[G.R. No. 147789.

January 14, 2004]

ALEXANDER P. RUGAS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Principles:
Agreeing to fistfight, not unlawful aggression:
We find that such plea cannot be availed of because no unlawful aggression, so to speak, was committed
by the deceased, Rodolfo Saldo, and Hernando Caunte against the appellant. Appellants version of the
incident was to the effect that he had come to the aid of Villafria at the latters call when Villafria boxed
Mariano Dioso and engaged the group of Dioso, Saldo and Caunte in a fight. In other words, he
voluntarily joined the fight, when he did not have to. He voluntarily exposed himself to the consequences
of a fight with his opponents. Granting arguendo that the first attack came from Dioso or Saldo or Caunte,
yet same cannot be considered an unlawful or unexpected aggression. The first attack which came from
either is but an incident of the fight.
Slapping in the face is unlawful aggression.
In People v. Sabio citing the ruling of the Supreme Court of Spain on January 20, 1904, is misplaced. In
that case, the Court ruled that a slap on the face is an unlawful aggression since the face represents a
person and his dignity. Slapping the face of a person is a serious personal attack; it is a physical assault,
coupled with a willful disgrace, nay, a defiance, of an individuals personality; and it may, therefore, be
frequently regarded as placing in real danger a persons dignity, rights and safety.
Facts:
Petitioner stabbed private respondent on the thigh and on the stomach. In his defense, petitioner allege
that prior to the stabbing, the private respondent along with 2 others went to petitioners house and in front
thereof shouted Get out those who are brave. So that accused got out and asked why are you like that?
Private respondent who was then armed, gave his knife to one of his peers. Then a fistfight

ensued. Petitioner alleges that private respondent hit him in his eyebrows thus constituting unlawful
aggression.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is unlawful aggression.
HELD:
NO.
The court a quo rejected the claim of self-defense interposed by the appellant. We find that such plea
cannot be availed of because no unlawful aggression, so to speak, was committed by the deceased,
Rodolfo Saldo, and Hernando Caunte against the appellant. Appellants version of the incident was to the
effect that he had come to the aid of Villafria at the latters call when Villafria boxed Mariano Dioso and
engaged the group of Dioso, Saldo and Caunte in a fight. In other words, he voluntarily joined the fight,
when he did not have to. He voluntarily exposed himself to the consequences of a fight with his
opponents. Granting arguendo that the first attack came from Dioso or Saldo or Caunte, yet same cannot
be considered an unlawful or unexpected aggression. The first attack which came from either is but an
incident of the fight. (People vs. Kruse, C.A., 64 O.G. 12632): (Reyes, Revised Penal Code on Crim. Law,
12th Ed., 1981, p. 168)
Like alibi, self-defense is inherently a weak defense which can be easily fabricated. ]When the accused
interposes self-defense, he hereby admits having caused the injuries of the victim. The burden of proof
then shifts on him to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the confluence of the essential requisites
for such a defense, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of
the means employed and to prevent or repel it; (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. The accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
prosecutions, for even if the latter is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the
killing. In People v. Alfaro,[ and People v. Camacho, we held that the failure of the accused to account for
the presentation of the bladed weapon allegedly used by the victim is fatal to his plea of self-defense. In
this case, the appellant failed to account for the knife supposedly held by the victim and the bolo which
the victim allegedly handed over to Rones. He also failed to account for the knife he used in stabbing the

victim and to surrender himself and the said knife to the police authorities and to admit having stabbed the
victim in self-defense.[ Such failure rejects appellants claim of self-defense.
The petitioners reliance on our ruling in People v. Sabio,[16] citing the ruling of the Supreme Court of Spain
on January 20, 1904, is misplaced. In that case, the Court ruled that a slap on the face is an unlawful
aggression since the face represents a person and his dignity. Slapping the face of a person is a serious
personal attack; it is a physical assault, coupled with a willful disgrace, nay, a defiance, of an individuals
personality; and it may, therefore, be frequently regarded as placing in real danger a persons dignity,
rights and safety. In this case, there is no evidence that the victim slapped the petitioner. The petitioner
merely claimed that he was hit on his eyebrow which the trial court and the Court of Appeals found to be
baseless. This reliance on People v. Sabio to sustain the claim that the petitioner intended to defend his
honor, is inconsistent with his testimony that he stabbed the victim to defend himself from an imminent
physical assault when the latter pulled out a knife. This is also inconsistent with the fact that the victim
was stabbed three times.

G.R. No. L-37673

March 31, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

POTENCIANO TANEO, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

On January 16, 1932, in the house of Potenciano Taneos parents in Dolores, Ormoc, Leyte, because of
severe stomachache, Potenciano slept early. While sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room with a bolo
in hand and upon meeting his wife who tried stop him, he wounded her int eh abdomen. Several others
were also attacked, this includes his father, and his guests, Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. It was claimed
that he was dreaming when the crime happened. The trial court found Potenciano guilty of parricide and
was sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:

WON the defendant is criminally liable.

HELD:

No. The defendant acted while in a dream and his acts with which he was charged were not voluntary in
the sense of entailing criminal liability. The expert witness claimed that the defendant was under the
influence of hallucination and not in his right mind. The defendant is not criminally liable however, he was
ordered to be confined in an insane asylum.

G.R. No. L-48100

June 20, 1941

FLORENCIO

PELOBELLO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
GREGORIO PALATINO, respondent-appellee.

FACTS:
The petitioner-appellant, Florencio Pelobello, instituted quo warranto proceedings against the respondentappellee, Gregorio Palatino, the mayor-elect of the municipality of Torrijos, Province of Marinduque. It
was alleged that the respondent-appellee, having been convicted by final judgment in 1912 was
disqualified from voting and being voted upon for the contested municipal office, such disqualification not
having been removed by plenary pardon. It is admitted that the respondent-appellee was granted by the
Governor-General a conditional pardon back in 1915; and it has been proven that on December 25, 1940,
His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, granted the respondent-appellee absolute pardon and
restored him to the enjoyment of full civil and political rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pardon granted to a convict after service of sentence works to resotre him full civil and
political rights.
HELD:
YES.
While there may be force in the argument which finds support in well considered cases that the effect of
absolute pardon should not be extended to cases of this kind, we are of the opinion that the better view in
the light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of
the Chief Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity
of the law to the extent of relieving completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and
resultant disabilities of criminal conviction. In the case at bar, it is admitted that the respondent mayorelect committed the offense more than 25 years ago; that he had already merited conditional pardon from

the Governor-General in 1915; that thereafter he had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor
of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921; was elected municipal president of that municipality
three times in succession (1922-1931); and finally elected mayor of the municipality in the election for
local officials in December, 1940. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting
him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will; and the
pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4 of
the Election Code for assuming office. We see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a
restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive. We, therefore, give
efficacy to executive action and disregard what at bottom is a technical objection.

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
PRINCIPLES:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the
civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising
from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates
these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission: a) Law; b) Contracts; c) Quasi-contracts; d) . . .; e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may
be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations
on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.
Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch
as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of
civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
FACTS:
In Criminal Case filed before the RTC, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually
convicted

thereof.

Pending

appeal

of

his

conviction,

Bayotas

at

the National Bilibid Hospital. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the
appeal.
ISSUE:
Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
HELD:
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to
recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule
111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated
not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon
which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law, result
in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed against the
executor or administrator17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or
administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover
real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien
thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or
personal, may be commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala

18

where we held that, in recovering damages for injury

to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed
against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not against the estate under
Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the
last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or implied.
Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations other than those which
have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civil action
must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the
civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the

accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising
from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates
these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may
be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations
on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished
his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently,
the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.

Mors Omnia Solvi Death Dissolves all things.