Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 200804

January 22, 2014

A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
EMMA MONDEJAR, accompanied by her husband, EFREN MONDEJAR, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse1 to the Court from the Decision2 dated November 23, 2011and Order3
dated February 16, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 45 (RTC) in RTC
Case No. 11-13833 which dismissed, on the ground of improper remedy, petitioner A.L. Ang
Network, Inc.'s (petitioner) petition for certiorari from the Decision4 dated June 10, 2011 of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Bacolod City, Branch 4 (MTCC) in Civil Case No. SCC-1436,
a small claims case for sum of money against respondent Emma Mondejar (respondent).
The Facts
On March 23, 2011, petitioner filed a complaint5 for sum of money under the Rule of Procedure
for Small Claims Cases6 before the MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent the amount of
P23,111.71 which represented her unpaid water bills for the period June 1, 2002 to September
30, 2005.7
Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and collect payment therefor
from the homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision, one of whom is respondent who owns and
occupies Lot 8, Block 3 of said subdivision. From June 1, 2002 until September 30, 2005,
respondent and her family consumed a total of 1,150 cubic meters (cu. m.) of water, which upon
application of the agreed rate of P113.00 for every 10 cu. m. of water, plus an additional charge
of P11.60 for every additional cu. m. of water, amounted to P28,580.09.8 However, respondent
only paid the amount of P5,468.38, thus, leaving a balance of P23,111.71 which was left unpaid
despite petitioners repeated demands.9
In defense, respondent contended that since April 1998 up to February 2003, she religiously paid
petitioner the agreed monthly flat rate of P75.00 for her water consumption. Notwithstanding
their agreement that the same would be adjusted only upon prior notice to the homeowners,
petitioner unilaterally charged her unreasonable and excessive adjustments (at the average of 40
cu. m. of water per month or 1.3 cu. m. of water a day) far above the average daily water

consumption for a household of only 3 persons. She also questioned the propriety and/or basis of
the aforesaid P23,111.71 claim.10
In the interim, petitioner disconnected respondents water line for not paying the adjusted water
charges since March 2003 up to August 2005.11
The MTCC Ruling
On June 10, 2011, the MTCC rendered a Decision12 holding that since petitioner was issued a
Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC)13 by the National Water Resources Board (NWRB)
only on August 7, 2003, then, it can only charge respondent the agreed flat rate of P75.00 per
month prior thereto or the sum of P1,050.00 for the period June 1, 2002 to August 7, 2003. Thus,
given that respondent had made total payments equivalent to P1,685.99 for the same period, she
should be considered to have fully paid petitioner.14
The MTCC disregarded petitioners reliance on the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Boards
(HLURB) Decision15 dated August 17, 2000 in HLURB Case No. REM C6-00-001 entitled
Nollie B. Apura, et al. v. Dona Carmen I Subdivision, et al., as source of its authority to impose
new water consumption rates for water consumed from June 1, 2002 to August 7, 2003 in the
absence of proof (a) that petitioner complied with the directive to inform the HLURB of the
result of its consultation with the concerned homeowners as regards the rates to be charged, and
(b) that the HLURB approved of the same.16
Moreover, the MTCC noted that petitioner failed to submit evidence showing (a) the exact date
when it actually began imposing the NWRB approved rates; and (b) that the parties had a formal
agreement containing the terms and conditions thereof, without which it cannot establish with
certainty respondents obligation.17 Accordingly, it ruled that the earlier agreed rate of P75.00
per month should still be the basis for respondents water consumption charges for the period
August 8, 2003 to September 30, 2005.18 Based on petitioners computation, respondent had
only paid P300.00 of her P1,500.00 obligation for said period. Thus, it ordered respondent to pay
petitioner the balance thereof, equivalent to P1,200.00 with legal interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from date of receipt of the extrajudicial demand on October 14, 2010 until fully paid.19
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari20 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
the RTC, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC in finding that it
(petitioner) failed to establish with certainty respondents obligation, and in not ordering the
latter to pay the full amount sought to be collected.
The RTC Ruling
On November 23, 2011, the RTC issued a Decision21 dismissing the petition for certiorari,
finding that the said petition was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of small
claims cases as provided under Section 2322 of the Rule of Procedure on Small Claims Cases. To
this end, the RTC ruled that it cannot supplant the decision of the MTCC with another decision
directing respondent to pay petitioner a bigger sum than that which has been awarded.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration23 but was denied in an Order24 dated February 16, 2012,
hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing petitioners recourse
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject
small claims case.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that:
SEC. 23. Decision. After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the same day,
based on the facts established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall immediately
be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith
served on the parties.
The decision shall be final and unappealable.
Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule, the
remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its
execution.25 Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other
proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy,26 does not preclude the aggrieved party
from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This general rule has
been enunciated in the case of Okada v. Security Pacific Assurance Corporation,27 wherein it
was held that:
In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that "the extraordinary writ of certiorari is
always available where there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law." In Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co., the Court ruled:
x x x Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil action of
certiorari may only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the course of law," this rule is not without exception. The availability of the ordinary
course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial,
speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy not the mere absence of all other legal remedies
and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that usually determines the propriety of
certiorari.
This ruling was reiterated in Conti v. Court of Appeals:

Truly, an essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary remedies under the Rules is
an absence of an appeal nor any "plain, speedy and adequate remedy" in the ordinary course of
law, one which has been so defined as a "remedy which (would) equally (be) beneficial, speedy
and sufficient not merely a remedy which at some time in the future will bring about a revival of
the judgment x x x complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy which will promptly
relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the inferior court
or tribunal" concerned. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In this relation, it may not be amiss to placate the RTCs apprehension that respondents recourse
before it (was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of [small claims cases],
because it asks [the court] to supplant the decision of the lower [c]ourt with another decision
directing the private respondent to pay the petitioner a bigger sum than what has been
awarded."28 Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original action29 designed to
correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it is therefore
incumbent upon petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the MTCC Decision. The
RTC, in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition based on an evaluation of whether or not
the MTCC gravely abused its discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding
evidence that is material to the controversy.30
In view of the foregoing, the Court thus finds that petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of
certiorari to assail the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case, contrary
to the RTCs ruling.
Likewise, the Court finds that petitioner filed the said petition before the proper forum (i.e., the
RTC).1wphi1 To be sure, the Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari.31 Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however,
does not give a party unbridled freedom to choose the venue of his action lest he ran afoul of the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Instead, a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy dictates that
petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari against first level courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals, before resort may be
had before the Court.32 This procedure is also in consonance with Section 4, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.33
Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,34 certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed
before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it
instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has
jurisdiction over the same. In fine, the RTC erred in dismissing the said petition on the ground
that it was an improper remedy, and, as such, RTC Case No. 11-13833 must be reinstated and
remanded thereto for its proper disposition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 23, 2011 and
Resolution dated February 16, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 45 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. RTC Case No. 11-13833 is hereby REINSTATED and the court a
quo is ordered to resolve the same with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
AT T E S T AT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 See Petition for Review on Certiorari dated March 12, 2012; rollo, pp. 3-35.
2 Id. at 290-292. Penned by Presiding Judge Eliseo C. Geolingo.
3 Id. at 306-307.
4 Id. at 145-152. Penned by Judge Francisco S. Pando.

5 Id. at 40-45.
6 A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, effective October 1, 2008.
7 Rollo, p. 149.
8 Id. at 147.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 146-147.
11 Id. at 146.
12 Id. at 145-152.
13 Id. at 191-192.
14 Id. at 149.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 149-151.
17 Id. at 151.
18 Id. at 152.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 153-176.
21 Id. at 290-292.
22 Infra.
23 Id. at 293-305.
24 Id. at 306-307.
25 Section 24, Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases.
26 See Republic v. Narceda, G.R. No. 182760, April 10, 2013, 695 SCRA 483, 489-490,
citing Republic v. Tango, G.R. No. 161062, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 560, 566-567
involving summary proceedings for petitions for the declaration of presumptive death;
see also Sarona v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 185280, January 18,

2012, 663 SCRA 394, 411-425, involving illegal dismissal cases decided by the NLRC;
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
27 G.R. No. 164344, December 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 124, 141-142, citing Jaca v. Davao
Lumber Co., 198 Phil. 493, 517 (1982) and Conti v. CA, 336 Phil. 956, 965 (1999).
28 Rollo, p. 291.
29 Dy v. Hon. Bibat-Palamos, G.R. No. 196200, September 11, 2013.
30 Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. v. Villamater, G.R. No. 179169, March 3, 2010, 614
SCRA 182, 192.
31 Rayos v. The City of Manila, G.R. No. 196063, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 684,
689.
32 Id.
33 SEC. 4. When and where to file the petition. - The petition shall be filed not later than
sixty ( 60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. x x x
If the petition relates to an act or omission of a municipal trial court or of a
corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional
Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. xx x.
34 Sections 2 and 4 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 168943

October 27, 2006

IGLESIA NI CRISTO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. THELMA A. PONFERRADA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Br. 104, Quezon City, and HEIRS OF ENRIQUE G. SANTOS, respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 72686 and its Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration of the said
decision.
On October 24, 2001, Alicia, Alfredo, Roberto, Enrique and Susan, all surnamed Santos, and
Sonia Santos-Wallin, represented by Enrique G. Santos, filed a complaint3 for Quieting of Title
and/or Accion Reinvindicatoria before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City against
the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC), defendant therein.
Plaintiffs alleged therein that, during his lifetime, Enrique Santos was the owner of a 936-squaremeter parcel of land located in Tandang Sora, Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 57272 issued by the Register of Deeds on July 27, 1961 which cancelled TCT
No. 57193-289. He had been in possession of the owners duplicate of said title and had been in
continuous, open, adverse and peaceful possession of the property. He died on February 9, 1970
and was survived by his wife, Alicia Santos, and other plaintiffs, who were their children.
Thereafter, plaintiffs took peaceful and adverse possession of the property, and of the owners
duplicate of said title. When the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City was burned on
June 11, 1988, the original copy of said title was burned as well. The Register of Deeds had the
title reconstituted as TCT No. RT-110323, based on the owners duplicate of TCT No. 57272.
Sometime in February 1996, plaintiffs learned that defendant was claiming ownership over the
property based on TCT No. 321744 issued on September 18, 1984 which, on its face, cancelled
TCT No. 320898, under the name of the Philippine National Bank, which allegedly cancelled
TCT No. 252070 in the names of the spouses Marcos and Romana dela Cruz. They insisted that
TCT Nos. 321744, 320898 and 252070 were not among the titles issued by the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City and even if the Register of Deeds issued said titles, it was contrary to law.
Enrique Santos, during his lifetime, and his heirs, after his death, never encumbered or disposed
the property. In 1996, plaintiffs had the property fenced but defendant deprived them of the final
use and enjoyment of their property.
Plaintiffs prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered
quieting the title of plaintiffs over and/or recover possession of their said property in the
name of deceased Enrique Santos, covered by said TCT No. RT-110323(57272) of the
Register of Deeds at Quezon City and that:
1. The title of defendant, TCT No. 321744 be ordered cancelled by the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City;
2. The defendant be ordered to pay plaintiffs claims for actual damages in the
sum of P100,000.00;

3. The defendant be ordered to pay plaintiffs claims for compensatory damages in

the sum of at least P1,000,000.00;
4. The defendant be ordered to pay plaintiffs claims for reimbursement of the
lawyers professional fees consisting of the aforesaid P50,000.00 acceptance fee
and reimbursement of the said success fee in par. 10 above; and lawyers expenses
of P2,000.00 for each hearing in this case;
5. The defendant be ordered to pay expenses and costs of litigation in the sum of
at least P200,000.00.
Other reliefs that are just and equitable in the premises are, likewise, prayed for.4
As gleaned from the caption of the complaint, plaintiffs appear to be the heirs of Enrique Santos,
represented by Enrique G. Santos. The latter signed the Verification and Certificate of NonForum Shopping which reads:
I, ENRIQUE G. SANTOS, of legal age, under oath, state that I am one of the children of
the late Enrique Santos and I represent the heirs of said Enrique Santos who are my coplaintiffs in the above-captioned case and that I directed the preparation of the instant
complaint, the contents of which are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and the
attachments are faithful reproductions of the official copies in my possession.
I hereby certify that I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the
same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or
any other tribunal or agency, and to the best of my knowledge, no such action or
proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, and that I shall notify this Commission within
three days from notice that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending
thereat.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereby affix my signature this 23rd day of October 2001 at
Pasig City, Metro Manila.
(Sgd.)
ENRIQUE G. SANTOS
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 23rd day of October 2001 at Pasig City,
affiant exhibiting to me his CTC No. 07303074 issued at Sta. Cruz, Laguna on April 16,
2001.
(Sgd.)
PETER FRANCIS G. ZAGALA
Notary Public

Until December 31, 2002

PTR No. 0287069
Issued on 1-10-01
At Pasig City5
Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs complaint on the following grounds: (1) plaintiffs failed
to faithfully comply with the procedural requirements set forth in Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) the action (either Quieting of Title or Accion Reinvindicatoria) had
prescribed, the same having been filed only on October 24, 2001 beyond the statutory ten-year
period therefor; and (3) that the complaint is defective in many respects.6
Defendant asserted that the case involved more than one plaintiff but the verification and
certification against forum shopping incorporated in the complaint was signed only by Enrique
Santos. Although the complaint alleges that plaintiffs are represented by Enrique Santos, there is
no showing that he was, indeed, authorized to so represent the other plaintiffs to file the
complaint and to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping.7 Thus, plaintiffs
failed to comply with Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Defendant cited the ruling of this
Court in Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman.8
Defendant maintained that the complaint is defective in that, although there is an allegation that
Enrique Santos represents the other heirs, there is nothing in the pleading to show the latters
authority to that effect; the complaint fails to aver with particularity the facts showing the
capacity of defendant corporation to sue and be sued; and the pleading does not state the address
of plaintiffs. Defendant likewise averred that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of
prescription. It argued that plaintiffs anchor their claim on quieting of title and considering that
they are not in possession of the land in question, their cause of action prescribed after ten years.
On the other hand, if the supposed right of plaintiffs is based on accion reinvindicatoria,
prescription would set in after 10 years from dispossession. In both cases, defendant asserts, the
reckoning point is 1984 when defendant acquired TCT No. 321744 and possession of the land in
question.
In their Comment9 on the motion, plaintiffs averred that the relationship of a co-owner to the
other co-owners is fiduciary in character; thus, anyone of them could effectively act for another
for the benefit of the property without need for an authorization. Consequently, Enrique Santos
had the authority to represent the other heirs as plaintiffs and to sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping.10 On the issue of prescription, plaintiffs argued that the
prescriptive period for the actions should be reckoned from 1996, when defendant claimed
ownership over the property and barred plaintiffs from fencing their property, not in 1984 when
TCT No. 321744 was issued by the Register of Deeds in the name of defendant as owner.
In its reply, defendant averred that absent any authority from his co-heirs, Enrique Santos must
implead them as plaintiffs as they are indispensable parties. In response, plaintiffs aver that a coowner of a property can execute an action for quieting of title without impleading the other coowners.

The trial court issued an Order11 denying defendants motion to dismiss. It declared that since
Enrique Santos was one of the heirs, his signature in the verification and certification constitutes
substantial compliance with the Rules. The court cited the ruling of this Court in Dar v. AlonzoLegasto.12 The court, likewise, held that prescription had not set in and that failure to state the
address of plaintiffs in the complaint does not warrant the dismissal of the complaint.
Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court likewise denied in an Order13 dated
July 10, 2002.
Unsatisfied, defendant, as petitioner, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction14 before the
CA, raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED
HER DISCRETION WHEN SHE HELD THAT THE CERTIFICATION OF NONFORUM SHOPPING SIGNED BY ENRIQUE G. SANTOS ALONE IS A
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 5, RULE 7 OF THE 1997 RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, IN CLEAR CONTRAVENTION OF THE RULES OF
COURT, AND THE RULING IN LOQUIAS V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R.
NO. 1399396 (SIC), AUGUST 16, 2000, 338 SCRA 62, AND ORTIZ V. COURT OF
APPEALS, G.R. NO. 127393, 299 SCRA 708 (DECEMBER 4, 1998).
II.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED
HER DISCRETION IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DAR, ET. AL. V. HON. ROSE
MARIE ALONZO-LEGASTO, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 143016, AUGUST 30, 2000 TO THE
INSTANT CASE.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED
HER DISCRETION WHEN SHE HELD THAT THE AUTHORITY OF ENRIQUE G.
SANTOS TO REPRESENT HIS CO-HEIRS IN THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT
AGAINST THE "INC" IS A MATTER OF EVIDENCE.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED
HER DISCRETION WHEN SHE HELD THAT THE ACTION FOR QUIETING OF
TITLE AND/OR ACCION REINVINDICATORIA (CIVIL CASE NO. Q-01-45415)
HAS NOT YET PRESCRIBED.15

Petitioner averred that, of the plaintiffs below, only plaintiff Enrique Santos signed the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, all the plaintiffs must sign, unless one of them is authorized by a special
power of attorney to sign for and in behalf of the others. Petitioner argues that the bare claim of
Enrique Santos that he signed the verification and certification in his behalf and of the other
plaintiffs who are his co-heirs/co-owners of the property does not even constitute substantial
compliance of the rule. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the absence or existence of an
authority of Enrique Santos to sign the verification and certification for and in behalf of his coplaintiffs is not a matter of evidence. The defect is fatal to the complaint of respondents and
cannot be cured by an amendment of the complaint. The trial court erred in applying the ruling of
this Court in Dar v. Alonzo-Legasto.16
Petitioner maintained that the action of respondents, whether it be one for quieting of title or an
accion reinvindicatoria, had prescribed when the complaint was filed on October 24, 2001.
Petitioner asserts that this is because when respondents filed their complaint, they were not in
actual or physical possession of the property, as it (petitioner) has been in actual possession of
the property since 1984 when TCT No. 321744 was issued to it by the Register of Deeds. This is
evident from the nature of a reinvindicatory action itself which is an action whereby plaintiff
alleges ownership over the subject parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. By
their action, respondents thereby admitted that petitioner was in actual possession of the
property, and as such, respondents action for quieting of title or accion reinvindicatoria may
prescribe in ten (10) years from 1984 or in 1994, it appearing that it acted in good faith when it
acquired the property from the registered owner, conformably with Article 555(4) of the New
Civil Code.
On April 7, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed decision17 dismissing the petition, holding that the
RTC did not commit grave abuse of its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying petitioners motion to dismiss. As the Court held in DAR v. Alonzo-Legasto18 and in
Gudoy v. Guadalquiver,19 the certification signed by one with respect to a property over which he
shares a common interest with the rest of the plaintiffs (respondents herein) substantially
complied with the Rules. As to the issue of prescription, the appellate court held that the
prescriptive period should be reckoned from 1996, when petitioner claimed ownership and
barred respondents from fencing the property.
Petitioner is now before this Court on petition for review on certiorari, raising the following
issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING SIGNED BY RESPONDENT
ENRIQUE G. SANTOS ALONE IS A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH
SECTION 5, RULE 7 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND IN
APPLYING THE CASE OF GUDOY V. GUADALQUIVER, 429 SCRA 723,
WITHOUT REGARD TO MORE RECENT JURISPRUDENCE.

II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT
THE AUTHORITY OF RESPONDENT ENRIQUE G. SANTOS TO REPRESENT HIS
CO-HEIRS IN THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT AGAINST THE PETITIONER IS
A MATTER OF EVIDENCE.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE AND/OR ACCION REINVINDICATORIA
(CIVIL CASE NO. Q-01-45415) HAS NOT YET PRESCRIBED.20
Petitioner reiterated its arguments in support of its petition in the CA as its arguments in support
of its petition in the present case.
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court on verification and certification against
forum shopping read:
Sec. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule,
pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information
and belief" or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification,
shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall
certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief,
or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he
has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in
any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such
other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim,
a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn
that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that
fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after
hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the

corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for
summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause
for administrative sanctions.
The purpose of verification is simply to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition
(or complaint) have been made in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely speculative. This
requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith
does not necessarily render it fatally defective. Indeed, verification is only a formal, not a
jurisdictional requirement.21
The issue in the present case is not the lack of verification but the sufficiency of one executed by
only one of plaintiffs. This Court held in Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo,22 that the
verification requirement is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the present case, only
one of the heirs-plaintiffs, who has sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the petition (complaint), signed the verification attached to it. Such verification is
deemed sufficient assurance that the matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith
or are true and correct, not merely speculative.
The same liberality should likewise be applied to the certification against forum shopping. The
general rule is that the certification must be signed by all plaintiffs in a case and the signature of
only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed in a number of cases that
the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration
of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with
respect to the contents of the certification. This is because the requirement of strict compliance
with the provisions merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be
altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded.23
The substantial compliance rule has been applied by this Court in a number of cases: Cavile v.
Heirs of Cavile,24 where the Court sustained the validity of the certification signed by only one of
petitioners because he is a relative of the other petitioners and co-owner of the properties in
dispute; Heirs of Agapito T. Olarte v. Office of the President of the Philippines,25 where the Court
allowed a certification signed by only two petitioners because the case involved a family home in
which all the petitioners shared a common interest; Gudoy v. Guadalquiver,26 where the Court
considered as valid the certification signed by only four of the nine petitioners because all
petitioners filed as co-owners pro indiviso a complaint against respondents for quieting of title
and damages, as such, they all have joint interest in the undivided whole; and Dar v. AlonzoLegasto,27 where the Court sustained the certification signed by only one of the spouses as they
were sued jointly involving a property in which they had a common interest.
It is noteworthy that in all of the above cases, the Court applied the rule on substantial
compliance because of the commonality of interest of all the parties with respect to the subject of
the controversy.

Applying the doctrines laid down in the above cases, we find and so hold that the CA did not err
in affirming the application of the rule on substantial compliance. In the instant case, the property
involved is a 936-square-meter real property. Both parties have their respective TCTs over the
property. Respondents herein who are plaintiffs in the case below have a common interest over
the property being the heirs of the late Enrique Santos, the alleged registered owner of the
subject property as shown in one of the TCTs. As such heirs, they are considered co-owners pro
indiviso of the whole property since no specific portion yet has been adjudicated to any of the
heirs. Consequently, as one of the heirs and principal party, the lone signature of Enrique G.
Santos in the verification and certification is sufficient for the RTC to take cognizance of the
case. The commonality of their interest gave Enrique G. Santos the authority to inform the RTC
on behalf of the other plaintiffs therein that they have not commenced any action or claim
involving the same issues in another court or tribunal, and that there is no other pending action or
claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues. Hence, the RTC correctly denied the
motion to dismiss filed by petitioner.
Considering that at stake in the present case is the ownership and possession over a prime
property in Quezon City, the apparent merit of the substantive aspects of the case should be
deemed as a special circumstance or compelling reason to allow the relaxation of the rule.
Time and again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are established to secure substantial
justice. Being instruments for the speedy and efficient administration of justice, they may be
used to achieve such end, not to derail it. In particular, when a strict and literal application of the
rules on non-forum shopping and verification will result in a patent denial of substantial justice,
these may be liberally construed.28 The ends of justice are better served when cases are
determined on the merits after all parties are given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and
defenses rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections.29
Indeed, this Court strictly applied the rules on verification and certification against forum
shopping as in the cases of Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman30 and Tolentino v. Rivera.31
However, in both cases, the commonality of interest between or among the parties is wanting. In
Loquias, the co-parties were being sued in their individual capacities as mayor, vice mayor and
members of the municipal board. In Tolentino, the lone signature of Tolentino was held
insufficient because he had no authority to sign in behalf of the Francisco spouses. In such case,
the Court concluded that Tolentino merely used the spouses names for whatever mileage he
thought he could gain. It is thus clear from these cases that the commonality of interest is
material in the relaxation of the Rules.
Anent the issue of the authority of Enrique G. Santos to represent his co-heirs/co-plaintiffs, we
find no necessity to show such authority. Respondents herein are co-owners of the subject
property. As such co-owners, each of the heirs may properly bring an action for ejectment,
forcible entry and detainer, or any kind of action for the recovery of possession of the subject
properties. Thus, a co-owner may bring such an action, even without joining all the other coowners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.32
We uphold the validity of the complaint because of the following circumstances: (1) the caption
of the instant case is Heirs of Enrique Santos v. Iglesia ni Cristo;33 (2) the opening statement of

the complaint states that plaintiffs are the heirs of Enrique Santos and likewise names the
particular heirs of the latter who instituted the complaint below;34 (3) the case involves a property
owned by the predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs therein;35 and (4) the verification signed by
Enrique G. Santos clearly states that he is one of the children of the late Enrique Santos and that
he represents the heirs of said Enrique Santos.36
On the issue of prescription of action, petitioner avers that the action of respondents is one to
quiet title and/or accion reinvindicatoria, and that respondents asserted ownership over the
property and sought the recovery of possession of the subject parcel of land. It insists that the
very nature of the action presupposes that respondents had not been in actual and material
possession of the property, and that it was petitioner which had been in possession of the
property since 1984 when it acquired title thereon. The action of respondent prescribed in ten
years from 1984 when petitioner allegedly dispossessed respondents, in accordance with Article
555(4) of the New Civil Code.
The contention of petitioner has no merit. The nature of an action is determined by the material
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought by plaintiff, and the law in
effect when the action was filed irrespective of whether he is entitled to all or only some of such
relief.37 As gleaned from the averments of the complaint, the action of respondents was one for
quieting of title under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Article 476 of the New Civil
Code. The latter provision reads:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently
valid or effective but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove
such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real
property or any interest therein.
A cloud is said to be a semblance of a title, either legal or equitable, or a cloud of an interest in
land appearing in some legal form but which is, in fact, unfounded, or which it would be
inequitable to enforce.38 An action for quieting of title is imprescriptible until the claimant is
ousted of his possession.39
The owner of a real property, as plaintiff, is entitled to the relief of quieting of title even if, at the
time of the commencement of his action, he was not in actual possession of real property. After
all, under Article 477 of the New Civil Code, the owner need not be in possession of the
property. If on the face of TCT No. 321744 under the name of plaintiff, its invalidity does not
appear but rests partly in pais, an action for quieting of title is proper.40
In the present case, respondents herein, as plaintiffs below, alleged in their complaint, that their
father, Enrique Santos, was the owner of the property based on TCT No. 57272 issued on July
27, 1961; and that, after his death on February 9, 1970, they inherited the property; Enrique
Santos, during his lifetime, and respondents, after the death of the former, had been in actual,

continuous and peaceful possession of the property until 1994 when petitioner claimed
ownership based on TCT No. 321744 issued on September 18, 1984 and barred respondents
from fencing their property.
Petitioners claim that it had been in actual or material possession of the property since 1984
when TCT No. 321744 was issued in its favor is belied by the allegations in the complaint that
respondents had been in actual and material possession of the property since 1961 up to the time
they filed their complaint on October 24, 2001.
Admittedly, respondents interposed the alternative reinvindicatory action against petitioner. An
accion reinvindicatoria does not necessarily presuppose that the actual and material possession
of the property is on defendant and that plaintiff seeks the recovery of such possession from
defendant. It bears stressing that an accion reinvindicatoria is a remedy seeking the recovery of
ownership and includes jus possidendi, jus utendi, and jus fruendi as well. It is an action whereby
a party claims ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession.41 Thus,
the owner of real property in actual and material possession thereof may file an accion
reinvindicatoria against another seeking ownership over a parcel of land including jus
vindicandi, or the right to exclude defendants from the possession thereof. In this case,
respondents filed an alternative reinvindicatory action claiming ownership over the property and
the cancellation of TCT No. 321744 under the name of petitioner. In fine, they sought to enforce
their jus utendi and jus vindicandi when petitioner claimed ownership and prevented them from
fencing the property.
Since respondents were in actual or physical possession of the property when they filed their
complaint against petitioner on October 24, 2001, the prescriptive period for the reinvindicatory
action had not even commenced to run, even if petitioner was able to secure TCT No. 321744
over the property in 1984. The reason for this is that
x x x one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof
may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives
him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the
nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can
be claimed only by one who is in possession.42
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72686 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, and Chico-Nazario, JJ.,
concur.

Footnotes

Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guaria III, with Associate Justices Marina L.
Buzon and Santiago Javier Ranada, concurring; rollo, pp. 21-28.
2

Rollo, p. 39.

Id. at 60-65.

CA rollo, pp. 24-25.

Id. at 26.

Id. at 72.

Id. at 73.

392 Phil. 596 (2000).

CA rollo, pp. 81-89.

10

Id. at 83-84.

11

Penned by Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada; rollo, pp. 117-118.

12

393 Phil. 734, 738 (2000).

13

Rollo, pp. 139-144.

14

Id. at 40-56.

15

Id. at 45-46.

16

Supra note 12.

17

Supra note 1.

18

Supra note 12.

19

G.R. No. 151136, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 722, 726.

20

Rollo, p. 7.

21

Estares v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144755, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 604, 616.

22

G.R. No. 160455, May 9, 2005, 458 SCRA 325, 333-334, citing Torres v. Specialized
Packaging Development Corporation, 433 SCRA 455, 463-464 (2000).

23

Heirs of Agapito T. Olarte v. Office of the President of the Philippines, G.R. No.
165821, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 561; Cavile v. Heirs of Clarita Cavile, 448 Phil. 302,
311 (2003).
24

Supra.

25

Supra.

26

Supra note 19.

27

Supra note 12.

28

Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo, supra note 22, at 336.

29

Id.

30

Supra note 8.

31

G.R. No. 149665, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 87.

32

Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa Santiago, G.R. No. 161817, July 30, 2004, 435
SCRA 690, 694 citing Sering v. Plaza, 166 SCRA 85, 86 (1988); Tolentino, Civil Code
(1983).
33

Rollo, p. 60

34

Id.

35

Id. at 61.

36

Id. at 65.

37

Barangay Piapi v. Talip, G.R. No. 138248, September 7, 2005, 469 SCRA 409; Hilario
v. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 815; Serdoncillo v. Benolirao,
358 Phil. 83 (1998).
38

Shults v. Shults, 42 NE 800 (1958).

39

Sapto v. Fabiana, 103 Phil. 683 (1958); Ordoez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84046,
July 30, 1990, 188 SCRA 109.
40

Gaves v. Ashburn, 215 US 331, 30 S.Ct. 168.

41

Capacete v. Baroro, 453 Phil. 392, 402 (2003).

42

Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 19 (1997).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 172623

March 3, 2010

COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, represented herein by its Secretary HON.

ARTURO L. TIU, Petitioner,
vs.
CELSO M. PALER,1 Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision2 dated
December 20, 2005 and resolution dated April 27, 2005 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 90360.
The facts are undisputed.
Respondent Celso M. Paler was a Supervising Legislative Staff Officer II (SG-24)3 with the
Technical Support Service of the Commission on Appointments.4 On April 8, 2003, he submitted
a request for vacation leave for 74 working days from August 1, 2003 to November 14, 2003.5
In a memorandum dated April 22, 2003, Ramon C. Nghuatco, Director III of Technical Support
Service, submitted to the Commission Secretary his comments/recommendation on Paler's
application:
"1. The request to go on leave of Mr. Paler is contingent upon the completion of his
various Committee assignments.
2. We have already acted favorably on his Leave Applications for 09 June 2003 - 30 July
2003, which may already cover his reasons enumerated under items 1-5.
3. Mr. Paler's Sick Leave Application shall require a medical certificate from the
attending physician advising him of the need to undergo medical operation and the
treatment and recuperation period therefor.
Mr. Paler's Application for Leave may be acted upon depending on the completion of his
work load and submission of the medical certificate."6 (Emphasis supplied)

Since he already had an approved leave from June 9 to July 30, 2003, Paler left for the United
States on June 8, 2003, without verifying whether his application for leave (for August 1
November 14, 2003) was approved or denied.
In a letter dated September 16, 2003, the Commission Chairman informed Paler that he was
being dropped from the roll of employees effective said date, due to his continuous 30-day
absence without leave and in accordance with Section 63, Civil Service Commission (CSC)
Memorandum Circular No. 14, s. 1999.7 Paler's son received the letter on September 23, 2003.8
Paler moved for reconsideration but this was denied on February 20, 2004, on the ground that it
was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.9 The denial was received by Paler's son on
March 18, 2004.
On appeal, the CSC reversed and set aside the Commission Chairman's decision dated
September 16, 2003 per resolution 04-1214 dated November 9, 2004.10 The dispositive portion of
the resolution read:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Celso M. Paler is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision
dated September 16, 2003 of Commission on Appointments Chairman Franklin M. Drilon
dropping Celso M. Paler from the rolls; and the decision dated February 20, 2004 denying his
motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. It is directed that Celso M. Paler
be immediately reinstated as Committee Secretary of the Commission on Appointments and shall
be considered to be on leave with pay until the exhaustion of his vacation leave credits.
Quezon City, Nov. 09, 2004.11
The Commission filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the CSC per
resolution No. 050833 dated June 23, 2005.
This constrained petitioner to file with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.
Since Paler had in the meantime already reached the compulsory age of retirement on July 28,
2005 and was no longer entitled to reinstatement, the CA affirmed with modification CSC
resolution 04-1214 dated November 9, 2004 and resolution No. 050833 dated June 23, 2005. The
dispositive portion of the assailed decision dated December 20, 2005 provided:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the order of reinstatement is DELETED. In lieu thereof, Paler should
be awarded backwages, retirement benefits and other privileges that accrued to him from the
time of his dismissal up to the date of his retirement.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in the assailed
resolution dated April 27, 2005.

Hence, this petition based on the following grounds:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING DUE
COURSE TO THE APPEAL OF RESPONDENT PALER WITH THE RESPONDENT CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS FILED OUT OF TIME.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
LEAVE APPLICATIONS OF RESPONDENT PALER WAS DEEMED APPROVED ON A
MISTAKEN INTERPRETATION OF SEC. 49, RULE XVI OF THE OMNIBUS RULE ON
LEAVE AS AMENDED.13
Petitioner's contentions are basically the same as those it presented to the CSC14 and the CA,15
viz.: (1) the CSC should not have entertained Paler's appeal since it was filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period; there were no meritorious reasons to relax the procedural rules, specially
since there was bad faith and misrepresentation on Paler's part in filing staggered applications for
leave; (2) the Commission Chairman's decision to drop Paler from the roll of employees was in
accord with Section 63 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 14, series of 1999 and (3) Paler's
application for leave was not "deemed approved" as petitioner acted on his application by
holding it in abeyance in view of the contingencies of his work and the submission of a medical
certificate.16
In his comment, Paler, aside from arguing that the CA did not commit any error in sustaining the
CSC resolutions, also assails Atty. Arturo L. Tiu's authority to file the petition and sign the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping on behalf of the Commission Chairman.17
The CSC, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), maintains the correctness of
the CSC and CA judgments.
Issues
This petition involves both procedural and substantive issues.
On the procedural aspect, Paler questions the authority of the Commission Secretary to file the
petition and sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in behalf of the
Commission Chairman. On the other hand, the Commission disputes the CSC's grant of Paler's
appeal despite having been filed beyond the reglementary period.
On the substantive aspect, was Paler's application for leave "deemed approved" within the
purview of Section 49, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave?
Authority to File Petition
First, we tackle Atty. Tiu's authority to file the petition and sign the verification and certification
of non-forum shopping.

The petitioner in this case is the Commission on Appointments, a government entity created by
the Constitution, and headed by its Chairman.18 There was no need for the Chairman himself to
sign the verification. Its representative, lawyer or any person who personally knew the truth of
the facts alleged in the petition could sign the verification.19 With regard, however, to the
certification of non-forum shopping, the established rule is that it must be executed by the
plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel.20 In this case, Atty. Tiu failed to show
that he was specifically authorized by the Chairman to sign the certification of non-forum
shopping, much less file the petition in his behalf. There is nothing on record to prove such
authority. Atty. Tiu did not even bother to controvert Palers allegation of his lack of authority.
This renders the petition dismissible.21
Furthermore, the petition is bereft of merit as it merely restates the arguments presented before
the CSC and CA. It does not advance any cogent reason that will convince this Court to deviate
from the rulings of both tribunals.
The Issue of Late Filing
Section 72 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, s. 1999,22 provides for the period of appeal for
non-disciplinary actions, to wit:
Section 72. When and Where to File. - A decision or ruling of a department or agency may be
appealed within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof by the party adversely affected to the Civil
Service Regional Office and finally, to the Commission Proper within the same period.
xxx
Paler's son received the letter from the Commission Chairman denying Palers motion for
reconsideration on March 18, 2004. Thus, Palers had until April 2, 2004 within which to file his
appeal with the CSC. It was filed, however, only on April 5, 2004.23 Nevertheless, the CSC
entertained the appeal in the interest of substantial justice.24
We agree with the CSC. We uphold its decision to relax the procedural rules because Paler's
appeal was meritorious. This is not the first time that the Court has upheld such exercise of
discretion. In Rosales, Jr. v. Mijares25 involving Section 49(a) of the CSC Revised Rules of
Procedure, the Court ruled:
On the contention of the petitioner that the appeal of the respondent to the CSC was made
beyond the period therefor under Section 49(a) of the CSC Revised Rules of Procedure, the CSC
correctly ruled that:
Movant claims that Mijares appeal was filed way beyond the reglementary period for filing
appeals. He, thus, contends that the Commission should not have given due course to said
appeal.
The Commission need not delve much on the dates when Mijares was separated from the service
and when he assailed his separation. Suffice it to state that the Commission found his appeal

meritorious.1avvphi1 This being the case, procedural rules need not be strictly observed.
This principle was explained by in the case of Mauna vs. CSC, 232 SCRA 388, where the
Supreme Court ruled, to wit:
"Assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioners appeal was filed out of time, it is within
the power of this Court to temper rigid rules in favor of substantial justice. While it is
desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts
should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper
administration of justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the orderly conduct of
litigation, it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the protection of
substantive rights of the parties. As held by the Court in a number of cases:
xxx
It bears stressing that the case before the CSC involves the security of tenure of a public officer
sacrosanctly protected by the Constitution. Public interest requires a resolution of the merits of
the appeal instead of dismissing the same based on a strained and inordinate application of
Section 49(a) of the CSC Revised Rules of Procedure.26 (Emphasis supplied)
Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania27 likewise sustained the CSC when it modified an
otherwise final and executory resolution and awarded backwages to the respondent, in the
interest of justice and fair play. The Court stated
No doubt, the Civil Service Commission was in the legitimate exercise of its mandate under Sec.
3, Rule I, of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service that
"[a]dministrative investigations shall be conducted without necessarily adhering strictly to the
technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings." This authority is
consistent with its powers and functions to "[p]rescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations
for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws" being
the central personnel agency of the Government.
Furthermore, there are special circumstances in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair
play that warrant such liberal attitude on the part of the CSC and a compassionate like-minded
discernment by this Court. x x x28
When substantial justice dictates it, procedural rules may be relaxed in order to arrive at a just
disposition of a case. The purpose behind limiting the period of appeal is to avoid unreasonable
delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to controversies. A one-day delay, as in
this case, does not justify denial of the appeal where there is absolutely no indication of intent to
delay justice on the part of Paler29 and the pleading is meritorious on its face.
Petitioner harps on Paler's alleged bad faith and misrepresentation in filing his previous
applications for leave. However, as correctly found by the CSC and CA, the basis for Paler's
dismissal was his continuous absence without leave, not bad faith and misrepresentation. The
CSC even noted that Paler never misrepresented or misled petitioner as to where he was
spending his vacation leave. He clearly stated in his application for leave dated April 17, 2003

that he was spending it not only in the Philippines but also in the U.S.30 According to the CA, "to
utilize Paler's alleged misrepresentation in his previously approved applications for leave as basis
for his separation from work, even in the absence of opportunity for him to controvert the matter,
would constitute a violation of the fundamental requirements of fairness and equity and the
constitutional guarantee of due process."31 The Court finds no reason to deviate from the findings
of both the CSC and CA, given that they concur with each other and should be accorded great
weight and respect.32
The CSC and CA were also correct in ruling that Paler could not be considered absent without
leave (AWOL) for the period of August 1, 2003 to November 14, 2003.
Paler was dropped from the roll of employees pursuant to Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus
Rules on Leave:
An official or an employee who is continuously absent without approved leave for at least thirty
(30) calendar days shall be considered on absence without official leave (AWOL) and shall be
separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice. He shall, however, be
informed, at his address appearing on his 201 files of his separation from the service, not later
than five (5) days from its effectivity. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
AWOL means that the employee has left or abandoned his post for a continuous period of thirty
(30) calendar days or more without any justifiable reason and notice to his employer.33
The bone of contention in this case is whether or not Paler had an approved leave.
Section 49, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave requires that an application for leave
should be acted upon within 5 working days from receipt, otherwise, such application is deemed
approved.34 The CSC interpreted said provision in this wise
It is explicit from the aforequoted rule that an application for leave of absence which had not
been acted upon either by approving or disapproving by the head of agency or his/her
authorized representative within five (5) working days from the date of its filing shall be deemed
approved.35 (Italics supplied)
The CSC also ruled that "Section 49 calls for a specific action to be done by the head of the
agency or his duly authorized representative on the application for leave filed which is either to
approve or to deny the same."36
Being the central agency mandated to "prescribe, amend, and enforce rules and regulations for
carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws," the CSC
has the power to interpret its own rules and any phrase contained in them, with its interpretation
significantly becoming part of the rules themselves.37 The Court has consistently yielded and
accorded great respect to the interpretation by administrative agencies of their own rules unless
there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly
conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.38

The CA added its own reading of Section 49 which the Court now sustains:
x x x The action contemplated therein connotes a clear and explicit exercise of discretion. It
pertains to an absolute and unequivocal "approval" or "disapproval" of the request for leave and
not one which is merely "recommendatory" in nature. If the rule were otherwise, the authority to
act on the application for leave would not have been vested on the head of the agency or the CA
[Commission on Appointments] Chairman's authorized representative. Needless to state, the
purpose of the provision is for the applicant to be immediately informed of the status of his
application, whether it has been approved or denied, so that he can act accordingly. x x x39
Clearly, Atty. Nghuatco's memorandum did not cover the action contemplated by Section 49. For
one, it did not bear the imprimatur of the Commission Chairman (or his duly authorized
representative) who was the proper party to grant or deny the application, as dictated by Section
52 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave.40 For another, it only submitted to the Commission Secretary
Atty. Nghuatco's comments and/or recommendations on Paler's application. It was merely
preliminary and did not propose any definitive action (i.e., approval or disapproval) on Paler's
application, and simply recommended what action to take. It was obviously not controlling and
the Chairman could have agreed or disagreed with the recommended action. In fact, the
memorandum clearly provided that Paler's request was still to be referred to the Legal Service for
comment,41 and that the application "(could) be acted upon depending on the completion of his
work load and submission of the medical certificate."42 These circumstances plainly meant that
further action was yet to be made on the application. And since there was no final approval or
disapproval of Paler's application within 5 working days from receipt as required by Section 49,
the application was deemed approved. Paler, therefore, could not be considered on AWOL.
All told, the CA committed no error in affirming, with modification, CSC Resolution Nos. 041214 dated November 9, 2004 and 050833 dated June 23, 2005.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

(No part)
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA*
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

(On official leave)

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA**
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
*

No part.

**

On official leave.

The Court of Appeals and the Civil Service Commission were impleaded as respondents
but their exclusion is proper under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2

Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador and concurred in by Presiding

Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now a retired Member of this Court) and Associate Justice
Aurora Santiago-Lagman (retired).

The Civil Service Commission erroneously denominated Palers position as "Committee

Secretary."
4

The Commission on Appointments shall be hereafter referred to as the "Commission."

Rollo, p. 132.

Id., p. 135.

Id., p. 123.

Ibid.

Id., p. 124, Resolution/Letter dated February 20, 2004 of the Chairman of the
Commission.
10

Penned by Civil Service Commission Chairman Karina Constantino-David, and

concurred in by Commissioner J. Waldemar V. Valmores. Commissioner Cesar D.
Buenaflor inhibited himself from the case.
11

Rollo, p. 113.

12

Id., p. 43.

13

Id., pp. 21-22.

14

Id., pp. 50-56, 59-63.

15

Id., pp. 71-80.

16

Id., pp. 22-27.

17

Id., pp. 181-183.

18

Section 18, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.

19

LDP Marketing, Inc. v. Monter, G.R. No. 159653, 25 January 2006, 480 SCRA 137,
141.
20

Gutierrez v. Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 142248,
16 December 2004, 447 SCRA 107, 117.
21

Metropolitan Cebu Water District (MCWD) v. Adala, G.R. No. 168914, 4 July 2007,
526 SCRA 465, 474.
22

Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

23

April 2, 2004 was a Friday; the appeal was filed on April 5, 2004, a Monday.

24

Rollo, p. 111.

25

G.R. No. 154095, 17 November 2004, 442 SCRA 532.

26

Id., pp. 547-549.

27

G.R. No. 156039, 14 August 2003, 409 SCRA 80.

28

Id, p. 88; see also Bunsay v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. NO. 153188, 14 August
2007, 530 SCRA 68.
29

Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Angara, G.R. NO. 142937, 15

November 2005, 475 SCRA 41, 52.
30

Rollo, p. 118; CSC Resolution No. 05-8333 dated June 23, 2005, p. 4.

31

Id., p. 42; CA Decision dated December 20, 2005, p. 12.

32

Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, 30 September 2005, 471
SCRA 589, 605-606.
33

Binay v. Odea, G.R. No. 163683, 8 June 2007, 524 SCRA 248, 258.

34

Sec. 49. Period within which to act on leave application. - Whenever the application
for leave of absence, including terminal leave, is not acted upon by the head of agency or
his duly authorized representative within five (5) working days after receipt thereof, the
application for leave of absence shall be deemed approved.
35

Rollo, p. 112; CSC Resolution 04-1214 dated November 9, 2004, p. 9.

36

Id, p. 118; CSC Resolution No. 05-8333 dated June 23, 2005, p. 4.

37

City Government of Makati v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 131392, 6 February
2002, 376 SCRA 248, 264.
38

Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. International Communication

Corporation, G.R. No. 135992, 31 January 2006, 481 SCRA 163, 167.
39

40

Rollo, p. 39; CA Decision dated December 20, 2005, p. 9.

Section 52 states, "[L]eave of absence for any reason other than illness of an official or
employee or of any member of his immediate family must be contingent upon the needs
of the service. Hence, the grant of vacation leave shall be at the discretion of the head of
department/agency."

41

Rollo, p. 134.

42

Id., p. 135.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-29534 February 28, 1977

BENGUET EXPLORATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE & NATURAL RESOURCES and SOFIA V.
REYES, respondents.
William H. Quasha & Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General, for respondent DANR
S. Fangonil & Associates for private respondent.

FERNANDO, J:
A more extensive appraisal of the controlling doctrine on the status of a department
head as an alter ego of the President, with particular reference to the broad competence
enjoyed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in the disposition of the
public lands and the wealth it contains, and a more careful reading of the specific
provisions of the Mining Act, 1 not to mention the explicit recital in the order challenge that the
purpose thereof is to accord a party the "formal hearing" thereby complying with the procedural due
process requisite, ought to have cautioned against the filing of this certiorari petition against the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Petitioner is, a domestic mining corporation engaged in
the exploration and development of certain mineral claims. The records show that private respondent
Sofia V. Reyes filed with the Bureau of Mines an adverse claim against petitioner's Lode Lease
Application covering three mining claims in Benguet, Mountain Province. 2 That was countered by a
motion to dismiss, alleging as one of three legal objections the failure of such adverse claim to comply
with the mandatory requirements of Section 73 of the Mining Act. 3 The private respondent then submitted
an opposition with the Bureau of Mines thereafter dismissing the adverse claim. 4 The matter was taken
up on appeal to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, private respondent maintaining the
sufficiency of its adverse claim under the law, a point disputed by petitioner, as could have been
expected. 5 At first, the action taken by respondent Department was the dismissal of such appeal, but on a

second motion for reconsideration, an order was issued with its dispositive portion reading thus: "Order of
the Director of Mines dated September 15, 1966, and the Decision and Order of this Office dated July 21,
1967 and December 11, 1967, respectively, should be, as hereby they are, set aside; and to abbreviate
proceedings, Atty. [Romulo A. Redula] of this Office is hereby directed to conduct a formal hearing of this
case. 6 Hence this certiorari petition.
As intimated at the outset, this petition lacks merit. It mast be dismissed.
1. Petitioner lost sight of the fundamental doctrine set forth in Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 7 decided in
1939, where Justice Laurel categorically declared that acts of a department head and the challenged
order in this case came from the then Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Isosceles
Pascual, "performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumably the acts of the Chief Executive. 8 Not so long ago in
Tecson v. Salas, 9 it was affirmed that as far as the power of control over all executive departments,
bureaus and offices are concerned, "the Villena doctrine applies with undiminished force." 10 Since then,
two other decisions did reiterate such a principle. 11 Moreover, petitioner likewise did not take into account
the doctrine announced by the leading case of Ortua v. Singson Encarnacion. 12 As stated by Justice
Malcolm: "Accordingly, to paraphrase the authorities and decisions coming principally from the United
States Supreme Court, we deduce the rule on the subject to be, that a decision rendered by the Director
of Lands and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, upon a question of fact is
conclusive and not subject to be reviewed by the courts, in the absence of a showing that such decision
was rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition, or mistake, other than error of judgment in estimating
the value or effect of evidence, regardless of whether or not it is consistent with the preponderance of the
evidence, so long as there is some evidence upon which the finding in question could be made. 13 Here
such a stage has not been reached. Precisely, the assailed order spoke of no "hearing on the merits,
[therefore] it is but right and proper in the interest of justice that a formal hearing on the merits be
conducted. 14 There is, therefore, an element of prematurity. That alone would have sufficed for the
dismissal of this petition.
2. What appears to be the motivation behind this move of petitioner is to preclude the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources from conducting his own inquiry. He would thus be denied the power
accorded a bureau director. In Pinero Jr. v. Director of Lands 15 this Court, in an opinion by Justice
Barredo, expressly referring to the Regalian doctrine, Pointed out that even a Torrens title is not a bar to
the power of the Director of Lands to investigate an allegation of fraud that could have led to the issuance
of a free patent. As stated by him "It is to the public interest that one who succeeds in fraudulently
acquiring a title to a public land Should not be allowed to benefit therefrom, and the State should,
therefore, have an ever-existing authority, thru its duly authorized officers, to inquire into the
circumstances surrounding the issuance of any such title, to the end that the Republic, thru the Solicitor
General or any other officer who may be authorized by law, may file the corresponding action for the
reversion of the land involved to the public domain, subject thereafter to disposal to other qualified
persons in accordance with law. In other words, the indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is
not a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired, if the
purpose of such investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had been committed in securing such
title in order that the appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the Government." 16 If petitioner
would prevail, such power of inquiry vested in a subordinate would be denied a department head. That is
to disregard a well-settled concept in public law. What is more, that is to be insensible to another facet the
jura regalia concept by virtue of which the Republic of the Philippines possessed of the attributes of
imperium and dominium, acting through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, is given the
utmost latitude in ascertaining which party shall enjoy the privilege of exploiting the wealth that is found in

its natural resources.17 If petitioner were to prevail, there would be an undue diminution of the broad
competence conferred on the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as recognized in a host of
cases notable for their number and unanimity. 18
3. Petitioner would seek to weaken the force of the above authoritative doctrines as applied to it by the
allegation that there is a failure to abide by the statutory requirements in the Mining Act, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4388. Reference is made to Sections 61 and 73 as amended by Republic Act No. 4388.
19
The proviso in the former section which is relevant to the present controversy reads thus: "Provided,
That the decision or order of the Director of Mines may be appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources within thirty days from receipt of such decision or order. In case any one of the parties
should disagree from the decision or order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the
matter may be taken to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, within thirty days
from the receipt of such decision or order, otherwise the said decision or order shall be final and binding
upon the parties concerned. Findings of facts in the decision or order of the Director of Mines when
affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be final and conclusive, and the
aggrieved party or parties desiring to appeal from such decision or order shall file in the Supreme Court a
petition for review wherein only questions of law may be raised." What cannot be sufficiently stressed is
that only upon the affirmance of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources does the findings of
fact become conclusive, leaving only questions of law for this Court to decide. In the order complained of,
the Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources commendably sought to have a rational basis
for the acceptance or rejection of the conclusion reached by the Director of Mines. What was objected to
was that it could no longer be done as the matter had reached the stage of finality, such order coming
only after a second motion for reconsideration. Petitioner would thus ignore the basic principle that unless
the administrative procedure followed conforms with the requirement of procedural due process the
actuation could be stigmatized as void, a hearing being deemed of the essence of such proceeding. As a
matter of fact its absence would result in the loss of jurisdiction. As was state by Chief Justice
Concepcion in' Vda. de Cuaycong v. Vda de Sengbenco, 20 acts whether of Congress or of the Executive,
can deny due process only under pain of nullity, ... 21 As a matter of law, to accept petitioner's claim that in
thus issuing such an order the Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources failed to abide by
the requirements of the law would be precisely to cast doubt on the validity of such sections of the Mining
Act when all that was required by him was compliance with the requisite of a formal hearing. That would
be to incur the vice of the construction given such sections being repugnant to the due process clause.
Certainly, between two lines of interpretation, one of which would give it life and the other which would be
fatal to its validity, the former should prevail. Thus petitioner's first two errors assigned, which could be
summed up in the proposition that Secretary Pascual should not have passed upon the second motion for
reconsideration are clearly without merit.
4. It is thus apparent that the third error assigned to the effect that the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it arrogated the function of hearing the adverse
claims is even more bereft of support in law. The very provision of the Mining Act upon, as previously set
forth, speaks of the findings of facts of the Director of Mines "when affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources being final and conclusive," in which case the aggrieved party may file
a petition for review with this Court where only questions of law may be raised. 22 To sustain the
contention of petitioner would be to run counter to what was held in the leading case of Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relations. 23 Justice Laurel specifically spoke of "cardinal primary rights" embraced in
"the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character. 24 Here precisely, vital and essential facts remained at issue. It was the
considered judgment of the Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources that a hearing should
be held to ascertain the truth of the matter. As set forth in the challenged order: "It is but right and proper

in the interest of justice that a formal hearing on the merits of this case be conducted. 25 In a subsequent
paragraph, such point of view was reiterated: "The reason for this ruling is that the proceedings before
this Office is administrative in character, and, therefore, the parties to the case must be given all the
opportunity to be heard. 26 Hence, the dispositive portion directing a certain Romulo A. Redula
presumably of the staff of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, "to conduct a formal
hearing of this case and to submit his report relative thereto within thirty (30) days from the termination
thereof. 27
Clearly, to repeat, the allegation in the last assignment of error that there was an arrogation of the Power
on the part of respondent department is devoid of any legal justification. Moreover had Petitioner taken
into consideration the aforesaid landmark opinion of Justice Laurel in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations on the indispensability of complying with the due process requirement in an administrative
proceeding, it would have noted that one of the doctrines relied upon by this Court in that case is an
opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. United States. 28 It ought to be affirmed that in the two
subsequent Morgan cases, the stress became even more emphatic on the indispensability of complying
with the due process mandate, characterized as "the rudimentary requirements of fair play." 29 The
relevance of the Morgan decisions should be evident, dealing as they do with the exercise of powers
granted the Secretary of Agriculture of the United States.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Commonwealth Act No. 137, as amended (10361).
2 Petition, pars. 1 and 2.
3 Ibid, par. 3.
4 Ibid, pars. 4 and 5.
5 Ibid 6 and 7.
6 Ibid, pars. 8 and 9, Annex A.
7 67 Phil. 451.
8 Ibid, 463.
9 L-27524, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 275.
10 Ibid 283. Nine cases were cited beginning from Marc Donnelly and Associates v. Agregado, 95 Phil. 1452 (1954) to
Lacson Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Pano, L-27811, Nov. 17, 1967, 21 SCRA 895.
11 Philippine American Management Company, Inc. v. Philippine American Management Employees Association
(PAMEA-FFW L35254, May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 98 and Roque v. Director of Lands, L25373, July 1, 1976, 72 SCRA 1.
12 59 Phil. 440 (1934).

13 Ibid, 443-444. It was followed subsequently in the following cases: Ortua v. Rodriguez, 63 Phil. 809 (1936); Koppel
(Phil.), Inc. v. Yatco, 77 Phil. 496 (1946)-l Alejo v. Garchitorena, 83 Phil. 924 (1949); De Guzman .-. De Guzman, 104
Phil. 24 (1958); Denopol v. Director of Lands, 106 Phil. 666 (1959); Ingaran v. Ramelo 107 Phil. 498 (1960); Sanchez v.
Vda. de Tamsi 112 Phil. 668 (1961); Galvez v. Vda. de Kangleon, 116 Phil. 464 (1962)-, Dajunos v. Tandayag, L-32651,
Aug. 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 449; San Miguel Corporation v. Secretary of Labor, L-39195, May 16, 1975, 64 SCRA 56;
Mauleon v. Court of Appeals, L27762, Aug. 7, 1975, 66 SCRA 92.
14 Petition, Annex A, 4.
15 L-36507, June 14, 1974, 57 SCRA 386.
16 Ibid, 392.
17 Cf. Lee Hong Hok v. David, L-30389, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 372, citing Justice Holmes' opinion in Carino v.
Insular Government, 212 US 449 (1909,) and 3 Pound on Jurisprudence, 108-109 (1959).
18 Cf. Alejandrino v. Aquino, 70 Phil. 113 (1940); Director of Lands v. Abordo 74 Phil. 44 (1942); Espinosa v. Makalintal,
79 Phil. 134 (1947); Alejo v. Garchitorena, 83 Phil. 924 .(1949); Aureus v. Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, 85
Phil. 1 (1949); Azajar v. Ardales 97 Phil. 851 (1955); Hernandez v. Clapis, 98 Phil. 684 (1956); Heirs of Lachica v.
Ducusin, 102 Phil. 551 (1957); De Guzman v. De Guzman, 104 Phil. 24 (1958); Heirs of B.A. Crumb v. Rodriguez, 105
Phil. 391 (1959); Songahid v. Cinco, 106 Phil. 946 (1960); Ladrera v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
107 Phil. 794 (1960); Pajo v. Ago, 1o8 Phil. 905 (1960); Pascual v. Director of Lands, L-15816, Feb. 29, 1964, 10 SCRA
354; Vda. de Calibo v. Ballesteros, L-17466, Sept. 18, 1965, 15 SCRA 37; Dauan v. Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, L-19547, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 223; Bonilla v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
L-20083, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 836; Rallon v. Ruiz, Jr., L-23315, May 26, 1969, 28 SCRA 331; Ramirez v. Court of
Appeals, L-28591, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 297; Dajunos v. Tandayag, I,32651, Aug. 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 449; Ramos v.
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, L-29097, Jan. 28, 1974, 55 SCRA 330; Lacuesta v. Herrera, L-33646,
Jan. 28, 1975, 62 SCRA 115; Mauleon v. Court of Appeals, L-27762, Aug. 7, 1975, 66 SCRA 92; Roque v. Director of
Lands, L-25373, July 1, 1976, 72 SCRA 1.
19 Republic Act No. 4388 took effect on June 19, 1965. The main provision of the former section reads: "Conflicts and
disputes arising out of mining locations shall be submitted to the Director of Mines for decision." There is no change in
the Amendatory Act. As to Section 73, as amended, which is controlling, the main provision reads: "At any time during
the period of publication, any adverse claim may be filed under oath with the Director of Mines, and shall state in full
details the nature, boundaries, and extent of the adverse claim, and shall be accompanied by all plans, documents, and
agreements upon which such adverse claim is based." The proviso deals with adverse claims already decided by the
administrative authority no longer being subject to further inquiry. The last sentence of such proviso reads: "Upon the
filing of the adverse claim all proceedings except the publication of notice of application for patent or lease and the
making and filing of the affidavit in connection therewith, as herein prescribed shall be stayed until the controversy shall
have been settled or decided in accordance with Section sixty-one of this Act or the adverse claim waived."
20 110 Phil. 113(1960).
21 Ibid 118.
22 Section 61 of Commonwealth Act No. 137 as amended by Republic Act No. 4388.
23 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
24 Ibid, 641-642.
25 Petition, Annex A, 4.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 298 US 468 (1936).

29 Morgan v. United States, 304 US 1, 15 (1938). The third Morgan decision is United States of America v. F.O.
Morgan, 307 US 183 (1939). Page 295

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 177624, July 13, 2009
MODESTA LUNA, PETITIONER, VS. JULIANA P. LUNA, CORNELIO,
MILAGROS, RENATO, FLORDELITA, AURORA, ANDRITO AND GEORGE
ALL SURNAMED GARCILLA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioner assails in this Rule 45 petition the January 29, 2007 Decision[1] and the April 20, 2007
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90749. The appellate court, in the
assailed decision, dismissed petitioner's complaint on the ground of prescription, and, in the
challenged resolution, denied her motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
The antecedent facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Modesta A. Luna filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Pulilan, Bulacan, on
March 9, 1999, a Complaint[3] docketed as Civil Case No. 767 for the recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land situated in the municipality. On May 11, 1999, petitioner amended
her complaint to include, among others, additional defendants and to incorporate added
allegations.
In the Amended Complaint,[4] petitioner related that she and respondent Juliana P. Luna were the
daughters of the late Pedro Luna, the alleged owner of a 1-ha. property, a portion of which is the
subject of this case. On June 20, 1950, Pedro donated 2,268 sq m of the said land to petitioner.
When Pedro died in 1957, petitioner declared the land for taxation purposes in her name and paid
the real estate taxes thereon. She nevertheless allowed respondent to cultivate the land, harvest
fruits, and use the proceeds of the harvest to pay for the debts left by their father. Subsequently,
petitioner discovered that respondent applied for, and was issued in 1976, a free patent over
3,431 sq m of the land, which included 1,100 sq m of the portion donated to her. The land was
later subdivided in 1994 and titles transferred in the names of their other siblings.[5] Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-53813 included 211 sq m of the donated land, and TCT No. T53814 covered 889 sq m thereof. Petitioner thus prayed that the first TCT be declared as null and
void insofar as the 211 sq m portion was concerned, and the second TCT be voided in its entirety.
She further pleaded that all persons occupying the said donated land be ordered to vacate the
premises and pay damages.

On October 6, 2003, the MTC rendered its Decision[6] granting the complaint. It ruled, among
others, that the subject property was a private land donated by the parties' father to the petitioner;
therefore, respondent's free patent was null and void, for it covered property of private
ownership. The MTC consequently disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants,
as follows:
1. Declaring TCT No. 53814 (sic) null and void in so far as 211 sq.m. thereof while TCT
53814 is hereby declared null and void in its entirety.
2. Ordering the defendant and all persons claiming under them to vacate the 1,100 sq.m. of
land donated by Pedro Luna to plaintiff Modesta Luna and to pay P10,000.00 a year for
the reasonable compensation from their continued stay thereat to plaintiff in proportion to
the area they respectively withhold from the plaintiff.
3. Defendants jointly and severally is (sic) ordered to pay plaintiff the amount of
P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
4. To pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, in its June 7, 2005 Decision[8] in
Civil Case No. 362-M-2004, affirmed the ruling of the MTC. The RTC ruled that while the
complaint was captioned as an action for recovery of ownership and possession, the same was
actually an action for annulment of title, and the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case.
However, the RTC, instead of dismissing the case, assumed jurisdiction over it, pursuant to Rule
40, Sections 7 and 8 of the Rules of Court, and, as aforesaid, ruled in favor of the petitioner.
Relentless despite the adverse rulings of both trial courts, respondents elevated the case to the
CA. In the assailed January 29, 2007 Decision,[9] the appellate court set aside the ruling of the
RTC and dismissed the complaint upon a finding that the action had prescribed. The CA said that
petitioner failed to question, on the ground of actual fraud, the decision or order granting the
application for free patent within one year from the issuance thereof. Petitioner likewise failed to
institute an action for reconveyance, based on implied or constructive trust, within 10 years from
the issuance of the certificates of title. Thus, petitioner's complaint was time-barred.
Importantly, the CA found that the subject property was not private land. The records revealed
that the parties claimed to be beneficiaries/donees of their deceased parents, and that petitioner
had no title to the property independent of her deceased fathers' alleged right. It was also shown
that petitioner even applied for a free patent on the adjoining lot. The CA thus ruled that the
property was, at inception, public land, and no proof was introduced that it had already been
withdrawn from the public domain prior to the award of the free patent to respondent.

On the issue of jurisdiction, the CA ruled that the MTC had jurisdiction, the suit being one for
recovery of ownership and possession and the assessed value of the property being within the
jurisdictional competence of the MTC. The prayer for the consequent annulment of the issued
titles was merely incidental to the main action for recovery of ownership and possession.
The appellate court disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated
June 07, 2005 is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one is entered DISMISSING Modesta's
"Complaint for Recovery of Ownership and Possession" on the ground of prescription.
SO ORDERED.[10]
In the further challenged April 20, 2007 Resolution,[11] as earlier stated, the CA denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Displeased, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari on the following grounds:
I.
The Court of Appeals erred in considering the issue of prescription, despite the fact that it was
not assigned as an error in the Petition for Review of respondents.
II.
The Court of Appeals erroneously held that it has the discretion to dismiss an action on ground of
prescription, even without the said defense being raised in the pleadings.
III.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner's action prescribed after ten (10) years.
IV.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the free patent issued in favor of respondent Luna is a
valid title.
V.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that prescription cannot be waived.
Petitioner argues in the main that the appellate court should not have dismissed the complaint on
the ground of prescription, considering that the issue was never raised in any of respondents'
pleadings. She maintains that the CA, being an appellate court, has the jurisdiction merely to
review the correctness of the trial court's ruling; it does not have the power to dismiss an action
on the ground of prescription even when the parties' pleadings and the other facts on record show
that the action is time-barred. Petitioner moreover asserts that the prescriptive period in this case

is 30 years and not 10 as erroneously ruled by the CA.

We deny the petition. We find no reversible error in the assailed issuances of the CA.
Entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the appellate court may motu proprio dismiss an
action for having prescribed, even if the case has been elevated for review on different grounds,
where prescription clearly appears from the complaint filed with the trial court.[12]
Here, the CA correctly dismissed the case on the ground of prescription. Let it be noted that the
free patent and the original certificate of title were issued to respondent Juliana, who is in
possession of the subject property found to be a public land, on May 3, 1976.[13] Petitioner
instituted the personal action for reconveyance[14] only in May 1999 or after 23 years.
We have held in prior cases that the order or decision granting an application for a free patent can
be reviewed only within one year from its issuance on the ground of actual fraud via a petition
for review in the Regional Trial Court, provided that no innocent purchaser for value has
acquired the property or any interest thereon. However, an aggrieved party may still file an
action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust, but the right of action prescribes
in 10 years counted from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property,
provided that it has not been acquired by an innocent purchaser for value.[15] This 10-year
prescriptive period applies only when the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the
property. If the person claiming to be its owner is in actual possession thereof, the right to seek
reconveyance, which in effect is an action to quiet title thereto, does not prescribe.[16]
In the instant case, petitioner's action to recover the property and to annul the patent and title
issued to the respondents was filed beyond the prescriptive period. Thus, it ought to be
dismissed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The January 29, 2007 Decision
and the April 20, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90749 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., and Peralta, JJ., concur.

[1]

Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang, with Associate Justices Martin S.

Villarama, Jr. and Magdangal M. de Leon concurring; rollo, pp. 148-161.
[2]

Id. at 220-222.

[3]

Id. at 25-29.

[4]

Id. at 43-47.

[5]

As alleged in the amended complaint, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RP-2318 (P6715) / Free Patent No. (III-6) 006542 was issued to respondent on May 3, 1976. The land
covered by the patent was subdivided into four lots--Nos. 2929-A, 2929-B, 2929-C and 2929-D.
OCT No. RP-2318 (P-6715) was then cancelled and TCT Nos. T-53811, T-53812, T-53813 and
T-53814 were issued in the names of Pedro P. Luna, Jr., Pastora P. Luna, respondents Cornelio,
Milagros, Renato, Flordelita, Aurora, Andrito and George, all surnamed Garcilla; and Juliana P.
Luna.
[6]

Rollo, pp. 75-87.

[7]

Id. at 86-87.

[8]

Id. at 108-113.

[9]

Supra note 1.

[10]

Rollo, p. 160.

[11]

Supra note 2.

[12]

Katon v. Palanca, Jr., G.R. No. 151149, September 7, 2004, 437 SCRA 565, 567; Gicano v.
Gegato, No. L-63575, January 20, 1988, 157 SCRA 140, 145-146.
[13]

Rollo, p. 50.

[14]

An action for reconveyance respects the decree of registration as incontrovertible but seeks
the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in other persons'
names, to its rightful and legal owners or to those who claim to have a better right. There is no
special ground for an action for reconveyance. It is enough that the aggrieved party has a legal
claim on the property superior to that of the registered owner and that the property has not yet
passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. (Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. v.
Lumocso, G.R. No. 158121, December 12, 2007, 540 SCRA 1, 13-14.)
[15]

Khemani v. Heirs of Anastacio Trinidad, G.R. No. 147340, December 13, 2007, 540 SCRA
83, 96-97; Heirs of Maximo Sanjorjo v. Heirs of Manuel Y. Quijano, G.R. No. 140457, January
19, 2005, 449 SCRA 15, 26; Katon v. Palanca, supra note 12, at 579; Millena v. Court of
Appeals, 381 Phil. 132, 138 (2000). Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, further, provides
that "[t]he decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority,
or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court
for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government
and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such
adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First
Instance [now, Regional Trial Court] a petition for reopening and review of the decree of
registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of
registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent

purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced.
Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or any equivalent phrase occurs in this
Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for
value." [Underscoring supplied.]
[16]

Mendizabel v. Apao, G.R. No. 143185, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 587, 609.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an
incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the
Prosecutions case, albeit a good measure of the accuseds propensity for flight or for causing
harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the
accused appears at trial.1
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and
annul the resolutions dated July 14, 20142 and August 8, 20143 issued by the Sandiganbayan
(Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been charged with plunder along
with several others. Enrile insists that the resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To
Fix Bail and his Motion For Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
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Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in
the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).4 On June 10, 2014 and
June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6
praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against
him. The motions were heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated
Opposition.7

On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enriles motion, particularly on
the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then
voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody of the law.8 Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.9
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to
Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in
Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP)
General Hospital following his medical examination.10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital ,11 and his Motion
to Fix Bail,12 both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014.13
In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the
Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was
charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion
perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be
seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying Enriles Motion
to Fix Bail, disposing thusly:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have
made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he
demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the
amount of his bail.
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To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not
filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus
exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.
xxxx
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he is charged with
plunder, the maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him is reclusion temporal, not
reclusion perpetua. He anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on
the allegation that he is over seventy (70) years old and that he voluntarily surrendered.
Accordingly, it may be said that the crime charged against Enrile is not punishable by reclusion
perpetua, and thus bailable.
The argument has no merit.
xxxx
x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into
consideration. These circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper
penalty after trial should the accused be found guilty of the offense charged. x x x

xxxx
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he is not a flight
risk and his physical condition must also be seriously considered by the Court.
Admittedly, the accuseds age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are among the
factors that are considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained above, it
is premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior showing that the evidence
of guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enriles Motion to Fix Bail dated
July 7, 2014 is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 14
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its second assailed resolution to deny Enriles
motion for reconsideration filed vis--vis the July 14, 2014 resolution.15
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Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari, namely:
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A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right.

Enrile may be deemed to fall within the exception only upon concurrence of two (2)
circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii)
when evidence of guilt is strong.
xxxx
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would
be convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as
a matter of right.
xxxx
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of Enriles
guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
xxxx
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.16
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right;
that it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile
comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the
Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion
perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances his age and his voluntary
surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the

crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into account
that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.
In its Comment,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enriles right to bail is discretionary as he is
charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be
conducted to determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that
entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.

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Ruling of the Court

The petition for certiorari is meritorious.

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1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.18 The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail,19 and further binds the court to wait
until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional
crimes.21 The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose.22 Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate
both the accuseds interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the societys
interest in assuring the accuseds presence at trial.23
2.
Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 11424 of the Rules of Court, as
follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
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A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing at the
time of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death.25
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense,
shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the
moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can
claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to
bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.26 Once it has been
established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.27
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as
matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior
to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.28
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;29 or (2) if the RTC has
imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances
enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
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(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.
3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong
in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in
Concerned Citizens v. Elma,30 such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to
ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be

granted provisional liberty. It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant
is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice
to the Prosecution.31 The indispensability of the hearing with notice has been aptly explained in
Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz.:32
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled in People vs.
Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who is
charged with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any hearing on
the motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or comment,
as it turned out later, over its strong objections. The court granted bail on the sole basis of the
complaint and the affidavits of three policemen, not one of whom apparently witnessed the
killing. Whatever the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was intended
only for prima facie determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a wellfounded belief that the crime was committed and pinpointing the persons who probably
committed it. Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has
to be established unless the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already presented.
To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be
consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to due process.
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xxxx
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable
opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the
crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the
probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from
justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules
of Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte
determination where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should
primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. For this
purpose, a summary hearing means:
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight
of evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to
enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against
the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be
therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which
may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross examination.33
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with
the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral,34 to wit:
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1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section
18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of
the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
3.
Enriles poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating
circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years
at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered.35
Enriles averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose Opposition to the
Motion to Fix Bail has only argued that
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8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be imposed upon
Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the presence of two mitigating circumstances,
suffice it to state that the presence or absence of mitigating circumstances is also not
consideration that the Constitution deemed worthy. The relevant clause in Section 13 is
charged with an offense punishable by. It is, therefore, the maximum penalty
provided by the offense that has bearing and not the possibility of mitigating
circumstances being appreciated in the accuseds favor.36
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enriles averment on the presence
of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged against
him being punishable with reclusion perpetua,37 simply because the determination, being
primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enriles petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier
mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the
trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines
responsibility in the international community arising from the national commitment under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which
provides: The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights. The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those
detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide
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without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other
words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person
under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These
remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.38
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal
proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee
will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances.39
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In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the
authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this
jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for
plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this
country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been charged
with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal
disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his
trial because he was not seen as a flight risk.40 With his solid reputation in both his public and his
private lives, his long years of public service, and historys judgment of him being at stake, he
should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enriles health presents another compelling justification for his
admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was found during the
medical examinations conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering from the following conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple drug therapy;
(Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
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(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following:

a.
b.
c.

Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and

vertebral artery disease; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)
Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications.
(Annex 1.6)

(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by Holter
monitoring; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome; (Annexes 2.1,
2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:

a.
b.

Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the

Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens.
(Annexes 3.1, 3.2)

(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:

a.
b
c.
d.
e.
f.

High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;

.
High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
Alpha thalassemia;
Gait/balance disorder;
Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;
Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate
on recent ultrasound).42
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively, could pose
significant risks to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead
to brain or heart complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it could
lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially under stressful conditions; (3)
coronary calcifications associated with coronary artery disease, because they could indicate a
future risk for heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because
they could be triggered by certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen
exposure) which could cause a deterioration in patients with asthma or COPD.43
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enriles advanced age and ill health required
special medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own
instance,44 was not even recommended by the officer-in-charge (OIC) and the internist doctor of
that medical facility because of the limitations in the medical support at that hospital. Their
testimonies ran as follows:
xxxx
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JUSTICE MARTIRES:
The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile
at the Philippine National Police Hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator
Enrile at the PNP Hospital?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Why?

PSUPT. JOCSON:
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the best.
xxxx
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator Enrile, are you
happy or have any fear in your heart of the present condition of the accused vis a vis
the facilities of the hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if the
condition of the patient worsen, we have no facilities to do those things, Your Honor.45
xxxx
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly
shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite
imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration
during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has already held
in Dela Rama v. The Peoples Court:46
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:
x x x [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness of the
prisoner, independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the
law makes it a consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the
proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail;47 x x x
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xxxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect that the
petitioner is actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis,
and chronic, granular pharyngitis, and that in said institute they have seen similar cases, later
progressing into advance stages when the treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail;
taking into consideration that the petitioners previous petition for bail was denied by the
Peoples Court on the ground that the petitioner was suffering from quiescent and not active
tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the Peoples Court in sending the petitioner to the
Quezon Institute for clinical examination and diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs, was
evidently to verify whether the petitioner is suffering from active tuberculosis, in order to act

accordingly in deciding his petition for bail; and considering further that the said Peoples Court
has adopted and applied the well-established doctrine cited in our above-quoted resolution, in
several cases, among them, the cases against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino
(case No. 3527), in which the said defendants were released on bail on the ground that they were
ill and their continued confinement in New Bilibid Prison would be injurious to their health or
endanger their life; it is evident and we consequently hold that the Peoples Court acted with
grave abuse of discretion in refusing to release the petitioner on bail.48
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It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have
his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in
the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but,
more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful
consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to
entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive
of the issue of bail whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the
subject of judicial notice that the courts can already consider in resolving the application for
bail without awaiting the trial to finish.49 The Court thus balances the scales of justice by
protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at
the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to
ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear
showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in denying Enriles Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the
ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari, connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.50 The abuse must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.51
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari; ISSUES the writ of certiorari
ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the
PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238
upon posting of a cash bond of P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the
immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for
some other lawful cause.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

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Sereno, C. J., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.

Velasco, Jr., J., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Perez, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.
Peralta, J., for humanitarian reasons.
Del Castillo, J., I concur in the result based on humanitarian grounds.
Villarama, Jr., J., on official leave.
Reyes, J., on sick leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., I joint the dissent of J. Leonen.
Leonen, J., I dissent, see separate opinion.
Jardeleza, J., no part, prior OSG action.
Endnotes:
1

See Ariana Lindermayer, What the Right Hand Gives: Prohibitive Interpretations of the State
Constitutional Right to Bail, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 78, Issue 1 (2009), pp. 307-309.
2

Rollo, pp. 79-88; penned by Associate Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang, and concurred in by
Associate Justice Samuel R. Martires and Associate Justice Alex L. Quiroz.
3

Id. at 89-102.

Id. at 107-108.

Id. at 103-157.

Id. at 163-192.

Id. at 193-221.

Id. at 222-241.

Id. at 241.

10

Id. at 242-243.

11

Id. at 244-247.

12

Id. at 249-256.

13

Id. at 13.

14

Id. at 84-88.

15

Id. at 89-102.

16

Id. at 16-19.

17

Id. at 526-542.

18

Section 14, (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

19

Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, September 24,
2002, 389 SCRA 623 where the Court said that the constitutional right to bail flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt; see also Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, Ohio State
Law Journal, Vol. 72 (2011), p. 728.
20

Baradaran, supra note 19, at 736.

21

Id. at 731.

22

Yap, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001, 358 SCRA 564, 572.

23

Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 619, 628.

24

As amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, December 1, 2000.

25

Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.

26

Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, supra note 19, at 693.

27

Id.

28

Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception.All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as
a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this
Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment.
29

Section 5, Paragraph 1, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.

30

A.M. No. RTJ-94-1183, February 6, 1995, 241 SCRA 84, 88.

31

Gacal v. Infante, A.M. No. RTJ- 04-1845 (Formerly A.M. No. I.P.I. No. 03-1831-RTJ), October
5, 2011, 658 SCRA 535, 536.
32

33

A.M. No. RTJ-93-1052, October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA 778, 789-790.
Cortes v. Catral, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387, September 10, 1997, 279 SCRA 1, 11.

34

Id. at 18.

35

Rollo, pp. 252-253.

36

Id. at 260.

37

Worthy to mention at this juncture is that the Court En Banc, in People v. Genosa (G.R. No.
135981, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 537), a criminal prosecution for parricide in which the
penalty is reclusion perpetua to death under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, appreciated
the concurrence of two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance as a privileged
mitigating circumstance, and consequently lowered the penalty imposed on the accused to
reclusion temporal in its medium period.
38

Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr., G.R. No. 153675, April
19, 2007, 521 SCRA 470, 482 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis).
39

Rodriguez v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila, Br. 17, G.R. No.157977, February 27, 2006, 483
SCRA 290, 298.
40

Rollo, pp. 559, 571-576.

41

Id. at 339-340 (TSN of July 14, 2014).

42

Id. at 373-374 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis).

43

Id. at 334-335, 374-375.

44

Id. at 244-247.

45

Id. at 485-488 (TSN of September 4, 2014).

46

77 Phil. 461 (October 2, 1946), in which the pending criminal case against the petitioner was
for treason.
47

Id. at 462.

48

Id. at 465-466.

49

Bravo, Jr. v. Borja, No. L-65228, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 466, where the Court
observed:
To allow bail on the basis of the penalty to be actually imposed would require a consideration not
only of the evidence of the commission of the crime but also evidence of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. There would then be a need for a complete trial, after which the judge
would be just about ready to render a decision in the case. As perceptively observed by the

Solicitor General, such procedure would defeat the purpose of bail, which is to entitle the
accused to provisional liberty pending trial.
50

Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), G.R. No. 129406, March 6, 2006, 484 SCRA
119, 127; Litton Mills, Inc. v. Galleon Trader, Inc., G.R. No. L-40867, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA
489, 494.
51

Angara v. Fedman Development Corporation, G.R. No. 156822, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA
467, 478; Duero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131282, January 4, 2002, 373 SCRA 11, 17.

DISSENTING OPINION
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All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required. - Const., art. III, sec. 13
The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to
beg in the streets, and to steal bread.
The Red Lily, Chapter 7 (1894) by Anatole France, French novelist (1844-1924)
LEONEN, J.:

I dissent.
This Petition for Certiorari should not be granted. The action of the Sandiganbayan in denying
the Motion to Fix Bail was proper. Bail is not a matter of right in cases where the crime charged
is plunder and the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
Neither was there grave abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan when it failed to release
accused on bail for medical or humanitarian reasons. His release for medical and humanitarian
reasons was not the basis for his prayer in his Motion to Fix Bail1 filed before the
Sandiganbayan. Neither did he base his prayer for the grant of bail in this Petition on his medical
condition.
The grant of bail, therefore, by the majority is a special accommodation for petitioner. It is based
on a ground never raised before the Sandiganbayan or in the pleadings filed before this court.
The Sandiganbayan should not be faulted for not shedding their neutrality and impartiality. It is

not the duty of an impartial court to find what it deems a better argument for the accused at the
expense of the prosecution and the people they represent.
The allegation that petitioner suffers from medical conditions that require very special treatment
is a question of fact. We cannot take judicial notice of the truth contained in a certification
coming from one doctor. This doctor has to be presented as an expert witness who will be
subjected to both direct and cross-examination so that he can properly manifest to the court the
physical basis for his inferences as well as the nature of the medical condition of petitioner.
Rebutting evidence that may be presented by the prosecution should also be considered. All this
would be proper before the Sandiganbayan. Again, none of this was considered by the
Sandiganbayan because petitioner insisted that he was entitled to bail as a matter of right on
grounds other than his medical condition.
Furthermore, the majoritys opinionother than the invocation of a general human rights
principledoes not provide clear legal basis for the grant of bail on humanitarian grounds. Bail
for humanitarian considerations is neither presently provided in our Rules of Court nor found in
any statute or provision of the Constitution.
This case leaves this court open to a justifiable criticism of granting a privilege ad hoc: only for
one personpetitioner in this case.
Worse, it puts pressure on all trial courts and the Sandiganbayan that will predictably be deluged
with motions to fix bail on the basis of humanitarian considerations. The lower courts will have
to decide, without guidance, whether bail should be granted because of advanced age,
hypertension, pneumonia, or dreaded diseases. They will have to decide whether this is
applicable only to Senators and former Presidents charged with plunder and not to those accused
of drug trafficking, multiple incestuous rape, serious illegal detention, and other crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. They will have to decide whether this is
applicable only to those who are in special detention facilities and not to the aging or sick
detainees in overcrowded detention facilities all over this country.
Our trial courts and the Sandiganbayan will decide on the basis of personal discretion causing
petitions for certiorari to be filed before this court. This will usher in an era of truly selective
justice not based on clear legal provisions, but one that is unpredictable, partial, and solely
grounded on the presence or absence of human compassion on the day that justices of this court
deliberate and vote.
Not only is this contrary to the Rule of Law, it also undermines the legitimacy and the stability of
our entire judicial system.
I
On June 5, 2014, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) was charged with the crime of plunder
punishable under Republic Act No. 7080.2 Section 2 of this law provides:
SEC. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
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through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death[.]
(Emphasis supplied)
On June 10, 2014, Enrile filed an Omnibus Motion before the Sandiganbayan, praying that he be
allowed to post bail if the Sandiganbayan should find probable cause against him.3 On July 3,
2014, the Sandiganbayan denied the Omnibus Motion on the ground of prematurity since no
warrant of arrest had been issued at that time. In the same Resolution, the Sandiganbayan
ordered Enriles arrest.4
On the same day the warrant of arrest was issued and served, Enrile proceeded to the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group of the Philippine National Police in Camp Crame, Quezon
City.5
On July 7, 2014, Enrile filed a Motion to Fix Bail, arguing that his alleged age and voluntary
surrender were mitigating and extenuating circumstances that would lower the imposable penalty
to reclusion temporal.6 He also argued that his alleged age and physical condition indicated that
he was not a flight risk.7 His prayer states:
WHEREFORE, accused Enrile prays that the Honorable Court allow Enrile to post bail, and
forthwith set the amount of bail pending determination that (a) evidence of guilt is strong; (b)
uncontroverted mitigating circumstances of at least 70 years old and voluntary surrender will not
lower the imposable penalty to reclusion temporal; and (c) Enrile is a flight risk [sic].8
The Office of the Ombudsman filed its Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail9 dated July 9, 2014.
Enrile filed a Reply10 dated July 11, 2014.
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Pending the resolution of his Motion to Fix Bail, Enrile filed a Motion for Detention at the PNP
General Hospital11 dated July 4, 2014, arguing that his advanced age and frail medical
condition12 merit hospital arrest in the Philippine National Police General Hospital under such
conditions that may be prescribed by the Sandiganbayan.13 He also prayed that in the event of a
medical emergency that cannot be addressed by the Philippine National Police General Hospital,
he may be allowed to access an outside medical facility.14 His prayer states:
WHEREFORE, accused Enrile prays that the Honorable Court temporarily place him under
hospital confinement at the PNP General Hospital at Camp Crame, Quezon City, with continuing
authority given to the hospital head or administrator to exercise his professional medical
judgment or discretion to allow Enrile's immediate access of, or temporary visit to, another
medical facility outside of Camp Crame, in case of emergency or necessity, secured with
appropriate guards, but after completion of the appropriate medical treatment or procedure, he be
returned forthwith to the PNP General Hospital.15
After the prosecutions submission of its Opposition to the Motion for Detention at the PNP
General Hospital, the Sandiganbayan held a hearing on July 9, 2014 to resolve this Motion.
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On July 9, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order allowing Enrile to remain at the Philippine
National Police General Hospital for medical examination until further orders of the court.16
This Order regarding his detention at the Philippine National Police General Hospital is not the
subject of this Petition for Certiorari. Enrile did not ask that this Order be declared invalid or

null and void.

On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued the Resolution17 denying Enriles Motion to Fix Bail
for being premature,18 stating that:
[I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have made
a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand bail
as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his
bail.
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To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not
filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus
exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.19
Enrile filed a Motion for Reconsideration,20 reiterating that there were mitigating and extenuating
circumstances that would modify the imposable penalty and that his frail health proved that he
was not a flight risk.21 The Sandiganbayan, however, denied the Motion on August 8, 2014.22
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari was filed.
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II
The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied the Motion to Fix
Bail for prematurity. It was following entrenched and canonical procedures for bail based upon
the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
A trial courtin this case, the Sandiganbayanacquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused through his or her arrest.23 The consequent detention is to ensure that the accused will
appear when required by the Rules and by order of the court trying the offense.24 The provisions
on bail provide a balance between the accuseds right to be presumed innocent on one hand and
the due process rights of the state to be able to effect the accuseds prosecution on the other hand.
That balance is not exclusively judicially determined. The Constitution frames judicial
discretion.
Thus, Article III, Section 13 states:
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Article III
Bill of Rights
....
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
The doctrine on bail is so canonical that it is clearly provided in our Rules of Court. The grant of
bail is ordinarily understood as two different concepts: (1) bail as a matter of right and (2) bail as
a matter of discretion. Thus, Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 114 provide:
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SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a
matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this
Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment.
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the
filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate
court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved
by the appellate court.
Then in Section 7 of Rule 114:
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (Emphasis supplied)
The mandatory bail hearing is only to determine the amount of bail when it is a matter of right.
On the other hand, mandatory bail hearings are held when an accused is charged with a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not only to fix the amount of bail but
fundamentally to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
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The mandatory character of a bail hearing was first addressed in the 1945 case of Herras
Teehankee v. Rovira25 where this court ordered the Peoples Court to conduct a bail hearing
despite the accused being charged with a capital offense.26 This court reasoned that the hearing
is for the purpose of enabling the Peoples Court to exercise its sound discretion as to whether or
not under the Constitution and laws in force[,] petitioner is entitled to provisional release under
bail.27
A year later, this court clarified its orders to the Peoples Court and gave the following
instructions:
(1) In capital cases like the present, when the prosecutor does not oppose the petition for release
on bail, the court should, as a general rule, in the proper exercise of its discretion, grant the
release after the approval of the bail which it should fix for the purpose;
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(2) But if the court has reasons to believe that the special prosecutors attitude is not justified, it
may ask him questions to ascertain the strength of the states evidence or to judge the adequacy
of the amount of bail;
(3) When, however, the special prosecutor refuses to answer any particular question on the
ground that the answer may involve a disclosure imperiling the success of the prosecution or
jeopardizing the public interest, the court may not compel him to do so, if and when he exhibits a
statement to that effect of the Solicitor General, who, as head of the Office of Special
Prosecutors, is vested with the direction and control of the prosecution, and may not, even at the

trial, be ordered by the court to present evidence which he does not want to introduceprovided,
of course, that such refusal shall not prejudice the rights of the defendant or detainee.28
The ruling in Herras Teehankee was applied in Ocampo v. Bernabe:29
We have held in Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, that all persons shall before
conviction be bailable except when the charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is
strong. The general rule, therefore, is that all persons, whether charged or not yet charged, are,
before their conviction, entitled to provisional release on bail, the only exception being where the
charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is found to be strong. At the hearing of the
application for bail, the burden of showing that the case falls within the exception is on the
prosecution, according to Rule 110, section 7. The determination of whether or not the evidence
of guilt is strong is, as stated in the Herras Teehankee case, a matter of judicial discretion. This
discretion, by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is
submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence
and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the
court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt
be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce
his own evidence in rebuttal. Mere affidavits or recital of their contents are not sufficient since
they are mere hearsay evidence, unless the petitioner fails to object thereto.30 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
Herras Teehankee was also applied in Feliciano v. Pasicolan, etc., et al.31 and Siazon v. Hon.
Presiding Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, etc., et al.32
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We have disciplined numerous judges who violated this courts instructions on the application of
the constitutional provisions regarding bail.
Basco v. Judge Rapatalo33 outlines these administrative cases promulgated from 1981 to 1996.34
Unfortunately, there were still administrative complaints filed against judges for failing to hold a
hearing for bail even after the promulgation of Basco.
In Cortes v. Judge Catral,35 this court ordered Judge Catral to pay a fine of P20,000.00 for
granting bail to the accused charged with capital offenses.36 This court could only lament on the
deluge of these administrative cases, stating:
It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that the Court should be besieged with a number of
administrative cases filed against erring judges involving bail. After all, there is no dearth of
jurisprudence on the basic principles involving bail. As a matter of fact, the Court itself, through
its Philippine Judicial Academy, has been including lectures on the subject in the regular
seminars conducted for judges. Be that as it may, we reiterate the following duties of the trial
judge in case an application for bail is filed:
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1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8,

supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the Rules of Court, trial judges are
enjoined to study them well and be guided accordingly. Admittedly, judges cannot be held to
account for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith, but this defense is much too frequently
cited even if not applicable. A number of cases on bail having already been decided, this Court
justifiably expects judges to discharge their duties assiduously. For a judge is called upon to
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative
that he be conversant with basic legal principles. Faith in the administration of justice can only
be engendered if litigants are convinced that the members of the Bench cannot justly be charged
with a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.37
The guidelines in Cortes fell on deaf ears as administrative cases continued to be filed against
judges who failed to hold hearings in applications for bail.
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In Docena-Caspe v. Judge Bugtas,38 the accused was charged with murder.39 Judge Bugtas
initially denied the accuseds petition for bail but granted his motion for reconsideration and set
his bail without a hearing.40 As a result, Judge Bugtas was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.0041
for being grossly ignorant of the rules and procedures in granting or denying bail[.]42
In Marzan-Gelacio v. Judge Flores,43 the erring judge was ordered to pay a fine of P10,000.00
for granting bail to the accused charged with rape without a hearing.44
In Chief State Prosecutor Zuo v. Judge Cabebe,45 Judge Cabebe was fined P20,000.00 for
granting bail, without the requisite hearing, to the accused charged with possession of illegal
drugs.46
A bail hearing is mandatory even if the accused has not filed an application for bail or the
prosecutor already recommends an amount for bail.
In Atty. Gacal v. Judge Infante:47
Even where there is no petition for bail in a case like Criminal Case No. 1138-03, a hearing
should still be held. This hearing is separate and distinct from the initial hearing to determine the
existence of probable cause, in which the trial judge ascertains whether or not there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused
is probably guilty of the crime. The Prosecution must be given a chance to show the strength of
its evidence; otherwise, a violation of due process occurs.
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....
Being the trial judge, Judge Infante had to be aware of the precedents laid down by the Supreme
Court regarding the bail hearing being mandatory and indispensable. He ought to have

remembered, then, that it was only through such hearing that he could be put in a position to
determine whether the evidence for the Prosecution was weak or strong. Hence, his dispensing
with the hearing manifested a gross ignorance of the law and the rules.48
In the present charge of plunder, petitioner now insists that this court justify that bail be granted
without any hearing before the Sandiganbayan on whether the evidence of guilt is strong. During
the hearing on petitioners Motion to Fix Bail, the prosecution argued that any grant of bail
should be based only on their failure to establish the strength of the evidence against him.49 The
prosecution had no opportunity to present rebuttal evidence based on the prematurity of the
Motion.
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Building on consistent precedent, the Sandiganbayan correctly denied petitioners Motion to Fix
Bail for being premature. The denial is neither capricious, whimsical, arbitrary [nor] despotic50
as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. It was in accord with the clear provisions of the
Constitution, jurisprudence, and long-standing rules of procedure.
Thus, this could not have been the basis for declaring that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion when it denied petitioners Motion to Fix Bail.
III
The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it failed to release petitioner
on bail for medical or humanitarian reasons. Petitioner did not ask that bail be granted because of
his medical condition or for humanitarian reasons. Neither petitioner nor the prosecution as
respondent developed their arguments on this point at the Sandiganbayan or in this court to
establish the legal and factual basis for this special kind of bail in this case.
Yet, it now becomes the very basis for petitioners grant of bail.
In his Petition before this court, petitioner argued that:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right. Enrile may
be deemed to fall within the exception only upon concurrence of two (2) circumstances:
(i) where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt
is strong.
o It is the duty and burden of the prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that
Enrile falls within the exception and exclusion from the right; and not the burden
of Enrile to show entitlement to his right.
o The prosecution failed to establish that Enriles case falls within the exception;
hence, denial of his right to bail by the Sandiganbayan was in grave abuse of
discretion.

B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would be
convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter
of right.
o The Sandiganbayan ignored the fact that the penalty prescribed by the AntiPlunder Law itself for the crime of plunder is not only reclusion perpetua but also
the penalty next lower in degree (or reclusion temporal) by consider(ing) the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the
Revised Penal Code.
o Further proceedings to receive evidence of mitigating circumstances is a needless
formality.

C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of Enriles guilt (if
ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

o Notwithstanding that the prosecution did not assert, hence failed to raise in issue,
in its Opposition to Enriles motion for bail, that evidence of guilt is strong, in the
light of the prosecutions continuing muteness to the defenses repeated challenge
for the prosecution to produce any single piece of paper showing that Enrile
received even a single peso of kickback, the Sandiganbayan nonetheless insisted
that Enrile must first initiate, and formally apply for, the formal proceedings
(bail hearing) before the prosecution may be called upon to discharge its duty of
proving evidence of guilt is strong.

D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.

o The exception to, or exclusion from, the right (shall be bailable) does not
become a prohibition (shall not be bailable). Indeed, the exception to a
mandatory right (shall) is a permissive right (may).
o A liberal interpretation is consistent with the rights to presumptive innocence and
non-deprivation of liberty without due process, and the theory behind the
exception to right-to-bail.
o Hence, if the theory is clearly shown not to exist as to Enrile (i.e., Enrile is
demonstrated not being a flight risk), then bail may be granted to him.
o Enrile is definitely not a flight risk, being of old age, frail physical and medical
condition, and having voluntarily surrendered.

o Circumstances of official and social standing shows that Enrile is not a flight risk.
o Other circumstances negating Enriles disposition to become a fugitive from
justice are also present.
o The following illustrative cases decided by the Supreme Court show that at this
stage of the proceeding, Enrile is entitled to bail a matter of right.51
The prayer in his Petition reads:
WHEREFORE, petitioner Enrile respectfully prays that the Honorable Court:
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a. ACT En Banc on the Petition for Certiorari;

b. EXPEDITE the certiorari proceedings;
c. SET the Petition for Certiorari for oral arguments; and
d. after due proceedings, ANNUL, REVERSE, and SET ASIDE the Sandiganbayans
Resolution dated July 14, 2014, and the Resolution dated August 8, 2014, and forthwith
GRANT BAIL in favor of Enrile.
Petitioner Enrile prays for such other and further relief as may be just and equitable.52
IV

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This case entailed long, arduous, and spirited discussion among the justices of this court in and
out of formal deliberations. As provided by our rules and tradition, the discussion was triggered
by the submission of the member in charge of a draft early this year. The draft mainly adopted
the legal arguments of the Petition which was centered on this court taking judicial notice of
evidence to establish two generic mitigating circumstances that would lower the penalty to be
imposed even before trial or a hearing for the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is
strong happened before the Sandiganbayan. Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe and this
member submitted their reflections on this issue. Refutations and arguments were vigorously
exchanged in writing.
Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe and this member adopted the common position that there
was no grave abuse of discretion and, therefore, the Petition should be dismissed. At most, the
Motion to Fix Bail could be treated by the Sandiganbayan as a petition or application for bail as
in all cases where the statutorily imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, death, or life
imprisonment. Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe and this member differed only in the
treatment of mitigating circumstances and the interpretation of Bravo, Jr., etc. v. Hon. Borja, et
al.53
When this case was called again for deliberation during the En Banc session on August 11, 2015,
the member in charge (now the ponente) proposed the idea of dropping all discussion on the
legal points pertaining to whether bail was a matter of right and focusing the grant of bail on
humanitarian grounds. The member in charge committed to circulate a draft for the

consideration of all justices. This member expressed that he was open to listen to all arguments.
The revised draft that centered on granting bail on the basis of the medical condition of petitioner
was circulated on August 14, 2015. After considered reflection, this member responded with a
letter addressed to all the justices, which stated:
In my view, there are several new issues occasioned by the revisions in the proposed ponencia
that need to be threshed out thoroughly so that the Sandiganbayan can be guided if and when an
accused charged with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua should be released on bail for
humanitarian reasons.
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Among these are as follows:

First: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it applied the text of the Constitution, the rules of court, and the present canonical
interpretations of these legal texts?
Second: Are we taking judicial notice of the truth of the contents of the certification of a certain
Dr. Gonzalez? Or are we suspending our rules on evidence, that is, doing away with cross
examination and not appreciating rebutting evidence that may be or have been presented by the
prosecution?
Third: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in appreciating the facts relating
to the medical condition of the accused? Or, are we substituting our judgment for theirs?
Fourth: What happens to the standing order of the Sandiganbayan which authorizes the accused
to be brought to any hospital immediately if he exhibits symptoms which cannot be treated by
the PNP hospital subject only to reportorial requirements to the court? Are we also declaring that
the Sandiganbayans decisions in relation to their supervision of the detention of the accused
were tainted with grave abuse of discretion?
Fifth: What, if any, is the legal basis for humanitarian releases on bail? Or, if we are able to
hurdle the factual issues and find that there is actually a medical necessity, should his detention
rather be modified? Do we have clear judicial precedents for hospital or house arrests for
everyone?
Sixth: Without conceding, if the accused is released on bail so that his medical condition can be
attended to, should he be returned to detention when he becomes well? If he reports for work,
does this not nullify the very basis of the ponencia?
Seventh: What is the basis for P500,000.00 as bail? We have established rules on what to
consider when setting the amount of bail. In relation to the accused and his circumstances, what
is our basis for setting this amount? What evidence have we considered? Should this Court rather
than the Sandiganbayan exercise this discretion?
Eighth: What are our specific bases for saying that the medical condition of the accused entitles
him to treatment different from all those who are now under detention and undergoing trial for

plunder? Is it simply his advanced age? What qualifies for advanced age? Is it the medical
conditions that come with advanced age? Would this apply to all those who have similar
conditions and are also undergoing trial for plunder? Is he suffering from a unique debilitating
disease which cannot be accommodated by the best care provided by our detention facilities or
hospital or house arrest? Are there sufficient evidence and rules to support our conclusion?
Ninth: Are there more specific and binding international law provisions, other than the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which specifically compel the release of an accused in his
condition? Or, are we now reading the general tenor of the declaration of human rights to apply
specifically to the condition of this accused? What entitles the accused in this case to a liberal
application of very general statements on human rights?54
The points in my letter were raised during the deliberations of August 18, 2015. The member in
charge, however, did not agree to wait for a more extensive written reflection on the points
raised. Insisting on a vote, he thus declared that he was abandoning the August 14, 2015
circulated draft centering on release on bail on humanitarian grounds for his earlier version
premised on the idea that bail was a matter of right based on judicial notice and the judicial
declaration of the existence of two mitigating circumstances.
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This was the version voted upon at about 11:00 a.m. of August 18, 2015. The only amendment to
the majority opinion accepted by the member in charge was the increase of the proposed amount
of bail to P1,000,000.00.
The vote was 8 to 4 with Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, who was the member in charge,
emerging as the ponente. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, Senior Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe, and this member dissented.
During the oral arguments on the Torre de Manila case or at about 3:00 p.m., the ponente passed
around a final copy of the majority opinion which was not the version voted upon during the
mornings deliberation. Rather, the copy offered for signature was substantially the August 14,
2015 circulated version granting bail on humanitarian grounds.
The current ponencia now does away with petitioners entire argument, stating that:
Yet, we do not now determine the question of whether or not Enriles averment on the presence
of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged against
him being punishable with reclusion perpetua, simply because the determination, being primarily
factual in context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.55 (Citation omitted)
Ordinarily, the drafts of the dissents would have been available to all members of the court at the
time that the case was voted upon. But because the final version for signing was not the version
voted upon, this member had to substantially revise his dissent. Since the issue of mitigating
circumstances and bail as a matter of right was no longer the basis of the ponencia, Associate
Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe decided to graciously offer her points for the drafting of a single
Dissenting Opinion and to abandon her filing of a Separate Opinion and joining this member.
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The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allows one week for the submission of a dissenting
opinion. Thus, in Rule 13, section 7 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC:
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SEC. 7. Dissenting, separate or concurring opinion. - A Member who disagrees with the
majority opinion, its conclusions, and the disposition of the case may submit to the Chief Justice
or Division Chairperson a dissenting opinion, setting forth the reason or reasons for such dissent.
A Member who agrees with the result of the case, but based on different reason or reasons may
submit a separate opinion; a concurrence in the result should state the reason for the qualified
concurrence. A Member who agrees with the main opinion, but opts to express other reasons for
concurrence may submit a concurring opinion. The dissenting, separate, or concurring opinion
must be submitted within one week from the date the writer of the majority opinion presents the
decision for the signature of the Members. (Emphasis supplied)
But this member endeavored to complete his draft incorporating the ideas and suggestions of
other dissenting justices within two days from the circulation of the majority opinion.
In the meantime, media, through various means, got wind of the vote and started to speculate on
the contents of the majority opinion. This may have created expectations on the part of
petitioners friends, family, and counsel. The Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, while
admitting that the Decision had as yet not been promulgated and served, made announcements as
to their readiness to receive the cash bond and process the release of the accused even if August
19, 2015 happened to be a holiday in Quezon City, which was the seat of their court.
This is the context of the apparent delay in the announcements regarding the vote and the date of
promulgation of this judgment.
V
Despite brushing aside all of petitioners arguments, the majority, instead of denying the Petition
for Certiorari, grants it on some other ground that was not even argued nor prayed for by
petitioner.
In essence, the majority now insists on granting bail merely on the basis of the certification in a
Manifestation and Compliance dated August 14, 2014 by Dr. Jose C. Gonzales (Dr. Gonzales)
stating that petitioner is suffering from numerous debilitating conditions.56 This certification was
submitted as an annex to a Manifestation57 before this court regarding the remoteness of the
possibility of flight of the accused not for the purposes of asking for bail due to such ailments.
Nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow the grant of bail based on judicial notice of a
doctors certification. In doing so, we effectively suspend our rules on evidence by doing away
with cross-examination and authentication of Dr. Gonzales findings on petitioners health in a
hearing whose main purpose is to determine whether no kind of alternative detention is possible.
Under Section 2 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence:
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of matters which
are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known
to judges because of their judicial functions.
In State Prosecutors v. Muro:58
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must
be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not
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doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public
records and facts of general notoriety.59
Petitioners medical ailments are not matters that are of public knowledge or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration. His illness is not a matter of general notoriety.
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Assuming that the medical ailments of petitioner are relevant issues for bail, the prosecution is
now deprived of a fair opportunity to present any evidence that may rebut the findings of Dr.
Gonzales or any other medical documents presented by petitioner in this Court. Due process
requires that we remand this matter for a bail hearing to verify Dr. Gonzales findings and to
ensure that that is still the condition that prevails at present.
That we make factual determinations ourselves to grant provisional liberty to one who is
obviously politically privileged without the benefit of the presentation of evidence by both the
prosecution and the accused, without the prosecution being granted the opportunity to crossexamine the evidence, and without consideration of any rebutting evidence that may have been
presented should a hearing be held, casts serious doubt on our neutrality and objectivity.
The better part of prudence is that we follow strictly our well-entrenched, long-standing, and
canonical procedures for bail. Doctrinally, the matter to determine is whether the evidence of
guilt is strong. This is to be examined when a hearing is granted as a mandatory manner after a
petition for bail is filed by the accused. The medical condition of the accused, if any, should be
pleaded and heard.
VI
Assuming without conceding that petitioner suffers from illnesses that require immediate
medical attention, this court has not established clear guidelines for such releases. The closest
that the majority opinion reaches for a standard is:
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly
shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite
imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration
during trial.60 (Emphasis in the original)
To see the logical fallacy of the argument we break it down to its premises:
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Premise: There are those whose continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to their
health OR whose lives are endangered due to incarceration.
Premise: Petitioner is suffering from some ailments.
Therefore: Petitioner should be released.
There are various ways to see the fallacy of the argument.
It is true that it is the duty of courts to ensure that detention prisoners are humanely treated.

Under A.M. No. 07-3-02-SC,61 judges of lower courts are mandated to conduct monthly jail
visitations in order to [e]nsure the promotion and protection of the dignity and well being62 of
detention prisoners. Detention prisoners may also be released to a medical facility on
humanitarian grounds if their continuous confinement during the pendency of their case would
be injurious to their health or endanger their life.63
In many instances, alternative detentionwhether temporary or permanentis granted upon a
clear showing before the trial court or the Sandiganbayan that the physical condition of the
accused, as proven through evidence presented in open court, is absolutely requiring medical
attention that could not be accommodated within the current custodial arrangements. Care
should, however, be taken that such alternative custodial arrangements do not take place more
than the time necessary to address the medical condition of the accused. Likewise, the
Sandiganbayan should ensure that alternative custodial arrangements are not borne by the state
and, therefore, should be sensitive to the possibility that these alternatives are not seen as a
privilege given to the wealthy or powerful detainees.
On July 9, 201464 and July 15, 2014,65 the Sandiganbayan already issued Resolutions allowing
accused to remain at the Philippine National Police General Hospital and continue medical
examinations until further orders from the court, subject to reportorial requirements and at
accuseds personal expense. In particular, the Resolution dated July 9, 2014 states:
Pending receipt of [Dr. Jose C. Gonzaless report], the Court will hold in abeyance action on
accused Enriles motion for detention at the PNP General Hospital. However, he is allowed to
remain thereat until further orders from this Court. The Director or Administrator of PNP
General Hospital is GRANTED AUTHORITY to allow accused Enrile to access another medical
facility outside Camp Crame only (1) in case of emergency or necessity, and (2) the medical
procedure required to be administered on accused Enrile is not available at, or cannot be
provided for by the physicians of, the PNP General Hospital, ALL AT THE PERSONAL
EXPENSE OF ACCUSED ENRILE. After completion of the medical treatment or procedure
outside Camp Crame, accused Enrile shall be returned forthwith to the PNP General Hospital.
The said director or administrator is DIRECTED to submit a report to the Court on such
visit/s of accused Enrile to another medical facility on the day following the said visit/s.66
(Emphasis in the original)
The Resolution dated July 15, 2014 states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, and/or any his duly authorized
representative/s from the Philippine General Hospital, is DIRECTED to continue with the
medical examination of accused Juan Ponce Enrile and to submit a report and recommendation
to the Court within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof. The necessary medical examination/s
and/or procedure/s as determined the said doctor/s shall be undertaken at PGH or any
government hospital, which the medical team may deem to have the appropriate, suitable and/or
modern equipment or medical apparatus and competent personnel to undertake the procedure/s,
ALL AT THE PERSONAL EXPENSE OF ACCUSED JUAN PONCE ENRILE. Pending the
completion of the aforesaid medical examination/s and/or procedure/s and submission of the
required report and recommendation, accused Juan Ponce Enrile is allowed to remain at the
Philippine National Police General Hospital subject to conditions earlier imposed by the Court in
its Resolution dated July 9, 2014.
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SO ORDERED.67
These are standing orders of the Sandiganbayan that authorize accused to be brought to any
hospital immediately if he exhibits symptoms that cannot be treated at the Philippine National
Police General Hospital subject only to reportorial requirements to the court. In granting bail to
petitioner, we are, in effect, declaring that the Sandiganbayans decisions in relation to its
supervision of the accuseds detention were tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
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However, these orders were not the subject of this Petition for Certiorari.
To the Sandiganbayan, based upon the facts as presented to it, accused does not seem to be
suffering from a unique debilitating disease whose treatment cannot be provided for by our
detention facilities and temporary hospital arrest in accordance with their order. How the
majority arrived at a conclusion different from the Sandiganbayan has not been thoroughly
explained. Neither did this issue become the subject of intense discussion by the parties
through their pleadings.
It is unclear whether this privilege would apply to all those who have similar conditions and are
also undergoing trial for plunder. It is unclear whether petitioners incarceration aggravates his
medical conditions or if his medical conditions are simply conditions which come with advanced
age.
The majority has not set specific bases for finding that the medical condition of petitioner entitles
him to treatment different from all those who are now under detention and undergoing trial for
plunder. There is no showing as to how grave his conditions are in relation to the facilities that
are made available to him. There is also no showing as to whether any of his medical ailments is
actually aggravating in spite of the best care available. If his health is deteriorating, there is no
showing that it is his detention that is the most significant factor or cause for such deterioration.
Usually, when there is a medical emergency that would make detention in the hospital necessary,
courts do not grant bail. They merely modify the conditions for the accuseds detention. There is
now no clarity as to when special bail based on medical conditions and modified arrest should be
imposed.
Finally, there is no guidance as to whether this special bail based on medical condition is
applicable only to those of advanced age and whether that advanced age is beyond 90 or 91 years
old. There is no guidance as to whether this is applicable only to cases involving plunder. There
is no guidance in the majoritys opinion as to whether this is only applicable to the medical
conditions or stature or titles of petitioner.
The majority has perilously set an unstated if not ambiguous standard for the special grant of bail
on the ground of medical conditions.
Bail is not a matter of right merely for medical reasons. In People v. Fitzgerald:68
Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical care outside the
prison facility. A mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail. It may be that the trend now is for
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courts to permit bail for prisoners who are seriously sick. There may also be an existing
proposition for the selective decarceration of older prisoners based on findings that recidivism
rates decrease as age increases.69
VII
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Neither is there clarity in the majority opinion as to the conditions for this special kind of bail.
Thus, the majority asserts:
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have
his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in
the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but,
more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.70
Before the ink used to write and print the majority opinion and this dissent has dried, friends,
family, and colleagues of petitioner already strongly predict that he would report immediately for
work. This strongly indicates that the majoritys inference as to the existence of very serious
debilitating illnesses may have been too speculative or premature.
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Significantly, there is no guidance to the Sandiganbayan as to whether bail then can be cancelled
motu propio or upon motion. There is no guidance as to whether that motion to cancel bail
should be filed before the Sandiganbayan or before this court.
The crime charged in petitioners case is one where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
The Constitution and our rules require that bail can only be granted after granting the prosecution
the opportunity to prove that evidence of guilt is strong. The special grant of bail, due to medical
conditions, is unique, extraordinary, and exceptional. To allow petitioner to go about his other
duties would be to blatantly flaunt a violation of the provisions of the Constitution and our rules.
In other words, there is no rule on whether the grant of provisional liberty on the basis of
humanitarian considerations extends even after the medical emergency has passed. Again, a case
of a decision especially tailored for petitioner.
VIII
There is no evidentiary basis for the determination of P1,000,000.00 as the amount for bail. The
original proposal of the member in charge was P100,000.00. This was increased to P500,000.00
in its revised proposal circulated on August 14, 2015. Then, upon the request of one member who
voted with the majority, it was then increased to P1,000,000.00.
The rules guide courts on what to consider when setting the amount of bail.71 The majority
opinion is sparse on the evidence it considers for setting this particular amount. Again, the more
prudent course of action would have been for the Sandiganbayan, not this court, to exercise its
discretion in setting the amount of bail.
IX
There are no specific and binding international law provisions that compel this court to release
petitioner given his medical condition. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, relied upon
in the majority opinion, is a general declaration72 to uphold the value and dignity of every

person.73 It does not prohibit the arrest of any accused based on lawful causes nor does it prohibit
the detention of any person accused of crimes. It only implies that any arrest or detention must be
carried out in a dignified and humane manner.
The majority opinion cites Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Hon.
Olalia, Jr.74 as basis for the grant of bail on humanitarian reasons.75 However, Government of
Hong Kong does not apply to this case because the issue was on whether bail could apply to
extradition cases. This court stated that because of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
whose principles are now embodied in the Constitution, bail applies to all instances where an
accused is detained pending trial, including administrative proceedings such as extradition. This
court, however, does not state that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights mandates that bail
must be granted in instances where the accused is of advanced age and frail health.
Petitioners remedies under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that safeguard his
fundamental right to liberty are qualified by the Constitution. Article III, Section 13 of the
Constitution clearly states that bail is available to all persons before conviction except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong[.]
Even Article 29(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the same document used by
the majority opinion, provides that:
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations
as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the
rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and
the general welfare in a democratic society.
In any case, even this court in Government of Hong Kong was wary to grant bail without
evidence presented that the accused was not a flight risk. For this reason, it remanded the case to
the trial court76 instead of applying the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and categorically stating that based on these principles alone, the accused was entitled to bail.
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It is true that the Constitution is replete with provisions on both the respect for human dignity
and the protection of human rights. These rights are applicable to those who, during the dark
days of Martial Law, were illegally detained, tortured, and even involuntarily disappeared. There
is, of course, no reason for these rights and the invocation of human dignity not to be applicable
to Senators of our Republic.
However, the mere invocation of the broadest concept of human rights is not shibboleth. It
should not be cause for us to be nonchalant about the existence of other constitutional and
statutory provisions and the norms in our Rules of Court. The mere invocation of human rights
does not mean that the Rule of Law is suspended. It is not a shortcut to arrive at the conclusion
or result that we want. Rather, human rights are best entrenched with the Rule of Law.
Suspending the applicability of clear legal provisions upon the invocation of human rights
compels this court to do a more conscious and rigorous analysis of how these provisions violate
specific binding human rights norms.
The majority opinion fails in this respect.
Liberty is indeed a cherished value. It is an intrinsic part of our humanity to fight for it and

ensure that it allows all of us to lead the kind of lives that we will consider meaningful. This
applies to petitioner as accused. Yet it also applies with equal force to all the individuals in our
communities and in this society.
Our collective liberty, the kind that ensures our individual and collective meaningful existence, is
put at risk if justice is wanting. Special privileges may be granted only under clear, transparent,
and reasoned circumstances. Otherwise, we accept that there are just some among us who are
elite. Otherwise, we concede that there are those among us who are powerful and networked
enough to enjoy privileges not shared by all.
This dissent rages against such a premise. It is filled with discomfort with the consequences of
the majoritys position. It cannot accept any form of impunity.
X.
Plunder is not the only crime statutorily punished with the imposable penalty of reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. Under the Revised Penal Code, the following crimes, among
others, carry this as maximum penalty:
(1) Parricide;77
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(2) Murder;78
(3) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention;79
(4) Robbery with homicide;80
(5) Robbery with rape;81
(6) Robbery with serious physical injuries;82
(7) Attempted or frustrated robbery with homicide;83
(8) Rape;84
(9) Rape of children under 12 years old;85
(10) Sexual assault;86 and
(11) Incestuous rape.87
Under special laws, the following crimes, among others, carry the maximum penalty of life
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua:
(1) Carnapping with homicide or rape;88
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(2) Sale of illegal drugs regardless of quantity and purity;89

(3) Illegal possession of 10 grams or more of heroin, 10 grams or more of cocaine, 50 grams or

more of shabu, 500 grams or more of marijuana, or 10 grams or more of ecstasy;90

(4) Illegal possession of 10 grams to less than 50 grams of shabu;91
(5) Illegal possession of 5 grams to less than 10 grams of heroin, cocaine, shabu, or ecstasy;92
(6) Child prostitution;93
(7) Child trafficking;94
(8) Forcing a street child or any child to beg or to use begging as a means of living;95
(9) Forcing a street child or any child to be a conduit in drug trafficking or pushing;96
(10) Forcing a street child or any child to commit any illegal activities;97 and
(11) Murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation, and serious physical injuries of a child under
12 years old.98
If we are to take judicial notice of anything, then it should be that there are those accused of
murder, trafficking, sale of dangerous drugs, incestuous rape, rape of minors, multiple counts of
rape, or even serious illegal detention who languish in overcrowded detention facilities all over
our country. We know this because the members of this court encounter them through cases
appealed on a daily basis. Many of them suffer from diseases that they may have contracted
because of the conditions of their jails. But they and their families cannot afford hospitals better
than what government can provide them. After all, they remain in jail because they may not have
the resources to launch a full-scale legal offensive marked with the creativity of well-networked
defense counsel. After all, they may have committed acts driven by the twin evils of greed or lust
on one hand and poverty on the other hand.
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For them, there are no special privileges. The application of the law to them is often brute, banal,
and canonical. Theirs is textbook equal treatment by courts.
Our precedents show that when there are far less powerful, less fortunate, poorer accused, this
court has had no difficulty denying a motion to fix bail or motion to set bail where the crime
charged carries the imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua. With less powerful accused, we
have had no difficulty reading the plain meaning of Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution.
With those who are less fortunate in life, there are no exceptions.
Petitioner in this case is unbelievably more fortunate.
There is a right, just, and legal way to do things for the right, just, and legal result. In my view, it
is not right, just, and legal to grant bail, even for P1,000,000.00, without clearly articulating why
the Sandiganbayans actions were arbitrary, capricious, and whimsical.
In truth, the Sandiganbayan acted in accordance with law and with sufficient compassion. It did
not gravely abuse its discretion. Thus, this Petition should be dismissed.

XI
Those that read a decision which does not fully respond to the legal issues outlined in this dissent
may be tempted to conclude that the decision is the result of obvious political accommodation
rather than a judicious consideration of the facts and the law. This case may benefit one powerful
public official at the cost of weakening our legal institutions. If it is pro hac vice, then it amounts
to selective justice. If it is meant to apply in a blanket manner for all other detainees, then it will
weaken the administration of justice because the judicial standards are not clear.
Without further clarity, our signal to the various divisions of the Sandiganbayan hearing these
complex and politically laden plunder cases can be misinterpreted. Rather than apply the Rule of
Law without fear or favor, the sitting justices will become more sensitive to the demands of those
who have political influence. After all, in their minds, even if they do what is expected of them,
this court may still declare that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion.
The granting of bail is a judicial function circumscribed within the bounds of the Constitution.
Our duty is to ensure the realization of the Rule of Law even in difficult cases. This case does not
really present any kind of legal complexity if we blind ourselves as to who is involved. It is
complex only because it is political.
The grant of provisional liberty to petitioner without any determination of whether the evidence
of guilt is strong violates the clear and unambiguous text of the Constitution. It may be that, as
citizens, we have our own opinions on or predilections for how the balance of fundamental
rights, liberties, and obligations should be. It may be that, as citizens, such opinions are founded
on our wealth of knowledge and experience.
But, as members of this court, our duty is to enforce the exact textual formulation of the
fundamental document written and ratified by the sovereign. This fealty to the text of the
Constitution will provide us with a stable anchor despite the potential political controversies that
swirl over the legal questions that we need to decide. It is also this fealty to the text of the
Constitution that gives this court the legitimacy as the final bastion and the ultimate sentinel of
the Rule of Law.
As the apex of the judiciary, the very sentinels of the Rule of Law, the court from whom all other
courtslike the Sandiganbayanshould find inspiration and courage, we should apply the law
squarely and without fear or favor. We should have collectively carried the burden of doing
justice properly and denied this Petition.
Indeed, mercy and compassion temper justice. However, mercy and compassion should never
replace justice. There is injustice when we, as the court of last resort, conveniently rid ourselves
of the burden of enforcing the Rule of Law by neglecting to do the kind of rigorous, deliberate,
and conscious analysis of the issues raised by the parties. There is injustice when we justify the
result we want with ambiguous and unclear standards.
Compassion as an excuse for injustice not only fails us as justices of this court. It also fails us in
our own humanity.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the Petition. The Motion to Fix Bail should be treated by
the Sandiganbayan as a petition for bail under Rule 114, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
Endnotes:
1

Petition for Certiorari, Annex I.

An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659
(1993).
3

Ponencia, p. 2.

Id.

Id.

Petition for Certiorari, Annex I, pp. 45.

Id. at 5.

Id. at 67.

Petition for Certiorari, Annex J.

10

Petition for Certiorari, Annex K.

11

Petition for Certiorari, Annex H.

12

Id. at 2.

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Id. at 3.

16

Petition for Certiorari, Annex O, p. 5.

17

Petition for Certiorari, Annex A.

18

Id. at 6 and 10.

19

Id. at 6.

20

Petition for Certiorari, Annex L.

21

Id. at 35.

22

Petition for Certiorari, Annex B, p. 14.

23

See Fiscal Gimenez v. Judge Nazareno, 243 Phil. 274, 278 (1988) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].

24

See REV. RULES OF CRIM. PROC., Rule 114, sec. 3.

25

75 Phil. 634 (1945) [Per J. Hilado, En Banc].

26

Id. at 644.

27

Id.

28

Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756, 774 (1946) [Per J. Hilado, En Banc].

29

77 Phil. 55 (1946) [Per C.J. Moran, En Banc].

30

Id. at 58.

31

112 Phil. 781, 782783 (1961) [Per J. Natividad, En Banc].

32

149 Phil. 241, 247 (1971) [Per J. Makalintal, En Banc].

33

336 Phil. 214 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Second Division].

34

Id. at 221227, citing People v. Mayor Sola, et al., 191 Phil. 21 (1981) [Per C.J. Fernando, En
Banc], People v. Hon. San Diego, etc., et al., 135 Phil. 514 (1968) [Per J. Capistrano, En Banc],
People v. Judge Dacudao, 252 Phil. 507 (1989) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Third Division], People v.
Calo, Jr., 264 Phil. 1007 (1990) [Per J. Bidin, En Banc], Libarios v. Dabalos, A.M. No. RTJ-89286, July 11, 1991, 199 SCRA 48 [Per J. Padilla, En Banc], People v. Nano, G.R. No. 94639,
January 13, 1992, 205 SCRA 155 [Per J. Bidin, Third Division], Pico v. Combong, Jr., A.M. No.
RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992, 215 SCRA 421 [Per Curiam, En Banc], De Guia v. Maglalang,
A.M. No. RTJ-89-306, March 1, 1993, 219 SCRA 153 [Per Curiam, En Banc], Borinaga v.
Tamin, A.M. No. RTJ-93-936, September 10, 1993, 226 SCRA 206, 216 [Per J. Regalado, En
Banc], Aurillo, Jr. v. Francisco, A.M. No. RTJ-93-1097, August 12, 1994, 235 SCRA 283 [Per J.
Padilla, En Banc], Estoya v. Abraham-Singson, A.M. No. RTJ-91-758, September 26, 1994, 237
SCRA 1 [Per Curiam, En Banc], Aguirre v. Belmonte, A.M. No. RTJ-93-1052, October 27, 1994,
237 SCRA 778 [Per J. Regalado, En Banc], Lardizabal v. Reyes, A.M No. MTJ-94-897,
December 5, 1994, 238 SCRA 640 [Per J. Padilla, En Banc], Guillermo v. Judge Reyes, Jr., etc.,
310 Phil. 176 (1995) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division], Santos v. Judge Ofilada, 315 Phil. 11
(1995) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc], Sule v. Biteng, 313 Phil. 398 (1995) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En
Banc], and Buzon, Jr. v. Judge Velasco, 323 Phil. 724 (1996) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
35

344 Phil. 415 (1997) [Per J. Romero, En Banc].

36

Id. at 430431.

37

Id., citing Basco v. Judge Rapatalo, 336 Phil. 214, 237 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Second
Division].
38

448 Phil. 45 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

39

Id. at 48.

40

Id. at 4950.

41

Id. at 5657.

42

Id. at 56.

43

389 Phil. 372 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

44

Id. at 375 and 388.

45

486 Phil. 605 (2004) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division].

46

Id. at 611 and 618.

47

674 Phil. 324 (2011) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].

48

Id. at 340341, citing Directo v. Judge Bautista, 400 Phil. 1, 5 (2000) [Per J. Melo, Third
Division] and Marzan-Gelacio v. Judge Flores, 389 Phil. 372, 381 (2000) [Per J. YnaresSantiago, First Division].
49

Petition for Certiorari, Annex A, p. 2.

50

People v. Sandiganbayan, 490 Phil. 105, 116 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division],
citing People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 610, 616 [Per J.
Callejo, Sr., Second Division], Rodson Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141857,
June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 469, 480 [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division], Matugas v. Commission
on Elections, 465 Phil. 299, 313 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc], Tomas Claudio Memorial
College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 467 Phil. 541, 553 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second
Division], and Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 380 Phil.
660, 667 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
51

Petition for Certiorari, pp. 912.

52

Id. at 64.

53

219 Phil. 432 (1985) [Per J. Plana, First Division].

54

J. Leonen, Letter to Colleagues dated August 18, 2015.

55

Ponencia, p. 10.

56

The enumeration of diseases on page 12 of the ponencia is based on the certification of Dr.
Gonzales. There was a hearing but for the purpose of determining whether hospital arrest can
continue. The hearing was not for the purpose of determining whether bail should be granted on
the basis of his medical condition.
57

Rollo, p. 373.

58

A.M. No. RTJ-92-876, September 19, 1994, 236 SCRA 505 [Per Curiam, En Banc].

59

Id. at 521522, citing 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 17, 48, King v. Gallun, et al., 109 U.S. 99,
27 L. ed. 870, and 31 C.J.S., Evidence, Secs. 67, 823.
60

Ponencia, p. 14.

61

Re: Guidelines on the Jail Visitation and Inspection. New guidelines are stated in OCA Circular
No. 107-2013.
62

A.M. No. 07-3-02-SC (2008), sec. 1(3).

63

De la Rama v. Peoples Court, 77 Phil. 461, 465 (1946) [Per J. Feria, En Banc].

64

Petition for Certiorari, Annex O.

65

Petition for Certiorari, Annex P.

66

Petition for Certiorari, Annex O, p. 5.

67

Petition for Certiorari, Annex P, pp. 23.

68

536 Phil. 413 (2006) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, First Division].

69

Id. at 428, citing Release of Accused by Judge Muro in Non-Bailable Offense, 419 Phil. 567,
581 (2001) [Per Curiam, En Banc], People v. Judge Gako, Jr., 401 Phil. 514, 541 (2000) [Per J.
Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division], Ernesto Pineda, THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 193 (2003) which in turn cited De la Rama v. Peoples Court, 77 Phil. 461, 465
(1946) [Per J. Feria, En Banc], Archers case, 6 Gratt 705, Ex parte Smith, 2 Okla. Crim. Rep.
24, 99 Pfc. 893, and Max Rothman, Burton Dunlop, and Pamela Entzel, ELDERS, CRIME AND
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 233234 (2000).
70

Ponencia, p. 15.

71

See REV. RULES OF CRIM. PROC., Rule 114, sec. 9, which states:

SEC. 9. Amount of bail; guidelines. The judge who issued the warrant or granted the
application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited to, the
following factors:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
72

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 454 Phil. 504, 545 (2003) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc], this court
stated: Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding
document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the
generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.
73

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 1 states that [a]ll human beings are born free and
equal in dignity and rights.
74

550 Phil. 63, 72 (2007) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].

75

Ponencia, pp. 1011.

76

See Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Hon. Olalia, Jr., 550 Phil. 63,
77 (2007) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc]. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE,
we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence. If not, the
trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and
thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.

77

REV. PEN. CODE, art. 246.

78

REV. PEN. CODE, art. 248, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993), sec. 6, and Rep. Act
No. 9346 (2006), sec. 1.
79

REV. PEN. CODE, art. 267, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993), sec. 8, and Rep. Act
No. 9346 (2006), sec. 1.
80

REV. PEN. CODE, art. 294(1), as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993), sec. 9.

81

REV. PEN. CODE, art. 294(1), as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993), sec. 9.

82

REV. PEN. CODE, art. 294(2), as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993), sec. 9.

83

REV. PEN. CODE, art. 297.

84

REV. PEN. CODE, art. 266-A, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997), sec. 2.

85

REV. PEN. CODE, art. 266-A(1)(d), as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997), sec. 2.

86

REV. PEN. CODE, art. 266-A(2), as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997), sec. 2.

87

REV. PEN. CODE, art. 266-B(1), as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997), sec. 2.

88

Rep. Act No. 6539 (1972), sec. 14, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993), sec. 20 and Rep.
Act No. 9346 (2006), sec. 1.
89

Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), sec. 5.

90

Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), sec. 11, 1st par. (3)(4)(5)(7)(8).

91

Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), sec. 11, 2nd par. (1).

92

Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), sec. 11, 2nd par. (2).

93

Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 5.

94

Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 7.

95

Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 10(e)(1)

96

Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 10(e)(2).

97

Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 10(e)(3).

98

Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 10.

cralawred

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 170979

February 9, 2011

JUDITH YU, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 105, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Judith Yu to enjoin respondent Judge
Rosa Samson-Tatad of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 105, Quezon City, from taking
further proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105698, entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Judith Yu, et al."1
The Factual Antecedents
The facts of the case, gathered from the parties pleadings, are briefly summarized below.
Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an information for estafa
against the petitioner was filed with the RTC.
In a May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner as charged. It imposed on her a
penalty of three (3) months of imprisonment (arresto mayor), a fine of P3,800,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment, and the payment of an indemnity to the Spouses Casaclang in the same
amount as the fine.2

Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9, 2005, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the
RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that would exculpate her of the
crime for which she was convicted.3
In an October 17, 2005 order, respondent Judge denied the petitioners motion for new trial for
lack of merit.4
On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that
pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,5 she had a "fresh period" of 15 days from
November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, or up to November 18,
2005, within which to file a notice of appeal.6
On November 24, 2005, the respondent Judge ordered the petitioner to submit a copy of Neypes
for his guidance.7
On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed 10
days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases.8
On January 4, 2006, the prosecution filed a motion for execution of the decision.9
On January 20, 2006, the RTC considered the twin motions submitted for resolution.
On January 26, 2006, the petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC
from acting on the prosecutions motions to dismiss the appeal and for the execution of the
decision.10
The Petition
The petitioner argues that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecutions motions when she
filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court,
applying the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes.
The Case for the Respondents
The respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a manifestation in lieu of comment, stating that Neypes applies to criminal actions since the
evident intention of the "fresh period rule" was to set a uniform appeal period provided in the
Rules.11
In view of the OSGs manifestation, we required the Spouses Casaclang to comment on the
petition.12
In their comment, the Spouses Casaclang aver that the petitioner cannot seek refuge in Neypes to
extend the "fresh period rule" to criminal cases because Neypes involved a civil case, and the
pronouncement of "standardization of the appeal periods in the Rules" referred to the

interpretation of the appeal periods in civil cases, i.e., Rules 40, 41, 42 and 45, of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure among others; nowhere in Neypes was the period to appeal in criminal cases,
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, mentioned.13
Issue
The core issue boils down to whether the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes applies to
appeals in criminal cases.
The Courts Ruling
We find merit in the petition.
The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right it is a statutory privilege
and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or as provided by statutes. It may
be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of the law.14 The period to appeal is
specifically governed by Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129),15 as amended,
Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Section 39 of BP 129, as amended, provides:
SEC. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided, however, That in
habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the
judgment appealed from.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice
of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.
Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for
perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served
upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.

In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of the 15-day period within
which to appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a
motion for reconsideration within which to appeal, thus:
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to
amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the
speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals,
particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and
compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or
more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing
a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from
the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
(whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.16
The Court also reiterated its ruling that it is the denial of the motion for reconsideration that
constituted the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.
The raison dtre for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period provided in the
Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted.
Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial
or motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the
balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or
resolution.
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of a "fresh
period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6
of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no
distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP
129 categorically states that "[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the
notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from." Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also
ought not to recognize any distinction.17

Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section
6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean
exactly the same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal
results are concerned the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial
or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new
trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason
exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases
under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely
civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review
from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal
cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. x x x x
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
xxxx
Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme
Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate
jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason exists
why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in
civil and criminal cases under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be treated differently.
Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it applicable only to the
period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation
where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case
a situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the
accused-appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where
property interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We
must emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for being contrary to reason. Over
time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is
not allowed in law Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in lege.18
Thus, we agree with the OSGs view that if a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on
grounds of substantial justice in civil actions, with more reason should the same treatment be
accorded to the accused in seeking the review on appeal of a criminal case where no less than the
liberty of the accused is at stake. The concern and the protection we must extend to matters of
liberty cannot be overstated.1avvphi1

In light of these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal
on November 16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from November 3, 2005, the
date of receipt of notice denying her motion for new trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Judge Rosa
Samson-Tatad is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from further exercising jurisdiction over
the prosecutions motions to dismiss appeal and for execution of the decision. The respondent
Judge is also DIRECTED to give due course to the petitioners appeal in Criminal Case No. Q01-105698, and to elevate the records of the case to the Court of Appeals for review of the
appealed decision on the merits.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
AT T E S T AT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; rollo, pp. 3-23.

Penned by Pairing Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada; id. at 24-40.

Id. at 41-45.

Id. at 53-57.

G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 633.

Rollo, pp. 58-60.

Id. at 63.

Id. at 64-71.

Id. at 85-92.

10

Supra note 1.

11

Id. at 118-129.

12

Per the Courts July 26, 2006 resolution; id. at 131-134.

13

Id. at 150-163.

14

Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation v. Board of Investments, G.R. No. 175787,

February 4, 2009, 578 SCRA 69, 76; de La Cruz v. Ramiscal, G.R. No. 137882, February
4, 2005, 450 SCRA 449, 457.
15

Otherwise Known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980."

16

Supra note 5 at 643-645.

17

BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570,
October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449, 484; Pilar v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
115245, July 11, 1995, 245 SCRA 759, 763; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 101976, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 203, 214-215.
18

Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Commissioner of Customs v. Unimex

Micro-Electronics GMBH, G.R. Nos. 166309-10, March 9, 2007, 518 SCRA 19, 33;
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108926, July 12, 1996, 258 SCRA 712, 723.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 193650

October 8, 2014

GEORGE PIDLIP P. PALILEO and JOSE DE LA CRUZ, Petitioners,

vs.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the July 28, 2009 Amended Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01317-MIN, entitled "Planters Development Bank,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Eddie R. Roxas (in his capacity as the former Pairing Judge), Hon.
Panambulan M Mimbisa (in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 37, General
Santos City), Sheriff Marilyn P. Alano, Sheriff Ramon A. Castillo, George Philip P. Palileo, and
Jose Dela Cruz, Respondents," as well as its August 23, 2010 Resolution3 denying
reconsideration of the assailed amended judgment.
Factual Antecedents
In a June 15, 2006 Decision4 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos
City, Branch 37, in an action for specific performance/sum of money with damages docketed as
Civil Case No. 6474 and entitled "George Philip P. Palileo and Jose Dela Cruz, Plaintiffs, versus,
Planters Development Bank, Engr. Edgardo R. Torcende, Arturo R. delos Reyes, Benjamin N.
Tria, Mao Tividad and Emmanuel Tesalonia, Defendants," it was held thus:
Before this Court is a complaint for specific performance and/or sum of money and damages
with prayer for the issuance of writs of preliminary attachment and preliminary injunction filed
by Plaintiff George Philip Palileo and Jose L. Dela Cruz against Engr. Edgardo R. Torcende,
Planters Development Bank (defendant Bank), Arturo R. Delos Reyes, Benjamin N. Tria, Mao
Tividad, and Emmanuel Tesalonia on 22 December 1998.
After summons together with the verified Complaint and its annexes were duly served upon
defendants, the latter answered. During Pre-Trial conference defendant Bank manifested [its]
intention of settling the case amicably and several attempts to explore the said settlement [were]
made as per records of this case. In the last pre-trial hearing dated 17 November 2000, only

plaintiffs[,] George Philip Palileo and Jose L. Dela Cruz[,] and their counsel appeared, thus, the
latter move [sic] for the presentation of evidence ex-parte, which was granted by the Court with
the reservation of verifying the return card [to determine] whether the order for the pre-trial was
indeed received by defendants. Finally, [at the] 21 November 2001 hearing, x x x defendants
[again] failed to appear and their failure to file pre-trial brief was noted; thus [plaintiffs were]
allowed to present evidence ex-parte before the Clerk of Court.
xxxx
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, defendants are hereby ORDERED to jointly and severally
PAY plaintiffs as follows:
i) Actual Damages;
a) Plaintiff George Philip Palileo[,] the amount of Two Million Six Hundred Five
Thousand Nine [sic] Seventy Two Pesos and Ninety Two Centavos
(P2,605,972.92), with 12% compounded interest [per annum] reckoned from the
filing of this case until full settlement thereof;
b) Plaintiff Jose R. Dela Cruz[,] the amount of One Million Five Hundred Twenty
Nine Thousand Five Hundred Eight Thousand [sic] and Eighty Centavos
(P1,529,508.80), with 12% compounded interest [per annum] reckoned from the
filing of this case until full settlement thereof;
ii) Moral damages in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) each;
iii) Exemplary Damages in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00)
each;
iv) Attorneys Fees in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand [Pesos] (P500,000.00) each
x x x and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Respondent Planters Development Bank (PDB) received a copy of the RTC Decision on July 17,
2006.
On July 31, 2006, PDB filed by private courier service specifically LBC6 an Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial,7 arguing therein that the trial courts Decision
was based on speculation and inadmissible and selfserving pieces of evidence; that it was
declared in default after its counsel failed to attend the pre-trial conference on account of the
distance involved and difficulty in booking a flight to General Santos City; that it had adequate
and sufficient defenses to the petitioners claims; that petitioners claims are only against its
codefendant, Engr. Edgardo R. Torcende [Torcende]; that the award of damages and attorneys
fees had no basis; and that in the interest of justice, it should be given the opportunity to crossexamine the petitioners witnesses, and thereafter present its evidence.

Petitioners copy of the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was likewise
sent on July 31, 2006 by courier service through LBC, but in their address of record Tupi,
South Cotabato there was no LBC service at the time.
On August 2, 2006, PDB filed with the RTC another copy of the Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and for New Trial via registered mail; another copy thereof was simultaneously
sent to petitioners by registered mail as well.
Meanwhile, petitioners moved for the execution of the Decision pending appeal.
In an August 30, 2006 Order,8 the RTC denied the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for
New Trial, while it granted petitioners motion for execution pending appeal, which it treated as a
motion for the execution of a final and executory judgment. The trial court held, as follows:
Anent the first motion, records show that the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New
Trial dated 28 July 2006 was initially filed via an LBC courier on 28 July 2006 and was actually
received by the Court on 31 July 2006, which was followed by filing of the same motion thru
registered mail on 2 August 2006. Said motion was set for hearing by the movant on 18 August
2006 or 16 days after its filing.
The motion fails to impress. Section 5, Rule 159 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as
amended is pertinent thus:
Section 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned,
and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after
the filing of the motion. (Underscoring and italics supplied)
The aforesaid provision requires [that] every motion shall be addressed to all parties concerned,
and shall specify the time and date of the hearing NOT later than ten (10) days after the filing of
the motion. Being a litigated motion, the aforesaid rule should have been complied [with]. Its
noncompliance renders it defective.
[The] Rule is settled that a motion in violation thereof is pro forma and a mere scrap of paper. It
presents no question which the court could decide [upon]. In fact, the court has NO reason to
consider it[;] neither [does] the clerk of court [have] the right to receive the same. Palpably, the
motion is nothing but an empty formality deserving no judicial cognizance. Hence, the motion
deserves a short shrift and peremptory denial for being procedurally defective.
As such, it does not toll the running of the reglementary period thus making the assailed decision
final and executory. This supervening situation renders the Motion for Execution pending appeal
academic but at the same time it operates and could serve [as] well as a motion for execution of
the subject final and executory decision. Corollarily, it now becomes the ministerial duty of this
Court to issue a writ of execution thereon.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial is
hereby DENIED, and the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal (which is treated as a motion for

execution of a final and executory judgment) is also GRANTED as explained above.

Accordingly, let A WRIT OF EXECUTION be issued against herein defendants to enforce the
FINAL and EXECUTORY Decision dated 15 June 2006.
SO ORDERED.10
PDB received a copy of the above August 30, 2006 Order on September 14, 2006.11
On August 31, 2006, a Writ of Execution12 was issued. PDB filed an Urgent Motion to Quash
Writ of Execution,13 arguing that it was prematurely issued as the June 15, 2006 Decision was
not yet final and executory; that its counsel has not received a copy of the writ; and that no entry
of judgment has been made with respect to the trial courts Decision. Later on, it filed a
Supplemental Motion to Quash Writ of Execution,14 claiming that the writ was addressed to its
General Santos branch, which had no authority to accept the writ.
On September 7, 2006, PDB filed a Notice of Appeal.15
In an October 6, 2006 Order,16 the RTC denied the motion to quash the writ of execution.
On October 9, 2006, the RTC issued a second Writ of Execution.17
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On October 11, 2006, PDB filed with the CA an original Petition for Certiorari, which was later
amended,18 assailing 1) the trial courts August 30, 2006 Order which denied the omnibus
motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision and for new trial; 2) its October 6, 2006 Order
which denied the motion to quash the writ of execution; and 3) the August 31, 2006 and October
9, 2006 writs of execution.
On May 31, 2007, the CA issued a Decision19 dismissing PDBs Petition for lack of merit. It
sustained the trial courts pronouncement, that by setting the hearing of the Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and for New Trial on August 18, 2006 or 16 days after its filing on August 2,
2006 PDB violated Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court which categorically requires that
the notice of hearing shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than
10 days after the filing of the motion. Citing this Courts ruling in Bacelonia v. Court of
Appeals,20 the CA declared that the 10-day period prescribed in Section 5 is mandatory, and a
motion that fails to comply therewith is pro forma and presents no question which merits the
attention and consideration of the court.
The appellate court further characterized PDBs actions as indicative of a deliberate attempt to
delay the proceedings, noting that it did not timely move to reconsider the trial courts November
17, 2000 ruling21 allowing petitioners to present their evidence ex parte, nor did it move to be
allowed to present evidence in support of its defense. It was only after the RTC rendered its June
15, 2006 Decision that PDB moved to be allowed to cross-examine petitioners witnesses and to
present its evidence on defense.

The CA likewise held that the RTC did not err in ruling that the omnibus motion for
reconsideration did not toll the running of the prescriptive period, which thus rendered the June
15, 2006 Decision final and executory. It noted as well that PDBs September 7, 2006 notice of
appeal was tardy.
The CA found no irregularity with respect to the writs of execution, which contained the fallo of
the June 15, 2006 Decision of the RTC thus itemizing the amount of the judgment obligation.
Additionally, it held that the fact that the judgment debtors are held solidarily liable does not
require that the writs should be served upon all of the defendants; that it is not true that the
sheriffs failed to make a demand for the satisfaction of judgment upon PDB, as the mere
presentation of the writ to it operated as a demand to pay; and that PDB failed to attach the
Sheriffs Return to its Petition, which thus prevents the appellate court from resolving its claim
that the writs were not validly served.
PDB filed a Motion for Reconsideration,22 arguing that Rule 15, Section 5 of the Rules of Court
should be relaxed in view of the fact that judgment against it was based on a technicality and
not on a trial on the merits; that there was no deliberate intention on its part to delay the
proceedings; that the court acted with partiality in declaring that the Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and for New Trial was pro forma; that its notice of appeal was timely; and that
the writs of execution are null and void.
On July 28, 2009, the CA made a complete turnaround and issued the assailed Amended
Decision, which decreed thus:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. This Courts May 31, 2007
Decision is SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered GRANTING the petition for certiorari. The
trial courts Order dated August 30, 2006 is SET ASIDE and the Writ of Execution issued by the
trial court is QUASHED. The trial court is ORDERED to hear and rule on the merits of
petitioners "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial."
SO ORDERED.23
The CA reversed its original finding that the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New
Trial was pro forma. This time, it held just the opposite, ruling that PDBs "tacit argument" that
the "distances involved in the case at bench call for a relaxation of the application of Section 5,
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court" deserved consideration. It held that Section 5 should be read
together with Section 424 of the same Rule, thus:
When a pleading is filed and served personally, there is no question that the requirements in
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure pose no problem to the party
pleading. Under this mode of service and filing of pleadings, the party pleading is able to ensure
receipt by the other party of his pleading at least three days prior to the date of hearing while at
the same time setting the hearing on a date not later than ten days from the filing of the pleading.
When, as in the case at bench, the address of the trial court as well as that of the opposing
counsel is too distant from the office of the counsel of the party pleading to personally effect the

filing and service of the pleading, the latter counsel faces a real predicament. In a perfect world
with the best postal service possible, it would be problematic enough to ensure that both
requisites are fully met: that opposing counsel receives the pleading at least three days before the
date of hearing and that the date of hearing is no more than ten days after the filing (mailing) of
the pleading. But, as a matter of fact, given the state of the postal service today a matter the
Court takes judicial notice of the party pleading often finds himself [locked] between the horns
of a dilemma.
The case at bench presents the Court with the novel issue of whether the same rigid application
of the cited Sections-and-Rule is warranted when the filing and service of pleadings is by mail.
The Court is of the opinion that when confronted between [sic] the demands of sufficient notice
and due process on the one hand and the requirement that the date of hearing be set no later than
ten days from filing, the stringent application of the Rules is not warranted and a liberal posture
is more in keeping with Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
SECTION 6. Construction. - These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.25
The CA further sustained PDBs argument that since judgment against it was arrived at by mere
default or technicality, it is correspondingly entitled to a relaxation of the Rules, in line with the
principles of substantial justice. It likewise held that PDB counsels act of setting the hearing of
the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial 16 days after its filing was an
excusable lapse; that no scheme to delay the case is evident from PDBs actions; that more
telling is the trial courts "blurring in cavalier fashion" the distinction between Sections 1 and 2
of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,26 as well as its unequal treatment of the parties from its strict
application of Section 5, Rule 15 against respondent, while it bent backward to accommodate
petitioners by converting the latters motion for execution pending appeal into a motion for
execution of a final and executor judgment.
Lastly, the appellate court concluded that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion,
which thus warrants the grant of PDBs Petition for Certiorari.
Petitioners filed their Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,27 which the CA denied through its
assailed August 23, 2010 Resolution. Hence, the instant Petition.
Issues
Petitioners frame the issues involved in this Petition, as follows:
Being assailed herein is the refusal of the Court of Appeals, which is a patent error, for not giving
credence to petitioners-appellants arguments that the respondent-appellees special civil action
for certiorari before it is clearly devoid of merit as (i) the Decision dated June 15, 2006 of the
RTC, Branch 37, General Santos City had become final and executory before the special civil
action for Certiorari was filed before it which should have been dismissed outright, and which
issue of "finality" was never ruled upon, (ii) granting arguendo that a certiorari proceeding could

still be had, the same should be filed under Rule 45 instead of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, (iii) the alleged attendant abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent
judges, even granting arguendo that it exist [sic], were [sic] not grave but on the contrary were
purely errors of judgment and, (iv) the substantial and glaring defects of the petition in the
special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals were consistently and clearly called
to its attention but were unjustifiably ignored by it.28
Petitioners Arguments
In their Petition and Reply,29 petitioners seek to reverse the assailed CA dispositions and to
reinstate the appellate courts original May 31, 2007 Decision, arguing that the trial courts June
15, 2006 Decision became final and executor on account of PDBs failure to timely file its
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial, as it properly filed the same only on
August 2, 2006 or beyond the 15-day period allowed by the Rules of Court.
Petitioners argue that PDBs filing of its Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial
on July 31, 2006 by courier service through LBC was improper, since there was no LBC courier
service in Tupi, South Cotabato at the time; naturally, they did not receive a copy of the omnibus
motion. This is precisely the reason why PDB re-filed its omnibus motion on August 2, 2006
through registered mail, that is, to cure the defective service by courier; but by then, the 15-day
period within which to move for reconsideration or new trial, or to file a notice of appeal, had
already expired, as the last day thereof fell on August 1, 2006 counting from PDBs receipt of
the trial courts Decision on July 17, 2006.
Petitioners add that PDBs notice of appeal which was filed only on September 7, 2006 was
tardy as well; that PDBs resort to an original Petition for Certiorari to assail the trial courts
August 30, 2006 Order denying the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was
improper, for as provided under Section 9, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court,30 an order denying a
motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an appeal from the
judgment or final order; that certiorari was resorted to only to revive PDBs appeal, which was
already lost; and that it was merely a face-saving measure resorted to by PDB to recover from its
glaring blunders, as well as to delay the execution of the RTC Decision. They also assert that
certiorari is not an available remedy, since PDB did not file a motion for reconsideration with
respect to the other assailed orders of the trial court.
Petitioners maintain as well that the CA erred in relaxing the application of the Rules of Court as
to PDB, a banking institution with adequate resources to engage counsel within General Santos
City and not relegate Civil Case No. 6474 to its Manila lawyers who are thus constrained by the
distance involved.
Respondents Arguments
Seeking the denial of the Petition, PDB in its Comment31 maintains that the CA did not err in
declaring that its Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was not pro forma; that
there are justifiable grounds to move for reconsideration and/or new trial; that it had no intention
to delay the proceedings; that it was correct for the appellate court to relax the application of

Section 5, Rule 15; and that the CA is correct in finding that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in misapplying the Rules and in exhibiting partiality.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
The proceedings in the instant case would have been greatly abbreviated if the court a quo and
the CA did not overlook the fact that PDBs Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New
Trial was filed one day too late. The bank received a copy of the trial courts June 15, 2006
Decision on July 17, 2006; thus, it had 15 days or up to August 1, 2006 within which to file a
notice of appeal, motion for reconsideration, or a motion for new trial, pursuant to the Rules of
Court.32 Yet, it filed the omnibus motion for reconsideration and new trial only on August 2,
2006.
Indeed, its filing or service of a copy thereof to petitioners by courier service cannot be
trivialized.1wphi1 Service and filing of pleadings by courier service is a mode not provided in
the Rules.33 This is not to mention that PDB sent a copy of its omnibus motion to an address or
area which was not covered by LBC courier service at the time. Realizing its mistake, PDB refiled and re-sent the omnibus motion by registered mail, which is the proper mode of service
under the circumstances. By then, however, the 15-day period had expired.
PDBs Notice of Appeal, which was filed only on September 7, 2006, was tardy; it had only up
to August 1, 2006 within which to file the same. The trial court therefore acted regularly in
denying PDBs notice of appeal.
Since PDBs Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was filed late and the 15day period within which to appeal expired without PDB filing the requisite notice of appeal, it
follows that its right to appeal has been foreclosed; it may no longer question the trial courts
Decision in any other manner. "Settled is the rule that a party is barred from assailing the
correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him."34 The "presumption that a party who did
not interject an appeal is satisfied with the adjudication made by the lower court"35 applies to it.
There being no appeal taken by PDB from the adverse judgment of the trial court, its Decision
has become final and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. "Finality of a
judgment or order becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no
appeal is perfected, and is conclusive as to the issues actually determined and to every matter
which the parties might have litigated and have x x x decided as incident to or essentially
connected with the subject matter of the litigation, and every matter coming within the legitimate
purview of the original action both in respect to matters of claim and of defense."36 And "[i]n
this jurisdiction, the rule is that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it is the
ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment;"37 "execution
will issue as a matter of right x x x (a) when the judgment has become final and executory; (b)
when the judgment debtor has renounced or waived his right of appeal; [or] (c) when the period
for appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been filed x x x."38

Neither can the Court lend a helping hand to extricate PDB from the effects of its mistake;
indeed, PDB erred more than once during the course of the proceedings. For one, it did not
attempt to set right its failure to appear during pre-trial, which prompted the court to allow
petitioners to present evidence ex parte and obtain a favorable default judgment. Second,
assuming for the sake of argument that it timely filed its Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
and for New Trial, it nonetheless violated the ten-day requirement on the notice of hearing under
Section 5 of Rule 15. Third, even before it could be notified of the trial courts resolution of its
omnibus motion on September 14, 2006 assuming it was timely filed, it filed a notice of appeal
on September 7, 2006 which thus implies that it abandoned its bid for reconsideration and new
trial, and instead opted to have the issues resolved by the CA through the remedy of appeal. If so,
then there is no Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial that the trial court must
rule upon; its August 30, 2006 Order thus became moot and academic and irrelevant. "[W]here
[an action] or issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value."39
Fourth, instead of properly pursuing its appeal to free itself from the unfavorable effects of the
trial courts denial of its notice of appeal, PDB chose with disastrous results to gamble on its
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial by filing an original Petition for
Certiorari to assail the trial courts denial thereof. Time and again, it has been said that certiorari
is not a substitute for a lost appeal, especially if ones own negligence or error in ones choice of
remedy occasioned such loss.40
What remains relevant for this Court to resolve, then, is the issue relative to the trial courts
October 6, 2006 Order which denied the motion to quash the writ of execution and the
August 31, 2006 and October 9, 2006 writs of execution. The Court observes that the October 6,
2006 Order and the August 31, 2006 and October 9, 2006 writs of execution were set aside and
quashed merely as a necessary consequence of the CAs directive in the Amended Decision for
the trial court to hear and rule on the merits of PDBs Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and
for New Trial. Other than this singular reason, the CA would have sustained them, and this is
clear from a reading of both its original May 31, 2007 Decision and its subsequent Amended
Decision. Now, since the Court has herein declared that PDBs omnibus motion may not be
considered for being tardy and for having been superseded by the banks filing of a notice of
appeal, then the CAs original pronouncement regarding the October 6, 2006 Order and the
August 31, 2006 and October 9, 2006 writs of execution should necessarily be reinstated as well.
In light of the above conclusions, the Court finds no need to further discuss the other issues
raised by the parties. They are rendered irrelevant by the above pronouncements.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed July 28, 2009 Amended Decision and
August 23, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01317-MIN are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 37 is
ORDERED to proceed with the execution ofits June 15, 2006 Decision in Civil Case No. 6474.
SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
AT T E S T AT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
* Per Special Order No. 1829 dated October 8, 2014.
1 Rollo, pp. 12-27. Erroneously titled "Petition for Certiorari".
2 Id. at 41-62; penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja and concurred in by
Associate Justices Michael P. Elbinias and Ruben C. Ayson.
3 Id. at 6-9; penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja and concurred in by Associate
Justices Edgardo T. Lloren and Ramon Paul L. Hernando.

4 Id. at 106-112; penned by Judge Eddie R. Rojas.

5 Id. at 112.
6 LBC Express is a domestic corporation that offers cargo and courier services to and
from different parts of the country. http://www.lbcexpress.com/
7 Rollo, pp. 93-99.
8 Id. at 119-120.
9 On Motions.
10 Rollo, pp. 119-120.
11 Id. at 158. PDBs Comment to the instant Petition.
12 CA rollo, pp. 62-63.
13 Id. at 186-189.
14 Id. at 195-198.
15 Id. at 190-191.
16 Rollo, pp. 121-124.
17 CA rollo, pp. 200-201.
18 Rollo, pp. 125-145; Amended Petition (with Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order/ Preliminary Injunction).
19 Id. at 28-40; penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja and concurred in by
Associate Justices Mario V. Lopez and Michael P. Elbinias.
20 445 Phil. 300 (2003).
21 Rollo, p. 36; ruling of the RTC during pre-trial hearing of even date.
22 CA rollo, pp. 337-351.
23 Rollo, p. 61.
24 Sec. 4. Hearing of motion.

Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of
the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof
shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least
three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the
hearing on shorter notice.
25 Rollo, pp. 54-55.
26 Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders.
Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order
that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to
appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may
forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee,
submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final
order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the
adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice
so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.
Sec. 2. Discretionary execution.
(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. On motion of the
prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has
jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the
record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said
court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even
before the expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal
may be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a
special order after due hearing.
(b) Execution of several, separate or partial judgments. A several, separate or
partial judgment may be executed under the same terms and conditions as
execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal.
27 Rollo, pp. 63-80.

28 Id. at 13-14.
29 Id. at 166-177.
30 On New Trial or Reconsideration.
Sec. 9. Remedy against order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration.
An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the
remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final order.
31 Rollo, pp. 155-164.
32 RULE 37. NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION
Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or
reconsideration.
Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial
court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more
of the following causes x x x.
RULE 41. APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
Sec. 2. Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal.- The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by
filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. x x x
Sec. 3. Period of ordinary appeal.
The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or
final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant
shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from
notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.
33 Rule 13, on Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and Other Papers; Heirs of
Numeriano Miranda, Sr. v. Miranda, G.R. No. 179638, July 8, 2013, 700 SCRA 746, 755.

34 Heirs of Juan Oclarit v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96644, June 17, 1994, 233 SCRA
239, 249.
35 Spouses Catungal v. Hao, 407 Phil. 309, 325 (2001).
36 Amarante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 49698, May 3, 1994, 232 SCRA 104, 109110.
37 Torres v. National Labor Relations Commission, 386 Phil. 513, 520 (2000).
38 Florendo v. Paramount Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 167976, January 20, 2010,
610 SCRA 377, 384.
39 The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Ombudsman
Desierto, 519 Phil. 15, 29 (2006).
40 Teh v. Tan, G.R. No. 181956, November 22, 2010, 635 SCRA 593, 604.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131724. February 28, 2000]

MILLENIUM INDUSTRIAL COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

JACKSON TAN, respondent. Jjjuris
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
In December 1994, Millenium Industrial Commercial Corporation, petitioner herein,
executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage1[1] over its real property covered by TCT No.
24069 in favor of respondent Jackson Tan. The mortgage was executed to secure
payment of petitioner's indebtedness to respondent in the amount of P2 million, without
monthly interest, but which, at maturity date on June 10, 1995, was payable in the
amount of P4 million.
On November 9, 1995, respondent filed against petitioner a complaint for foreclosure of
mortgage in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Cebu City. On November 21, 1995,
1[1] Annex D; Rollo, p 55.

summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon petitioner through a certain
Lynverd Cinches, described in the sheriff's return, dated November 23, 1995, as "a
Draftsman, a person of sufficient age and (discretion) working therein, he is the highest
ranking officer or Officer-in-Charge of defendant's Corporation, to receive processes of
the Court."2[2]
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that there was no
valid service of summons upon it, as a result of which the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over it. Petitioner invoked Rule 14, 13 of the 1964 Rules of Court and
contended that service on Lynverd Cinches, as alleged in the sheriff's return, was invalid
as he is not one of the authorized persons on whom summons may be served and that,
in fact, he was not even its employee. 3[3]
Petitioner also sought the dismissal of the complaint against it on the ground that it had
satisfied its obligation to respondent when the latter opted to be paid in shares of stock
under the following stipulation in the mortgage contract:
That in the remote possibility of failure on the part of the mortgagor to pay
the mortgage obligation and interest in cash, the MORTGAGEE at his
option may demand that payment be made in the form of shares of stock
of Millenium Industrial Commercial Corporation totaling at least 4,000,000
shares.4[4]
Petitioner further prayed for "other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5[5]
Jurismis

On December 15, 1995, the trial court denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. Its order
stated:
This refers to the Motion to Dismiss, dated December 4, 1995, by
defendant anchored on the following grounds:

2[2] Annex F; Id., p. 60.

3[3] Annex J; Id., p. 130.
4[4] Whether respondent availed of the above option by accepting payment in the
form of Millenium shares is a matter of dispute. Petitioner contends that when Tan
instituted the foreclosure suit, he had already opted to collect payment through the
issuance of P4 million worth of stocks. Respondent, however, denies that he opted
to be paid in shares of the corporation.
5[5] Rollo, p. 133.

1. That the Court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant corporation because summons was served upon a person who
is not known to or an employee of the defendant corporation.
2. That the obligation sought to be collected was already paid and
extinguished.
By interposing the second ground, the defendant has availed of an
affirmative defense on the basis of which the Court has to hear and
receive evidence. For the Court to validly decide the said plea of the
defendant it necessarily had to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. Thus, defendant is considered to have then abandoned its first
ground and is deemed to have voluntarily submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the Court. It is a legal truism that voluntary appearance
cures the defect of the summons, if any. The defendant's filing of the
motion to dismiss by pleading therein the second ground amounts to
voluntary appearance and it indeed cured the defect.
Wherefore, Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied for lack of merit. 6[6]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the trial court in its
order, dated January 16, 1996, for failure of petitioner to raise any new ground.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, assailing the
aforesaid orders of the trial court.
On September 18, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. 7[7] The appellate
court ruled that although petitioner denied Lynverd Cinches' authority to receive
summons for it, its actual receipt of the summons could be inferred from its filing of a
motion to dismiss, hence, the purpose for issuing summons had been substantially
achieved. Moreover, it was held, by including the affirmative defense that it had already
paid its obligation and praying for other reliefs in its Motion to Dismiss, petitioner
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. 8[8] Lexjuris
Hence, this petition for review. Petitioner raises the following issues:
I......WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON A
MERE DRAFTSMAN WHO IS NOT ONE OF THOSE UPON
WHOM SUMMONS MAY BE SERVED IN CASE OF A
6[6] CA Decision, pp. 1-2; Id., pp. 47-48. (Emphasis added)
7[7] In CA-G.R. SP No. 39957, dated Sept. 18, 1997. Per Justice Artemon D. Luna,
concurred in by Justices Hector L. Hofilea and Demetrio G. Demetria.
8[8] CA Decision, pp. 4-5; Id., pp. 50-51.

DEFENDANT CORPORATION AS MENTIONED IN THE

RULES IS VALID.
II......WHETHER OR NOT THE INCLUSION OF ANOTHER
AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF IN A MOTION TO DISMISS
ABANDONS AND WAIVES THE GROUND OF LACK OF
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE
DEFENDANT THEREIN ALSO PLEADED UNDER
PREVAILING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
III......WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A LEGAL GROUND
TO GRANT PETITIONERS MOTION TO DISMISS THE
COMPLAINT BELOW.
First. Petitioner objects to the application of the doctrine of substantial compliance in the
service of summons for two reasons: (1) the enumeration of persons on whom service
of summons on a corporation may be effected in Rule 14 13, is exclusive and
mandatory; and (2) even assuming that substantial compliance is allowed, its alleged
actual receipt of the summons is based on an unfounded speculation because there is
nothing in the records to show that Lynverd Cinches actually turned over the summons
to any of the officers of the corporation. 9[9] Petitioner contends that it was able to file a
motion to dismiss only because of its timely discovery of the foreclosure suit against it
when it checked the records of the case in the trial court.
The contention is meritorious.
Summons is the means by which the defendant in a case is notified of the existence of
an action against him and, thereby, the court is conferred jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant.10[10] If the defendant is corporation, Rule 14, 13 requires that service of
summons be made upon the corporations president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent,
or any of its directors.11[11] The rationale of the rule is that service must be made on a
representative so integrated with the corporation sued as to make it a priori presumable
9[9] Petition, p. 6; Id., pp. 22-25.
10[10] Matanguihan v. Tengco, 95 SCRA 478 (1980); Arcenas v. Court of Appeals, 299
SCRA 733 (1998)

11[11] As amended, Rule 14, 11 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now provides:When the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a
juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.

that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers
received by him.12[12] Esmso
Petitioner contends that the enumeration in Rule 14, 13 is exclusive and that service of
summons upon one who is not enumerated therein is invalid. This is the general rule. 13
[13] However, it is settled that substantial compliance by serving summons on persons
other than those mentioned in the above rule may be justified. In G & G Trading
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,14[14] we ruled that although the service of summons was
made on a person not enumerated in Rule 14, 13, if it appears that the summons and
complaint were in fact received by the corporation, there is substantial compliance with
the rule as its purpose has been attained.
In Porac Trucking, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,15[15] this Court enumerated the requisites for
the application of the doctrine of substantial compliance, to wit: (a) there must be actual
receipt of the summons by the person served, i.e., transferring possession of the copy
of the summons from the Sheriff to the person served; (b) the person served must sign
a receipt or the sheriff's return; and (c) there must be actual receipt of the summons by
the corporation through the person on whom the summons was actually served. 16[16] The
third requisite is the most important for it is through such receipt that the purpose of the
rule on service of summons is attained.
In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites were fulfilled. With
respect to the third, the appellate court held that petitioner's filing of a motion to dismiss
the foreclosure suit is proof that it received the copy of the summons and the complaint.
There is, however, no direct proof of this or that Lynverd Cinches actually turned over
the summons to any of the officers of the corporation. In contrast, in our cases applying
the substantial compliance rule,17[17] there was direct evidence, such as the admission of
the corporation's officers, of receipt of summons by the corporation through the person
upon whom it was actually served. The question is whether it is allowable to merely infer
actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the person on whom summons
was served. We hold that it cannot be allowed. For there to be substantial compliance,
actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the person served must be
12[12] Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Far East Motor Corporation, 81 SCRA 298 (1978). See
also Delta Motor Sales Corp. v. Mancosing, 70 SCRA 598 (1976)
13[13] See E.N. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. v. Imperial Development Corp., G.R. No.
136426, Aug. 6, 1999
14[14] 158 SCRA 466 (1988)
15[15] 183 SCRA 45 (1990)
16[16] Id., pp. 48-49.

shown. Where a corporation only learns of the service of summons and the filing of the
complaint against it through some person or means other than the person actually
served, the service of summons becomes meaningless. This is particularly true in the
present case where there is serious doubt if Lynverd Cinches, the person on whom
service of summons was effected, is in fact an employee of the corporation. Except for
the sheriff's return, there is nothing to show that Lynverd Cinches was really a draftsman
employed by the corporation. Mse sm
Respondent casts doubt on petitioner's claim that it came to know about the summons
and the complaint against it only after it learned that there was a pending foreclosure of
its mortgage. There is nothing improbable about this claim. Petitioner was in default in
the payment of its loan. It had received demand letters from respondent. Thus, it had
reason to believe that a foreclosure suit would be filed against it. The appellate court
was, therefore, in error in giving weight to respondent's claims. Receipt by petitioner of
the summons and complaint cannot be inferred from the fact that it filed a Motion to
Dismiss the case.
Second. We now turn to the issue of jurisdiction by estoppel. Both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals held that by raising the affirmative defense of payment and by praying
for other reliefs in its Motion to Dismiss, petitioner in effect waived its objection to the
trial court's jurisdiction over it. We think this is error.
Our decision in La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals18[18] settled this question.
The rule prior to La Naval was that if a defendant, in a motion to dismiss, alleges
grounds for dismissing the action other than lack of jurisdiction, he would be deemed to
have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. 19[19] This rule no longer holds true.
Noting that the doctrine of estoppel by jurisdiction must be unequivocal and intentional,
we ruled in La Naval:
Jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably raised, i.e., that it is
pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense.
Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a waiver of this defense. The
assertion, however, of affirmative defenses shall not be construed as an
estoppel or as a waiver of such defense.20[20]
17[17] Talsan Enterprises, Inc. v. Baliwag Transit, G.R. No. 126258, July 8, 1999;
Pabon v. NLRC, 296 SCRA 7 (1998); Golden Country Farms, Inc. v. Sanvar
Development Corp., 214 SCRA 295 (1992); Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA
800 (1989); G&G Trading Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra.
18[18] 236 SCRA 78 (1994)
19[19] Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Mendoza, 156 SCRA 44 (1987); De Midgely v. Judge
Ferandos, 64 SCRA 23 (1975); Republic v. Ker & Company, Ltd., 18 SCRA 207 (1966)

Third. Finally, we turn to the effect of petitioner's prayer for "other reliefs" in its Motion to
Dismiss. In De Midgely v. Fernandos,21[21] it was held that, in a motion to dismiss, the
allegation of grounds other than lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
including a prayer "for such other reliefs as" may be deemed "appropriate and proper"
amounted to voluntary appearance. This, however, must be deemed superseded by the
ruling in La Naval that estoppel by jurisdiction must be unequivocal and intentional. It
would be absurd to hold that petitioner unequivocally and intentionally submitted itself to
the jurisdiction of the court by seeking other reliefs to which it might be entitled when the
only relief that it can properly ask from the trial court is the dismissal of the complaint
against it. Ex sm
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the complaint
against petitioner is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-56011 October 31, 1984
ELMER PEREGRINA, ADELAIDA PEREGRINA and CECILIA PEREGRINA,
petitioners,
20[20] 236 SCRA at 91.
21[21] 64 SCRA 23 (1975)

vs.
HON. DOMINGO D. PANIS, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Zambales &
Olongapo City, Branch III, PROCOPIO SANCHEZ and CARMELITA SANCHEZ,
respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:+.wph!1
Respondent Court's assumption of jurisdiction, without prior conciliation proceedings
between the parties in the Lupon Tagapayapa, is questioned in this Petition for certiorari
and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction. We issued a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining respondent Judge from taking further action in the case pending resolution of
the controversy.
The Complaint filed below by the SPOUSES Procopio and Carmelita Sanchez against
PETITIONERS Elmer, Adelaida and Cecilia, all surnamed Peregrina, is a civil action for
damages for alleged disrespect for the dignity, privacy and peace of mind of the
SPOUSES under Article 26 of the Civil Code, and for alleged defamation under Article
33 of the same Code.
Admittedly, the parties are actual residents of the same barangay in Olongapo City. In
fact, they are neighbors. Unquestionably, too, no conciliation proceedings were filed
before the Lupon. It is not surprising then that the Complaint is silent regarding
compliance with the mandatory requirement, nor does it allege that the dispute falls
within the excepted cases. 1
PETITIONERS, as defendants below, moved for the dismissal of the Complaint. Before firing an Opposition, the SPOUSES applied for a Writ
of Preliminary Attachment. Thereafter, the SPOUSES presented their Opposition claiming that, under Section 6(3) of P.D. No. 1508, the
parties may go directly to the Courts if the action is coupled with a provisional remedy such as preliminary attachment.
In resolving the Motion to Dismiss, respondent Judge at first, dismissed the Complaint for failure of the SPOUSES to comply with the precondition for amicable settlement under P.D. No. 1508, stating that the application for a provisional remedy was merely an afterthought. On
motion for reconsideration by the SPOUSES, however, respondent Judge denied PETITIONERS' Motion to Dismiss on the ground that under
Rule 57, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the application for attachment can be made at the commencement of the action or any time
thereafter. PETITIONERS now assail that Order of denial before us.
We uphold PETITIONERS. Section 3 of P.D. No. 1508 specifically provides: t.hqw
Disputes between or among persons actually respectively in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable
settlement before the Lupon of said barangay. ...
It is also mandated by Section 6 of the same law: t.hqw
SECTION 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving
any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided. in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any
other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the
Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated. ...
Thus, Morata vs. Go, 125 SCRA 444 (1,,983), and Vda. de Borromeo vs. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217 (1983) have held that P.D. No. 1508 makes
the conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in Court. Non-compliance with that condition
precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of
2
3
cause of action or prematurity. The condition is analogous to exhaustion of administrative remedies, or the lack

of earnest efforts to compromise suits between family members, 4 lacking which the case can be
dismissed. 5
The parties herein fall squarely within the ambit of P.D. No. 1508. They are actual residents in the same
barangay and their dispute does not fall under any of the excepted cases. 6
It will have to be held, therefore, that respondent Judge erred in reconsidering his previous Order of
dismissal on the ground that the provisional remedy of attachment was seasonably filed. Not only was the
application for that remedy merely an afterthought to circumvent the law, but also, fundamentally, a Writ of
Attachment is not available in a suit for damages where the amount, including moral damages, is
contingent or unliquidated. 7 Prior referral to the Lupon for conciliation proceedings, therefore, was
indubitably called for.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge's Order, dated November 17, 1980, is SET ASIDE, and the Complaint
in Civil Case No. 2946-0 for damages is DISMISSED, without prejudice. The Temporary Restraining
Order heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. No costs.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Footnotest.hqw
1 Sections 2 and 6, P.D. No. 1508.
2 Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 127 SCRA 470 (1984).
3 Gone vs. District Engineer, 66 SCRA 335 (1975).
4 Versoza vs. Versoza, 26 SCRA 78 (1968).
5 Sections (g) & (j), Rule 16, Rules of Court.
6 Section 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. ... However, the parties may go directly to court in the
following cases:
(1) Where the accused is under detention;
(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;
(3) Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property
and support pendente lite; and
(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations.
7 Salas vs. Adil, 90 SCRA 121 (1979).