Estella Aviles

Philosophy 3000 Paper 1

Mills Defense of the Death Penalty and its Implications for Utilitarianism
In his 1868 British House of Commons address, John Stuart Mill defends the use of the
death penalty for the sentencing of criminals guilty of particularly heinous crimes. In the speech
he claims that death is a better punishment than the alternative (life in prison) due to its merciful
nature (65). Lifelong imprisonment, he argues, is tantamount to a life of suffering (66). Death, on
the other hand, is both more merciful and a better deterrent for others who might otherwise
consider committing crimes, for as Mill says, there is notany human infliction which makes
an impressionso entirely out of proportion to its real severity as the punishment of death (66).
The claims Mill makes in this defense, however, undermine much of his theories from
Utilitarianism.
The most obvious contradiction Mills address poses to his ethical theories is in the idea
of the basic concept of goodness. Mill claims that something is desirable, and therefore good, if
people desire it (35). By this reasoning, Mills claim that the death penalty is a good practice
should be supported by prisoners desire for it, or at least by their preferring it to the alternative
of life in prison. This, however, is clearly not the case; the death penalty is generally perceived in
society as the worst punishment a court can give, whereas life in prison is a more desirable
sentence. If we are going to make a judgment of the death penalty with the thought that what is
generally desired is good, then we must conclude that life in prison is better than death.
Mill can pose several objections to this conclusion, the first that those who prefer life in
prison to death are misguided in their desires, and would desire death if they clearly understood
their options (7, 15-16). This objection can be dismissed using Mills own logic, specifically his
view on ranking pleasures by levels of goodness. Mill claims only someone who has experienced

all options available in a given scenario has the wisdom to know which is better (9). In the case
of death and lifelong imprisonment, there is no such person. It follows, then, that no individual
(including Mill) has the authority to claim that one is preferable to the other.
Abandoning this route, Mill can pose another objection: in allowing the death penalty, the
desires of the prisoner may not be fulfilled, but the desires of the general public are, and that
their desire carries the most weight (7). The desire for justice is being satisfied in a large number
of people, and in the grand scheme of things this adds more greatly to the sum total of happiness
in the world than satisfying one prisoners desire to live. Furthermore, the termination of a
criminals life adds virtually nothing to the amount of suffering in the world.
We can refute this claim by looking at the way the death penalty exists in todays world.
Illegal in 140 (of approximately 196) countries worldwide, a large group of people have
determined that it is in fact not desirable. In the United States support is at a record low and it is
one of the most controversial and heated debates on the political and ethical spectrums. While
this does not prove that having a death penalty is not desirable, it does indicate that we cannot
make the claim that it is desirable, either. Given this, it is unreasonable and irresponsible to
making the irreversible decision of taking human life, particularly without any kind of certainty.
Life in prison, however, achieves the goal of punishing the criminal and neutralizing the threat
they pose to society, addressing the desires for justice and safety.
These observations have serious implications for Mills ethical theories. Firstly, Mill must
now provide an alternative method for distinguishing between pleasures/pains in cases where no
one has experienced all options. More importantly, however, Mill undermines the core of his
ethics when he states that the death penalty is both a more merciful option than life in prison as

well as a better deterrent to crime, since people mistakenly believe death a far worse punishment
than life in prison. When Mill advocates for such a solution he discounts much of his previous
work establishing that the best version of the world is one in which people clearly understand
their desires and so are able to pursue them. The scenario which he claims renders the most good
in the case of justice is one in which people are kept ignorant of their own desires. As such, Mill
must either admit that it is good in some circumstances that people pursue ends which do not
bring about the most possible happiness or that it is not always good for people to understand
their own desires. In other words, in the first case Mill must enlighten the world to the merciful
nature of the death penalty and cause a dilemma in which the publics desire to deliver justice by
the worst punishment is not fulfilled (i.e. the death penalty continues) or many more individuals
live lives of great suffering (life in prison replaces the death penalty). In the second case, Mill
must keep the public ignorant of the best implementation of its desire for justice. In both of these
options it is clear that there is something more important than the pursuit of happiness, and this is
Mills entire ethical theory invalidated. The objection could be posed that the public has a desire
for mercy as well as justice, and while valid, this view is never voiced by Mill, whose only
reference to mercy in Utilitarianism is as a case where claims of justice are waived, in
obedience to other considerations (45).