ostensible objective to prevent (Priscilla) from developing the
subject property and from proceeding with the ejectment case until his appeal is
finally resolved, as the CA explicitly determined in its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
60455.[34]
Nor were the dangers that the adoption of the judicial policy against forum
shopping designed to prevent or to eliminate attendant. The first danger, i.e., the
multiplicity of suits upon one and the same cause of action, would not materialize
Instead, we see the situation of resorting to two inconsistent remedial approaches

to be the result of the tactical misjudgment by Javellanas counsel on the efficacy
of the appeal to stave off his caretakers eviction from the parcels of land and to
prevent the development of them into a residential or commercial subdivision
pending the appeal. In the petition for certiorari, Javellana explicitly averred that his
appeal was inadequate and not speedy to prevent private respondent Alma Jose
and her transferee/assignee xxx from developing and disposing of the subject
property to other parties to the total deprivation of petitioners rights of possession
and ownership over the subject property, and that the dismissal by the RTC had
emboldened private respondents to fully develop the property and for respondent
Alma Jose to file an ejectment case against petitioners overseer xxx.[35] Thereby,
it became far-fetched that Javellana brought the petition for certiorari in violation of
the policy against forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on
certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 20, 2002; and
ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Page
considering that the appeal was a continuity of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, whereas
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455 dealt with an independent ground of alleged grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. The
second danger, i.e., the unethical malpractice of shopping for a friendly court or
judge to ensure a favorable ruling or judgment after not getting it in the appeal,
would not arise because the CA had not yet decided C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259 as of
the filing of the petition for certiorari.

Atty. Dela Pea

Atty. Dela Pea
[G.R. No. 186720 : February 08, 2012]

ELSA D. MEDADO, PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF THE LATE ANTONIO
CONSING, AS REPRESENTED BY DR. SOLEDAD CONSING, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which seeks to annul and set aside the following issuances of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in the case docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 02660, entitled Heirs of
the Late Antonio Consing as represented by Dra. Soledad Consing v. Hon. Renato
D. Muez, Presiding Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Cadiz City,
Spouses Meritus Rey Medado, the Sheriff IV, Balbino B. Germinal, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 60, Cadiz City and Land Bank of the Philippines:cralaw
(1) the Decision[1] dated September 26, 2008, reversing and setting aside the
order[2]of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60, Cadiz City, in Civil Case No.
797-C, an action for injunction; and
(2) the Resolution[3] dated January 21, 2009, denying the motion for
reconsideration of the decision dated September 26, 2008.
The Factual Antecedents
Sometime in 1996, petitioner Meritus Rey Medado and Elsa Medado (Spouses
Medado) and the estate of the late Antonio Consing (Estate of Consing), as
represented by Soledad Consing (Soledad), executed Deeds of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage for the former's acquisition from the latter of the property
in Cadiz City identified as Hacienda Sol. Records indicate that the sale included
the parcels of land covered by OCT No. P-498, TCT No. T-31275, TCT No. T31276 and TCT No. T-31277. As part of the deal, Spouses Medado undertook to
assume the estate's loan with Philippine National Bank (PNB).
Subsequent to the sale, however, the Estate of Consing offered the subject lots to
the government via the Department of Agrarian Reform's Voluntary Offer to Sell
(VOS) program. On November 22, 2000, the Estate of Consing also instituted with
the RTC, Branch 44 of Bacolod City an action for rescission and damages,
docketed as Civil Case No. 00-11320 against Spouses Medado, PNB and the
Register of Deeds of Cadiz City, due to the alleged failure of the spouses to meet
Page
SECOND DIVISION
the conditions in their agreement.

In the meantime that Civil Case No. 00-11320 for rescission was pending, Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) issued in favor of the Estate of Consing a certificate
of deposit of cash and agrarian reform bonds, as compensation for the lots
covered by the VOS. Spouses Medado feared that LBP would release the full
proceeds thereof to the Estate of Consing. They claimed to be the ones entitled to
the proceeds considering that they had bought the properties through the Deeds of
Sale with Assumption of Mortgage which they and the Estate of Consing had
earlier executed.
The foregoing prompted Spouses Medado to institute Civil Case No. 797-C, an
action for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order,
with the RTC, Branch 60 of Cadiz City. They asked that the following be issued by
the trial court: (a) writ of prohibitory injunction to restrain LBP from releasing the
remaining amount of the VOS proceeds of the lots offered by the Estate of
Consing, and restraining the Estate of Consing from receiving these proceeds; and
(b) writ of mandatory injunction to compel LBP to release the remaining amount of
the VOS to the spouses.
On March 9, 2007, the RTC of Cadiz City issued an Order[4] granting Spouses
Medado's application for the issuance of writs of preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction. The order's dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction of the plaintiffs to be
MERITORIOUS, the same is hereby GRANTED.
Let therefore a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction be issued
against defendant Land Bank, its agents, lawyers and all other persons acting in its
behalf to cease and desist from releasing the balance of the VOS Proceeds to
defendant Heirs of the Late Antonio Consing as represented by Dra. Soledad
Consing and restraining said defendant Consing, her agents, lawyers, successorsin-interest, and all other persons acting in its behalf from receiving the same and to
maintain the STATUS QUO ANTE BELLUM while defendant Land Bank of the
Philippines is hereby ordered to release and pay the whole of the remaining
balance of the VOS Proceeds held by the said defendant to the plaintiffs after the
posting of a bond by the plaintiffs in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P5,000,000.00) executed in favor of the defendants conditioned upon the payment
to the said defendants by the plaintiffs [of] all damages which the former may
sustain by reason of the issuance of the writ of preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction in case this Court should finally decide that the plaintiffs are
not entitled thereto.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Feeling aggrieved, the heirs of the late Antonio Consing (Consing) questioned the
RTC's order via a petition for certiorari filed with the CA, against Hon. Renato D.
Muez, Presiding Executive Judge, RTC, Branch 60 of Cadiz City, Spouses
Medado, Sheriff IV Balbino B. Germinal of RTC, Branch 60 of Cadiz City and LBP.
They sought, among other reliefs, the dismissal of the complaint for injunction for
violation of the rules on litis pendentia and forum shopping. On the matter of the
absence of a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's order before resorting to
a petition for certiorari, the heirs explained that the implementation of the
questioned writs through LBP's release of the VOS proceeds' balance to the sheriff
on March 29, 2007, notwithstanding: (a) the pendency of motions for
reconsideration and dissolution of the writs filed by the heirs, and (b) the fact that
the writs were immediately implemented even if a hearing on the motions was
already scheduled for March 30, 2007, prompted the heirs' withdrawal of their
motions for being already moot and academic. The heirs argued that their case
was within the exceptions to the general rule that a petition under Rule 65 will not
lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the lower court.
In their comment on the petition, Spouses Medado questioned, among other
matters, the authority of Soledad to sign the petition's certification of non-forum
shopping on behalf of her co-petitioners.
The Ruling of the CA
On September 26, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed decision,[6] the dispositive
portion of which reads:
Page
Furnish copies of this Order to all counsels and parties.

Atty. Dela Pea
11320 for rescission and damages as this violates the rule against forum shopping.
Spouses Medado's motion for reconsideration of the decision of September 26,
2008 was denied by the CA via its Resolution[8] dated January 21, 2009. Hence,
this petition.
The Present Petition
This petition was instituted by petitioner Elsa Medado without naming her husband
as co-petitioner, due to their alleged separation de facto.[9] It presents the following
issues for this Court's determination:
I. Whether or not the CA correctly admitted the petition for certiorari filed before it,
notwithstanding alleged deficiencies in its verification and certification against
forum shopping;
II. Whether or not the CA correctly admitted the petition for certiorari filed before it
even if no motion for reconsideration of the RTCs Order dated March 9, 2007 was
filed with the lower court; and
III. Whether or not the CA correctly held that the rule against forum shopping was
violated by the filing of the complaint for injunction during the pendency of the
action for rescission and damages.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents also raise as an issue the failure
of the petitioner to join her husband as a party to the petition, considering that the
action affects conjugal property.
This Court's Ruling
After due study, this Court finds the petition bereft of merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition being impressed with merit is GRANTED. The
assailed Order dated March 9, 2007 is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE and the
complaint in Civil Case No. 797-C DISMISSED. Private respondents are directed
to return P3,743,825.88 to Land Bank of the Philippines to await a final ruling in
Civil Case No. 00-1320.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The CA ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in taking cognizance of
Civil Case No. 797-C for injunction during the pendency of Civil Case No. 00-
The requirements for verification and certification against forum shopping in

the CA petition were substantially complied with, following settled
jurisprudence.
Before us, the petitioner contended that the consolidated verification and
certification against forum shopping of the petition filed with the CA was defective:
first, for being signed only by Soledad, instead of by all the petitioners, and second,
its jurat cites a mere community tax certificate of Soledad, instead of a
government-issued identification card required under the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. The second ground was never raised by herein petitioner in her
comment on the CA petition, thus, it cannot be validly raised by the petitioner at
As regards the first ground, records show that Soledad signed the verification and
certification against forum shopping on behalf of her co-petitioners by virtue of a
Special Power of Attorney[10](SPA) attached to the petition filed with the CA. The
SPA, signed by her co-heirs Ma. Josefa Consing Saguitguit, Ma. Carmela Consing
Lopez, Ma. Lourdes Consing Gonzales and Mary Rose Consing Tuason, provides
that their attorney-in-fact Soledad is authorized:
To protect, sue, prosecute, defend and adopt whatever action necessary and
proper relative and with respect to our right, interest and participation over said
properties, particularly those described in previous titles under TCT No. T-498,
TCT No. T-31275, TCT No. T-31276 and TCT No. T-31277 of the [R]egister of
Deeds, Cadiz City, covering a total area of 73.6814 square meters, and declared in
the name of said Antonio Consing and located in Brgy. Magsaysay, Cadiz City,
Negros Occidental, the same parcels of land are the subject of judicial litigation
before the [R]egional Trial [Court], Branch 44, Bacolod City, docketed as Civil
[C]ase No. 11320, entitled Soledad T. Consing, for herself and as Administratix of
the estate of Antonio Consing, plaintiffs, versus, Spouses Meritus Rey and Elsa
Medado, et.al., defendants, and Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Cadiz City and
docketed as Civil Case No. 797-C, entitled, []Spouse[s] Meritus Rey Medado and
Elsa Medado, plaintiffs, versus, Land Bank of the Philippines and heirs of the Late
Antonio Consing as represented by Dra. Soledad Consing, defendants; pending in
said court and which cases may at anytime be elevated to the Court of Appeals
and/or Supreme Court as the circumstances so warrant;[11]
As may be gleaned from the foregoing, the authority of Soledad includes the filing
of an appeal before the CA, including the execution of a verification and
certification against forum shopping therefor, being acts necessary to protect, sue,
prosecute, defend and adopt whatever action necessary and proper in relation to
their rights over the subject properties.
In addition, the allegations and contentions embodied in the CA petition do not
deviate from the claims already made by the heirs in Civil Case Nos. 00-11320 and
797-C, both specifically mentioned in the SPA. We emphasize that the verification
requirement is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
pleading are true and correct, and not the product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith.[12] We rule that there was
no deficiency in the petition's verification and certification against forum shopping
filed with the CA.
In any case, we reiterate that where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who
share a common interest in the property subject of the action, the fact that only one
Page
this stage.

Atty. Dela Pea
of the petitioners executed the verification or certification of forum shopping will not
deter the court from proceeding with the action. In Heirs of Domingo Hernandez,
Sr. v. Mingoa, Sr.,[13] we held:
Even if only petitioner Domingo Hernandez, Jr. executed the
Verification/Certification against forum-shopping, this will not deter us from
proceeding with the judicial determination of the issues in this petition. As we
ratiocinated in Heirs of Olarte v. Office of the President:
The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all
the plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient.
However, the Court has also stressed that the rules on forum shopping were
designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and thus
should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be
availed of with respect to the contents of the certification. This is because the
requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of
non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the
certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely
disregarded. Thus, under justifiable circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule
requiring the submission of such certification considering that although it is
obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.
In HLC Construction and Development Corporation v. Emily Homes Subdivision
Homeowners Association, it was held that the signature of only one of the
petitioners in the certification against forum shopping substantially complied with
[the] rules because all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense.
The same leniency was applied by the Court in Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, because
the lone petitioner who executed the certification of non-forum shopping was a
relative and co-owner of the other petitioners with whom he shares a common
interest. x x x
xxx
Here, all the petitioners are immediate relatives who share a common interest in
the land sought to be reconveyed and a common cause of action raising the same
arguments in support thereof. There was sufficient basis, therefore, for Domingo
Hernandez, Jr. to speak for and in behalf of his co-petitioners when he certified that
they had not filed any action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same
issues. Thus, the Verification/Certification that Hernandez, Jr. executed constitutes
substantial compliance under the Rules.[14] (citations omitted)
Page
Furthermore, we have consistently held that verification of a pleading is a formal,

not a jurisdictional, requirement intended to secure the assurance that the matters
alleged in a pleading are true and correct. Thus, the court may simply order the
correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with
the rules. It is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs
the verification; and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good
faith or are true and correct.[15] It was based on this principle that this Court had
also allowed herein petitioner, via our Resolution[16] dated April 22, 2009, a chance
to submit a verification that complied with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court,
as amended, instead of us dismissing the petition outright.
10

Atty. Dela Pea
which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and where the issue raised is one
purely of law or where public interest is involved.[17] (emphasis supplied, and
citations and underscoring omitted)
As correctly held by the CA, a motion for reconsideration, or the resolution of the
trial court thereon, had become useless given that the particular acts which the
movants sought to prevent by the filing of the motion were already carried out.
Significantly, the heirs of the late Consing had filed a motion for reconsideration of
the RTC's order, but withdrew it only after the trial court had decided to implement
the writs notwithstanding the pendency of the motion and just a day before the
scheduled hearing on said motion.
Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia concur.
There are recognized exceptions permitting resort to a special civil action
of certiorari even without first filing a motion for reconsideration.
On the second issue, the CA did not err in accepting the petition for certiorari even
if the motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order of March 9, 2007 was withdrawn
by herein respondents before the RTC could act thereon. It is settled that the
requirement on the filing of a motion for reconsideration prior to the institution of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court admits of several
exceptions, such as when the filing of a motion appears to be useless given the
circumstances attending the action. Thus, we have repeatedly held:
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua
non before a petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity
for the court a quo to correct any error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal
and factual circumstances of the case. There are, however, recognized exceptions
permitting a resort to the special civil action for certiorari without first filing a motion
for reconsideration. In the case of Domdom v. Sandiganbayan, it was written:
The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as where the
order is a patent nullity because the court a quo had no jurisdiction; where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the
lower court; where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question,
and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner, or the subject matter of the action is perishable; where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;where the
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency of relief;
where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the grant of
such relief by the trial court is improbable; where the proceedings in the lower court
are a nullity for lack of due process; where the proceedings were ex parte or in
On the third issue, there is forum shopping when the elements of litis pendentia are
present, i.e., between actions pending before courts, there exist: (1) identity of
parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, (2)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts, and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the action under consideration; said requisites are also
constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens.[18] Applying
the foregoing, there was clearly a violation of the rule against forum shopping when
Spouses Medado instituted Civil Case No. 797-C for injunction notwithstanding the
pendency of Civil Case No. 00-11320 for rescission of contract and damages.
All elements of litis pendentia are present with the filing of the two cases. There is
no dispute that there is identity of parties representing the same interests in the
two actions, both involving the estate and heirs of the late Consing on one hand,
and Spouses Medado on the other. The rescission case names Soledad T.
Consing, for herself and as administratrix of the estate of Antonio Consing as
plaintiff, with Spouses Meritus Rey and Elsa Medado, [PNB] and the Register of
Deeds of Cadiz City as respondents. The injunction case, on the other hand, was
instituted by Spouses Medado, against (LBP) and the Heirs of the Late Antonio
Consing, as represented by Dra. Soledad Consing. The primary litigants in the
two action, and their interests, are the same.
The two other elements are likewise satisfied. There is an identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for in the two cases, with the reliefs being founded on
the same set of facts. In both cases, the parties claim their supposed right as
owners of the subject properties. They all anchor their claim of ownership on the
deeds of absolute sale which they had executed, and the law applicable thereto.
They assert their respective rights, with Spouses Medado as buyers and the heirs
It does not even matter that one action is for the enforcement of the parties'
agreements, while the other action is for the rescission thereof. In the similar case
of Victronics Computers, Inc. v. RTC, Branch 63, Makati,[19] we discussed:
Civil Case No. 91-2069 actually involves an action for specific performance; it thus
upholds the contract and assumes its validity. Civil Case No. 91-2192, on the other
hand, is for the nullification of the contract on the grounds of fraud and vitiated
consent. While ostensibly the cause of action in one is opposite to that in the
other, in the final analysis, what is being determined is the validity of the
contract. x x x Thus, the identity of rights asserted cannot be disputed.
Howsoever viewed, it is beyond cavil that regardless of the decision that would be
promulgated in Civil Case No. 91-2069, the same would constitute res judicata on
Civil Case No. 91-2192 and vice versa.[20] (emphasis supplied)
This was further explained in Casil v. CA,[21] where we ruled:
The Court of Appeals held that there can be no res adjudicata because there is no
identity of causes of action between the two cases. We do not agree. In the two
cases, both petitioner and private respondent brought to fore the validity of the
agreement dated May 4, 1994. Private respondent raised this point as an
affirmative defense in her answer in the First Case. She brought it up again in her
complaint in the Second Case. A single issue cannot be litigated in more than one
forum. As held inMendiola vs. Court of Appeals:
The similarity between the two causes of action is only too glaring. The test of
identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an action but on whether the
same evidence would support and establish the former and the present causes of
action. The difference of actions in the aforesaid cases is of no moment. In Civil
Case No. 58713, the action is to enjoin PNB from foreclosing petitioner's
properties, while in Civil Case No. 60012, the action is one to annul the auction
sale over the foreclosed properties of petitioner based on the same
grounds. Notwithstanding a difference in the forms of the two actions, the doctrine
of res judicata still applies considering that the parties were litigating for the same
thing, i.e. lands covered by TCT No. 27307, and more importantly, the same
contentions and evidence as advanced by herein petitioner in this case were in
fact used to support the former cause of action.[22]
Page
as sellers, based on the same set of facts that involve the deeds of sale's contents
and their validity. Both actions necessarily involve a ruling on the validity of the
same contract as against the same parties. Thus, the identity of the two cases is
such as would render the decision in the rescission case res judicata in the
injunction case, and vice versa.
11

Atty. Dela Pea
The CA was then correct in ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case
No. 797-C for violation of the rule against forum shopping. The issue on the
validity of the subject deeds of absolute sale can best be addressed in the action
for rescission, as against the case for injunction filed by Spouses Medado. In a
line of cases, we have set the relevant factors that courts must consider when they
have to determine which case should be dismissed, given the pendency of two
actions, to wit:
(1) the date of filing, with preference generally given to the first action filed to be
retained;
(2) whether the action sought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the
latter action or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal; and
(3) whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between
the parties.[23]
We emphasize that the rules on forum shopping are meant to prevent such
eventualities as conflicting final decisions.[24] This Court has consistently held that
the costly consequence of forum shopping should remind the parties to ever be
mindful against abusing court processes.[25] In addition, the principle of res
judicata requires that stability be accorded to judgments. Controversies once
decided on the merits shall remain in repose for there should be an end to litigation
which, without the doctrine, would be endless.[26]
Given the foregoing grounds already warranting the denial of this petition, we
deem it no longer necessary to take any action or to now rule on the issue of the
non-joinder of the petitioner's husband in the petition.cralaw
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals Decision dated September 26,
2008, which reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
60, Cadiz City, dated March 09, 2007, is perforceAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS

SECRETARY HON. ARTURO L. TIU, PETITIONER, VS. CELSO M. PALER,
[1]
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
decision[2] dated December 20, 2005 and resolution dated April 27, 2005 rendered
by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90360.
The facts are undisputed.
Respondent Celso M. Paler was a Supervising Legislative Staff Officer II (SG-24)
[3]
with the Technical Support Service of the Commission on Appointments.[4] On
April 8, 2003, he submitted a request for vacation leave for 74 working days - from
August 1, 2003 to November 14, 2003.[5] In a memorandum dated April 22, 2003,
Ramon C. Nghuatco, Director III of Technical Support Service, submitted to the
Commission Secretary his comments/recommendation on Paler's application:
"1. The request to go on leave of Mr. Paler is contingent upon the completion of his
various Committee assignments.
2. We have already acted favorably on his Leave Applications for 09 June 2003 30 July 2003, which may already cover his reasons enumerated under items 1-5.
3. Mr. Paler's Sick Leave Application shall require a medical certificate from the
attending physician advising him of the need to undergo medical operation and the
treatment and recuperation period therefor.
Mr. Paler's Application for Leave may be acted upon depending on the
completion of his work load and submission of the medical certificate."[6]
(Emphasis supplied)
Since he already had an approved leave from June 9 to July 30, 2003, Paler left for
the United States on June 8, 2003, without verifying whether his application for
leave (for August 1 - November 14, 2003) was approved or denied.
In a letter dated September 16, 2003, the Commission Chairman informed Paler
that he was being dropped from the roll of employees effective said date, due to
Page
[G.R. No. 172623 : March 13, 2010]
12

Atty. Dela Pea
his continuous 30-day absence without leave and in accordance with Section 63,
Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 14, s. 1999.[7] Paler's
son received the letter on September 23, 2003.[8]
Paler moved for reconsideration but this was denied on February 20, 2004, on the
ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.[9] The denial was
received by Paler's son on March 18, 2004.
On appeal, the CSC reversed and set aside the Commission Chairman's decision
dated September 16, 2003 per resolution 04-1214 dated November 9, 2004.[10] The
dispositive portion of the resolution read:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Celso M. Paler is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the
decision dated September 16, 2003 of Commission on Appointments Chairman
Franklin M. Drilon dropping Celso M. Paler from the rolls; and the decision dated
February 20, 2004 denying his motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. It is directed that Celso M. Paler be immediately reinstated as
Committee Secretary of the Commission on Appointments and shall be considered
to be on leave with pay until the exhaustion of his vacation leave credits.
Quezon City, Nov. 09, 2004.[11]
The Commission filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the CSC
per resolution No. 050833 dated June 23, 2005.
This constrained petitioner to file with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court.
Since Paler had in the meantime already reached the compulsory age of
retirement on July 28, 2005 and was no longer entitled to reinstatement, the CA
affirmed with modification CSC resolution 04-1214 dated November 9, 2004 and
resolution No. 050833 dated June 23, 2005. The dispositive portion of the assailed
decision dated December 20, 2005 provided:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the order of reinstatement is DELETED.
In lieu thereof, Paler should be awarded backwages, retirement benefits and other
privileges that accrued to him from the time of his dismissal up to the date of his
retirement.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in the
Hence, this petition based on the following grounds:

A.
B.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING

DUE COURSE TO THE APPEAL OF RESPONDENT PALER WITH THE
RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION DESPITE THE FACT
THAT IT WAS FILED OUT OF TIME.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE LEAVE APPLICATIONS OF RESPONDENT
PALER WAS DEEMED APPROVED ON A MISTAKEN
INTERPRETATION OF SEC. 49, RULE XVI OF THE OMNIBUS RULE
ON LEAVE AS AMENDED.[13]
Petitioner's contentions are basically the same as those it presented to the

CSC[14] and the CA,[15]viz.: (1) the CSC should not have entertained Paler's appeal
since it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period; there were no
meritorious reasons to relax the procedural rules, specially since there was bad
faith and misrepresentation on Paler's part in filing staggered applications for
leave; (2) the Commission Chairman's decision to drop Paler from the roll of
employees was in accord with Section 63 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 14,
series of 1999 and (3) Paler's application for leave was not "deemed approved" as
petitioner acted on his application by holding it in abeyance in view of the
contingencies of his work and the submission of a medical certificate.[16]
In his comment, Paler, aside from arguing that the CA did not commit any error in
sustaining the CSC resolutions, also assails Atty. Arturo L. Tiu's authority to file the
petition and sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping on behalf
of the Commission Chairman.[17]
The CSC, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), maintains the
correctness of the CSC and CA judgments.
Page
assailed resolution dated April 27, 2005.
13

Atty. Dela Pea
Commission disputes the CSC's grant of Paler's appeal despite having been filed
beyond the reglementary period.
On the substantive aspect, was Paler's application for leave "deemed approved"
within the purview of Section 49, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave?
Authority to File Petition
First, we tackle Atty. Tiu's authority to file the petition and sign the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping.
The petitioner in this case is the Commission on Appointments, a government
entity created by the Constitution, and headed by its Chairman.[18] There was no
need for the Chairman himself to sign the verification. Its representative, lawyer or
any person who personally knew the truth of the facts alleged in the petition could
sign the verification.[19] With regard, however, to the certification of non-forum
shopping, the established rule is that it must be executed by the plaintiff or any of
the principal parties and not by counsel.[20] In this case, Atty. Tiu failed to show that
he was specifically authorized by the Chairman to sign the certification of nonforum shopping, much less file the petition in his behalf. There is nothing on record
to prove such authority. Atty. Tiu did not even bother to controvert Paler's allegation
of his lack of authority. This renders the petition dismissible.[21]
Furthermore, the petition is bereft of merit as it merely restates the arguments
presented before the CSC and CA. It does not advance any cogent reason that will
convince this Court to deviate from the rulings of both tribunals.
The Issue of
Late Filing
Section 72 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, s. 1999,[22] provides for the
period of appeal for non-disciplinary actions, to wit:
Issues
Section 72. When and Where to File. - A decision or ruling of a department or

agency may be appealed within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof by the party
adversely affected to the Civil Service Regional Office and finally, to the
Commission Proper within the same period.
This petition involves both procedural and substantive issues.
xxx
On the procedural aspect, Paler questions the authority of the Commission

Secretary to file the petition and sign the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping in behalf of the Commission Chairman. On the other hand, the
Paler's son received the letter from the Commission Chairman denying Paler's
motion for reconsideration on March 18, 2004. Thus, Paler's had until April 2, 2004
within which to file his appeal with the CSC. It was filed, however, only on April 5,
We agree with the CSC. We uphold its decision to relax the procedural rules
because Paler's appeal was meritorious. This is not the first time that the Court has
upheld such exercise of discretion. InRosales, Jr. v. Mijares[25] involving Section
49(a) of the CSC Revised Rules of Procedure, the Court ruled:
On the contention of the petitioner that the appeal of the respondent to the CSC
was made beyond the period therefor under Section 49(a) of the CSC Revised
Rules of Procedure, the CSC correctly ruled that:
Movant claims that Mijares' appeal was filed way beyond the reglementary period
for filing appeals. He, thus, contends that the Commission should not have given
due course to said appeal.
The Commission need not delve much on the dates when Mijares was separated
from the service and when he assailed his separation. Suffice it to state that the
Commission found his appeal meritorious. This being the case, procedural
rules need not be strictly observed. This principle was explained by in the case
of Mauna vs. CSC, 232 SCRA 388, where the Supreme Court ruled, to wit:
"Assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioner's appeal was filed out of
time, it is within the power of this Court to temper rigid rules in favor of
substantial justice. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully
and even meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about
procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of
justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the orderly conduct of litigation, it
is because of the higher objective they seek which is the protection of
substantive rights of the parties. As held by the Court in a number of cases:
xxx
It bears stressing that the case before the CSC involves the security of tenure of a
public officer sacrosanctly protected by the Constitution. Public interest requires a
resolution of the merits of the appeal instead of dismissing the same based on a
strained and inordinate application of Section 49(a) of the CSC Revised Rules of
Procedure.[26] (Emphasis supplied)
Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania[27] likewise sustained the CSC when it
modified an otherwise final and executory resolution and awarded backwages to
the respondent, in the interest of justice and fair play. The Court stated -
Page
2004.[23] Nevertheless, the CSC entertained the appeal in the interest of substantial
justice.[24]
14

Atty. Dela Pea
No doubt, the Civil Service Commission was in the legitimate exercise of its
mandate under Sec. 3, Rule I, of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service that "[a]dministrative investigations shall be conducted
without necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and
evidence applicable to judicial proceedings." This authority is consistent with its
powers and functions to "[p]rescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for
carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws"
being the central personnel agency of the Government.
Furthermore, there are special circumstances in accordance with the tenets of
justice and fair play that warrant such liberal attitude on the part of the CSC and a
compassionate like-minded discernment by this Court. x x x[28]
When substantial justice dictates it, procedural rules may be relaxed in order to
arrive at a just disposition of a case. The purpose behind limiting the period of
appeal is to avoid unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an
end to controversies. A one-day delay, as in this case, does not justify denial of the
appeal where there is absolutely no indication of intent to delay justice on the part
of Paler[29] and the pleading is meritorious on its face.
Petitioner harps on Paler's alleged bad faith and misrepresentation in filing his
previous applications for leave. However, as correctly found by the CSC and CA,
the basis for Paler's dismissal was his continuous absence without leave, not bad
faith and misrepresentation. The CSC even noted that Paler never misrepresented
or misled petitioner as to where he was spending his vacation leave. He clearly
stated in his application for leave dated April 17, 2003 that he was spending it not
only in the Philippines but also in the U.S.[30] According to the CA, "to utilize Paler's
alleged misrepresentation in his previously approved applications for leave as
basis for his separation from work, even in the absence of opportunity for him to
controvert the matter, would constitute a violation of the fundamental requirements
of fairness and equity and the constitutional guarantee of due process."[31] The
Court finds no reason to deviate from the findings of both the CSC and CA, given
that they concur with each other and should be accorded great weight and respect.
[32]
The CSC and CA were also correct in ruling that Paler could not be considered
absent without leave (AWOL) for the period of August 1, 2003 to November 14,
2003.
Paler was dropped from the roll of employees pursuant to Section 63, Rule XVI of
the Omnibus Rules on Leave:
AWOL means that the employee has left or abandoned his post for a continuous
period of thirty (30) calendar days or more without any justifiable reason and notice
to his employer.[33]
The bone of contention in this case is whether or not Paler had an approved leave.
Section 49, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave requires that an application
for leave should be acted upon within 5 working days from receipt, otherwise, such
application is deemed approved.[34]The CSC interpreted said provision in this wise It is explicit from the aforequoted rule that an application for leave of absence
which had not been acted upon - either by approving or disapproving - by the head
of agency or his/her authorized representative within five (5) working days from the
date of its filing shall be deemed approved.[35] (Italics supplied)
The CSC also ruled that "Section 49 calls for a specific action to be done by the
head of the agency or his duly authorized representative on the application for
leave filed which is either to approve or to deny the same."[36]
Being the central agency mandated to "prescribe, amend, and enforce rules and
regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other
pertinent laws," the CSC has the power to interpret its own rules and any phrase
contained in them, with its interpretation significantly becoming part of the rules
themselves.[37] The Court has consistently yielded and accorded great respect to
the interpretation by administrative agencies of their own rules unless there is an
error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly
conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.[38]
The CA added its own reading of Section 49 which the Court now sustains:
x x x The action contemplated therein connotes a clear and explicit exercise of
discretion. It pertains to an absolute and unequivocal "approval" or "disapproval" of
the request for leave and not one which is merely "recommendatory" in nature. If
the rule were otherwise, the authority to act on the application for leave would not
have been vested on the head of the agency or the CA [Commission on
Appointments] Chairman's authorized representative. Needless to state, the
Page
An official or an employee who is continuously absent without approved leave for

at least thirty (30) calendar days shall be considered on absence without official
leave (AWOL) and shall be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls
without prior notice. He shall, however, be informed, at his address appearing on
his 201 files of his separation from the service, not later than five (5) days from its
effectivity. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
15

Atty. Dela Pea
purpose of the provision is for the applicant to be immediately informed of the
status of his application, whether it has been approved or denied, so that he can
act accordingly. x x x[39]
Clearly, Atty. Nghuatco's memorandum did not cover the action contemplated by
Section 49. For one, it did not bear the imprimatur of the Commission Chairman (or
his duly authorized representative) who was the proper party to grant or deny the
application, as dictated by Section 52 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave.[40] For
another, it only submitted to the Commission Secretary Atty. Nghuatco's comments
and/or recommendations on Paler's application. It was merely preliminary and did
not propose any definitive action (i.e., approval or disapproval) on Paler's
application, and simply recommended what action to take. It was obviously not
controlling and the Chairman could have agreed or disagreed with the
recommended action. In fact, the memorandum clearly provided that Paler's
request was still to be referred to the Legal Service for comment,[41] and that the
application "(could) be acted upon depending on the completion of his work load
and submission of the medical certificate."[42] These circumstances plainly meant
that further action was yet to be made on the application. And since there was no
final approval or disapproval of Paler's application within 5 working days from
receipt as required by Section 49, the application was deemed approved. Paler,
therefore, could not be considered on AWOL.
All told, the CA committed no error in affirming, with modification, CSC Resolution
Nos. 04-1214 dated November 9, 2004 and 050833 dated June 23, 2005.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
BENGUET EXPLORATION, INC., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS,

SWITZERLAND GENERAL INSURANCE, CO., LTD., and SEAWOOD
SHIPPING, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated June 30, 1994, and
resolution, dated September 29, 1994, of the Court of Appeals 1 which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati, dismissing the complaints
filed by petitioner against herein private respondents, and denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration, respectively.
The background of this case is as follows:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On November 29, 1985, petitioner Benguet Exploration, Inc. (Benguet) filed a
complaint for damages against Seawood Shipping, Inc. (Seawood Shipping) with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 12394
and assigned to Branch 149. 2 On March 4, 1986, petitioner Benguet filed another
complaint for damages against respondent Switzerland General Insurance, Co.,
Ltd. (Switzerland Insurance), which was docketed as Civil Case No. 13085 3 and
assigned to Branch 148 of the court.
The two cases were consolidated. Switzerland Insurance filed a third-party
complaint against Seawood Shipping, praying that the latter be ordered to
indemnify it for whatever might be adjudged against it in favor of petitioner. 4
Thereafter, the cases were jointly tried, during which petitioner Benguet presented
its employees, Rogelio Lumibao and Ernesto Cayabyab, as witnesses.
Rogelio Lumibao, marketing assistant of Benguet, was in charge of exportation.
His responsibilities included the documentation of export products, presentations
with banks, and other duties connected with the export of products. He explained
that private respondent Seawood Shipping was chartered by petitioner Benguet to
transport copper concentrates. The bill of lading (Exh. A) stated that the cargo,
consisting of 2,243.496 wet metric tons of copper concentrates, was loaded on
board Sangkulirang No. 3 at Poro Point, San Fernando, La Union. It was insured
by Switzerland Insurance (marine insurance policy was marked Exh. C). When the
cargo was unloaded in Japan, however, Rogelio Lumibao received a report (Exh.
Page
[G.R. No. 117434. February 9, 2001.]
16

Atty. Dela Pea
B), dated August 19, 1985, from a surveyor in Japan stating that the cargo was 355
metric tons short of the amount stated in the bill of lading. For this reason,
petitioner Benguet made a claim of the loss to Seawood Shipping and Switzerland
Insurance. In its letter, dated August 21, 1985 (Exh. D), petitioner Benguet made a
formal demand for the value of the alleged shortage. As both Seawood Shipping
and Switzerland Insurance refused the demand, petitioner Benguet brought these
cases against Seawood Shipping and Switzerland Insurance. 5
On cross-examination, Lumibao admitted that he did not see the actual loading of
the cargo at Poro Point and that his knowledge was limited to what was contained
in the bill of lading which he received about two days after the loading. Lumibao
testified that at Camp 6, Kennon Road, Baguio, the copper concentrates were
weighed prior to being transported to Poro Point, where they were once more
weighed before being loaded on the vessel. But again he admitted that he had not
seen the actual weighing and loading of the copper concentrates because he was
not the one in charge of the operation. Nor was he in Japan when the cargo was
unloaded. He also did not know how to perform the procedure for weighing cargo.
Thus, he could not determine the truth or falsity of the contents of the draft survey.
He only knew that there was in fact a shortage based on his reading of the draft
report. 6 Further, Lumibao testified that, although he prepared the export
declaration, he did not prepare the bill of lading. The bill of lading was made on the
basis of the draft survey conducted by the Overseas Merchandise Inspection Co.,
Ltd. or OMIC. 7 Some other person undertook the weighing of the cargo, and
Lumibao was only informed by telephone of the cargos weight during its loading
and unloading.
Lumibao had nothing to do with the preparation of the bill of lading, the weighing of
the copper concentrates, and the shipment of the cargo. He did not accompany the
trucks which transferred the cargo from Baguio to Poro Point. He was not on the
ship when the cargo was loaded at Poro Point. Nor did he know if spillage occurred
during the loading or unloading of the copper concentrates.
Lumibao said that the buyer of the copper concentrates was the Brandeis Intsel
Co., Inc. Upon receipt of the cargo, Brandeis Intsel Co., Inc. paid for the cargo
based on its weight in dry metric tons, or 90 percent more or less of the price of
2,243.496 tons, the weight of the cargo in wet metric tons. With regard to the
insurance policy, he testified that petitioner Benguet made no objection to any of
the terms stated on the face of the policy. 8
Ernesto Cayabyab next testified for petitioner. He had been with Benguet for 13
years and, at the time of his testimony, he was secretary of Nil Alejandre, manager
of Benguet. According to Cayabyab, on July 28, 1985, he was sent to the
warehouse (bodega) at Poro Point, La Union to assist in the loading of the copper
When cross-examined, Cayabyab said that, as a secretary, his duties included

computing the companys daily main production in the mine site and accompanying
his superior, Mr. Alejandre, during shipments. He explained that the copper
concentrates were transported by dump trucks from the mining site to Poro Point
for over a month, possibly even three to six months. Cayabyab went to Poro Point
on July 27, 1985 to witness the loading of the copper concentrates on the vessel
Sangkulirang No. 3. But the copper concentrates had already been delivered and
stored in a bodega when he arrived. These concentrates were placed on the
cemented ground inside the bodega after their weight was recorded. Describing
the procedure for weighing, he said that the trucks, without the copper
concentrates, were weighed. Then, after they had been loaded with copper
concentrates, the trucks were placed in the bodega and weighed again. To
determine the weight of the copper concentrates, the weight of the trucks was
deducted from the weight of the trucks loaded with copper concentrates. The
copper concentrates were then loaded on the ship by means of a conveyor at the
average rate of 400 tons an hour. Cayabyab did not know, however, how many
trucks were used to load the entire cargo of the copper concentrates nor did he
know exactly how many hours were spent loading the copper concentrates to the
ship. He could only remember that he reported for work in the morning and that he
worked overtime because he had to wait until the loading of the cargo was finished
before he could leave. During the loading, he moved from place to place, and his
attention was sometimes distracted. Thus, he could not tell with certainty that no
spillage took place during the loading. The figure of 2,243.496 wet metric tons was
computed by the Marine Surveyor and the Chief Mate. 12
Respondent Switzerland Insurance then presented its evidence. Three witnesses,
Eduardo Pantoja, Anastacio Fabian, and Edgardo Dio, testified for it.
Eduardo Pantoja, assistant branch manager of respondent Switzerland Insurance
in the Philippines, testified that he prepared the data and conditions of the marine
Page
concentrates. These copper concentrates were to be loaded on the ship

Sangkulirang No. 3. Cayabyab said he was present when the cargo was loaded on
the ship, as evidenced by the Certificate of Loading (Exh. E), Certificate of Weight
(Exh. F), and the Mates Receipt (Exh. G), all dated July 28, 1985. According to
Cayabyab, the Marine Surveyor and the Chief Mate would go around the boat to
determine how much was loaded on the ship. Cayabyab stated that he saw
petitioner Benguets representative and his immediate superior, Mr. Alejandre, and
the Inspector of Customs, Mr. Cardenas, sign the Certificate of Weight. Cayabyab
also witnessed the ship captain sign the Certificate of Weight, 9 which stated
therein that 2,243.496 wet metric tons of copper concentrates were loaded on the
ship. 10 Cayabyab likewise confirmed the authenticity of the Mates Receipt,
saying that he witnessed the Chief Mate sign the document. 11
17

Atty. Dela Pea
insurance policy of petitioner Benguet using information furnished by the latter,
although some of the conditions attached to the policy were conditions Switzerland
Insurance attached to all the marine policies issued by it. Pantoja stated that the
figure of 2,243.496 wet metric tons contained in the policy of Benguet was taken
from the latters declaration. Switzerland Insurance relied on the value of the cargo
declared by the insured on the basis of the principle of uberrimae fidei, i.e., the
insured must act in the utmost good faith. 13 One of the conditions set forth in the
marine policy (Exh. 8) was that the" [w]arranted vessel is equipped with steel
centerline bulk head." According to Pantoja, this condition was specifically included
in the policy because the nature of the cargo warranted the same, and Switzerland
Insurance would not have accepted the policy had such condition not been
attached. The purpose of the centerline bulkhead was to prevent the copper
concentrates from shifting while being transported on the ship. Upon verification by
Certified Adjusters, Inc., adjusters of Switzerland Insurance, it was found that the
vessel Sangkulirang No. 3 did not have a steel centerline bulkhead. Pantoja
identified a letter, dated February 13, 1986, sent by his company to petitioner
Benguet canceling its insurance contract because the carrying vessel was not
equipped with a steel centerline bulkhead as warranted under the policy (Exh. 7-a).
Enclosed was Check No. HSBC 419463 for P98,174.43 representing the refund by
Switzerland Insurance of the premium payments, documentary stamps, and
premium taxes paid by petitioner Benguet (Exh. 7). He testified that Switzerland
Insurance paid its legal counsel P40,000.00 as attorneys fees plus appearance
fees. 14
On cross-examination, Pantoja explained that the company had its own system of
determining various rates of insurance. Several factors were taken into
consideration, such as the nature of the goods, the manner by which they were
packed, and the destination of the cargo. For example, Switzerland Insurance
would anticipate pilferage if the cargo involved household goods or, in the case of
chemicals, it would consider the possibility of spillage. Pantoja, however, stated
that he did not make any investigation in this case but used only his previous
experience and project knowledge in dealing with similar cases. He admitted that
Switzerland Insurance checked whether the ship had a steel centerline bulkhead
only after a claim had been made by petitioner Benguet. He explained, however,
that it was impossible for them to make the investigation before the execution of
the marine policy because they had only one day to check whether the ship had a
steel centerline bulkhead and the ship at that time was not in Manila but in Poro
Point. He reiterated that good faith dealing with the insured included relying on the
truth of the latters representations. There was little risk involved in relying on the
insureds representations because the company would not have accepted the risk
if it found that the conditions in the policy had not been complied with. Switzerland
Insurance refused Benguets demand because non-compliance with the condition
that the ship be equipped with a steel centerline bulkhead rendered the marine
Another witness for Switzerland Insurance was Anastacio Fabian, the marine
manager of Certified Adjusters, Inc. He testified that he went to Poro Point where
the shipment was loaded for transport to Japan. It took him almost two months to
finish his investigation and to come up with a written report (Exh. 12). He prepared
a letter, dated January 31, 1986, seeking a certification from Capt. Jae Jang of
Sangkulirang No. 3 on whether the ship was equipped with a steel centerline
bulkhead (Exh. 5). In response thereto, respondent Seawood Shipping sent a
letter, dated February 1, 1986, stating therein that the vessel was not equipped
with a steel centerline bulkhead (Exh. 6). This steel centerline bulkhead was a
steel separation of a vessel for the purpose of preventing the vessel from sinking,
especially in heavy weather. Pictures of the ship were taken by Wise Insurance
showing that the vessel did not have a steel centerline bulkhead (Exhs. 15 to 15H).
Fabian also identified petitioner Benguets export declaration (Exh. 11) which
provides therein that the cargo loaded on the ship weighed 2,050 wet metric tons
or 1,845 dry metric tons. 16 On further direct examination, he testified that Certified
Adjusters, Inc.s president, Mr. Edgardo Dio, wrote a letter, dated January 13,
1986, to the shipping company inquiring as to the circumstances surrounding the
loss of the cargo (Exh. 17). Seawood Shipping responded to Certified Adjusters,
Inc. in a letter, dated January 16, 1986, explaining that the weight of the cargo
might have been increased by the rains which occurred during the loading, and
that the shortage upon unloading might be due to the moisture which evaporated
during the voyage from the Philippines to Japan. Fabian testified that the moisture
on the copper concentrates increased the weight of the cargo.
Fabian said that during his investigation he asked how and when the shipment was
loaded in the vessel and where it was loaded. He also checked records of the
loading of the cargo. Although he admitted that the records show that a shortage of
the copper concentrates had occurred when these reached Japan, he attributed it
to the rains which occurred during the loading of the copper concentrates which
increased their weight, although he conceded that it was not possible that the rains
would cause a shortage of around 300 metric tons. He did not know what could
have caused the shortage. 17
The last witness to testify for the defense was Edgardo Dio, president and
general manager of Certified Adjusters, Inc. He testified that his company
conducted an investigation and found that the vessel Sangkulirang No. 3 was not
Page
insurance policy null and void from the beginning. This is why Switzerland
Insurance refunded the premium paid by petitioner Benguet. Pantoja stated that
petitioner Benguet did not claim that the loss was caused by the shipping of the
cargo because it did not know the cause of the shortage. 15
18

Atty. Dela Pea
equipped with a steel centerline bulkhead. The main function of the steel centerline
bulkhead was to prevent shifting of the copper concentrates during transport. If
there was no steel centerline bulkhead, the vessel was liable to sink. He stated that
the ship had two holds, one of which was loaded with petitioner Benguets copper
concentrates and the other with a Lepanto shipment. Dio identified photographs
showing that only a wooden partition separated the two cargoes on both holds
(Exhs. 15-A to 15-G). He testified that his company wrote a letter to the shipping
company inquiring about the shortage which occurred on petitioner Benguets
copper concentrates. He expressed doubt that the loss of moisture of the copper
concentrates caused the shortage because these were actually mixed with some
water to keep them from heating up or to prevent spontaneous combustion.
According to Dio, it was possible that some shifting of the cargo occurred as
indicated by the photographs of the ship. 18chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court rendered its decision on July 2,
1990 dismissing petitioners complaint as well as Switzerland Insurances thirdparty complaint against Seawood Shipping.
On appeal, its decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 19 Petitioner
Benguet moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied. 20 Hence this
petition.
Petitioner Benguet contends that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that it
failed to establish the loss or shortage of the subject cargo because such loss was
sufficiently established by documentary and testimonial evidence, as well as the
admissions of private respondents. 21 Petitioner argues that documents regarding
the tonnage of the copper concentrates have been properly identified and that the
bill of lading (Exh. A), the Certificate of Weight (Exh. F), and the Mates Receipt
(Exh. G), all of which stated that 2,243.496 wet metric tons of copper concentrates
were loaded on the ship, create a prima facie presumption that such amount was
indeed what was loaded on the vessel. Petitioner asserts that the Draft Survey
Report of OMIC (Exh. B) was sufficient evidence to prove that the cargo which
arrived in Japan had a shortage of 355 wet metric tons.
We find petitioners contentions to be without merit.
First. It is settled that only questions of law may be raised on appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45. The trial court, having heard the witnesses and
observed their demeanor and manner of testifying, is in a better position to decide
the question of their credibility. Hence, unless the factual findings complained of
are not supported by the evidence on record or the assailed judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts, the findings of the trial court must be accorded the
highest respect, even finality, by this Court. 22 It is noteworthy that the Court of
Contrary to this rule, petitioner is raising questions of facts as it seeks an

evaluation of the evidence presented by the parties. However, we find no basis for
concluding that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals misappreciated the
evidence in this case. To the contrary, we find that petitioner failed to present
evidence to prove that the weight of the copper concentrates actually loaded on
the ship Sangkulirang No. 3 was 2,243.496 wet metric tons and that there was a
shortage of 355 metric tons when the cargo was discharged in Japan.
Petitioners own witness, Rogelio Lumibao, admitted that he was not present at the
actual loading of the cargo at Poro Point, his information being limited to what was
contained in the bill of lading. As he was not in charge of the operation, he did not
see the actual weighing and loading of the copper concentrates. Nor did he
prepare the bill of lading. He only verified the weight of the cargo, from the time it
was loaded on the ship to the time it was unloaded in Japan, through the
telephone. Neither was he present when the cargo was discharged in Japan. 24
Thus, Lumibao testified:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Page
Appeals made the same factual findings as did the trial court. 23
19

Atty. Dela Pea
A Yes, sir.
Q And you have nothing to do with OMIC?
A None, sir.
Q You are not an employee of OMIC?
A No, sir.
Q Are you connected with it in any way?
A No, sir.
Q In the Bill of Lading, you identified this document a xerox copy of the supposed
original Bill of Lading and marked as Exh. A, are the wordings and figures "copper
concentrate 2,243.496 WMT" this means weight per metric ton?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now Exhibit A is a bill of lading which you identified?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you have it [verified] if this was the actual weight loaded on the ship of the
defendant Seawood, Shipping, Inc.?
Q Do you have anything to do in the preparation of this bill of lading?
A We were advised by the OMIC surveyor that the weight was loaded.
A None, sir.
Q Did you personally verify if these figures are true?
Q In other words, you did not verify if the weight stated in the bill of lading was the
actual weight of the copper concentrate loaded in the ship of the defendant
Seawood Shipping Inc.?
A Yes, by phone.
A No, sir. Just by phone.
x.
A The bill of lading is prepared on the basis of the draft survey. That is the
procedure.
Q Did you participate in weighing?
Q In other words somebody else made the weighing not you?

A Yes, sir.
Q And who undertakes the draft survey?

Q Did you personally do the verification of the actual weight loaded in the ship?
A For that particular shipment we required or hired the services of OMIC.
x
Q In other words, your draft survey is from the point of origin to Poro Point up to
the point of destination, Onahama, Japan, was done by OMIC?
A Yes, sir by phone.
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you always verify by phone?
A That is only preliminary, while waiting what is the concluding things. (sic) That is
after the surveyor has submitted the report to us.
Q So in other words, all the time you have been basing your testimony on reports
prepared by other person?
A Yes, sir.
Q In fact, you have nothing to do with the preparation of the Bill of Lading?
A Yes, sir.
Q You have nothing to do with the weighing of the copper concentrate? . . . . You
have nothing to do [with] the transport of the copper concentrate from Camp 6,
Baguio to Poro Point?
A None, sir.
Q You did not even accompany the truck?
Page
Q So you are informed [of] the weight actually loaded by phone?
20

Atty. Dela Pea
A No, sir. 25chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On the other hand, Ernesto Cayabyab testified that he was at Poro Point when the
copper concentrates were being loaded on the ship. Although he was present
when the Certificate of Loading (Exh. E), Certificate of Weight (Exh. F), and the
Mates Receipt (Exh. G) were signed at the loading site, 26 he admitted that he
could not say for certain that no spillage occurred during the loading of the cargo
on the ship because his attention was not on the cargo at all times. 27
It is evident that petitioners witnesses had no personal knowledge of the actual
weight of copper concentrates loaded on the vessel and discharged in Japan.
Lumibao had no part in the preparation of the bill of lading (Exh. A) and the Draft
Survey Report prepared by OMIC (Exh. B). Nor was he present when the copper
concentrates were loaded on the vessel or when the cargo was unloaded in Japan.
He merely relied on the declarations made by other persons that 2,243.496 wet
metric tons were indeed loaded on Sangkulirang No. 3 and that the cargo was
short by 355 metric tons when unloaded in Japan. The same may be said of
witness Cayabyab. While present at the loading site and familiar with the
procedure followed in loading the cargo, he admitted that he could not state for
certain that no spillage occurred as his attention was not at all times focused on
the loading operation. Moreover, none of the documents he identified, i.e.,
Certificate of Loading, Certificate of Weight, and Mates Receipt, were signed by
him. He only witnessed the signing of these documents by other people. Hence, he
was in no position to testify as to the truth or falsity of the figures contained therein.
The testimonies of these witnesses were thus hearsay. It has been
held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A No, sir.
Q You were not at the shipside when this copper concentrate was loaded?
A No, sir.
Q You did not know whether there was spillage when or while loading copper
concentrates?
A Yes, sir.
Q Neither were you on the ship on its way to Japan, were you?
A No, sir.
Q You were not at Onahama, Japan, the port of destination?
Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not
based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another
person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or
not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls
within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule. 28
Second. Petitioner contends that the genuineness and due execution of the
documents presented, i.e., Bill of-Lading, Certificate of Loading, Certificate of
Weight, Mates Receipt, were properly established by the testimony of its witness,
Ernesto Cayabyab, and that as a result, there is a prima facie presumption that
their contents are true.
This contention has no merit. The admission of the due execution and
genuineness of a document simply means that "the party whose signature it bears
admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his authority;
Execution can only refer to the actual making and delivery, but it cannot involve
other matters without enlarging its meaning beyond reason. The only object of the
rule was to enable a plaintiff to make out a prima facie, not a conclusive case, and
it cannot preclude a defendant from introducing any defense on the merits which
does not contradict the execution of the instrument introduced in evidence. 31
In this case, respondents presented evidence which casts doubt on the veracity of
these documents. Respondent Switzerland Insurance presented Export
Declaration No. 1131/85 (Exh. 11) 32 which petitioners own witness, Rogelio
Lumibao, prepared, 33 in which it was stated that the copper concentrates to be
transported to Japan had a gross weight of only 2,050 wet metric tons or 1,845 dry
metric tons, 10 percent more or less. 34 On the other hand, Certified Adjusters,
Inc., to which Switzerland Insurance had referred petitioners claim, prepared a
report which showed that a total of 2,451.630 wet metric tons of copper
concentrates were delivered at Poro Point. 35 As the report stated:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
It is to be pointed out that there were no actual weighing made at Benguet
Exploration, Inc.s site. The procedure done was that after weighing the trucks
before and after unloading at Philex Poro Point Installation, the weight of the load
was determined and entered on "Philex" Trip Ticket which was later on copied and
entered by the truck driver on Benguet Exploration, Inc.s Transfer Slip. 36
Considering the discrepancies in the various documents showing the actual
amount of copper concentrates transported to Poro Point and loaded in the vessel,
there is no evidence of the exact amount of copper concentrates shipped. Thus,
whatever presumption of regularity in the transactions might have risen from the
genuineness and due execution of the Bill of Lading, Certificate of Weight,
Certificate of Loading, and Mates Receipt was successfully rebutted by the
evidence presented by respondent Switzerland Insurance which showed
disparities in the actual weight of the cargo transported to Poro Point and loaded
on the vessel. This fact is compounded by the admissions made by Lumibao and
Cayabyab that they had no personal knowledge of the actual amount of copper
concentrates loaded on the vessel. Correctly did the Court of Appeals
Page
that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the
pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any
formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue
stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him." 29 In another case, we held that "When
the law makes use of the phrase genuineness and due execution of the
instrument it means nothing more than that the instrument is not spurious,
counterfeit, or of different import on its face from the one executed." 30 It is equally
true, however, that
21

Atty. Dela Pea
rule:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In the face of these admissions, appellants claim of loss or shortage is placed in
serious doubt, there being no other way of verifying the accuracy of the figures
indicated in appellants documentary evidence that could confirm the alleged loss
of 355.736 MT. Notwithstanding the figure stated in Bill of Lading No. PP/0-1
(Exhibit A) that 2,243.496 WMT of copper concentrates was loaded by appellant at
the port of origin, it should be stressed that this is merely prima facie evidence of
the receipt by the carrier of said cargo as described in the bill of lading. Thus, it has
been held that recitals in the bill of lading as to the goods shipped raise only a
rebuttable presumption that such goods were delivered for shipment and as
between the consignor and a receiving carrier, the fact must outweigh the recital
(Saludo v. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 498, 509 [1992]). Resultingly, the
admissions elicited from appellants witnesses that they could not confirm the
accuracy of the figures indicated in their documentary evidence with regard to the
actual weight of the cargo loaded at the port of origin and that unloaded at the port
of destination, in effect rebuts the presumption in favor of the figure indicated in the
bill of lading. 37chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Atty. Dela Pea
[G.R. NO. 160242 : May 17, 2005]

ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and MONARK
EQUIPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On March 13, 2001, Monark Equipment Corporation (MEC) filed a Complaint1 for a
sum of money with damages against the Asian Construction and Development
Corporation (ACDC) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. The
complaint alleged the following: ACDC leased Caterpillar generator sets and Amida
mobile floodlighting systems from MEC during the period of March 13 to July 15,
1998 but failed, despite demands, to pay the rentals therefor in the total amount
of P4,313,935.00; from July 14 to August 25, 1998, various equipments from MEC
were, likewise, leased by ACDC for the latter's power plant in Mauban, Quezon,
and that there was still a balance of P456,666.67; and ACDC also purchased and
took custody of various equipment parts from MEC for the agreed price
ofP237,336.20 which, despite demands, ACDC failed to pay.
MEC prayed that judgment be rendered in its favor, thus:
1. Ordering defendant to pay the plaintiff the total amount of FIVE MILLION
SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE [PESOS] & 86/100
(P5,071,335.86);
2. Ordering defendant to pay the plaintiff legal interest of 12% per annum on the
principal obligations in the total amount of FIVE MILLION SEVENTY-ONE
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE [PESOS] & 86/100
(P5,071,335.86) computed from the date the obligations became due until fully
paid;
Page
22
SECOND DIVISION
3. Ordering defendant to pay attorney's fees in the amount equivalent to 15% of

the amount of claim;
4. Ordering defendant to pay all costs of litigation.
Plaintiff prays for such other reliefs as may be just and equitable under the
premises.2
ACDC filed a motion to file and admit answer with third-party complaint against
Becthel Overseas Corporation (Becthel). In its answer, ACDC admitted its
indebtedness to MEC in the amount ofP5,071,335.86 but alleged the following
special and affirmative defenses:
5. Defendant has incurred an obligation with plaintiff, in the amount
of P5,071,335.86. But third-party defendant fails and refuses to pay its overdue
obligation in connection with the leased equipment used by defendant to comply
with its contracted services;
6. The equipment covered by the lease were all used in the construction project of
Becthel in Mauban, Quezon, and Expo in Pampanga and defendant was not yet
paid of its services that resulted to the non-payment of rentals on the leased
equipment.3
And by way of third-party complaint against Becthel as third-party defendant,
ACDC alleged that:
7. Third-party plaintiff repleads the foregoing allegations in the preceding
paragraphs as may be material and pertinent hereto;
8. Third-party BECTHEL OVERSEAS CORPORATION (herein called "Becthel") is
a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the United States of
America but may be served with summons at Barangay Cagsiay I, Mauban,
Quezon 4330, Philippines;
10. With the contracted work, third-party plaintiff rented the equipment of the
plaintiff Monark;
11. Third-party plaintiff rendered and complied with its contracted works with thirdparty defendant using plaintiff's (Monark) rented equipment. But, third-party
defendant BECTHEL did not pay for the services of third-party plaintiff
ASIAKONSTRUKT that resulted to the non-payment of plaintiff Monark's claim;
12. Despite repeated demands, third-party defendant failed and refused to pay its
overdue obligation to third-party plaintiff ASIAKONSTRUKT, and third-party
defendant needs to be impleaded in this case for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or other reliefs to off-set or to pay the amount of money claim of
plaintiff Monark on the leased equipment used in the Mauban, Quezon project in
the total amount of P456,666.67;
13. By reason thereof, third-party plaintiff was compelled to prosecute its claim
against third-party defendant and hired the services of undersigned counsel for an
attorney's fees of P500,000.00.4
ACDC prayed that judgment be rendered in its favor dismissing the complaint and
ordering the third-party defendant (Becthel) to pay P456,666.67 plus interest
thereon and attorney's fees.5
MEC opposed the motion of ACDC to file a third-party complaint against Becthel
on the ground that the defendant had already admitted its principal obligation to
MEC in the amount of P5,071,335.86; the transaction between it and ACDC, on the
one hand, and between ACDC and Becthel, on the other, were independent
transactions. Furthermore, the allowance of the third-party complaint would result
in undue delays in the disposition of the case.6
Page
9. Third-party defendant Becthel contracted the services of third-party plaintiff to do

construction work at its Mauban, Quezon project using the leased equipment of
plaintiff Monark;
23

Atty. Dela Pea
MEC then filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging therein that there was no
genuine issue as to the obligation of ACDC to MEC in the total amount
of P5,071,335.86, the only issue for the trial court's resolution being the amount of
attorney's fees and costs of litigation.7
ACDC opposed the motion for summary judgment, alleging that there was a
genuine issue with respect to the amount of P5,071,335.86 being claimed by MEC,
and that it had a third-party complaint against Becthel in connection with the reliefs
sought against it which had to be litigated.8
In its reply, MEC alleged that the demand of ACDC in its special and affirmative
defenses partook of the nature of a negative pregnant, and that there was a need
for a hearing on its claim for damages.
On August 2, 2001, the trial court issued a Resolution denying the motion of ACDC
for leave to file a third-party complaint and granting the motion of MEC, which the
trial court considered as a motion for a judgment on the pleadings. The fallo of the
resolution reads:
ACCORDINGLY, this Court finds defendant Asian Construction and Development
Corporation liable to pay plaintiff Monark Equipment Corporation and is hereby
ordered to pay plaintiff the amount of FIVE MILLION SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND
AND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE & 86/100 PESOS (P5,071,335.86) plus
12% interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.9
ACDC appealed the resolution to the Court of Appeals (CA), alleging that '
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO FILE AND ADMIT
ANSWER WITH THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT;
On July 18, 2001, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the appeal and affirming
the assailed decision. The appellate court ruled that since MEC had prayed for
judgment on the pleadings, it thereby waived its claim for damages other than the
amount of P5,071,335.86; hence, there was no longer a genuine issue to be
resolved by the court which necessitated trial. The appellate court sustained the
disallowance of the third-party complaint of ACDC against Becthel on the ground
that the transaction between the said parties did not arise out of the same
transaction on which MEC's claim was based.
Its motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied, ACDC, now the
petitioner, filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, and raises the
following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT IS PROPER; AND
Page
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE THIRD-PARTY

COMPLAINT AND ORDERED DEFENDANT TO PAY THE AMOUNT
OF P5,071,335.86 PLUS INTEREST OF 12% PER ANNUM.10
24

Atty. Dela Pea
As alleged in the Answer with Third-Party Complaint, it is admitted then by
respondent, for purposes of judgment on the pleadings, that failure to pay
respondent was in connection of Becthel Overseas Corporation's failure to pay its
obligation to petitioner and that the equipment leased was used in connection with
the Becthel Overseas Corporation project.
This tendered issue could not just be disregarded in the light of the third-party
complaint filed by herein petitioner and third-party plaintiff which, as argued in the
first discussion/argument, is proper and should have been given due course.14
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 11. Third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint. - A third (fourth, etc.) - party complaint
is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not
a party to the action, called the third (fourth, etc.) - party defendant, for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's
claim.
II. WHETHER OR NOT JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS IS PROPER.11

Citing the rulings of this Court in Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of
Appeals12 and British Airways v. Court of Appeals,13 the petitioner avers that the CA
erred in ruling that in denying its motion for leave to file a third-party complaint, the
RTC acted in accordance with the Rules of Court and case law. The petitioner
maintains that it raised genuine issues in its answer; hence, it was improper for the
trial court to render judgment on the pleadings:
With due respect, the judgment on the pleadings affirmed by the Court of Appeals
is not, likewise, proper considering that the Answer with Third-Party Complaint,
although it admitted the obligation to respondent, tendered an issue of whether the
respondent's claim is connected with the third-party claim.
Furthermore, Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court may
render judgment on the pleadings, as follows:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue,
or, otherwise, admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the
court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. However, in
actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation,
the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
The purpose of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court is to permit a defendant to
assert an independent claim against a third-party which he, otherwise, would
assert in another action, thus preventing multiplicity of suits. All the rights of the
parties concerned would then be adjudicated in one proceeding. This is a rule of
procedure and does not create a substantial right. Neither does it abridge, enlarge,
or nullify the substantial rights of any litigant.15 This right to file a third-party
complaint against a third-party rests in the discretion of the trial court. The third-
A prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that some substantive basis for a
third-party claim be found to exist, whether the basis be one of indemnity,
subrogation, contribution or other substantive right.17 The bringing of a third-party
defendant is proper if he would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant or both
for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against the original defendant, although the
third-party defendant's liability arises out of another transaction.18 The defendant
may implead another as third-party defendant (a) on an allegation of liability of the
latter to the defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief;
(b) on the ground of direct liability of the third-party defendant to the plaintiff; or (c)
the liability of the third-party defendant to both the plaintiff and the
defendant.19 There must be a causal connection between the claim of the plaintiff
in his complaint and a claim for contribution, indemnity or other relief of the
defendant against the third-party defendant. In Capayas v. Court of First
Instance,20 the Court made out the following tests: (1) whether it arises out of the
same transaction on which the plaintiff's claim is based; or whether the third-party
claim, although arising out of another or different contract or transaction, is
connected with the plaintiff's claim; (2) whether the third-party defendant would be
liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against
the original defendant, although the third-party defendant's liability arises out of
another transaction; and (3) whether the third-party defendant may assert any
defenses which the third-party plaintiff has or may have to the plaintiff's claim.
The third-party complaint does not have to show with certainty that there will be
recovery against the third-party defendant, and it is sufficient that pleadings show
possibility of recovery.21 In determining the sufficiency of the third-party complaint,
the allegations in the original complaint and the third-party complaint must be
examined.22 A third-party complaint must allege facts which prima facieshow that
the defendant is entitled to contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief from
the third-party defendant.23
It bears stressing that common liability is the very essence for contribution.
Contribution is a payment made by each, or by any of several having a common
liability of his share in the damage suffered or in the money necessarily paid by
Page
party complaint is actually independent of, separate and distinct from the plaintiff's
complaint, such that were it not for the rule, it would have to be filed separately
from the original complaint.16
25

Atty. Dela Pea
one of the parties in behalf of the other or others.24 The rule on common liability is
fundamental in the action for contribution.25 The test to determine whether the
claim for indemnity in a third-party complaint is, whether it arises out of the same
transaction on which the plaintiff's claim is based, or the third-party plaintiff's claim,
although arising out of another or different contract or transaction, is connected
with the plaintiff's claim.26
In this case, the claims of the respondent, as plaintiff in the RTC, against the
petitioner as defendant therein, arose out of the contracts of lease and sale; such
transactions are different and separate from those between Becthel and the
petitioner as third-party plaintiff for the construction of the latter's project in
Mauban, Quezon, where the equipment leased from the respondent was used by
the petitioner. The controversy between the respondent and the petitioner, on one
hand, and that between the petitioner and Becthel, on the other, are thus entirely
distinct from each other. There is no showing in the proposed third-party complaint
that the respondent knew or approved the use of the leased equipment by the
petitioner for the said project in Quezon. Becthel cannot invoke any defense the
petitioner had or may have against the claims of the respondent in its complaint,
because the petitioner admitted its liabilities to the respondent for the amount
of P5,075,335.86. The barefaced fact that the petitioner used the equipment it
leased from the respondent in connection with its project with Becthel does not
provide a substantive basis for the filing of a third-party complaint against the latter.
There is no causal connection between the claim of the respondent for the rental
and the balance of the purchase price of the equipment and parts sold and leased
to the petitioner, and the failure of Becthel to pay the balance of its account to the
petitioner after the completion of the project in Quezon.27
We note that in its third-party complaint, the petitioner alleged that Becthel should
be ordered to pay the balance of its account of P456,666.67, so that the petitioner
could pay the same to the respondent. However, contrary to its earlier plea for the
admission of its third-party complaint against Becthel, the petitioner also sought the
dismissal of the respondent's complaint. The amount ofP456,666.67 it sought to
collect from Becthel would not be remitted to the respondent after all.
The rulings of this Court in Allied Banking Corporation and British Airways are not
applicable in this case since the factual backdrops in the said cases are different.
'In the words of private respondent, he "[s]eeks to transfer liability for the default
imputed against him by the petitioner to the proposed third-party defendants
because of their tortious acts which prevented him from performing his
obligations." Thus, if at the outset the issue appeared to be a simple maker's
liability on a promissory note, it became complex by the rendition of the aforestated
decision.28
In British Airways, the Court allowed the third-party complaint of British Airways
against its agent, the Philippine Airlines, on the plaintiff's complaint regarding his
luggage, considering that a contract of carriage was involved. The Court ruled,
thus:
Undeniably, for the loss of his luggage, Mahtani is entitled to damages from BA, in
view of their contract of carriage. Yet, BA adamantly disclaimed its liability and
instead imputed it to PAL which the latter naturally denies. In other words, BA and
PAL are blaming each other for the incident.
In resolving this issue, it is worth observing that the contract of air transportation
was exclusively between Mahtani and BA, the latter merely endorsing the Manila to
Hongkong leg of the former's journey to PAL, as its subcontractor or agent. In fact,
the fourth paragraph of the "Conditions of Contracts" of the ticket issued by BA to
Mahtani confirms that the contract was one of continuous air transportation from
Manila to Bombay.
"4. xxx carriage to be performed hereunder by several successive carriers is
regarded as a single operation."
Page
In Allied Banking Corporation, Joselito Yujuico obtained a loan from General Bank
and Trust Company. The Central Bank of the Philippines ordered the liquidation of
the Bank. In a Memorandum Agreement between the liquidation of the Bank and
Allied Banking Corporation, the latter acquired the receivables from Yujuico. Allied
Banking Corporation then sued Yujuico for the collection of his loan, and the latter
filed a third-party complaint against the Central Bank, alleging that by reason of its
tortious interference with the affairs of the General Bank and Trust Company, he
was prevented from performing his obligation under the loan. This Court allowed
the third-party complaint based on the claim of the defendant therein, thus:
26

Atty. Dela Pea
Prescinding from the above discussion, it is undisputed that PAL, in transporting
Mahtani from Manila to Hongkong acted as the agent of BA.
Parenthetically, the Court of Appeals should have been cognizant of the wellsettled rule that an agent is also responsible for any negligence in the performance
of its function and is liable for damages which the principal may suffer by reason of
its negligent act. Hence, the Court of Appeals erred when it opined that BA, being
the principal, had no cause of action against PAL, its agent or sub-contractor.
Also, it is worth mentioning that both BA and PAL are members of the International
Air Transport Association (IATA), wherein member airlines are regarded as agents
of each other in the issuance of the tickets and other matters pertaining to their
relationship. Therefore, in the instant case, the contractual relationship between BA
and PAL is one of agency, the former being the principal, since it was the one
which issued the confirmed ticket, and the latter the agent.29
It goes without saying that the denial of the petitioner's motion with leave to file a
third-party complaint against Becthel is without prejudice to its right to file a
separate complaint against the latter.
Considering that the petitioner admitted its liability for the principal claim of the
respondent in its Answer with Third-Party Complaint, the trial court did not err in
rendering judgment on the pleadings against it.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Page
27

Atty. Dela Pea
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 181235 : July 22, 2009]
BANCO DE ORO-EPCI, INC. (formerly Equitable PCI Bank), Petitioner, v. JOHN
TANSIPEK,Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69130 dated 18 August 2006 and the Resolution of
the same court dated 9 January 2008.
The facts of the case are as follows:
J. O. Construction, Inc. (JOCI), a domestic corporation engaged in the construction
business in Cebu City, filed a complaint against Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank (PCIB) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City docketed as
Civil Case No. 97-508. The Complaint alleges that JOCI entered into a contract
with Duty Free Philippines, Inc. for the construction of a Duty Free Shop in
Mandaue City. As actual construction went on, progress billings were made.
Payments were received by JOCI directly or through herein respondent John
Tansipek, its authorized collector. Payments received by respondent Tansipek were
PCIB filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the grounds that (1) an
indispensable party was not impleaded, and (2) therein plaintiff JOCI had no cause
of action against PCIB. The RTC denied PCIB's Motion to Dismiss.
PCIB filed its answer alleging as defenses that (1) JOCI had clothed Tansipek with
authority to act as its agent, and was therefore estopped from denying the same;
(2) JOCI had no cause of action against PCIB; (3) failure to implead Tansipek
rendered the proceedings taken after the filing of the complaint void; (4) PCIB's act
of accepting the deposit was fully justified by established bank practices; (5)
JOCI's claim was barred by laches; and (6) the damages alleged by JOCI were
hypothetical and speculative. PCIB incorporated in said Answer its counterclaims
for exemplary damages in the amount of P400,000.00, and litigation expenses and
attorney's fees in the amount ofP400,000.00.
PCIB likewise moved for leave for the court to admit the former's third-party
complaint against respondent Tansipek. The third-party complaint alleged that
respondent Tansipek was a depositor at its Wilson Branch, San Juan, Metro
Manila, where he maintained Account No. 5703-03538-3 in his name and/or that of
his wife, Anita. Respondent Tansipek had presented to PCIB a signed copy of the
Minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors of JOCI stating the resolution that
Checks payable to J.O. Construction, Inc. may be deposited to Account No. 570303538-3 under the name of John and/or Anita Tansipek, maintained at PCIB,
Wilson Branch.2
Page
initially remitted to JOCI. However, payment through PNB Check No. 0000302572
in the amount of P4,050,136.51 was not turned over to JOCI. Instead, respondent
Tansipek endorsed said check and deposited the same to his account in PCIB,
Wilson Branch, Wilson Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. PCIB allowed
the said deposit, despite the fact that the check was crossed for the deposit to
payee's account only, and despite the alleged lack of authority of respondent
Tansipek to endorse said check. PCIB refused to pay JOCI the full amount of the
check despite demands made by the latter. JOCI prayed for the payment of the
amount of the check (P4,050,136.51), P500,000.00 in attorney's fees, P100,000.00
in expenses, P50,000.00 for costs of suit, and P500,000.00 in exemplary
damages.
28

Atty. Dela Pea
Respondent Tansipek had also presented a copy of the Articles of Incorporation of
JOCI showing that he and his wife, Anita, were incorporators of JOCI, with Anita as
Treasurer. In the third-party complaint, PCIB prayed for subrogation and payment
of attorney's fees in the sum of P400,000.00.
PCIB filed a Motion to Admit Amended Third-Party Complaint. The amendment
consisted in the correction of the caption, so that PCIB appeared as Third-Party
Plaintiff and Tansipek as Third-Party Defendant.
Upon Motion, respondent Tansipek was granted time to file his Answer to the ThirdParty Complaint. He was, however, declared in default for failure to do so. The
Motion to Reconsider the Default Order was denied.
Respondent Tansipek filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals
assailing the Default Order and the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration. The
Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47727. On 29 May 1998, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the Petition for failure to attach the assailed Orders. On 28
September 1998, the Court of Appeals denied respondent Tansipek's Motion for
Reconsideration for having been filed out of time.
Pre-trial on the main case ensued, wherein JOCI and PCIB limited the issues as
follows:
1. Whether or not the defendant bank erred in allowing the deposit of Check No.
0302572 (Exh. "A") in the amount of P4,050,136.51 drawn in favor of plaintiff JO
Construction, Inc. in John Tansipek's account when such check was crossed and
clearly marked for payee's account only.
2. Whether the alleged board resolution and the articles of Incorporation are
genuine and a valid defense against plaintiff's effort to collect the amount
of P4,050,136.51.
On 14 July 2000, the RTC promulgated its Decision in Civil Case No. 97-508, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
On the third party complaint, third-party defendant John Tansipek is ordered to pay
the third-party plaintiff Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank all amounts said
defendant/third-party plaintiff shall have to pay to the plaintiff on account of this
case.3
Respondent Tansipek appealed the Decision to the Court of Appeals. The case
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 69130. Respondent Tansipek assigned the
following alleged errors:
a) The trial court's decision upholding the order of default and the consequent exparte reception of appellee's evidence was anchored on erroneous and baseless
conclusion that:
1) The original reglementary period to plead has already expired.
2) The ten day extended period to answer has likewise expired.
3) There is no need to pass upon a second motion to plead much less, any need
for a new motion for extended period to plead.
b) The trial court erred in utterly depriving the appellant of his day in court and in
depriving constitutional, substantive and procedural due process premised solely
on pure and simple technicality which never existed and are imaginary and illusory.
c) The trial court erred in ordering the third-party defendant-appellant John
Tansipek to pay the third party plaintiff-appellee PCIBank all amounts said bank
shall have to pay to the plaintiff-appellee by way of subrogation since appellant if
allowed to litigate in the trial court, would have obtained a favorable judgment as
he has good, valid and meritorious defenses.4
Page
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff [JOCI] and

against the defendant bank [PCIB] ordering the latter to pay to the plaintiff the sum
of P4,050,136.51 with interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from
the filing of this complaint until fully paid plus costs of suit. The other damages
claimed by the plaintiff are denied for being speculative.
29

Atty. Dela Pea
On 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Decision finding that
it was an error for the trial court to have acted on PCIB's motion to declare
respondent Tansipek in default. The Court of Appeals thus remanded the case to
the RTC for further proceedings, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The decision
relative to the third party complaint is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
ordered REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings on the third party
complaint.5
The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of PCIB in a
Resolution dated 9 January 2008.
Petitioner Banco de Oro-EPCI, Inc., as successor-in-interest to PCIB, filed the
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the above Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, and laying down a lone issue for this Court's
consideration:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS CAN REVERSE ITS DECISION
HANDED DOWN EIGHT YEARS BEFORE.6
To recapitulate, upon being declared in default, respondent Tansipek filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the Default Order. Upon denial thereof, Tansipek filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed for failure to
attach the assailed Orders. Respondent Tansipek's Motion for Reconsideration
with the Court of Appeals was denied for having been filed out of time. Respondent
Tansipek did not appeal said denial to this Court.
Respondent Tansipek's remedy against the Order of Default was erroneous from
the very beginning. Respondent Tansipek should have filed a Motion to Lift Order
of Default, and not a Motion for Reconsideration, pursuant to Section 3(b), Rule 9
of the Rules of Court:
(b) Relief from order of default.' A party declared in default may at any time after
notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order
of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud,
A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different from an ordinary motion in that the
Motion should be verified; and must show fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect, and meritorious defenses.7The allegations of (1) fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable neglect, and (2) of meritorious defenses must concur.8
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that respondent Tansipek's Motion
for Reconsideration may be treated as a Motion to Lift Order of Default, his Petition
for Certiorari on the denial thereof has already been dismissed with finality by the
Court of Appeals. Respondent Tansipek did not appeal said ruling of the Court of
Appeals to this Court. The dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari assailing the
denial of respondent Tansipek's Motion constitutes a bar to the retrial of the same
issue of default under the doctrine of the law of the case.
Page
accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense.

In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions
as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.
30

Atty. Dela Pea
As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the
law of the case whether that decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the party
deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing.
Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will be regarded
as the law of the case on a subsequent appeal, although the questions are not
expressly treated in the opinion of the court, as the presumption is that all the facts
in the case bearing on the point decided have received due consideration whether
all or none of them are mentioned in the opinion. (Emphasis supplied.)
The issue of the propriety of the Order of Default had already been adjudicated in
Tansipek's Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. As such, this issue
cannot be readjudicated in Tansipek's appeal of the Decision of the RTC on the
main case. Once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case, whether
or not said decision is erroneous.10 Having been rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction acting within its authority, the judgment may no longer be altered even
at the risk of legal infirmities and errors it may contain.11
In People v. Pinuila,9 we held that:

"Law of the case" has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal.
More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case
continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not,
so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the
facts of the case before the court.
It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the evidence on a
second or succeeding appeal is substantially the same as that on the first or
preceding appeal, all matters, questions, points, or issues adjudicated on the prior
appeal are the law of the case on all subsequent appeals and will not be
considered or readjudicated therein.
x
Respondent Tansipek counters that the doctrine of the law of the case is not
applicable, inasmuch as a Petition for Certiorari is not an appeal. Respondent
Tansipek further argues that the Doctrine of the Law of the Case applies only when
the appellate court renders a decision on the merits, and not when such appeal
was denied due to technicalities.
We are not persuaded.
In Buenviaje v. Court of Appeals,12 therein respondent Cottonway Marketing
Corporation filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court assailing the Decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering, inter alia, the
reinstatement of therein petitioners and the payment of backwages from the time
their salaries were withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement. The Petition
for Certiorari was dismissed by this Court. The subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied. However, the Labor Arbiter then issued an
Order limiting the amount of backwages that was due to petitioners. The NLRC
reversed this Order, but the Court of Appeals reinstated the same. This Court,
applying the Doctrine of the Law of the Case, held:
Furthermore, there is no substantial distinction between an appeal and a Petition

for Certiorari when it comes to the application of the Doctrine of the Law of the
Case. The doctrine is founded on the policy of ending litigation. The doctrine is
necessary to enable the appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily and
efficiently, which would be impossible if a question once considered and decided
by it were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent
appeal.14
Likewise, to say that the Doctrine of the Law the Case applies only when the
appellate court renders a decision on the merits would be putting a premium on the
fault or negligence of the party losing the previous appeal. In the case at bar,
respondent Tansipek would be awarded (1) for his failure to attach the necessary
requirements to his Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals; (2) for his
failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration in time; and (3) for his failure to appeal
the Decision of the Court of Appeals with this Court. The absurdity of such a
situation is clearly apparent.
Page
The decision of the NLRC dated March 26, 1996 has become final and executory
upon the dismissal by this Court of Cottonway's petition for certiorari assailing said
decision and the denial of its motion for reconsideration. Said judgment may no
longer be disturbed or modified by any court or tribunal. It is a fundamental rule
that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable, and any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final
and executory judgment is void, including the entire proceedings held for that
purpose. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can
have it executed as a matter of right, and the issuance of a writ of execution
becomes a ministerial duty of the court. A decision that has attained finality
becomes the law of the case regardless of any claim that it is erroneous. The writ
of execution must therefore conform to the judgment to be executed and adhere
strictly to the very essential particulars.13 (Emphases supplied.)rbl
r l l lbrr
31

Atty. Dela Pea
It is important to note that a party declared in default - respondent Tansipek in this
case - is not barred from appealing from the judgment on the main case, whether
or not he had previously filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default, and
regardless of the result of the latter and the appeals therefrom. However, the
appeal should be based on the Decision's being contrary to law or the evidence
already presented, and not on the alleged invalidity of the default order.15
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69130
dated 18 August 2006 and the Resolution of the same court dated 9 January 2008
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City in Civil Case No. 97-508 dated 14 July 2000 is hereby
REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page
32

Atty. Dela Pea
On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Civil
Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Ferdinand E. Marcos,
represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to RA 1379 1 in
relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 2, 3 14 4 and 14-A. 5
In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356
million (now estimated to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest)
deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously
held by the following five account groups, using various foreign foundations in
certain Swiss banks:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts;
EN BANC
(2) Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-Spinus-Avertina Foundation accounts;
[G.R. No. 152154. July 15, 2003.]
(3) Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts;
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE

SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), FERDINAND E. MARCOS
(REPRESENTED BY HIS ESTATE/HEIRS: IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA
IMELDA [IMEE] MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. AND
IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA) AND IMELDA ROMUALDEZ
MARCOS, Respondents.
(4) Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts and
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to (1)
set aside the Resolution dated January 31, 2002 issued by the Special First
Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the
Philippines v. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et. al., and (2) reinstate its earlier decision
dated September 19, 2000 which forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (Republic) the amount held in escrow in the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) in the aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31,
2002.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
(5) Maler Foundation accounts.

In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in
treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couples salaries, other lawful income
as well as income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are
frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by
virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG.
On October 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc,
Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. filed their answer.
Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental
Agreements 6 dated December 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children
and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the
assets of the Marcos family. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children filed a
motion dated December 7, 1995 for the approval of said agreements and for the
enforcement thereof.
The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate,
cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the
Marcos family under the conditions contained therein. The aforementioned General
Agreement specified in one of its premises or "whereas clauses" the fact that
Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the

General/Supplemental Agreements. Respondent Ferdinand, Jr. was presented as
witness for the purpose of establishing the partial implementation of said
agreements.
motion for summary judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356 million,
based on the following grounds:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Page
petitioner "obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21,
1990, that the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million)
belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain
conditionalities are met. . . ." The said decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of Zurich District Attorney Peter Consandey, granting
petitioners request for legal assistance. 7 Consandey declared the various
deposits in the name of the enumerated foundations to be of illegal provenance
and ordered that they be frozen to await the final verdict in favor of the parties
entitled to restitution.
33

Atty. Dela Pea
I
THE ESSENTIAL FACTS WHICH WARRANT THE FORFEITURE OF THE FUNDS
SUBJECT OF THE PETITION UNDER R.A. NO. 1379 ARE ADMITTED BY
RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PLEADINGS AND OTHER SUBMISSIONS MADE IN
THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDING.
II
On October 18, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or
judgment on the pleadings. Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition thereto
which was later adopted by respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and
Ferdinand, Jr.
RESPONDENTS ADMISSION MADE DURING THE PRE-TRIAL THAT THEY DO

NOT HAVE ANY INTEREST OR OWNERSHIP OVER THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF
THE ACTION FOR FORFEITURE TENDERS NO GENUINE ISSUE OR
CONTROVERSY AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT IN THE PRESENT ACTION,
THUS WARRANTING THE RENDITION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 8
In its resolution dated November 20, 1997, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners
motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that
the motion to approve the compromise agreement" (took) precedence over the
motion for summary judgment."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner contended that, after the pre-trial conference, certain facts were
established, warranting a summary judgment on the funds sought to be
forfeited.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation on May 26, 1998 claiming she was
not a party to the motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement and that she
owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate.
Meanwhile, on August 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the District Attorney in Zurich,
Switzerland, an additional request for the immediate transfer of the deposits to an
escrow account in the PNB. The request was granted. On appeal by the Marcoses,
the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in a decision dated December 10, 1997, upheld
the ruling of the District Attorney of Zurich granting the request for the transfer of
the funds. In 1998, the funds were remitted to the Philippines in escrow.
Subsequently, respondent Marcos children moved that the funds be placed in
custodia legis because the deposit in escrow in the PNB was allegedly in danger of
dissipation by petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, in its resolution dated September 8,
1998, granted the motion.
After the pre-trial and the issuance of the pre-trial order and supplemental pre-trial
order dated October 28, 1999 and January 21, 2000, respectively, the case was
set for trial. After several resettings, Petitioner, on March 10, 2000, filed another
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition to the petitioners motion for
summary judgment, which opposition was later adopted by her co-respondents
Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.
On March 24, 2000, a hearing on the motion for summary judgment was
conducted.
In a decision 9 dated September 19, 2000, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioners
motion for summary judgment:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
CONCLUSION
There is no issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence.
The Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.
The Swiss deposits which were transmitted to and now held in escrow at the PNB
are deemed unlawfully acquired as ill-gotten wealth.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Republic of the

Philippines and against the respondents, declaring the Swiss deposits which were
transferred to and now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the
total aggregate value equivalent to US$627,608,544.95 as of August 31, 2000
together with the increments thereof forfeited in favor of the State. 10
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a motion for reconsideration dated September 26,
2000. Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. filed their own motion for
reconsideration dated October 5, 2000. Mrs. Araneta filed a manifestation dated
October 4, 2000 adopting the motion for reconsideration of Mrs. Marcos, Mrs.
Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.
Page
DISPOSITION
34

Atty. Dela Pea
REQUISITES OF SECTIONS 2 AND 3 OF R.A. NO. 1379:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CATEGORICALLY ADMITTED NOT ONLY THE
PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND IMELDA R.
MARCOS AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS BUT ALSO THE EXTENT OF THEIR
SALARIES AS SUCH PUBLIC OFFICIALS, WHO UNDER THE CONSTITUTION,
WERE PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN THE MANAGEMENT OF
FOUNDATIONS.
B. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ALSO ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF THE
SWISS DEPOSITS AND THEIR OWNERSHIP THEREOF:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Subsequently, petitioner filed its opposition thereto.
1. ADMISSIONS IN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ANSWER;
In a resolution 11 dated January 31, 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed its

September 19, 2000 decision, thus denying petitioners motion for summary
judgment:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
2. ADMISSION IN THE GENERAL/SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENTS THEY

SIGNED AND SOUGHT TO IMPLEMENT;
3. ADMISSION IN A MANIFESTATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT IMELDA R.
MARCOS AND IN THE MOTION TO PLACE THE RES IN CUSTODIA LEGIS;
AND
CONCLUSION
In sum, the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that
the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal
proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds in
escrow from the Swiss Banks.
The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed to have
been established and our judgment thereon, perforce, must also have been without
basis.
WHEREFORE, the decision of this Court dated September 19, 2000 is
reconsidered and set aside, and this case is now being set for further proceedings.
12
Hence, the instant petition. In filing the same, petitioner argues that the
Sandiganbayan, in reversing its September 19, 2000 decision, committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that
I
PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO PROVE ITS CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
4. ADMISSION IN THE UNDERTAKING TO PAY THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS.

C. PETITIONER HAS PROVED THE EXTENT OF THE LEGITIMATE INCOME OF
FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND IMELDA R. MARCOS AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS.
D. PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF
UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED WEALTH.
II
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER SINCE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE
NOT RAISED ANY GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT CONSIDERING THAT:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DEFENSE THAT SWISS DEPOSITS WERE
LAWFULLY ACQUIRED DOES NOT ONLY FAIL TO TENDER AN ISSUE BUT IS
CLEARLY A SHAM; AND
B. IN SUBSEQUENTLY DISCLAIMING OWNERSHIP OF THE SWISS DEPOSITS,
III
THE FOREIGN FOUNDATIONS NEED NOT BE IMPLEADED.
IV
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN REVERSING HIMSELF ON THE GROUND THAT ORIGINAL
COPIES OF THE AUTHENTICATED SWISS DECISIONS AND THEIR
"AUTHENTICATED TRANSLATIONS" HAVE NOT BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE
COURT, WHEN EARLIER THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS QUOTED EXTENSIVELY
A PORTION OF THE TRANSLATION OF ONE OF THESE SWISS DECISIONS IN
HIS PONENCIA DATED JULY 29, 1999 WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO
RELEASE ONE HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION US DOLLARS ($150,000,000.00) TO
THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS.
V
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED THEIR
OBJECTION TO THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE SWISS FEDERAL SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS. 13
Petitioner, in the main, asserts that nowhere in the respondents motions for
reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration were the authenticity,
accuracy and admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever challenged. Otherwise
stated, it was incorrect for the Sandiganbayan to use the issue of lack of
authenticated translations of the decisions of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court as
the basis for reversing itself because respondents themselves never raised this
issue in their motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion for
reconsideration. Furthermore, this particular issue relating to the translation of the
Swiss court decisions could not be resurrected anymore because said decisions
had been previously utilized by the Sandiganbayan itself in resolving a "decisive
issue" before it.
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for questioning the non-production of the
authenticated translations of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court decisions as this
Page
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ABANDONED THEIR SHAM DEFENSE OF

LEGITIMATE ACQUISITION, AND THIS FURTHER JUSTIFIED THE RENDITION
OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
35

Atty. Dela Pea
was a marginal and technical matter that did not diminish by any measure the
conclusiveness and strength of what had been proven and admitted before the
Sandiganbayan, that is, that the funds deposited by the Marcoses constituted illgotten wealth and thus belonged to the Filipino people.
In compliance with the order of this Court, Mrs. Marcos filed her comment to the
petition on May 22, 2002. After several motions for extension which were all
granted, the comment of Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. and the separate
comment of Mrs. Araneta were filed on May 27, 2002.
Mrs. Marcos asserts that the petition should be denied on the following
grounds:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A.
PETITIONER HAS A PLAIN, SPEEDY, AND ADEQUATE REMEDY AT THE
SANDIGANBAYAN.
B.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN SETTING THE
CASE FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. 14
Mrs. Marcos contends that petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law in view of the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated
January 31, 2000 directing petitioner to submit the authenticated translations of the
Swiss decisions. Instead of availing of said remedy, petitioner now elevates the
matter to this Court. According to Mrs. Marcos, a petition for certiorariwhich does
not comply with the requirements of the rules may be dismissed. Since petitioner
has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, that is, to proceed to trial and submit
authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions, its petition before this Court must
be dismissed. Corollarily, the Sandiganbayans ruling to set the case for further
proceedings cannot and should not be considered a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment.
Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr., in their comment, prayed for the
dismissal of the petition on the grounds that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(A)
BY THE TIME PETITIONER FILED ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON 10 MARCH 2000, IT WAS ALREADY BARRED FROM DOING SO.
(2) By its positive acts and express admissions prior to filing the Motion for
Summary Judgment on 10 March 1990, petitioner had legally bound itself to go to
trial on the basis of existing issues. Thus, it clearly waived whatever right it had to
move for summary judgment.
Page
(1) The Motion for Summary Judgment was based on private respondents Answer
and other documents that had long been in the records of the case. Thus, by the
time the Motion was filed on 10 March 2000, estoppel by laches had already set in
against petitioner.
36

Atty. Dela Pea
funds has not yet attached. There can, therefore, be no premature forfeiture of the
funds.
(C)
IT WAS ONLY BY ARBITRARILY ISOLATING AND THEN TAKING CERTAIN
STATEMENTS MADE BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OUT OF CONTEXT THAT
PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO TREAT THESE AS "JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS"
SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE AND THEREAFTER A
CONCLUSIVE CASE TO JUSTIFY THE FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS.
(B)
EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT LEGALLY BARRED FROM
FILING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE SANDIGANBAYAN IS
CORRECT IN RULING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT YET ESTABLISHED A
PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR THE FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS.
(1) Republic Act No. 1379, the applicable law, is a penal statute. As such, its
provisions, particularly the essential elements stated in section 3 thereof, are
mandatory in nature. These should be strictly construed against petitioner and
liberally in favor of private respondents.
(2) Petitioner has failed to establish the third and fourth essential elements in
Section 3 of R.A. 1379 with respect to the identification, ownership, and
approximate amount of the property which the Marcos couple allegedly "acquired
during their incumbency" .
(a) Petitioner has failed to prove that the Marcos couple "acquired" or own the
Swiss funds.
(b) Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the fact of acquisition has been
proven, petitioner has categorically admitted that it has no evidence showing how
much of the Swiss funds was acquired "during the incumbency" of the Marcos
couple from 31 December 1965 to 25 February 1986.
(3) In contravention of the essential element stated in Section 3 (e) of R.A. 1379,
petitioner has failed to establish the other proper earnings and income from
legitimately acquired property of the Marcos couple over and above their
government salaries.
(4) Since petitioner failed to prove the three essential elements provided in
paragraphs (c) 15 (d) 16 and (e) 17 of Section 3, R.A. 1379, the inescapable
conclusion is that the prima facie presumption of unlawful acquisition of the Swiss
(1) Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the General and
Supplemental Agreements, as well as the other written and testimonial statements
submitted in relation thereto, are expressly barred from being admissible in
evidence against private respondents.
(2) Had petitioner bothered to weigh the alleged admissions together with the other
statements on record, there would be a demonstrable showing that no such
judicial admissions were made by private respondents.
(D)
SINCE PETITIONER HAS NOT (YET) PROVEN ALL THE ESSENTIAL
ELEMENTS TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR FORFEITURE, AND
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT MADE ANY JUDICIAL ADMISSION THAT
WOULD HAVE FREED IT FROM ITS BURDEN OF PROOF, THE
SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
DENYING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. CERTIORARI,
THEREFORE, DOES NOT LIE, ESPECIALLY AS THIS COURT IS NOT A TRIER
OF FACTS. 18
For her part, Mrs. Araneta, in her comment to the petition, claims that obviously
petitioner is unable to comply with a very plain requirement of respondent
Sandiganbayan. The instant petition is allegedly an attempt to elevate to this Court
matters, issues and incidents which should be properly threshed out at the
Sandiganbayan. To respondent Mrs. Araneta, all other matters, save that
pertaining to the authentication of the translated Swiss Court decisions, are
irrelevant and impertinent as far as this Court is concerned. Respondent Mrs.
Araneta manifests that she is as eager as respondent Sandiganbayan or any
interested person to have the Swiss Court decisions officially translated in our
known language. She says the authenticated official English version of the Swiss
Court decisions should be presented. This should stop all speculations on what
indeed is contained therein. Thus, respondent Mrs. Araneta prays that the petition
PROPRIETY OF PETITIONERS
ACTION FOR CERTIORARI
But before this Court discusses the more relevant issues, the question regarding
the propriety of petitioner Republics action for certiorari under Rule 65 19 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolution dated
January 21, 2002 should be threshed out.
Page
be denied for lack of merit and for raising matters which, in elaborated fashion, are
impertinent and improper before this Court.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
37

Atty. Dela Pea
at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all
parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be
relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since the
government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The
definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is
proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct,
let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these funds and other assets be
finally determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying
technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks. 23
We thus take cognizance of this case and settle with finality all the issues therein.
At the outset, we would like to stress that we are treating this case as an exception
to the general rule governing petitions for certiorari. Normally, decisions of the
Sandiganbayan are brought before this Court under Rule 45, not Rule 65. 20 But
where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense public interest, public policy
and deep historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the
existence and availability of the remedy of appeal. 21
ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT
One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino Government in February 1986 was the
recovery of the unexplained or ill-gotten wealth reputedly amassed by former
President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, their relatives, friends and business
associates. Thus, the very first Executive Order (EO) issued by then President
Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to office after the ouster of the Marcoses
was EO No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986. It created the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and charged it with the task of
assisting the President in the "recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad,
including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities
owned or controlled by them during his administration, directly or through
nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their
powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship." The urgency of this
undertaking was tersely described by this Court in Republic v. Lobregat
22 :chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) The Propriety of Summary Judgment
surely . . . an enterprise "of great pith and moment" ; it was attended by "great
expectations" ; it was initiated not only out of considerations of simple justice but
also out of sheer necessity the national coffers were empty, or nearly so.
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit
to set aside technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede
judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits
The crucial issues which this Court must resolve are: (1) whether or not
respondents raised any genuine issue of fact which would either justify or negate
summary judgment; and (2) whether or not petitioner Republic was able to prove
its case for forfeiture in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379.
We hold that respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their
pleadings. Thus, on motion of petitioner Republic, summary judgment should take
place as a matter of right.
In the early case of Auman v. Estenzo 24 , summary judgment was described as a
judgment which a court may render before trial but after both parties have pleaded.
It is ordered by the court upon application by one party, supported by affidavits,
depositions or other documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may in
turn file an opposition supported also by affidavits, depositions or other documents.
This is after the court summarily hears both parties with their respective proofs and
finds that there is no genuine issue between them. Summary judgment is
sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time
after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting
affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all
or any part thereof.25cralaw:red
Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any
material fact in the action. 26 The theory of summary judgment is that, although an
The Solicitor General made a very thorough presentation of its case for
forfeiture:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Page
answer may on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is demonstrated
by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine but sham
or fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary
judgment for petitioner Republic.
38

Atty. Dela Pea
1975 were filed under Tax Identification No. 1365-055-1. For the years 1976 until
1984, the returns were filed under Tax Identification No. M 6221-J 1117-A-9.
13. The data contained in the ITRs and Balance Sheet filed by the "Marcoses are
summarized and attached to the reports in the following schedules:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Schedule A:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x
Schedule of Income (Annex "T" hereof);
4. Respondent Ferdinand E. Marcos (now deceased and represented by his

Estate/Heirs) was a public officer for several decades continuously and without
interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of the
Republic of the Philippines from December 31, 1965 up to his ouster by direct
action of the people of EDSA on February 22-25, 1986.
Schedule B:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
5. Respondent Imelda Romualdez Marcos (Imelda, for short) the former First Lady
who ruled with FM during the 14-year martial law regime, occupied the position of
Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 up to the peaceful revolution in
February 22-25, 1986. She likewise served once as a member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa during the early years of martial law from 1978 to 1984 and
as Metro Manila Governor in concurrent capacity as Minister of Human
Settlements. . . .
Schedule of Net Disposable Income (Annex "T-2" hereof);
Schedule of Income Tax Paid (Annex "T-1" hereof);

Schedule C:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Schedule D:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Schedule of Networth Analysis (Annex "T-3" hereof).
14. As summarized in Schedule A (Annex "T" hereof), the Marcoses reported
P16,408,442.00 or US$2,414,484.91 in total income over a period of 20 years from
1965 to 1984. The sources of income are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Official Salaries - P2,627,581.00 - 16.01%
11. At the outset, however, it must be pointed out that based on the Official Report
of the Minister of Budget, the total salaries of former President Marcos as
President from 1966 to 1976 was P60,000 a year and from 1977 to 1985,
P100,000 a year; while that of the former First Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister
of Human Settlements from June 1976 to February 22-25, 1986 was P75,000 a
year. . . .
Legal Practice - 11,109,836.00 - 67.71%

Farm Income - 149,700.00 - .91%
Others - 2,521,325.00 - 15.37%
ANALYSIS OF RESPONDENTS
LEGITIMATE INCOME
Total P16,408,442.00 - 100.00%

x
12. Based on available documents, the ITRs of the Marcoses for the years 1965-
15. FMs official salary pertains to his compensation as Senate President in 1965
in the amount of P15,935.00 and P1,420,000.00 as President of the Philippines
during the period 1966 until 1984. On the other hand, Imelda reported salaries and
allowances only for the years 1979 to 1984 in the amount of P1,191,646.00. The
16. Of the P11,109,836.00 in reported income from legal practice, the amount of
P10,649,836.00 or 96% represents "receivables from prior years" during the period
1967 up to 1984.
17. In the guise of reporting income using the cash method under Section 38 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, FM made it appear that he had an extremely
profitable legal practice before he became a President (FM being barred by law
from practicing his law profession during his entire presidency) and that, incredibly,
he was still receiving payments almost 20 years after. The only problem is that in
his Balance Sheet attached to his 1965 ITR immediately preceding his ascendancy
to the presidency he did not show any Receivables from client at all, much less the
P10,65-M that he decided to later recognize as income. There are no documents
showing any withholding tax certificates. Likewise, there is nothing on record that
will show any known Marcos client as he has no known law office. As previously
stated, his networth was a mere P120,000.00 in December, 1965. The joint income
tax returns of FM and Imelda cannot, therefore, conceal the skeletons of their
kleptocracy.
18. FM reported a total of P2,521,325.00 as Other Income for the years 1972 up to
1976 which he referred to in his return as "Miscellaneous Items" and "Various
Corporations." There is no indication of any payor of the dividends or earnings.
19. Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda did not declare any income from any deposits
and placements which are subject to a 5% withholding tax. The Bureau of Internal
Revenue attested that after a diligent search of pertinent records on file with the
Records Division, they did not find any records involving the tax transactions of
spouses Ferdinand and Imelda in Revenue Region No. 1, Baguio City, Revenue
Region No. 4A, Manila, Revenue Region No. 4B1, Quezon City and Revenue No.
8, Tacloban, Leyte. Likewise, the Office of the Revenue Collector of Batac. Further,
BIR attested that no records were found on any filing of capital gains tax return
involving spouses FM and Imelda covering the years 1960 to 1965.
Page
records indicate that the reported income came from her salary from the Ministry of
Human Settlements and allowances from Food Terminal, Inc., National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation, National Food Authority Council, Light Rail Transit
Authority and Home Development Mutual Fund.
39

Atty. Dela Pea
total deductions in the amount of P1,994,845.00 represents 12% of the total gross
income.
21. In Schedule C, the net cumulative disposable income amounts to
P6,756,301.00 or US$980,709.77. This is the amount that represents that portion
of the Marcoses income that is free for consumption, savings and investments. The
amount is arrived at by adding back to the net income after tax the personal and
additional exemptions for the years 1965-1984, as well as the tax-exempt salary of
the President for the years 1966 until 1972.
22. Finally, the networth analysis in Schedule D, represents the total accumulated
networth of spouses, Ferdinand and Imelda. Respondents Balance Sheet
attached to their 1965 ITR, covering the year immediately preceding their
ascendancy to the presidency, indicates an ending networth of P120,000.00 which
FM declared as Library and Miscellaneous assets. In computing for the networth,
the income approach was utilized. Under this approach, the beginning capital is
increased or decreased, as the case may be, depending upon the income earned
or loss incurred. Computations establish the total networth of spouses Ferdinand
and Imelda, for the years 1965 until 1984 in the total amount of US$957,487.75,
assuming the income from legal practice is real and valid. . . .
G. THE SECRET MARCOS DEPOSITS
IN SWISS BANKS
23. The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how
both respondents clandestinely stashed away the countrys wealth to Switzerland
and hid the same under layers upon layers of foundations and other corporate
entities to prevent its detection. Through their dummies/nominees, fronts or agents
who formed those foundations or corporate entities, they opened and maintained
numerous bank accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the impossibility of
detecting and documenting all those secret accounts as well as the enormity of the
deposits therein hidden, the following presentation is confined to five identified
accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M with a reservation for
the filing of a supplemental or separate forfeiture complaint should the need arise.
H. THE AZIO-VERSO-VIBUR
20. In Schedule B, the taxable reported income over the twenty-year period was
P14,463,595.00 which represents 88% of the gross income. The Marcoses paid
income taxes totaling P8,233,296.00 or US$1,220,667.59. The business expenses
in the amount of P861,748.00 represent expenses incurred for subscription,
postage, stationeries and contributions while the other deductions in the amount of
P567,097.00 represents interest charges, medicare fees, taxes and licenses. The
FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
24. On June 11, 1971, Ferdinand Marcos issued a written order to Dr. Theo
Bertheau, legal counsel of Schweizeresche Kreditanstalt or SKA, also known as
Swiss Credit Bank, for him to establish the AZIO Foundation. On the same date,
Page
Marcos executed a power of attorney in favor of Roberto S. Benedicto empowering

him to transact business in behalf of the said foundation. Pursuant to the said
Marcos mandate, AZIO Foundation was formed on June 21, 1971 in Vaduz. Walter
Fessler and Ernst Scheller, also of SKA Legal Service, and Dr. Helmuth Merling
from Schaan were designated as members of the Board of Trustees of the said
foundation. Ferdinand Marcos was named first beneficiary and the Marcos
Foundation, Inc. was second beneficiary. On November 12, 1971, FM again issued
another written order naming Austrahil PTY Ltd. In Sydney, Australia, as the
foundations first and sole beneficiary. This was recorded on December 14, 1971.
40

Atty. Dela Pea
Ferdinand E. Marcos. Another document signed by G. Raber of SKA shows that
VIBUR FOUNDATION is owned by the "Marcos Familie" .
30. As of December 31, 1989, the balance of the bank accounts of VIBUR
FOUNDATION with SKA, Zurich, under the General Account No. 469857 totaled
$3,597,544.00.
I. XANDY-WINTROP: CHARIS-SCOLARIVALAMO-SPINUS-AVERTINA
25. In an undated instrument, Marcos changed the first and sole beneficiary to
CHARIS FOUNDATION. This change was recorded on December 4, 1972.
26. On August 29, 1978, the AZIO FOUNDATION was renamed to VERSO
FOUNDATION. The Board of Trustees remained the same. On March 11, 1981,
Marcos issued a written directive to liquidated VERSO FOUNDATION and to
transfer all its assets to account of FIDES TRUST COMPANY at Bank Hofman in
Zurich under the account "Reference OSER." The Board of Trustees decided to
dissolve the foundation on June 25, 1981.
27. In an apparent maneuver to bury further the secret deposits beneath the thick
layers of corporate entities, FM effected the establishment of VIBUR
FOUNDATION on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz. Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag Management,
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust, were designated as members of the
Board of Trustees. The account was officially opened with SKA on September 10,
1981. The beneficial owner was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust
Company acted as fiduciary. However, comparison of the listing of the securities in
the safe deposit register of the VERSO FOUNDATION as of February 27, 1981
with that of VIBUR FOUNDATION as of December 31, 1981 readily reveals that
exactly the same securities were listed.
28. Under the foregoing circumstances, it is certain that the VIBUR FOUNDATION
is the beneficial successor of VERSO FOUNDATION.
29. On March 18, 1986, the Marcos-designated Board of Trustees decided to
liquidate VIBUR FOUNDATION. A notice of such liquidation was sent to the Office
of the Public Register on March 21, 1986. However, the bank accounts and
respective balances of the said VIBUR FOUNDATION remained with SKA.
Apparently, the liquidation was an attempt by the Marcoses to transfer the
foundations funds to another account or bank but this was prevented by the timely
freeze order issued by the Swiss authorities. One of the latest documents obtained
by the PCGG from the Swiss authorities is a declaration signed by Dr. Ivo Beck
(the trustee) stating that the beneficial owner of VIBUR FOUNDATION is
FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
31. This is the most intricate and complicated account group. As the Flow Chart
hereof shows, two (2) groups under the foundation organized by Marcos
dummies/nominees for FMs benefit, eventually joined together and became one
(1) account group under the AVERTINA FOUNDATION for the benefit of both FM
and Imelda. This is the biggest group from where the $50-M investment fund of the
Marcoses was drawn when they bought the Central Banks dollar-denominated
treasury notes with high-yielding interests.
32. On March 20, 1968, after his second year in the presidency, Marcos opened
bank accounts with SKA using an alias or pseudonym WILLIAM SAUNDERS,
apparently to hide his true identity. The next day, March 21, 1968, his First Lady,
Mrs. Imelda Marcos also opened her own bank accounts with the same bank using
an American-sounding alias, JANE RYAN. Found among the voluminous
documents in Malacaang shortly after they fled to Hawaii in haste that fateful
night of February 25, 1986, were accomplished forms for "Declaration/Specimen
Signatures" submitted by the Marcos couple. Under the caption "signature(s)"
Ferdinand and Imelda signed their real names as well as their respective aliases
underneath. These accounts were actively operated and maintained by the
Marcoses for about two (2) years until their closure sometime in February, 1970
and the balances transferred to XANDY FOUNDATION.
33. The XANDY FOUNDATION was established on March 3, 1970 in Vaduz. C.W.
Fessler, C. Souviron and E. Scheller were named as members of the Board of
Trustees.
34. FM and Imelda issued the written mandate to establish the foundation to
Markus Geel of SKA on March 3, 1970. In the handwritten Regulations signed by
the Marcos couple as well as in the type-written Regulations signed by Markus
Geel both dated February 13, 1970, the Marcos spouses were named the first
beneficiaries, the surviving spouse as the second beneficiary and the Marcos
35. The XANDY FOUNDATION was renamed WINTROP FOUNDATION on August

29, 1978. The Board of Trustees remained the same at the outset. However, on
March 27, 1980, Souviron was replaced by Dr. Peter Ritter. On March 10. 1981,
Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos issued a written order to the Board of Wintrop to
liquidate the foundation and transfer all its assets to Bank Hofmann in Zurich in
favor of FIDES TRUST COMPANY. Later, WINTROP FOUNDATION was
dissolved.
36. The AVERTINA FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with
Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of FIDES
TRUST CO., as members of the Board of Trustees. Two (2) account categories,
namely: CAR and NES, were opened on September 10, 1981. The beneficial
owner of AVERTINA was not made known to the bank since the FIDES TRUST
CO. acted as fiduciary. However, the securities listed in the safe deposit register of
WINTROP FOUNDATION Category R as of December 31, 1980 were the same as
those listed in the register of AVERTINA FOUNDATION Category CAR as of
December 31, 1981. Likewise, the securities listed in the safe deposit register of
WINTROP FOUNDATION Category S as of December 31, 1980 were the same as
those listed in the register of Avertina Category NES as of December 31, 1981.
Under the circumstances, it is certain that the beneficial successor of WINTROP
FOUNDATION is AVERTINA FOUNDATION. The balance of Category CAR as of
December 31, 1989 amounted to US$231,366,894.00 while that of Category NES
as of 12-31-83 was US$8,647,190.00. Latest documents received from Swiss
authorities included a declaration signed by IVO Beck stating that the beneficial
owners of AVERTINA FOUNDATION are FM and Imelda. Another document
signed by G. Raber of SKA indicates that Avertina Foundation is owned by the
"Marcos Families."cralaw virtua1aw library
Page
children Imee, Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) and Irene as equal third

beneficiaries.
41

Atty. Dela Pea
39. On December 13, 1974, Charis Foundation was renamed Scolari Foundation
but the directors remained the same. On March 11, 1981 FM ordered in writing that
the Valamo Foundation be liquidated and all its assets be transferred to Bank
Hofmann, AG in favor of Fides Trust Company under the account "Reference
OMAL." The Board of Directors decided on the immediate dissolution of Valamo
Foundation on June 25, 1981.
40. The SPINUS FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with
Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust
Co., as members of the Foundations Board of Directors. The account was officially
opened with SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner of the foundation
was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust Co. acted as fiduciary.
However, the list of securities in the safe deposit register of Valamo Foundation as
of December 31, 1980 are practically the same with those listed in the safe deposit
register of Spinus Foundation as of December 31, 1981. Under the circumstances,
it is certain that the Spinus Foundation is the beneficial successor of the Valamo
Foundation.
41. On September 6, 1982, there was a written instruction from Spinus Foundation
to SKA to close its Swiss Franc account and transfer the balance to Avertina
Foundation. In July/August, 1982, several transfers from the foundations German
marks and US dollar accounts were made to Avertina Category CAR totaling DM
29.5-M and $58-M, respectively. Moreover, a comparison of the list of securities of
the Spinus Foundation as of February 3, 1982 with the safe deposit slips of the
Avertina Foundation Category CAR as of August 19, 1982 shows that all the
securities of Spinus were transferred to Avertina.
J. TRINIDAD-RAYBY-PALMY
FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
37. The other groups of foundations that eventually joined AVERTINA were also
established by FM through his dummies, which started with the CHARIS
FOUNDATION.
38. The CHARIS FOUNDATION was established in VADUZ on December 27,
1971. Walter Fessler and Ernst Scheller of SKA and Dr. Peter Ritter were named
as directors. Dr. Theo Bertheau, SKA legal counsel, acted as founding director in
behalf of FM by virtue of the mandate and agreement dated November 12, 1971.
FM himself was named the first beneficiary and Xandy Foundation as second
beneficiary in accordance with the handwritten instructions of FM on November 12,
1971 and the Regulations. FM gave a power of attorney to Roberto S. Benedicto
on February 15, 1972 to act in his behalf with regard to Charis Foundation.
42. The Trinidad Foundation was organized on August 26, 1970 in Vaduz with C.W.
Fessler and E. Scheller of SKA and Dr. Otto Tondury as the foundations directors.
Imelda issued a written mandate to establish the foundation to Markus Geel on
August 26, 1970. The regulations as well as the agreement, both dated August 28,
1970 were likewise signed by Imelda. Imelda was named the first beneficiary and
her children Imelda (Imee), Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) and, Irene were named as
equal second beneficiaries.
43. Rayby Foundation was established on June 22, 1973 in Vaduz with Fessler,
Scheller and Ritter as members of the board of directors. Imelda issued a written
mandate to Dr. Theo Bertheau to establish the foundation with a note that the
44. The PALMY FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Dr.
Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust Co, as
members of the Foundations Board of Directors. The account was officially
opened with the SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner was not made
known to the bank since Fides Trust Co. acted as fiduciary. However, when one
compares the listing of securities in the safe deposit register of Trinidad Foundation
as of December 31,1980 with that of the Palmy Foundation as of December 31,
1980, one can clearly see that practically the same securities were listed. Under
the circumstances, it is certain that the Palmy Foundation is the beneficial
successor of the Trinidad Foundation.
45. As of December 31, 1989, the ending balance of the bank accounts of Palmy
Foundation under General Account No. 391528 is $17,214,432.00.
46. Latest documents received from Swiss Authorities included a declaration
signed by Dr. Ivo Beck stating that the beneficial owner of Palmy Foundation is
Imelda. Another document signed by Raber shows that the said Palmy Foundation
is owned by Marcos Familie.
K. ROSALYS-AGUAMINA
Page
foundations capitalization as well as the cost of establishing it be debited against

the account of Trinidad Foundation. Imelda was named the first and only
beneficiary of Rayby foundation. According to written information from SKA dated
November 28, 1988, Imelda apparently had the intention in 1973 to transfer part of
the assets of Trinidad Foundation to another foundation, thus the establishment of
Rayby Foundation. However, transfer of assets never took place. On March 10,
1981, Imelda issued a written order to transfer all the assets of Rayby Foundation
to Trinidad Foundation and to subsequently liquidate Rayby. On the same date,
she issued a written order to the board of Trinidad to dissolve the foundation and
transfer all its assets to Bank Hofmann in favor of Fides Trust Co. Under the
account "Reference Dido," Rayby was dissolved on April 6, 1981 and Trinidad was
liquidated on August 3, 1981.
42

Atty. Dela Pea
were transferred to Aguamina Corporations (Panama) Account No. 53300 with
SBC. The ownership by Aguamina Corporation of Account No. 53300 is evidenced
by an opening account documents from the bank. J. Christinaz and R.L. Rossier,
First Vice-President and Senior Vice President, respectively, of SBC, Geneva
issued a declaration dated September 3, 1991 stating that the by-laws dated
October 3, 1971 governing Rosalys Foundation was the same by-law applied to
Aguamina Corporation Account No. 53300. They further confirmed that no change
of beneficial owner was involved while transferring the assets of Rosalys to
Aguamina. Hence, FM remains the beneficiary of Aguamina Corporation Account
No. 53300.
As of August 30, 1991, the ending balance of Account No. 53300 amounted to
$80,566,483.00.
L. MALER FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
49. Maler was first created as an establishment. A statement of its rules and
regulations was found among Malacaang documents. It stated, among others,
that 50% of the Companys assets will be for sole and full right disposal of FM and
Imelda during their lifetime, which the remaining 50% will be divided in equal parts
among their children. Another Malacaang document dated October 19, 1968 and
signed by Ferdinand and Imelda pertains to the appointment of Dr. Andre Barbey
and Jean Louis Sunier as attorneys of the company and as administrator and
manager of all assets held by the company. The Marcos couple, also mentioned in
the said document that they bought the Maler Establishment from SBC, Geneva.
On the same date, FM and Imelda issued a letter addressed to Maler
Establishment, stating that all instructions to be transmitted with regard to Maler
will be signed with the word "JOHN LEWIS." This word will have the same value as
the couples own personal signature. The letter was signed by FM and Imelda in
their signatures and as John Lewis.
50. Maler Establishment opened and maintained bank accounts with SBC,
Geneva. The opening bank documents were signed by Dr. Barbey and Mr. Sunnier
as authorized signatories.
FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
47. Rosalys Foundation was established in 1971 with FM as the beneficiary. Its
Articles of Incorporation was executed on September 24, 1971 and its By-Laws on
October 3, 1971. This foundation maintained several accounts with Swiss Bank
Corporation (SBC) under the general account 51960 where most of the bribe
monies from Japanese suppliers were hidden.
48. On December 19, 1985, Rosalys Foundation was liquidated and all its assets
51. On November 17, 1981, it became necessary to transform Maler Establishment

into a foundation. Likewise, the attorneys were changed to Michael Amaudruz, Et.
Al. However, administration of the assets was left to SBC. The articles of
incorporation of Maler Foundation registered on November 17, 1981 appear to be
the same articles applied to Maler Establishment. On February 28, 1984, Maler
Foundation cancelled the power of attorney for the management of its assets in
favor of SBC and transferred such power to Sustrust Investment Co., S.A.
53. All the five (5) group accounts in the over-all flow chart have a total balance of
about Three Hundred Fifty Six Million Dollars ($356,000,000.00) as shown by
Annex "R-5" hereto attached as integral part hereof.
x
x. 27
Respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and

Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., in their answer, stated the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
x
4. Respondents ADMIT paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Petition.

5. Respondents specifically deny paragraph 5 of the Petition in so far as it states
that summons and other court processes may be served on Respondent Imelda R.
Marcos at the stated address the truth of the matter being that Respondent Imelda
R. Marcos may be served with summons and other processes at No. 10-B Bel Air
Condominium 5022 P. Burgos Street, Makati, Metro Manila, and ADMIT the rest.
Page
52. As of June 6, 1991, the ending balance of Maler Foundations Account Nos.
254,508 BT and 98,929 NY amount SF 9,083,567 and SG 16,195,258,
respectively, for a total of SF 25,278,825.00. GM only until December 31, 1980.
This account was opened by Maler when it was still an establishment which was
subsequently transformed into a foundation.
43

Atty. Dela Pea
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation
since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged
ITRs.
14. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 15 of the Petition for lack of
ITRs.
ITRs.
16. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 17 of the Petition insofar as it
attributes willful duplicity on the part of the late President Marcos, for being false,
the same being pure conclusions based on pure assumption and not allegations of
fact; and specifically DENY the rest for lack of knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot
remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs or the attachments
thereto.
ITRs.
10. Respondents ADMIT paragraph 11 of the Petition.

ITRs and that they are not privy to the activities of the BIR.

knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since
Respondents were not privy to the transactions and that they cannot remember
exactly the truth as to the matters alleged.

ITRs.

ITRs and Balance Sheet.

ITRs.
22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that

Respondents clandestinely stashed the countrys wealth in Switzerland and hid the
same under layers and layers of foundation and corporate entities for being false,
the truth being that Respondents aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.
Page

ITRs.
44

Atty. Dela Pea
a genuine issue for trial. Respondents defenses of "lack of knowledge for lack of
privity" or" (inability to) recall because it happened a long time ago" or, on the part
of Mrs. Marcos, that "the funds were lawfully acquired" are fully insufficient to
tender genuine issues. Respondent Marcoses defenses were a sham and
evidently calibrated to compound and confuse the issues.
The following pleadings filed by respondent Marcoses are replete with indications
of a spurious defense:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of
the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegation since Respondents were not privy to the transactions
regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except that as to
Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved
were lawfully acquired.
(a) Respondents Answer dated October 18, 1993;
24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39,
40, and 41 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents are not privy to the
transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember
with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to
Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved
(c) Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 21, 2000, filed by
Mrs. Marcos which the other respondents (Marcos children) adopted;
25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46, of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegations since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and
as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the
same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R.
Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
(b) Pre-trial Brief dated October 4, 1999 of Mrs. Marcos, Supplemental Pre-trial
Brief dated October 19, 1999 of Ferdinand, Jr. and Mrs. Imee Marcos-Manotoc
adopting the pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, and Manifestation dated October 19,
1999 of Irene Marcos-Araneta adopting the pre-trial briefs of her co- respondents;
(d) Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2, 2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos and adopted by
the Marcos children;
(e) Motion for Reconsideration dated September 26, 2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos;
Motion for Reconsideration dated October 5, 2000 jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and
Ferdinand, Jr., and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated October 9,
2000 likewise jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.;
(f) Memorandum dated December 12, 2000 of Mrs. Marcos and Memorandum
dated December 17, 2000 of the Marcos children;
(g) Manifestation dated May 26, 1998; and
26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52, of the Petition
for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same
having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos
she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
Upon careful perusal of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Mrs. Marcos
and the Marcos children indubitably failed to tender genuine issues in their answer
to the petition for forfeiture. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and
contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance so as not to constitute
(h) General/Supplemental Agreement dated December 23, 1993.

An examination of the foregoing pleadings is in order.
Respondents Answer dated October 18, 1993.
In their answer, respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation
contained in the petition for forfeiture in the manner required by the rules. All they
gave were stock answers like "they have no sufficient knowledge" or "they could
not recall because it happened a long time ago," and, as to Mrs. Marcos, "the
funds were lawfully acquired," without stating the basis of such
Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:chanrob1es

virtual 1aw library
A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does
not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters
upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only
a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and
shall deny the remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the
complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial. 28
The purpose of requiring respondents to make a specific denial is to make them
disclose facts which will disprove the allegations of petitioner at the trial, together
with the matters they rely upon in support of such denial. Our jurisdiction adheres
to this rule to avoid and prevent unnecessary expenses and waste of time by
compelling both parties to lay their cards on the table, thus reducing the
controversy to its true terms. As explained in Alonso v. Villamor, 29
A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and
skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other.
It is rather a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the
court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all
imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done
upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapiers thrust.
On the part of Mrs. Marcos, she claimed that the funds were lawfully acquired.
However, she failed to particularly state the ultimate facts surrounding the lawful
manner or mode of acquisition of the subject funds. Simply put, she merely stated
in her answer with the other respondents that the funds were "lawfully acquired"
without detailing how exactly these funds were supposedly acquired legally by
them. Even in this case before us, her assertion that the funds were lawfully
acquired remains bare and unaccompanied by any factual support which can
prove, by the presentation of evidence at a hearing, that indeed the funds were
acquired legitimately by the Marcos family.
Respondents denials in their answer at the Sandiganbayan were based on their
alleged lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations of the petition.
It is true that one of the modes of specific denial under the rules is a denial through
a statement that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to
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assertions.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
45

Atty. Dela Pea
form a belief as to the truth of the material averment in the complaint. The
question, however, is whether the kind of denial in respondents answer qualifies
as the specific denial called for by the rules. We do not think so. In Morales v.
Court of Appeals, 30 this Court ruled that if an allegation directly and specifically
charges a party with having done, performed or committed a particular act which
the latter did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and express denial
must be made.
Here, despite the serious and specific allegations against them, the Marcoses
responded by simply saying that they had no knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of such allegations. Such a general, self-serving claim
of ignorance of the facts alleged in the petition for forfeiture was insufficient to raise
an issue. Respondent Marcoses should have positively stated how it was that they
were supposedly ignorant of the facts alleged. 31
To elucidate, the allegation of petitioner Republic in paragraph 23 of the petition for
forfeiture stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
23. The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how
both respondents clandestinely stashed away the countrys wealth to Switzerland
and hid the same under layers upon layers of foundations and other corporate
entities to prevent its detection. Through their dummies/nominees, fronts or agents
who formed those foundations or corporate entities, they opened and maintained
numerous bank accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the impossibility of
detecting and documenting all those secret accounts as well as the enormity of the
deposits therein hidden, the following presentation is confined to five identified
accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M with a reservation for
the filing of a supplemental or separate forfeiture complaint should the need arise.
32
Respondents lame denial of the aforesaid allegation was:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that
Respondents clandestinely stashed the countrys wealth in Switzerland and hid the
same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities for being false,
the truth being that Respondents aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired. 33
Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on
pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of
the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It
was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. 34 Stated
otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with
In the instant case, the material allegations in paragraph 23 of the said petition
were not specifically denied by respondents in paragraph 22 of their answer. The
denial contained in paragraph 22 of the answer was focused on the averment in
paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture that "Respondents clandestinely stashed
the countrys wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of
foundations and corporate entities." Paragraph 22 of the respondents answer was
thus a denial pregnant with admissions of the following substantial
facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) that the Swiss bank deposits existed and
Page
it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse

party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in
the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the
words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been
held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is
admitted. 35
46

Atty. Dela Pea
transactions and as to such transactions they were privy to, they cannot remember
with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except as to respondent
Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired.
25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 45, and 46 of the petition
for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to from a belief as to the truth of the
allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
transaction they were privy to, they cannot remember with exactitude, the same
having occurred a long time ago, except that as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos,
26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52 of the petition
for lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same
having occurred a long time ago, except that as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos,
(2) that the estimated sum thereof was US$356 million as of December, 1990.
Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss
bank deposits in the sum of about US$356 million, not having been specifically
denied by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted by them pursuant to
Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Material averment in the complaint, . . . shall be deemed admitted when not
specifically denied. . . . 36
By the same token, the following unsupported denials of respondents in their
answer were pregnant with admissions of the substantial facts alleged in the
Republics petition for forfeiture:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of
the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegation since respondents were not privy to the transactions
regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except that, as to
respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved
24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39,
40, 41 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to the
The matters referred to in paragraphs 23 to 26 of the respondents answer

pertained to the creation of five groups of accounts as well as their respective
ending balances and attached documents alleged in paragraphs 24 to 52 of the
Republics petition for forfeiture. Respondent Imelda R. Marcos never specifically
denied the existence of the Swiss funds. Her claim that "the funds involved were
lawfully acquired" was an acknowledgment on her part of the existence of said
deposits. This only reinforced her earlier admission of the allegation in paragraph
23 of the petition for forfeiture regarding the existence of the US$356 million Swiss
bank deposits.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The allegations in paragraphs 47 37 and 48 38 of the petition for forfeiture referring
to the creation and amount of the deposits of the Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation as
well as the averment in paragraph 52-a 39 of the said petition with respect to the
sum of the Swiss bank deposits estimated to be US$356 million were again not
specifically denied by respondents in their answer. The respondents did not at all
respond to the issues raised in these paragraphs and the existence, nature and
amount of the Swiss funds were therefore deemed admitted by them. As held in
Galofa v. Nee Bon Sing, 40 if a defendants denial is a negative pregnant, it is
equivalent to an admission.
Moreover, respondents denial of the allegations in the petition for forfeiture "for
lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions" was just a
pretense. Mrs. Marcos privity to the transactions was in fact evident from her
It is worthy to note that the pertinent documents attached to the petition for
forfeiture were even signed personally by respondent Mrs. Marcos and her late
husband, Ferdinand E. Marcos, indicating that said documents were within their
knowledge. As correctly pointed out by Sandiganbayan Justice Francisco Villaruz,
Jr. in his dissenting opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The pattern of: 1) creating foundations, 2) use of pseudonyms and dummies, 3)
approving regulations of the Foundations for the distribution of capital and income
of the Foundations to the First and Second beneficiary (who are no other than FM
and his family), 4) opening of bank accounts for the Foundations, 5) changing the
names of the Foundations, 6) transferring funds and assets of the Foundations to
other Foundations or Fides Trust, 7) liquidation of the Foundations as
substantiated by the Annexes U to U-168, Petition [for forfeiture] strongly indicate
that FM and/or Imelda were the real owners of the assets deposited in the Swiss
banks, using the Foundations as dummies. 43
How could respondents therefore claim lack of sufficient knowledge or information
regarding the existence of the Swiss bank deposits and the creation of five groups
of accounts when Mrs. Marcos and her late husband personally masterminded and
participated in the formation and control of said foundations? This is a fact
respondent Marcoses were never able to explain.
Not only that. Respondents answer also technically admitted the genuineness and
due execution of the Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and the balance sheets of the late
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos attached to the petition for forfeiture,
as well as the veracity of the contents thereof.
The answer again premised its denials of said ITRs and balance sheets on the
ground of lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of the contents thereof. Petitioner correctly points out that respondents denial was
not really grounded on lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
but was based on lack of recollection. By reviewing their own records, respondent
Marcoses could have easily determined the genuineness and due execution of the
ITRs and the balance sheets. They also had the means and opportunity of
verifying the same from the records of the BIR and the Office of the President.
They did not.
When matters regarding which respondents claim to have no knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief are plainly and necessarily within their
knowledge, their alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be considered a
Page
signatures on some of the vital documents 41 attached to the petition for forfeiture
which Mrs. Marcos failed to specifically deny as required by the rules. 42
47

Atty. Dela Pea
specific denial. 44 An unexplained denial of information within the control of the
pleader, or is readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to constitute
an effective denial. 45
The form of denial adopted by respondents must be availed of with sincerity and in
good faith, and certainly not for the purpose of confusing the adverse party as to
what allegations of the petition are really being challenged; nor should it be made
for the purpose of delay. 46 In the instant case, the Marcoses did not only present
unsubstantiated assertions but in truth attempted to mislead and deceive this Court
by presenting an obviously contrived defense.
Simply put, a profession of ignorance about a fact which is patently and
necessarily within the pleaders knowledge or means of knowing is as ineffective
as no denial at all. 47 Respondents ineffective denial thus failed to properly tender
an issue and the averments contained in the petition for forfeiture were deemed
judicially admitted by them.
As held in J.P. Juan & Sons, Inc. v. Lianga Industries, Inc.:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Its "specific denial" of the material allegation of the petition without setting forth the
substance of the matters relied upon to support its general denial, when such
matters were plainly within its knowledge and it could not logically pretend
ignorance as to the same, therefore, failed to properly tender on issue. 48
Thus, the general denial of the Marcos children of the allegations in the petition for
forfeiture "for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegations since they were not privy to the transactions" cannot
rightfully be accepted as a defense because they are the legal heirs and
successors-in-interest of Ferdinand E. Marcos and are therefore bound by the acts
of their father vis-a-vis the Swiss funds.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Pre-Trial Brief Dated October 18, 1993
The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos was adopted by the three Marcos children. In
said brief, Mrs. Marcos stressed that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
But, as in their answer, they failed to state and substantiate how these funds were
acquired lawfully. They failed to present and attach even a single document that
would show and prove the truth of their allegations. Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, . . . their
(d) the documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof;

x
(f) the number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective
testimonies. 49
It is unquestionably within the courts power to require the parties to submit their
pre-trial briefs and to state the number of witnesses intended to be called to the
stand, and a brief summary of the evidence each of them is expected to give as
well as to disclose the number of documents to be submitted with a description of
the nature of each. The tenor and character of the testimony of the witnesses and
of the documents to be deduced at the trial thus made known, in addition to the
particular issues of fact and law, it becomes apparent if genuine issues are being
put forward necessitating the holding of a trial. Likewise, the parties are obliged not
only to make a formal identification and specification of the issues and their proofs,
and to put these matters in writing and submit them to the court within the specified
period for the prompt disposition of the action. 50
The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, as subsequently adopted by respondent Marcos
children, merely stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x
5.1 Respondent Imelda reserves the right to present and introduce in evidence
documents as may be necessary in the course of the trial.
Mrs. Marcos did not enumerate and describe the documents constituting her
evidence. Neither the names of witnesses nor the nature of their testimony was
stated. What alone appeared certain was the testimony of Mrs. Marcos only who in
fact had previously claimed ignorance and lack of knowledge. And even then, the
substance of her testimony, as required by the rules, was not made known either.
Such cunning tactics of respondents are totally unacceptable to this Court. We
hold that, since no genuine issue was raised, the case became ripe for summary
judgment.
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 21, 2000
The opposition filed by Mrs. Marcos to the motion for summary judgment dated
March 21, 2000 of petitioner Republic was merely adopted by the Marcos children
as their own opposition to the said motion. However, it was again not accompanied
by affidavits, depositions or admissions as required by Section 3, Rule 35 of the
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at
least three (3) days before hearing. After hearing, the judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and
admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. 51
The absence of opposing affidavits, depositions and admissions to contradict the
sworn declarations in the Republics motion only demonstrated that the averments
of such opposition were not genuine and therefore unworthy of belief.
Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2, 2000; 52 Motions for Reconsideration; 53
and Memoranda of Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos Children 54
WITNESSES
4.1 Respondent Imelda will present herself as a witness and reserves the right to
present additional witnesses as may be necessary in the course of the trial.
x
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Page
respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among others:chanrob1es virtual

1aw library
48

Atty. Dela Pea
All these pleadings again contained no allegations of facts showing their lawful
acquisition of the funds. Once more, respondents merely made general denials
without alleging facts which would have been admissible in evidence at the
hearing, thereby failing to raise genuine issues of fact.
Mrs. Marcos insists in her memorandum dated October 21, 2002 that, during the
pre-trial, her counsel stated that his client was just a beneficiary of the funds,
contrary to petitioner Republics allegation that Mrs. Marcos disclaimed ownership
of or interest in the funds.
PJ Garchitorena:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Make of record that as far as Imelda Marcos is concerned through the statement of
Atty. Armando M. Marcelo that the US$360 million more or less subject matter of
the instant lawsuit as allegedly obtained from the various Swiss Foundations do
not belong to the estate of Marcos or to Imelda Marcos herself. Thats your
statement of facts?
Atty. MARCELO:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Yes, Your Honor.
Thats it. Okay. Counsel for Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. What is your point here?
Does the estate of Marcos own anything of the $360 million subject of this case.
Page
This is yet another indication that respondents presented a fictitious defense

because, during the pre-trial, Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children denied
ownership of or interest in the Swiss funds:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
49

Atty. Dela Pea
Atty. SISON:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Irene Araneta as heir do (sic) not own any of the amount, Your Honor. 55
We are convinced that the strategy of respondent Marcoses was to confuse
petitioner Republic as to what facts they would prove or what issues they intended
to pose for the courts resolution. There is no doubt in our mind that they were
leading petitioner Republic, and now this Court, to perplexity, if not trying to drag
this forfeiture case to eternity.
Manifestation dated May 26, 1998 filed by Mrs. Marcos; General/Supplemental
Compromise Agreement dated December 28, 1993
These pleadings of respondent Marcoses presented nothing but feigned defenses.
In their earlier pleadings, respondents alleged either that they had no knowledge of
the existence of the Swiss deposits or that they could no longer remember
anything as it happened a long time ago. As to Mrs. Marcos, she remembered that
it was lawfully acquired.
In her Manifestation dated May 26, 1998, Mrs. Marcos stated that:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Atty. TECSON:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

We joined the Manifestation of Counsel.
COMES NOW undersigned counsel for respondent Imelda R. Marcos, and before
this Honorable Court, most respectfully manifests:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That respondent Imelda R, Marcos owns 90% of the subject matter of the aboveentitled case, being the sole beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of the
various foundations alleged in the case;
You do not own anything?

Atty. TECSON:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to
the estate of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Yes, Your Honor.

Counsel for Irene Araneta?
In the Compromise/Supplemental Agreements, respondent Marcoses sought to

implement the agreed distribution of the Marcos assets, including the Swiss
deposits. This was, to us, an unequivocal admission of ownership by the Marcoses
of the said deposits.
Atty. SISON:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I join the position taken by my other compaeros here, Your Honor.
x
But, as already pointed out, during the pre-trial conference, respondent Marcoses
denied knowledge as well as ownership of the Swiss funds.
Anyway we look at it, respondent Marcoses have put forth no real defense. The
We therefore rule that, under the circumstances, summary judgment is proper.

In fact, it is the law itself which determines when summary judgment is called for.
Under the rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine
issues of fact requiring the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on
their face the pleadings appear to raise issue, if the affidavits, depositions and
admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as
prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter of law. 56
In sum, mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which will be admissible in
evidence at a hearing, are not sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and will not
defeat a motion for summary judgment. 57 A summary judgment is one granted
upon motion of a party for an expeditious settlement of the case, it appearing from
the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no important
questions or issues of fact posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A motion for summary judgment is premised on the
assumption that the issues presented need not be tried either because these are
patently devoid of substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent
fact. It is a method sanctioned by the Rules of Court for the prompt disposition of a
civil action where there exists no serious controversy. 58 Summary judgment is a
procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise
only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any material fact. The theory of
summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to tender
issues requiring trial, if it is established by affidavits, depositions or admissions that
those issues are not genuine but fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with
the trial and rendering summary judgment for petitioner. 59
In the various annexes to the petition for forfeiture, petitioner Republic attached
sworn statements of witnesses who had personal knowledge of the Marcoses
participation in the illegal acquisition of funds deposited in the Swiss accounts
under the names of five groups or foundations. These sworn statements
substantiated the ill-gotten nature of the Swiss bank deposits. In their answer and
other subsequent pleadings, however, the Marcoses merely made general denials
of the allegations against them without stating facts admissible in evidence at the
hearing, thereby failing to raise any genuine issues of fact.
Under these circumstances, a trial would have served no purpose at all and would
have been totally unnecessary, thus justifying a summary judgment on the petition
for forfeiture. There were no opposing affidavits to contradict the sworn
Page
"facts" pleaded by respondents, while ostensibly raising important questions or

issues of fact, in reality comprised mere verbiage that was evidently wanting in
substance and constituted no genuine issues for trial.
50

Atty. Dela Pea
declarations of the witnesses of petitioner Republic, leading to the inescapable
conclusion that the matters raised in the Marcoses answer were false.
Time and again, this Court has encountered cases like this which are either only
half-heartedly defended or, if the semblance of a defense is interposed at all, it is
only to delay disposition and gain time. It is certainly not in the interest of justice to
allow respondent Marcoses to avail of the appellate remedies accorded by the
Rules of Court to litigants in good faith, to the prejudice of the Republic and
ultimately of the Filipino people. From the beginning, a candid demonstration of
respondents good faith should have been made to the court below. Without the
deceptive reasoning and argumentation, this protracted litigation could have ended
a long time ago.
Since 1991, when the petition for forfeiture was first filed, up to the present, all
respondents have offered are foxy responses like "lack of sufficient knowledge or
lack of privity" or "they cannot recall because it happened a long time ago" or, as to
Mrs. Marcos, "the funds were lawfully acquired." But, whenever it suits them, they
also claim ownership of 90% of the funds and allege that only 10% belongs to the
Marcos estate. It has been an incredible charade from beginning to end.
In the hope of convincing this Court to rule otherwise, respondents Maria Imelda
Marcos-Manotoc and Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. contend that "by its positive acts
and express admissions prior to filing the motion for summary judgment on March
10, 2000, petitioner Republic had bound itself to go to trial on the basis of existing
issues. Thus, it had legally waived whatever right it had to move for summary
judgment." 60
We do not think so. The alleged positive acts and express admissions of the
petitioner did not preclude it from filing a motion for summary judgment.
Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Rule 35
Summary Judgment
Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time
after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting
affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all
or any part thereof.
Under the rule, the plaintiff can move for summary judgment "at any time after the
pleading in answer thereto (i.e., in answer to the claim, counterclaim or crossclaim) has been served." No fixed reglementary period is provided by the Rules.
How else does one construe the phrase "any time after the answer has been
served?"
This issue is actually one of first impression. No local jurisprudence or authoritative
work has touched upon this matter. This being so, an examination of foreign laws
and jurisprudence, particularly those of the United States where many of our laws
and rules were copied, is in order.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party seeking to
recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim may move for summary
judgment at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of
the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party,
and that a party against whom a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted
may move for summary judgment at any time.
However, some rules, particularly Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New
York, specifically provide that a motion for summary judgment may not be made
until issues have been joined, that is, only after an answer has been served. 62
Under said rule, after issues have been joined, the motion for summary judgment
may be made at any stage of the litigation. 63 No fixed prescriptive period is
provided.
Like Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York, our rules also provide that
a motion for summary judgment may not be made until issues have been joined,
meaning, the plaintiff has to wait for the answer before he can move for summary
judgment. 64 And like the New York rules, ours do not provide for a fixed
reglementary period within which to move for summary judgment.
This being so, the New York Supreme Courts interpretation of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Civil Practice can be applied by analogy to the interpretation of Section 1,
Rule 35, of our 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under the New York rule, after the issues have been joined, the motion for
summary judgment may be made at any stage of the litigation. And what exactly
does the phrase "at any stage of the litigation" mean? In Ecker v. Muzysh, 65 the
Page
Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. A party against whom a

claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought
may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a
summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. (Emphasis ours) 61
51

Atty. Dela Pea
New York Supreme Court ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff introduced her evidence and the defendants rested on the case made by
the plaintiff. The case was submitted. Owing to the serious illness of the trial
justice, a decision was not rendered within sixty days after the final adjournment of
the term at which the case was tried. With the approval of the trial justice, the
plaintiff moved for a new trial under Section 442 of the Civil Practice Act. The
plaintiff also moved for summary judgment under Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil
Practice. The motion was opposed mainly on the ground that, by proceeding to
trial, the plaintiff had waived her right to summary judgment and that the answer
and the opposing affidavits raised triable issues. The amount due and unpaid
under the contract is not in dispute. The Special Term granted both motions and
the defendants have appealed.
The Special Term properly held that the answer and the opposing affidavits raised
no triable issue. Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice and the Civil Practice Act
prescribe no limitation as to the time when a motion for summary judgment must
be made. The object of Rule 113 is to empower the court to summarily determine
whether or not a bona fide issue exists between the parties, and there is no
limitation on the power of the court to make such a determination at any stage of
the litigation." (Emphasis ours)
On the basis of the aforequoted disquisition, "any stage of the litigation" means
that "even if the plaintiff has proceeded to trial, this does not preclude him from
thereafter moving for summary judgment." 66
In the case at bar, petitioner moved for summary judgment after pre-trial and
before its scheduled date for presentation of evidence. Respondent Marcoses
argue that, by agreeing to proceed to trial during the pre-trial conference, petitioner
"waived" its right to summary judgment.
This argument must fail in the light of the New York Supreme Court ruling which we
apply by analogy to this case. In Ecker, 67 the defendant opposed the motion for
summary judgment on a ground similar to that raised by the Marcoses, that is,
"that plaintiff had waived her right to summary judgment" by her act of proceeding
to trial. If, as correctly ruled by the New York court, plaintiff was allowed to move for
summary judgment even after trial and submission of the case for resolution, more
so should we permit it in the present case where petitioner moved for summary
judgment before trial.
Therefore, the phrase "anytime after the pleading in answer thereto has been
In cases with political undertones like the one at bar, adverse parties will often do
almost anything to delay the proceedings in the hope that a future administration
sympathetic to them might be able to influence the outcome of the case in their
favor. This is rank injustice we cannot tolerate.
The law looks with disfavor on long, protracted and expensive litigation and
encourages the speedy and prompt disposition of cases. That is why the law and
the rules provide for a number of devices to ensure the speedy disposition of
cases. Summary judgment is one of them.
Faithful therefore to the spirit of the law on summary judgment which seeks to
avoid unnecessary expense and loss of time in a trial, we hereby rule that
petitioner Republic could validly move for summary judgment any time after the
respondents answer was filed or, for that matter, at any subsequent stage of the
litigation. The fact that petitioner agreed to proceed to trial did not in any way
prevent it from moving for summary judgment, as indeed no genuine issue of fact
was ever validly raised by respondent Marcoses.
This interpretation conforms with the guiding principle enshrined in Section 6, Rule
1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that the" [r]ules should be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding." 69
Respondents further allege that the motion for summary judgment was based on
respondents answer and other documents that had long been in the records of the
case. Thus, by the time the motion was filed on March 10, 2000, estoppel by
laches had already set in against petitioner.
Page
served" in Section 1, Rule 35 of our Rules of Civil Procedure means "at any stage
of the litigation." Whenever it becomes evident at any stage of the litigation that no
triable issue exists, or that the defenses raised by the defendant(s) are sham or
frivolous, plaintiff may move for summary judgment. A contrary interpretation would
go against the very objective of the Rule on Summary Judgment which is to "weed
out sham claims or defenses thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time
involved in a trial." 68
52

Atty. Dela Pea
A careful examination of the records, however, reveals that petitioner was in fact
never remiss in pursuing its case against respondent Marcoses through every
remedy available to it, including the motion for summary judgment.
Petitioner Republic initially filed its motion for summary judgment on October 18,
1996. The motion was denied because of the pending compromise agreement
between the Marcoses and petitioner. But during the pre-trial conference, the
Marcoses denied ownership of the Swiss funds, prompting petitioner to file another
motion for summary judgment now under consideration by this Court. It was the
subsequent events that transpired after the answer was filed, therefore, which
prevented petitioner from filing the questioned motion. It was definitely not because
of neglect or inaction that petitioner filed the (second) motion for summary
judgment years after respondents answer to the petition for forfeiture.
In invoking the doctrine of estoppel by laches, respondents must show not only
unjustified inaction but also that some unfair injury to them might result unless the
action is barred. 72
This, respondents failed to bear out. In fact, during the pre-trial conference, the
Marcoses disclaimed ownership of the Swiss deposits. Not being the owners, as
they claimed, respondents did not have any vested right or interest which could be
adversely affected by petitioners alleged inaction.
But even assuming for the sake of argument that laches had already set in, the
doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the government sues as a
sovereign or asserts governmental rights. 73 Nor can estoppel validate an act that
contravenes law or public policy. 74
As a final point, it must be emphasized that laches is not a mere question of time
but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or asserted. 75 Equity demands that petitioner Republic
should not be barred from pursuing the peoples case against the
Marcoses.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
(2) THE PROPRIETY OF FORFEITURE
We disagree. Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or
unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the person has
abandoned his right or declined to assert it. 70 In effect, therefore, the principle of
laches is one of estoppel because "it prevents people who have slept on their
rights from prejudicing the rights of third parties who have placed reliance on the
inaction of the original parties and their successors-in-interest." 71
The matter of summary judgment having been thus settled, the issue of whether or
not petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with
the requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379 now takes center stage.
The law raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully acquired,
hence subject to forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to
Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has

acquired during his incumbency an amount or property which is manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be
presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.
x
Sec. 6. Judgment. If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the

court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall
declare such property in question, forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of
such judgment the property aforesaid shall become the property of the State.
Provided, That no judgment shall be rendered within six months before any
general election or within three months before any special election. The Court may,
in addition, refer this case to the corresponding Executive Department for
administrative or criminal action, or both.
From the above-quoted provisions of the law, the following facts must be
established in order that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits may be
effected:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) ownership by the public officer of money or property acquired during his
incumbency, whether it be in his name or otherwise, and
(2) the extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i.e., is
grossly disproportionate to, the legitimate income of the public officer.
That spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officials during the time
material to the instant case was never in dispute. Paragraph 4 of respondent
Marcoses answer categorically admitted the allegations in paragraph 4 of the
petition for forfeiture as to the personal circumstances of Ferdinand E. Marcos as a
public official who served without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate
President and President of the Republic of the Philippines from December 1, 1965
to February 25, 1986. 77 Likewise, respondents admitted in their answer the
contents of paragraph 5 of the petition as to the personal circumstances of Imelda
R. Marcos who once served as a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa from
Page
the official salary and other lawful income of the public officer who owns it. Hence,
Sections 2 and 6 of RA 1379 76 provide:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
53

Atty. Dela Pea
1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor, concurrently Minister of Human
Settlements, from June 1976 to February 1986. 78
Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted in paragraph 10 of her answer the
allegations of paragraph 11 of the petition for forfeiture which referred to the
accumulated salaries of respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.
79 The combined accumulated salaries of the Marcos couple were reflected in the
Certification dated May 27, 1986 issued by then Minister of Budget and
Management Alberto Romulo. 80 The Certification showed that, from 1966 to
1985, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos had accumulated salaries in the
amount of P1,570,000 and P718,750, respectively, or a total of
P2,288,750:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Ferdinand E. Marcos, as President
1966-1976 at P60,000/year P660,000
1977-1984 at P100,000/year 800,000
1985 at P110,000/year 110,000
P1,570,00
Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister
June 1976-1985 at P75,000/year P718,000
In addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 are the Marcos
couples combined salaries from January to February 1986 in the amount of
P30,833.33. Hence, their total accumulated salaries amounted to P2,319,583.33.
Converted to U.S. dollars on the basis of the corresponding peso-dollar exchange
rates prevailing during the applicable period when said salaries were received, the
total amount had an equivalent value of $304,372.43.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
The dollar equivalent was arrived at by using the official annual rates of exchange
of the Philippine peso and the US dollar from 1965 to 1985 as well as the official
monthly rates of exchange in January and February 1986 issued by the Center for
Statistical Information of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
Prescinding from the aforesaid admissions, Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Section 4. Judicial admissions An admission, verbal or written, made by a

party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof.
The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. 81
It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the
parties; (b) in the course of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or
stipulations; or (c) in other stages of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the
case. 82 Thus, facts pleaded in the petition and answer, as in the case at bar, are
deemed admissions of petitioner and respondents, respectively, who are not
permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position contrary to or
inconsistent with such admissions. 83
The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of
respondents since they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL),
as required by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Besides, under
the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive "any
other emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and
instrumentalities." 84 Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos
as President could "not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the
Government or any other source." 85 In fact, his management of businesses, like
the administration of foundations to accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited
under the 1973 Constitution:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Article VII, Sec. 4(2) The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their
tenure, hold any other office except when otherwise provided in this Constitution,
nor may they practice any profession, participate directly or indirectly in the
management of any business, or be financially interested directly or indirectly in
any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government or any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
any government owned or controlled corporation.
Article VII, Sec. 11 No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as
counsel before any court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, . . . . Neither
shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof including any government owned or controlled
corporation during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before
any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.
Article IX, Sec. 7 The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be
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Court provides that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
54

Atty. Dela Pea
subject to the provision of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as
counsel before any court or administrative body, or manage any business, or
practice any profession, and shall also be subject to such other disqualification as
may be provided by law.
Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly
serve as basis for determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of
the Swiss funds.
Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to establish a prima facie case for
the forfeiture of the Swiss funds since it failed to prove the essential elements
under Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of RA 1379. As the Act is a penal
statute, its provisions are mandatory and should thus be construed strictly against
the petitioner and liberally in favor of respondent Marcoses.
We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the Marcoses other lawful income
or income from legitimately acquired property for the presumption to apply
because, as between petitioner and respondents, the latter were in a better
position to know if there were such other sources of lawful income. And if indeed
there was such other lawful income, respondents should have specifically stated
the same in their answer. Insofar as petitioner Republic was concerned, it was
enough to specify the known lawful income of respondents.
Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations provides that, in determining prima
facie evidence of ill-gotten wealth, the value of the accumulated assets, properties
and other material possessions of those covered by Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2
must be out of proportion to the known lawful income of such persons. The
respondent Marcos couple did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities
(SAL) from which their net worth could be determined. Their failure to file their SAL
was in itself a violation of law and to allow them to successfully assail the Republic
for not presenting their SAL would reward them for their violation of the law.
Further, contrary to the claim of respondents, the admissions made by them in their
various pleadings and documents were valid. It is of record that respondents
judicially admitted that the money deposited with the Swiss banks belonged to
them.
We agree with petitioner that respondent Marcoses made judicial admissions of
their ownership of the subject Swiss bank deposits in their answer, the
General/Supplemental Agreements, Mrs. Marcos Manifestation and Constancia
dated May 5, 1999, and the Undertaking dated February 10, 1999. We take note of
the fact that the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan were unanimous in
holding that respondents had made judicial admissions of their ownership of the
In their answer, aside from admitting the existence of the subject funds,
respondents likewise admitted ownership thereof. Paragraph 22 of respondents
answer stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
22. Respondents specifically DENY PARAGRAPH 23 insofar as it alleges that
respondents clandestinely stashed the countrys wealth in Switzerland and hid the
same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities for being false,
the truth being that respondents aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.
(Emphasis supplied)
By qualifying their acquisition of the Swiss bank deposits as lawful, respondents
unwittingly admitted their ownership thereof.chanrob1es virtua1 law library
Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted ownership of the Swiss bank deposits by
failing to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of certain actionable
documents bearing her signature attached to the petition. As discussed earlier,
Section 11, Rule 8 86 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that material
averments in the complaint shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.
The General 87 and Supplemental 88 Agreements executed by petitioner and
respondents on December 28, 1993 further bolstered the claim of petitioner
Republic that its case for forfeiture was proven in accordance with the requisites of
Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379. The whereas clause in the General Agreement
declared that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY has obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal
Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the $356 million belongs in principle to the
Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met, but even after
7 years, the FIRST PARTY has not been able to procure a final judgment of
conviction against the PRIVATE PARTY.
While the Supplemental Agreement warranted, inter alia, that:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
In consideration of the foregoing, the parties hereby agree that the PRIVATE
PARTY shall be entitled to the equivalent of 25% of the amount that may be
eventually withdrawn from said $356 million Swiss deposits.
The stipulations set forth in the General and Supplemental Agreements undeniably
indicated the manifest intent of respondents to enter into a compromise with
petitioner. Corollarily, respondents willingness to agree to an amicable settlement
Page
Swiss funds.
55

Atty. Dela Pea
with the Republic only affirmed their ownership of the Swiss deposits for the simple
reason that no person would acquiesce to any concession over such huge dollar
deposits if he did not in fact own them.
Respondents make much capital of the pronouncement by this Court that the
General and Supplemental Agreements were null and void. 89 They insist that
nothing in those agreements could thus be admitted in evidence against them
because they stood on the same ground as an accepted offer which, under Section
27, Rule 130 90 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that "in civil cases,
an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability and is not admissible in
evidence against the offeror."cralaw virtua1aw library
We find no merit in this contention. The declaration of nullity of said agreements
was premised on the following constitutional and statutory infirmities: (1) the grant
of criminal immunity to the Marcos heirs was against the law; (2) the PCGGs
commitment to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the
Marcos heirs was against the Constitution; and (3) the governments undertaking
to cause the dismissal of all cases filed against the Marcoses pending before the
Sandiganbayan and other courts encroached on the powers of the judiciary. The
reasons relied upon by the Court never in the least bit even touched on the
veracity and truthfulness of respondents admission with respect to their ownership
of the Swiss funds. Besides, having made certain admissions in those agreements,
respondents cannot now deny that they voluntarily admitted owning the subject
Swiss funds, notwithstanding the fact that the agreements themselves were later
declared null and void.
The following observation of Sandiganbayan Justice Catalino Castaeda, Jr. in the
decision dated September 19, 2000 could not have been better said:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
. . . The declaration of nullity of the two agreements rendered the same without
legal effects but it did not detract from the admissions of the respondents
contained therein. Otherwise stated, the admissions made in said agreements, as
quoted above, remain binding on the respondents. 91
A written statement is nonetheless competent as an admission even if it is
contained in a document which is not itself effective for the purpose for which it is
made, either by reason of illegality, or incompetency of a party thereto, or by
reason of not being signed, executed or delivered. Accordingly, contracts have
been held as competent evidence of admissions, although they may be
unenforceable. 92
The testimony of respondent Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. during the hearing on the
ATTY. FERNANDO:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Mr. Marcos, did you ever have any meetings with PCGG Chairman Magtanggol C.
Gunigundo?
F. MARCOS, JR.:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Yes. I have had very many meetings in fact with Chairman.
Would you recall when the first meeting occurred?
PJ GARCHITORENA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Page
motion for the approval of the Compromise Agreement on April 29, 1998 also lent
credence to the allegations of petitioner Republic that respondents admitted
ownership of the Swiss bank accounts. We quote the salient portions of Ferdinand
Jr.s formal declarations in open court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
56

Atty. Dela Pea
My reaction to all of these approaches is that I am always open, we are always
open, we are very much always in search of resolution to the problem of the family
and any approach that has been made us, we have entertained. And so my
reaction was the same as what I have always . . . why not? Maybe this is the one
that will finally put an end to this problem. 94
x

Basically, what were the true amounts of the assets in the bank?
So, we are talking about liquid assets here? Just Cash?
Well, basically, any assets. Anything that was under the Marcos name in any of the
banks in Switzerland which may necessarily be not cash. 95
In connection with what?

In connection with the ongoing talks to compromise the various cases initiated by
PCGG against your family?
The nature of our meetings was solely concerned with negotiations towards
achieving some kind of agreement between the Philippine government and the
Marcos family. The discussions that led up to the compromise agreement were
initiated by our then counsel Atty. Simeon Mesina . . .. 93
x

What was your reaction when Atty. Mesina informed you of this possibility?

. . . What did you do in other words, after being apprised of this contract in
connection herewith?
I assumed that we are beginning to implement the agreement because this was
forwarded through the Philippine government lawyers through our lawyers and
then, subsequently, to me. I was a little surprised because we hadnt really
discussed the details of the transfer of the funds, what the bank accounts, what the
mechanism would be. But nevertheless, I was happy to see that as far as the
PCGG is concerned, that the agreement was perfected and that we were
beginning to implement it and that was a source of satisfaction to me because I
thought that finally it will be the end. 96
Ferdinand Jr.s pronouncements, taken in context and in their entirety, were a
confirmation of respondents recognition of their ownership of the Swiss bank
In her Manifestation 99 dated May 26, 1998, respondent Imelda Marcos

furthermore revealed the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That respondent Imelda R. Marcos owns 90% of the subject matter of the aboveentitled case, being the sole beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of the
various foundations alleged in the case;
That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to
the estate of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos;
x
Respondents ownership of the Swiss bank accounts as borne out by Mrs. Marcos
manifestation is as bright as sunlight. And her claim that she is merely a
beneficiary of the Swiss deposits is belied by her own signatures on the appended
copies of the documents substantiating her ownership of the funds in the name of
the foundations. As already mentioned, she failed to specifically deny under oath
the authenticity of such documents, especially those involving "William Saunders"
and "Jane Ryan" which actually referred to Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos,
respectively. That failure of Imelda Marcos to specifically deny the existence, much
less the genuineness and due execution, of the instruments bearing her signature,
was tantamount to a judicial admission of the genuineness and due execution of
said instruments, in accordance with Section 8, Rule 8 100 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Likewise, in her Constancia 101 dated May 6, 1999, Imelda Marcos prayed for the
approval of the Compromise Agreement and the subsequent release and transfer
of the $150 million to the rightful owner. She further made the following
manifestations:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x
Page
deposits. Admissions of a party in his testimony are receivable against him. If a

party, as a witness, deliberately concedes a fact, such concession has the force of
a judicial admission. 97 It is apparent from Ferdinand Jr.s testimony that the
Marcos family agreed to negotiate with the Philippine government in the hope of
finally putting an end to the problems besetting the Marcos family regarding the
Swiss accounts. This was doubtlessly an acknowledgment of ownership on their
part. The rule is that the testimony on the witness stand partakes of the nature of a
formal judicial admission when a party testifies clearly and unequivocally to a fact
which is peculiarly within his own knowledge. 98
57

Atty. Dela Pea
2. The Republics cause of action over the full amount is its forfeiture in favor of the
government if found to be ill-gotten. On the other hand, the Marcoses defend that it
is a legitimate asset. Therefore, both parties have an inchoate right of ownership
over the account. If it turns out that the account is of lawful origin, the Republic
may yield to the Marcoses. Conversely, the Marcoses must yield to the Republic.
(Emphasis supplied)
x
3. Consistent with the foregoing, and the Marcoses having committed themselves
to helping the less fortunate, in the interest of peace, reconciliation and unity,
defendant MADAM IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, in firm abidance thereby,
hereby affirms her agreement with the Republic for the release and transfer of the
US Dollar 150 million for proper disposition, without prejudice to the final outcome
of the litigation respecting the ownership of the remainder.
Again, the above statements were indicative of Imeldas admission of the
Marcoses ownership of the Swiss deposits as in fact "the Marcoses defend that it
(Swiss deposits) is a legitimate (Marcos) asset."cralaw virtua1aw library
On the other hand, respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand
Marcos, Jr. and Maria Irene Marcos-Araneta filed a motion 102 on May 4, 1998
asking the Sandiganbayan to place the res (Swiss deposits) in custodia
legis:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
7. Indeed, the prevailing situation is fraught with danger! Unless the aforesaid
Swiss deposits are placed in custodia legis or within the Courts protective mantle,
its dissipation or misappropriation by the petitioner looms as a distinct possibility.
Such display of deep, personal interest can only come from someone who believes
that he has a marked and intimate right over the considerable dollar deposits.
Truly, by filing said motion, the Marcos children revealed their ownership of the
said deposits.
Lastly, the Undertaking 103 entered into by the PCGG, the PNB and the Marcos
foundations on February 10, 1999, confirmed the Marcoses ownership of the
Swiss bank deposits. The subject Undertaking brought to light their readiness to
pay the human rights victims out of the funds held in escrow in the PNB. It
stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREAS, the Third Party is likewise willing to release, assign and/or waive all its
rights and interests over said US$150 million to the aforementioned human rights
victims-plaintiffs.
All told, the foregoing disquisition negates the claim of respondents that "petitioner
failed to prove that they acquired or own the Swiss funds and that "it was only by
arbitrarily isolating and taking certain statements made by private respondents out
of context that petitioner was able to treat these as judicial admissions." The Court
is fully aware of the relevance, materiality and implications of every pleading and
document submitted in this case. This Court carefully scrutinized the proofs
presented by the parties. We analyzed, assessed and weighed them to ascertain if
each piece of evidence rightfully qualified as an admission. Owing to the farreaching historical and political implications of this case, we considered and
examined, individually and totally, the evidence of the parties, even if it might have
bordered on factual adjudication which, by authority of the rules and jurisprudence,
is not usually done by this Court. There is no doubt in our mind that respondent
Marcoses admitted ownership of the Swiss bank deposits.
We have always adhered to the familiar doctrine that an admission made in the
pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and
becomes conclusive on him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto
or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether an objection is interposed by
the adverse party or not. 104 This doctrine is embodied in Section 4, Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in
the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made. 105
Page
WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines sympathizes with the plight of the
human rights victims-plaintiffs in the aforementioned litigation through the Second
Party, desires to assist in the satisfaction of the judgment awards of said human
rights victims-plaintiffs, by releasing, assigning and or waiving US$150 million of
the funds held in escrow under the Escrow Agreements dated August 14, 1995,
although the Republic is not obligated to do so under final judgments of the Swiss
courts dated December 10 and 19, 1997, and January 8, 1998;
58

Atty. Dela Pea
1aw library
SEC. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. The act or declaration of a partner
or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the existence of
the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the
partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or
other person jointly interested with the party. 106
SEC. 31. Admission by privies. Where one derives title to property from another,
the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to
the property, is evidence against the former. 107
The declarations of a person are admissible against a party whenever a "privity of
estate" exists between the declarant and the party, the term "privity of estate"
generally denoting a succession in rights. 108 Consequently, an admission of one
in privity with a party to the record is competent. 109 Without doubt, privity exists
among the respondents in this case. And where several co-parties to the record
are jointly interested in the subject matter of the controversy, the admission of one
is competent against all. 110
Respondents insist that the Sandiganbayan is correct in ruling that petitioner
Republic has failed to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss
deposits.
We disagree. The sudden turn-around of the Sandiganbayan was really strange, to
say the least, as its findings and conclusions were not borne out by the voluminous
records of this case.
Section 2 of RA 1379 explicitly states that "whenever any public officer or
employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to
his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said
property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully
acquired. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The elements which must concur for this prima facie presumption to apply
are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, respondents judicial

admission of ownership of the Swiss deposits is definitely binding on them.
(1) the offender is a public officer or employee;
The individual and separate admissions of each respondent bind all of them
pursuant to Sections 29 and 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:chanrob1es virtual
(2) the must have acquired a considerable amount of money or property during his
incumbency; and
It is undisputed that spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were former public
officers. Hence, the first element is clearly extant.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The second element deals with the amount of money or property acquired by the
public officer during his incumbency. The Marcos couple indubitably acquired and
owned properties during their term of office. In fact, the five groups of Swiss
accounts were admittedly owned by them. There is proof of the existence and
ownership of these assets and properties and it suffices to comply with the second
element.
The third requirement is met if it can be shown that such assets, money or property
is manifestly out of proportion to the public officers salary and his other lawful
income. It is the proof of this third element that is crucial in determining whether a
prima facie presumption has been established in this case.
Petitioner Republic presented not only a schedule indicating the lawful income of
the Marcos spouses during their incumbency but also evidence that they had huge
deposits beyond such lawful income in Swiss banks under the names of five
different foundations. We believe petitioner was able to establish the prima facie
presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses were
manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public
officials. Otherwise stated, petitioner presented enough evidence to convince us
that the Marcoses had dollar deposits amounting to US $356 million representing
the balance of the Swiss accounts of the five foundations, an amount way, way
beyond their aggregate legitimate income of only US$304,372.43 during their
incumbency as government officials.
Considering, therefore, that the total amount of the Swiss deposits was
considerably out of proportion to the known lawful income of the Marcoses, the
presumption that said dollar deposits were unlawfully acquired was duly
established. It was sufficient for the petition for forfeiture to state the approximate
amount of money and property acquired by the respondents, and their total
government salaries. Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations
states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Prima Facie Evidence. Any accumulation of assets, properties, and other
material possessions of those persons covered by Executive Orders No. 1 and No.
2, whose value is out of proportion to their known lawful income is prima facie
Page
(3) said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property.
59

Atty. Dela Pea
deemed ill-gotten wealth.
Indeed, the burden of proof was on the respondents to dispute this presumption
and show by clear and convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully
acquired and that they had other legitimate sources of income. A presumption is
prima facie proof of the fact presumed and, unless the fact thus prima facie
established by legal presumption is disproved, it must stand as proved. 111
Respondent Mrs. Marcos argues that the foreign foundations should have been
impleaded as they were indispensable parties without whom no complete
determination of the issues could be made. She asserts that the failure of petitioner
Republic to implead the foundations rendered the judgment void as the joinder of
indispensable parties was a sine qua non exercise of judicial power. Furthermore,
the non-inclusion of the foreign foundations violated the conditions prescribed by
the Swiss government regarding the deposit of the funds in escrow, deprived them
of their day in court and denied them their rights under the Swiss constitution and
international law. 112
The Court finds that petitioner Republic did not err in not impleading the foreign
foundations. Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, 113 taken
from Rule 19b of the American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for the
compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Generally, an indispensable party
must be impleaded for the complete determination of the suit. However, failure to
join an indispensable party does not divest the court of jurisdiction since the rule
regarding indispensable parties is founded on equitable considerations and is not
jurisdictional. Thus, the court is not divested of its power to render a decision even
in the absence of indispensable parties, though such judgment is not binding on
the non-joined party. 114
An indispensable party 115 has been defined as one:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
[who] must have a direct interest in the litigation; and if this interest is such that it
cannot be separated from that of the parties to the suit, if the court cannot render
justice between the parties in his absence, if the decree will have an injurious
effect upon his interest, or if the final determination of the controversy in his
absence will be inconsistent with equity and good conscience.
There are two essential tests of an indispensable party: (1) can relief be afforded
the plaintiff without the presence of the other party? and (2) can the case be
decided on its merits without prejudicing the rights of the other party? 116 There is,
however, no fixed formula for determining who is an indispensable party; this can
only be determined in the context and by the facts of the particular suit or litigation.
The rulings of the Swiss court that the foundations, as formal owners, must be
given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings hinged on the assumption
that they owned a nominal share of the assets. 118 But this was already refuted by
no less than Mrs. Marcos herself. Thus, she cannot now argue that the ruling of the
Sandiganbayan violated the conditions set by the Swiss court. The directive given
by the Swiss court for the foundations to participate in the proceedings was for the
purpose of protecting whatever nominal interest they might have had in the assets
as formal owners. But inasmuch as their ownership was subsequently repudiated
by Imelda Marcos, they could no longer be considered as indispensable parties
and their participation in the proceedings became unnecessary.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 119 this Court ruled that impleading the firms which
are the res of the action was unnecessary:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"And as to corporations organized with ill-gotten wealth, but are not themselves
guilty of misappropriation, fraud or other illicit conduct in other words, the
companies themselves are not the object or thing involved in the action, the res
thereof there is no need to implead them either. Indeed, their impleading is not
proper on the strength alone of their having been formed with ill-gotten funds,
absent any other particular wrongdoing on their part . . .
Such showing of having been formed with, or having received ill-gotten funds,
however strong or convincing, does not, without more, warrant identifying the
corporations in question with the person who formed or made use of them to give
the color or appearance of lawful, innocent acquisition to illegally amassed wealth
at the least, not so as place on the Government the onus of impleading the
former with the latter in actions to recover such wealth. Distinguished in terms of
juridical personality and legal culpability from their erring members or stockholders,
Page
In the present case, there was an admission by respondent Imelda Marcos in her
May 26, 1998 Manifestation before the Sandiganbayan that she was the sole
beneficiary of 90% of the subject matter in controversy with the remaining 10%
belonging to the estate of Ferdinand Marcos. 117 Viewed against this admission,
the foreign foundations were not indispensable parties. Their non-participation in
the proceedings did not prevent the court from deciding the case on its merits and
according full relief to petitioner Republic. The judgment ordering the return of the
$356 million was neither inimical to the foundations interests nor inconsistent with
equity and good conscience. The admission of respondent Imelda Marcos only
confirmed what was already generally known: that the foundations were
established precisely to hide the money stolen by the Marcos spouses from
petitioner Republic. It negated whatever illusion there was, if any, that the foreign
foundations owned even a nominal part of the assets in question.
60

Atty. Dela Pea
said corporations are not themselves guilty of the sins of the latter, of the
embezzlement, asportation, etc., that gave rise to the Governments cause of
action for recovery; their creation or organization was merely the result of their
members (or stockholders) manipulations and maneuvers to conceal the illegal
origins of the assets or monies invested therein. In this light, they are simply the
res in the actions for the recovery of illegally acquired wealth, and there is, in
principle, no cause of action against them and no ground to implead them as
defendants in said actions."cralaw virtua1aw library
Just like the corporations in the aforementioned case, the foreign foundations here
were set up to conceal the illegally acquired funds of the Marcos spouses. Thus,
they were simply the res in the action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and did not
have to be impleaded for lack of cause of action or ground to implead them.
Assuming arguendo, however, that the foundations were indispensable parties, the
failure of petitioner to implead them was a curable error, as held in the previously
cited case of Republic v. Sandiganbayan: 120
"Even in those cases where it might reasonably be argued that the failure of the
Government to implead the sequestered corporations as defendants is indeed a
procedural aberration, as where said firms were allegedly used, and actively
cooperated with the defendants, as instruments or conduits for conversion of public
funds and property or illicit or fraudulent obtention of favored government
contracts, etc., slight reflection would nevertheless lead to the conclusion that the
defect is not fatal, but one correctible under applicable adjective rules e.g.,
Section 10, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court [specifying the remedy of amendment
during trial to authorize or to conform to the evidence]; Section 1, Rule 20
[governing amendments before trial], in relation to the rule respecting omission of
so-called necessary or indispensable parties, set out in Section 11, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court. It is relevant in this context to advert to the old familiar doctrines
that the omission to implead such parties "is a mere technical defect which can be
cured at any stage of the proceedings even after judgment" ; and that, particularly
in the case of indispensable parties, since their presence and participation is
essential to the very life of the action, for without them no judgment may be
rendered, amendments of the complaint in order to implead them should be freely
allowed, even on appeal, in fact even after rendition of judgment by this Court,
where it appears that the complaint otherwise indicates their identity and character
as such indispensable parties." 121
Although there are decided cases wherein the non-joinder of indispensable parties
in fact led to the dismissal of the suit or the annulment of judgment, such cases do
not jibe with the matter at hand. The better view is that non-joinder is not a ground
to dismiss the suit or annul the judgment. The rule on joinder of indispensable
Likewise, jurisprudence on the Federal Rules of Procedure, from which our Section
7, Rule 3 124 on indispensable parties was copied, allows the joinder of
indispensable parties even after judgment has been entered if such is needed to
afford the moving party full relief. 125 Mere delay in filing the joinder motion does
not necessarily result in the waiver of the right as long as the delay is excusable.
126 Thus, respondent Mrs. Marcos cannot correctly argue that the judgment
rendered by the Sandiganbayan was void due to the non-joinder of the foreign
foundations. The court had jurisdiction to render judgment which, even in the
absence of indispensable parties, was binding on all the parties before it though
not on the absent party. 127 If she really felt that she could not be granted full relief
due to the absence of the foreign foundations, she should have moved for their
inclusion, which was allowable at any stage of the proceedings. She never did.
Instead she assailed the judgment rendered.
In the face of undeniable circumstances and the avalanche of documentary
evidence against them, respondent Marcoses failed to justify the lawful nature of
their acquisition of the said assets. Hence, the Swiss deposits should be
considered ill-gotten wealth and forfeited in favor of the State in accordance with
Section 6 of RA 1379:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 6. Judgment. If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the
court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall
declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment
the property aforesaid shall become property of the State . . . .
THE FAILURE TO PRESENT AUTHENTICATED
TRANSLATIONS OF THE SWISS DECISIONS
Finally, petitioner Republic contends that the Honorable Sandiganbayan Presiding
Justice Francis Garchitorena committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing
himself on the ground that the original copies of the authenticated Swiss decisions
and their authenticated translations were not submitted to the court a quo. Earlier
PJ Garchitorena had quoted extensively from the unofficial translation of one of
these Swiss decisions in his ponencia dated July 29, 1999 when he denied the
motion to release US$150 Million to the human rights victims.
Page
parties is founded on equity. And the spirit of the law is reflected in Section 11, Rule
3 122 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It prohibits the dismissal of a suit on
the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment of the
complaint at any stage of the proceedings, through motion or on order of the court
on its own initiative. 123
61

Atty. Dela Pea
While we are in reality perplexed by such an incomprehensible change of heart,
there might nevertheless not be any real need to belabor the issue. The
presentation of the authenticated translations of the original copies of the Swiss
decision was not de rigueur for the public respondent to make findings of fact and
reach its conclusions. In short, the Sandiganbayans decision was not dependent
on the determination of the Swiss courts. For that matter, neither is this Courts.
The release of the Swiss funds held in escrow in the PNB is dependent solely on
the decision of this jurisdiction that said funds belong to the petitioner Republic.
What is important is our own assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence to rule
in favor of either petitioner Republic or respondent Marcoses. In this instance,
despite the absence of the authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions, the
evidence on hand tilts convincingly in favor of petitioner Republic.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2002 is SET ASIDE. The Swiss deposits which
were transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National
Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31,
2002, plus interest, are hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the
Philippines.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
Page
62

Atty. Dela Pea
[G.R. NO. 142896 : September 12, 2007]
CANELAND SUGAR CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. HON. REYNALDO M.
ALON, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, and ERIC B. DE
VERA, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
On July 15, 1999, Caneland Sugar Corporation (petitioner) filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Silay City, Branch 40, a complaint for damages, injunction, and
nullity of mortgage against the Land Bank of the Philippines (respondent) and
Sheriff Eric B. de Vera, docketed as Civil Case No. 2067-40, praying for the
following reliefs: issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent
and the Sheriff from proceeding with the auction sale of petitioner's property;
declaration of nullity of any foreclosure sale to be held; declaration of nullity of the
mortgage constituted over petitioner's property covered by TCT No. T-11292 in
favor of respondent; and award of damages.1
On July 21, 1999, the RTC issued an Order holding in abeyance the auction sale
set on July 23, 1999, as agreed upon by the parties.2 Notwithstanding said
directive, another foreclosure sale was scheduled on October 15, 1999. Per RTC
Order dated October 14, 1999, the October 15 scheduled sale was held in
abeyance; but re-scheduled the sale on November 15, 1999, for the following
reasons:
However, P.D. 385 provides that it shall be mandatory for government financial
institution to foreclose collaterals and/or securities for any loan, credit
accommodations and/or guarantees granted by them whenever the arrearages on
such account, including accrued interest and other charges amount to at least 20%
of the total outstanding obligation as appearing in the books of the financial
institution. Moreover, no restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction shall
be issued by the court against any government financial institution in any action
taken by such institution in compliance with the mandatory foreclosure provided by
said law. x x x The defendant Land Bank of the Philippines and Eric B. De Vera,
THIRD DIVISION
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's Order, but this was
denied per Order dated November 8, 1999.4
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 56137. In a
Decision5 dated March 22, 2000, the CA, finding that the RTC did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion, denied due course and dismissed the petition for lack of
merit.6 Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Decision, which was eventually
denied by the CA in a Resolution dated April 17, 2000.7
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
Petitioner contends in the main that the RTC's act of authorizing the foreclosure of
its property amounts to a prejudgment of the case since it amounts to a ruling that
respondent has a valid mortgage in its favor. Petitioner also argues, among others,
that Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 385 is not applicable inasmuch as at the time of
the lease to Sunnix, Inc., the management and control of its operations has already
been virtually taken over by respondent.
On the other hand, respondent maintains that: P.D. No. 385 prohibits the issuance
of an injunctive order against government financial institutions; the CA did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion; the RTC Order merely dealt with the
propriety of the injunctive order and not the validity of the mortgage; and the issue
of the propriety of the injunctive order has been rendered moot and academic by
the foreclosure sale conducted and the issuance of a certificate of sale by the
sheriff.8
Based on the arguments of the parties, the principal issue is whether the CA erred
in finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not enjoining
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties subject of this case.
Page
Sheriff of this Court, are hereby authorized to proceed with the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale on November 15, 1999.3
63

Atty. Dela Pea
Without first resolving the foregoing issue, the Court finds that the petition should
be denied for the sole reason that the act sought to be enjoined by petitioner is
already fait accompli. In Transfield Philippines, Inc. v. Luzon Hydro
Corporation,9 the Court held that '
[I]njunction would not lie where the acts sought to be enjoined have already
become fait accompli or an accomplished or consummated act. In Ticzon v. Video
Post Manila, Inc. this Court ruled that where the period within which the former
employees were prohibited from engaging in or working for an enterprise that
competed with their former employer' the very purpose of the preliminary injunction
'has expired, any declaration upholding the propriety of the writ would be entirely
useless as there would be no actual case or controversy between the parties
insofar as the preliminary injunction is concerned.10
Records show that the foreclosure sale which petitioner sought to be enjoined by
the RTC has already been carried out by the Sheriff, and in fact, a Certificate of
Sale dated June 26, 2000 was issued to respondent.11 There is, therefore, no more
actual case or controversy between the parties insofar as the RTC's refusal to
enjoin the sale is concerned, and any resolution by the Court of the impropriety or
propriety of the RTC's refusal to issue any restraining or injunctive relief against the
foreclosure sale will serve no purpose but merely lend further addle to Civil Case
No. 2067-40 pending before the RTC.
Nevertheless, even if petitioner's quest for the issuance of an injunctive relief has
been rendered moot and academic by the holding of the foreclosure sale and
issuance of Certificate of Sale, the Court finds it necessary to resolve the merits of
the principal issue raised for the future guidance of both bench and bar. As the
Court stated in Acop v. Guingona, Jr.,12 "courts will decide a question otherwise
moot and academic if it is 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.' "
Petitioner does not dispute its loan obligation with respondent. Petitioner's bone of
contention before the RTC is that the promissory notes are silent as to whether
they were covered by the Mortgage Trust Indenture and Mortgage Participation on
its property covered by TCT No. T-11292.13 It does not categorically deny that
these promissory notes are covered by the security documents. These vague
assertions are, in fact, negative pregnants, i.e., denials pregnant with the
admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not
Petitioner's allegations do not make out any justifiable basis for the granting of any
injunctive relief. Even when the mortgagors were disputing the amount being
sought from them, upon the non-payment of the loan, which was secured by the
mortgage, the mortgaged property is properly subject to a foreclosure sale. This is
in consonance with the doctrine that to authorize a temporary injunction, the
plaintiff must show, at least prima facie, a right to the final relief.15
The foregoing conclusion finds greater force in light of the provisions of P.D. No.
385,16 Section 1 of which, provides for a mandatory foreclosure, viz.:
Section 1. It shall be mandatory for government financial institutions, after the
lapse of sixty (60) days from the issuance of this Decree, to foreclose the
collaterals and/or securities for any loan, credit, accommodation, and/or
guarantees granted by them whenever the arrearages on such account, including
accrued interest and other charges, amount to at least twenty (20%) of the total
outstanding obligations, including interest and other charges, as appearing in the
books of account and/or related records of the financial institution concerned. This
shall be without prejudice to the exercise by the government financial institution of
such rights and/or remedies available to them under their respective contracts with
their debtors, including the right to foreclose on loans, credits, accommodations,
and or guarantees on which the arrearages are less than twenty percent (20%).
while Section 2 prohibits the issuance of restraining orders or injunctions against
government financial institutions in any foreclosure action taken by such
institutions, to wit:
Section 2. No restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction shall be issued
by the court against any government financial institution in any action taken by
Page
squarely denied. As defined in Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan,14 a

negative pregnant is a "form of negative expression which carries with it an
affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It
is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the
words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been
held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is
admitted."
64

Atty. Dela Pea
such institution in compliance with the mandatory foreclosure provided in Section 1
hereof whether such restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction is sought
by the borrower(s) or any third party or parties, except after due hearing in which it
is established by the borrower and admitted by the government financial institution
concerned that twenty percent (20%) of the outstanding arrearages had been paid
after the filing of foreclosure proceedings.
Petitioner cannot find any solace in its contention that the case of Filipinas Marble
Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court17 is applicable to the present case.
In Filipinas Marble, it was the DBP-imposed management of FMC that brought the
corporation to ruin, not to mention that there wereprima facie findings of
mismanagement and misappropriation of the loan proceeds by DBP and Bancom.
Moreover, the liability of FMC for the loan, which was the basis of the mortgage
being foreclosed, was not yet settled. These circumstances prompted the Court to
grant an injunction against the foreclosure sale. The Court ruled '
x x x P.D. 385 was never meant to protect officials of government lending
institutions who take over the management of a borrower corporation, lead that
corporation to bankruptcy through mismanagement or misappropriation of its
funds, and who, after ruining it, use the mandatory provisions of the decree to
avoid the consequences of their misdeeds.
The designated officers of the government financing institution cannot simply walk
away and then state that since the loans were obtained in the corporation's name,
then P.D. 385 must be peremptorily applied and that there is no way the borrower
corporation can prevent the automatic foreclosure of the mortgage on its properties
once the arrearages reach twenty percent (20%) of the total obligation no matter
who was responsible.18
In the case at bench, petitioner does not deny its liability. While petitioner alleged
that the management and control of its operations has already been virtually taken
over by respondent, thus, implying that it was respondent that caused petitioner's
present miserable financial state, this allegation is obviously merely an attempt to
place itself under the Filipinas Marble situation in order to preempt the operation of
P.D. No. 385. Petitioner's claim is more appropriately threshed out and determined
after trial on the merits.
In any event, such issue of the validity of the mortgage, not to mention the issue of
the nullity of the foreclosure sale as well as petitioner's prayer for damages, still
has to be resolved in the trial court.
Page
The Court likewise cannot sustain petitioner's argument that the RTC's refusal to
grant any injunctive relief amounts to a prejudgment of the issues before it. The
RTC's sole basis for allowing the foreclosure sale to proceed is P.D. No. 385. It did
not make any finding or disposition on the issue of the validity of the mortgage.
65

Atty. Dela Pea
preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights and
interests. Injunction is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional
remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. When the act sought to be enjoined ha[d]
become fait accompli, only the prayer for provisional remedy should be
denied. However, the trial court should still proceed with the determination of
the principal action so that an adjudication of the rights of the parties can be
had.20 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
As ruled in Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals,19 to wit:
Costs against petitioner.
In the instant case, aside from the principal action for damages, private respondent
sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the foreclosure sale in order to prevent an alleged irreparable
injury to private respondent. It is settled that these injunctive reliefs are
SO ORDERED.

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Atty. Dela Pea

[G.R. No. 158239 : January 25, 2012]

Javellana prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of

In his appeal (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259), Javellana submitted the following as

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Priscilla claims that Javellana engaged in forum shopping by filing a notice of

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Instead, we see the situation of resorting to two inconsistent remedial approaches

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[G.R. No. 186720 : February 08, 2012]

the conditions in their agreement.

Furnish copies of this Order to all counsels and parties.

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The requirements for verification and certification against forum shopping in

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Furthermore, we have consistently held that verification of a pleading is a formal,

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COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS

[G.R. No. 172623 : March 13, 2010]

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Hence, this petition based on the following grounds:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING

Petitioner's contentions are basically the same as those it presented to the

assailed resolution dated April 27, 2005.

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Section 72. When and Where to File. - A decision or ruling of a department or

This petition involves both procedural and substantive issues.

On the procedural aspect, Paler questions the authority of the Commission

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An official or an employee who is continuously absent without approved leave for

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BENGUET EXPLORATION, INC., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS,

[G.R. No. 117434. February 9, 2001.]

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When cross-examined, Cayabyab said that, as a secretary, his duties included

concentrates. These copper concentrates were to be loaded on the ship

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Contrary to this rule, petitioner is raising questions of facts as it seeks an

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Q Do you have anything to do in the preparation of this bill of lading?

Q Did you personally verify if these figures are true?

A No, sir. Just by phone.

Q Did you participate in weighing?

Q In other words somebody else made the weighing not you?

Q And who undertakes the draft survey?

Q So you are informed [of] the weight actually loaded by phone?

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[G.R. NO. 160242 : May 17, 2005]

3. Ordering defendant to pay attorney's fees in the amount equivalent to 15% of

9. Third-party defendant Becthel contracted the services of third-party plaintiff to do

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III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE THIRD-PARTY

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II. WHETHER OR NOT JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS IS PROPER.11

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