Int J Psychoanal 2003; 84:11251147

ExperienceWhat is it?
H. SHMUEL
ERLICH
42 Midbar Sinai St, Jerusalem IL-97 805, Israel

Shmuel.E rlich @h u ji. ac. il

(Final version accepted 3
February 2003)

The author takes a renewed look at the constitutive aspects

of experience, looking at it as process rather than contents.
Recently more psychoanalytic voices are

discernible that

argue for the complexity and multi-leveled nature of inner

experience.

Yet

psychoanalytic

the

voice

predominant

has

and

traditionally

preeminent

emphasized

the

linearity and single-factored nature of experience and all that

is

based

on

it:

development,

psychopathology, and treatment. The

understanding

of

operation

two

of

experience

as

contiguous,

object
author

stemming
ongoing

relations,
ofers
from

an
the

modalities

of

processing internal and external input, and reecting two

polarities of the subject-object experience: of separateness
and instrumentality, and of oneness and ongoing being. Such
a

conceptual

reframing

of

experience

implications

for

understanding

subjectivity,

inter-relatedness

as

harbors

subjectivity
well

as

psychology, and the all-important role of an

multiple

and

inter-

single-person
experiential

goodness-of-t in the analytic situation and elsewhere.

Keywords: experience, subjectivity,
intersubjectivity, object relations,
experiential modalities

More so than any area of combined knowledge and

practice, psychoanalysis deals with human experience. A
century of engagement has resulted in a rich and
diverse clinical and theoretical body of thought and
cumulative experience. Yet there is a gap that needs
urgently to be addressedbetween structural notions
of the mind and its workings, and the varieties of
experiential contents to which it gives rise. It is this
gap that I attempt to address by ofering an approach
to experience that I think is different and new. It is a
way of understanding that puts the question: How is

experience formed ? before the one more usually asked:

What does it tell or communicate?
These questions border on the philosophical, and
psychoanalysis can indeed be enriched by the wisdom
and insight offered by philosophy. There are
reviews of this
pursue (see,

in

1993).

to

It

is

excellent

juncture, which I do not intend to

particular,
be

hoped

Kirshner,
that

1991;

the

Cavell,

psychoanalytic

discussion may also be of value to philosophy, as well as

to other elds. For the sake of brevity and clarity, I
must

similarly

refrain

from

mentioning

the

many

psychoanalytic writings that touch on what I attempt to

examine.1
The logic of causality,
harking back to its
Aristotelian roots, heavily dominates
psychoanalytic thinking. A causal line of understanding,
explanation and argumentation typies the theory and
the

treatment

approach based on

it.

This

logic

is

intrinsically related to numerous debates around the

analysts
neutrality,

objectivity/subjectivity,
transference

and

issues

around

countertransference,

and

disclaimers concerning the scientic

1

A much abbreviated list of psychoanaly tic contr ibutions p er tinent to

this d iscu ssion mu st include Balint (1968), Bion (1977), Eigen (1981,
1983), Feder n (1926 ), Ferenczi (1933), Grotstein (1980, 1981, 1982),
Her man n (1936,
1980), Kohut (1971, 1977), Lacan (1977, 1978), Loewald (1980), Matte
Blanco (1975), Meltzer (1973), Mil ner (1957,
1969), Mo dell (1993), Sandler (196 0), Sandler and
Ro senblat t
(1962), Ster n (1977, 1985) and Win n icot t (1971).
2003 Institute of Psychoanalysis

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EXPERIENCE
H. SHMUEL
WHAT
ERLICH
IS IT?

standing of psychoanalysis. The latter issue has often

been ascribed to being caught up in a nineteenth-century
model of physical science, or in a biological-medical
model.

This

is

only

partially

accurate,

however.

In

efect, it is part of a much larger view of reality as

objectivei.e. as separate from the subject
that envelops Western thought, far beyond science and
medicine.

This

treatment

stance

has

professions,

found

and

its

way

especially

into
into

the
the

psychoanalytic view of the mind. In fact, the term

mind is itself an objectication of what could more
protably

be studied

experience is,

as experience.

however,

The study of

biased and slanted by such

traditional and habitual modes of thinking. I would like

to offer a new way of thinking about the nature of
experience. I take a view that treats experience as dual,
not singular, and regards causality as an aspect arising
from and conned to only one strand of experience.
Such an

approach opens the way to dethroning the

causal and objective model as the singular and only

worthwhile one. But I also take a view that contrasts
with

recent

and

current

experiential approach as

writers

who

stress

the

the only meaningful one. In

my opinion, both the objective (subject separate from

object)

and

subjective

(subject

not

separate

from

object) points of view are emanations of the inherently

dualistic nature of our experience and the way it is
processed. We can no more get rid of one than of the
other, and we denitely need both modes to function
and to engage in the treatment of others.

What do we mean by experience?

Experience is a term loaded with signication and
meaning. Among these we
through an

event

nd The actual living

the real life as contrasted

with the ideal or imaginary. Other senses

knowledge,

skill

or

technique

that

refer to the
results

from

experience, or to the cumulative addition and residue of

11271
EXPERIENCE
H. SHMUEL
11271
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IS IT?
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having experience. WHAT
Another
meaning is The sum total

of the conscious events which compose an individual

life. Yet another is The ultimate, nonanalyzed [!] data
of

all

happenings

that

may

be

apprehended;

summum genus of all knowable reality

the
The

data of perception, in contrast with what is supplied by

the operations of thought. All

the denitions are

quoted from Websters (1959).

In psychoanalytic writings, experience is typically
used in the rst two of the
above senses. We
usually
speak of a
persons
experience in terms of
him/her,

or

(still

in

what actually happened to

the

same

sense)

of

his/her

prolonged, cumulative life experience. Another frequent

usage

stresses

psychic

immediacy,

in

the

connected

to

what

actuality

sense

of

and

feeling

transpires,

emotional
subjectively

particularly

in

the

affective sphere. We may say, for example, that someone

did not really experience his/ her sorrow or trauma.
This phenomenon

is then causally explained in meta-

psychological termsas the result of repression,

dissociation, characterological
and overload,
register
beginning

defenses, ego weakness

and so on. In fact, patients who do not

their
with

experience
Freuds

are

commonplace,

hysterical

patients

la

belle

indifference all the

way to the deeply disturbed borderline and severe
personality disorders so frequently
met today. They present as not feeling,
or not
experiencing

themselves,

or

not

connected, even, or especially, with

an

feeling

alive

and

what ought to be

acute experience, such as trauma, object loss and

separation. Different metaphors have been suggested for

these experiential

states, such as absence, void, black

hole, inner deadness, and being unavailable to oneself

or others.2 The implication

is that,

regardless of the

nature of the
2

See,

especially, Grotstei n (1980), who develops an explanator y concept

the dual t rack bir th of the in fantwh ich at some points is

cong r uent with my prop osition s.

experience in question, it did not register consciously

or, if it did, it was devoid of its expected accompanying
affective signiers.
Lacanian thinking speaks of three realms or registers
of

experiencereal,

which

bear

imaginary

differently

upon

and

symbolic

experiencing

experience. The real, the most difcult

to

and
grasp

and dene, refers to the ultimate,

non-analyzed and

non- symbolic level. It implies

absence of sharp

an

delineation between self and the world, as in psychotic

experience, or the unassimilated nature of

traumatic

experience, the uncanny and unnamable. The imaginary

refers to the direct correspondence between an

object

and its image, as in an object presentation (as against its

representation). The symbolic realm is
served by the introduction
language)

ushered in and

of signiers

(signs

and

and the complexities enabled by it. These

realms may, perhaps, be analogized with developmental

phases as, for instance, the transition from pictograms to
linguistic representation.
Post-Lacanian thinking takes up the creation of
experiential meaning through
signication. Language and signiers are mutually
attuned, so that signiers provide a semiotic level and
context that follows the structure of language, spoken
or otherwise signed, while the structure of language
follows the semiotic level and context provided by the
contiguity and similarity of signs (Muller, 1996). The
signication

of

experience

is

indeed

crucial

for

transforming experience from the realm of the real

into those realms in which it becomes psychologically
imbued with meaning. Early infant research corroborates
the

assertion that,

initially

while

the

be pre-verbal, he/she is

human

infant

almost never pre-

linguistic (Trevarthen, 1989a, 1989b; Muller,

The

semiotically

constructive

may

and

1996).

participatory

environment is what helps the infant transpose

real

(i.e.

non-semiotic)

experience

into

signed,

signied and signicant experience in the symbolic

and imaginary spheres. While

language is

certainly a

medium for this process, it does not constitute

the

process of transposition.

Is experience unitary?
Whether I am learning the table of multiplication,
riding a bicycle, listening to music, engaged in an
intimate
or sexual relationship, getting
angry or
hostile, the specic experience I have in each case is
that singular or particular one. Concurrently,
there
may, of
course,
be
other, related
or
unrelated
experiences, of which I may be more, less or not at all
aware: I may also feel bored while learning the table of
multiplication ; afraid or exhilarated while riding my
bicycle; attentive to other images, fantasies and
thoughts while listening to music or participating in
sex; excited while being angry;
and so on and so forth. Psychoanalysis has a great deal
to say about such concurrent, correlated or collateral
experiences, and how we may approach and understand
them

by

following

associative

chains,

discovering

conicts, overcoming defensive postures etc.3

But these are clearly other experiences, which exist along
with or are triggered by the
experiences in question. In my view, this approach to
experience is essentially unitary (i.e. conceived as a
singular event) and typically refers to the contents of
what is focused on as the experience. From the
psychoanalytic point of view, the relevant question then
becomes that of consciousness. We want to know what
else, or what more, was going on in the persons mind,
while that one experience was consciously registered.
As I said, the implication
is of unitariness, and the
emphasis is on contents, as in a narrative.
3

The variou s ways in wh ich collateral experience has b een

psychoanaly tically are

stud ied

too nu merous to elaborate, but they include such

notions as splitt ing, d issociation, a divided self and a decentered subject.

The

narrative

expressed

in

notion
the

of

experience

Kleinian

idea

is
of

beautifully
unconscious

phantasy (Isaacs, 1948). I submit that this view of

experience dominates Western thought in general, and
psychoanalysis in particular.
I

suggest

indeed,

the

diferent

view.

ultimate,

happenings that may

If

experience

nonanalyzed

data

of

is,
all

be apprehended;

the summum

genus of all knowable reality

The data of

perception, in contrast with what is supplied by the

operations of thought, then what we experience is, in
some way, the end result of whatever processes are
involved in transforming our raw sense
psychologically

meaningful

data into the

experiential

contents

we

eventually cognize and recognize. In other words, our

experience is

entirely contingent upon the mode or

method in which it is processed. The question of where

and

how

concern

such processing actually

us at

this point:

it

is

occurs

probably

neuropsychological mechanisms, which

studied and identied.

need not
related to

may

soon be

It may also, however, take

place at higher, more essentially psychological levels.

From a psychoanalytic point of view, if we wish to
understand inner experience, it need not be a question
of how and where the transformation
Freud

(1900) realized

when

he

takes place, as

switched

from

the

neurological to the psychological level. Yet the question

he raised in this regard in the Project (1895) is still
pertinent: How do raw sense
experiential

qualities?

data produce diferent

Freuds

solution

to

the

question
How is experience formed? was to posit a process that
transforms raw sense data into
psychological qualities. The transformation, motivated
by adaptive survival needs (Freud,
1911) is reected in the two processes that govern
mental

life,

that

is,

the

primary

and

secondary

processes. Perhaps it was Freuds model of the neuronal

ow of energy that played a

decisive role in the

unquestioning adoption by psychoanalysis of a singular

or unitary model of experience,

since the passage of

energy can only be pictured as a singular stream.

Bion advanced a similar notion of an intermediate
process between raw sense
data and psychological phenomena. He developed the
idea of an alpha-function, whose task it is to convert
sense
the

data into alpha-elements and

psyche

with

the

material

for

dream

provide
thoughts

the capacity to wake up or go to sleep, to be

conscious or unconscious (1967, p. 115). Bions

alpha- and beta-elements represent two modes, as well
as two

end states, of the transformation of raw sense

data into
is

psychological experience. The transformation

contingent upon the mothers

participation in the

assimilative process through her reverie, and the entire

process is mediated
with

many

of

psychoanalytically
pathological
structural

by projective identication. As

Bions
adopted

implications,

and

concepts,
mainly

in

and less

phenomenological

the

idea

terms

for its

was
of

its

potential

signicance.

Both

Freuds and Bions theories, however, and more recently

Fonagys

(2001)

approach,

essentially

describe

unidimensional process of mentalization. They assume a

single mode of transformation, in which a specic
(single)

unit

of

mental

content

is

processed

and

transformed into a different, usually higher, form of

mental content along a singular conceptual hierarchy.

Two experiential modes

I

suggest

that

this

misleadingif
transformational
tracked. In

picture
we

may
consider

process is not

other words, I

am

hypothesis that the transformation

into

be

singular

seriously

that

the

but dual-

putting forth
of raw sense

the
data

psychologically meaningful experience takes place

simultaneously along two transformational routes or

channels. In terms of the examples cited above, this

implies that, as I ride my bicycle, learn to multiply
numbers, engage in intimate relationships
or react
aggressively, each of these experiences consists not of
one but of two simultaneous experiences of the same
sense data or input. This can be so if this input is actually
processed twice, in two parallel, ongoing channels or
modes.
How can this be so? What supports this assertion?
Why only two

modes? It is, of course, a

hypothetical

construction of the way the mind functions. A great

many

advances

functioning

of

have
psyche

taken
and

place

mind

regarding

the

precisely through

conceiving more innovative, parsimonious and accurately

descriptive models. In principle, it is not very different
from the notion usually subscribed to in psychoanalysis
and elsewhere, that whatever is going on in our mind
encompasses much more than the data of consciousness
suggest. As a given experience is going on, it is actually
paralleled an innity of other mental bits, ideas or
feelings, which are more or less directly related to it and
have

varying

becoming
readily

opportunities

and

probabilities

conscious. This idea, though

accepted,

addresses experience

for

usually quite
in

terms

of

mental
contents, which I see as referring to the end products
of the transformational process.
I propose that, before we speak of end products or
contents of experience, before we become engrossed in
the

story

or

narrative offered

by

the

process of

mentalization or signication, we must attend to its

formative denition: its form, shape and characteristics,
as determined by the process

or mode by which it

was fashioned. It is

reasonable to assume that the way

mental contents are

fashioned and created molds and

stamps their quality in an essential and irreducible way;

in other words, it must determine their experiential
meaning and signicance. This implies that the same
contents may

take

on

very

different

experiential

qualities and meaning that are

directly related to how

i.e.
in what processing mode
they were fashioned.
What sort of different experiential processing modes
can we encounter or conceive of?
take the critical
our

point of

dimension

I suggest that we

of separatenessfusion as

departure. This

dimension ofers

two

polarities, which we can take as the basis for these two

modes (and a reason for why there are only two). The
dimension of fusion separateness has been the source
of endless psychoanalytic debate and theorization. It is
usually viewed as an

either/or

psychic state (Klein,

1948) or as a linear developmental dimension (Blatt

and Behrends, 1987; Blass and Blatt, 1996). It is closely
linked with the question of narcissism
1977, 1984)

and

has its

origins

(Kohut, 1971,

in

Freuds work

(Freud, 1914; Erlich and Blatt, 1985). It is

basis of
based

at

the

the debate between ego-psychological driveand

object-relations

schools

of

(Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983). It fuels

controversy

between

relational

and

thought

the current

so-called

non-

relational approaches, and the growing emphasis on the

intersubjective mode. All of these revolve essentially
around the question of the relation between the subject
and its object.4 Typically this has assumed a spatial mold,
as if the issue is to account for subject and object in a
spatial

relation

physicalspatial

to

one

view,

another.
the

Taking

question

such

turns

into

determining where one begins and the other ends. One

way

to

experience

the

subject/object relationship

is

indeed within such a spatial arrangement or context. Yet

this need not be (entirely) so if we look at it from an
experiential point
T he subject/object ter minolog y do es, of cou rse, beg the qu estion u nd er

d iscu ssion by int roducing a frame and lang u age th at a pr iori imply
separateness. More accurately, and sp eak ing from the vant age point of
related ness, we may on ly speak of subject/subject related ness and
relation sh ips. I have opted for the traditional lang u age so as to make th is
st atement cohere with psychoan aly tic writing, and not to f u rt her confou
nd the issue by ch ang ing ter ms.

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EXPERIENCE
H. SHMUEL
WHAT
ERLICH
IS IT?

of view. A physicalspatial view of the subject/object

relationship

is

predicated

on

their

essential

separatenessexperienced, presumed or desired.

There is another mode of experience in which the issue
of separateness of subject/object is

neither pertinent

nor even relevant. Here the experience of subject/object

revolves

around

the

quality

of

their

continuity,

ongoingness and mutual existence or inter-being. In

this dimension, subject and object are
what

may

be

described

(from

experienced in
spatialphysical

viewpoint) as together, merged or fused. Not because

they actually are merged, but because the
experience is one that does not distinguish one from
another,

and

rather

renders

and

lends

them

an

everlasting quality of one with another. In this sense,

it might be described (reminding ourselves that we are
adopting, for purposes of this description, a
physical language totally

spatial

extrinsic to the experience

depicted) as a state of
fusion and merger of
subject and other.
Let me proceed to a more detailed and specic
delineation of the two proposed experiential modes. As
I suggested, the basic assumption is that all sense data
are processed by two,

not one, intermediate

psychic

functions that render them amenable and available for

further

elaboration. Such

inborn and characteristic

It takes

place

tracks, resulting

along

processing is

of

two

in two

the

human

parallel

contiguous,

ride

my

and contiguous
are

processed,

experiences of the same input. As

bicycle,

simultaneous

endowment.

parallel modes in

which the same sensory data or input

producing two

presumably

therefore,

experiences

I
of

actually
the

have

two

sensations

and

perceptions produced. One experience involves a more

or less

focused attention on keeping my balance and

direction,

watching

obstacles, and
intentional

set

the

road,

maintaining

steering
generally

away

from

purposeful

regarding the ride and journey. The

11311
EXPERIENCE
H. SHMUEL
ERLICH
IS difcult
IT?
13111
other experience WHAT
is more

11311
to describe.13111
It

involves a sense of me as bicycle rider, perhaps with the

bicycle as an extension of this self that is riding it, but
also in touch with aspects of the way and the natural
settings I

am traversing, which

are experienced as

extensions of this self, or as deeply connected with it.

For the purpose

of explication, let us assume that I

wish to concentrate on the nature of this experience,

not in order to create or enhance it, but to study it
further. I would then probably discover a poignant and
powerful sense of my own aliveness and continuity, of
the continuity

and actual existence of my bike, the

elds and meadows, the air, the scents, my breathing,

or the portion of the universe I am in touch with. The
experience

may

rewarding.

It

undertaking

be

may
to

exhilarating,

actually

ride

satisfying

have more

my

bike

to

than

and

do

the

with
rst

experience I described, although it may easily be the

reverse.

If,

for

example,

use

my

bike

to

get

somewhere quickly, say to fetch a needed medicine or

nd my child, the rst experience will probably be
much more sustained and dominant. The point is that,
no matter what is actually going on, my experience of
riding my bike takes place along both lines, and that it
represents two distinct experiential modes of processing
the

same sensual input. The

of

which

question of

experience

awareness

occupies

my

consciousness at a given momentis determined

not so
the

much

by the process responsible for creating

experience,

as

by

shifts

of

attention

and

concentration. Rather than playing a formative part

in

these

processes,

themselves part
which

such

attentional

shifts

of the particular track

are

or mode in

they take place, and are dictated by overall or

higher manifestations of that experiential mode. For

instance, if I am very goal orientated,

pressed by an

overpowering need or desire, I am much more likely to

nd

myself attending to the intentional

data and

11321
EXPERIENCE
H. SHMUEL
11321
WHAT
ERLICH
IS IT?
13211
13211
details described under
the
rst type of experience.

In this case,

the

second

experiential

mode

will

recede

to

the

background; I may not at all become aware of it, unless

I make a concerted effort in that direction. Once I have
shifted into the second mode, the nature of attention
will

correspond to the demands and dictates of this

mode,

resulting

in

different

kind

of

attention,

concentration and awareness.

To sum up what I have outlined so far:
1) It is more precise, rened and heuristically fruitful
to speak of experience not only in narrative or mental
content terms,

but as embodying the quality of the

process that shaped and formed it.

2) Two experiential modes can be distinguished, based
on the dimension of separateness
fusion of subject
and object.
3) It is hypothesized that these modes of processing
and

shaping

experience

are

structurally

inherent,

inborn, human psychic characteristics. Furthermore, it is

assumed that they operate simultaneously and in parallel,
constantly processing input and shaping experience (as
end states or contents).
4) Becoming aware of (or within) an experiential mode
is

essentially

question

of

directing

attention

and

concentration to it (Rapaport, 1961). Consciousness is

an added dimension, and does not constitute a sine qua non
for the operation of experiential processing.
One immediate implication of these considerations is
an updated understanding
of subjectobject separateness/fusion. Clearly,
the
issue is an experiential one.5 If we keep in mind that we
are not making a material or concrete judgement on this
issue, but are examining its

experiential status, it is of

major interest to discover that our psychic life is,

in

fact, shaped by both experiences. Of course, in a sense,

psychoanalysis

has always claimed this to be so. It is,

however, of even greater consequence to discover that

the

attributes

of

separateness/fusion

object are simultaneous and

of

subject

and

contiguous psychic and experiential

poles around
which experience is constantly
organized. This realization would eliminate once and
for all

the

debate about the developmental priority

and ascendancy of one mode over the other, which has

been a psychoanalytic shibboleth for almost a century.
The

evidence

supports

from

the

infant

assumption

research
I

have

unquestionably

made

of

two

simultaneous experiences available to the infant from

the

start

(Stern,

1985;

Trevarthen,

Grotstein (1980) has similarly

track of infantile

1989a,

referred

1989b).

to a

dual-

experience, associating it with the

two brain hemispheres.

Clinical psychoanalysis, I believe, can also
substantiate this claim once it takes it into account.
Experience in the course of analytic sessions, for both
analyst and patient,
uctuates between these two modes. During stretches
in

the

analytic

process, as

sessions, the analyst may

well

note

as within

specic

his/her widely

ranging

experience, varying from being sharply distinct, well

dened and separate from the analysand, all the way
to being fused with and indistinguishable from him/her.
I

am

also

sure

that

many

analysts

have

had

the

experience I have encountered myself and often heard

from supervisees that, either with certain patients or at
particular analytic junctures, it is impossible to remember
what was said in a session. At other times, with different
analytic

material,

the

experience

can

be

totally

diferentsharp, well delineated, following an easily

recognizable

plot

and

dramatic

unfolding.

Such

commonplace uctuations may, of course, vary with

different

analysands.

They

possess

diagnostic

prognostic signicance and provide dynamic

5

Subject and object were always a pr iori regarded as separate entities,

but epistemolog ically experience was employed to sub stantiate and to

ser ve as evidence for their independent or fu sed p ositions. For very p er
tinent reviews and exposit ions, see K irsh ner (1991) and Cavell (1993).

and

and psychopathological insightprovided, of course,

the theoretical implications are correctly understood.
The following

vignette is

intended to provide a

avor of the experiences described. It

the

subtle

within

qualitative

sessions,

may

experiential

encountered

illustrate

uctuations

particularly

when

working with patients who suffer from disturbance of

the second experiential modality, reected as emptiness
and difculty in feeling existing and connected
with oneself, others and life.

Case A
A young man in his 20s has a

long history of drug

abuse and severe difculties with work and intimacy.

He

gradually expresses his sense

of

emptiness and

tenuous hold on life, which contrast sharply with his

talents

and

monotonously,
sleepy. In

capacities.
tiring

He

the

speaks

slowly

analyst and

making

and
him

spite of the charged and difcult contents,

the analyst has to struggle to be able to follow and stay

awake.
The patient reports a conict with his girlfriend,
caused by his having

of jealousy. She blamed

herself for what happened, but he felt and said it did

not matter; he would have blown up in any case. She
stays at the factual and detailed level, while he tries to
remain above it:
P: The more I talked, the more disconnected I
became and the less I understood. A: Something similar
is taking place here. You try to connect with me
around something painful, but the more you try, the
more disconnected you become, and the
more difcult
to follow.
P: [After silence.] I became frustrated again by my
emptiness, my not succeeding in loving or becoming
connected to anything
to life. I realize again
that everything

comes with

the good and the bad, and I am not ready

for this. I cant enjoy or want anything if it comes with

these conditions.

I played with

the idea of jumping

out the window, as always, but gave it up. But I dont

want to struggle. I want to leave it all

work,

analysis, my apartment. Actually, if I nd someone

willing to have me in analysis for no pay, then all right

A: Something in you hates life, and mainly hates your

connectednesswith
yourself, your girlfriend and your analyst. That is why
you try to annihilate me, to trade me for someone who
would not want anything from you.
P: I do everything out of a sense of no choice. I live
because I have no choice, and
this is not a good enough reason to live, or to live with
my girlfriend. I felt this maddening rush in my brain, an
extreme unrest

You are

I had an extreme death feeling

rightI felt something that is

nothing, a wish to annihilate everything

Then I

decided to smoke
a joint because I could not
stand it anymore.
A: You had no strength to feel, to be with this
difcult feeling.
The patient describes his

inability to cope with this,

his kicking the wallssmoked two joints and his head

quietened downbut the hate did not disappear
with the smoke, it just quietened down. He just wanted
to die

The only reason for living is the love

one gets. Without this, there is no reason.

A: [Feeling his brain becoming a mush.] Perhaps
this is why you hate life so muchlove for you
is something to receive, not to give. Then you feel cut
of, not

together with, and your only recourse is to doto

smoke a joint, calm yourself, like a baby that does not
need the breast because he sucks on himself.
The patient remembers suddenly that there are things
he likes to do, and he elaborates at length the details of
sexual intercourse they had, which left him unsatised.
A: You sense there is something really good about
being joined, feeling together, but you dont know
how. It is as if there is another possibility beside who is
doing what to whom, like masturbatinga possibility
of another kind of being together. Not knowing lls
you with rage and despair, also with me.
The patient describes his sadness, then the futility of
his existence and the analysis, his tremendous emptiness.
He does not see why he has to live.
A: Have to?
P: Its hard to admit something in me also wants
to live. I cant fool myself. This thing of giving does
not exist in meonly to receive. I want to suckle
from my girlfriend, be in her womb, and not be in
touch with life. Not to deal with separation from some
connectedness. It seems totally cut of that at my age I
will try to experience again what a baby experiences at
two weeks, because I am not a baby anymore, and it
wont ever happen to me. [He cries, then talks about his
emotionally distant and cut of mother. He wanted to
come to another session this week, but did not because he
preferred
to smoke a joint.]
A: There is a lot of anger and despair in you, because
in your experience I cannot, or wont, be this womb.
You want to be wrapped, protected and merged with
something, but prefer to do it with smoke and with
yourself, not with me.
P: Something in me refuses and resists you
to join with you, like you offer, is to join life, and I just
want to die.
A

word

scientic

must

be

thinking

interjected
and

progress.

here

concerning

As

man-made

discipline, scientic thinking is not exempt from the

considerations offered here. In other words, if we choose

to look at our experience scientically, we are

not

stepping

our

inherent

outside

the

experiential

possibilities

modes,

as

offered

is

often

by

surmised.

Epistemologically, it is impossible for us as human beings

to

do

so.

We

may

acknowledge

the

fact

that

the

scientic approach to phenomena (by rules of inference

and probability theory) has been largely made possible by
the Cartesian-inspired notion of objectivityby the
separateness

of

subject

from

object,

creating

the

Cartesian theater in which phenomena can be explored as

objective, i.e. as separate from the observing subject
(Orange, 2001). In this sense, the subject is, of course,
no less illusory than the object (Zizek, 2000). My point
here is that, as we think scientically or logically (as I
attempt to do at this moment, addressing a reader who is
likewise

engaged

thought),

we

in

this

are

kind

of

psychically

experience
maintaining

and
one

experiential mode as the dominant and leading one. For

the

purpose

of

such

exposition,

research

and

knowledge, it is undoubtedly a marvelous asset, without

which

many epistemological achievements would

have been possible. But we must

be

not

on guard against

being seduced and captivated by the thought that this

represents

achievement,
objectively
objective.

higher
and

developmental

that

objective

its

and

and

objectivity
not

merely

is,

cultural
indeed,

subjectively

Characterizing the two experiential modes

Let

me

now

experiential

spell

modes

out
are,

more

fully

what

the

along

with

some

of

two
their

consequences. The starting point, again, is how subject

and

object

another,

are

or

experienced:

as

experientially

as

separate

fused

and

from

one

together

in

oneness. The experience of subject and object, in either

6

mode, is at the root of psychoanalytic thinking and

practice:
kind,

it

is the essence of object relations

whether

conceived

as

Kohutian

of any

selfobject

relationships, ego-psychological object representations or

Kleinian internal object relations. It is the paradigm of
drive-inspired relatedness, as well as the contemporary
relational and intersubjective emphasis.
Let us take as our rst case

the experience of

subject and object as two distinct, separate, interactive

entities. An immediate consequence of this separateness
is that the subject does not experience him/herself as if it
is the object (i.e. there is no experienced
identity). The experience vis--vis the object is then one of
having or possessing it, or
of not having it. As Freud observed, having and
identifying are mutually exclusive:
I have it [means] I am not it (1941, p. 299).
Having or not having the object in turn gives rise to
a range of feelings, like the feeling

that one needs the

object and is motivated or moved towards it; feelings of

loss, longing, missing, wishful desire, a need to test the
objects durability and realness; and so on.
The experience of the separateness of subject and
object also produces a range of fears and anxieties with
associated affects.

Castration

experienced entirely within

separateness.

anxiety,

for

instance, is

the realm of experience of

It may even be considered one of its

more powerful and poignant emanations. It

and involves feelings of potential

invokes

or threatened

loss

and raises the specter of loss of treasured body parts

and

physical

phase, there is

integrity. At
an

an

early

intensication

developmental

of the potential

separateness of the genitals from

the self: the penis

takes on independent existence, as it were. At this early

stage, it is not yet experienced as an integral part of the
maleness of the self. Sensations associated with it are
experienced as unintegrated with the self, giving rise to a
wish to have it, and simultaneously to the anxiety of
losing it. In the course of development, this anxiety may
persist and undergo elaboration as a function
poor

integration

of

genital

sexuality.

Due

of the
to

the

increased complexity introduced by symbolic processes,

it may attach itself to various signiers, giving rise

to

adult

of

experiences

threatened
integrity.

loss,

of

or

These

sexual

violation
fears

crisis,
of

fearfulness

personal

always

have

boundary

common

denominator: the experienced separatenessreal,

fantasied or projectedof the subject from

that

(object) which it fears might be injured or lost.

Drive-embedded wishes and impulses, and the
fantasies based on them, similarly
fall within the paradigm of the separateness of the
desired

object

separateness

is

from

the

experiencing

responsible

for

the

subject.

tension

This

that

so

typically accompanies drive-dominated experience, that

propels the subject towards the drive object, perceived
and experienced as the only one capable of relieving this
tension.
This tension is the precondition and fertile soil out of
which desire for the Other germinates and unfolds.
Otherness emanates largely

out

of

the

experience

of

separateness, of the object experienced as a not-me.

The wish for

having the

Other,

born from the

experience of his othernessseparateness, is

felt

for

him/her,

and

serves as

the

the desire

basis

for

the

seduction described by Laplanche (1989). Whatever

basis we are
Remarkable experimental sup por t for the latter notion is contained
i n t he work of Silverman et al. (1982).
6

wont

to

ascribe

to

drives,

whether

intrapsychic or interpersonal, they are

forces

that

emanate

from

and

resultant need to have it

the motivating

revolve

separateness of the object from

biological,

the

around

self,

and

the
the

in order to alleviate the

pressure of yearning for it. The drive concept, thus,

implies the otherness of the object vis--vis the subject
who desires it. 7

When dealing with

manifestations of

desire, drive or instinct, we are always concerned with

an object experienced as separate from subject.
A

further

consequence

is

the

experience

of

conict. Here, the subject is faced with two (or

more)

incompatible

consequences

that

stem

entirely

from the separateness of the object and the needwish

to

possess

and

have

it.

The

realization

of

consequence in itself is only possible within this mode

of experience.
Numerous additional consequences to the experience
of the objects separateness are

well familiar.

Primarily

and importantly, it is the basis for the experience of

objectivitythat Cartesian looking at, studying
and evaluating the detached object. It

enables an

entire developmental line that regards reality as existing

independently

of,

and

distinct

from,

the

observing

subject. In fact, it forms the basis for the illusory real,

objective

existence

of

the

subject

itself.

Scientic

progress has depended on and made extensive use of this

attitude. A language and body of thought was developed
characterized by such detached regard for experience,
both internal and external, treating it as removed from
the observing subject/ego. Introspection, the basis for
phenomenology, implies an inwardly directed look of a
subject studying its own experience as if detached
from itself, claiming an implicit

objectivity for the

supposed universality of the products of this inspection

(Dennett, 1991). There are indications that the insistence
on the exclusive usefulness of this stance for physical or
empirical

science may be

changing. Nonetheless, this

notion of subject as separate from object serves as an

underpinning for articulation, as well as an explanatory
tool,

in

numerous

symbolization

and

areas:

cognitive

symbolic

development,

thinking,

narcissism,

identication, self and identity, and the developmental

aim of separationindividuation
(Mahler et al., 1975).
This experience of subject and object revolves
around the clearly demarcated boundaries that dene
and

separate

essentially

them.

within

In

fact,

this

boundaries become

mode

it

is

of

primarily

and

experience

that

such a crucially important issue.

The denition and uniqueness of subject and object

depends upon the extent to which adequate boundaries
between them have been instituted and maintained.
The experience of subject and other as
and

distinct

implies

experienced

as

that

implies,

relationship is experienced
purpose

and

their relatedness will

functional

instrumentality

separate

and

instrumental.

furthermore,

be
This

that

as causal: it is dominated

intentionality,

by

directionality

the
by
and

chronology. This is the experiential realm that gives rise

to the sense of agency and volition, and within which
they play a central role. Furthermore, the dimension of
activitypassivity takes place in, is characteristic of and
understandable only within, this experiential mode.
Temporality is a phenomenon that has attracted
much psychoanalytic and
philosophical
interest
(Bergson,
1889,
1922;
Heidegger,

1927;

Hartocollis,

1983). There is general

agreement that the perception of time relies on deepseated experiential dimensions. In terms of the particular
experiential mode we are considering, of the distinctly
constituted
temporal

subject

dimension

placeis

and
in

object,
which

experienced

as

timei.e.

such relatedness takes

linear,

chronological,

measurable and realistically objective.

7

It is precisely the ab sence of such other ness th at ch aracter izes

autoerotism, necessit ating th is sp ecial category of non-relational yet

pleasu rable activ it y/state.

the

Experiencing

subject and object

as

separate and

distinct is usually associated with what is considered to

be good reality testing. In fact, it is deemed essential to
it. It is unquestionable

that the all-dominant adaptive

view is

reciprocally

supported by a notion of reality

that is

objective,

i.e. experienced as separate from

the subject. As already noted, the fruitfulness

conception
progress

of

of

civilization,

reality

science.

has been
It

thinking

permeates its

is

and

culture,

of this

invaluable

hallmark

philosophy,

for

of

the

Western

and

deeply

language and values. What

is

regarded as valuable and important is what works, gets

results, or is objectively demonstrable. Quite naturally,
this is also the dimension applied to evaluating and
understanding

psychotherapeutic

treatment (Erlich,

and

psychoanalytic

1995). The ubiquitous resistance of

psychotherapists and psychoanalysts to this

enquiry into their work hints

mode of

at an awareness that

something else might be going on which is difcult to

capture by an exclusive reliance on this approach.
Separateness
of
subject
and
object
is,
thus,
associated with, and gives rise to, an
entire gamut of thought processes, cognition and
mentalization that are adaptively geared, and emphasize
objective, logico-scientic aims and methods. It is the
force behind the kind of conceptualization that breaks
up patterns into elements capable of symbolization (e.g.
mathematical). In this sense, it is the tension behind
constructive

and deconstructive activity.

The

overall

tendency generated by this mode of experience is goal

directed, and it aims for efciency of function, task
performance and evaluated accomplishment.
Let us now
As

look

described

at
it

the second experiential

above,

the

mode.

distinguishing

characteristic of this mode is that subject and object are

not experienced as

separate and distinct

from each

other. On the contrary, the fundamental experiential

quality in this mode is their merger, identity and fusion.
The fact that this is

a regular mode in which subject

and

object

are

experienced

implies

that

it

is

legitimate and psychologically (probably biologically as

well) necessary experience. It is not a necessary evil, nor
is

it to be

regarded as

a threat to psychic life. The

experiential dimension of fusion, oneness and unity has

been regarded by some as developmentally primary, an
essential prerequisite

for

all subsequent development

(Balint, 1968; Winnicott, 1971; Mahler et al., 1975;

Kohut, 1977). Others saw it as a lifelong and lifesustaining

source of faith,

creativity

(Milner, 1957; Eigen, 1981, 1983).

Winnicotts

and plentitude
It is

transitional phenomena. It

is,

implicit in
perhaps,

suggested in Bions description of O, which

cannot be known
one with
science

[yet] it is

it. That it exists is

but

it

cannot

be

possible to be at

an essential postulate of

scientically discovered. No

psycho-analyticdiscovery is possible without recognition of

its existence, at-one-ment with it and evolution (1977, p.
30).

In fact, and most importantly, it is but one of the

two experiential modes that maintain psychic life.
Without
it
psychic
life
suffers,
withers
and
malfunctions, yet for reasons quite diferent than any
malfunction due or known to the previously described
experiential mode.
What are the implications of this experiential mode
for psychic life? In the rst place, the experience of
subject/object union is antithetical to the importance of
boundaries. In this mode, boundaries cannot and do not
play the crucial role they occupy in the rst one (Erlich,
1990). Experience here does not rely on the quality of
denition, distinctiveness or separateness of the one
from the otherthey are experienced as one, as in a
state of oneness. The variety of experiences in which
the state of oneness is encountered

or

dominant is

actually

quite

wide.

It ranges from

normal to psychopathological, from the early primitive

to the highly sophisticated, from intrapsychic,
person

to

transpersonal

illustrations

are

the

experience.
faulty

single-

Well-known

functioning

and

breakdown of boundaries in psychosis, the identity

diffusion of

the borderline, as well as motherinfant

oneness captured

by Mahlers symbiosis, Winnicotts

primary maternal preoccupation, and Kohuts selfobject

relationship. There are numerous adult non-pathological
varieties

of

this,

experienced

momentarily

when

dancing, listening to music, engaging in physical activity

(running, swimming, skiing etc.), making love, under the
inuence
states.

If

of

alcohol

boundaries

and drugs, or
possess

any

in

meditative

relevance

or

signicance in such experiences, it is entirely external

to

the

experiencing

subject

and

experienced

object.

Boundaries may be implicitly present and represented in

the

container that

1971)

holds (Bion,

subject-with-object,

1962;

immersed

Winnicott,
in

their

experienced oneness.
The experience of oneness militates against an
instrumental or functional
relatedness between subject and object. Experience in this
mode has little or nothing to do with manipulating,
afecting or being affected by an

Other. It is similarly

not based upon or generative of desire, as the object is

not experienced as an Other

to

be had for

some

purpose. It thus eliminates any need for intentionality

and agency, direction and volition. All such aspects are
constitutive of erotic wishful yearnings, which are

all

together absent from this experiential dimension. The

subject does not desire an it, required for fullling or
completing itself, since it experiences itself as complete
and whole, with the
it (object) an inseparable and indistinguishable
component of this wholesomeness.
And yet it would be untrue to say that this state is
entirely

devoid

of

motivational

import.

conservative (Freud, 1920) or conservational wish is

conceivably embedded in this experiential mode, in the
sense of a wish to prolong and persist in this experience.
The subject united with its object wishes, in a totally
non-instrumental

way,

for

the

uninterrupted

continuation of this oneness. This experiential mode is

therefore

marked

by

experiences

and

wishes

for

oneness and togetherness, as well as their continuity and

ongoingness (Winnicott, 1945), that are
unbounded and timeless.
This mode of experience seems to contribute little
or nothing to adaptive and
realistic
concerns and preoccupations. One might
even wonder what its

evolutionary role and purpose

area question I will take up later. Time, space and

other dimensions of

physical and factual reality are

experienced here in drastically different ways. Time, for

instance,

may

be

experienced

as

non-linear

or

non-

durational; space may be seen as multi- dimensional and

unbounded. Such experiences of time and space are well
known from a variety

of

sources: sensory deprivation,

substance inducement and psychotic illness. They also

play an important and well-known role in mystical and
meditative experiences (Epstein,
1996; Molino, 1998; Twemlow,
the

clinical

clinical

psychoanalytic

tendency,

psychoanalytically,

1990, 1995; Rubin,

2001), as

situation.

psychiatrically
is

to

pathologize

The
as

well as

immediate
well

and

in
as

downgrade

them, typically by ascribing them to regressive trends, to

illness,

immaturity

and

developmental

lag.

This

is

directly related, of course, to the domination of the

view of reality gained through the rst

experiential

dimension, so different than the one under discussion.

Whereas the former is essentially
objective (not because it actually is, but because it is
experienced as objective, i.e. it gives
rise to an experience of subjective objectivity), the latter
is rst and foremost subjective.
Or, bet ter put: subject with su
bject (cf. foot note 4).
8

This

is

also

reected

characteristics of thought

in

the

quality

and

processes that arise within

this experiential domain. Thinking here is not geared

towards reality testing, precision and objectivity. It is
closer to and often expressed in the form of metaphor,
simile and allegory. The guiding tendency is towards
subjectivity ; it allows the subject to fully experience
him or herself as ongoing, having ontological continuity
and security, and existing in interconnectedness and
union with the other.
A further implication of the experience of oneness
and fusion is, as stated above, its characteristic absence
of desire. To the extent that desire for the other stems
from

not

having

him,

her,

experiencing them as separate

or

it,

from

as

part

subject,

of

this

is

not the experience in this mode. The experience here is

of

being at

one with

the

object

(or

subject, see

footnote 4), and therefore there is not, and cannot be,

desire

for

it.

In

this

sense,

drive,

passion

and

the

peremptory need for the object so characteristic of them

are not part of this experience. In line with this, there is
also no experience of conict.
So far I have focused on the positive pole of this
experiential dimension. What
is its negative pole? It would have to be the negative
of the experiences described: the disruption, absence or
deciency

of

ongoingness
important
lack

or

of

the

the

experienced

oneness

subject-cum-object

state.

and
It

is

to stress and explicate the implications of a

disturbance in

this

experiential

mode:

the

experience of oneness and fusion means that subject and

object are

experienced together, and not as separate

entities. In this sense, the absence of this ongoingness

and continuity

applies indiscriminately to both. In other

words, as the object (i.e. the Other) is experienced

as

not at one with or

not continuing to be, so is the subject. Contrariwise, if
the subject is experienced in this
negative way, so is the object. This has far-reaching
implications

for

the

understanding

of

psychopathological

processes,

as

well

as

of

psychoanalytic treatment, which I have partially spelled

out (Erlich, 1991, 1995, 1998).
I have outlined
the two

the essential differences

between

experiential modes. Hopefully, it is clearer

now what is implied by an experiential view, as well as

why I claim that taking this
advantages

and,

view offers

furthermore,

why

denite

thinking

of

experience as proceeding and shaped along two modes

or dimensions yields a more complex, but also more
sensitively attuned, understanding of psychic life. An
experiential viewpoint

implies

focusing

contents of thoughts, feelings

addressing them
within

rst

certain

with

its

distinct

experiential

and

so

as

the

produced

dimension

that they are

indelible

qualities.

advantage of this point of view is

understanding of

on

and fantasies, but on

and foremost

processes and shapes them,

less

that

imbued
A

major

a radically altered

regression, but also a new way of

regarding relatednessof what draws, maintains

and fuels the coming

together

of

one subject with

another. There are naturally many unanswered questions

that stem from these considerations, which should be
dealt with in due course.
Beyond noting the differences and the constitutive or
dening aspects of these two
modes of processing experience, there are
several
structural

and

developmental

aspects

that

must

be

addressed.

Structural and functional considerations

1) I make the fundamental assumption that these two
modes of processing experience are inborn, present and
operative from
ordinate
operates.

the beginning of life. They are

dimensions

in

which

the

human

superpsyche

2)

These

modes

operate

constantly

and

always

in

parallel with one another, creating an experiential world

that is dualistic and not unitary.9
3) Considered through the prism of conscious awareness,
typically one of the two modes will be dominant, or in
the

foreground,

while

the

other

recedes

into

the

background. This is reminiscent of a Gestalt gureand-ground situation.

4) The determinants of the ascendancy or dominance
of one mode over the other are numerous, but it may
be assumed to derive from the ego state of the given
moment, which will color and focus attention on one at
a time. Some sort of internal control or modulation is
probably operative here, describable in cognitive terms.
I strongly suggest that the two experiential modes
produce two entirely different psychic

experiences of

subject and object. The self-referential

subject that is

met introspectively as
as

an

an

entity, identied varyingly

I, a he/she or an it, is

rst

experiential

experienced,

the product of the

modethe

distance-creating mode

object (whether

externally

or

separately
that

regards its

internally

met)

as

separate from the experiencing or perceiving subject.

The subject developed in the second mode is not an
entity, an

object or a thing-like it. It is

the elusive,

de-centered (see Ogden,

1992a, 1992b), unself-conscious subject implicit in so
much of our experience, until the
moment we become aware of it, when it becomes a
something. This unself-conscious, implicitly

present

subject is typically implied in what we describe as being

absorbed and involved to the point that we forget
ourselves. This subject feels intrinsically connected and
absorbed, as well as ongoing with whatever takes place
(I did not notice where the time went).10
6)

Considering

(subjects),

the

interaction

each serving as

constitutes a relationship
or

of

two

object for the other,

or relatedness (i.e. an

fantasized interaction).

persons

It

this

actual

also denes

the

intersubjective

eld.

Obviously, both experiential

modes operate in both persons. In each of them, the

one

or

the

other

experiential mode may dominate

during the interaction. The nature and quality of the

interaction

or

intersubjective

experience

is,

thus,

determined not only by the contents of the exchange

(feelings, information, demands, praise etc.), but also
by the experiential format in which these contents are
conceived,

received

and

perceived.

This

strongly

suggests that intersubjective experience is shaped and

determined

by

the

goodness of t between the

independent experiential modes of the two

persons.

The extent and quality of this

t is no less, and perhaps even more, inuential than
its

specic contents. Consider this example: a patient

acts aggressively towards the analyst; the patient is in

the rst mode (subject separate from object), but the
analyst is

in

the second mode (subject

united

with

object). Given this t, it is likely that the analyst may

not feel attacked and, if he does, will experience the
aggression

as

inexplicable

and

extraneous

to

the

merged relatedness, will not perceive it as directed at

him, nor be moved to interpret it or to retaliate in some
way. Signicantly, this does not require or indicate the
analysts resorting to denial, which would be relevant if
the analyst were also in the rst mode, thus open to
perceiving the patients aggression and warding it off
by resorting to denial. The patient, on the other hand,
still

in

the

rst

mode,

might

well

misjudge

the

analysts non-reaction as signifying his anxiety, passivity

or

aloofness.

He

might

be

driven

to

depressive

resignation and giving up on life, quite to the contrary

of what the analysts experience actually is. This schema
may, of course, apply equally much to other instances of
inter-relatedness, such
Mod ell (1993) at tr ibutes different levels of exp
erience to a mu ltileveled self .
9

Exp erience of f ull absorpt ion in a p erson or task and

effects is descr ib ed by Csi kszent mi halyi (1990).
10

its benecial

11401
14011

11401
14011

EXPERIENCE
H. SHMUEL
WHAT
ERLICH
IS IT?

as motherinfant, parent and adolescent child, a pair of

lovers etc. It also describes and accounts for the acute
misunderstanding
violent means are

that

frequently

occurs

where

non-

resorted to in the face of violent

action. Non-violent demonstrators aim to transpose

their opponents to an
oneness

and

experiential

togetherness.

They

mode

may

based on

or

may

not

succeed in this, while their pragmatic opponents may

well perceive them as softies, degenerates and a real
threat.
The following vignette may illustrate the
tremendously delicate nature of the
goodness of t between
patient and analyst.

Case B
A woman in her 50s, successful in her profession, has
been talking about her depression and emptiness. She
focuses on her children who she feels have some of this
in them. She had a close phone conversation with
daughter, which
pragmatic

her

her husband interrupted with some

question, making her furious. She felt the

interruption was OK, sensible, but

A:
You
felt
some togetherness was interrupted.
[There was some good practical reason why she could
not go on with the conversation.] You seem to prefer to
take it to the practical level. I was referring to a special
feelingof togetherness, which
you felt was
ruptured.
P: Yes. I need it so muchit makes me feel in
contact and alive.
She then

talks about a

situation

in

daughter looked beautifully radiant, with

her. She felt

which

her

light around

ecstatic, but someone spoiled this

making a rational, critical comment.

A: [While turning to put on his glasses.] And how
did you feel?

by

11411
EXPERIENCE
H. SHMUEL
11411
ERLICH
IS IT?
14111 P: You just lostWHAT
me

You were listening14111

all

along, but suddenly it was as if you were not there

anymore. You turned to look at the clock or something.
Was it not objective?
A: Objective or subjective, it is as if I spoiled it for
you. What we were talking about just happened here:
the feeling of togetherness was suddenly ruptured
by me.
P: Yes. But then againother people are always
such a mystery.
A: The mystery is also in youin your need for this
togetherness to be uninterrupted so as to feel in contact
and alive; and in being so extremely sensitive to these
uctuations.

Developmental considerations
1)

Both

experiential

modes

beginning of life. They are

are

present

from

the

part of the process of

diferentiation of mind and psyche out of the psychesoma (Winnicott, 1949), and play a leading role in it.
2) Infant research over the past several decades supports
the view that newborn infants are equipped with both
modalities: with an inherent capacity for selfobject
differentiation,
as well as a capacity for fusion and merger experiences
that are neither pathological nor
regressive (see, for example, Stern, 1985;
Trevarthen, 1989a, 1989b).
3) The newborn infant, not yet an actual user of signs,
probably has no developed sense that may be designated
as

subject.

notion of

It equally may not yet have a

parallel

object. This age-old controversy within psychoanalysis

(King and Steiner, 1991) boils down to cognitive issues
that are beyond the scope of this paper. It is strongly
assumed, however,
that whether
such notions
as
subject and object are
present in a
referential,
denotative sense
is, experientially
speaking, not at
issue. On the contrary, the modes of experience I
described are precisely what, in the context of other
experiential and meaning-making functions, enable the
infant to develop the kind of experiencing mind that is
gradually capable of producing
such concepts in a
referential, signifying and eventually abstract fashion.
The absence of the capacity for mental referencing does not equal or connote the
absence of experience.
4) In infancy and throughout early childhood and
latency, the two experiential modes appear to go on in
parallel, with denite but difcult-to-predict swings
in one direction or another. There seems to be no special
advantage

to

one

or

the

other,

although

different

activities and developmental phases rely selectively and

heavily on the more suitable mode. The psychoanalytic
view of early object relations favors the availability of
the Other for an unchallenging, merger and fusion type
of experience in early development. This is reected in
Kohuts emphasis on the availability of the other in the
selfobjectmaternal

merged

or

preoccupation.

experiences form,
writers,

mode,

Winnicotts
Such

early

primary
fusional

according to many psychoanalytic

the required basis and background for

later and essentially different

competitive wishes. These are

the

oedipal concerns and

not mutually

exclusive,

however. Considered in terms of the two experiential

modes,

we realize that both types of experience are

necessary, and indeed available, early on. The crucial

issue in interacting with the parental Other is not solely
the latters sensitivity to one or the other mode, but the
parents capacity for shifting
adaptively
between
modes,
in
maximal
attunement with the child.
5) This picture changes drastically in adolescence. The
adolescent is faced with a new developmental task: to
integrate the two experiential modes. This becomes
apparent when we consider the two critical challenges

the adolescent faces: identity formation and the

achievement of intimacy (Erikson, 1950). Neither can
be securely attained without integrating the two
experiential modes (Erlich,
1998, 2001). Identity
formation can only take place when based on both modes,
and this applies equally to intimacy. Failure to achieve
this integration ushers in a heretofore not-experienced
type of loneliness (Erlich, 1998), and promotes the
outbreak of numerous sorts of psychopathology at this
developmental juncture.
6) Later stages of development rely heavily on this
adolescent integration. Further shifts may be required,
particularly with

the process of ageing and towards

the end of the life cycle, but this is beyond the present
scope.

It

is

fruitful

to

regard

the

drastic

shift

necessitated by adolescent development as the basis for

certain adult psychopathology, such
mood

and

perversion,
narcissistic
Major

affect

and

borderline

inexplicable
emanations

of

personality

emptiness,

loneliness.
from

the

All

this

severe

disorders; etc.
connection

disconnectedness

of

failure

tendencies;

addiction;

themes encountered in

experiences

depression;

regulation; acting-out

conversion
and

as:

these
to

are

integrate

are
and

essentially
the

two

experiential modes in adolescence, a failure that often

stems from

disturbance or difculty in the second

experiential mode and its integration.

7) Anxiety takes on very different meaning and value in
conjunction with the experiential
mode in which it is encountered. The value of anxiety
as a signal

(Freud, 1926) is,

patterned after the rst

for example, adaptively

mode. Castration anxiety is

paradigmatic of anxiety over potential and actual loss,

and contingent on regarding the object as

separate.

Annihilation

anxiety,

on

the

other

hand,

pertains to the second mode. It stems from the sense of

the combined demise of both subject and object, fused
and in a state of oneness. Both Bions (1977) nameless
dread and Winnicotts (1974) ultimate agonies are
relevant here. Though it may have little or nothing to
do with adaptive concerns, it conveys an ultimate sense
of

the

cessationnot

subjects
this

destructionof

the

and objects mutually ongoing existence. In

sense,

it

is

reminiscent

of

end

of

the

world

(Weltuntergang) psychotic anxiety.

Naming the experiential modes

It is probably notable that, thus far, I have refrained
from naming the two modes. I did so because I realize
that naming them early on, as I did in some previous
writings, detracts from
and subverts the
associative

the clarity

readers

distractions.

of the

attention

Having

argument

by introducing

outlined

the

major

points of my thinking, it is now appropriate to discuss

the labels to be assigned.
I think it is of importance to nd names for these
experiential modes. Not only
to avoid some of the cumbersomeness of referring to
them as rst and second, or separateness and
oneness,
but
also because names have important
additional connotations. I see advantage in deriving
names from everyday language. But it is important to
remember that naming provides added meaning, not to be
substituted for or confused with the generic value of the
experiential modes themselves. They might as well be
named rst and second, or receive abstract
designations, such as a- and b-modes.
The names I opted for stem from considering the
nature

and

characteristics

rst,

or

separateness

characterized

by

relatedness that

the

of

the

mode,

two
is

instrumental

modes. The
predominantly
or

functional

prevails between subject and object.

Experiencing the separation, as described earlier, brings

up wishes for having, possessing and doing. The major

experiential

quality,

thus, captures shades of what one

does to the
other, in wish, fantasy or actuality. I therefore suggest
calling this the mode of Doing.
The second mode revolves around the experience of
subject and object as united, fused and merged, in what
is

predominantly

experienced as

timeless,

ongoing

state. The experience of oneness eschews instrumental

wishfulness and knows only the need for its prolongation
and continuity. The essence of this experience is the
going-on-being

(Winnicott,

1960) of

the

self,

in

harmony and at-one-ment with another subject (i.e.

object). I therefore suggest calling

this the mode of

Being.
Being
writings

and Doing
(the

rst

feature
more

in

many

than

philosophical

the second, e.g.

Heidegger, 1927; Sartre, 1956), as well as in Winnicotts

work (particularly
1971, pp. 6585). There is much similarity and overlap
between Winnicotts use of the
terms and my own. There are, however, also several
important differences, which I would like to point out:
1) In the rst place, Winnicott uses the terms in a
sense closer to the contents of
experience.
In this,
he
is
well
within
the
psychoanalytic tradition of referring to experiential
contents as valid in themselves, without sufciently
attending to their form and mode of conception. I refer
to dimensions of processing experience that are inherent and
given; these may be conceived as inherent modes of ego
functioning. In this sense, I see them as structural
dimensions as well as psychic contents. I therefore
regard
Being/
Doing
as
much
more
general,
encompassing
and
inherent
psychological
modes,
affecting (ego) functioning and adaptation.

2)

Winnicott

assigns

signicance

and

priority

to

Being as antecedent to Doing: After being

doing and being done to. But rst, being (1971, p.
99). I do not regard Being as prior to Doing.
3) In Winnicotts view Doing is not present at birth,
and develops out of Being. I regard Being/Doing as
parallel,

contemporaneous

and

complementary

modalities, both present and interactive from the start.

4) Winnicott (1971) gender-linked Being with
femaleness and Doing with maleness. In my view,
Being/Doing as experiential modes are not intrinsically
gender-linked.
They operate across gender lines and are
subject to
selective reinforcement, especially
by
cultural
factors
and inuences.
One
issue that
has hindered
and
obfuscated
development

in

this

area

is

the predilection for

singular dimensions or vectors. This has typically resulted

in the view that undifferentiation and merger are at the
lower end of a single continuum that culminates in
diferentiation and self-denition. As has already been
noted, there is no reason to suppose that our sense

of

separateness and connectedness do not arise together and

make each other possible (Eigen, 1983). Eigen used the
concept dual union to encompass the simultaneous
presence of the dimensions of one-in-twoness and twoin-oneness, of distinction and union. In seemingly full
agreement with what I have argued, he asserts,
In theoretical discussions we have been prone to assign
primacy to one pole of a co- constitutive relationship, a
decision or

slippage which

is bound

to

afect

our

perception of clinical events (p. 424).

The second issue is the precarious and, in a sense,
discredited

role traditionally assigned to the Being

dimension. It is
attention
believe

it

this

this

mode that has

deserves
is

related,

in

not received the

psychoanalytic

among

other

writings.

factors,

to

I
its

association with existentialism, which may have moved

many psychoanalysts to shy away from it as anti- or unscientic. It may well be un-scientic. But as I have
tried to show, human nature and experience cannot be
understood fully if we do not provide for a dimension of
experience that exists and operates along lines that do not
have anything to do with
scienceobjectivity,
adaptation.

Science

the prime underpinnings of

causality

and

rational

is a product and endeavor of the

human psyche. But

the psyche that produced it has

more to it than would be known if we take scientic

thinking to be paradigmatic of human experience.
This may also be the place to touch briey on the
question raised earlier, regarding
the evolutionary place and value of the Being mode.
It is actually associated with important cornerstones of
psychoanalysis,

like

the

understanding

of

sleep

and

dreaming. Freud (1900) was keenly perceptive of the

withdrawal from reality that is mandatory for sleep. He
linked it with embryonic and infantile functioning, later
described as narcissistic and also operative in waking
states.

11

ways

There is no doubt that this dimension is in many

signicantly

development

and

value.

equally

It

is

related

functioning

to

aspects

that

remarkable

of

possess
that

in

brain

survival
Western

civilizations this mode has been downgraded, and the

Doing mode was given virtually exclusive priority and
prominence. In Eastern civilizations, on the other hand,
if a sweeping generalization is allowed, the
11

Freud seems to have d iscovered at the end of h is long career the Being/

Doi ng d imen sions in con nection with object relating. In a posthu mously
published br ief note he obser ved , Having and being in children.
Ch ild ren li ke expressing an object relation by ident ication: I am the
object. Havi ng is the later of the t wo; af ter loss of the object it
relapses into being. Example: the breast. T he breast is part of me, I
am the breast. On ly later: I h ave itthat is, I am not it
(1941, p. 299). Freuds having refers to what I have ter med
Doi ng.

opposite seems to be true.12 In my view,

the Being

mode is inherently involved in and silently underpins

our sense

of aliveness as

everything

well as

connectedness with

relationships,

nature,

life,

ideals

and valueswithout which our psychological life is

seriously

impoverished

and

hampered.

upsurge of interest in the West

practices,

philosophy

The

in Eastern

and religion

recent

meditative

bears testimony

to

this need, which must yet be recognized and integrated

by

psychoanalysis.

Psychoanalysis

can

signicantly

progress towards performing this integration if it begins

by

recognizing

and

integrating

into

its

theoretical

structure the dual nature of experience.

Acknowledgements: This paper was written during my stay as the
Erikson Scholar, JulyOctober
2001, at the Austen Riggs Center, Stockbridge, MA, USA. I
am indebted to Dr. Edward Shapiro, Medical Director, for his
support, and to too many to be
listed staff
for their
enlightening and constructive comments.

Translations of summary
Erfahrung was ist das? Ich betrachte die konstitutiven Aspekte von
Erfahrung unter einem neuen
Blickwinkel und verstehe sie weniger als Inhalte denn als Prozess. In
der

jngsten

vermehrt

Vergangenheit

Stimmen

zu

melden

Wort,

die

vielschichtige Natur innerer Erfahrung

aber war

sich

in

auf

die

der

Psychoanalyse

Komplexitt

und

verweisen. Vorherrschend

in der Psychoanalyse seit jeher die Betonung der linearen

und einfaktoriellen Natur von Erfahrung und allem, was auf ihr
beruht:

Entwicklung,

Behandlung.
Erfahrung

Ich

Objektbeziehungen,

erlutere

meine

Psychopathologie

Sichtweise,

nach

der

und

innere

aus der Operation von zwei parallel verlaufenden Modi

der Verarbeitung innerer und uerer Stimuli hervorgeht und zwei

Pole des Subjekt-Objekt-Erlebens
Instrumentalitt,
konzeptuelle

Einheit

und

Neuformulierung

Implikationen

fr

das

widerspiegelt: Getrenntheit und

fortwhrendes
von

Verstehen

Sein.

Erfahrung
von

Eine

birgt

solche

zahlreiche

Subjektivitt

und

Intersubjektivitt, von wechselseitiger Bezogenheit und Ein-PersonPsychologie

sowie

fr

die

beraus

wichtige

Bedeutung

der

Goodness-of-t-Erfahrung in der analytischen Situation und

anderenorts.

La experiencia. Qu es? El autor lanza una mirada renovada a los aspectos

constitutivos de la experiencia, al considerarla ms como proceso que
como contenido. En los ltimos tiempos se advierten ms puntos de
vista psicoanalticos que argumentan a
favor
de la naturaleza
compleja
y los mltiples
niveles de la experiencia interna. Sin
embargo la
voz psicoanaltica
predominante y preeminente
tradicionalmente ha enfatizado la naturaleza lineal y unifactorial de
la experiencia y de todo aquello que se basa en ella: el desarrollo, las
relaciones objetales, la psicopatologa, y el tratamiento. El autor
ofrece una comprensin
de la experiencia en cuanto proviene del funcionamiento de dos
modalidades contiguas de procesamiento de estmulos
externos, y que reejan
objeto:

la

dos polaridades de la experiencia sujeto-

de separacin e instrumentalidad, y la de

continuidad

existencial.

internos y

Esta

reformulacin

unidad y

conceptual

de

la

experiencia contiene mltiples implicaciones para la comprensin de

la

subjetividad e

intersubjetividad,

de

las

interrelaciones como

tambin de la psicologa de la persona individual, as como del papel

vital de una experiencia de

bondad de

ajuste (goodness-of-

t) en la situacin analtica y en otras circunstancias.

Lexprience (le vcu) quest-ce que cest ? Lauteur propose un regard nouveau
sur les aspects constitutifs de lexprience, en la considrant comme
un processus plutt que comme un ensemble de contenus. Plusieurs
voix psychanalytiques se sont rcemment fait entendre pour
souligner la complexit et
la nature multi- niveaux de
lexprience
intrieure.
Cependant
lopinion
psychanalytique
prdominante et prminente a traditionnellement mis laccent sur la
linarit et la nature mono-factorielle de lexprience, et tout est bas
sur
cette
singularit
:
dveloppement,
relations
dobjet,
psychopathologieet traitement. Lauteur avance une comprhension
de lexprience comme rsultant de

lopration de deux modalits

contigus et continues de traitement des affrences (input) internes

et externes, et retant deux polarits de lexprience sujet-objet :
2
For d iscussions of the relevance of Budd hist thi n ki ng
sychotherapeutic trai ning, see Ep stein , 1995; Rubin,
1

1996;
Twemlow,
01.

20

to p

dune part, celle de sparation et de linstrumentalit, dautre part

celle

de

lunicit

reformulation

et

de

conceptuelle

la

continuit

de

de

lexprience

ltre.
porte

Une

de

telle

multiples

implications concernant la comprhension de

la subjectivit et de

lintersubjectivit, de la

la psychologie de la

vie relationnelle et de

personne en tant quunit, et du rle capital dune bonne adquation

des expriences vcues dans la situation analytique et ailleurs.
Che cosa lesperienza? In questo articolo si esaminano da un nuovo punto
di vista gli aspetti costitutivi dellesperienza,
considerata come
processo anzich come un insieme di contenuti. Nel mondo della
psicoanalisi attualmente si sentono molte voci che sostengono che
lesperienza interiore sia complessa e
straticata su molti livelli, per la voce predominante e preminente
ha

tradizionalmente

posto

laccento

sulla

linearit

la

natura

unifattoriale dellesperienza e di tutto ci che su di essa si basa: lo

sviluppo, le relazioni oggettuali, la psicopatologia ed il trattamento.
Lautore presenta una visione dellesperienza secondo cui essa procede
dalle operazioni di due modalit contigue e continue di elaborazione
di input interni ed esterni, e che riette due polarit dellesperienza
soggettivo-oggettiva: quella della separatezza e della strumentalit e
quella dellunicit e del divenire dellessere. Un simile nuovo quadro
concettuale dellesperienza comprende in s molteplici
relative

alla

comprensione

della

implicazioni

soggettivit

dellintersoggettivit, della psicologia inter-relazionale oltre che di

quella della singola persona, e il ruolo importantissimo di un buon
adattamento esperienziale entro e fuori la situazione psicoanalitica.

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