Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
2d 93
3 ERC 1591, 2 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,087
Carl Eardley, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen. (L. Patrick Gray, III, Asst. Atty.
Gen., C. Nelson Day, U.S. Atty., Glenn J. Mecham, Asst. U.S. Atty.,
Ronald R. Glancz, Atty., Dept. of Justice, and R. Stanley Harsh and
Harold M. Carter, Attys., Dept. of Agriculture, and C. Blaine Fielding,
Atty., Environmental Protection Agency, of counsel, on the brief), for
appellants.
I. Daniel Stewart, Jr., of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, Salt
Lake City, Utah (Donald B. Holbrook, of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook &
McDonough, Salt Lake City, Utah, on the brief), for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, HILL and DOYLE, Circuit Judges.
WILLIAM E. DOYLE, Circuit Judge.
other hand, both before and since the injunction the company continues to
manufacture and market these products and so the administrative process was
not interfering, directly at least, with their business.
3
It started July 10, 1967, when PAX applied for renewal of registration for two
of its products. Next, on July 18, 1969, two years later, the government notified
PAX that Interpretation 25 (Note 2, supra) was to become effective and that this
would result in denial of its application and would also result in denial of
registration for three other PAX products. PAX proceeded to exercise its rights
granted by statute, 7 U.S.C. Sec. 135b(c).
had not yet had an administrative hearing and thus might never have been hurt;
further, if it had been hurt relief could have been sought in court. Moreover, the
merits should be tried on the basis of the expertise prescribed by Congress.
8
The Supreme Court has held that exhaustion is essential, but has not always
required it.5 It certainly is to be gleaned from the decisions, however, that
courts ought not ordinarily to interfere with the administrative process in the
absence of the most compelling reasons, and here there is no assurance from
the proceedings taken and from those to be taken pursuant to the law that PAX
will ultimately fail or that there will be a failure of justice. The Act after all
provides for ultimate and orderly judicial review.6 Furthermore, Sec. 10(c) of
the Administrative Procedure Act establishes a well defined procedure for
judicial scrutiny of administrative proceedings which are not final when taken,
and, as previously noted, the statute in question is careful, deliberate and
protracted so that no product is cancelled unless there has been abundant and
extensive due process. Also, while the administrative remedies are being
pursued no action is taken which affects the product apart from the presence of
the threat. Thus, while PAX initially maintained that the government intended
to force its product off the market before the conclusion of administrative
proceedings, counsel for the government now expressly disavow this intent and
in their brief concede (as they must) that the statute forbids any such action.
10
The case at bar is different from the situation which obtained in Columbia
Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 62 S.Ct. 1194, 86 L.Ed.
1563 (1942), wherein the proposed standards promulgated by the F.C.C. were
held to have had immediate detrimental effect on C.B.S. notwithstanding that
they were not pressed into operation: it was shown that stations affiliated with
the network withdrew in anticipation that the F.C.C. would not renew their
licenses once the standards became effective. It was this extensive and actual
harm that caused the judicial intervention in that case. The Supreme Court in
the C.B.S. case said:
12
A comparison of the conditions present in the C.B.S. case with the case at bar
serves to point up that the problems which necessitated the injunction in the
C.B.S. case are not suffered by PAX. After all, PAX continues to sell its
product and the administrative proceedings have been so slow that proof of
irreparable injury appears inconceivable.
13
The Secretary took more drastic action in Nor-Am Agricultural Products, Inc. v.
Hardin, 435 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. en banc, 1970). There the order of the
Secretary was for suspension of registration of certain fungicides. Suspension
of registration is an emergency procedure, employed by the Secretary when he
determines that continued use of the questioned product (in Nor-Am certain
mercury-containing compounds) would pose an imminent threat to health. After
suspension the producers are entitled to go through the same procedures as are
available to one whose registration is cancelled through the usual process, only
on an "expedited" basis. The injunction was granted and was upheld by a panel
of the 7th Circuit en banc. The en banc court ruled that the emergency
suspension was not final and that the damage suffered by Nor-Am did not
justify the extraordinary remedy granted:
14this preliminary injunction were approved, other litigants could obtain district
If
court threshold review by parroting plaintiffs' claim that the Secretary had acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in suspending their registrations, even though Sections
4(c) and 4(d) specify that review shall only be in the courts of appeals after action by
the advisory committee and then by the Secretary. We should not countenance such
an evasion of the review procedure provided by Congress in this statute. (435 F.2d
at 1161).
15
16
17
18
Members
of an advisory committee shall receive as compensation for their services a
reasonable per diem, which the Secretary shall by rules and regulations prescribe, for
time actually spent in the work of the committee, and shall in addition be reimbursed
for their necessary travelling and subsistence expenses while so serving away from
their places of residence, all of which costs may be assessed against the petitioner,
unless the committee shall recommend in favor of the petitioner . . . . (7 U.S.C. Sec.
135b(c).
19
PAX objects to being required to pay the members' per diem allowances as well
as the other expenses, but it is our feeling that a reading of the statute clearly
authorizes this imposition, an interpretation upheld by the legislative history of
the provision. See U.S.Code Cong. & Adm.News, 88th Cong., 2d Session,
1964, p. 2169.
20
PAX also objects to subpart (3) of the above regulation, which reads:
21 advance deposit shall be made in the amount of $2,500 to cover the costs.
An
Further advance deposits of $2,500 each shall be made upon request of the
Administrator when necessary to prevent arrears in the payment of such costs. Any
deposits in excess of actual expenses will be refunded to the depositor.
22
23
Some of the other provisions of the regulation are not designed to quiet
apprehensions. We cannot, however, see that they are likely to cause immediate
harm; thus, after the administrative process has been completed, if the
determination is adverse to PAX, and a full record has been developed so that
the matter can be thoroughly and carefully reviewed on its merits, these
provisions can more meaningfully be evaluated.
24
The other complaint is that the procedure is so interminable, but it would seem
that it should now be carried out with some degree of celerity and precision. In
sum then we do not find that the challenged regulations are void on their face
with the single exception noted.
25
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed, and the cause is
remanded with instructions to vacate the injunction and to dismiss the action,
whereby the administrative process may proceed with dispatch.
The original action against the company was undertaken while the enforcement
of the FIFRA was entrusted to the Department of Agriculture; such
responsibility has since been transferred to the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency. See Reorg.Plan No. 3 of 1970, s. 2(a) (8)
(i), U.S.Code Cong. & Adm.News, pp. 6322, 6324, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)
See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51, 58 S.Ct. 459,
463, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938): "So to hold would . . . in effect substitute the District
Court for the Board as the tribunal to hear and determine what Congress
declared the Board exclusively should hear and determine in the first instance.
The contention is at war with the long-settled rule of judicial administration
that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until
the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted." (Emphasis added.)
The court went on to note in a footnote that "The rule has been most frequently
applied in equity where relief by injunction was sought." (Id., n. 9).
But see Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535, 74 S.Ct. 745, 98
L.Ed. 933 (1954); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.Ct. 1507,
18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967); Toilet Goods Association v. Gardner, 360 F.2d 677 (2d
Cir. 1966), aff'd, 387 U.S. 158, 87 S.Ct. 1520, 18 L.Ed.2d 697 (1967).