spectacle

http://hum.uchicago.edu/faculty/mitchell/glossary2004/spectacle2.htm

The word spectacle (spectculum) is derived from the Latin verb

spectre (to look). The Oxford English Dictionary reports that a
spectacle is a thing seen or capable of being seen and is typically of
a striking or unusual character. Though not inaccurate to employ the
term in the sense of a philosophy of perception, that is to simply refer
to those things seen or capable of being seen, a spectacle is generally
understood as a person or thing exhibited to, or set before, the
public gaze as an object either (a) of curiosity or contempt, or (b) of
marvel or admiration. Such an exhibition is intended to form an
impressive or interesting show or entertainment for those viewing
it. Of specific interest to media studies the intellectual lineage of the
critique of spectacle begins with its two major foundational think ers:
Plato and Aristotle. Unlike the latter, Plato does not offer a specific
theory of spectacle. However, interpreting his allegory of the cave in
light of the concerns addressed by postmodern media theorists
proves rich for tracing an intellectual history and opening up those
more recent exegeses.
In Platos Republic Socrates asks that the young Glaucon imagine
human beings who have, for all of their lives, been immobilized and
their sight restricted by captors. The only things they know come
from a fire-cast puppet show consisting of statues of people, and
animals made of stone and wood and all kinds of materials. [1]
Occasionally the prisoners can hear voices but are unable to
distinguish whether the voices belong to fellow prisoners, captors, or
puppets. At some interval nature brings this state of affairs to an
end. [2] A prisoner is freed to exit the cave and behold the things
under the light of the sun, and upon acclimating to the pain of such
light, to behold the sun itself.
With this allegory, Plato, through the medium of Socrates, argues that
the philosopher is morally obligated to discover and disclose the Good
to non-philosophers who are, with regard to reality, deceived by
images. Contemporary media theorist W.J.T. Mitchell points out that
the allegory is constructed on a set of hypervalued metapictures.
[3] He contends that such an image theory permits Plato to treat the
world of concrete sensations as a mere shadow world of insubstantial
images, and the ideal sphere of forms as the realm of real
substance. [4] Though Plato does not explicitly address spectacle as
such, he nonetheless problematizes the relationship of a spectator to

those things seen by asking Glaucon and the reader to picture a

theory about pictures or images. Thus, he comments upon the
authenticity of visual experiences; and predating more recent
theorists, his cave allegory situates the critique of spectacle within a
suspicious discourse of power and knowledge.
On the other hand, Platos student Aristotle directly addresses
spectacle, what he calls opsis. An Ionic word, opsis refers to a sight,
appearance, face, or even the power of vision itself. [5] However,
whereas Plato uses the word in a non-technical manner, Aristotle
jargonizes opsis for his discussion of tragedy in the Poetics. Tragedy,
he writes, must have six components, which give it its qualities
namely, plot, character, diction, thought, spectacle, and lyric poetry.
The media of the mimesis are two components, its mode one, and its
objects three; there are no others. [6] For Aristotle, spectacle is the
least important of the components because though it is emotionally
potent it falls quite outside the art and is not integral to poetry:
tragedys capacity is independent of performance and actors, and,
besides, the costumiers art has more scope than the poets for
rendering effects of spectacle. [7] The spectacle is brought to bear in
the construction of masks and the performance of the actors, and
thus need not be contrived by the poet. In other words, spectacle
does not ensure the authenticity of the tragedy as such.
Taken at his word an internal problem arises for Aristotle with regard
to the necessary or excessive status of opsis as a component of
tragedy. As Mitchell has noted, ultimately Aristotle privileges lexis
over opsis, speech over scenery, dialogue over visual spectacle; for
Aristotle claims the plot should be so structured that, even without
seeing it performed, the person who hears the events that occur
experiences horror and pity. [8] However, the apparent contradiction
may be explained away by the fact that Aristotle classifies spectacle
as a mode and not a medium (or media). Whereas the media of
tragedy, diction and lyric poetry, are the sole territory of the poet,
opsis, as mode, is a kind of shared territory between the poet, actors,
and costumiers. Apropos Mitchells above claim, Aristotle further
argues that, what is fearful and pitiable can result from spectacle,
but also from the actual structure of events, which is the higher
priority and the aim of a superior poet. [9] The tragedians craft or
art lay not in mere spectacle because he is a poet whose, to use an
Aristotelian characterization, appropriate medium is lexis (words)
and not opsis. [10]
Late in the 20th century a number of theorists advanced positions

that were primarily concerned with the role of spectacle within society
and the discourse of political and power relations. Guy Debord, a
French philosopher-artist and leading figure in the Situationist
International, offered one the most controversial critiques of
spectacle in The Society of the Spectacle. Contra Plato and Aristotle,
Debord argues that the spectacle is not a collection of deceptive or
kitsch images but rather a social relationship between people that is
mediated by images and that this relationship appears at once as
society itself. [11] Following a Marxist logic, he theorizes three
manifestations of spectacular power that sustain the society of
spectacle: the concentrated spectacle, the diffuse form of spectacle,
and the integrated spectacle. [12]
Debord equates the concentrated spectacle with bureaucratic
capitalism and/ or totalitarian regimes such as Maos China. He
argues that spectacular power is concentrated in a single authority
(i.e. Mao) and that such a dictatorship must be attended by a
permanent violence. [13] In addition to violence, spectacular power
is also maintained by the proliferation of propaganda. Historically a
rival of concentrated spectacle, the diffuse form of the spectacle is
associated with the abundance of commodities, with the undisturbed
development of modern capitalism. [14] Debord argues that the
competing industries and markets that jockey for position within an
affluent economy maintain this particularly American brand of
spectacle. For instance, the spectacular logic of the automobile
argues for a perfect traffic flow entailing the destruction of the old
city centers, whereas the spectacle of the city itself calls for these
same ancient sections to be turned into museums. [15] As capitalists
vie for the passions of consumers by producing more desirable
commodities, particular commodities wear themselves out in the
fight, and the commodity as abstract form continues on its way to
absolute self-realization. [16] This spectacular logic of production
fashions and sustains the society of the spectacle; it is both its goal
and outcome. Of the integrated spectacle, Debord writes that it
shows itself to be simultaneously concentrated and diffuse, and ever
since the fruitful union of the two has learnt to employ both these
qualities on a grander scale. [17] Though initiated in France, Debord
insists that the integrated spectacle imposes itself globally and has
integrated itself into reality to the same extent as it was describing
it, and that it was reconstructing it as it was describing it. The
consequence is that the integrated spectacle spread itself to the
point where it now permeates all reality. [18]
As Jonathan Crary has pointed out, the infamous postmodern
theorist, Jean Baudrillard, rejects the notion of the society as

spectacle as a critical concept on the grounds that there is no more

opposition between the abstraction of money and the apparent
materiality of commodities; money and what it can buy are now
fundamentally of the same substance. And it is the potential
dissolution of any language of the market or of desire into binarized
pulses of light or electricity that unhinges the fictive unity of
spectacular representation. [19] Within Debords understanding of
the integrated spectacle, commodities and their relationships can be
(re)presented and identified. Baudrillard, on the other hand, argues
that all means of reference have been liquidated in the age of
simulation and the experience of hyperreality. For Baudrillard, those
commodities of which Debord speaks are not material instantiations
of production but simulacrum. Ergo the critique of spectacle is but a
simulated discourse whose Utopic dialectic is illusory at best, and at
worst, mendacious. [20]
Despite Baudrillards objection, Paul Virilio, one of the leading
thinkers of the convergence of technology and vision, as well as the
integration of military-industrial power with spectacle, argues that
present-day society is characterized by an integrated circuit of
vision, a paradoxical logic that synthesizes spectacle with
surveillance. [21] Virilio points out that human beings now live with
vision machines, machines that watch us watch them watch us ad
infinitum. [22] In a telling example, he observes that televisions have
a built-in device, a Motivac, which permits the monitoring of
audiences. Unlike older models, the updated instrument can detect
the presence of a viewer and not only whether the television is turned
on. Recently, televisions have been allowed in the private cells of
prisoners, which allows them (i.e. the inmates] to monitor actuality.
[23] This means that prisoners can witness the activity of a world
simultaneously denied and granted, albeit in a restricted form.
Moreover, Virilio is quick to stress that as soon as viewers switch on
their sets, it is they, prisoner or otherwise, who are in the field of
television, a field in which they are obviously powerless to intervene.
[24] To further reinforce his thesis, Virilio calls upon Michel Foucaults
observation that surveillance and punishment go hand and hand
which allows him to pose a question reminiscent of Debord: what
other kind of punishment is there if not envy, the ultimate
punishment of advertising? [25]
In light of this question, in order to grasp the relevance or irrelevance
of a concept of spectacle with regard to media studies, perhaps a
return to Platos cave is in order. Upon reentering the darkness, the
media theorist may inquire as to why reprieve was granted and what
it means to leave the cave? Is the puppet show an advertisement of

the world outside? Or as Aristotle might wonder: is the puppet show

but mere spectacle whereas the authentic tragedy is disclosed and
experienced with the philosophers discovery that such was, in fact,
the case with the world outside the cave as well? Or with Virilio and
Debord, the media theorist could ask is this world but a high
definition, fully integrated spectacle? [26] If so, is authenticity or art
even possible or desirable?

Zach Harris
Winter 2007